1. PEOPLE V.

PAGUNTALAN
G.R NO. 116272, MARCH. 27, 1995

FACTS:

Tiu was fatally shot by supposedly Noel Paguntalan during a festivity in Ormoc City. The latter ran toward his
employer’s (Sotto) farmhouse to ask for medicine and to take some rest. He was then advised by Sotto,
through Major Manago to surrender before the authorities. The following day he fled. This gave way to the idea
of conspiracy between the three parties due to the knowledge of Sotto and Manago regarding the whereabouts
of Paguntalan and their lack of interest in the matter. It was also discovered that there are real estate issues
between Tiu’s father-in-law and Sotto that might be the reason behind his killing. A witness pinpointed to have
seen the gun used and claimed that it can never be acquired by Paguntalan because he is simply a janitor and
that it belonged to Sotto.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sottto be charged of conspiracy towards the death of killing Tiu.

HELD: In the case at bench, the court entertained serious doubts as to the “fact of agreement”, as same is
drawn from after events and anchored as it is unfounded conjectures. Conclusions based on speculations
cannot serve as basis for conviction. Accused-appellant acquitted

2. KILOSBAYAN V. MORATO
G.R No. 118910 Nov. 16,1995

FACTS:
As a result of the Court’s ruling in the first Kilosbayan case (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110),
PCSO forged a new and allegedly legal agreement with Phil. Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC): the
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA).

Petitioners file this suit seeking to invalidate the ELA for the reason that it is substantially the same as the
Contract of Lease nullified in the first case. Respondents again challenge the petitioners’ locus standi.
Petitioners contend the previous ruling sustaining their standing is now the “law of the case” and therefore the
question of their standing can no longer be reopened.

ISSUE:
May the petitioners’ locus standi be challenged anew notwithstanding the previous ruling sustaining it?

RULING:
Yes. The Doctrine of “law of the case” or stare decisis is not applicable in this case. While this case is a sequel
to the first Kilosbayan case, it is not its continuation. The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a
second time after a ruling by an appellate court, i.e. where both the parties and the case are the same in the
first and in the subsequent. In the case at bar, the parties are the same but the cases are not. The ELA in this
present case is essentially different from the 1993 Contract of Lease in the first case. Moreover, there is no
constitutional question actually involved here and therefore, “standing” is, strictly speaking, not the issue since
that is a concept in constitutional law.² On the contrary, what is raised here actually involves questions of
contract law, more specifically whether petitioners have a legal right which has been violated. The issue, thus,
is not “standing” but whether the petitioners are the “real parties-ininterest”, those who have “present
substantial interest”. But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle
them to bring this suit. We deny them of their right to intervene, but they may still raise their issues in an
appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or the Ombudsman.
¹ Doctrine of “Law of the Case” — whatever is once established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case xxx so long as
the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. It
is the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,
246 SCRA 559, 560)

² It was held in constitutional issues, standing restrictions require partial consideration of the merits
as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary. The question as to “real
party in interest” is whether he is “the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the
“party entitled to the avails of the suit.” In contract law, real parties are those who are parties to the
agreement or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show
the detriment, which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not
intervene in it, or who can claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been illegally excluded
from it.

3. ZABALA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R.No.210760 Jan. 26, 2015

Evidence Principle:
The rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must exclude the possibility that some
other person committed the crime.

Facts: Alas and Zabala were neighbors. Alas would call Zabala to repair his vehicle and allow Zabala to
follow him to his bedroom to get cash whenever spare parts are to be bought. On June 18, 2007, when
he returned from work, he discovered that his money, P68,000, which he kept in an envelope inside his
closet, was missing. During that time, there were 5 persons living in their house: Alas, his parents, his
son, and his aunt. Piñon, testified that on the same day, she and Zabala, her boyfriend, were together
and she saw him climb the fence and enter the house of Alas. When he returned, she noticed that he
had a bulge in his pocket. Zabala bought two Nokia mobile phones, which cost about P8,500. Zabala
testified that on that day he was with his conductor plying the route of his driven jeepney. They did not
drop by the house of Alas. Neither did he meet Piñon, of whom he regarded only as an acquaintance.
Zabala was then charged with theft. The evidence of the prosecution purports to establish the following
narrative: (1) that Alas hides P68,000 in cash in his closet inside their house; (2) that Zabala is aware
that Alas hides money in his bedroom closet; (3) that on the night of the incident, Zabala was with his
then girlfriend, Piñon; (4) that Zabala climbed through the fence of Alas’s house and successfully
gained entrance to his house; (5) that Zabala later went out of the house with a bulge in his pockets;
and (6) that day, Zabala and Piñon went shopping for a cellphone. The trial court held that these series
of circumstances are sufficient to support a conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the circumstancial evidence in the case warrants the conviction of Zabala for
theft.

Ruling: No. It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, and that
direct evidence is not always necessary. Circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence, is that which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue,
which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue." To sustain a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility
that some other person has committed the crime. The prosecution failed to present sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict the petitioner of the offense charged. First, nobody saw Zabala enter
the bedroom of Alas, where the money was hidden. The other occupants of the house did not testify
that they saw or heard something out of the ordinary at the time of the alleged incident. Piñon merely
testified that she saw Zabala scale the fence of Alas’ house and enter it. Second, the evidence is
insufficient to determine without a reasonable doubt that the cash was lost due to felonious taking,
and,more importantly, that it was petitioner who committed the felonious taking. Third, Piñon' s
 testimony fails to establish that Alas' pocket indeed contained the stolen money, as she never actually
saw what was inside the pocket of Zabala. And fourth, the prosecution failed to prove, or even allege,
that it was impossible for some other person to have committed the crime of theft against Alas. The
prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no other
person inside the house of Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of
Alas. Thus, Zabala should be acquitted.

4. PEOPLE V. PENTECOSTES
G.R No. 226158 Nov. 8, 2017

Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of murder in an Information which alleges that
the accused, with treachery, feloniously assault and attack VIVIAN VARGAS Y BRIONES, a 7 year old
minor by submerging (drowning) her in water thus causing her instantaneous death.
Liberato, as sole witness for the defense, denied knowing Vivian or any of the children of Angel. He
confirmed his presence at the drinking spree and claimed that he went home alone at around 3:00 p.m.
He arrived home shortly at around 3:10 p.m.
The RTC and CA found Liberato guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery. Insisting on his
innocence, Liberato makes the claim that the CA erred in convicting him despite the prosecution's
failure to establish a motive for the killing.

Issue: Whether or not Liberato is guilty for the crime of murder.

Ruling: Motive is not an essential element of the crime and the absence thereof does not preclude a
finding of guilt. What is necessary is the element of intent to kill.
Here, it proved that (1) Liberato was present at the residence of the victim; (2) he left the residence of
Vivian after the drinking spree at about 3:00 in the afternoon; (3) Angel sent Vivian to return a chair to
Auring Habal also after the drinking spree and she failed to return home; (4) Antonio and Jason both
saw Liberato carrying Vivian on his back at around 3:30 or 4:30 in the afternoon at the corn plantation;
(5) on the following morning, the lifeless body of Vivian was found in the corn plantation; (6) Antonio
and Jason both testified that Liberato, while carrying Vivian on his back, proceeded to the direction of
the stream and the creek; (7) the cause of death of Vivian is drowning; (8) Liberato fled while being
investigated by the police. Thus, the totality of circumstantial evidence dispels any doubt that Liberato
was responsible for the ghastly death of Vivian.

Ration Decidendi: Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal

prosecutions; a contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible.

Gist: This is an Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Decision
rendered by the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58, which found herein accused-appellant
Liberato C. Pentecostes guilty of the crime of Murder.