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petivery anatysis § 461 to this replacement of a ‘public administration’ paradigm Mie ‘public-sector management paradigm’, students of the policy Fy nave also been busy revising their frameworks to take more the changing structures and institutional arrangements in jitical systems. As proponents of ‘network’ and ‘sub-sys- policy-making have noted, government is no longer addition Sgccount o E oder Pol / approach or of triangular zelationships and tiers of decision-making: new S praphors aze required to explain the dynamics of policy formulation wer plementation in a more complex ‘post-modem’ society (see | 50). It is against this background of changing ideas and institutional Jprms that the study of the ‘output’ side of policy-making and of policy analysis must be viewed in the 1990s. Implementation (4.3): reviews different approaches to the analysis of how policy is put into action or practice. Delivery systems (4.4): looks at how we can analyse implementation in terms of the mix of instruments, institutions and values which are used in providing public policy: Evaluation (4.5): examines how public policy and the people who deliver it may be appraised, audited, valued and controlled Change and continuity (4.6): considers various approaches to study- ing the way in which policy change takes place. Promise and performance (4.7): focuses on the evaluation of policy impacts and outcomes. Implementation 43.1 Approaches to implementation ‘The implementation problem is assumed to be a series of mundane deci- sions and interactions unworthy of the attention of scholars seeking the heady stuff of politics, Implementation is deceptively simple: it does not appear to involve any great issues. (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 450) A study of implementation is a study of change: how change occurs, possibly how it may be induced. It is also a study of the micro-structure of political life; how organizations outside and inside the political system conduct their affairs and interact with one another; what motivates them to actin the way they do, and what might motivate them to get (enkins, 1978: 203) ie rent Fine of he gant Poligy-making does not come 10 an end once a policy ts set oy e080 ge approved. As Anderson nicely expresses it: ‘Policy is being maga st | eqs to Work OFS is being administered and adminis i red as itis being made’ (Andena:t stage" on, sentation stag waking carried out by othermeay | mee" 2). However traditionally we hr Which reinforces i 1975: 9) implementation ~ (to paraph tended to view se Clausewitz on w sis of at political syste Fee cp damm problem, by demarcating be istration, Admin |" yen eter and ¥2 istration, a “point, takes over when 4979) carry out the policy administered by the bureaucrat. g7ay, Hem et al. and interaction between politi ina way ween policy and a cording to this (Wilsoniaa) vi 'Y Out policy form The inp and service neglected area of process (ee Hangs ya eres. roan and Wide Barett and Fudd +4981); and policy t 4o86ah: and as Pe », administrator ently, been sis and research: a ‘missing link’ in the poliey 1975). viders has, until comparatively n To a great extent, the lack of concem about the probe policy-making” was due to the dominance of the models which structured inquiry. The black vided a powerful framework to anal to assume m of “pos and maps ox model, for example, pr 3 policy qua ‘system’, but tended about the processes which tock place within the system, and within the ‘output and ‘feedback’ activities. Analysts of Policies tended. until the 1970s and 1880s, to bypass the impact of bureaucracy and service-providers on the effectiveness of a policy. policy was judged in terms of the decision-makers rather than by the ‘street-level’ implementation of fine-sounding ideas from national and focal leaders. At the same time, the tradition of Anglo-American pub- lic administration has tended to lay great stress on the different fune | tions of the administrator and the politician. These distinctions, ak | |) 7 thought a necessary part of the liberal-democratic idea of the st: accountability (see Massey, 1993: 200-1), were ‘aloatons of react ratoial aro: Wiliam vétiems and Eimon ‘ge0s and 1970s ot ie field which take: woge, America ar studies drawn from | | 1 | | | sections whicn | | | i i Tha best review of fate and in practice somewhat 4 unrealistic and bore litle relation to the politcal reality in which | bureaucrats were not just neutral servants, but also had ideas, values, T beliefs and interests which they used to shape policy. This distinction a between policy as politics and administration as implementation, which r was fundamental to the Anglo-American notion of public administra- | F on, was perhaps less evident in other continental European politcal C systems, where the civil servant has long been characterized as. having, ' a more dynamic ‘policy’ role (see Aberbach ef al, 1981 | them to act diffe a policy is set out o cy is being made ae ing made’ (andenr, sd out by othermeat traditionally we hay, which reinforces iy ministration. Admin t nt, takes over whens TY oUt policy fora. 2tvice provider is uucrat, The interplay ors and service pro slected area of analy sees (see Hargrove problems of ‘post 2 models and maps « for example, pr system’, but tended °K place within the tivities. Analysts of pass the impact of eness of a policy. A $ rather than by the s from national and sglorAmerican pub the different se distinctions, ak tea of the state and practice somewhat 1 reality in which hhad ideas, values, +. This distinction lementation, which public administea European political terized as having 51) Fan outline of the development of implementation studies oy eacings igs: the work of Selznick on the TVA (1949). saplementation stage ‘discovered! | he analysis of failure: Derthick (1972); Pressman and Wildavsky (1973); Bardach (1977) TRtonal (lop-down) models to identity factors vnich rake for successful implementation ven Meter and Van Horn (1978); Hood (1976): Gunn (1978); Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979). otomup citiques of the top-down model in terms of the importance of other actors and frganizational Interactions: Lipsky (1974), Wetherley and Lipsky (1977); Elmore (1870, 1879); Hjem et al (1978), tybrid theories. Implementation as: evolution (Majone and Wikdavsty. 1878); as teaming {Browne and Wildavsky, 1984); as a policy-action continuum (Lewis and Flynn, 1878, 197% parett and Fudge, 1981); inter-organizational analysis (Hjern, 1982; Hjem and Porter, “g81}; and policy lypes (Ripley and Franklin, 1982); as part ofa policy sub-system (Sabatier, 46862); and as ‘public sector management’ (Hughes, 1994) inthe sections which follow we examine several of these contributions. ‘olections of readings or commissioned chapters on implementation which provide useful raterel are: Williams and Elmore (eds) (1976); Younis (ed.) (1980); Hill (ed.) (1993), Yiliams and Elmore is eseontial to get a feel of the disilusionment with the reforms of the {860s and 1970s out of which Implementation was to grow. Younis is one of the few books in jd which takes a comparative perspective and includes studies of implementation from Euope, America and the developing world. Hill's collection also provides a variety of case studies drawn from European experience. ‘The best review of implementation theory is Sabatier (19862). # 43.2. Top-down rational system approaches ‘This model was the first on the scene. The neglect of the politics of implementation was brought to an end with the publication of a study by Martha Derthick of urban policy New Towns in Town: Why a Feeral Progrant Failed (1972), and ntation by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). Although Derthick’s study was an important breakthrough in the development of a new focus on implementation, it was Pressman and Wildavsky’s book which has had the most impact. Not least of the reasons for this is because it must hold a record for one of the longest subtitles of any book in public policy, including government reports: Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in ms Work Ay 4 ‘aml . istration as tog : vatdation of -vear per ° hypothe ‘cit’. Goals h available, the chain and control thes mance of tasks, hors hoped thatthe ws example to other poli rop-diown system af conto! and ot deliver fhe best to rein inthe Hamabie foe the implementation sionment and ntation ofr ve the pb fo fulfillment, but more 1d Wildavsky ro which the onjunction with Majone -y of implementation e Oakland study’ Lewis, this som btectice 9! whlch cou samme: 1 Cirou Work 41 an, ny, fiom as tld by roe ‘undation of Ring *Horis by Oaklang alifornia to imple nee act that, although were rately any, concerned, any 2-year period 18 “a hypothesis ces. TEX is done Witdavsicy, 197, tion between th em’ (P. x0), Thi ain 50 a5 to py become less ant acies involved in iv’. Goals have ailable, the chan B resources, ani trol the “2 of tasks. inc s hoped that the to other policy * of control and moral is, that >t deliver, Ifthe 2st to rein in the implementation 1 Tead to disille: nentation af po- recrease the prob ses may be made ment, but more and Wildavsky re which thei on with Majone plementation ad study: beLivery anatysis 465 > Majone and Wildavsky (1978): ‘Implementation as evolution * Browne and Wildavsky (1984): ‘Implementation as mutual adaption’ * Browne and Wildavksy (1987): ‘implementation as exploration’ The main theme of these pieces is that implementation has to be understood as a more evolutionary, ‘learning’ process, rather than as the kind of policy-implementation sequence which was originally put forward. In the adjustments to the first edition, the study acknowl edges that implementation is a process which involves implementers im making policy as well as in carrying out, ot puiting into elfect, policy from above. These chapters written with Majone and Browne serve as a bridge between the ‘top-down’ model and later ‘bottom-up’ critiques, The original study, however, set out an essentially ‘top-down’ view of implementation. Effective implementation required, they argued, a good chain of command and a capacity to co-ordinate and control which was sadly lacking in the case of the ODA. This ‘top-down’ notion of a rational system model ~ or ideal type ~ of implementation was later developed in the work of Andrew Dunsire (1978a, 1978b, 1990), Christopher Hood (1976) and Lewis Gunn (1978). These ana- lysts proposed models which asked what would ‘perfect’ impiemen- tation ‘look like’, The idea, of course, has much in common with Weber's construction of the ideal type of bureaucracy. In his book Limits to Administration Christopher Hood (1976) set out five such conditions for perfect implementation: * that ideal implementation is a product of a unitary ‘army‘like or- ganization, with clear lines of authority; + that norms would be enforced and objectives given; © that people would do what they are told and asked: * that there should be perfect communication in and between units of organization; + that there would be no pressure of time. eee eee Lewis A. Gunn, ‘Why is implementation so difficult?’, 1978 'othis seminal article Gunn aeked a very pertinent question. He draws attention to the general Feglect of the issues and sums up what the state of play was with regard to the theory and Fractice of implementation. Gunn then set out ten conditions (or pethaps commandments) which could be said to provide a framework of questions that might be asked about a pro- treme: + Circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling constraints. the hands of man.’ The tor's hands; rything dogenecin mibued with the ides 'o what they bout gettin ventation is 8 people to Control over a sequence of stages in a system and abe nt OF & Programme of control which minimizes ange ind deviation from the goals se by the initial ‘policy and Wildavsky, 1973: xii). Andtew Dunsine ( example; puts forward a ‘rationalist mod hides al} considerations of tors whatsoever’. When liey obj such as the select hypothe 01 ie " which deliberately fact any motivat ion has failed - that's net ~ it may be said to be due to n of the wm wrong ‘machines ts") the ‘programming’ of the bureaucracy was incove ‘perationalization was poor; something went wrong at tho ‘sop floor lever 200F re. sponse to problems, However ‘ion of what goes wrong, Dut Neber} wit we are to arrive at an explana ideal ~ “whe hings go tight ave to under 1d the nature of bureaucracy, the essence of w n structural terms, i ;Pecialisation funtion in both he nnd vertical planes, so that each member has a well defined Funct nee of which, in process terms, is acivanced roubinsation of = formance ... We have to understond the nature oo imeienennuee eel comprising, bas and widespread exercise of a tho Process cath nd secondly of an organising of prograsmming"... The number ci ps gramme, also at each Se 3 actually aan dette, 2, any, inten, on ather genie fy ships are mininaig tives t0 be echisies te detail nd perog various elements» implementatin le: “Bverything 1g degenerates in vith the ideas tha, ey are told, ani omy and about the sinimizes conde olicy hypothesy ire (1990: 15), fe deliberately ex any motivations ailed ~ that is 4 be dure to factors & machinery’ o¢ ¥ Was incomes 1 at the ‘shope ms, However, wrong, Dunsire 1 ideal — ‘when essence of which ‘in both horizon fined fancton tnisation of pes rontation ite Be of a thought ‘omber of pins ' | | peuiveny anaysis 467 at which things could ‘go wrong’ is clearly immense ... the wonder is that things ever ‘go right (Dunsire, 1990: 26) ‘The rational model is essentially a prescriptive theory in the sense which we may find in Taylorism and scientific management, and may he subjected to the same kind of criticisms. Too much emphasis is placed upon the definition of goals by the top, rather than on the role of the workers on the line. It assumes a great deal about goal defini- tion and human interaction and behaviour, or, as in the case of Dunsire it just blatantly excludes any consideration of how real people actu ally behave, all the better to understand the logical relationship be tween input, process and output. However, the distinction between policy’ as input and implementation as the administrative output is specious. As ‘bottom-up’ critics argue, the implementation process involves ‘policy-making’ from those who are involved in putting ‘it’ into effect. Implementation is not a process in which x follows y in a chain of causation, Unlike a sausage factory, the output of public agencies is not so well-defined and quantified ~ or ‘evaluated’ ~ and what actually counts as success and failure is a matter of controversy and conflict 43.3. Critiques of the rational control model Bureaucratic ‘street-level! behaviour The top-down model has been greatly criticized for not taking into account the role of other actors and levels in the implementation process. A major source of this criticism actually pre-dates the top- Gown model. In an article published in 1971 Michael Lipsky argued that students of public policy had to take account of the interaction of bureaucrats with their clients ata ‘street-level’ (Lipsky, 1971). Later, he developed his ideas more fully for a collection of papers on urban policy (Lipsky, 1976). He concluded that: To better understand the interaction between government and citizens at the place’ where govemment meats people, URave atompted to demon- Jib commun fists inte behaviour oF see tevel bureaucrats. have spgeste tt there ae pattems to this interaction hat continuities may EehGiServed which transcend individual Burenicraces, and that certain CEualitons in the work environment of these bureaucracies appear to be SSintvely salient in structuring the bureauicrat-ciizen interaction his Shalyei has been tall persuasive, i suggest that in sigaficant respec Shaeilevel bureaucracies as currently structured may be inherently tnca- Bible of responding favorably fo contemporary demands for improved BAU lore spmpethete sevice to some Cents, Steetievel bureaucrats sttpond to work-related pressures in ways that, however understandable Sr ullantentioned, mey have ineigios effects eiizen impressions of Govesninental responsiveness and equity in performance If indeed, gov- Puptic Poticy Tih opeeonenes ena ties whee IMR ane pope aba see te th ements or his te ae sab selves at least for their concentration on fundamental spent work environment of street-ievel bureaucrats. Hons of i here i frequent cons may haven Following this piece, in 1977 a stady by R, Wetheriey ‘Steet level bureaucrats and institutional imovation: imple’ effective in practice, or convincing in theory. The authoos «ct the implementation of a law in the state of Massachusetts cn hensive Special Law, 1972), which depended on attitudes and practices of teachers, welfare workers ind olhesin te Public sector who had direct contact withthe public (service ng ers). The conditions which the rational model sets out (a ‘G00d chain of command, well-defined objectives, and so on) were in lange pag Place: the law was well defined there was plenty of suppor ample resources; and a communications and monitoring system. Yet hee \was not implemented in the way which policy-makers intended: deed, the changes actually made matters worse as the workiocd Schools and staf increased dramatically. The services were mained | by ‘coping strategies’ employed by the dedicated and committal poy ple involved at the ‘street level’ (see Hudson, 1989, for a review ag interesting application of the Lipsky model to public policy and te disabled). The implication ofthis study was that control over people was not the way forward to effective implementation. Instead of e garding human beings as chains in a line of command, policy-makers | should realize that policy is best implemented by what Elmore 9793, 1985) termed a ‘backward mapping’ of problems and policy, which involves defining success in human or behavioural terms rather than as the completion of a ‘hypothesis’. Forward-mapping ~ or the top- down approach — Eimore regards as little more than a myth which was ‘increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of accumulating evidence on the nature of the implementation process’ (Elmore, 1985: 20), Elmore suggested that we should begin 2d Mn with a concrete statement of the behaviour that cents the occasion or policy intervention, describe ast of organizational operons tate Expested to alfect that beneviong ee expected effect of thse operations and then describe foreach eval ofthe Repleeatnen ee what eect one would expect that evel have one snes akeebat and what resource are regured for tot Wiest hee (Elmore, 198535) T ® Pp 1 st terion Sore ee ene on AM. Lipsy aplementin del was not «8 examined ts (Compre: coup in the others in the vice-provide ain of ange part in port; ample Yet the law ended: in ‘orkload on maintained mitted peo- review and icy and the over people stead of re icy-makers nore (1973, licy, whieh rather than or the top ayth whi ‘umulating nore, 1985: casion for 8 that can be sct of those fon process behaviour petvery anatysis = 469 What is really important, argue the bottom-uppers, is the relationship of policy-makers to policy deliverers. It is Alice in Wonderland in reverse, lice says: ‘Begin at the beginning and go on to the end.’ The idea of backward mapping is to begin at the phase when the polic reaches its end-point, then analyse and organize policy from the pat- tems of behaviour and conflict which exist. The bottom-up model is one which sees the process as involving negotiation and consensus- building. These involve two contexts or environments: the manage- ment skills and cultures of the organizations involved in implement- ing public policy (schools, hospitals, police forces, welfare agencies, armed forces, government departments), and the political environ- ment in which they have to work Bottom-up models lay great stress on the fact that ‘street-level’ imple- ‘menters have discretion in how they apply policy. Professionals have a key role in ensuring the performance of a policy: teachers, doctors, planners, engineers, social workers, architects, all have opportunities and responsibilities of control and delivery of a service. This means that, as Dunleavy notes, the policy formulation process may be ‘skewed by policy implementation which is dominated by professionals (Dunleavy, 1981, 1982). Teachers, for example, may develop ways of teaching or implementing ‘government policy’ which actually result in outcomes which are quite different to those intended or desired by policy-makers. The same could be said for other professions charged with carrying out law oF policy. Of course, this raises the question of analysis and prescription: street-level implementers may be shaping policy ~ but is it right for teachers or the police to be making up ‘policy’? (See Linder and Peters, 1987.) ‘That this may come about is because implementation involves a nec- essarily high margin of discretion. The analysis of discretion in public policy is a subject addressed by students of social policy (Hill, 1969; Titmus, 1968), administrative law (Wade, 1967; Davis, 1963), law enforcement (Cain, 1973; Lambert, 1967; Wilson, 1970); and organiza- tional sociology (Simon, 1945; Dunsire, 1978; Gouldner, 1954). Poli- ies, regulations, laws and procedures contain an interpretative ele~ ment, As Davis expresses it: ‘A public officer has discretion wherever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction’ (Davis, 1969: 4). Whether the mode of implementation is top-down or bottom-up, those on the front Line of policy delivery have varying bands of discretion over how they choose to exercise the rules which they are employed to apply. On a larger scale, the existence of discretion within interna- tional law and policy-making makes very clear the problems of differ- ‘ences in interpreting and applying general policy to specific cireum- "© From ang gp ves the reo ational limit els which 9 recognize thal onli an ictional and in need ot oF resoletien flict andl bargaining take plage on is effective wun ion. An ef evs will have methouis and systems of can ; ring about compliance (Dunsire, 1978 rane ve have 2 vient ofopgaokzations whichis base ks up te notion of cont structures which o> composed of group duals all seek their power and influence may see such cons ferent strategies for acquiring Jing power. Implemer nterested people ‘playing pis book Tie model was advanced by Bardach in 1977 in implementation Game. Inplen os is a game of ‘bargain noeuveiNg under conditions of uncertainty ing to win as much ch model is essentially ot that polities Union, where my Variation it. hoy From and stays nade and inp ‘he Lipsky modu wolves the eo, ional limitato, cctive implemen, + knowledge ¥ fels which view conflict and bay ‘hat conflict and ver, this conflict aLand in need of £) oF resohstion ining take 5 effective when xction. An effec: systems of con- Dunsine, 19784) >ased less upon osed of groups and influence, acess involving ver, Implemer ‘eople ‘playing his book The ne of ‘bargain of uncertainty’ win as much sstem so as 10 5 that polities ities does not peuivery anacysis 471 stop once a bill becomes law. It does not stop in the political process, nor does it cease in the decision-making process. Models of the kind which Bardach proposes are urging us to redefine the boundaries between politics and bureaucracy, and between the decision-making process and the delivery of those decisions. Implementation is there- fore simply another form of polities which takes place within the domain of unelected power. As we noted above, the rational-control model o! implementation tends to see interests as capable of being united for common goals, and conflict as a manageable source of friction. However, models of implementation which stress power, conilict and interests as the stuf y be inter- of which implementation is made, divide on how it mat preted. The various models of power that we discussed in Past Three (3.3) would see the contlict and power struggles within and around an organization responsible for implementing policy in very different ways (for a review of these, see Morgan, 1986: 362: 43.4 Policy-action frameworks: implementation as an evolutionary process A problem with both the top-down and bottom-up frameworks is that they tend to over-simplify the sheer complexity’ of implementation ‘Two early models which incorporated and developed the insights of both approaches were developed by Lewis and Flynn (1978, 1979) and Barrett and Fudge (1981). Lewis and Flynn, in an examination of urban and regional policy, put forward a behavioural model which views implementation as ‘action’ by individuals which is constrained by the world outside their organizations and the institutional context within which they endeavour to act (figure 4.1). Figure 4.1 Lewis and Elynn’s model Percetion ‘Channels of action The individual j=—e| within an organization The world outside the organization context Source: Adapted from Lewis and Flynn (1978 11) Policy implementers inhabit a world which bears little resemblance to the rational ideal: PusLIG POLICY eet the ar sn greements bout poiy goals and obec {25 avallable and existing problems; and conflc arising hom paca ‘pation, pressure group activity and political dissenst, ids (Cobian Eyam, 1988 3 ‘The interaction with the oulside world, the organization and it in tutional context means that policy objectives are not the sou guides to action, in the cases they examined it wa: found that ve of more often to be actions result from the and poliey es may proce the formulations ots proseduas of ete wih sil enses nftare ant thereRone tne policy oe ae nea hat in feasible in the circumstances rather than the hlblneee ea Original objectives ie) Priorities This theme of analysis in context is also present in the ideas of Bare and Fudge, who argue that implementation may be best understand in terms of a ‘policy-action continuum’ (figure 4.2) “in which an inter active and negotiative process is taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon wham action de ends’ (Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 25), Figure 42 Poliey-action continent Pol > Retormuation Time Action ————» Reaction Source: Barrett and ndge (1981: 25) Power is central to the dynamics of this relationship. Implementation in this policy-action model isan iterative bargaining process between those who are responsible for enacting policy and those who have control of resources. In theit model, ‘more emphasis is placed on issues of power and dependence, interests, motivations and behav- jour’ (Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 29) than in either the top-down or the ote gui rat gar adic Ger ide zat sol 43 le pe be e tives vague sir operon ‘etrten pon and its ins ve source of often 10 be sof prone ‘efor dealing 7 result from Iment of the \s of Barrett understood chan inter: ween those Tine mentation s between who have slaced on vd behav wa or the DELIVERY ANALYSIS. bottom-up frameworks, Furthermore, the policy-action perspective focuses on the factors which affect the scope for action and behaviour of individuals and agencies, as well as how perceptions of that scope are formed. The policy-action model shows that policy is not some- thing that happens at the ‘front end’ of the policy process. Policy is something which ‘evolves’ or ‘unfolds’. The ‘front end’ of policy in this sense produces potentialities and principles which change and adapt in practice. In the words of Majone and Wildavsky (1984: 116): Amplementation will always be evolutionary; it will inevitably refor- mulate as well as carry out policy. The ‘action’ approach emphasizes the extent to which implementation involves more than a chain of command ~ it is a process which re- quires that we understand the way in which individuals and organi- zations perceive ‘reality’ (cf. Vickers in 3.7.5 on this point) and how organizations interact with other more-powerful or less-powerful or- ganizations in order to attain their goals. This is an issue which is addressed in more depth in theories of interorganizational behaviour (sce 4.3.7, 4.63). The policy-action model is also supportive of the idea in garbage-can theory that organizations do not have goals in the rational sense, but define them in the process of attaching problems to solutions (see 3.4.5). 43.5 Implementation in a managerialist framework ‘The line between the prescriptions of implementation theory ~ espe- cially top-down models ~ and managerialist approaches to the prob- lems associated with implementation ‘failure’ (sic) is a very fine one indeed. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979), for example, offer a guide to perplexed managers on how to accomplish policy objectives (see 4.3.8). Many other models of implementation are redolent of the kind of advice and ‘how-to’ approach which is the stuff of management text- books. Managerialist approaches to implementation have come to form the dominant ‘operational’ paradigm in the administration (qua man- agement) of public policy. As the management of the public sector has endeavoured to become more ‘business-like’, 50 techniques which were once thought of as ‘private-sector’ methods have been adopted. We may consider these in terms of thee kinds of approaches: + operational management; » corporate management; > personnel management. esol imple how the stant ems are pro lation of this unceetaints Y 10 another aration. PERT analy of & project. ia a3 most applicabil with many areas of un ferris ferent eae wo the system’ which asa whote involved in he id and services. The systems analyst is inter equence af activitins, -nputs anc niribute c ot failure of project. on in human 4 to ‘hare sys 11 this mociel is therefore a oetiveny awatvsis 475 25 + defining objectives and formulating a plan; © monitoring the plan: + analysing what has happened in ferms of what should have hap- pened according to the plan; + implementing change so as to remedy the failure to realize a goal alsky, Tory | Carter of al. (1984: 96) suggest that a successful implementation sys- | tem invalves four types of control ' + co-ordination over time; | + co-ordination at particular times; » projects nf + detailed logistics and scheduling: MS of ‘ne. » defending and maintaining structural boundaries. reexecution Ff sents which The systems approach lays stress on attaining good levels of co-opera- which aims | tion within a ‘soft system’ by focusing on the importance of ‘team- ssful imple | work’ for successful implementation (Carter etal, 1984: 106-7), ow the star tromone | Corporate management testhat tte | Unlike OR techniques, the ‘corporate management’ approach to im- sare po | plementation is a framework which was developed in the private eertainty business sector and has been adopted by public-sector managers. As © another, | we noted in our discussion of PPBS, corporate management tech- iven acti | niques found theit way into government through the door opened by ERTanaly. | reforms to the budgetary process. The corporate management model sre there is has, therefore, much in common with PPBS, with its emphasis on the project. In analysis of management problems in a strategic fashion proceeding ‘pplicabit- anaging a Figure 43 The corporate management planning cycle with come ingencies Define goals and objectives me bul a ompletion | iano Monitor Stengtis — Forecasts — Opportunities sis This Weaknesses. Threats be ana. ed in the Develop strategies projects an sys. Impioment control ate rerofore ormulate action plan ‘ anning, organia B82, diet inte al §; a Stree Ught of surcn der 2 pian here isthe relations Hon se epi \ organizational st : in tum sh ae) ae haps sPoreach gies tig slture and sie the organization, a ‘ation what his ‘mission anonitoring ofthe imp to management at problems need to be ad roach in ‘new pub- in the environment of the 1980s for money and a 9 many industria Sector, Performance meastirement, for example, is adv ci of financial contrat can be es more effectively (Thompson, 19%: nique whe asam det of implementation & fe those by Pat sok and person. These falas and neroes. Ard song cultures vans. 2200 C20 sean Fal dui tat if + History anc 9 «technology » the environs + the people: ‘Te Plus Progra Asign ofthe way thaught of as act poiiciag of Lone London bobby, a was in the ‘good In reeponce to Metropolitan Pal Olins. was a ds They pects of pote and presentation service mote aif + toteei more: toimprove le toadont organizing, wes and thence ¥ phase in the mores 1e interna emal Opportuniie, ies » then consi idered in the light of swor consider a plan ty © is the relationshiy dits personnel, Fo. tganizational str hich in tum shapes >roach gives a high culture and sie organization, ang at this ‘mission’ i oring of the imple K’ to management ms need to be ad ‘oach in ‘new pubs nent of the 19803 for money and a many industria sin the 1960s and 3 about change in xample, is advo. ‘ial control can be ‘Thompson, 1890; al improvement ‘0ks about publi andy (1976). ad person, These land heroes, And peLiveRY anatysis = 477 lake for strong organizations which co not suit all imes, purposes and indl- ong cultures ™ fhe argues, be good and effective cultures, but thoy can lead to inetfective- sounls. Ea0h can. Foss and fale. cainype of eto as a patton ged ich symbolizes ie cutie values and stuctres |. power Culture: a web in which decisions are the outcome of power and iniluencs, God: Zeus vfho rules by impulse and whim. toe Culture: a Greek temple whose culture Is ene of rationality an function. Bureaucracies fave come to typify these cultures. Goc: Apollo, the god of reason. Tok Culture. a net-ike culture which is concemed with getting tasks done, itis efficent, anc geptive to the demands of consumers, Handy believes it has no patron god. ‘Culture: a cluster culture in which individuals predominate over structure and organi «Person found, save in communes. God: Dionysus, the god of the selt-oslentated zation. Rarely, individual. What influences cultures? + History and ownership: + technology; + goals and objectives: » the environment: + the people. The Plus Programme and the Metropolitan Police sign ofthe way in which management ciscourse is being incorporated within wat were once thought of as activities far removed from business criteria and culture is found in policing. The policing of Landon has been subjected to high levele of criticism in the past decades. The London bobby, an international symbol of London and ‘community policing’. is no longer what it wae in the ‘good old days In cesponge to the changing ‘customer perceptions’ of the police, the Commissioner of the Metropoiitan Police, Sir Peter Imbert, commissioned a study by management consuitants Wolf ins, It was a decision which he later described as a ‘bit of blood:-atting in order to ensure that the patient becomes healthy’ They interviewed over 250 people, examined practices, visited police stations, and surveyed all aspects of police work. What they produced was highly critical of the Met. It questioned their ‘clearness and effectiveness of purpose, organization, management, attitudes, communication and presentation. The report argued that the police force had a job on its hands to make the service more effective. The Met nad five tasks: + to feel more united and be clear about what tis there for + to improve leadership as well as management systems; + to adopt a more positive attitude towards the concept of a sence: Public powrey ‘o improve its communication techniques, both internally and with {o improve its appearance in terms of buildings, uniforms, equip the outside worl ment and associst, development of q 1 predomi 2 Followed up ig gg a re oregon en. It included a ‘nies st such chal The report, A Force for Change, was distributed fo all personnel an egy of implementation, the Plis Programme, to make it happs statement’ designed to encapsulate the aims and purposes of the n 980 strategy statement was to make it clear to both the public service that the Met was daterminod o see the report's 1 cantly this has involved building up from the canteens, Scotland Yard. For a review of changing management Loveday (1993), alice. The Commisionsee sion (consumers) and to the ommendations through, rativer than down from the Plus 't Approaches in the police ser, spe | er omar & fesrments moy als yraitain contol ppienty and far = aatiempt to ‘dove iat one level pert to promote ¢ f Geate more ‘sete! approach takesyg 4 _faese. controls in ter oma ico ee Personnel management The ‘cultural’ aspects of the corporate management te another important aspect of managerialism inthe public sea ha management of people. The quintessential method of corporat mae agement is the setting and the getting of objectives. How people 4 Public organizations and services respond to these objectives whiah they are being asked (told) to implement is of & Two techniques have bi implementation, tives: the greatest importance, een utilized to improve the human side of Performance appraisal and management by objez = human resource * performance-rel: + appraisal schem praising individuals in terms | peer review tance’ as set against the objectives of the or ¢ + imiations on tet he context of the development of the potential of + Peformance apasa method of Of his or heer the inv | Bertie: * Management by obi (20) isa tecwigue n which cen _ | wanend oe fered oom are agreed between manager and managed so as to set clear and Gee demands of weltnd sous (Drakes, 950, The amo MBO oc cme the integration of the goals of the individual and the goals of the frais and profess organization (Drucker, 1964), sector, to forms of <= ensumorsm is th appraisal and 1874; Clegg and D to address the issues associated with changing cultures by changing people. They are a mix of carrots and sticks © (Teuton environment in which administrators/managers and seet | evel implementers can be encouraged to modify or adapt ther be oe viour so as to attain corporate : vidual or professional goals. ‘Hanedbaatia eine As methods of approaching implementation problems, MBO are designed Macro delivery oc 5 opposed to departmental, ind * increasing thet ~ privatization erial approach as creating ‘self-regulating’ systems repr eins delves wich 0 ger papi of aie a lue ecerns wih fiery and oestrone eres sary vara. Aero ho feos rane goa Bier aus mone snow ett erat yo Fae ms iy opuopaon an camel dro marae re conn eee ane omer sa ono” ea ot govern on oer ao meaeurs cane a ereenng the capacty ol govern ne FU be ood "rough. Sign the Pius team ay uments silee serv fain contol (and legitimacy) in corlitons of greater social, econemic and poltcal ee seg Mat and nancial contrait, Decertrazation in this sense may be vowed as essoniay ——_3 erst to ownioad conkol to mere buitsh, sllreguating (Kicked, 1999) delivery eve- Ba eo tevel this has involved the use of new mixes of goverment, sectors an inst veep promote more ‘selregulatingaystome (ough markets), and at another level, to 2a ore soereguatina' poople by applying new management techniques, We may clssity "Poach fakes us ffs cons in forms of ro and macro sei-egulation Dlic sector: tie orporate man Tow people in ‘yisro delivery controls iectives whi fers nhs | ae cove nt ctl dace arcane tr ot eee stimporiance neu uman side of sprvenes ent by objee + human resource management, performance-related pay; ‘appraisal schemes: pear review, + limitations on tenure. uals in terms ves of the or © potential of “hese techniques signat a move away {rom improving the rationality and expertise of bureau- ats and professionals as a way of improving services, an approach which seeks to improve the matnods of controlling the non-policy-making stratum So as to make it more responsive to the demands of taxpayers’ qua customers, This move from rationality of production to the . sovereignty of consumers and control by decision-makers may be read as subjecting bureau- ch objectives set clear and sto facil goals of the | ‘crais and professionals, ‘ong held to be different from workers and managers in the private | east tome of contot which have been familar in the profit sector. Thus the fipside of | Comumetem's te roletanerization, desing and de;rotessionazation’ (808 Braverman, ppraisal and | 1874, Glogg and Dunkerly, 1980) of bureaucrats and professionals. th changing | ind sticks and ‘street Macro delivery controls apt their bef ‘These techniques have sought to change the organizational and wider social and political rental, indi contexts of service provision. We have reviewed these elsewhere (seo 9.10.8, 4.3.5), They inode + increasing the number of providers by measures to increase competition: — privatization; 8 Workin tn, ational environmen ial environment, 60 bias in + Gordon © how hard wi ype inthe argumer iw san this lopment progran ramme the same 3s 9 fs ramen Castes t@ Buta man on the moon hin contol, methe ta hema ation? The trouble witha conettuets the 7 odels of implementation nap to enabie peice wemaking which fails about his an _ “ roblems se varied in their context Is com ae on the moon or developing a eee mwvineing model for policy areas sand acquiring resoures Dificuties a proach, therefore may well be to f e Who are ae etween the type of policy ‘ anti the factors which may itapace oy : 2 Whats th wi's (1964 : fe implementation pr 3 What are butive, regulatory and 4 lathe pro en applied to imple ngmve, Difficulties 0 programme AHtempts f0 analyse implementation, by Van Melt 75), took the view that tke study of implementation 1 Money: ein go fake account of the content or type of policy. Drawing on Porconne see 2.5) Yan Meter and Van enough? petiveay anatysis 481 hat the effectiveness of implementation will vary across policy types wind policy issues. The key factors operating in implementation — henge, control and compliance - suggested to them that where there cies a high degree of consensus and a low or marginal amount of henge required, policy implementation was likely to prove more successful Jive difficulties of succe Ripley and Franklin (1986) suguest that implementation is low where disteibutive polices are concerned, mod- ane in regulative policies and low in redistributive policies. The vark os policy areas have different patterns of relationships, which means sharin the redistributive areas there is more bargaining and politicking than in the distributive areas, where a higher measure of control may tnt Ingram (1878) has related this variation inthe pattem of relation: chip in terms of decision-making costs structure of statute, appropri J variables. “OURS work in the p : inbiraucate hae the same time mat * ng approach, criteria for evaluation and criti Garton Chase, ‘A framework for Implementing human service programme jow hard will it be?", 1979 nine ergumentsof Gunn we see a general model cpertect implementation” Howeyes forthe eran of human senices, wear, ceucation, Pealth (tal sence directed st poople), Fore ts general model bo made more speci to poly types? Gordon Chase provi & rk to examine the obstactes confronting the implementation of human sendoes: ead very methadone maintenance, and prison heath oform. Using these three examples Ns at asthe flowing framework which, he suggests, may be used by implementers a5 4

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