Yiagadeesen Samy, Howard Duncan - International Affairs and Canadian Migration Policy

CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
International Affairs
and Canadian
Migration Policy
CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2019
Edited by
Yiagadeesen Samy
Howard Duncan
Canada and International Affairs
Series Editors
David Carment
NPSIA
Carleton University
Ottawa, ON, Canada
Philippe Lagassé
NPSIA
Carleton University
Ottawa, ON, Canada
Meredith Lilly
NPSIA
Carleton University
Ottawa, ON, Canada
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Yiagadeesen Samy · Howard Duncan
Editors
International Affairs
and Canadian
Migration Policy
Editors
Yiagadeesen Samy Howard Duncan
Norman Paterson School of Department of Political Science
International Affairs Carleton University
Carleton University Ottawa, ON, Canada
Ottawa, ON, Canada
ISSN 2523-7187 ISSN 2523-7195 (electronic)

Canada and International Affairs
ISBN 978-3-030-46753-1 ISBN 978-3-030-46754-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8
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Acknowledgments
First published in 1985, and as a product of the Norman Paterson School

of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University, Canada Among
Nations has over more than three decades been the premier annual assess-
ment of Canadian international relations.
This 2021 edition of Canada Among Nations would not have been
possible without the contributions of all the authors—a group of
academics, researchers, emerging scholars and policymakers—whose chap-
ters will no doubt enrich our understanding of various issues related to
Canadian migration policy, and its connections with Canada’s interna-
tional relations. As editors of this volume, we want to thank them for
their contributions.
We also want to thank Bryan Bereziuk, a Ph.D. candidate at NPSIA
for his research assistance in the initial stages of this project. Our thanks
to Marshall Palmer, also a Ph.D. candidate at NPSIA, for his research
assistance—proofreading and commenting on the initial drafts of chap-
ters—and contributions to the introductory chapter of this volume. We
are also extremely grateful to the Dean’s Office at the Faculty of Public
Affairs and NPSIA, both at Carleton University, for their support to the
Canada Among Nations project. Last but not least, our thanks to our
publisher, Palgrave Macmillan, and in particular our editor Katelyn Zingg
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
and her colleague Anca Pusca, for guiding us and helping us to see this
project through.
Howard Duncan
Yiagadeesen Samy
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Yiagadeesen Samy, Howard Duncan, and Marshall Palmer
2 The Political Foundations of Canadian Exceptionalism

in Immigration Policy 13
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos and Zack Taylor
3 Canada and the UN Global Compact on Refugees: A

Case Study of Influence in the Global Refugee Regime 41
James Milner
4 The Coming Clash Over Migration Policy Between

Canada and the United States 65
Christopher Sands and Taylor Jackson
5 Immigrants to Canada: Welcomed Citizens or Security

Threats? 87
Grazia Scoppio and Wendi Winter
6 Canada’s Position in the Global Competition for

Talent 111
Jasmine Gill
vii
viii CONTENTS
7 Weighing the Effects of Immigration on Canadian

Prosperity: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 131
Samuel MacIsaac
8 Sustainable Development and Diaspora Engagement

in Canada 153
Sujata Ramachandran and Jonathan Crush
9 The Road Taken: Temporary Labour Migration in

Canada’s Immigration System 183
Jenna Hennebry
10 Cities of Migration: The Role of Municipal Planning

in Immigrant Settlement and Integration 205
Zhixi Cecilia Zhuang
11 Managing Immigration in the Canadian Federation:

The Case of Quebec 227
Pierre-Loup Beauregard, Alain-G. Gagnon,
and Jean-Denis Garon
12 Conclusion: Will Canada’s Immigration Policy Take

an International Turn? 247
Howard Duncan and Yiagadeesen Samy
Notes on Contributors
Pierre-Loup Beauregard is an economic researcher and M.A. candidate

at the Economics Department at Queen’s University. His research inter-
ests lie within the field of microeconometrics as applied to the economics
of education and of the family. He is particularly interested in the analysis
of public policies related to human capital.
Century Initiative (CI) is a national non-partisan organization with
a mission to enhance Canada’s long-term prosperity through bigger
and bolder thinking, imagination and action. To that end, CI provides
research and education, creates opportunities to engage and share view-
points, and contributes to public policy and solutions design. CI’s current
areas of focus are immigration, urban development, early childhood
support, employment & entrepreneurship and education. CI seeks to
broaden the conversation on Canada’s future, and to work with others
on actionable strategies. Lead Contributor: Jasmine Gill is formerly
the Director of Policy and Programs at Century Initiative. Prior to this,
she was Executive Director of World Literacy Canada, an internationally
focused NGO devoted to advancing opportunities for women and chil-
dren through education.
Jonathan Crush is the University Research Professor at Wilfrid Laurier
University and a member of the faculty at the Balsillie School of Inter-
national Affairs in Waterloo. He was previously a faculty member at
ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Queen’s University, the University of Alberta and the National Univer-

sity of Lesotho. He was an Honorary Professor at the University of Cape
Town from 2008 to 2018 and is now an Extraordinary Professor at the
University of Western Cape. He founded three African and global research
and policy networks with strong diaspora involvement: SAMP (www.
samponline.org), AFSUN (www.afsun.org) and the Hungry Cities Part-
nership (www.hungrycities.net). He has published extensively on issues of
migration, development and diaspora engagement.
Howard Duncan received his Ph.D. in Philosophy in 1981 from the
University of Western Ontario where he studied the history and philos-
ophy of science. In 1997, Howard joined the Metropolis Project at Citi-
zenship and Immigration Canada and was its Executive Head and Chair of
the Metropolis International Steering Committee from 2002 until 2018.
In 2012, he moved the Ottawa Secretariat operations from the Govern-
ment of Canada to Carleton University in Ottawa. He was Editor of
the IOM’s journal, International Migration, from 2015 to 2019 and is
a member of the Advisory Council of the Century Initiative. Howard is a
frequent speaker on the management of migration and integration.
Alain-G. Gagnon is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at
the Université du Québec à Montréal and founding director of the Centre
for Interdisciplinary Research on Diversity and Democracy (CRIDAQ).
He is also Director of the Groupe de recherche sur les sociétés pluri-
nationales (GRSP) and holder of the Canada Research Chair in Quebec
and Canadian Studies (CREQC). A significant portion of his publications
covers subjects related to minority nations in the Western hemisphere. He
is the author of over 500 works in political sociology, political economy,
federal studies and Canadian politics.
Jean-Denis Garon is a Professor in the Department of Economics
at Université du Québec à Montréal. He specializes in public sector
economics, with special emphasis on theoretical normative tax and
behavioural issues, and on fiscal federalism and a research fellow at the
CESIfo Group Munich. Professor Garon is currently a director of the
Fiscal Federalism branch of the Centre d’Analyse Politique Constitution
et Fédéralisme (CAP-CF), a multidisciplinary research centre at UQAM.
He also acts as a member of the Public Policy Committee, an advisory
body of the Association des Économistes Québécois.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi
Jenna Hennebry is an Associate Professor at the Balsillie School of

International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada. Hennebry is
co-founder and past-Director of the International Migration Research
Centre (IMRC), where she is now a Senior Research Associate and Board
Member. She has published extensively on migrant workers rights and
health, labour migration governance and gender-responsive migration
policy and this work has been recognized internationally. Hennebry is a
member of the IOM’s Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate, and she has
been actively engaged in the consultation process for the Global Compact
for Migration in Geneva and New York.
Taylor Jackson is a graduate student at Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies, specializing in International Political
Economy, International Economics and Canadian Studies. He holds a
B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from Simon Fraser University.
Samuel MacIsaac is a Ph.D. candidate at the Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University and recipient of the
SSHRC Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS Doctoral Scholarship and TD
Graduate Fellowship in Migration and Diaspora Studies. His most recent
work has focused on Canadian immigration trends, remittance channel
decision-making, forced migration in conflict zones and the effects of
trade on skill acquisition.
James Milner is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton
University. He is also currently Project Director of LERRN: The Local
Engagement Refugee Research Network, a 7-year, SSHRC-funded part-
nership between researchers and civil society actors primarily in Canada,
Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon and Tanzania. He has been a researcher, practi-
tioner and policy advisor on issues relating to the global refugee regime,
global refugee policy and the politics of asylum in the global South.
He is author of Refugees, the State and the Politics of Asylum in
Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), co-author of UNHCR: The Politics
and Practice of Refugee Protection (Routledge, 2012), and co-editor
of Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Secu-
rity Implications (UN University Press, 2008) and Refugees’ Roles in
Resolving Displacement: Beyond Beneficiaries (Georgetown, 2019).
Marshall Palmer is a Ph.D. candidate at the Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs (NPSIA), at Carleton University. He holds a B.Sc. in
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
International Relations from the London School of Economics and Polit-

ical Science and an M.Phil in International Relations from the University
of Oxford. His research focuses on the strategic logic of foreign elec-
toral intervention. Before joining NPSIA, he worked as a Middle Eastern
regional analyst at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe,
and as a researcher at Oxford Analytica.
Sujata Ramachandran is an affiliated researcher with Wilfrid Laurier
University. A geographer by training, she holds a Ph.D. from Wilfrid
Laurier University and MA degrees from the University of Toronto
and Jawaharlal Nehru University. She previously worked as a Senior
Researcher with the Southern African Migration Program (SAMP) and
has conducted extensive research on xenophobia in South Africa and
India. She has contributed research for the UNDP, Global Commis-
sion for International Migration (GCIM), Migrants in Countries in Crisis
Initiative (MICIC) and the Global Detention Project. She has also worked
as a consultant for the Global Knowledge Partnership for Migration and
Development (KNOMAD) initiative of the World Bank.
Yiagadeesen Samy is a Professor of International Affairs, and the
Director, at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs,
Carleton University. He holds a BA in Economics and Mathematics from
York University, an MA in Economics from the University of Toronto, and
a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Ottawa. He has published
widely on issues related to international economics and economic devel-
opment, including in the Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Third
World Quarterly, International Interactions, and Journal of Conflict Reso-
lution. His most recent book Exiting the Fragility Trap: Rethinking Our
Approach to the World’s Most Fragile States (with David Carment) was
published by Ohio University Press in 2019. His current research areas
include state fragility, aid effectiveness, domestic resource mobilization
and income inequality.
Christopher Sands is Director of the Canada Institute at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Senior Research Professor
at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies where he is director of the Hopkins Center for Canadian
Studies and interim director of the Latin American Studies Program.
Grazia Scoppio is a Professor in the Department of Defence Studies,
Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). In September 2017, she was
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii
appointed Dean of Continuing Studies at RMC, having served as Asso-

ciate Dean since 2013. Between 2002 and 2013, she held various appoint-
ments at the Canadian Defence Academy and the Canadian Forces Lead-
ership Institute. Dr. Scoppio holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) from the
University of Toronto, a Master’s degree from the Université Stendhal
Grenoble 3 (France) and a Ph.D. in Education from the University of
Toronto. She is the author of a book, and has authored or co-authored
multiple journal articles, editorials, book chapters and scientific reports.
Her inter-disciplinarily research areas include diversity and gender in mili-
tary organizations, organizational culture, whole-of-government, military
education, comparative and international education, multiculturalism and
immigration.
Zack Taylor is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director of
the Centre for Urban Policy and Local Governance at the University of
Western Ontario. He is a Fellow at the Institute on Municipal Finance
and Governance in the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
at the University of Toronto. He is the author of Shaping the Metropolis:
Institutions and Urbanization in the United States and Canada (McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2019). His research focuses on the politics of
urbanization and public policies for and in Canadian cities.
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos is an Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of Toronto. He is the author of Becoming
Multicultural: Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada
and Germany (UBC, 2012), editor of Wanted and Welcome? Policies
for Highly Skilled Immigrants in Comparative Perspective (Springer,
2013), and co-editor (with Kristin Good and Luc Turgeon) of Segmented
Cities? How Urban Contexts Shape Ethnic and Nationalist Politics (UBC
Press, 2014). His current research examines how centre-right conserva-
tive parties in Europe and North America are adapting to more culturally
diverse electorates. He is also interested in the extension of public funding
for Islamic religious education in Germany and its relation to debates over
school choice.
Wendi Winter holds a Master of Arts degree in History from Queen’s
University, a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) from Wilfrid Laurier University
and a Bachelor of Education from Nipissing University. Prior to begin-
ning her master’s degree at Queen’s, she worked as an elementary school
teacher for two years. Her research focuses on the history of sexual assault
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
and harassment within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) from the 1990s
to the present. Wendi has studied the failures of leadership within the CAF
to address issues of sexual assault preceding the 1998 “Rape Crisis”. She
has also studied the prevalence of different forms of harassment (hazing
and bullying) within the CAF despite Defence Administrative Orders and
Directives addressing them.
Zhixi Cecilia Zhuang is an Associate Professor at Ryerson University’s
School of Urban and Regional Planning. Before joining Ryerson, she
worked with the Regional Municipality of Peel and practiced in the archi-
tectural and urban design fields in China and Canada. She is a regis-
tered professional planner and a member of the Ontario Professional
Planners Institute and the Canadian Institute of Planners. Her Ph.D. is
from the School of Planning, University of Waterloo and she received
her master’s in Urban Planning and Design and Bachelor of Architec-
ture from South China University of Technology. Her research interests
concerns how immigrant settlement affects urban landscapes, municipal
policies and planning, with a present focus on the rise of ethnic retail
neighbourhoods.
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Cumulative percentage of immigrant and visible minority

populations by riding (2016 Census, 2013 representation
order) 28
Fig. 5.1 Distribution in percentage of the foreign-born population,
by place of birth, Canada, 1871–2011 (Statistics Canada
2016) 100
Fig. 5.2 Average disagreement survey responses to questions
about immigration in Canada (Environics Institute
2010, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019; K. Neuman personal
communication, August 1, 2019) 102
Fig. 6.1 Ratio of working-age population to seniors (65+) (Source
Statistics Canada; Department of Finance Canada) 114
Fig. 6.2 Skill level and occupational mix of recent immigrants
(Source OECD, Statistics Canada) 117
Fig. 6.3 Changes in labour demand and percentage of immigrants
in skills growth areas (Source Century Initiative 2019a) 117
Fig. 6.4 Inventor immigrants, 2001–2010 (Source Ernest
Miguelez and Carsten Fink, “Measuring the international
mobility of inventors: A new database.” World Intellectual
Property Organisation, 2013) 119
Fig. 7.1 Canadian immigration trends, 2000–2018 (Source IRCC
and CIDP. Disaggregated numbers by province are
available through the CIDP website: http://cidpnsi.ca/
migration-flows/) 133
xv
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 7.2 Unemployment rate (%) of individuals 15 years or

older by immigrant status, 2006–2018 (Source Table
14-10-0083-01, Statistics Canada) 139
Fig. 7.3 Wages and salaries by period of immigration, 2016
(Source 2016 Census, Statistics Canada) 140
Fig. 9.1 TFW-entries verses TFW-related policy growth in
Canada (Source Data was compiled for this analysis
from Citizenship and Immigration Canada [2012],
Robert [2005], Makarenko [2010], Hawkins [1972],
the Canada Gazette [2010–2019], LegisInfo [various],
Department of Justice [2013–2019]) 189
Fig. 9.2 History of immigration policy changes in Canada 190
Fig. 10.1 Provincial distribution of immigrants to Canada.
Produced by Ministry of Finance (2017) (Note
Percentage figures are share of Canada. Source Statistics
Canada) 209
Fig. 10.2 Toronto CMA Municipalities with highest shares of
foreign-born population, 2011 and 2016. Produced by
Ministry of Finance (2017) (Source Statistics Canada) 210
Fig. 11.1 Categories of immigrants selected by Québec and French
language proficiency (Source Ministère de l’Immigration,
de la Diversité et l’Inclusion, Rapport annuel de gestion
2015–2016, and 2017–2018) 238
Fig. 11.2 Proportion of PEQ and CEC immigrants over the
economic category (Source Canada, 2012 to 2018
Annual report to Parliament on Immigration. Ministère
de l’immigration, de la Diversité et l’Inclusion, Rapport
Annuel de Gestion 2012 to 2016. Ministère de
l’immigration, de la Diversité et l’Inclusion, Demande
d’accès à l’information #16221) 239
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Percentage of population foreign-born, 1996–2016 16

Table 2.2 Percentage of ridings in selected regions 26
Table 2.3 Concentration of immigrants in federal ridings by
region (%) and representation order 27
Table 2.4 Safe and unsafe seats by region, 2004–2011 (2003
representation order) 31
Table 4.1 United States refugee admission statistics 78
Table 4.2 Canadian refugee admission statistics 78
Table 5.1 1976 Immigration Act and 2001 Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act 97
Table 5.2 Frequency keyword search 106
Table 5.3 Immigration survey data before and after 9/11 106
Table 6.1 Top 5 health care spenders among OECD nations in
2017 113
Table 8.1 Diaspora philanthropy matrix 160
Table 8.2 Immigrant remitters from sub-Saharan African countries
in Canada, 2017 162
Table 8.3 South African diaspora identity 163
Table 8.4 South African diaspora activities in previous year 164
Table 8.5 South African diaspora intended activities in next two
years 164
Table 9.1 Temporary migration to Canada, entries, 2015–2019 188
xvii
xviii LIST OF TABLES
Table 9.2 Changes to temporary migration program streams,

2010–2019 195
Table 11.1 Evolution of the share of immigrants with respect to
the total population 237
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Yiagadeesen Samy, Howard Duncan, and Marshall Palmer
Migration and Canadian Foreign Policy

Canada has a long and successful history of welcoming immigrants and
resettling refugees, assisted by years of forward-looking policy and a
unique geography that has significantly shielded it from the type of large-
scale undocumented migration seen elsewhere. This history of immigra-
tion is a history of nation-building, from colonial times to the present.
Today, immigrants are seen to bring prosperity, economic development
and the advantages of diversity. The majority of the Canadian public
continues to support the immigration program, as well as associated
programs of refugee protection and immigrant integration. Multicultur-
alism, a value enshrined in the Canadian Constitution, remains largely
Y. Samy (B) · M. Palmer

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University,
Ottawa, ON, Canada
e-mail: yiagadeesen.samy@carleton.ca
H. Duncan
Department of Political Science, Carleton University,
Ottawa, ON, Canada
e-mail: howard_duncan@carleton.ca
© The Author(s) 2021 1

Y. Samy and H. Duncan (eds.), International Affairs and Canadian
Migration Policy, Canada and International Affairs,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_1
2 Y. SAMY ET AL.
respected and has facilitated the integration of immigrants into Canadian

society.
To be sure, some recent polls have shown a modest negative shift in
attitudes towards immigration and visible minorities in Canada. However,
an ageing population and low-fertility rates will provide strong incen-
tives for Canada to maintain an open immigration policy to make up for
slow population (and labour force) growth.1 Indeed, a recent Conference
Board of Canada (2019) report makes the case that all of Canada’s net
labour force growth will be met by immigrants in the coming decades.
Unsurprisingly, the government has already taken notice. In the 2018
annual report to Parliament on immigration tabled by the Minister of
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), it is projected
that Canada will admit more than one million permanent residents from
2019 to 2021 (330,800 in 2019, 341,000 in 2020 and 350,000 in 2021),
a significant increase from previous years.
In any case, not all of the news coming out of recent polling data is
negative towards immigration. For example, in a recent survey conducted
by the Environics Institute in April 2019, 6 in 10 Canadians disagreed
that immigration levels were too high and eight in ten said that immigra-
tion had a positive economic impact. In another poll (Environics 2019b)
conducted in the final weeks of Canada’s 2019 federal election campaign,
24% of respondents indicated that the environment and climate change
should be priorities for the government. The economy or unemployment
(14%) and the cost of living (8%) were also seen as important problems
while only 2 % of respondents chose immigration as a priority.
Thus, the recent backlash against migration in many Western countries,
which has seen far-right parties make political gains in several elections,
seems odd when contrasted with the Canadian case. Consider that the
People’s Party of Canada, led by Maxime Bernier, and which opposes
multiculturalism and sought to restrict immigration levels, obtained less
than 2% of votes and no seats during the 2019 federal elections. Migration
has not been a wedge issue in Canada. Perhaps one of the key differences
between Canada and other Western countries is that economic anxiety,
rather than the dominant status of one’s group being at risk (see Mutz’s
2018 study on the US Presidential election), is more salient. Canada’s
1 For example, see http://www.ekospolitics.com/index.php/2019/04/increased-polari

zation-on-attitudes-to-immigration-reshaping-the-political-landscape-in-canada/ (Accessed
on February 1, 2020).
1 INTRODUCTION 3
embrace of multiculturalism and its success in integrating newcomers have

certainly played a role in preventing the sort of backlash that we have seen
against immigration and refugees in other countries.
Despite its inherent international character, immigration policy—in
terms of prosperity, economic development, diversity and so on—has
primarily been treated as a domestic rather than foreign policy issue.
Accordingly, treatments of immigration policy as foreign policy are
comparatively rare. Most studies have tended to focus on the domestic
effects of immigration, that is, what has happened to Canada as a result of
the immigrants having arrived in this country. And yet, there is evidence
of international impacts of Canada’s immigration program, to cite just
one example, that immigrants increase trade flows. In particular, immi-
grants tend to consume products from their countries of origin, thus
increasing imports, and they also help boost exports due to their contacts
and knowledge of markets of their native countries (Head and Ries 1998).
By emphasizing how immigration has affected the Canadian economy,
social cohesion, demographics, housing markets, social welfare and other
domestic matters, the effects of immigration to Canada on foreign affairs
have been comparatively neglected. As another example of this neglect,
many countries have built relationships with their overseas populations
through explicit diaspora strategies, and although engaging the diaspora
is often mentioned in the Canadian context, it is not clear what has been
accomplished thus far.
The movement of people across borders brings up bilateral relations
between nation states and multilateral cooperation through international
institutions such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Canada’s relations with individual countries in the rest of the world as
well as with the “international community” as embodied in the United
Nations system and other multilateral fora are touched, sometimes signif-
icantly, by our immigration policies and practices. Viewing immigration
through both a domestic and international lens is thus paramount to
understanding these policies and practices. This book will draw attention
to some of these areas in the hope that it will encourage more schol-
arly and policy activity directed to the impact of immigration on foreign
affairs.
Specifically, the book examines various issues related to Canada’s immi-
gration policy: Canadian exceptionalism with regard to migration; the
impact of immigration on the Canadian economy; immigration and the
4 Y. SAMY ET AL.
global competition for talent; possible linkages between immigration

and national security; the role of diasporas and how they contribute
to the development of their homelands; the role of Canadian cities
in managing migration; and the delicate balance between Federal and
Provincial management of immigration through Quebec’s immigration
policy. In particular, and where relevant, the book focuses on the link-
ages between Canada’s immigration policy and its international relations.
A massive academic literature on immigration has emerged from Canada
over the past 25 years, but much of it has been about domestic concerns.
The impact of immigration on Canadian society and its economy has been
a mainstay of academic research, and perhaps even more attention has
been given to the well-being of those individuals and families who have
chosen to reside in this country. This speaks to the highly visible integra-
tion agenda of governments at all levels in this country. This academic
literature has been an important supplement to research done within
government ministries and has had an influence on the making of policy.
Far less attention, however, has been given by academic researchers to
the effects of Canada’s immigration program on our relations with other
countries and the international community. We believe that this is a rich
field to explore and one that will receive much greater attention now
with the arrival of the United Nations on the migration scene. The UN’s
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and its Global
Compact on Refugees offer considerable scope for academic researchers
to look at immigration from an international relations perspective. There
are the obvious matters of degrees of compliance by UN member states
but more significantly the extent to which member states establish bilat-
eral or multilateral approaches to shared migration-related interests. We
hope that this volume of essays stimulates more academic researchers to
dive into these deep and plentiful waters.
The Chapters
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 by Triadafilopoulos and
Taylor opens the discussion with an examination of claims to Canadian
exceptionalism on immigration, claims that have been voiced more loudly
recently owing to the growing number of countries that have turned their
backs on immigration as rising nationalism and concerns over globaliza-
tion, over uncontrolled irregular migration, over security, and over losses
1 INTRODUCTION 5
of national identities have begun to displace previously more open atti-

tudes towards the world beyond national borders. As many countries have
tightened their borders and further restricted migration flows including
flows of refugees and asylum seekers, Canada has not only remained open
to immigration at its previous high levels but has continued to increase
these numbers and with the acquiescence of the public (see our earlier
discussion in this introduction). Why has Canada become a rare example
of continued support for immigration and population diversity when all
around the trends are otherwise? Does it have to do with the nature of
the Canadian people, a people nearly all of whom are immigrants and
descendants of immigrants?
Given that there are many countries that share this immigrant char-
acter with Canada, appealing to the exceptionalism of the Canadian
people seems an unlikely explanation for its current policy trajectories.
Other explanations beckon. Triadafilopoulos and Taylor point to three
additional factors: the distribution of immigrants in Canada, Canada’s
citizenship policy, and its Single Member Plurality electoral system. They
argue that these factors enhance the electoral weight of new Canadian
voters and moderate the positions of Canadian political parties, thus
providing support for cross-party political consensus on migration.
Underlying the question of Canadian exceptionalism is whether Canada’s
approach to managing migration can serve as a model for other coun-
tries; however, Triadafilopoulos and Taylor also argue that the portability
of the Canadian model is limited because of the uniqueness of these
aforementioned factors.
Within the international community, Canada is a middle power
economically, militarily and politically. It has long enjoyed, however, a
strong reputation for managing migration well with regard to both immi-
grants and refugees. As a result of the recognition of the weakness of
the international community to manage the flows of migrants towards
Europe, either from its east or from across the Mediterranean Sea, a
weakness that was most dismally displayed during the 2015–2016 crisis
stemming from the Syrian civil war, the United Nations took the bold
step of launching twin processes to establish a Global Compact for Safe,
Orderly, and Regular Migration and a Global Compact on Refugees.
These processes were completed towards the end of 2018. Chapter 3
by Milner examines Canada’s role in the development of the UN Global
Compact on Refugees. While Canada has been an active member of the
global refugee regime since its inception in the aftermath of the Second
6 Y. SAMY ET AL.
World War, Milner observes that not much is known about the mech-
anisms that it employs to influence outcomes in the regime. He argues
that Canada was able to do so as a result of its perceived moral and expert
authority—resulting from refugee resettlement and financial contributions
made to the regime—as well as through political and diplomatic engage-
ment with the functioning of the regime itself. Interestingly, according
to Milner, there is still work to be done to understand how actors can
influence complex governance processes such as the development of the
Global Compact on Refugees that include a mix of domestic politics and
international relations.
Disputes over migration policy between the United States and Canada
form the core of Chapter 4 by Sands and Jackson. They consider changes
to labour mobility in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, and
examine why both this and NAFTA have not included significant provi-
sions for the easy movement of people across borders. The chapter also
looks at related issues concerning the migration of tech professionals,
entry-exit issues, including recent changes to work visas and the impact of
marijuana legalization in Canada, as well as the growing challenge posed
by refugees, asylum seekers, and the safe-third country agreement. As
the chapter shows, disputes between Canada and the United States over
migratory issues have historically been solved by short-term compromises.
Although there are structural reasons for this—especially now through the
combination of the Trump administration and a minority government in
Canada—the continued importance of migration should incentivise the
development of a long-term forward thinking, bilateral, strategy.
Part of the reason for the resistance to the movement of human beings
has to do with national security, an historic fundamental of exercising
sovereignty over territory. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11) on
the United States, migration management has been intensely linked to
national security with many now critically referring to the “securitization
of migration”. Many countries have joined forces in preventing further
attacks arising from the entry of migrants hostile to their interests, thus
coordinating their foreign policies by sharing information, and Canada
is among those joining with others in this effort. Chapter 5 by Scoppio
and Winter examines immigration in Canada from a security perspective
and focuses on Canadian legislation on immigration and Canadian atti-
tudes towards immigrants after 9/11. The authors find that although
most Canadians continue to view immigration positively, Canadian immi-
gration legislation after 9/11 became more concerned with immigrants
1 INTRODUCTION 7
as potential security threats. However, according to the authors, even if

the “new” 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that was imple-
mented after 9/11 and came into effect in 2002 is more security-focused,
it is also more flexible and accepting of immigrants. Finally, the chapter
does not find a significant shift in source countries for immigrants since
9/11 as Asian countries continue to be the top source countries, with the
majority of immigrants admitted under the economic category.
Economic prosperity is an important component of any nation-
building exercise and Canada’s immigration program has maintained its
historical trend of being driven by economic interests. However, as the
Canadian economy has evolved, knowledge-based skills have become
more important for the selection of migrants. Indeed, almost 60% of
those offered permanent residency visas are within the economic category,
while the rest are the result of family reunification or refugee protection.
The availability of skilled workers in a rapidly changing global economic
environment has become restricted because of both supply and demand
factors. On the one hand, developed economies such as Canada are facing
lower supplies of talent due to low-fertility demographics and ageing
populations. This is compounded by an increase in demand for talent
in both advanced and developing economies as they all try to achieve
economic growth and development.
Chapter 6 by the Century Initiative reflects on how well Canada
will fare in attracting and, just as importantly, retaining the talent upon
which the country’s future economic prosperity depends. It considers
not only skilled immigrants with permanent residency visas but also
international students and high-skilled temporary workers whose talents
Canada increasingly wants to retain. A stark reminder of the stakes are
the 500,000 Canadian citizens who are estimated to reside in China, not
to mention the much greater number of Canadians in the United States
and elsewhere. The chapter recommends that Canada should capitalize
on its ability to attract and integrate immigrants and commit to a more
ambitious long-term trajectory of increasing its immigration target from
1 to 1.25% of the Canadian population, and with most of that increase in
the economic category. It also recommends a number of concrete steps to
integrate immigrants better such as matching immigration programs with
longer-term labour market needs, piloting programs that target specific
groups of immigrants and providing more downstream support to help
immigrants succeed in Canada.
8 Y. SAMY ET AL.
Chapter 7 by MacIsaac builds on the previous one and provides

a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between immigration and
economic prosperity. While highlighting the many economic benefits that
result from immigration—a larger and more innovative middle class, a
more educated population and higher economic growth—MacIsaac also
acknowledges that immigrants may in the short run face higher rates
of poverty, more unemployment and low earnings, all of which impact
prosperity negatively and represent a fiscal burden for Canada. MacIsaac
makes the case for more research and evidence-based policymaking to
push back against anti-immigration rhetoric as it relates to job losses and
impacts on wages. There is also a connection with the previous chapter
in terms of policy recommendations to address the problem of degree
recognition and helping migrants with job market integration. However,
MacIsaac argues that these policies should be prioritized over the quest
for specific numbers or targets for immigration. He also makes the case
that immigration can be used to maintain Canada’s position as a middle
power by attracting highly talented individuals that can then contribute
to domestic prosperity.
No book on the foreign relations implications of migration would
be complete without an examination of the effects of migration on the
countries from which Canada’s immigrants arrive. The discussion of the
relationship between migration and development has risen to an interna-
tional prominence that it has not before seen, culminating in the many
references to migration effects in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals. This document marks the first time that the United
Nations has considered well-managed migration as a potential driver of
development, and it calls upon states to establish migration policies that
are sensitive to development impacts for low income countries. Older
concerns over a brain drain remain as do more recent emphases on the
benefits of remittances and return migration, the so-called “brain gain”.
Central to these discussions are the roles of diasporas, roles they actually
play and, increasingly, that they are expected to play in contributing to
the development of homelands.
Chapter 8 by Ramachandran and Crush examines the role of dias-
pora groups in sustainable development and how their efforts are being
institutionalized through international agreements and the national policy
framework in Canada. The chapter uses the case of the South African
diaspora in Canada and draws on an attitudinal survey to go beyond
remittances and consider other ways in which they engage with both their
1 INTRODUCTION 9
country of origin and in Canada. In particular, this philanthropic engage-

ment is examined through activities related to health and education. As
expected, the philanthropic activities of the South African diaspora—made
up of individuals and organizations—are mostly directed at the country of
origin, thus contributing towards the implementation of the SDGs in the
areas of health and education specifically. However, what is interesting in
this case is that these same individuals and organizations are also running
similar programs for Canadians in Canada. The chapter also makes the
case that these philanthropic initiatives are taking place even as a clear
diaspora engagement strategy on the part of the Canadian government
has failed to emerge. Whether the South African diaspora is exceptional
and unique when compared to other Canadian-based diasporas remains
an open question that would benefit from more research according to
Ramachandran and Crush.
Traditional societies of immigration, Canada included, have tended
to regard immigration as a primarily, one-way permanent movement of
people to a new country where they will settle, become integrated into
the society, its economy, and its institutions, take out citizenship, and
remain for the rest of their lives. For many years, this assumption about
immigrants was borne out in practice, but over the past generation, new
paradigms have taken root and are rapidly displacing the idea of immi-
gration as a one-way permanent movement. As the financial, social and
temporal costs of migrating have fallen with the technologies and oppor-
tunities of globalization, migration has become easier, cheaper, and faster
than ever before. The pattern of multiple migration is now firmly in place
which means that migrants, whether or not they are on a permanent
residency visa, are increasingly changing their countries of destination or
returning to their homelands with stronger credentials and more lucra-
tive opportunities. This new mobility, coupled with the phenomenon of
transnationalism where people effectively live in more than one country
at a time, presents challenges to not only how we think about immigra-
tion and set immigration policies, but how we consider integration and
citizenship. Whereas it was once said that there is nothing more perma-
nent than temporary migration, we now hear that there is nothing more
temporary than permanent migration.
Canada has long issued temporary migration visas for foreign workers
and students, the former on a demand basis by employers and the latter
on a supply basis on the part of students wishing to come to Canada. As
Canada attempts to retain many of these temporary migrants through a
10 Y. SAMY ET AL.
two-step path to permanent residency, many are lured back to their home-
lands, especially those whose economies are developing rapidly. Chapter 9
by Hennebry examines these issues, focusing in particular on the various
changes that have been made to Canada’s immigration system since 2000,
and specifically those targeted at the Temporary Foreign Worker Program.
Her core argument is that while many changes took place, they have led
to a more complex system of immigration in Canada characterized by
rights differentiation across migrant categories and increased restrictions
on the mobility of migrants. According to her, this is the result of labour
market concerns rather than the rights and protections of migrants. The
complexity has also created a tiered system that makes it easier for some
such as the high skilled from richer countries to access permanent resi-
dency when compared to the lower skilled from developing countries.
And perhaps more worryingly, as she argues, is the fact that the serious
problems of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program as they relate to
the vulnerabilities of migrant workers, have not been dealt with, and have
even worsened in some cases.
In Chapter 10, Zhuang takes a ground level view and examines the
implications of immigration for cities. As the chapter argues, immigra-
tion has changed the urban landscape of Canada’s metropolitan regions
by increasing ethnocultural diversity and the concentration of immigrants
in metropolitan areas. This leads to both challenges and opportunities
for local municipalities that are responsible for the provision of services
and infrastructure to support the settlement and integration of immi-
grants, even as they do not have jurisdictional authority over federal
immigration policies (and provincial ones in the case of Quebec—see next
paragraph). Local municipal planning systems face various challenges such
as housing, transportation, retailing and community-building. The inte-
gration of immigrants into Canada’s multicultural society contributes to
nation-building when the former feel a sense of belonging and inclusion.
Unfortunately, not enough attention has been paid to how municipali-
ties can help immigrants settle and integrate according to Zhuang. The
author proposes that an equity lens be applied to planning topics and
practice that include housing, education, climate change and resilience,
and mobility and transportation.
Chapter 11 by Beauregard, Gagnon and Garon confronts the Consti-
tution Act’s dividing of authority over immigration between the federal
and provincial governments. Canada’s constitutionally defined nature as
a federation makes a difference to how migration is governed and to
1 INTRODUCTION 11
how Canada relates to the rest of the world in its management of

international migration. Although there have been a number of exam-
ples of provinces embarking on international relations with respect to
migration, most powerfully is the role of the province of Quebec in
managing its immigration program in support of its historic linguistic
roots. Quebec’s management of immigration for cultural as well as
economic ends has resulted in a preference of immigrants from the
Francophonie, an international body of significant importance to Canada.
The decentralization agreement with the federal government in the
field of immigration allows Quebec’s provincial government to select
immigrants for the economic class but not refugees or those associated
with the family reunification program. Beauregard, Gagnon and Garon
explain how this asymmetric decentralization happened and why Quebec
has asked for even more decentralization, namely, linguistic specificity
and its intercultural, as opposed to Canada’s multicultural, approach to
integration. After presenting a few international examples of decentral-
ization in other federations, the authors explain that the Canada-Quebec
asymmetric system is necessary for an efficient and flexible immigration
system for Canada. In their view, what is required for the system to work
is trust between different levels of government and better coordination,
even if the latter is difficult in practice because of political and economic
uncertainties.
As the various chapters in this book document, the connection between
migration and foreign policy is, in short, complex. It raises questions of
economics, cultural identity, national security, municipal, provincial, and
federal politics, and international development, among others. Perhaps
as a result, the links between migration and foreign relations are also
intensely political. Facing one of the most contested and important issues
in the country today, the contributors to this volume have sought to
clarify and explain this complexity. In the concluding chapter of this
volume, Duncan and Samy ask whether Canada’s immigration policy will
take an international turn, pointing to several instances where there are
linkages between Canada’s migration policy and its international relations.
They argue that Canada can establish itself as a leader on international
migration management by sharing its experience with other countries that
go beyond that of protecting its sovereignty.
Overall, we hope that this volume will have cut through some of the
noise, providing a way forward to both analytically think about migration
and foreign policy and to construct well-designed and effective policies.
12 Y. SAMY ET AL.
References
Conference Board of Canada. 2019. Can’t Go It Alone. Immigration is Key to
Canada’s Growth Strategy. Insight Briefing, May 8–9 in Ottawa, ON, Canada.
Environics Institute. 2019a. Focus Canada—Spring 2019. Canadian Public
Opinion About Immigration and Refugees, April 29.
Environics Institute. 2019b. Focus Canada—Fall 2019. Regional Perspectives on
Politics and Priorities, November 11.
Head, Keith, and John Ries. 1998. Immigration and Trade Creation: Econo-
metric Evidence From Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics 31 (1):
47–62.
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada. 2018. Annual Report to
Parliament on Immigration. Ottawa: IRCC.
Mutz, Diana C. 2018. Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the
2016 Presidential Vote. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115
(19): E4330–E4339.
CHAPTER 2
The Political Foundations of Canadian

Exceptionalism in Immigration Policy
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos and Zack Taylor
Introduction
Human migration in a world of sovereign nation-states is inescapably
political. The crossing of a border by an “alien” necessarily raises ques-
tions concerning their admissibility, status, and rights in the receiving
country (Zolberg 1981). The politics generated by international migra-
tion is especially fraught in democratic states, where elected governments
are charged with protecting and advancing the interests of their citi-
zens. Immigrants have long been viewed as competitors in labor markets,
vectors of threat and insecurity, and disrupters of the social and demo-
graphic status quo. Citizens demand that governments take their concerns
regarding the economic and social consequences of immigration into
account and craft policies that put their interest first. Given this logic,
T. Triadafilopoulos (B)
University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
e-mail: t.triadafilopoulos@utoronto.ca
Z. Taylor
Western University, London, ON, Canada

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_2
14 T. TRIADAFILOPOULOS AND Z. TAYLOR
some degree of populism is unavoidable in the politics of immigration

(and in democratic politics more generally [Canovan 2002]). No govern-
ment can afford to ignore the will of the people, however blurrily it
is construed. While organized interests such as employers and humani-
tarian organizations may prevail upon governments to admit immigrants
(Freeman 1995), all democratically elected decision-makers consciously
offset such moves by reassuring citizens that their policies serve the
collective good.
While populism is inherent in the politics of immigration, there is
widespread concern that it has intensified in the years following the
global economic crisis of 2008–2009. Commentators point to the elec-
toral success of extreme, anti-immigrant political parties and politicians
(Art 2011; Golder 2016), the coarsening of discourse around immigra-
tion (Fekete 2018; Lean 2017), and the proliferation of policies and
practices that take a hardline against “unwanted” migrants, generally,
and asylum seekers, in particular (Mountz et al. 2013; Hatton 2016).
Anti-immigration populists (and others) have also rejected the notion
that minority groups should be accommodated through policies of multi-
culturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). This rejection of multicul-
turalism has been most pronounced with regard to religious minorities,
generally, and Muslims, in particular (Dauvergne 2016, pp. 62–89;
Brubaker 2017). The populist anti-immigrant wave has washed over
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and
several other countries. Arguably, its influence helps us make sense of two
of the most unexpected and consequential events of 2016: the victory of
the “leave” side in the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s election
as the 45th President of the United States (Dennison and Geddes 2018;
Martin 2017).
Canada stands out as an exception to this trend. As we point out
below, Canada continues to pursue an expansionary immigration policy,
Canadian public opinion is, on the whole, supportive of immigration and
multiculturalism, and an attempt to harness anti-immigrant sentiment by
the People’s Party of Canada failed spectacularly in the 2019 federal elec-
tion. Explanations of Canadian exceptionalism in the areas of immigration
and multiculturalism point to Canada’s isolated geography and distinc-
tive immigration and multiculturalism policies (Reitz 2011; Banting and
Kymlicka 2010; Bloemraad 2012; Hiebert 2016; Fleras 2018). While we
agree that geography and policy are important, we believe political and
institutional factors must also be taken into consideration. In particular,
2 THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN EXCEPTIONALISM … 15
we emphasize the interaction of three distinctive features of the Cana-

dian case: the distribution of immigrants in Canada, Canada’s citizenship
policy, and its Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system. The inter-
play of these factors enhances the electoral weight of new Canadian voters
and this, in turn, moderates Canadian political parties’ positions, helping
to preserve a robust cross-party political consensus on the basic features
of Canada’s immigration policy.
The portability of the “Canadian model” of immigration and multi-
culturalism is therefore limited. On the one hand, other countries
have and will continue to borrow from Canada with respect to policy.
However, given the contingent factors shaping the politics of immigra-
tion in Canada, it will be difficult for policymakers in other countries
to enjoy the same leeway granted to governments in Canada. As such,
Canada will remain exceptional with respect to the politics of immigra-
tion policymaking. That being said, recent trends in Germany suggest
that subtle movement toward a more Canadian-style immigration politics
may emerge over time, driven by some of the same forces that have made
Canada so unique.
Elements of Exceptionalism:
Immigration Policy and Public Opinion
Canada has an aggressive immigration policy. Under Prime Minister
Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party, annual immigration levels
topped 257,900, 259,000, and 260,400 in 2012, 2013, and
2014, respectively (Martel and D’Aoust 2016). Since forming
government in 2015, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal
government has expanded Canada’s immigration program. Annual
admissions increased from 271,845 in 2015 to 296,346 in 2016,
before dipping to 286,479 in 2017. Targets for 2019, 2020,
and 2021 are 330,000, 340,000, and 350,000 (Immigration,
Refugees and Citizenship Canada 2018, p. 12). Actual and proposed
increases in annual admissions levels have not generated organized polit-
ical opposition—all of Canada’s major political parties at the federal level
support high levels of annual admissions.
While countries such as the United States and Germany admit more
immigrants per year, they have much larger populations. Consequently,
the overall impact of immigration in these countries is less profound.
As per Table 2.1, Canada’s foreign-born population grew from 17.4%
Table 2.1 Percentage of population foreign-born, 1996–2016
1996 (%) 2006 (%) 2016 (%)
Canada 17.4 19.8 21.9

Ontario 25.6 28.3 29.1
Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa CMAs 38.1 41.4 41.8
British Columbia 24.5 27.5 28.3
Vancouver-Abbotsford CMAs 33.6 38.2 39.1
Québec 9.3 11.3 13.7
Montréal CMA 17.6 20.4 22.8
Source Statistics Canada, Census 1996, 2006, 2016. Does not include non-permanent residents
in 1996 to 21.9% in 2016. By comparison, as of 2018 the foreign-born

population stood at 13.6% in the United States and 16% in Germany
(OECD 2019; Radford 2019). Statistics Canada (2017a, p. 28) forecasts
that the percentage foreign-born could rise as to as much as 30% by the
year 2036, depending on the maintenance of a high-immigration policy.
Table 2.1 also shows that the effect of immigration has been most
pronounced in Canada’s largest urban regions. The percentage foreign-
born population in the Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa Census Metropolitan
Areas (CMAs) increased from 38.1% in 1996 to 41.8% in 2016. The 2016
figures for the Vancouver-Abbotsford and Montreal CMAs were 39.1 and
22.8%, respectively. If one combines the foreign-born with the second-
generation children of immigrants, the proportion of total population for
the City of Toronto reaches 78%; the figure for the City of Vancouver is
70% (Adams and Norris 2018). Canada’s urban regions are being trans-
formed by immigration, with the pace of change intensifying in recent
years.
Immigration to Canada has been exceptionally diverse with respect to
source countries. This is particularly noteworthy given that prior to the
1970s, almost all immigrants came from Europe (Triadafilopoulos 2012,
pp. 2–3; Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 2014, pp. 141–185). Changes in
policy introduced in 1960 and 1967, and entrenched in the Immigration
Acts of 1976 and 2001, did away with selection criteria based on race
and country of origin and introduced preferences based on human capital
(Triadafilopoulos 2013). In 2016, 48.1% of Canada’s foreign-born popu-
lation was born in Asia (a broad administrative category that includes the
Middle East), while 27.7% was born in Europe. And whereas African-born
immigrants made up 1.7% of the foreign-born population in 1971, they

counted for 8.5% in 2016 (Statistics Canada 2017b). The top 10 source
countries in 2017 were India, the Philippines, the People’s Republic of
China, Syria, the United States of America, Pakistan, France, Nigeria,
the United Kingdom, and Iraq (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada 2018, p. 28).
Increasing diversity with respect to source countries has led to changes
in Canada’s demographic complexion. Canada was a self-declared “white
man’s country” for most of its history; today, Canada’s “visible minority”
population—that part of the population that is defined as neither white
nor Indigenous (as per the Employment Equity Act, 1981)—is 22.3% and
is projected to reach between 31.2 and 35.9% by 2036 (Statistics Canada
2017b). The visible minority population in both the City of Toronto and
the broader Toronto Census Metropolitan Area presently exceeds 50%,
while that of Markham, a city of 342,970 on the City of Toronto’s north-
eastern border, is 78%, up from 72.3% in 2011 (Whalen 2017). Other
mid-sized cities in the Toronto CMA, such as Brampton, have seen similar
increases in their share of visible minority residents. In British Columbia,
five cities in Greater Vancouver have visible minority populations of over
50%, including Richmond (76.3%), Burnaby (63.6%), and Surrey (58.5%)
(Carman 2017).
Canada’s religious landscape is also being transformed by immigra-
tion. While Christianity remains Canada’s largest religion, counting 22.1
million adherents, or 67.3% of the total population, “the number of
Canadians who belong to other religions – including Islam, Hinduism,
Sikhism, Buddhism, Judaism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity” has
been growing rapidly (Pew Research Center 2013). As of 2011, the
share of Canadians belonging to a “other” religious group was 11%,
up from 4% in 1981. Islam is the fastest growing religion in Canada,
with over 1 million adherents, constituting 3.2 of Canada’s population.
The share of individuals reporting they had no religious affiliation has
also increased, reaching 7.8 million, or 23.9% of the population in 2011
(Statistics Canada 2013). This point is worth bearing in mind, as contem-
porary debates over the place of religion in the public sphere often pit
secularist non-believers against devout members of religious communities
(Joppke 2015).
Most surveys suggest that a majority of Canadians accept their
governments’ aggressive immigration policies. Indeed, public opinion has
become more supportive of mass immigration over time. Whereas 61% of
Canadians believed that immigration levels were too high in 1977, only
34% shared this view in October 2019. Conversely, the share of those who
disagreed with this position was only 35% in 1977; by October 2019, it
had increased to 61% (Environics 2019). A significant majority of Cana-
dians—80%—believe that the economic impact of immigration is positive
(Environics 2019). Cross-national comparisons of public opinion echo
this point. The Pew Research Center’s 2018 Global Attitudes Survey
asked respondents in 18 countries whether immigrants constituted a
burden on their country or made it stronger. Canadians expressed the
most positive views on this point, with 68% stating that immigrants made
Canada stronger and only 27% claiming that immigrants constituted a
burden (Gonzalez-Barrera and Connor 2019, p. 3).
For the most part, Canadians’ views on multiculturalism have been
similarly positive. In their analysis of surveys conducted between 2006 and
2009, Stuart Soroka and Sarah Roberton (2010, p. 41) note that “there is
broad support for multiculturalism and immigration, and that support has
not decreased in recent years; indeed, it may even have increased slightly.”
Most polls taken since the publication of Soroka and Roberton’s report
suggest that support for multiculturalism remains steady. For instance, a
2015 survey by the polling firm Environics revealed that the percentage
of Canadians who deem multiculturalism to be a very important element
of Canadian identity had increased from 37% in 1997 to 54% in 2015. By
way of comparison, 39% of those surveyed believed that ice hockey was a
very important marker of Canadian identity (Environics 2015).
While Canadians’ attachment to multiculturalism is evident, their
understanding of the policy is complicated. As Soroka and Roberton point
out, Canadians’
broad level of support for immigration and multiculturalism is accompa-

nied by majority support for a certain degree of integration. However,
exactly what respondents mean by integration, is difficult to specify given
the nature of the questions asked in existing public opinion surveys. Most
likely, respondents showing support for integration have quite different
views of what that integration entails; the result is that there is a good deal
of variance in opinion amongst those within the “integration” category on
any one question. (p. 41)
Canadians’ ambivalence regarding the parameters of multiculturalism

has been evident in recent surveys. The same Environics poll that showed
54% of Canadians held multiculturalism to be a very important element

of Canadian identity also reported that 50% believed too many immi-
grants were not adopting Canadian values.1 Another Environics survey
conducted in June 2015 showed that 75% of Canadians believed that
“ethnic groups should blend into Canadian society,” suggesting that
many Canadians were concerned that too many immigrants were not
“blending in.” Canadians opinions on religious minorities, generally, and
Muslims, in particular, also deviate from what one would expect given
their support for multiculturalism. For instance, in an Angus Reid poll
released in April 2017 (Korzinski 2017) only 33% of those surveyed stated
that they had a “generally favorable opinion” of Islam, as compared to
68% for Christianity. The same Angus Reid poll showed that this antipathy
extended to positions concerning the toleration and accommodation of
Islamic religious practices. A majority of those polled opposed wearing
the niqab and burka in public; among respondents 55 and older, 81%
opposed wearing the burka in public.
Antipathy to religious accommodation is especially pronounced in
Quebec, where Premier François Legault’s Coaliton Avenir Quebec
(CAQ) successfully campaigned on a platform that included promises to
reduce annual immigration levels, introduce a “values test” for immi-
grants, and ban the wearing of religious symbols by public servants
(Bruemmer 2018). The CAQ has overseen the implementation of these
promises since taking office, enjoying the continuing support of a majority
of Quebecers.
In the months leading up to the October 2019 federal election,
some commentators, including the political scientist Eric Kaufmann,
claimed that Canada’s cross-party political consensus on immigration
and multiculturalism was threatened (Thompson 2019). Their views
were informed, in part, by an April 2015 survey by the polling firm
EKOS, which reported an intensification of “ideological and partisan
polarization” around issues of immigration and predicted the imminent
“reshaping of the political landscape in Canada” (EKOS 2019). A jump
in the number of asylum seekers crossing the Canada–US border irreg-
ularly in 2017 and 2018 also fed into this growing sense of pessimism
1 As the pollsters responsible for the Environics survey point out, “the proportion of
Canadians who [do not think immigrants adopt Canadian values] has actually declined
from 72 per cent in 1993. Such concern is now at the lowest level in the 25 years over
which this survey questions has been put to Canadians” (Adams and Neuman 2018).
(Schertzer and Paquet 2019), as did the founding of the People’s Party
of Canada (PPC), a self-consciously populist party led by former Conser-
vative cabinet minister and unsuccessful leadership candidate, Maxime
Bernier.
Bernier had made it clear that he and his party believed immigration
levels were too high and multiculturalism policy was incapable of success-
fully inculcating Canadian values into immigrants. In a speech devoted
to immigration, Bernier equated Canada’s immigration program to “a
very dangerous type of social engineering” that would “bring increasing
cultural balkanization, distrust, social conflict, and potentially violence”
(Bernier 2019). Bernier also drew his audience’s attention to the threat
to “Western culture” posed by “political Islam.” Bernier promised that
if elected, the PPC would reduce total immigration levels to between
100,000 and 150,000 immigrants per year “depending on economic and
other circumstances,” repeal the Multiculturalism Act and “eliminate all
funding to promote multiculturalism,” reduce the number of refugees
and other non-economic immigrants, and only select immigrants that
shared “basic Canadian values” through a mandatory in-person interview
(Bernier 2019; also see Ling 2019).
Contrary to expectations, immigration did not figure prominently in
the 2019 federal campaign. Despite significant press coverage and media
exposure, including appearances in both the French and English-language
leaders’ debates, the PPC performed dismally, never exceeding 5% support
in pre-election polls and capturing only 1.6% of the popular vote on elec-
tion day (as compared to 34.4% for the Conservatives, 33.1% for the
Liberals and 15.9% for the New Democratic Party [NDP]). The PPC
was shut out of the House of Commons and Bernier lost the seat he
had held since 2006. Justin Trudeau’s pro-immigration Liberal Party
won a renewed mandate, albeit in a minority parliament. The Conserva-
tive Party’s leader, Andrew Scheer, resigned as criticism of his campaign
mounted. Many in the Conservative Party have indicated that they would
prefer a new leader who will do a better job of competing for support in
the immigrant-heavy suburbs and mid-sized cities ringing Toronto (the
so-called “905” region) (Boessenkool 2020).
The 2019 campaign demonstrated the durability of the Canadian
approach to immigration policy. None of the major parties politicized
immigration or multiculturalism and the PPC was obliterated at the polls.
To the degree that a populist wave had washed over Canada, it left
few, if any, traces. What explains the resilience of pro-immigration poli-

tics in Canada? After surveying explanations that emphasize geography
and policy, we outline our argument regarding the interplay of immi-
grant settlement patterns, citizenship policy, and Canada’s SMP electoral
system. Canadian political parties have cleaved to an immigration-friendly
approach because it is in their interests to do so.
Explaining Exceptionalism I: Geographic Isolation,

Selective Immigration, and Multiculturalism
The outcry over a relatively modest increase in irregular border crossing
in 2017–2018 makes clear that Canadians expect their governments to
successfully exercise control over migration. Canadian governments are
aided in this endeavor by Canada’s geography: access to Canadian terri-
tory is complicated by the fact that it is bounded by the Atlantic, Pacific,
and Artic Oceans. Canada also shares a land border with the United
States, one of the wealthiest countries in the world and a principal desti-
nation for immigrants (including many Canadians). In Jeffrey Reitz’s
words, “The geographic isolation of Canada from all countries other than
the US has limited illegal immigration and has made legal immigration
more attractive. This factor has been important in sustaining the political
perception of Canadian immigration as being controlled in the national
interest” (Reitz 2012a, p. 531; also see Bloemraad 2012, pp. 4–6).
Canadian governments are exquisitely attuned to sensing shifts in
the public’s mood when border control appears to have been compro-
mised. Policymakers have acted quickly to salve discontent, typically by
introducing new regulations that enhance their powers to regulate migra-
tion (Triadafilopoulos 2012, p. 106). The Trudeau government followed
this playbook in 2019, by including several measures aimed squarely at
reducing the flow of irregular asylum seekers in an omnibus budget bill
(Wright 2019). When irregular migrants are able to circumvent Canada’s
geographical impediments, their numbers are small enough to enable the
state to quickly and efficiently plug gaps through tweaks to immigration
regulations. Canada’s geography has enabled Canadian governments to
avoid having to deal with the large, unplanned, and politically charged
movements of migrants that have roiled politics in Germany, Greece, the
United States, and elsewhere.
Explanations of Canadian exceptionalism often highlight the success
of Canadian policies on immigration, settlement, and integration. With
respect to immigration policy, Reitz notes that Canada’s preference for

highly skilled immigrants, and the employment of a selection system
designed to find them, has helped policymakers (a) attract “large numbers
of immigrants [who] have minimum qualifications for survival in a
modern economy” and (b) make the case that immigrants contribute
positively to the Canadian economy. It is this latter point that is most
important:
Although economists in Canada (as elsewhere) have tended to view immi-

gration as only a small economic benefit, Canadian policymakers – and
the general public – have ignored this. They support immigration as a
boon to the economy, not only meeting labor shortfalls, but as a source
of economic stimulation. They believe immigrants support the economy
by adding size, new ideas, creative potentials, international awareness and
linkages critical in a global economy. These views exist across the country,
not only in the major immigrant settlement cities. (Reitz 2012a, p. 525)
Echoing Reitz, Daniel Hiebert (2016, p. 5) notes that
framing immigration in economic terms and presenting it as a solution to

the nation’s problems has led to a mutually reinforcing set of outcomes:
Canadians expect immigration to be coordinated with economic need and,
as a result, they have typically supported immigration mainly when it is
aligned with economic concerns.
Reitz, Hiebert, and others (see Bloemraad 2012, p. x) maintain that

Canada’s focus on attracting highly skilled immigrants has played a
crucial role in preserving public support for immigration. Canada selects
immigrants likely to succeed; their success grants credence to claims
that immigration has a positive economic impact “with minimal social
costs or impact on expenditures required to maintain the welfare state”
(Reitz 2012b, p. 300). Moreover, the children of highly skilled immi-
grants “from China, India, and other Asian countries, and from Latin
America and the Caribbean, have in turn become highly educated and
attained employment success” (Reitz 2012b, pp. 300–301). Once set in
motion, the economic immigration “machine” produces a set of positive,
self-reinforcing multi-generational outcomes.
Explanations of Canadian exceptionalism also highlight the importance
of multiculturalism policy. Unlike any other country in the world, multi-
culturalism policy is entrenched in Canada’s constitution (in Section 27 of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and a federal statute (The Multicul-
turalism Act, 1988). While the relevance of multiculturalism from a purely
legal standing is open to debate, scholars have persuasively argued that
the policy’s value lies in its symbolic resonance. Irene Bloemraad (2012,
p. 8) maintains that, “[m]ulticulturalism policy has played a critical role
in reorganizing the symbolic order of membership in Canada,” helping
to encourage the development of a national identity that is appealing to
“old” and “new” Canadians. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (pp. 60–
61) also stress multiculturalism’s role in grounding a shared national
identity:
[T]he fact that Canada has officially defined itself as a multicultural nation
means that immigrants are a constituent part of the nation that citizens
feel pride in; multiculturalism serves as a link for native-born citizens from
national identity to solidarity with immigrants. Conversely, multiculturalism
provides a link by which immigrants come to identify with, and feel pride
in, Canada. From their different starting points, there is convergence on
high levels of pride and identification with a multicultural conception of
Canadian nationhood…. [I]n the absence of multiculturalism, these links
are more difficult to establish, and national identity is more likely to lead
to intolerance and xenophobia.
Multiculturalism’s importance extends far beyond what one would

expect given its meagre budget line. Its day-to-day application in
programs is nowhere near as important as its symbolic role as a defining
feature of Canadian national identity. Multiculturalism has enabled
Canada to reinvent “its national identity away from that of a British
colony or a shadow of the United States to one as a society that embraces
immigration, diversity, and tolerance” (Bloemraad 2012, p. 14).
Taken together, then, explanations that focus on the consequences
of policy suggest that continuing support for the “Canadian model” of
immigration on the part of political parties and the public at large lies
in the happy interaction of differing objectives: A selective immigration
policy admits immigrants with skills and talent needed to be economically
successful; multiculturalism policy provides a warmth of welcome that
encourages newcomers to join the Canadian family, while also providing
local ethnic organizations with the resources needed to assist in this
endeavor. Integration, supported by funding from the federal govern-
ment, proceeds apace and is facilitated by a relatively liberal citizenship
regime which efficiently transforms immigrants into voting Canadians
who, in turn, can be counted on to support prevailing immigration

and multiculturalism policies (Bloemraad 2012, p. 14). Members of the
majority are impressed by immigrants’ industriousness, accept official
claims that Canada’s economic prospects depend in part on the contri-
butions of newcomers, and base their identity on the values advanced
by Canada’s official multiculturalism policy. Augie Fleras (2018, p. 301)
suggests this “mutually reciprocating effect” has helped Canada move
along the path to becoming an “immigration society”—that is, a society
that: operates a rules-based admissions policy, sees immigrants as valued
assets for nation-building, includes immigrants in its national identity,
enables permanent residency and access to citizenship to immigrants, and
facilitates integration through policies such as official multiculturalism.2
Additional policy-centered arguments point to the importance of
gaining the support of provinces by fostering meaningful intergovern-
mental relations and granting provincial governments a say in immigrant
selection through innovations such as the Provincial Nominee Program
(or, in Quebec’s case, the devolution of immigrant selection full stop)
(Schertzer 2015; Paquet 2016). Scholars have also commented on the
ability of Canadian governments to shift gears quickly, for example by
regulating the supply of Temporary Foreign Workers in a way that
responds to employers’ demands while not exceeding the tolerance of
an at times skeptical public (Triadafilopoulos 2012, pp. 9–10; Fudge and
Tham 2017).
There is no gainsaying the importance of public policy in building
support for the Canadian approach to immigration. Admissions policies
have helped Canada attract large numbers of highly qualified immigrants
with middle-class aspirations and a fierce desire to succeed. Multicultur-
alism policy has helped inculcate a particular ethos among Canadians that
helps to encourage support for immigration and diversity (though within
limits and premised on the expectation that newcomers will do what is
necessary to “blend in”). Nevertheless, we maintain that policy-centered
arguments overlook the importance of contingent factors, specifically,
the unplanned yet important interplay of immigrant settlement patterns,
2 Emma Ambrose and Cas Mudde (2015) argue that potential critics of the Canadian
model are silenced by a “high level of state repression of debate on immigration issues.”
Ryan (2016) offers a spirited critique of Ambrose and Mudde’s argument, pointing out
that Canada has experienced its fair share of debate on immigration and multiculturalism.
citizenship rules, and Canada’s SMP electoral system. We develop our

argument below.
Explaining Exceptionalism II: Settlement Patterns,

Citizenship Regime, and Electoral Rules
Canada’s major political parties have rejected anti-immigrant politics
because doing so is in their interest. Their preferences have been shaped
by the political dynamic generated by the intersection of immigration
settlement patterns, Canada’s efficient citizenship policy, and its “first-
past-the-post”/SMP electoral system. We begin by touching on each of
these factors.
Settlement Patterns
Canada’s 338 parliamentary seats are distributed according to a complex
system that seeks to balance “representation by population with regional
imperatives of a federal House of Commons” (Pal and Choudhry 2007,
p. 12). There is some debate as to whether this effort to strike a balance
has succeeded; Michael Pal and Sujit Choudhry have argued persuasively
(prior to the most recent redistribution of seats in the House of Commons
in 2013, which added seats in large metropolitan areas) that Canada’s
growing cities have been underrepresented and, hence, the votes of their
diverse populations “diluted.” We maintain that even if the principle of
representation by population is imperfectly observed in Canada, its effect
is still extremely important.
Table 2.2 summarizes the distribution of federal ridings in Canada by
selected regions. It shows that about 38% of Canada’s federal ridings are
located in the country’s three largest metropolitan areas defined by the
Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa CMAs, the Vancouver-Abbotsford CMAs,
and the Montreal CMA.
Recall that Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec collectively account
for 71.1% of Canada’s foreign-born population. Much of that popula-
tion is concentrated in and around Toronto, Vancouver, and Montréal.
Foreign-born residents account for 41.8% of the population in the
Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa conurbation, and 39.1% in the Vancouver-
Abbotsford region. First- and second-generation immigrants together
make up 78% of the City of Toronto’s population and 70% of the City of
Vancouver’s population.
Table 2.2 Percentage of ridings in selected regions
Representation orders 1996, 2003, 2013

RO 1996 RO 2003 RO 2013
Ontario 34.2 34.4 35.8

Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa CMAs 15.3 16.6 18.9
British Columbia 11.3 11.7 12.4
Vancouver-Abbotsford CMAs 5 6.2 7.4
Québec 24.9 24.4 23.1
Montréal CMA 10.0 11.0 11.5
Note Ridings are assigned to a CMA if 75% of their population was located within the CMA
Table 2.3 provides an overview of the concentration of immigrants in

federal ridings by region. Two effects are visible: high-immigrant ridings
are mostly located in British Columbia and Ontario, and the proportion
of ridings that contain high proportions of immigrants has increased over
the past 20 years as the regionalized pattern of immigration has continued
and riding boundaries have been reapportioned. Ontario has 31 ridings
that have a foreign-born population of 40% or more; BC has 33 and
Quebec has 12.
If we include ridings with a foreign-born population of 20–40%, we
see that BC has 64 seats, Ontario has 62, and Quebec has 30. That is,
156 out of the 338 federal ridings in the 2013 representation order have
a foreign-born population of at least 20%. If we include the children of
immigrants, the percentages are higher still.
This point is given added force when we take visible minorities into
consideration. In his analysis of the 2016 census, Andrew Griffiths (2017)
points out that 41 federal ridings have visible minority populations of 50%
or more: 24 have visible minority populations between 50 and 70%; 17
have 70% or more. All 17 ridings with a visible minority population of 70%
or more are located in the Toronto (13) and Vancouver (4) metropolitan
areas.
To sum up, immigrants and visible minorities are disproportion-
ately concentrated in and around Toronto, Vancouver, and Montréal.
Figure 2.1 visualizes this: 50% of the foreign-born population resides
in 20% of ridings; 75% resides in 40% of ridings. Similarly, 50% of the
visible minority population resides in 17% of ridings; 75% resides in 32%
of ridings.
2
Table 2.3 Concentration of immigrants in federal ridings by region (%) and representation order
Region
BC Prairies Ontario
RO 1996 RO 2003 RO 2013 RO 1996 RO 2003 RO 2013 RO 1996 RO 2003 RO 2013
Less than 20% foreign 50 44 36 78 75 56 48 45 37
born
20–40% foreign born 32 31 31 22 25 39 28 28 31
Greater than 40% foreign 18 25 33 0 0 5 24 26 31
born
Québec Atlantic North
RO 1996 RO 2003 RO 2013 RO 1996 RO 2003 RO 2013 RO 1996 RO 2003 RO 2013
Less than 20% foreign 81 76 71 100 100 100 100 100 100
born
20–40% foreign born 16 16 18 0 0 0 0 0 0
Greater than 40% foreign 3 8 12 0 0 0 0 0 0
born
Note Census year for RO 1996 is 1996; RO 2003 is 2006; and RO 2013 is 2016. Foreign-born does not include non-permanent residents
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN EXCEPTIONALISM …
27
Fig. 2.1 Cumulative percentage of immigrant and visible minority populations

by riding (2016 Census, 2013 representation order)
The relative concentration of groups can be interpreted in two ways.

On the one hand, immigrants make up a substantial proportion of the
population in a substantial number of federal seats—too many, we would
argue, to ignore (also see Black and Hicks 2008, p. 248; Speer and Jivani
2017). At the same time, immigrants and visible minority groups are
neatly concentrated in only a few metropolitan areas, facilitating access
to them during campaigns. As Fig. 2.1 suggests, this is especially true
when we consider groups such as South Asians: 50% of South Asians live
in 8% of ridings; 75% live in only 20% of ridings. The spatial concentra-
tion of immigrants aids voter recruitment by parties. The concentration
of immigrants sharing a common language and cultural origins facilitates
the formation of community-oriented institutions such as social clubs,
self-help organizations, religious organizations, and media outlets (Lapp
1999). As Stephen White (2017, pp. 710–711) suggests, social networks
generated by immigrant settlement patterns provide political parties with
opportunities to exercise “interpersonal influence” (by cultivating rela-

tionships with the leadership of community-oriented institutions) to
favorably influence voters’ political opinions.
An Efficient Citizenship Regime

Of course, none of this would matter if immigrants could not vote.
Canada’s citizenship regime has ensured that immigrants are able to
participate politically, transforming their latent political potential into
real power. The rate at which immigrants acquire Canadian citizenship
through naturalization is high. In 2006, the naturalization rate for immi-
grants with three or more years of legal residency was 85%; the rate for
immigrants with five or more years was 88.3%, eight percentage points
higher than the rate in 1986 (Xu and Golah 2015, p. ii). In 2011, of the
6,042,200 foreign-born people in Canada eligible to acquire citizenship,
5,175,100, or 85.6% reported that they had done so (Statistics Canada
2013, p. 3). More impressively, the 2011 National Household Survey
also found that of Canada’s total population, “78.3% were Canadian citi-
zens by birth, another 15.8% were Canadian by naturalization and the
rest, 6.0%, did not have Canadian citizenship” (Statistics Canada 2013,
p. 3). Ontario “had the largest eligible immigrant population and the
highest proportion of immigrants who had obtained citizenship (87.0%).”
Quebec and British Columbia’s proportions of eligible immigrants who
had obtained citizenship stood at 85.1 and 84.3%, respectively (Statistics
Canada 2013, p. 4). Canada’s naturalization rate is consistently higher
than that of Australia (74% in 2011) and the United States (43.7% in
2010).
Canada’s high naturalization rate is based on its relatively liberal citi-
zenship policy. In order to qualify for citizenship, an immigrant must: be a
permanent resident; have lived in Canada for 3 out of the last 5 years; have
filed taxes (if necessary); pass a test on rights, responsibilities, and knowl-
edge of Canada; prove their language skills; swear an oath of allegiance
to the Queen; and pay a fee of $530. Changes enacted by Prime Minister
Stephen Harper’s Conservative Government, including raising the “citi-
zenship fee” from $100 to $530, setting a higher standard of language
competency, toughening the written test, and increasing the residency
requirement form three out of four years to four out of six years, have
dampened the naturalization rate of late, though it still hovers in the range
of 85% (Griffith 2018). In any case, the Trudeau Liberals have rolled
back several of these changes, shortening the residency requirement and

pledging to waive the citizenship fee altogether (Alhmidi 2019). Conse-
quently, we should expect that any decline in Canada’s naturalization rate
will only be temporary.
Electoral System
Canada’s SMP electoral system generally rewards regionally concentrated
support at the expense of broad, diffuse support, and particularly at the
expense of support that is spread evenly across the country (Cairns 1968).
Given the regional concentration of immigrant and visible minority popu-
lations in Canada, the potential pay-off for targeting immigrant-dense
ridings is magnified by the electoral system (Westlake 2018, p. 423). As
SMP systems reward the first-place parties with all the spoils (making a
second-place finish largely inconsequential), even small swings in the vote
preferences of regionally concentrated groups may translate into a rela-
tively large swing in the seats share of competing parties (Linzer 2012;
Rogowski and Kayser 2002). In short, parties may reap a high electoral
return on investment by concentrating recruitment efforts on particular
immigrant groups.
Through the 1990s and early 2000s, ridings with high concentra-
tions of immigrant and visible minority voters consistently supported the
Liberal Party of Canada (Bilodeau and Kanji 2010; Blais 2005; Harell
2013; White 2017). The Liberals under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien
leveraged this support to win majority governments, taking advantage of
vote splitting on the right between the Progressive Conservative Party
and Reform Party/Canadian Alliance. After the merger of the Progressive
Conservatives and Canadian Alliance in 2004, and in light of difficulties
in building a strong base of support in Québec (Gordon et al. 2019;
Flanagan 2011, pp. 105–106), the Conservatives focused their efforts on
competing for the votes of immigrants and visible minority groups, partic-
ularly in the Greater Toronto Hamilton Area and the Greater Vancouver
region. As Stephen Harper’s former adviser (and political scientist), Tom
Flanagan (2011, p. 106), noted, the “emerging conservative coalition”
would be based on a combination of traditional Tory voters, western
populists, and “ethnic voters, new Canadians, mostly in Ontario.” The
Conservative strategy, dubbed “ethnic outreach” by pundits, included
rhetorical gestures (such as apologizing for the Chinese head tax) that
“signaled to multicultural communities that the Conservatives cared

about their issues” (Flanagan 2011, p. 106).
Beyond that it was mainly the patient effort of establishing contact –

visits by Harper and other leading Conservatives, notably Jason Kenney, to
ethnic events; recruiting multicultural candidates and political organizers;
printing political materials in languages other than English and French.
(Flanagan 2011, p. 106)
Flanagan maintains that this Conservatives strategy succeeded in

winning “a treasure trove of seats” in the 2011 federal election: “It was
this batch of new seats in Ontario, mainly in the GTA, that gave the Tories
their majority in 2011” (Flanagan 2011, p. 106). Indeed, of the 28 seats
the Conservatives gained from the Liberals between 2004 and 2011, 18
had an immigrant population of over 40%, of which 10 were majority
immigrant.
As highlighted in Table 2.4, the vast majority of Conservative safe
seats during the 2000s were located in nonmetropolitan areas and in
Western cities, not including the Vancouver-Abbotsford CMA. Indeed,
they consistently held 51 of 68 nonmetropolitan seats, and 22 of 24 seats
in Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, and other Western
Table 2.4 Safe and unsafe seats by region, 2004–2011 (2003 representation
order)
Region Safe Seats Unsafe Total

Seats
CPC Liberal NDP BQ Total
Nonmetropolitan 51 10 4 3 68 61 129
Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa 4 8 2 0 14 36 50
CMAs
Vancouver-Abbotsford 5 2 3 0 10 7 17
CMAs
Montréal CMA 0 6 0 0 6 27 33
Other Western CMAs 22 1 1 0 24 11 35
Other Ontario CMAs 5 4 3 0 12 14 26
Other Québec CMAs 0 0 0 0 0 10 10
Atlantic CMAs 0 1 2 0 3 5 8
Total 87 32 15 3 137 171 308
Notes Seats are assigned to a CMA if more than 75% of their population is located within that CMA.
A seat is considered “safe” if a party won it in all four elections held between 2004 and 2011
CMAs. (In this analysis, a seat is considered “safe” if a party won it in

all four elections held between 2004 and 2011.) The Liberal pool of safe
seats was more diffuse. In seeking to grow their seat count, both parties
had a strong incentive to funnel resources into the metropolitan area with
the largest pool of unsafe seats whose geographically proximate residents
were potentially open to their appeals: the Greater Toronto and Hamilton
Area (GHTA).
The Liberals won back most of the high-immigrant seats gained by
the Conservatives in 2011 in Greater Toronto and Vancouver in the 2015
federal election. They were assisted by Stephen Harper’s unpopularity and
strategic overstep on the part of Conservative strategists, who sought to
preserve gains with new Canadian voters while at the same time seeking to
take advantage of anti-Muslim public opinion (Levitz 2016; MacQueen
2015). Although the Conservatives’ politicization of the niqab—through
their insistence that women be forced to take the full face veil off before
swearing the oath of allegiance during citizenship ceremonies—proved to
be popular (at least for a time), other proposals such as the introduction
of a “tip line” through which Canadians could report “barbaric cultural
practices,” and a promise to strip citizenship from dual citizens accused of
terrorism, “backfired as many voters were repelled by what they perceived
as gratuitous anti-immigrant proposals” (Kymlicka 2019, p. 10). Analyses
of the 2015 election suggest that overreach on the part of the Conserva-
tives created circumstances that assisted the Liberals in winning a majority
(Dornan 2016, p. 20; Radwanski 2015; Clark et al. 2017, p. 704).
To sum up, Canada’s major political parties recognize the impor-
tance of competing in ridings with high concentrations of immigrants
and visible minority voters. They do so out of self-interest: the seat-
rich metropolitan regions centered on Toronto and Vancouver are both
where the greatest electoral payoffs are, and where many of Canada’s
ethno-cultural communities and associated institutions are concentrated.
Attracting the votes of immigrants and their communities into a party’s
electoral coalition is therefore the difference between winning and losing
national elections. This logic of electoral competition dampens the polit-
ical mobilization of anti-immigrant rhetoric and generates broad support
for the fundamental features of Canada’s immigration policy, including
relatively high levels of annual admissions and the maintenance of a policy
of official multiculturalism. As the Conservatives’ experience in 2015 and
the PPC’s 2019 debacle make clear, an anti-immigrant populist strategy is
risky. Whether there are ways of making such a strategy work remains an
open question. What is clear is that, for the most part, parties in Canada
will avoid alienating immigrant and visible minority voters, whom they
believe are key to their success (Besco and Tolley 2018).
Conclusion
Canada’s apparent avoidance of the populist, anti-immigration politics
that have become common in other liberal democracies is based on
a complex mix of factors, including its geographic isolation and rela-
tive insulation from unwanted migration flows, its selective immigration
system that recruits large numbers of well-educated and highly skilled
immigrants, and its multiculturalism policy, which has developed into
an important marker of Canadian identity. In this chapter, we have
highlighted the interaction of three additional factors: the geograph-
ical concentration of immigration settlement patterns in relation to the
boundaries of federal electoral districts, the efficiency of Canada’s citi-
zenship regime, and the single member plurality electoral system. We
have argued that the political logic generated by the interaction of these
factors has led the major parties to compete for the votes of new Cana-
dians and visible minorities and eschew the politics of anti-immigrant
populism. Parties that have experimented with anti-immigrant populism
at the national level have failed. These failures add additional support to
strategies counseling a pro-immigration stance.
The interaction of forces we have described is contingent. No integra-
tion policy objective guided the geographical concentration of immigra-
tion in Canada’s largest metropolitan areas. Similarly, Canada’s citizenship
rules, which facilitate rapid naturalization, and the electoral system were
devised for their own, distinctive reasons, not to inoculate Canada against
the spread of populist nativism as an electorally viable party strategy. In
this sense, Canada’s ability to maintain and even expand its immigration
program since 2008 is due to a combination of thoughtful public policy
and contingent circumstances. Canada has been good, but it has also been
lucky.
Again, we must emphasize the contingency of this interaction, the
electoral effect of which is visible during the first two decades of the
twenty-first century. Will it persist into the future? We believe it will.
Given low fertility rates, virtually all future population growth in Canada
will be through immigration. The proportion of the Canadian popula-
tion made up of immigrants and their children will only increase, and
to levels unprecedented in any developed country. At the same time,

there is little evidence that the concentrated metropolitan geography of
immigrant settlement—and therefore the geography of overall population
growth—will change (Statistics Canada 2017a). Canada’s nonpartisan
legislative reapportionment process, which uses “communities of interest
or identity” as a boundary-drawing criterion, will accommodate this by
creating more immigrant-heavy ridings in Greater Toronto and the Lower
Mainland of British Columbia. To win national elections, Canada’s polit-
ical parties must win seats. They will have little choice but to appeal to
growing immigrant populations.
This contingency suggests that Canada is exceptional, and therefore
that there are few lessons that can be learned by other countries. While
some elements of the Canadian approach (such as its means of selecting
economic immigrants) have been adopted by other countries, others,
most notably Canada’s geography, are irreplicable. Similarly, no country
can recreate Canada’s geographical pattern of immigrant settlement or
easily change its electoral system (a point with which Canadian advocates
of electoral system reform are all too familiar). Even citizenship policies
are sticky, though we have seen a steady liberalization of policy across
most immigrant-receiving democracies since the 1990s (Howard 2012).
So, there are significant limits on how much other countries can
borrow from Canada. That being said, there have been trends in the
politics of immigration in some countries that bear some resemblance to
Canada. Take Germany, for example. While observers have been quick
to highlight the emergence of the populist, anti-immigrant Alternativ
für Deutschland party, they have tended to overlook the fact that Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel has overseen a significant liberalization of Germany’s
immigration and citizenship policies and convinced many in her Christian
Democratic Union party to recognize the growing importance of urban
voters with a “migration background” (Triadafilopoulos 2019; Mushaben
2017, pp. 250–290; Lau 2009). While Merkel famously rejected multi-
culturalism in 2010, she has since advocated the building of a “welcome
culture” in Germany, in part to assist the Federal Republic in competing
for highly skilled immigrants. These moves were unthinkable 20 or even
15 years ago. Yet things are changing, driven by high rates of immigra-
tion, the settlement of newcomers in large cities, their enfranchisement
as a result of the liberalization of German citizenship policy, and the
resulting competition among parties for the support of immigrant and
ethnic minority voters. We doubt that the Federal Republic will come
to resemble Canada in any appreciable way or avoid populist politics

to the degree Canada has. Nevertheless, we believe the changes we are
seeing in Germany might be usefully understood through a more nuanced
appreciation of the factors that have made Canada so unique.
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CHAPTER 3
Canada and the UN Global Compact

on Refugees: A Case Study of Influence
in the Global Refugee Regime
James Milner
Introduction
On 17 December 2018, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
“affirmed” the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). This act was a
culmination of efforts since 2015 to respond to limitations in the global
refugee regime laid bare by the problematic response to the claims of
some one million individuals who sought entry to Europe in 2015.
Building on the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF),
approved by UNGA in September 2016 as part of the New York Declara-
tion, the GCR represents the most recent multilateral effort to realize the
mandate of the global refugee regime: to ensure protection for refugees
and to find a solution to their plight.
J. Milner (B)
Ottawa, ON, Canada
e-mail: James.Milner@carleton.ca

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_3
42 J. MILNER
Canada played a prominent role in the two-year process that led to the
GCR, both in its formal role as Chair of the Executive Committee of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) during the
development of the GCR and through its role in the formal and informal
deliberations over two years that culminated in 181 UN Member States
supporting the final text of the GCR. While it would be problematic to
ascribe independent causal significance to Canada’s role in the develop-
ment process as a whole, it is widely accepted by those closely involved
with the process that Canadian leadership had a discernable impact on the
final text of the GCR. More generally, Canada’s role in the process high-
lights how its engagement in humanitarian diplomacy is a distinct element
of Canadian participation in the global refugee regime.
What impact did Canada have on the process leading to the GCR?
And how can this impact be explained? This chapter argues that Canada’s
engagement in the GCR process had impact on both the content of the
GCR and the process itself. Specifically, Canada achieved its objectives in
the development of the text by adopting a role as a norm entrepreneur
and leader on issues of gender inclusion, accountability, and inclusive and
participatory mechanisms. More generally, Canadian representatives acted
as important “bridge-builders” throughout the process by facilitating
and sustaining informal dialogue with like-minded states, refugee-hosting
states in the global South, and civil society actors, especially national and
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academics.
Canada’s ability to play this role can largely be explained by its moral
and expert authority on refugee issues, stemming from its decision in
2015 to offer resettlement as a solution to some 25,000 Syrian refugees.
While other states, like Germany, admitted a greater number of refugees
during this period, they did so in response to the arrival of asylum seekers
on their territory and their commensurate legal obligations under inter-
national refugee and human rights law. In contrast, Canada’s decision to
identify some 25,000 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries of asylum
and offer them resettlement to Canada and a pathway to citizenship was
a voluntary and discretionary act. Coupled with sustained positive polit-
ical discourse around refugees during this time, Canada’s decision to
demonstrate political will through the discretionary act of offering reset-
tlement to refugees in addition to the number of refugees seeking asylum
on Canadian territory, contributed in a significant way to Canada being
recognized as a global leader on refugee issues within the international
community.
3 CANADA AND THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES … 43
This moral and expert authority was enhanced by Canada’s decision to

offer other states technical expertise on the private sponsorship of refugees
through the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative (GRSI), Canada’s
diplomatic capacity invested in the process, and sustained political support
for leadership from key Cabinet Ministers. It was also significant that
Canada became increasingly distinct globally as a state in the global North
that was receptive to refugees and progressive on refugee issues, especially
as other prominent donor and resettlement countries, especially the US,
expressed their suspicions of multilateral responses and as European states
faced domestic opposition to progressive approaches to refugees.
The chapter supports this argument through five sections. First, the
chapter will provide an overview of the elements and limitations of the
global refugee regime. Second, it will outline Canada’s traditional forms
of engagement with the regime. The chapter will then describe how the
limitations of the regime were manifest in the chaotic response of Euro-
pean states to the arrival of one million individuals seeking asylum in
2015, and how these events set in motion the process leading to the
GCR. Fourth, the chapter will trace the process leading to the text of
the GCR, leading to it being affirmed by UNGA in December 2018.
This section will also trace Canada’s objectives in the process, drawing on
Canada’s public statements during the formal consultations. The chapter
will finally draw on the work of Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004)
to identify sources of Canadian moral and expert authority and other
factors that enabled Canada to exert such influence over the process. The
chapter will conclude by highlighting the implications of this analysis for
future research and practice relating to Canada’s role in the global refugee
regime.
The Global Refugee Regime

The modern refugee regime was established in the aftermath of World
War II, which left some 55 million people displaced in Europe (Loescher
2001). The regime contains specific norms and institutions intended to
facilitate cooperation and overcome collective action failure in responding
to refugee movements (Betts et al. 2012; Betts and Milner 2019). In
creating the regime, states recognized the right of refugees to not be
forcibly returned to a country where they would face serious harm and
adopted a definition of “refugee” based on a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
44 J. MILNER
particular social group, or political opinion. As a foundation of the

regime, Article 14(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provided that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.”
The principle norms of the regime are detailed in the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees. While the 1951 Convention provided a
general definition of refugees in Article 1A(2), and details the process by
which individuals may be excluded from refugee status and when refugee
status ends, the bulk of the convention details a progressive set of refugee
rights, including access to national courts, freedom of movement, the
right to employment and education, and a host of other social, economic,
civil and political rights on par with those held by nationals of the host
country. The most significant right detailed in the 1951 Convention is
non-refoulement: detailed in Article 33(1) as the prohibition of returning
refugees “in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
[their] life or freedom would be threatened on account of…race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
Non-refoulement remains the cornerstone of international refugee protec-
tion (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007) and is now considered to be a
provision of customary international law, binding even on states not party
to the 1951 Convention.
The central institution of the regime is the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was created
by UNGA on 14 December 1950 through Resolution 428 (V). UNHCR
was established to act under the authority of the UNGA to serve two
specific functions: to ensure the international protection of refugees, and
to cooperate with governments to find permanent solutions for refugees.
Its Statute, however, does not grant UNHCR the autonomous power to
fulfill this mandate. Instead, UNHCR was created as an organization that
was reliant on states and lacked political capacity or functional autonomy.
As specified in paragraph 20 of its Statute, UNHCR only receives finan-
cial support from the UN budget to cover administrative expenditures
relating to the office’s functioning, and “all other expenditures relating
to the activities of the High Commissioner shall be financed by voluntary
contributions.” In this way, UNHCR was made financially dependent on
donor governments.
These constraints continue to affect the functioning of the refugee
regime as a whole. As argued by Betts and Milner (2019, p. 2),
“UNHCR’s reliance on annual voluntary funds and its non-political
mandate significantly constrain its ability to resist and influence the actions
and interests of the more powerful states in the international system.”
This influence is amplified by the fact that 80% of funding to UNHCR
comes from a limited number of states in the global North. The US
alone provides more than a third of funding to UNHCR, all of which
is earmarked for activities in specific regions or for particular activities. As
a result, US interests played a significant role in shaping the activities
of the UNHCR throughout its history (Loescher 2001). The conse-
quences of such influence are compounded through the combination of
domestic and international priorities that drive US engagement in the
refugee regime (Martin and Ferris 2017).
Arguably more significant, however, is what is missing from the global
refugee regime. Specifically, the regime contains no binding obligation
on states to cooperate to ensure the functioning of the regime. While the
norm of non-refoulement places an international obligation on countries
of first asylum to not forcibly return refugees to a country where they
fear persecution, there is no binding obligation on other states to share
the costs associated with the provision of asylum (Milner 2016). This
gap is surprising as the importance of international cooperation has been
affirmed in a range of documents and UNGA resolutions over the past
six decades. The preamble of the 1951 Convention notes that “the grant
of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and…a
satisfactory solution…cannot therefore be achieved without international
cooperation.” Similar statements have been included in more than 30
conclusions of the UNHCR’s ExCom over the past 35 years and in a
similar number of UNGA resolutions. Specific support for the principle
was also highlighted by the Global Consultations on International Protec-
tion (Feller et al. 2003), the 2001 Declaration of States Parties to the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and
the 2002 Agenda for Protection (UNHCR 2002).
While these statements represent broad consensus on the principle
of international cooperation, they do not constitute an obligation. In
fact, international law, by custom or treaty, does not include a duty on
the part of other states to provide support to refugee-hosting states.
In response, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees António
Guterres included this observation in his opening statement to the annual
meeting of the UNHCR’s ExCom in October 2015: “As we face the
highest levels of forced displacement in recorded history, the institution
46 J. MILNER
of asylum must remain sacrosanct, honored as one of the deepest expres-

sions of humanity—especially now as it is being so severely tested in
many parts of the world. It is my conviction that the best way to do
this is through genuine international cooperation and equitable burden
and responsibility sharing. In fact, if there is one protocol that is yet to be
drafted to complement the 1951 Convention, it is one on international
solidarity and burden sharing.”
In the absence of such a mechanism, responsibility for refugees is the
result of “accidents of geography” (Hathaway and Neve 1997, p. 141),
with states in regions of refugee origin hosting the vast majority of the
world’s refugees. In fact, 60% of the world’s refugees are hosted by just 10
states in the global South, while 80% of the world’s refugees are hosted by
low- and middle-income countries in regions of refugee origin (UNHCR
2018). At the same time, just 10 donors in the global North account for
80% of all financial contributions to UNHCR (2019). The result is the
concentration of refugees in the global South, and a regime responsive to
the interests of donors in the global North.
Canada in the Global Refugee Regime

Canada has been an active member of the global refugee regime since
the regime’s inception. In fact, it was a Canadian—Leslie Chance—who
chaired the UN Committee that drafted the 1951 Convention. From the
1950s, Canada played prominent roles in collective responses to specific
refugee situations, including the resettlement of more than 37,000
Hungarian refugees in 1956–1957, 7000 Ugandan Asians in 1972–1973,
and some 70,000 refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia between
1975 and 1980 alone (Molloy et al. 2017). In 1986, the people of Canada
were awarded the Nansen Medal by UNHCR in recognition of “their
major and sustained contribution to the cause of refugees.”
Today, there are primarily three ways that Canada engages with the
global refugee regime. First, Canada is among the top-10 donors to
UNHCR. In 2018, Canada contributed US$72.8 million to UNHCR
alone (UNHCR 2019). This is in addition to financial contributions
to other UN humanitarian agencies, such as the World Food Program,
and funding to Canadian NGOs through the International Humanitarian
Assistance Fund to support humanitarian programming overseas. While
Canada’s funding levels to UNHCR are notable, it is also important to
highlight the qualitative nature of this funding: 20% of Canada’s contribu-

tions to UNHCR are either unearmarked or only softly earmarked. This
gives UNHCR greater scope to determine the allocation of this funding,
and contrasts with US contributions, which are 100% earmarked, or the
Netherlands, which earmarks only 41% of contributions to UNHCR.
Second, Canada is now the largest refugee resettlement country in
the world. Resettlement is the process by which a refugee is selected in
country of first asylum to be offered permanent legal status in a third
country. It is recognized as one of the three possible “durable solu-
tions” for refugees. Since 1997, UNHCR has promoted resettlement
as a solution for refugees, as a tool to ensure protection to refugees
facing particular risks in their country of first asylum, and as a way of
showing solidarity with refugee-hosting countries. Traditionally, the US
was the largest resettlement country, accepting some 90,000 refugees for
resettlement each year. However, restrictions introduced by the Trump
administration saw that number fall to 22,900 in 2018. In contrast,
Canada resettled 28,100 refugees in 2018 (UNHCR 2019).
Also notable about Canada’s refugee resettlement program is the
opportunity for community groups and civil society organizations to
support the resettlement of refugees. Refugees resettled to Canada may
be selected and supported as a Government Assisted Refugee (GAR),
whereby the refugee is referred to Canada by UNHCR, government offi-
cials conduct selection and determination interviews—along with medical
and security screening—abroad, and government-supported settlement
agencies are responsible for the reception and integration of reset-
tled refugees during their first 12 months in Canada. Since 1978,
the Government of Canada has also worked with sponsorship groups
through the Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) program, whereby
refugees are identified by community sponsorship groups who submit a
sponsorship request to the Government of Canada. Through the PSR
program, Canadian officials retain responsibility for conducting determi-
nation interviews—along with medical and security screening—abroad,
while community groups are responsible for the reception and integra-
tion of resettled refugees during their first 12 months in Canada. In 2018,
some two-thirds of refugees resettled to Canada were privately sponsored.
While financial contributions to UNHCR and the resettlement of
refugees are Canada’s two most tangible forms of engagement with the
refugee regime, Canada has also been a significant diplomatic actor both
in major refugee-hosting regions and in Geneva, which hosts UNHCR’s
48 J. MILNER
Headquarters and the main decision-making bodies of the regime. Given

that 80% of the world’s refugees are in the global South, Canadian
missions in major refugee-hosting regions have been actively engaged
in collective efforts to promote protection for refugees and to leverage
durable solutions. One prominent example of Canadian leadership in
this area is the response to the prolonged presence of some 107,000
Lhotshampas refugees from Bhutan in neighboring Nepal since the early
1990s. In 2007, Canada helped lead a group of eight diplomatic missions
in Nepal’s capital, Kathmandu, to negotiate with both Nepal and Bhutan
to find a solution to this protracted refugee situation. Other members
of this group were Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, the US, and the UK. This group negotiated for some refugees
to return to Bhutan, while also securing an agreement from Nepal that
it would allow refugees who could not return to be resettled to third
countries.
More prominent examples of Canadian leadership and innovation,
however, have been found at the global level. Through the decision-
making bodies of the refugee regime, Canada has been a champion
of new norms and policies. Through the 1990s, for example, Canada
promoted the notion that provisions of persecution based on “mem-
bership in a particular social group” could be interpreted to include
gender-based persecution—a concept that is now well-established in inter-
national refugee law. In the 2000s, Canada promoted the notion of the
“strategic use of resettlement” (Pressé and Thomson 2008), through
which offers of resettlement to a smaller number of refugees is incor-
porated into discussions with refugee-hosting countries on enhancing
protection conditions for refugees not resettled.
Canada has also played a critical role as “bridge-builder” in negotia-
tions with UNHCR’s Executive Committee, facilitating dialogue between
refugee-hosting states of the global South and donor and resettlement
countries in the global North. For example, Canada is credited in having
helped secure agreement in 2009 for a UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion on responding to protracted refugee situations (Milner and
Loescher 2011). As early as 2004, UNHCR had recognized that refugees
were spending on average 18 years in exile, and that new approaches were
required to “unlock” these situations of prolonged exile. A new initiative
was launched in 2008, including pilot programs and a global meeting
on protracted refugee situations in Geneva in December 2008, involving
states, UN agencies, NGOs, and members of the research community.
The meeting identified key elements of the causes and consequences of

prolonged exile, along with a number of steps that could be taken to
resolve protracted refugee situations.
In 2009, UNHCR and states agreed that the annual meeting of
UNHCR’s Executive Committee (ExCom) that October would adopt a
Conclusion providing guidance to UNHCR and states on how protracted
refugee situations could be resolved. Since 1958, these Conclusions
have served significant, yet non-binding, agreements on how coopera-
tion between actors can address specific challenges confronting the global
refugee regime. Such agreements constitute key sources of global refugee
policy given that they are adopted by consensus by more than 100
UN Member States (Milner 2014). Negotiations for a 2009 ExCom
Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations began in May 2009. By
late September, however, it was clear that there would be no consensus,
as refugee-hosting states in the global South came to see negotiations as
a pretense for states in the global North to impose new obligations on
refugee-hosting states without offering additional assistance. When nego-
tiations failed to produce a consensus text ahead of the normal meeting
of ExCom in October, many observers assumed that efforts to find an
agreement had failed. Canadian leadership is widely credited with contin-
uing negotiations into November and the convening of a special ExCom
meeting on 8 December 2009 to adopt ExCom Conclusion No. 109
(LXI) on Protracted Refugee Situations (Milner and Loescher 2011).
These three forms of engagement with the global refugee regime—as
a top-10 donor, as a leading resettlement country, and as a promi-
nent diplomatic actor—give Canada particular moral and expert authority
within the regime. This authority enables Canada to exert influence
and exercise forms of productive power within the regime, especially
in promoting new norms and forms of innovation. Also significant is
Canada’s ability to promote and sustain dialogue within the regime,
especially between refugee-hosting states in the global South and more
powerful donor and resettlement countries in the global North. These
forms of influence were all critical to Canada’s ability to influence the
outcomes of the process leading to the Global Compact on Refugees.
50 J. MILNER
2015 and the Road to the 2016 New York Summits

Events in Europe in 2015 provided but the latest illustration of the core
deficiencies of the global refugee regime. By December 2015, it was esti-
mated that some 911,000 individuals had sought asylum in Southern
Europe that year, most undertaking perilous crossings of the Mediter-
ranean or Aegean to reach Italy or Greece. From April 2015, thousands
of individuals died undertaking these crossings. On 20 April, for example,
UNHCR reported that “600 people drowned in the Mediterranean when
their boat capsized shortly before midnight on April 18 in Libyan waters
some 180 km south of Italy’s Lampedusa Island” (UNHCR 2015). Then
UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres expressed his
“shock” and “urged European countries to restore a robust rescue-at-sea
operation.”
By September 2015, more than 300,000 individuals had sought entry
to Europe and an estimated 2600 had died trying. European responses to
these arrivals were chaotic and uncoordinated. Despite mechanisms at the
level of the European Union to foster cooperation, states in Northern and
Eastern Europe sought to contain refugees in Italy and Greece. Condi-
tions in the reception centers for migrants were desperate as individuals
there lacked reliable access to shelter and sanitation, let alone the legal
process to claim asylum.
Global calls for action were galvanized in early September 2015 by
images of Aylan Kurdi, a Syrian toddler who drowned while attempting
to cross the Aegean from Turkey to Greece along with his family. But the
initiative was truly seized by refugees themselves who began walking from
southern Europe to seek asylum further north. What followed was a series
of efforts by states to close borders or encourage the onward movement
of refugees into neighboring states, especially when Germany announced
its willingness to accept all Syrian asylum seekers arriving on its territory.
These events had a clear impact on the Canadian federal campaign
ahead of the election on 19 October 2015. The publication of the image
of Aylan Kurdi’s body on 2 September prompted calls for all parties to
commit to robust contributions to responding to the needs of Syrian
refugees. The issue of refugees was thrust into Canadian politics in a
way not seen for more than 25 years. On 5 September, the Liberal Party
responded with three specific commitments if elected (Liberal Party of
Canada 2015):
• Resettlement to Canada of 25,000 Government Assisted Syrian

Refugees by the end of 2015;
• C$100 million to increase refugee processing and sponsorship and
settlement services capacity in Canada; and
• C$100 million to UNHCR to support relief activities in Syria and
the region.
These commitments went well beyond commitments made by other polit-

ical parties and were a defining aspect of the Liberal Party’s progressive
and internationalist foreign policy platform. These commitments were
also clearly a priority for the new government as they were largely met in
a matter of months. In November 2015, the government announced its
resettlement plan and made good on its promise to contribute an addi-
tional C$100 million to UNHCR operations in Syria and neighboring
states. The government ultimately met its target of resettling 25,000
Syrian refugees by the end of February 2016 through a combination
of government-assisted and privately sponsored refugees. According to
government statistics, a total of 29,970 Syrian refugees were resettled to
Canada between 24 November 2015 and 15 August 2016 (IRCC 2016).
This response, and the speed with which it was implemented, posi-
tioned Canada along with Germany as prominent leaders from the global
North on the refugee issue when it was raised on the agenda of the United
Nations in New York, thus beginning the process that led to the GCR.
On 20 November 2015, UNGA convened a plenary session on “Global
Awareness of the Tragedies of Irregular Migrants in the Mediterranean
Basin with Specific Emphasis on Syrian Asylum Seekers.” In his statement
to the session, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for a “new
approach to manage the challenges of global mobility, built on equitable
responsibility sharing.” Over 50 member states spoke at the session in
support of a UN-led process to develop a new collective response, not
only to the needs of Syrian refugees, but also to address the limitations of
the global refugee regime.
What followed from November 2015 to September 2016 was an
extraordinary series of events (Ferris and Donato 2019). On 4 February
2016, the UNSG and the governments of the UK, Norway, Kuwait, and
Germany cohosted a conference on the humanitarian needs of Syrian
refugees. In March 2016, the UNHCR hosted a “resettlement plus”
conference in Geneva to seek to secure additional resettlement opportu-
nities for Syrian refugees. During this meeting, particular attention was
52 J. MILNER
paid to Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) program. As

noted above, this program allows community groups to assume many of
the financial and other obligations associated with the admission of reset-
tled refugees to Canada, while the government retains responsibility for
determining eligibility and admissibility, especially on security and medical
grounds. Until 2016, Canada was the only country in the world with such
a system. In response to the interest of other states, who wanted to be
seen internationally as responding to the needs of refugees but who faced
domestic opposition on this issue, Canada’s Minister of Immigration,
John McCallum, announced in March 2016 that Canada would develop
an initiative to share details of the PSR program. This initiative was later
launched in December 2016 as the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative
(GRSI), a partnership between the Government of Canada, UNHCR,
the University of Ottawa, the Giustra Foundation, and the Open Society
Foundations.
Then, in April 2016, the UNSG issued a report entitled In Safety
and Dignity, which made ambitious calls for more robust international
cooperation for refugees and migrants. In May 2016, the World Human-
itarian Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, resulted in new commitments to
humanitarian financing. Although falling short of the level of new binding
commitments to meet humanitarian needs, the Summit concluded with
61 UN Member States, including Canada, endorsing a political commu-
niqué that supported the “five core responsibilities” identified in the
UNSG’s Agenda for Humanity report.
In parallel, negotiations began in New York on the text of the New
York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants ahead of the UN Summit
for Refugees and Migrants, scheduled for 19 September 2016. Through
negotiations in June and early July 2016, it was expected that the Decla-
ration would call for a further process to negotiate a Global Compact on
Migration within two years, while adopting the Comprehensive Refugee
Response Framework (CRRF) developed by UNHCR. It was only in late
July 2016 that refugee-hosting states asserted their position that the New
York Declaration should lead to parallel two-year processes to develop
two distinct compacts: one for refugees and one for migrants.
World leaders gathered in New York in September 2016 for two signif-
icant events. The first was the UN Summit on 19 September, which
adopted the New York Declaration and endorsed its call for greater inter-
national cooperation to respond to the needs of the world’s refugees and
migrants. The Declaration also tasked UNHCR with leading a process to
develop a Global Compact on Refugees, intended to ensure implemen-

tation of the CRRF, which was attached as Annex 1 to the New York
Declaration (Ferris and Donato 2019).
The second event was the Leaders’ Summit on 20 September 2016.
This event was organized as an initiative by US President Barack Obama,
and was cohosted by the UN Secretary-General, President Obama, and six
other UN Member States, including Canada. The purpose of the Leaders’
Summit was to supplement the passage of the New York Declaration by
securing specific commitments to additional humanitarian funding and
resettlement opportunities by states in the global North, matched by
policy concessions by major refugee-hosting states relating to refugees’
work rights and access to education. 52 UN Member States participated
at the Summit.
Canada played a prominent role in both events. The Canadian delega-
tion was led by Prime Minister Trudeau, who stated on the floor of the
UN General Assembly “we’re Canada, and we’re here to help.” Prime
Minister Trudeau’s presence generated significant interest from partic-
ipants. In fact, the start of a side-event on international cooperation
for refugees, cochaired by Prime Minister Trudeau and Queen Rania of
Jordan, was delayed by the number of participants seeking “selfies” with
the Canadian Prime Minister.
Also significant was the fact that Canada was invited by the US to
be one of the cohosts for the Leaders’ Summit on 20 September. This
invitation was in recognition of the leadership that Canada had already
shown on the resettlement of Syrian refugees, and its leadership in
helping other states develop private sponsorship resettlement programs
through the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative. Canada also made
important funding announcements at the Leaders’ Summit, including
C$37.8 million to support UNHCR’s global response, C$20 million to
the Education Cannot Wait Fund initiative, and C$739,000 through
the International Development Research Center (IDRC) to improve the
accessibility and quality of learning for refugee and host community chil-
dren, and to build capacities of teachers and educators in up to 25 schools
in Lebanon and Jordan.
Canada’s leadership in the global refugee regime was further recog-
nized in October 2016 when Canada was elected Chair of UNHCR
Executive Committee at a meeting in Geneva. This election was antici-
pated as it followed the custom of the Vice-Chair to the Office of Chair
the following year, but Canada’s election was greeted with particular
54 J. MILNER
enthusiasm given that Canada’s term as Chair, from October 2016 to

October 2017, would coincide with the start of the process leading to
the GCR. In this way, Canada had a particular opportunity to influence
the process through its Mission in Geneva and the leadership of Rosemary
McCarney, then Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to
the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
Before turning to the process between 2016 and 2018 that led to the
GCR itself, it is important to consider if Canada’s global engagement
with the refugee issue was an isolated issue or possibly part of a broader
foreign policy strategy by the government. Here, it is important to note
that Canada announced its bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Secu-
rity Council just two weeks before its commitment to share its refugee
resettlement model in March 2016. While this bid may, at first, seem
unrelated to Canada’s refugee policy, the two may have been related.
Canada’s contributions to protection and solutions for refugees is, first
and foremost, a humanitarian program and contribution to the global
refugee regime. At the same time, however, tangible leadership on global
refugee issues was also understood to be part of Canada’s re-engagement
with multilateralism and the UN System under the Trudeau govern-
ment, and an opportunity to enhance Canada’s global reputation—both
among refugee-hosting states in the global South and with other donor
and resettlement countries in the global North. Support from both these
constituencies would be important if Canada is to be successful in its bid
for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
The Making of the Global Compact on Refugees

Annex 1 of the New York Declaration detailed the Comprehensive
Refugee Response Framework, intended to engage a wide range of actors
to ensure more predictable responses to specific refugee situations. The
final section of the CRRF, entitled “The Way Forward,” called for the
implementation of the CRRF, under the leadership of UNHCR. In the
final fortnight of negotiating the text, a further two paragraphs were
added, stating that states invited UNHCR “to engage with States and
consult with all relevant stakeholders over the coming two years, with a
view to evaluating the detailed practical application of the comprehen-
sive refugee response framework and assessing the scope for refinement
and further development” with a view to realizing four goals: “to ease
pressures on the host countries involved, to enhance refugee self-reliance,
to expand access to third-country solutions, and to support conditions

in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.” In concert with
the parallel timeline to develop the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and
Managed Migration by the end of 2018 (Ferris and Donato 2019), states
committed to “work towards the adoption in 2018 of a global compact
on refugees” and invited UNHCR to “include such a proposed global
compact on refugees in [its] annual report to the General Assembly in
2018.” In practical terms, this gave UNHCR until September 2018 to
initiate and guide a consultation process it had not anticipated.
On 17 May 2017, UNHCR issued a one-page “roadmap” document
that outlined the process intended to lead to the development of the
GCR. This process included two tracks: first, the implementation of the
CRRF in a number of pilot countries; and, second, a series of thematic
discussions and formal consultations with Member States and other actors
in Geneva. Thus began the marathon that was the GCR process. From
2016 to 2018, the CRRF was piloted on a regional basis in Central
America (involving Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
and Panama), in eight African states (Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, and Zambia) and in Afghanistan. The results
of these pilots contributed to five thematic discussions in Geneva between
July and November 2017. These experiences were brought together
in December 2017 during the convening of the High Commissioner’s
Dialogue in Geneva, an annual thematic meeting on issues of broad
concern to UNHCR and involving states, NGOs, other UN agencies,
members of the private sector and academics.
Canada was actively engaged in all aspects of this lead-up to the
formal consultations on the text of the GCR through its Mission in
Geneva and staff in the relevant teams at Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
and Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) who were
assigned specifically to following the process and supporting Canada’s
involvement. In addition, Canada was an engaged donor in many of
the CRRF pilot countries, attending regional meetings to discuss and
monitor implementation. In addition, Canada invested time and effort in
supporting regular consultations and dialogue with civil society organiza-
tions, NGOs, and academics engaged in the process. These consultations
included formal meetings open to civil society partners to prepare Canada
for its formal participation in the GCR process, to share information,
and to report to civil society on Canada’s engagement with other states
56 J. MILNER
and UNHCR. In addition, representatives from GAC and IRCC main-

tained an active dialogue with a range of Canadian partners engaged in
the process to provide Canada with an evidence-base to advance its prior-
ities and to help shape Canada’s engagement in the process. Largely as
a result, Canada’s official representatives in the process benefited in large
measure from the support of Canadian civil society during the process.
A clear example of the results of this dialogue between the Govern-
ment of Canada and Canadian civil society was Canada’s decision to issue
a non-paper on the development of the GCR. In May 2017, GAC and
IRCC convened a half-day meeting with Canadian NGOs and academics
to discuss the GCR process, Canada’s experience with the implementa-
tion of the CRRF approach, and opportunities for Canadian influence
in the GCR process. Given Canada’s standing within the international
community on refugee issues at the time, coupled with ambiguity on
the substantive direction of the GCR process, civil society actors strongly
encouraged the Government of Canada to issue a non-paper, outlining
its objectives and ambitions in the GCR process, and as a means of influ-
encing the terms and parameters of the process. The resulting document,
issued in October 2017, called for the GCR to increase accountability,
include complementary pathways for refugees to be resettled, main-
streaming a gender-sensitive approach throughout the GCR, and the
development of clear mechanisms to ensure effective implementation.
Canada was one of the first member states to issue such a public and
comprehensive statement on its objectives in the GCR process. Canadian
civil society broadly welcomed and endorsed the paper, thereby enhancing
Canada’s moral authority within the formal consultation process that
followed.
This support from civil society became increasingly important during
the formal consultations on the text of the GCR from February to July
2018, in which only UN Member States could participate, unlike the
thematic consultations in 2017 that included states, UN agencies, NGOs
and refugee representatives. Despite this structural constraint, Canada
maintained its dialogue with civil society actors to discuss the evolution
of the text of the GCR, from the release of the Zero Draft text on 31
January 2018 to the conclusion of the consultation process in Geneva
and the transmission of the text to New York in late July 2018. It was
another extraordinary chapter in an extraordinary process.
The zero draft of the GCR, issued by UNHCR on 31 January 2017,
was greeted by general dismay by many commentators. Jeff Crisp, former
Head of Policy and Evaluation at UNHCR, described the text as “cau-

tious in tone, constipated in style and curiously oblivious of both current
realities and historical experience” (cited in Alfred 2018). There was a
general sense that the draft did nothing to address the core gaps of the
refugee regime, it did not address the issue of reliability or predictability
of cooperation in response to refugee movements and it made no mention
of the need for mobilizing political will. Instead, it focused on program-
matic and technical aspects of program design and implementation. The
document was also critiqued for not grounding its content in a clear
commitment to refugee rights and the need to reaffirm the normative
foundations of the refugee regime.
These themes were addressed by Canada’s Representative in Geneva
during the first formal consultations on the text in February 2018.
Ambassador McCarney noted the immense opportunity afforded the
international community in the crafting of the GCR and called for the
text to “clearly reaffirm the international legal obligations and norms that
are foundational to the refugee protection regime” (McCarney 2018).
She further called for the revisions of the text to more fully reflect the
importance of the participation of refugees and host communities in the
mechanisms of the GCR, as opposed to simply state actors. She also high-
lighted the importance of the text to develop a stronger emphasis on
gender, age, and diversity, and to ensure that the GCR clearly recog-
nized how central the “mobilization of political will and of political
engagement” would be to the success of the process (McCarney 2018).
While many of these points were repeated by other states, it was
striking how consistent Canada was in its emphasis on these priori-
ties throughout the six rounds of formal consultations and its informal
dialogue with UNHCR. Also notable was Canada’s role in facilitating
multi-stakeholder dialogue on specific aspects of the GCR, from the role
of normative commitments in the text and the specific areas of support
required, to the development of the mechanisms ultimately included in
the final text. This included delicate questions relating to UNHCR’s role
in the mechanisms developed in the GCR, the role of refugees themselves
in the process, and the ability of the process to adequately reflect the inter-
ests and priorities of refugee-hosting states in the global South. This was
crucial given that the GCR text would ultimately need to be approved by
UNGA in New York, where states in the global South have a majority of
votes. By the time of the final formal consultation in early July 2018,
Canada made note of the “many positive refinements” that had been
58 J. MILNER
made over the four drafts of the text, and how many of Canada’s priorities
had been met. While the text remained a non-binding agreement, Canada
expressed its hope that the mechanisms contained in the GCR, espe-
cially the ministerial level Global Refugee Forums to be hosted every four
years, represented “a good compromise for maintaining momentum and
political will while also guiding the Compact’s implementation” (Canada
2018).
The conclusion of the formal consultations in Geneva in July 2018
did not, however, mean an end to the GCR process. Instead, the future
of the GCR seemed to be in doubt in September 2018 as right-wing
populist actors, especially in the US, Europe, and Australia, began to
mobilize against the passage of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly
and Regular Migration (Ferris and Donato 2019). Arguing that the
global compact process would limit state sovereignty and impose external
controls on state borders, politicians in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the
Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the US spoke against the global
compacts. In Belgium, for example, the governing coalition was threat-
ened when the Flemish Nationalist NVA party called for Belgium to
withdraw from the Global Compact for Migration (GCM). In December
2018, only days before the GCM was to be adopted, Steve Bannon and
Marine Le Pen took part in anti-GCM rallies outside the Flanders regional
parliament in Brussels.1 The fate of both compacts seemed increasingly
in doubt in light of this growing opposition, especially following the
decision by the Trump Administration to withdraw US support for the
GCM.
These currents arrived in Canada in September 2018. On 24
September 2018, Ministers Hussen (Immigration) and Bibeau (Interna-
tional Cooperation) copublished an op-ed in Maclean’s magazine with
the UNHCR Representative to Canada, Jean-Nicolas Beuze entitled
“Why Canada will lead the charge on the UN’s global refugee plan”
(Hussen et al. 2018). The article specifies how Canada would work to
support the four objectives of the GCR. As if in reply, and in an effort
to respond to the launch of the People’s Party of Canada in September
2018 and statements from activists such as Faith Goldy and Michelle
Rempel, the Immigration Critic for the Conservative Party of Canada,
1 The author wishes to thank Nathan Benson and colleagues at the Refugee Hub,
University of Ottawa, for analysis of global movements against the GCM.
moved the following motion in the Standing Committee on Citizenship

and Immigration on 30 October 2018:
That… the Committee conduct a study of the United Nations’ Global

Compact on Migration; that this study examine the degree to which
Canada was consulted; that the study also determine how the compact
will affect Canada, including but not limited to potential impacts on
immigration levels, resettlement cost supports, potential cost impact on
social programs (such as social welfare systems, affordable housing stock,
regional homeless shelters and food banks), sovereignty on decision making
regarding immigration policy; that departmental officials be in attendance
for at least one meeting; that this study consist of no fewer than two
meetings; that the study be completed prior to Canada making a final deci-
sion to ratify the United Nations’ Global Compact on Migration; that the
Committee report its findings to the House; and that … the government
table a comprehensive response thereto.
While the Liberal Party of Canada exercised its majority to ultimately

approve a report that endorsed both global compacts, the Opposition’s
motion and the rise of the People’s Party of Canada suggested that polit-
ical resolve was required for Canada to remain supportive of the GCR
and GCM, at home and abroad.
In the end, the Global Compact on Refugees passed safely through the
final process in New York. Concerns that states in the global South would
be mobilized by the G-77 to oppose the GCR given its lack of binding
commitments by states in the global North did not come to fruition.
As part of the UNHCR’s annual “omnibus” resolution, the GCR was
approved by UNGA’s Third Committee on 13 November 2018. A final
hurdle emerged in December 2018 on the wording of the UNGA reso-
lution in relation to the GCR and the reluctance of some Member States
to be seen as “endorsing” or “approving” the non-binding GCR. In the
end, the UNGA voted to “affirm” the GCR in a plenary vote on 17
December 2018. 181 Member States voted in favor of the motion. Three
states (Eritrea, Liberia, Libya) abstained. More significant were the two
Member States to vote against the resolution: Hungary and the US. Given
that the US had long been the most powerful and influential state in the
global refugee regime (Martin and Ferris 2017), it remains to be seen
what lasting impact US opposition will have on the implementation of
the GCR.
60 J. MILNER
Explaining Canada’s Influence in the GCR Process

As noted above, it would be problematic to ascribe independent causal
significance to Canada’s role in the negotiation process as a whole.
That said, Canada is widely understood by those closely involved in the
process to have had a discernable impact on the development and conclu-
sion of the GCR. Canada’s leadership on refugee issues on the global
stage became increasingly important over time as other states became
constrained by domestic politics to be so clearly supportive of the process.
This provided UNHCR with a critical ally in the process, especially during
difficult stages in the formal consultations and during the uncertainty
over the GCR’s fate once it went to New York. Canada’s objectives in
the development of the text were generally achieved. Canada was able to
support the effort to reach a consensus on the text in Geneva and helped
ensure the final passage of the text through the UN General Assembly in
New York. More significantly, the final text contains clear expressions of
Canadian interests, especially through its emphasis on the normative foun-
dations of the international refugee protection regime, the highlighting
of the needs of refugee women and girls, the prioritizing of whole-of-
society approaches, and the articulation of specific mechanisms to help
ensure implementation of the agreement. These are all priorities Canada
expressed in its non-paper at the start of the process in 2017, and around
which it built a coalition of support over time.
How can Canada’s impact in the process be explained? Given the size
of Canada’s resource contributions to the global refugee regime, and the
larger impact Canada was seen to have relative to states, like the Nether-
lands, that contribute more to UNHCR and have a higher proportion of
their contributions unearmarked, Canada’s influence cannot be explained
only in terms of material power. Instead, Canada’s influence can be
explained more fully through Canada’s moral and expert authority within
the refugee regime. While these tools of influence are more traditionally
associated with international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999,
2004), this chapter has illustrated how Canada’s influence was derived
from its leadership on refugee issues, its own discretionary actions to
resettle Syrian refugees at a time when other states were closing borders
despite legal obligations, and on the expertise it shared around the private
sponsorship of refugees. Also crucial was the capacity Canada had to
engage in both the formal process and informal consultations at home and
abroad through the staff resources dedicated to the cumbersome process.
Finally, Canadian influence may also be explained in large measure

by the reality that UNHCR needed support from prominent states in
the refugee regime as the process became more fraught and a growing
number of states faced constraints on the global stage due to domestic
opportunity structures. Further to Putnam’s analysis of international poli-
tics as a “two-level game” with domestic and international politics being
deeply entwined (Putnam 1988), Canada’s ability to lead in the GCR
process was greatly enhanced by a stable majority government in Ottawa
that was committed to being a progressive voice on refugee issues as part
of its strategic re-engagement with multilateralism. This stable political
support from Canada was significant for UNHCR, which arguably added
significance to Canada’s suggestions to UNHCR throughout the process.
This argument has important implications for theory and practice in
the governance of the global refugee regime. Practically, it sheds addi-
tional light on when and how certain actors are able to exert power and
influence in the global refugee regime (Milner and Wojnarowicz 2017).
It also suggests the need for a robust research agenda on the moments
and mechanisms through which states, like Canada, and other actors are
able to influence global governance processes as nuanced and complex as
the development of the Global Compact on Refugees. As suggested by
Putnam (1988, p. 427), “domestic politics and international relations are
often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the
puzzling tangle.” The case of Canadian influence in the process leading
to the GCR makes clear that that puzzle is as relevant today as it was
30 years ago.
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CHAPTER 4
The Coming Clash Over Migration Policy

Between Canada and the United States
Christopher Sands and Taylor Jackson
Introduction
People are increasingly on the move. Transportation has become easier
and cheaper. Despite automation and telecommunication, human-
to-human interaction remains essential for collaboration and service
provision. Yet the same human-to-human connection can transmit
disease, violence, and death causing people to flee their homes or,
in less dire circumstances, seek new opportunity. Just as the flow of
information, goods, and capital is essential to the global economy, the
movement of people is necessary for growth and the pursuit of happiness.
Governing and regulating the temporary and permanent movement
of people crossing national borders is a central function of the state.
Control of who may enter a territory is a manifestation of sovereignty.
C. Sands (B) · T. Jackson

Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: csands@jhu.edu

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_4
66 C. SANDS AND T. JACKSON
Despite Kenichi Ohmae’s prediction of a borderless world in the twenty-

first century (Omae 1999) national borders set durable parameters for
markets and communities.
North American economic integration has eschewed political integra-
tion by design. Canada and the United States remain capable of taking
divergent paths when it comes to immigration policy, and in several areas
today the potential for a clash over these policies is growing. The United
States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) made minor changes to
temporary entry provisions for certain professions, retaining limits on
labour mobility that were only modestly liberalized by the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Firms are seeking to import skilled
professionals for the tech sector despite efforts to upskill local labour to
meet this demand. After nearly two decades of talks, the United States and
Canada have begun to exchange data on individuals crossing their borders
by air, sea, and now finally by land; yet better data about who crosses
can trigger issues of law enforcement and public service delivery at the
shared border, too. Both countries are also grappling with an increased
flow of refugees and asylum seekers whose irregular border crossings may
compromise the ability of governments to enforce current migration poli-
cies, a phenomenon made more difficult by the mutual intervulnerability
of the United States and Canada.
Intervulnerability, as Charles Doran (1984) observed, often fosters
bilateral tension and conflict before Washington and Ottawa find ways
to cooperate. A minority government in Canada and a populist govern-
ment in the United States raise the potential for conflict over differences
in migration policies in the near term, but the longer-term outlook is for
eventual cooperation. The place of issues relating to migration policies on
the bilateral agenda is assured.
Under the Trudeau government, Canada has sought to increase
inbound migration. This commitment is emphasized in the mandate
letter given to the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
after the Liberal’s 2015 election victory, where the government estab-
lished the goal of bringing in more than 1 million permanent residents
in the three-year period between 2020 and 2022 (see also Chapter 6 in
this volume). At the same time, the government also established that
it will be working to reduce the processing times for asylum seekers
(Trudeau 2019). Canada’s comparatively open approach to immigration
policy stands in stark contrast to that of the Trump administration in
4 THE COMING CLASH OVER MIGRATION POLICY … 67
the United States. During its three-years in power, the Trump adminis-
tration has sought to restrict irregular or undocumented migration and
asylum claims, while also trying to reduce the number of legal migrants
to the country (Montoya-Galvez 2020). This divergence on immigration
policy and existing issues presents the possibility of several coming policy
clashes between Canada and the United States, including whether labour
mobility should have been expanded under the USMCA, immigration for
the tech sector, various entry and exit issues, the acceptance of refugee and
asylum seekers, and the language in the Safe Third Country Agreement
between the two countries.
Labour Mobility Under the USMCA

High-skilled labour demand is on the rise across North America. Demo-
graphic change across the continent is shrinking the size of the labour
force, and simultaneously placing increasing pressure on government
services and raising the demand for skilled healthcare workers. At the same
time, technological change is transforming labour markets by reshaping
the types of jobs that are being created and the skills that are needed to
work in those fields (McDaniel et al. 2015; Broecke et al. 2016; Holzer
2019). Firms are also trying to manage complex integrated supply chains
that require cross-border expertise. One way to address at least part of
these challenges is to have policies that allow for temporary cross-border
labour mobility. These types of policies have a history in North America,
and they have been introduced through the region’s trade agreements
dating back to the 1987 Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA).
While there is an over three-decade history of trade agreement-based
temporary labour mobility in North America, the USMCA offers little
change or improvement to the existing structures that were ushered in
with the NAFTA.
In Chapter 15 of CUFTA, Canada and the United States set out the
institutional framework to provide for the temporary1 ability of either
1 Here temporary was defined as “entry without the intent to establish permanent
residence”.
country’s citizens, who meet certain criteria or work in certain occupa-

tional categories, to work in the other country.2 The CUFTA preamble
sets out this rationale for the inclusion of labour migration as part of a
trade agreement:
Export sales today require more than a good product at a good price.
They also require a good sales network and, most of all, reliable after-
sales service. Free and open trade conditions, therefore, require not only
that goods, services and investments be treated without discrimination, but
that the people required to make sales and manage investments or provide
before and after service of those sales and investments should be able to
move freely across the border. (Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement 1987,
p. 215)
It was this focus on facilitating trade in goods and broader economic

integration that was behind the logic of the Canadian government
in pursuing its objectives to gain the temporary entry provisions in
the CUFTA. Several Canadian businesspersons and entrepreneurs had
expressed indignation towards the Canadian government regarding their
frustration with delays, and in some cases outright rejection of entry,
that they were experiencing when they tried to cross the U.S. border
to make service sales. In some cases, Canadian firms were resorting to
setting up U.S. subsidiaries, using third-parties, or conducting business
in-absentia, ultimately leading to inefficient uses of resources, lower sales,
and higher costs. While the emphasis was on the cross-border movement
of labour to facilitate goods trade, the temporary entry chapter would
govern much more. For example, in the list of approved professional
occupations covered by the agreement, temporary work authorization
could be granted to a number of medical and science professions that
are beyond the scope of allowing labour mobility for the purpose of
facilitating the sale and service of goods.
In recognizing that the NAFTA labour mobility provisions were new
to both countries, Canada and the United States agreed to consider ways
to improve and update them in the future. This opportunity presented
itself when the negotiations for what would become the NAFTA began
2 There were four types of persons (business visitors, professionals, traders or investors,
or inter-company transferees) to enter the other country for temporary work purposes.
Under the professional designation there were 49 listed occupations.
in 1991. In the NAFTA, temporary entry for businesspersons falls under

Chapter 16. In general, compared to the CUFTA, the chapter on skilled
labour mobility within the NAFTA is much more detailed and specific, in
addition to having a number of qualifiers that were not in the CUFTA.
What remained similar is the general intent of the Chapter as explained
in Article 1602. This Article iterated that the obligations embodied in
the Chapter were “to avoid unduly impairing or delaying trade in goods
or services or conduct of investment activities under this Agreement”.
As such, the general architecture of labour mobility preferences estab-
lished under the CUFTA remained quite similar under the NAFTA, in
that labour mobility under the NAFTA was for citizens of the parties who
are engaged in business activities, professionals, traders and investors, or
intra-company transfers.
For professional entry, the NAFTA made several changes. Parties could
formally require that those working under the professional designation
obtain a visa prior to entry (this could be required of all entry categories
governed by Chapter 16). This provision would lead to the creation of the
TN Visa in the United States and, in the case of Canada, NAFTA profes-
sionals receive work permits under the International Mobility Program.
The labour mobility and temporary entry provisions established under
the CUFTA are best described as a first step in the direction of furthering
high-skilled North American labour market integration. In comparison,
labour mobility under the NAFTA is aptly described as a more mature
document that is cognizant of, and tries to address, what some of the
criticisms of labour mobility were under the CUFTA. Not only does
the NAFTA chapter represents a more detailed exposition of the rules
governing temporary entry, but it also includes provisions aimed at
ensuring that temporary entry is not used to undermine the labour rights
of individuals working within the respective parties. While the NAFTA
was a step forward on North American labour mobility, it went for
25 years without substantial change, even though labour markets under-
went a considerable transformation in this time period. An update was
needed.
The opportunity for that long-overdue update to the labour mobility
chapter came with President Trump’s push to renegotiate the NAFTA.
USMCA’s Chapter 16 governing labour mobility is best described as a
status quo continuation from the NAFTA, considering that the majority
of the USMCA chapter is identical to the NAFTA Chapter 16. Two of
the additions to the USMCA are Articles 16.2 (2) and (3). The addi-
tion of these articles seems to be more about clearly articulating that (1)
entry under this chapter is indeed temporary and that there is no path to
permanent residence and citizenship; and (2) that parties still retain the
sovereign right to regulate who enters their respective territories. What
the additions to the chapter on temporary labour mobility in the USMCA
demonstrate is a slightly more sovereign-managed form of labour market
integration. The USMCA did not significantly change any of the provi-
sions established by the NAFTA, rather, it inserted language that to some
degree, emphasizes more the temporary nature of the program and the
rights of the parties. These changes, however, are far from substantive and
will likely have little impact on the temporary labour mobility framework
that has been agreed upon for almost three decades.
In a similar vein, it is also worth noting that the language justifying the
inclusion of a labour mobility chapter in the USMCA still centred around
not adversely delaying trade in goods and services or investment between
the three countries. Labour mobility has thus never moved beyond the
framing of trade activities. That is, the institutional framework governing
North American skilled-labour market integration has not recognized the
rising demand within all three countries for high-skilled labour beyond
goods trade or investment flows.
That little was changed for temporary labour mobility from the
NAFTA to the USMCA is perhaps not surprising given the divergent
positions on immigration policy between Canada and the United States
under President Trump. Throughout the USMCA negotiations there
appeared to be little interest from the United States side for revisiting
the NAFTA temporary entry provisions, even though one of Canada’s
demands was to expand the free movement of professionals. Admittedly,
it is unclear whether liberalizing the temporary mobility provisions would
have led to expanded freedom for the movement of professionals. Indeed,
there were positions held by politicians in the United States that the
TN visa program should be limited. In a letter to U.S. trade repre-
sentatives, Senator Charles Grassley expressed that the “uncapped and
under-recognized pool of high skill employees” resulting from the TN
visa program “exacerbates the risk to American workers” (Jackson 2017).
It is important to recognize that if labour mobility under the NAFTA
was substantially reopened during the USMCA negotiations, the result
could have been more restricted labour flows, or Canada might have
had to compromise on key sectors (e.g. dairy or culture) to move the
labour mobility issue forward. Given these realities, it was unlikely that
much progress would have been made on working towards freer labour
markets. However, during the six-year USMCA review (should the agree-
ment be ratified and enter into force), the countries should commit to
examining how the regime governing the flow of high-skilled workers in
North America could be improved.
Another issue that could pose challenges for the TN visa in the future is
President Trump’s moves to curb the use of the H-1B temporary skilled
worker visas. Under the Trump administration, denials of H-1B appli-
cations are rising, yet as discussed above, demand for skilled labour is
growing. In fiscal year 2018, denials of initial H-1B applications increased
to 24% from 13% in 2017 (the initial denial rate was 32% in the first
quarter of 2019) and the denial rate for continuing H-1B petitions
increased to 12% from 5% in the previous year (the continuing denial
rate was 18% in the first quarter of 2019) (Anderson 2019). The rise in
denials could push firms to use the TN visa more to address their skilled
labour needs. If the TN visa comes to be seen by the U.S. Congress as
a workaround for the H-1B visa, this could lead to policymakers in the
United States to seek reform or limit its use. Canada would try to limit
any proposed restrictions to the TN visa and, as such, if there is a push
for the United States to restrict TN visa use there will likely be a clash on
this issue between Canada and the United States.
Tech Sector Professionals

Canada has experienced strong growth in tech sector employment in
recent years and has overcome a skilled labour shortage through immigra-
tion policy. Advanced degrees and technical specializations in demand in
Canada confer significant advantages for would-be immigrants who apply
through the normal process due to Canada’s immigration points system.
Innovation Science and Economic Development Minister Navdeep Bains
instituted a new Global Skills program as a fast track for tech sector profes-
sionals that promises processing in as little as two weeks for qualifying
specialists with a job offer from an employer in Canada (Lindeman 2017).
The United States manages the immigration of skilled professionals
through the H1-B visa. A fixed number of H1-B visas is made available
each year in an annual quota, a number determined by the U.S. Congress.
Larger tech sector firms have lobbied Washington for an increase in this
quota in order to alleviate a shortage in local tech talent. Congress has
refused to increase the H1-B quota in order to force tech firms to hire
Americans, training them if necessary, to fill well-paid technology jobs.
At the same time, many U.S. states have scaled up Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Math (STEM) education programs at the primary and
secondary level to meet tech employers halfway by generating a future
stream of skilled labour that will allow for tech sector growth domestically.
The promise of a medium-term fix to the shortage of appropriately
skilled labour in the United States has not satisfied the short-term needs
of technology firms. Many of the largest U.S. tech firms have looked
to Canada for growth, investing in Canadian facilities in Vancouver,
Edmonton, Waterloo, Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal that share time
zones with these firms’ U.S. hubs in Silicon Valley, Denver, and on the
east coast in places like Boston, New York, and Washington. Through
their Canadian operations, U.S. headquartered tech firms are now able
to import talent from Asia and Europe to work in North America. For
tech professionals who attain Canadian citizenship, transfers to U.S. work
sites are possible, enhancing these firms’ chances to retain talent in a
competitive market.
The Canadian solution to tech firms’ immediate employment needs is
an end-run around the H1-B quotas that the U.S. Congress has resisted
changing, setting up the potential for a political clash between tech firms
and populist politicians who favour restrictive immigration policies that
put “Americans first”.
Increasing the risk of a backlash is a souring of the relationship between
Big Tech and Washington, DC. Once hailed as the conquering heroes of
the global economy, tech firms largely ignored Washington politics until
recently, and politicians at the federal, state, and local level fought to
attract investment and employment from tech firms with subsidies and
incentives. But in a trajectory that closely tracks the automotive industry,
as the growth in benefits (e.g. employment, investment, and economic
growth) generated by the sector flattened out, the political clout of
the sector began to decline (Luger 2000). In 2019, leading Democrats
and Republicans proposed using anti-trust law to break up technology
companies in the United States and demanded greater accountability
for collateral social impacts from the so-called FANG firms: Facebook,
Amazon, Netflix, and Google. Just as the car companies were threatened
with anti-trust investigations and asked to invest in passenger safety, fuel
efficiency, and emissions controls, the tech companies are being asked to
address misinformation and privacy.
With U.S. politicians placing additional scrutiny on tech firms, there

is a growing risk that the nearshoring—that is outsourcing to a nearby
country—of technology employment to Canada as a workaround for
the problems of skilled labour shortages in the United States and the
restrictive effects of the H1-B visa quota will become a source of conflict
between the United States and Canada. Another analogous situation from
the auto industry shows how this might emerge as a bilateral issue.
Before the NAFTA negotiations, automotive assemblers began
nearshoring labour-intensive manufacturing work to Mexico as a way for
U.S. and Canadian auto companies to save money by paying less for
labour that was covered by union contracts in the United States and
Canada; Mexico accommodated this by allowing tariff free treatment for
goods that entered Mexico for processing but were then re-exported by
plants known as maquiladoras.
Although a dormant concern today, the Trump administration’s use
of the USMCA negotiations to redistribute employment and investment
in North America to benefit the U.S. market at the expense of Canada
and Mexico illustrates the risk to Canada should the expansion in Canada
by U.S. headquartered tech firms be viewed in time as “tech-iladoras” by
jealous U.S. politicians and even voters.
Entry-Exit
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States led to a
decisive shift in the regulation of the movement of people and goods
across the Canada–U.S. border. To paraphrase the U.S. ambassador to
Canada at the time, Paul Cellucci, security was now more important than
trade and the result was a myriad of measures that led to a “thickening”
of the border (Ackleson 2009). While Canada and the United States have
negotiated several agreements to try to make the border “thinner” (Sands
2009), contention over several entry-exit issues remain, partly as a result
of those agreements themselves and partly as a result of domestic policy
changes.
NEXUS vs. Global Entry

One of the first responses to the heightened U.S. security concerns post-
9/11 was to establish the Smart Border Declaration and a 30-point
action plan between Canada and the United States.3 As part of the
declaration, the two countries committed to expanding the previously
piloted NEXUS program that provided expedited border crossings to
pre-approved travellers. The NEXUS program has since expanded consid-
erably, now being featured at 21 major land border crossings and in 9
major Canadian airports. A potential problem for the long-term sustain-
ability of the NEXUS program is the growth of the Global Entry Trusted
Traveler Program in the United States. Ostensibly, NEXUS and Global
Entry, which was established in 2008 and now apply to 11 countries,
function similarly and are in place for similar purposes, namely to expe-
dite travel for pre-approved individuals who are deemed low-risk. In
both cases, those interested in joining the programs and attaining the
benefits of expedited processing during travel, submit an application to
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (or to the Canada Border Services
Agency (CBSA) in the case of Canadians applying to NEXUS), pay an
enrollment fee, and if an individual is conditionally pre-approved they
schedule an interview with a border official at an enrollment centre. If
no issues arise during the interview, the individual is admitted to the
program. However, Americans admitted to the Global Entry program are
not eligible to enter Canada under NEXUS, although Canadian NEXUS
holders are eligible for Global Entry into the U.S. In order for Amer-
ican Global Entry holders to attain the benefits of the NEXUS program
for expedited entry into Canada, they must go through a number of addi-
tional steps, including an interview with a CBSA official and a retinal scan
at a designated Canadian airport if they want the benefits of an expedited
entry through Canadian airports.
It is this overlapping dual nature of the Global Entry and NEXUS
Trusted Traveler Programs that may present a problem in the future.
Congress or the executive branch may begin to question the need
to maintain unique programs like NEXUS when Global Entry is now
used by 11 countries (including India, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Mexico, and South Korea) and, in addition, the Government Account-
ability Office found in 2014 that 76% of NEXUS members were Canadian
(GAO 2014). The United States also appears to be showing a preference
for adding new countries to the Global Entry system instead of nego-
tiating unique Trusted Traveler Programs. This could lead to questions
3 The Declaration was signed by U.S. Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and
Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John Manley on December 12, 2001.
about whether the additional financial outlays associated with maintaining

separate Trusted Traveler Programs are justifiable given a comparatively
low American participation rate in NEXUS and whether there would be
cost savings and efficiency gains by rolling Canadians into the Global
Entry program. A push to fold the NEXUS program into Global Entry
might be resisted by Canadian politicians who will likely want to continue
having equal footing between CBSA and CBP officials. In addition,
Canada appears to show no desire for moving beyond NEXUS given that
the CBSA has recently extended access to NEXUS for Mexican nationals
who are part of their Viajero Confiable Trusted Traveler program (CBSA
2019). As such, a conflict between Canada and the United States might
arise in the future over NEXUS versus Global Entry.
Bilateral Data Exchange

Another looming entry–exit issue stems from the Beyond the Border
Declaration that was signed by Prime Minister Harper and President
Obama in 2011. The Declaration was signed as a response to the border
thickening that took place after 9/11 and attempted to create a conti-
nental approach to security that would help foster freer cross-border flows
of people, goods, and services. As part of the agreement, U.S. CBP and
CBSA recently began sharing with each other the biographic data, travel
documents, and other information on border crossings by Canadian and
U.S. citizens at land borders in the summer of 2019 (CBC News 2019).4
The purpose of the data sharing is to allow the Canadian and Amer-
ican governments to be better able to determine how long someone has
been in the country and to better focus resources on “high-risk travellers”
(CBC News 2019). The United States may have a legitimate reason to
want to better determine how long someone has been in the country,
given that visa overstays have exceeded illegal border crossings every year
for the past seven years, even though illegal border crossings along the
southern U.S. border receive the bulk of the media and political atten-
tion (Calamur 2019). Indeed, better tracking Canadian citizen entry and
exit records could allow the United States to have a greater sense of who
is overstaying their visas, which proves to be an issue for U.S. immigration
4 The two border protection agencies had already been sharing data on legal permanent
residents and third country nationals with each other since 2012. It is expected that they
will begin sharing data from individuals at airports in 2020.
authorities. Moreover, Canadian overstays are of concern. According to

data from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in FY 2018 for
individuals crossing into the United States at air and sea ports-of-entry,
there were an estimated 666,582 visa overstays, 92,542 of which were by
Canadians (~14%) (DHS 2019a). This was the highest number of over-
stays of any country in that year. However, the data does not include land
crossings and the majority of Canadian visits to the United States are by
land, meaning that the issue of Canadian visa overstays in the United
States is likely much greater.
Although there are legitimate reasons for Canada and the United
States to share the entry–exit data in question, privacy concerns have
been raised in Canada, in addition to the issue of U.S. “national secu-
rity overreach” (CBC News 2019). In reality, the Canadian concerns
regarding privacy might be overwrought. In testimony to the Standing
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Canada’s Privacy
Commissioner Daniel Therrien said that he is “generally satisfied that
this border management issue is based on important public policy objec-
tives and the personal information in question is not particularly sensitive”
(Therrien 2018). Nevertheless, privacy concerns reflect the long-standing
fear among many Canadians of succumbing to the security overreaches of
“Fortress America”. Recently raised privacy concerns in Canada as a result
of the entry–exit data sharing may also receive a boost from the new pilot
program that the U.S. DHS has implemented where they collect DNA
from people in immigration custody at select border crossings (Abedi
2020). Given the confluence of instigating policies, the potential for a
clash over privacy issues will remain well into the future.
Marijuana Legalization
A third entry–exit issue posing problems for Canadians entering into the
United States is the legalization of Marijuana in Canada. In October
2018, Canada legalized the use of recreational marijuana and 11 U.S.
states have done the same, including the border states of Washington
State, Michigan, Vermont, and Maine. The issue as it pertains to entry
into the United States is that marijuana remains illegal under federal law
and it is federal law that governs the border. As such, crossing the border
with marijuana can result in denial of entry into the U.S. and even arrest.
The United States has also made it clear that it does not intend to change
its federal laws in response to marijuana legalization in Canada (Steinmetz

2017).
The issue for Canadians crossing into the United States has moved
beyond being caught with actual quantities of marijuana on their persons.
For example, several reports suggest that Canadians are being denied
entry into the United States for past marijuana use (Meissner 2019).
When arriving at the U.S. border, some Canadian travellers are asked if
they have ever used marijuana. Admission of prior use when marijuana
was illegal in Canada is grounds for inadmissibility, indeterminate of how
long in the past the use occurred. Anecdotes suggest that some Canadians
are being given lifetime bans from the United States if they admit to past
marijuana use (Meissner 2019).
To the extent that such actions are occurring, they pose a problem
for governments in both Canada and the United States. In the case of
Canada, individuals are being denied entry and this could potentially
affect cross-border business. From the U.S. perspective, such actions will
have the unintended consequence of causing border crossers to withhold
information or outright lie. At this time, it appears that U.S. federal mari-
juana laws will not be reformed. However, to solve this issue Canada and
the United States should be working to clarify the issue of inadmissibility
over past drug use and Canada should be emphasising the need to collect
data on the extent to which this is occurring.
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and the Safe

Third Country Agreement
The refugee and asylum systems of Canada and the United States have
received considerable attention from voters and politicians in both coun-
tries in recent years (Woroby 2015). On the one hand, President Trump is
dramatically reducing the annual number of refugees that will be accepted
into the United States. As seen in Table 4.1, from 2016 to 2020 the
annual ceiling for refugee admissions into the United States has fallen
from 85,000 to 18,000 persons.
Contrast this with Canada on the other hand, from 2016 to 2019
(through November), the number of refugees accepted into Canada has
risen from 10,241 to 19,628 (Table 4.2). If this trend continues, which
it is likely to, given the priorities of the Trudeau government and the
increases in refugee claims received and the ongoing backlog, Canada is
on track to accept more refugees than the United States in 2020. This
Table 4.1 United

Year Annual ceiling Number admitted
States refugee admission
statistics 2016 85,000 84,995
2017 50,000 53,716
2018 45,000 22,491
2019 30,000 30,000
2020 18,000 –
Source Migration Policy Institute (2020). U.S. Annual Refugee

Resettlement Ceilings and Number of Refugees Admitted, 1980–
Present. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/cha
rts/us-annual-refugee-resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-
admitted-united?width=850&height=850&iframe=true
Table 4.2 Canadian

Year Claims received Claims accepted Claims
refugee admission
pending
statistics
2016 23,350 10,241 23,110
2017 47,425 14,411 47,183
2018 55,388 16,359 72,260
2019 42,708 19,628 81,360
Notes 2019 data is for January to September. Claims accepted

and pending includes claims that are being processed under the
system initialized in 2012 and those accepted under legacy rules.
Source Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2019. Refugee
Claims Statistics. Government of Canada. https://www.irb-cisr.gc.
ca/en/statistics/protection/Pages/index.aspx. The above data does
not include the thousands of Syrian refugees who were resettled in
Canada
divergence in refugee policy could lead to further policy clashes. For one,
as the United States, who has traditionally been the largest accepter of
refugees, accepts fewer and fewer, more pressure will be placed on coun-
tries like Canada to help settle the estimated approximately 71 million
displaced persons around the world (UNHCR 2019). A further rise in the
number of refugees accepted into Canada or in the number of claims that
must be processed would add to the financial stress already being placed
on governmental and non-profit organizations associated with refugee
resettlement (Falconer 2019).
Another issue centred around refugee policy that has already arisen is
in relation to the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and
the United States that entered into force in 2004. Under the agreement,
those seeking refugee protection must do so in the first safe country

that they arrive in, be that Canada or the United States.5 The purpose
of the agreement is to lessen pressure on domestic asylum systems and
to allow governments to better manage their asylum processes. The
agreement applies to refugee claimants entering Canada at land border
crossings, by train or in certain circumstances those arriving at airports.
It does not cover those entering by sea, most cases of entry at airports
or, most importantly in the current context, those entering Canada
between land ports-of-entry. Claimants crossing between ports-of-entry
have become a major issue for Canada. From January 2017 to November
2019, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) apprehended 54,862
asylum seekers crossing between ports-of-entry (Government of Canada
2019). Internal Canadian government memos have indicated that govern-
ment officials hold the view that the Safe Third Country Agreement is
not “working as intended” given the influx of asylum seekers at non-
designated ports-of-entry (Connolly 2019). The Canadian government
also worries that the use of the irregular crossings may intensify in the
future. This is perhaps one reason that the recent mandate letter to
the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship included a point
about continuing to “work with the United States to modernize the Safe
Third Country Agreement” (Trudeau 2019). Indeed, if not addressed
Canada could see the levels of asylum seekers using the irregular cross-
ings rise given the drastic reduction in U.S. planned refugee admissions.
At this time, it does not appear that the United States will cooperate with
Canada and change the agreement’s language.
Another issue that has arisen is the actual designation of the United
States as a safe third country. Under Section 102 of Canada’s Immigra-
tion and Refugee Protection Act, countries can be designated as safe third
countries if they meet four criteria: (1) the country must be party to
the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention and the 1984 Convention Against
Torture; (2) its policies and practices must be in line with respect to
claims made under the Refugee Convention and with respect to obliga-
tions under the Convention Against Torture; (3) it must have a positive
human rights record; and (4) the country in question must be party to
an agreement with the Government of Canada in order to share responsi-
bility regarding claims for refugee protection. Countries are continuously
5 There are four types of exceptions to this: family member exceptions; unaccompanied
minor exceptions; document holder exceptions; and public interest exceptions.
reviewed to determine whether they still comply with the four factors
and to date Canada has only designated the United States as a safe third
country.
However, the designation of the United States as a safe third country
has recently been challenged in Federal Court by unnamed refugees
joined by a number of human rights organisations. The complaint alleges
that the United States no longer meets the Section 102 criteria for
being designated as a safe third country. Specifically, the concern is that
a number of policies implemented under President Trump have added
barriers to making an asylum claim and that when asylum seekers are
sent back to the United States they face a greater risk of being returned
to their home countries and facing the persecution or violence that they
were trying to escape (Canadian Council for Refugees 2018). The Cana-
dian government has denied that the safe third country designation of
the United States should be removed but the ruling in the case has not
yet been made as of writing (Paperny 2019). If the court rules that the
United States should no longer be designated as a safe third country, this
would have a number of ramifications. First, Canada will likely see an
increase in asylum seekers, which would further overwhelm the Canadian
refugee system (Falconer 2019). Second, such a ruling would likely attract
the ire of President Trump, placing Canada in a precarious diplomatic
situation that would have been managed accordingly. If the court rules
in favour of the government, Canada will still be left with the question
of how to deal with the rise in asylum seekers that are crossing between
ports-of-entry.
One option would be for the government to increase the funding for
the Immigration and Refugee Board to try to speed up the process, but
with the backlog in claims and the increase in arrivals, it is not clear
that additional funds would be able to alleviate much of the issue. A
second potential option would be for Canada to negotiate a solution to
the irregular crossings similar to that which the United States has done
with Mexico. The Migrant Protection Protocols or “Remain in Mexico”
policy was introduced by the Trump administration and the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) to reduce the number of asylum seekers
actively in the United States and it sees that asylum seekers are returned
to Mexico while they await the decision on their case (DHS 2019b).
To be clear, the U.S. policy vis-à-vis Mexico has a number of problems,
including low claim acceptance rates and concerns about the safety of the
asylum seekers that will soon be the subject of a congressional investi-

gation (Solis 2019; Cochrane and Kanno-Youngs 2020). However, such
problems would likely not be of a comparable concern if Canada tried
to negotiate a similar policy with the United States where the Safe Third
Country Agreement is amended so that asylum seekers can apply to be
refugees in Canada while they are in the United States and they would
remain there to await a decision on their claim. While a policy like this
could help stem the flow of migrants at irregular border crossings, it
would likely face a number of domestic challenges within Canada. One
challenge would be that when a prospective refugee is determined to be
eligible to make a claim, they may be able to access social assistance,
health services, emergency housing, legal aid, and they may be eligible
to retain a work permit. It is not clear if similar rights would be extended
to asylum seekers applying from the United States or how such rights
even would be extended. Another challenge in accordance with the 1985
decision in Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration would be
to ensure that asylum seekers receive an adequate hearing, although there
may be questions as to whether the Charter rights at the heart of the
Singh Decision would apply to those persons seeking asylum into Canada
from outside the country. Yet a further challenge would be to ensure that
potential Canadian asylum seekers who are to remain in the United States
but entered the United States illegally are indeed able to remain there
pending the Canadian decision and that they are not deported by U.S.
authorities. The government would also likely face domestic pressure from
civil society groups. These challenges alone might prove insurmountable
for the Canadian government to pursue a “Remain in the United States”
policy.
Given that intervulnerability to migration policies affects the United
States and Canada, and the U.S.–Mexico relationship as well, third
option would be for trilateral North American cooperation to manage the
increased flow of asylum seekers. It is not clear what such a coordinated
approach would look like, but it does remain an option to include this
in a future USMCA update or in a separate agreement. Moving forward,
issues surrounding asylum and refugee claims will remain contentious in
all three countries.
Conclusion
In the European Union, regional integration is reified through “four free-
doms” including the freedom of movement of people which is considered
by many scholars to be the most fundamental achievement of European
integration (Militaru 2018). In North American integration, only three
freedoms—free movement of capital, goods, and ideas—have been fully
(if conditionally) incorporated into the design of regional integration
through CUFTA, NAFTA, and now the USMCA. Yet the movement
of people across North American borders to work on a temporary or
longer-term basis is important for the future of regional competitiveness.
Unlike the architects of the European Union, the leaders of Canada,
the United States, and Mexico have resisted arrangements that involved
the delegation or pooling of sovereignty. Instead, the North Americans
have relied on government-to-government cooperation to address issues
as they arise. However, this cooperation has been to date largely reactive
rather than proactive; conflict is the usual predicate of liberalization.
Canada should anticipate the coming conflict with the United States
over migration and leverage mutual intervulnerability to negotiate coop-
erative solutions to shared concerns. The agenda for such cooperation is
growing, as outlined here. Avoiding these issues in the past or pursuing
limited compromises to stave off immediate crises for a time has not
diminished their salience nor their potential negative effects on Canadian
economic competitiveness.
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CHAPTER 5
Immigrants to Canada: Welcomed Citizens

or Security Threats?
Grazia Scoppio and Wendi Winter
Introduction
Canada has a long history as a nation of immigrants bringing with
them diverse cultures and traditions. Today, Canada is still one of the
most welcoming countries towards immigrants compared to most other
Western countries and it is one of the very few that admits newcomers
with a permanent residency visa; by “immigrant” we mean those who
have entered the country with a permanent residency visa. Between
2011 and 2016, Canada welcomed over 1.2 million newcomers, with
the majority (over 60%) being admitted as economic immigrants (Statis-
tics Canada 2017). By 2036, it is estimated that the proportion of
Canada’s foreign-born population could be as high as 30% (Statistics
Canada 2017). Even today, the cities of Toronto and Vancouver count
more than 50% of their populations as born outside Canada. Notwith-
standing these trends, some immigration critics have questioned whether
there are too many newcomers entering Canada, whether immigrants take
G. Scoppio · W. Winter (B)

Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, ON, Canada
e-mail: wendi.winter@rmc-cmr.ca

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_5
88 G. SCOPPIO AND W. WINTER
jobs away from Canadians, or whether immigrants should espouse Cana-

dian values. Moreover, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against
the United States (U.S.) on September 11, 2001 (9/11), immigration
became increasingly linked to concerns of national security and securiti-
zation (defined further below). But is this in fact how Canadians perceive
immigration? This chapter aims to shed some light on these issues by
looking at immigration in Canada from a security perspective, focusing
on Canadian legislation on immigration and Canadian attitudes towards
immigrants after 9/11.
Specifically, this chapter seeks to address these research questions: (1)
Did Canadian immigration policy become more concerned about security
threats after 9/11? (2) Have Canadians become less supportive of immi-
grants since the events of 9/11? (3) Have immigration rates and source
countries been affected by security concerns? Our inquiry was guided by
the hypothesis that, after the 9/11 attacks, both Canadian immigration
legislation and Canadian attitudes towards immigrants have become more
concerned about potential security threats in relation to immigration and
consequently that this would negatively affect immigration rates from
certain source countries.
A comparative approach was adopted to contrast the Canadian immi-
gration acts, and Canadian attitudes towards immigrants, as well as
immigration rates, before and after 9/11. The research methods used
to inform this chapter involved both primary and secondary sources
including government legislation, statistical data, academic literature,
media, and existing research on the topic. A few informal consultations
were conducted via email with subject matter experts in relevant organi-
zations to identify specific data which was not publicly available to inform
the study.
People who enter Canada with a permanent resident visa fall under
three main categories: economic immigrants, family class, and refugees,
of which the economic and family categories constitute over 87% of
immigrants between 2011 and 2016 (Government of Canada 2018;
Canadian Immigration Newsletter 2017). There are also individuals living
in Canada temporarily, such as those with temporary worker visas or
international students. Additionally, there are “irregular” migrants, such
as those who cross the Canada–U.S. border between ports of entry,
many of whom apply for refugee status (Immigration and Refugee Board
of Canada 2019, p. 1). This chapter focuses on the largest group of
immigrants in Canada, namely those admitted through the economic
5 IMMIGRANTS TO CANADA: WELCOMED CITIZENS … 89
and family categories with permanent residence status as defined below;

however, other types of immigrants may be mentioned where relevant to
the discussion. A permanent resident is defined by the 1976 Immigration
Act and the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act as someone
residing within Canada who has been granted a permanent residency visa,
not yet obtained Canadian citizenship, and who has not lost that desig-
nation due to other regulations as set out in the two Acts (Immigration
Act 1976; Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001).
We begin the chapter with an exploration of relevant literature on
immigration and security in Canada. An overview of the immigration
landscape in Canada follows. We then compare Canadian immigration
legislation, immigration trends, and Canadian attitudes towards immi-
grants before and after 9/11. The chapter concludes with a brief discus-
sion and conclusion summarizing this chapter’s contribution to the field
of immigration and security.
Literature on Immigration and Security in Canada

The review of the literature revealed that there is much left to be written
about immigration and security within Canada. When searching for infor-
mation pertaining to Canadians and immigrants in relation to security, we
noted that much of this literature is limited to refugees and asylum seekers
and the ways that Canadians react especially to asylum seekers, opening
discussions about how truly receptive Canadians are to refugees, asylum
seekers, and other vulnerable groups seeking admission into Canada. The
literature is interesting and sheds light on refugee issues and how to effec-
tively integrate uprooted populations into Canadian society; however,
they are not the topic of discussion in this chapter and thus will not be
further discussed here.
Within the context of immigration and security in Canada, five broad
and at times related themes emerge from the literature: (1) immigration
as a security risk; (2) immigration and crime; (3) differences between
Canadian immigration practices, patterns and policies and those of other
Western societies; (4) the role of racism in Canadian immigration policies;
and (5) the securitization phenomenon in Canada.
The concept of immigration posing a security risk to Canadians is not
new. In fact, there is considerable literature both before and after 9/11
on this topic. For example, in 1998, Abu-Laban studied the contradic-
tory nature of Canadian immigration policy. Her study claimed that there
was a shift in the Canadian government’s direction which triggered a

change in Canadians’ views from thinking of immigrants as potential citi-
zens to perceiving them as security threats (Abu-Laban 1998). This shift
can be seen in 1993 when Kim Campbell, during her short term as Prime
Minister of Canada, created the Department of Public Security which was
given some of the functions related to immigration that were previously
the responsibility of the Department of Employment and Immigration
(Abu-Laban 1998).1 This shift in departmental oversight and power was
perceived by minority leaders as “symbolically criminalizing immigrants”
(Abu-Laban 1998, p. 193). The main idea that this literature conveyed is
how people’s perceptions of immigration can be influenced and reshaped
thereby the portrayal of immigrants as a threat to Canadian society. As a
result of this shift in the perceptions of Canadians towards immigrants,
it is argued by some that successive Canadian governments have been
able to enact laws giving them increasing power to monitor the commu-
nications and other activities of non-citizens (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban
2009).
More recently, some researchers have begun to explore the connec-
tion between immigration and crime levels in Canada. The perception
that immigration leads to increased crime is especially prevalent after
times of unrest or when there is a large influx of immigrants arriving in
Canada (Jung 2017). Currently, 30% of the Canadian population agrees
that immigrants increase the level of crime (see Table 6.3 in Annex
B). There are a limited number of Canadian studies focusing on the
correlation between immigration and crime that investigate the perceived
connection. These studies have all shown that there is no positive corre-
lation between the two (Zhang 2014; Jung 2017). As has been shown
by Jung (2017), crime rates have fallen as numbers of immigrants have
grown, when one controls for demographic and socio-economic variables.
In fact, Zhang (2014, p. 4) argues that immigrants have a “spillover
effect” that changes the characteristics of neighbourhoods and reduces
crime over time.
1 In June 1993, Kim Campbell was selected by a party convention of the Progressive
Conservatives to replace Brian Mulroney upon his retirement, and she became Canada’s
first woman prime minister. However, in November 1993, the Progressive Conservatives
suffered a shattering electoral defeat and consequently Campbell left office on November
4, 1993 (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2019).
Another trend in the literature dealing with immigration and security

in Canada is a comparison between Canadian and other Western immi-
gration practices. Some authors have pointed to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms as the reason that Canadian immigration standards
and rates are different from other Western societies (Antonius et al. 2007;
Scoppio 2001). Others have explained that Canada faces lower levels of
illegal migration than other countries because of its geographic isolation
and the Safe Third Country Agreement with the U.S., “a treaty between
Canada and the U.S. that blocks visitors from seeking refugee protection
at an official port of entry” (Wright 2018, para. 7; Antonius et al. 2007).
However, it must be noted that those blocked from making asylum claims
are those who already have received refugee status in the other country
and the Safe Third Country Agreement is not an agreement designed
to refoule asylum seekers. Another group of literature has compared
Canada to the U.S. to highlight the differences between immigration
policies and restrictive measures in place. Jennifer Wispinski, whose 2006
study looked at how the USA PATRIOT Act (2001) and Canada’s Anti-
Terrorism Act differ, showed that the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act was
less intrusive than its American counterpart. While comparisons between
the two nations are helpful for contextualizing how accepting Canada is of
immigrants, it is important to remember that these are two separate coun-
tries with different “histories, characteristics, and policies of immigration”
(Jung 2017, p. 38).
Another area of study in the literature is the role of racism within Cana-
dian immigration policies. Some authors have looked at the assumptions
embedded in the legislation governing immigration in Canada to identify
aspects that perpetuate an immigration system that allows for domination
and oppression of certain groups (Huot et al. 2016). These studies claim
that racism continues to be integrated into Canadian immigration policies
despite declarations that immigrants will not be discriminated against due
to race (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001). It is well-known
that in the past, some Canadian immigration policy was indeed racist,
designed to favour the admission to Canada of immigrants of primarily
European backgrounds, that is, whites. Dhamoon and Abu-Laban (2009)
believe that the government proposed racist policies, such as the intern-
ment of Japanese Canadians during WWII, as answers to questions of
national security which, at that time, caused some Canadians to believe
that foreigners are dangerous to the nation-state. Likewise, other scholars
claim that, despite an increase in the number of non-white immigrants
into Canada since the 1990s, these immigrants are especially feared as they
bring an ethnic diversity that does not conform to traditional Western
cultural practices (Boyd and Vickers 2000; Chan 2005). Li (2001, p. 92)
argued that racial messages and policies are legitimated through Canadian
opinion polls, and this discourse, in time, “mitigates racial messages and
makes them respectable”.
A final topic often discussed in the literature surrounding immigra-
tion is securitization. Securitization is the process wherein the spheres of
internal and external security merge after a period of separation (Crépeau
and Nakache 2006). This process is said to create distrust towards immi-
grants as it associates migrants with new threats of terrorism thus making
stricter immigration standards a necessity (Crépeau and Nakache 2006).
Some literature focusing on the securitization movement points out that
this is not a new phenomenon and that it was not a direct result of 9/11
(Hernandez-Ramirez 2019). The emergence of securitization policies and
practices has been linked to post-Cold War beliefs that the state needed
to protect its citizens, especially from terrorists (Bhattacharyya 2002).
Despite literature disproving its validity, myths that immigrants consti-
tute a security risk to Canadians continue to linger (Anderson 2018).
In actual fact, although screening processes for immigrants are not fool-
proof, they are intense and require that immigrants meet a number of
criteria including a security screening conducted by The Canadian Secu-
rity Intelligence Service in order to receive an entry visa. In addition,
some Canadians believe that there is a connection between immigra-
tion and terrorism; however, there is no evidence to support a claim
that the immigration program poses a risk to national security. On the
other hand, there have been an admittedly small number of immigrants
convicted of terrorism offences. The Canadian Council for Refugees,
which it should be said is an advocacy group rather than a research organi-
zation, argues that “a positive immigration program actually discourages
violence by promoting an open, diverse, dynamic and tolerant society,
with opportunities for all” (Canadian Council for Refugees, n.d., para.
3). Although immigration poses a minimal security risk to Canadians,
since 9/11 homegrown terrorism has posed a noteworthy security risk. As
Lorne Dawson noted in 2014, homegrown terrorism is markedly different
from the terroristic actions undertaken by left-wing radicals in the 1960s
and 1970s. Marc Sageman claimed that 9/11 was a watershed moment
in the history of terrorism and the West (2008). Whereas before 9/11,
terroristic threats were posed by people outside of the nation and could
be addressed by hardening national borders, the threat was no longer

posed by “foreign fanatics” but now came from homegrown terrorists
(Sageman 2008, p. 71). Sageman explained that homegrown terrorist
networks operate like a “bunch of guys” with no top-down recruitment
program; they are informal and often involve trusted friends who are self-
organized (2008, p. 69). Thus, any fear that immigrants are the main root
cause of terrorism within Canada appear to be overblown.
Landscape of Immigration in Canada

Canada has traditionally been a nation of immigrants, and one of the first
countries in the world with an active program for permanent immigration
and a policy of multiculturalism. Over the years, the Canadian immigra-
tion system has evolved to be in line with the changing values of Canadian
society.
The first immigration policy, crafted during the Great Depression
(1929–1934), was highly restrictive and did not allow for many non-
European races to immigrate to Canada (Knowles 2016). In 1952,
Mackenzie King’s government crafted the 1952 Immigration Act which
outlined the powers of the immigration minister and his officials (Knowles
2016). This Act vested an all-embracing power in the governor-in-council
to “prohibit or limit the admission of persons by reason of such factors as
nationality, ethnic group, occupation, lifestyle, unsuitability with regard to
Canada’s climate, and perceived inability to readily assimilate to Canadian
society” (Knowles 2016, p. 170). This power structure remained in place
until 1962 when Ellen Fairclough (Minister of Immigration) tabled new
regulations to the Immigration Act that would eliminate racial discrimina-
tion in the selection process (Knowles 2016). These changes were tabled
as regulations rather than statutes to facilitate a quicker implementation
(Knowles 2016). These regulations shifted the focus of immigration from
specific ethnic groups to potential economic benefits of allowing an immi-
grant to enter Canada. Unsponsored immigrants, those who did not have
a family member in Canada promising to support them through their
transition, would now be selected on the basis of their education, skill,
and other qualifications rather than their race, colour, or national origin
(Knowles 2016). To equalize the selection process, a new points system
was introduced in 1967 through which immigration officers assigned
points, up to a fixed maximum in each of the nine categories, to a prospec-
tive immigrant (Knowles 2016). The passing mark for acceptance was
50 out of 100 points. This system remained in place until the 1976
Immigration Act was implemented. In 1978, a new set of regulations
concerning immigration revised the points system. This revision increased
the emphasis placed upon practical training and experience rather than
formal education (Knowles 2016). That the points system was located
in the regulations and not the Act itself made for a much easier revision
process that allowed the system to respond to changes in the Canadian
economy; this relative ease of revision remains in place to this day.
A few years prior, in 1971, Canada became the first country in the
world to adopt an official policy of multiculturalism, which was later
enshrined in an act of Parliament. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act
recognizes that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diver-
sity of Canadian society and is a fundamental characteristic of Canadian
heritage (1985). The Act also promotes equitable participation of individ-
uals of all origins and ensures that all individuals receive equal treatment
and protection while respecting and valuing their diversity (Canadian
Multiculturalism Act 1985). In relation to immigration, proponents of
multiculturalism posit that it is:
…based upon the idea that immigrants are granted equal rights and oppor-
tunities, and are expected to conform to certain norms, while they are
encouraged to maintain their distinctive cultural traits. This approach is
the most successful in achieving the integration of immigrants into the
host society, where integration is understood not as assimilation but as a
two-way process of mutual accommodation between immigrants and the
receiving population. (Scoppio 2009, p. 18)
When looking at immigrants’ integration, a key indicator is citizen-

ship acquisition. Once again, Canada is a leader in this area, with one
of the highest immigrant citizenship rates among Western countries.
Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that over the past 20 years,
the percentage of recent immigrants acquiring Canadian citizenship has
declined by about 15%, going from 75.4% in 1996, to 60.4% in 2016
(Statistics Canada 2019b). This decline occurred mostly since 2006 and
mainly among immigrants from lower socio-economic status and with
lower education levels (Statistics Canada 2019b).
Preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Canadian government had
proposed a legislative change to rectify the shortcomings of the 1976
Immigration Act, and on November 1, 2001, the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act came into effect (Knowles 2016). This new Immi-
gration Act highlights the economic, social, and humanitarian reasons for
immigration (Knowles 2016).
Immigration Legislation
in Canada Before and After 9/11
Although the two main pieces of legislation that will be examined in this
section are the 1976 Immigration Act and the 2001 Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, it is important to acknowledge the roles of two
other governmental initiatives that have been associated with security and
immigration in Canada. The first initiative is an international agreement
that grew out of the aftermath of WWII. At the end of the war, the
United States and the United Kingdom agreed to cooperate and share
intelligence through the UKUSA Agreement (Cox 2012). This pact soon
grew to include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and came to be
known as the Five Eyes (FVEY) (Cox 2012). This agreement links FVEY
countries into a cooperative that allows each national intelligence orga-
nization to follow national mandates but interact and share intelligence
among the partner countries (Cox 2012). While this agreement does not
directly affect day-to-day immigration practices within Canada, it does
expedite the Canadian government’s attempts to prevent immigrants from
entering Canada under false pretenses.
The second initiative that should be acknowledged is Canada’s Anti-
Terrorism Act which was passed after 9/11. The act, which “aims to
address the global hazard of terrorism”, can be viewed as a method of
securitization in Canada (Schneiderman 2001, p. 66). The Anti-Terrorism
Act emphasizes the role that Canada should (and will) play in eradi-
cating terrorism for the security of its own people and international peace
and security (Anti-terrorism Act 2001). The act targets both immigrants
entering Canada and Canadian citizens who perform or attempt acts of
terrorism (Department of Justice 2017).
In 2001, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act received Royal
Assent and came into effect in 2002. As mentioned, this policy change
was already planned due to the fact that the 1976 Immigration Act was
dated and placed too many restrictions upon immigration and who may
be seen as a legitimate immigrant to Canada (Knowles 2016). Although
the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act received Royal Assent
less than two months after the events of 9/11, this Act is not as restrictive
as some Canadians had feared. On the one hand, the new act includes
references to security risks and terrorist actions. On the other, it outlines
a more holistic approach to the selection of immigrants. They would now
be selected based on their “human capital attributes” which take into
account the whole collection of abilities that an immigrant possesses, and
which facilitate their ability to function within and adapt to Canadian
society (Knowles 2016, p. 258). Key components of the two Acts are
described in Table 5.1.
The stated objectives of both acts deal with economic, social, and
humanitarian obligations, but the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protec-
tion Act has a more accepting wording to it. In particular, the 2001 Act
shows a greater recognition of the rights of immigrants to their culture
and religious beliefs. The 1976 Immigration Act intended immigrants to
adapt to their new country and society and to assimilate into Canadian
culture. However, in an attempt to address some of the difficulties that
immigrants face when integrating into Canadian society, such as the lack
of recognition for their foreign credentials, this Act also allows for more
discussion between the provinces and the federal government as to what
credentials provinces can accept without requiring further education in
Canada (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001; Koziey 2001).
Whereas the Immigration Act from 1976, in some inadmissibility
categories, focused on the person, the 2001 Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act focuses more on the actions of people that would make
them inadmissible. Admissibility is no longer simply decided based
on whether a person’s characteristics (such as health impairments and
genuineness of application) are desirable but also based on their actions
and human capital characteristics, and specifically, whether their actions
pose a danger to the public or work contrary to the Canadian government
(i.e. engaging in espionage or assisting in subverting any government by
force) (Immigration Act 1976; Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
2001).
The 2001 Act also acknowledges that Canadian residents, including
partners and spouses, sometimes spend time overseas for work or family
reasons. The Act increases the amount of time new residents can spend
Table 5.1 1976 Immigration Act and 2001 Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act
Article Immigration Act (1976) Immigration and Refugee

Protection Act (2001; updated
2013)
Key objectives • to enrich and strengthen the • to enrich and strengthen the
cultural and social fabric of social and cultural fabric of
Canada, taking into account the Canadian society, while
federal and bilingual character respecting the federal,
of Canada bilingual, and multicultural
• to encourage and facilitate the character of Canada
adaptation of persons who have • to support the development of
been granted admission as a strong and prosperous
permanent residents to Canadian economy and to
Canadian society promote the successful
• to facilitate the entry of visitors integration of permanent
into Canada for the purpose of residents into Canada
fostering trade and commerce, • to promote international
tourism, cultural and scientific justice and security by denying
activities and international access to Canadian territory to
understanding and to uphold persons who are criminals or
Canada’s humanitarian tradition security risks
• to promote international order • to work with provinces to
and justice by denying the use secure better recognition of
of Canadian territory to persons foreign credentials of
who are likely to engage in permanent residents and more
criminal activity rapidly integrate into society
Exclusion • anyone suffering from disease • anyone who has engaged in
or health impairment who may espionage, terrorism, or acts of
be a danger to public health or violence that endanger
safety Canadians
• anyone convicted of an offence • anyone convicted of serious or
• anyone engaged or believed organized criminality
would engage in espionage • anyone who is a health-risk to
• anyone believed were not the public or who cannot
genuine immigrants support themselves financially
(continued)
Table 5.1 (continued)
Article Immigration Act (1976) Immigration and Refugee

Protection Act (2001; updated
2013)
Loss of Status • permanent resident who • permanent residents must be

remained outside of Canada for physically present in Canada
more than 183 days in any for 730 days every 5-year
12-month period period unless outside of
Canada working for a
Canadian business or
accompanying another
permanent resident
outside of Canada, a policy change that shows greater concern for main-
taining family unity and stable employment. The Immigration Act (1976)
required that permanent residents return to Canada yearly, but the Immi-
gration and Refugee Protection Act (2001) simply requires that they
spend 730 days in a five-year period within Canada, giving them more
flexibility and choice in their time spent abroad and in Canada. While
the recognition of immigrants’ foreign credentials has been a struggle
in the past, various provincial governments are working to eliminate this
barrier. In 2019, Bill 11, proposed by the Legislative Assembly of Alberta,
received Royal Assent. This bill, known as the Fair Registration Practices
Act, outlines a regulatory body’s responsibility to “carry out registration
practices that are transparent, objective, impartial and procedurally fair”
(Fair Registration Practices Act 2019, p. 4). Through a federally funded
program called the Foreign Credential Recognition Program (FCRP),
provinces have begun offering loans to immigrants to help upgrade their
credentials to meet Canadian standards (Desjardins 2019; Fraser 2019).
At first glance, then, the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protec-
tion Act seems more accepting and flexible towards immigrants than
the 1976 Immigration Act. A frequency word search revealed that the
2001 Act more frequently used accepting words towards immigrants such
as “social”, “cultural”, and “multicultural”. However, the search also
revealed that words like “security” and related terms such as “safety”,
“terror”, and “detain” appear more frequently in the 2001 Act (see Annex
A, Table 5.2). Multiculturalism was not enshrined in legislation prior
to the creation of the 1976 Act, which explains its exclusion from that
version of immigration legislation. While social and cultural differences
were concepts that were embraced by Canadian society prior to 1976,

these words are included more frequently in the 2001 Act. Based on
this analysis, it appears that the new Act is more concerned with secu-
rity issues than the previous Act. At the same time, the newer Act has a
more accepting and flexible approach towards immigrants than the 1976
Act, which shows a growing consideration for the social well-being of
immigrants and their cultures.
Immigration Trends Before and After 9/11

The topic of immigration and security is often studied from the perspec-
tive of refugees and the perceived security risks they could pose to
Canadian citizens (Adelman 2006; Bhattacharyya 2002; Huot et al.
2016). Immigrants admitted through the economic or family categories,
having permanent immigration status and residency, are seldom discussed
through a security lens. This focus on refugees occurred despite the
importance placed by the Canadian government upon the economic
considerations of immigration (Huot et al. 2016). To be sure, economic
prosperity has historically been the driving force behind Canadian immi-
gration, as will be illustrated in this section.
Beginning in the early 1800s and lasting until the early 1900s, the
number of immigrants admitted varied between 6300 and 133,000
(Statistics Canada 2016). This was followed by a boom of more than
400,000 immigrants in 1913 but with the advent of the World Wars, these
numbers decreased (Statistics Canada 2016). The numbers of immigrants
began to rise again in the 1970s and have increased steadily since 1998
when 174,184 immigrants arrived in Canada (Statistics Canada 2019a).
Beginning in 2017, around 300,000 immigrants arrive in Canada yearly
(Grenier 2017).
Although the numbers of immigrants fluctuated greatly, their countries
of origin remained steady until the 1970s (Statistics Canada 2016) when
a major shift in countries of origin began as a result of the introduction of
the points system. The percentage of immigrants from a variety of source
regions is illustrated in Fig. 5.1.
From Confederation to the 1970s, the majority of immigrants arrived
from the British Isles, U.S., Germany, and France and some arrived
from Asia. During the first 100 years after Confederation, immigration
was encouraged to facilitate the settlement of previously uninhabited
areas of Western Canada which would enhance national security and
Fig. 5.1 Distribution in percentage of the foreign-born population, by place of

birth, Canada, 1871–2011 (Statistics Canada 2016)
strengthen the Canadian economy (Statistics Canada 2016; Knowles

2016; Dirks 2019). Immigration was “indispensable to Canada’s staples
economy and the colonial project, aiming to transform Canada into a
strong manufacturing and mining powerhouse…” (Hernandez-Ramirez
2019, p. 115). Following World War II, the number of immigrants from
Western Europe (Germany and Netherlands) and Southern Europe (Italy,
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Portugal) increased (Statistics Canada 2016).
Following the war, and due to the lobbying of a number of Canadian
pro-immigration groups, Prime Minister Mackenzie King lowered immi-
gration standards to “foster the growth of the population of Canada”
(Knowles 2016, p. 162). In the 1980s and 1990s, increasing numbers of
immigrants arrived in Canada from Eastern European countries such as
the Russian Federation, Soviet Republic, Poland, and Romania (Statistics
Canada 2016). Between 1991 and 1996, the top five birth countries for
immigrants to Canada included: Hong Kong, the People’s Republic of

China, India, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka (Boyd and Vickers 2000).
While the number of immigrants arriving from Asian countries has
been increasing, the number of immigrants arriving from the U.S. has
continued to decrease (Statistics Canada 2016). At the same time, the
Canadian government has continued to encourage economic immigrants
to arrive in large numbers to boost an aging work force (Antonius et al.
2007). In 2004, the majority of immigrants to Canada, or 57%, were
economic immigrants, skilled workers, or business people (Antonius et al.
2007). Throughout the early 2000s, the source countries for immigration
to Canada remained relatively unchanged. The majority of immigrants to
Canada in 2006 came from Asian countries (China, India, and the Philip-
pines) with a large number also arriving from Pakistan and Iran (Smick
2006). In 2016, Asian and African immigrants were the highest portion
of newcomers to Canada with 60% of immigrants from Asia, including the
Middle East, and 13.4% from Africa (Grenier 2017). Of the immigrants
from Asia, 15.6% immigrated from the Philippines, 12.1% from India,
and 10.6% from China (Grenier 2017). By 2017, while the number of
immigrants from India had surpassed those from the Philippines, immi-
gration class trends had remained the same with 56% of immigrants
admitted under the economic class (Government of Canada 2018). The
trends discovered in the data show that source countries of immigration
remained mostly unchanged after 9/11, with the top source countries
still being Asian countries.
Canadian Attitudes Towards

Immigrants Before and After 9/11
In a 2008 study, Bauder found that although there was an increase in the
number of newspaper articles written about terrorism and immigration
following the 9/11 attacks, there was no lasting increase in articles that
linked immigrants to terrorism. In his thematic study of the Vancouver
Sun, the Calgary Herald, The Toronto Star, the National Post (called the
Financial Post until 1998), and the Ottawa Citizen, Bauder systematically
searched for the occurrence and frequency of various words and argu-
ments in relation to immigration. Bauder pursued the following research
questions:
Which arguments or perspectives of immigration have been applied most

frequently in the media debate of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act? Are these arguments and perspectives used in favor of or against immi-
gration? Are they applied consistently throughout the period of debate or
do they fluctuate over time? (2008, p. 296)
Despite the fact that his research uncovered that “danger” was the
most frequent theme associated with immigrants, the second and third
most frequent themes were humanitarian and political considerations
(Bauder 2008). These associations show that despite the 9/11 attacks,
immigration debates in Canada were not heavily affected (Bauder 2008).
The Environics Institute, a Canadian-based research group, gath-
ered survey data pertaining to immigration from the 1970s to 2019 as
illustrated in Fig. 5.2 (more details can be found at Annex B, Table 5.3).
The Environics Institute survey data show a trend that Canadians are
more welcoming of immigrants after the attacks of 9/11. One question
asked Canadians whether they felt immigration had a positive effect on the
Too much immigraon in Canada
Immigraon has posive impact on the

economy
Immigraon increases the level of crime
Immigrants take away jobs
Too many immigrants not adopng Canadian

values
Immigrants should blend into Canadian
society
Immigrants work harder than people born in
Canada
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

% Disagreement
Before 9/11 Aer 9/11
Fig. 5.2 Average disagreement survey responses to questions about immigra-

tion in Canada (Environics Institute 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019; K. Neuman
personal communication, August 1, 2019)
Canadian economy. Respondents prior to 9/11 showed a 31% disagree-

ment rate on average while respondents after 9/11 disagreed at 17%.
Canadians have decreasingly viewed immigrants as a security issue in the
last decade. Before 9/11, respondents had a 44% disagreement rate when
asked if they believed immigration increases the level of crime; after 9/11
the disagreement rate increased to 70%. The only question that shows
a negative trend is whether immigrants should adopt Canadian values.
The disagreement rate prior to 9/11 was 36% and after 9/11 was 25%,
suggesting an anxiety in three quarters of the respondents. A racial over-
tone was found in a recent Ipsos poll conducted for Global News which
found that 36% of Canadians strongly or somewhat strongly agree that
immigration is a threat to white Canadians (Ipsos Public Affairs 2019b).
Aside from the answers to the questions regarding whether immigrants
should blend into Canadian society, all the other responses in the Envi-
ronics Institute surveys over the years show similar trends, namely that
Canadians are more accepting of immigrants post 9/11 than they were
prior. This may reflect an increase in the education levels of Canadians
and an increased sense of economic security (Environics Institute 2019).
The majority of participants who held negative views were those without a
high school diploma and those who felt their incomes were “not enough
and in some cases are struggling” (Environics Institute 2019, p. 1).
There have been a number of polls cited recently in news articles
claiming that Canadians are less accepting of immigrants (Vomiero and
Russell 2019; Wright 2019). The surveys cited were conducted by Ipsos
Public Affairs and Leger Marketing between December 2018 and June
2019. Respectively, the Ipsos Public Affairs survey, which was conducted
on behalf of Global News, found that 44% of Canadians feel there is too
much immigration in Canada and 48% agree that immigration is “causing
Canada to change in ways they don’t like” (Ipsos Public Affairs 2019a,
p. 1). Nonetheless, this survey shows that the majority of Canadians
are still receptive to immigrants and confirm our findings from Envi-
ronics Institute survey data trends. A later survey, organized by Leger
Marketing, was conducted as a federal politics poll and not specifically
investigating immigration and security issues (Leger Marketing 2019). It
asked respondents whether they believed the federal government should
prioritize limiting the number of immigrants welcomed into Canada each
year as “we may be reaching our limit to integrate them in our communi-
ties”, to which 63% agreed, or if they wanted the federal government to
prioritize increasing the number of immigrants welcomed into Canada,
to which 37% agreed (Leger Marketing 2019, p. 4). While the Leger
poll results contradict the results of the Environics Institute’s surveys, the
questions posed in the Leger survey were very restrictive and leading,
which could account for the “negative” responses towards immigrants.
Unlike the poll conducted by Ipsos Public Affairs (2019a), the Leger
Marketing poll did not make a distinction between immigrants and
refugees when questioning respondents which may also partially explain
why respondents seemed more opposed to immigration compared to the
Environics Institute’s survey.
Indeed, there has been an increasing concern, as proven by the number
of news articles published on the topic, with asylum seekers entering
Canada illegally (Lilley 2019; Wright 2019). There are also some arti-
cles pushing for a decrease in the number of immigrants allowed entry
to Canada. These articles, however, do not reflect an increasing fear that
immigrants pose security risks to Canadians, but rather show a growing
concern with the economic strain that immigration places on Canada
(Wright 2018). They also highlight that the concern is not with the immi-
grants coming into Canada but the way the immigration process works
(Immigration Concerns 2019).
Conclusion
We started our chapter with an exploration of the literature and the
immigration landscape in Canada, followed by an analysis of immigration
legislation, immigration trends, and Canadian attitudes towards immi-
grants. Overall, our research shows that, despite rising security concerns
worldwide after 9/11, the majority of Canadians have remained accepting
and welcoming towards immigrants. Our inquiry was guided by the
hypothesis that, after the attacks of 9/11, both the Canadian immigra-
tion legislation and Canadian attitudes towards immigrants have become
more concerned with immigrants as potential security threats and conse-
quently immigration rates and source countries have been affected. This
hypothesis was mostly disproved by our findings. Indeed, our research
shows that, after 9/11:
a. Canadians are more accepting towards immigrants and not more

concerned with immigrants as potential security threats;
b. Immigration rates have increased; and
c. Source regions and countries have remained mostly unchanged.
On the other hand, our assumption that the Canadian immigration

legislation after 9/11 has become more concerned with immigrants as
potential security threats was supported by our findings; namely, we iden-
tified a greater security-related focus in the new immigration policy. At
the same time, our comparative analysis shows that, although the new
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act implemented after 9/11 is
more concerned with security than the previous act, it is also more flex-
ible and accepting of immigrants. As well, public opinion polls trends
across multiple years before and after 9/11 indicate that the majority of
Canadians remain optimistic and believe that immigration is beneficial to
Canada; and overall, Canadians believe that immigrants work hard and
have a positive effect on the economy. In terms of immigration rates and
source countries, Statistics Canada data show a steady increase in immigra-
tion rates, and not a significant change in source countries for immigrants
since 9/11.
The field of immigration and security in Canada is by no means
exhaustively researched. Many works focusing on immigration as it relates
to security deal with refugees immigrating to Canada rather than on
the immigrants in the economic stream. This chapter has attempted
to address this deficiency through an examination of the relationship
between permanent immigration and security in Canada. Welcomed citi-
zens or security threats? is not a binary question. Although the current
Canadian immigration act shows there is more concern for security by
the Canadian government, the act also shows greater acceptance and flex-
ibility towards immigrants. As well, Canadians by and large still support
immigration, and immigration rates continue to rise with the majority of
immigrants becoming Canadian citizens.
Annex A
This frequency table was created by conducting keyword searches of the
two immigration Acts discussed throughout the chapter. These numbers
do not include the use of any of the words in a title, position, or name of
an organization (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Frequency keyword search
Keywords 1976 Immigration 2001 Immigration

Act and Refugee
Protection Act
Security 30 64
Safety 6 23
Terror/Terrorism/Terroristic 0 8
Detain 22 26
Social 4 8
Cultural/Multicultural/Multiculturalism 2 4
Annex B
The following table shows the average percentage of Canadians who
disagree with each of the statements. These averages have been compiled
using selected data as provided by Environics Institute. Some of the statis-
tics used to create this table of information are not publicly available (K.
Neuman, personal communication, August 1, 2019) (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Immigration survey data before and after 9/11
Before 9/11 After 9/11

(disagreement) (%) (disagreement) (%)
Too much immigration in Canada 35 63

Immigration has a positive impact on the 31 17
economy
Immigration increases the level of crime 44 70
Immigrants take away jobs 47 34
Too many immigrants are not adopting 25 36
Canadian values
Immigrants should blend into Canadian 22 18
society
Immigrants work harder than people born 36 36
in Canada
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CHAPTER 6
Canada’s Position in the Global Competition

for Talent
Jasmine Gill
Introduction
A country’s potential lies in its people. Leveraging their talent and skills
leads to prosperity. However, nearly all countries around the world,
including Canada, are beset by demographic trends that will under-
mine efforts to scale the levels of this prosperity. As nearly all developed
economies face the impact of declining fertility and population aging,
in addition to the technological advances that are disrupting the nature
of work, the ability to attract, develop and retain people—talent—will
become a critical source of competitive advantage in the years ahead. And
as the race for talent accelerates, Canada must reexamine its approach to
highly skilled immigrants, including inventors, entrepreneurs and interna-
tional students‚ to navigate this changing world and remain competitive.
This chapter was submitted in December 2019 on behalf of Century Initiative.
J. Gill (B)
Toronto, ON, Canada

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_6
112 J. GILL
The Impact of Global Demographics

on the Demand for Talent
Around the world, populations are getting older. By the middle of this
century, 16% of people in the world will be over the age of 65, an increase
from 9% in 2019 (United Nations 2019). The number of persons aged
80 years or over is projected to multiply six-fold between now and 2100,
from 143 million in 2019 to 426 million in 2050 to 881 million in 2100
(United Nations 2019; Cilluffo and Ruiz 2019).
By 2100, the global fertility rate is expected to fall to 1.9—below the
global replacement fertility rate of 2.1 births. As a result, the median age
of the world’s population will reach 42 in 2100, up from 31 today and
24 in 1950. And, by the end of this century, the world’s annual popu-
lation growth is expected to screech to a halt. Between 1950 and today,
the world’s population grew at between the rate of 1 and 2% annually,
with the number of people on the planet increasing from 2.5 billion to
more than 7.7 billion (Cilluffo and Ruiz 2019). By 2100, the world’s
population will grow at a rate below 0.1%.
Over the remainder of this century, between 2020 and 2100, ninety
countries are expected to shrink in population size. Two-thirds of all
countries and territories in Europe are expected to lose population by
2100. In Latin America and the Caribbean, half of the region’s fifty coun-
tries are expected to decline in population. As a stark contrast, over the
last seventy years, only six countries in the world lost population, because
of higher fertility rates and a relatively younger population (Cilluffo and
Ruiz 2019). Even Asia’s population is projected to increase through 2055
and then begin to reverse direction (Cilluffo and Ruiz 2019).
Africa is the only global region expected to exhibit sustained and
high population growth through to 2100. 50% of the growth of the
world’s population between 2020 and 2100 will be led by five countries
in Africa—Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania,
Ethiopia and Angola—and one in Asia, Pakistan (Cilluffo and Ruiz 2019).
In light of these trends, the global demand for talent will become
increasingly intense as countries around the world face the challenge of
attracting and growing a domestic talent base. And where does Canada fit
into this competition? Today, largely as a result of its successful immigra-
tion system, Canada has the highest annual population growth rate (1.4%
in 2018) among all G7 countries (Statistics Canada 2018), roughly 80%
of it accountable to immigration. However, Canada’s population is aging
6 CANADA’S POSITION IN THE GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR TALENT 113
steadily—today, 17.2% of Canadians are 65 and older (Statistics Canada

2019) and that number is expected to rise to between 23 and 25% by
2036 and between 24 and 28% by 2061 (Statistics Canada 2010). In
2100, Canada’s fertility rate is projected to be slightly higher that it was
in 2016 at 1.54, but still well below the replacement level of 2.1. Canada,
too, is a country that is sliding down the ranks in terms of population
growth. If the current trends continue, Canada will have a population
of 53.7 million people in 2100, making it the 48th largest country by
population in the world, down from 38th today.
As Canadians get older and fertility rates decline, natural growth will
turn negative—and by 2034, immigration will account for 100% of popu-
lation growth (El-Assal and Fields 2018, p. iii). Without immigration, the
size of Canada’s labour market will decline. Over the 2020s, more than
270,000 Canadians will retire annually (RBC Economics Research 2019,
p. 12). This comes at a time when the national jobless rate is at an all-
time low, with nearly half a million unfilled jobs in 2018 (RBC Economics
Research 2019, p. 11). Assuming the current rates of population growth
are maintained, economic growth (as measured by GDP growth) will be
at a fraction of the levels we know today.
If these trends continue, Canada will face escalating pressure to fund
health care and Old Age Security programs. Canada is already one of
the highest health care spenders among all 36 OECD nations, ranking
5th in spending as a share of GDP behind the United States, France,
Germany and Sweden (Canadian Institute for Health Information 2018,
p. 10) (see Table 6.1). Health care costs are expected to rise by an annual
average of 4% in the coming decades as the share of Canada’s senior
population rises from about 17% in 2017 to 24% by 2040 (El-Assal and
Fields 2018, p. 19). Consequently, health care spending as a share of
Table 6.1 Top 5

Rank Country % share of Per capita
health care spenders
GDP ($ CAD)
among OECD nations
in 2017 1 United States 17.2 12,865
2 France 11.5 6177
3 Germany 11.3 7218
4 Sweden 10.9 6944
5 Canada 10.4 6082
Source OECD; Canadian Institute for Health Information

114 J. GILL
provincial revenues is forecast to increase from 35% in 2017 to 39% by

2040 (El-Assal and Fields, pp. 13–14). Population aging will also result
in an increase in federal spending on Old Age Security from about 17%
of federal government revenues to nearly 20% by the 2030s (Ades et al.
2016, p. 17).
And yet, there will be fewer working Canadians to support these rising
costs. The senior dependency ratio, the number of working-age people
(20–64) compared to the number of people aged 65+, illustrates this. In
2008, Canada had 4.74 working-age people (those aged 20–64) for every
retiree (those aged 65 and over) (Martel 2019). With more of Canada’s
most dominant worker cohort (the baby boomers) retiring, the worker-
per-retiree ratio fell to 3.9 in 2017 and is set to hover around 2.5 from the
mid-2030s and onward‚ even in a model where Canada increases immi-
gration to 1% (El-Assal and Fields 2018, p. 18) (see Fig. 6.1). This will
result in greater fiscal strain since there will be fewer workers to pay the
taxes necessary to support social spending.
Diminished government revenues will result in higher taxes or cuts to
services or both. Tighter spending budgets will impact other government
activities from infrastructure investment to education, foreign aid and
defence. This will not equate to a better Canada for future generations.
3.9
3.1
2.6 2.5 2.4
2018 2025 2035 2045 2055
Fig. 6.1 Ratio of working-age population to seniors (65+) (Source Statistics

Canada; Department of Finance Canada)
Century Initiative’s goal of reaching a population target of 100 million

people by 2100 would allow us to turn this future scenario around. A
proactive approach towards allowing for increased immigration of highly
skilled immigrants could bolster our economy by a full percentage point
of annual GDP growth. In addition, the economic benefits of growing
our population to the scale of 100 million would include: a larger, skilled,
labour pool and taxpayer base to fund health care and social services,
a larger domestic market to drive both consumption and innovation,
regions and cities with enough density to allow for more concentrated
innovation clusters with accessible and affordable housing and transporta-
tion to connect Canadians to jobs and to facilitate business—all features
that will in turn increase Canada’s competitiveness in attracting talent in a
virtuous cycle. In short, adopting a more ambitious approach to planning
for population growth will ensure a prosperous and growing future for
generations to come.
The impetus to scale the breadth of Canada’s talent is clear. Canada
is currently a leader in the world in immigrant attraction, integration
and retention because of its strong immigration system and perva-
sive public support—however this position is by no means guaran-
teed in the decades to come. The OECD identifies Australia, Sweden,
Switzerland and New Zealand as Canada’s top competitors in terms of
attractiveness to highly skilled immigrants (OECD/Bertelsmann Stiftung
2019). INSEAD’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Index names Switzer-
land, Singapore and the United States as the world’s leaders in talent
competitiveness, and lists Canada as lagging behind in the 15th position
in its ranking (Lanvin and Monteiro 2019). Canada needs to leverage its
strengths and address its weaknesses in the arena of skilled immigration in
the context of an accelerating global competition for talent and a rapidly
changing skills landscape.
The Skills Imperative

and Canadian Immigration Policy
The size of a country’s talent base alone will not lead to sustainable
prosperity. In a changing world, the talent and skills to navigate the
disrupting forces of aging populations, of automation and Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI) are key. Optimistically, there is no proven correlation between
such disruption and net job loss—instead, automation of certain jobs will
lead to the demand for new skills to fill jobs higher up the value chain.
116 J. GILL
According to McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), the strongest growth in

demand is projected in technological skills, which will rise by 55% over
the next decade (McKinsey Global Institute 2018). By 2030, techno-
logical skills will represent 17% of hours worked, up from 11% in 2016
(McKinsey Global Institute 2018). The demand for social and emotional
skills such as leadership and people management will rise by 24%, to
22% of hours worked. Demand for higher cognitive skills will also grow
steadily but will spike considerably for higher specific cognitive skills like
creativity (McKinsey Global Institute 2018, p. 11).
Realizing the imperative to match immigrant skills to the Canadian
economy, the Canadian government has placed a strong emphasis on
skilled immigrants, comprising the economic class, over the past three
decades. The proportion of immigration that is primarily economic
has grown from 35% in 1980 to 56% in 2017, and the absolute
number of economic immigrants has grown by over 218%, compared
to around 100% for all immigrant groups (Hussen 2018, p. 13; Citi-
zenship and Immigration Canada 2004, p. 8). Admission of immigrants
from the economic category has a disproportionate impact on growth.
While economic immigrants comprised 56% of all immigrants in 2017,
they accounted for 76% of all immigrants’ cumulative contribution to
economic growth that year (El-Assal and Fields 2018, p. 23).
Canada’s Attraction and Retention

of Highly Skilled Permanent Residents
and Temporary Foreign Workers
a. Skilled Permanent Residency Admissions
High-skilled immigration fuels economic growth, by attracting talent

that is more educated, stimulates innovation, and drives growth in
advanced, high-wage industries (Century Initiative 2019b, p. 3). Immi-
grants to Canada are among the most highly educated among rich-world
peer countries and the occupational mix of Canada’s immigrants gener-
ally match short-term labour market needs in Canada (Century Initiative
2019b, p. 6) (see Fig. 6.2). The majority of working newcomers are
employed in professional, skilled and technical roles that often require
tertiary education, which also make up two of the three areas of greatest
labour market demand, as expressed in projected job openings. Recent
Fig. 6.2 Skill level and occupational mix of recent immigrants (Source OECD,
Statistics Canada)
immigrant cohorts in Canada slightly over-index on skilled and technical

occupations, and under-index on managerial roles.
The skill mix of new immigrants currently skews towards professional
occupations; these roles are expected to remain in demand over the next
decade (Century Initiative 2019b, p. 8) (Fig. 6.3). However, the fastest
Fig. 6.3 Changes in labour demand and percentage of immigrants in skills

growth areas (Source Century Initiative 2019a)
118 J. GILL
growing demand will be in areas that current cohorts of immigrants do

not adequately address, specifically care providers, educators and creatives.
Even compared to Canadian students’ current fields of study, immigration
appears to lag behind in anticipating the shift in skill mix required by the
evolution of Canada’s economy (Century Initiative 2019b, p. 8).
Inventors and entrepreneurs are important subsets of high-skilled
immigrants as they contribute among the most to a country’s innova-
tion and growth capacity and, in an increasingly uncertain world, will
become increasingly important to facilitate the change and transformation
presented by technology. Data on the migration patterns of patent-
filing inventors is instructive as to where Canada has room to improve
in its retention efforts of inventors. Although Canada welcomed 7300
immigrant inventors during the 2001–2010 period, more than 21,300
inventors emigrated from Canada during the same period, resulting in
a net loss of 14,000 inventors (Miguelez and Fink 2017, p. 20) (see
Fig. 6.4).
Canada loses most of its inventors to the United States: during the
2001–2010 period, Canada lost 18,700 inventors to its southern neigh-
bour (Miguelez and Fink 2017, p. 22), due to its higher innovation
capacity. Over a longer-term horizon, attracting and retaining such talent
through innovation capacity building will become even more important
as the Canadian economy evolves.
Immigrants to Canada are highly entrepreneurial. According to Statis-
tics Canada, immigrants who have been in Canada between 10 and
30 years have a private incorporated business ownership rate of 5.8%
compared with 4.8% for the rest of the population (Green et al. 2016,
p. 11). This is a positive finding since it indicates that a significant share
of Canada’s immigrants are self-sufficient and are creating new jobs. Busi-
ness survival rates are comparable for immigrants and Canadian-born
entrepreneurs. About 80% of immigrant entrepreneurs remain in business
after 2 years and 56% continue to operate after 7 years (Ostrovsky and
Picot 2018a, p. 6). Statistics Canada analysis of the period between 2003
and 2013 has found that immigrants registered a higher level of annual
net job creation per firm and were more likely to own firms with higher
rates of job creation than Canadian-born entrepreneurs (Picot and Rollin
2019). The reason for this is that immigrant entrepreneurs are younger
on average than Canadian-born ones, and younger firms tend to create
more jobs (Picot and Rollin 2019, p. 7).
6
Fig. 6.4 Inventor immigrants, 2001–2010 (Source Ernest Miguelez and Carsten Fink, “Measuring the international
mobility of inventors: A new database.” World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2013)
CANADA’S POSITION IN THE GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR TALENT
119
120 J. GILL
These positive findings, however, are undermined by other factors.

Statistics Canada has found that 33% of immigrants reported they were
self-employed due to a lack of job opportunities compared with 20% of
the Canadian-born population (Ostrovsky and Picot 2018b). Between
2003 and 2013, 31% of established firms with Canadian-born owners had
at least 5 employees compared with 19% of immigrant-owned businesses
(Picot and Rollin 2019, p. 12). In a previous analysis, Statistics Canada
found that just under 40% of immigrant-owned businesses had one
employee or less in 2010 compared with roughly a quarter of Canadian-
born entrepreneurs (Green et al. 2016, p. 12). This is because immigrant
entrepreneurs tend to operate lower value businesses, in industries where
firms are smaller on average such as retail and wholesale trade, and
accommodation and food services (Picot and Rollin 2019, p. 12).
While Canada’s immigration system places a strong emphasis on skilled
immigration, there is room for improvement. Greater effort to antici-
pate the skills and job markets of the future, to build innovation capacity
and support the growth of entrepreneurial businesses can optimize the
attraction of the talent that Canada needs to fuel its long-term economic
growth and prosperity.
b. Temporary Foreign Workers
The purpose of the migration of temporary workers is to fill skills

shortages on a temporary basis (Elgersma 2014). The number of
temporary foreign workers in Canada is increasing, though this group
contributes a smaller share to the labour force than in other coun-
tries such as Australia and New Zealand (only 1.1% of its labour force)
(OECD 2019). In 2017, approximately 214,000 temporary foreign
workers entered Canada for work (OECD 2019).
In Canada, there are two pathways to temporary labour migration
(OECD 2019). The first is the Temporary Foreign Worker Program
which admits foreign workers to meet specific labour shortages in the
labour market, however the number of Temporary Foreign Workers is
declining (OECD 2019). There are several reasons that have been cited
as the cause for declining numbers under the Temporary Foreign Worker
Program. One is the fact that, apart from foreign workers admitted
under the Global Talent Stream which allows for expedited processing
for workers in certain high-skilled occupations, employers of temporary
foreign workers have to complete an extensive labour market impact

assessment (OECD 2019). Secondly, in contrast to other OECD coun-
tries, the cost and procedure for a renewal of a temporary work permit
is the same as for the initial permit (OECD 2019). Thirdly, employers
seeking workers with wages above the median regional hourly wage have
to provide a detailed transition plan that describes how they will reduce
their dependence on temporary foreign workers and eventually transition
to a Canadian workforce (OECD 2019).
The second pathway is the International Mobility Program. Four
out of five temporary immigrants to Canada with working rights were
admitted under this program in 2018, often “because their presence
provides broader economic, cultural or other competitive advantages for
Canada or because Canadian permanent residents enjoy the same bene-
fits in their country of origin” (OECD 2019). The admissions of these
immigrants are not linked to labour market needs. Of these, about two-
thirds receive open work permits, and as a result there is little information
on their economic outcomes (OECD 2019). An important subset of this
category is international students (OECD 2019).
c. International Students1 (Century Initiative 2019a)
In a recent study, the OECD ranked Canada as the eighth most

attractive destination for international university students in the world
(OECD/Bertelsmann Stiftung 2019). The number of international
students studying in Canada has increased rapidly in the past few years.
In 2018, the total number of international students studying in Canada
climbed to 572,415, representing a 154% increase since 2010 (Canadian
Bureau for International Education 2018). International students choose
to study in Canada for a variety of reasons including competitive tuition
costs—though there is significant variation between institutions across
the country (McKenzie-Sutter 2018)—perceptions of high educational
quality, Canada’s reputation as a safe and accepting country, and the
presence of diverse cultural communities (Macdonald 2019; Walton-
Roberts 2011, p. 470). The perception that Canada offers comparatively
greater economic opportunities than many students’ home countries,
combined with the fact that it is relatively easy in Canada to transition
1 Excerpted from Century Initiative (2019a).

122 J. GILL
from an international student permit to some other form of temporary

work permit—or even permanent residency—make Canada an attrac-
tive economic destination for international students (Macdonald 2019;
Immigration and Citizenship 2019).
International students are considered ideal immigrants to Canada
because they tend to be young, skilled and possess Canadian educational
credentials, generally good official language proficiency, and Canadian
social networks and work experience—all of which should enable them
to integrate into the labour market and society comparatively quickly
and easily (Hawthorne 2012; Lu and Hou 2015, p. 2) and help grow
the foundations of the country’s age pyramid. However, while interna-
tional students may represent ideal immigrants, historically, only a small
percentage of them have tended to remain in Canada and successfully
transition to permanent residency after completing their studies (Lu and
Hou 2015). Analysis by Statistics Canada finds that of the international
students who obtained a study permit between 1990 and 2014, just over
270,000, or 19%, had transitioned to permanent residency by 2014 (Lu
and Hou 2015).
Canada’s proficiency in retaining international students must be more
closely examined to ascertain its position in the global competition for
this subset of talent. While retention of international students is a poorly
defined concept and does not appear to be a universally accepted measure
(Morris-Lange and Brands 2015, p. 16), one measure that is often used
is the “stay rate” which is defined as the proportion of student permit
holders who remain in a country over a set period of time but who change
their status to something other than “student” (Morris-Lange and Brands
2015). Using this measure of retention, the OECD found that for the
years 2008–2009, Canada was the most successful country in the world
with a stay rate of 33%, though some other countries like France and the
Czech Republic were close behind (Morris-Lange and Brands 2015).
While Canada may be leading the competition in many respects, there
is still considerable room to grow and facilitate the retention and inte-
gration of international students. In 2011 as well as in 2014 and 2019,
the provincial and territorial governments and the federal government,
respectively, adopted international education strategies that identified
retention of international students in Canada post-graduation as a tool
for addressing demographic challenges and skilled labour shortages
(Provincial and Territorial Ministers of Education and of Immigration
2011). These strategies are now part of an expanding portfolio of
policies, programs, strategies and other initiatives at the federal and

provincial levels aimed at easing international students’ transition to
permanent residency and into the workforce. The federal government has
made changes to Canada’s immigration rules to encourage international
students to transition from temporary foreign residents to permanent
ones (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada 2011), including
such measures as the expansion of the Post-Graduation Work Permit
Program (PGWPP) in 2005 and 2008 (Immigration, Refugees and
Citizenship Canada 2011) to now almost automatically qualify interna-
tional students for a three-year work permit upon graduation, and an
increase in the number of hours of paid work that international students
can undertake while studying (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada 2011; Esses et al. 2018). The Canadian government has also
made changes to the Express Entry program to benefit international
students, for example, through the addition of points for applicants
who studied in Canada (Hussen 2017). The pathway from international
student to permanent residency in Canada is now one of the easiest in
the world (Toughill 2018, p. 39; ICEF Monitor 2016).
In spite of this, there are still some important barriers to the reten-
tion of international students in Canada that cannot be overlooked. Poor
communication of the rules governing study permits and the pathways
for transitioning to permanent residency create significant uncertainty and
act as a significant roadblock in the journey from international student to
permanent resident. In a survey conducted in 2017, only 36% of interna-
tional graduates were aware of all the pathways to permanent residency
that were available to them (Association of Atlantic Universities 2017,
p. 23). Additionally, restrictive rules, such as those requiring continuity
of studies, result in some students losing eligibility for post-graduation
work permits for reasons such as giving birth or suspending their studies
due to illness (Toughill 2018, p. 37).
Achieving Scale in Canada’s Attraction,

Integration and Retention of Global Talent
The draw and development of more people—with the skills and talent
to navigate the future—is the biggest and most important step towards
scaling the levels of Canada’s long-term prosperity. Committing to a more
ambitious trajectory for admission of immigrants—from an immigration
rate of 1% of the Canadian population to 1.25% with the increase residing
124 J. GILL
primarily in the economic category of admissions—will set us on this

course today in a way that is incremental and manageable (Century Initia-
tive 2019c). Fortuitously, the attraction and integration of immigrants is
a Canadian strength giving it a strong position in this global competition.
In comparison to other OECD countries, Canada leads the way in its
ability to integrate immigrants into the economy. The employment rate
of the foreign-born population in Canada in 2017 was 72% in contrast
to the OECD average of 68% (OECD 2018, p. 11). Principal applicants
in the economic category generally take a few years to integrate into the
Canadian labour market, but after 7 years they average higher levels of
income than the typical Canadian (El-Assal and Fields 2018).
However, as strong as Canada is in the draw of global talent, it is
not yet realizing its full potential. Canada’s challenge is to increase the
numbers of skilled immigrants while simultaneously identifying how to
tackle the common barriers that inhibit high-skilled immigrants, tempo-
rary foreign workers and other newcomers from maximizing their talents
in an evolving labour market.
In the context of a global competition for talent, highly skilled immi-
grants are able to choose where to go, and attracting this top tier of
immigrants will require taking an approach that provides a clear path to
prosperity. Canada must create the conditions that will allow for successful
growth of its population, newcomer and Canadian-born alike. Planning
for cities and mega regions that are built for scale and that facilitate
innovation, the provision of affordable childcare and re-skilling and life-
long learning opportunities are some measures to achieve this (Century
Initiative 2019c). In addition to increasing the levels of skilled worker
admissions and taking an integrative view of population growth across
the areas of education, employment, urban development and early child-
hood support (Century Initiative 2019b, c), we propose a three-tiered
approach to address some of the challenges raised in this chapter to
ensure Canada’s efforts to attract, retain and integrate highly skilled immi-
grants, including inventors, entrepreneurs and international students, are
successful (Century Initiative 2019b):
1. Take steps to better match immigration programs with longer-

term labour market needs. This will involve setting goals for immi-
gration policy in close coordination with economic growth strategies
at the national and provincial levels. For instance, sector-specific
forward-looking strategies will point to current and future labour
market needs that a targeted approach to immigration can help

address. Canada should also adjust existing programs (e.g. Express
Entry) to render them more focused on long-term rather than
short-term labour market needs. These programs should adopt a
10–20-year time horizon. Finally, policies can be revamped to make
it easy for inventors, entrepreneurs and international students to
navigate the immigration process. For instance, re-evaluating labour
market impact assessment (LMIA) requirements (where applicable)
and restrictions on post-graduation work permits can accelerate
entry to and retention within Canada.
2. Pilot non-structural programs to target specific groups of immi-
grants. A thorough view of immigrant needs will help the govern-
ment design and pilot tailored programs that target niche groups.
These pilots may consist, for example, of the creation of infor-
mation, resources and networks that are pertinent to international
students. For instance, the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick govern-
ments have forged specialized immigration streams for international
students planning to start businesses after graduation (Toughill
2018, p. 35). Other initiatives, such as EduNova, a “co-operative
industry association of education and training providers” mandated
to “raise the profile of Nova Scotia’s education and training exper-
tise” globally (EduNova 2019a) and the Atlantic “Study and
Stay” initiative, which includes a managed professional mentor-
ship program (EduNova 2019b) are also designed to address some
of the key obstacles that discourage international students from
remaining in Atlantic Canada. Defining and tracking success metrics
to measure pilot results will also be critical, along with plans to
scale-up promising programs.
3. Provide vigorous downstream support to help immigrants
thrive in Canada. Canada can work to address existing job place-
ment, skills recognition and skill matching issues for immigrants
by convening workforce agencies, training providers, and civic and
business partners to collaborate on solutions to foster improved
economic integration of immigrants. A key component may involve
ensuring that information about support resources reach immigrants
prior to and upon arrival, including via social media and ethnic
news outlets in Canada and for international students, university
and college information hubs. Another component of this strategy
should involve coordinating programming (e.g. networking and
126 J. GILL
community-building opportunities) within the start-up ecosystem to

support immigrant inventors and entrepreneurs. Financing supports
that are offered by both financial institutions and organizations
beyond the financial services sector must be made known and avail-
able. Finally, the government can work with universities and research
institutions on technology transfer and commercialization proce-
dures to ensure that inventor immigrants have the incentives needed
to stay in Canada.
Inventors, entrepreneurs and international students offer vital skills

that will shape the future of Canada. Scaling Canada’s imagination,
thinking and action in the area of such high-skilled immigration will pay
long-term dividends for Canada. If we get it right‚ the prosperity created
through immigration can compound over the course of generations. It
is a multiplier effect that is at the foundation of long-term, enduring
prosperity.
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CHAPTER 7
Weighing the Effects of Immigration

on Canadian Prosperity: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly
Samuel MacIsaac
Introduction
Immigration is an increasingly polarising issue in both public and political
spheres. Despite near-generalised agreement on the overall positive effect
of migration on global labour efficiency, productivity, and output among
academics (Rodrik 2001; Özden and Schiff 2006; Rosenzweig 2005),
critics continue to disparage the effects of immigrants on labour markets.
Although a rise in identity politics worldwide has led to an upsurge
in anti-immigration backlash and xenophobic sentiments, a lot of the
tensions remain focused on socioeconomics. Whether fuelled by national
identity, isolationism, fear of cultural imports, or a wide array of other
factors, populist parties have harnessed these sentiments in order to rally
the public to their cause on a global scale. Although far from a novel
phenomenon, the seeming rise global tension has many people wondering
S. MacIsaac (B)
Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
e-mail: samuel.macisaac@carleton.ca

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_7
132 S. MACISAAC
what the impacts of increasingly hefty migrant inflows, largely attributed

to the 2015 refugee crisis, will have on the prosperity of host, or recipient,
states. However, as will be discussed in this chapter, Canada has largely
been immune from this due to its geography and its immigration policies.
In Canada, under the Trudeau government, the narrative from Immi-
gration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) has been quite
different. Then Minister Ahmed Hussen, himself a Somali migrant to
Canada, announced in 2017 that Canada would increase its target for
admission of immigrants to 1% of the population by 2020, or nearly
one million permanent residents over three years. To put this in histor-
ical perspective, this would make the total percentage of first-generation
Canadians, as a proportion of the entire Canadian population, the highest
since the early 1930s. Plotted over time, immigration as a proportion
of the Canadian population takes on a U-shape (Boyd and Vickers
2000). Despite the Canadian focus on economic migrants through its
“points system”, mainly aimed at economic and family reunification
class immigrants (see Fig. 7.1 and refer to the next chapter in this
volume for more on Canada’s competition for talent), there remain ample
domestic concerns with regards to the impact on local employment,
earnings and wages, income inequality, and economic growth. All this
in addition to other immigration programs aimed at filling labour gaps
such as the Temporary Foreign Worker (TFW) program. Despite these
concerns, there exist several movements that run counter to populist
anti-immigration sentiments. For instance, the Century Initiative (see
Chapter 6 in this volume) proposes Canada increase its population to
reach one hundred million by 2100 to maintain its prosperity and place
on the world stage. This ambitious goal could only be achieved through
immigration (Fig. 7.1).
In an era of (dis)information abundance, it can be onerous to delve
deep into a plethora of sources and navigate a maze of contradic-
tory information and findings on the impacts of immigration prosperity
and well-being in the host-country. How does one reconcile drastically
opposing views on immigration and its positive or negative consequences
for Canadian prosperity? Furthermore, there is the age-old causality
puzzle of whether immigration affects growth or if it is economic growth
that attracts migrants in search of better opportunities. Although the
answer to this endogeneity issue is that dual causation is at play, how
does one isolate one effect from the other? Although a difficult problem,
migration scholars have developed a vast array of tools to uncover these
7
Fig. 7.1 Canadian immigration trends, 2000–2018 (Source IRCC and CIDP. Disaggregated numbers by province are
available through the CIDP website: http://cidpnsi.ca/migration-flows/)
WEIGHING THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON CANADIAN …
133
134 S. MACISAAC
causal effects and avoid falling in the endogeneity trap (Card 1990; Borjas
1999; Morley 2006; Boubtane et al. 2016).
The goal of this chapter is to explore the economic effects of immigra-
tion in the Canadian context by answering the following questions: Are
immigrants beneficial to Canadian prosperity, and would increased levels
of immigration continue to have the same positive or negative effects?
For the purposes of this chapter, prosperity is defined from an
economic perspective,1 focusing on employment, earnings, inequality,
fiscal impacts, and demographic effects (such as population ageing
and labour shortages) on both immigrants and non-immigrants within
Canada. It will be shown that immigration, albeit with differential impacts
across different population segments and subnational geographies, has
been largely positive for the Canadian economy. The main argument
advanced in this chapter is that, although not a panacea, immigration
does show some promise in relieving demographic and labour imbal-
ances. Moreover, Canada’s focus on economic class immigration, as well
as its unique geography, ensure that immigrants are highly skilled on
average and, for the most part, positively affect Canadian prosperity—
most notably in the long-run by addressing demographic problems such
as population ageing.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five parts. Part one
examines the seminal theories and the debates on the economic impact
of immigration. Part two focuses on the impacts of immigration on
economic growth and income in the Canadian context. Part three identi-
fies the ways in which immigration acts as a tool to combat labour short-
ages and demographic gaps. Part four consists of a brief overview of the
polarisation of public views on immigration. Finally, part five provides a
short conclusion with policy recommendations moving forward. Overall,
the chapter aims to provide a nuanced look at the effects of immigration
on Canadian prosperity and lay out the benefits (the good), the disad-
vantages, such as short-term costs, (the bad), and, in the midst of a
1 This chapter opts for an economic lens, as opposed to a cultural or social lens. For
instance, many scholars have argued that cultural and social imports are beneficial to
Canadian society (Costigan et al. 2016) and the benefits of multiculturalism go beyond
the realm of economics. Although these findings are important to our understanding
of migration and its impacts on our societies, these will not be the main focus of this
chapter. However, the importance of immigration and multiculturalism from a Canadian
foreign policy lens are briefly discussed in the conclusion and touch on some of these
sociocultural themes.
7 WEIGHING THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON CANADIAN … 135
cacophony of misinformation and contradicting information, to insulate

both from prejudiced rhetoric (the ugly).
From Seminal Debates to the Canadian

Immigration Landscape
Migration studies have come a long way since Harris and Todaro’s (1970)
seminal work on rural to urban migration. Their neoclassical economic
model, which states that individuals move due to higher expected living
standards than their location of origin, has been extended beyond rural–
urban sector migration to now include international displacements. Along
a similar vein, Lee’s (1966) Push–Pull theory to migration offers an excel-
lent starting point to the analysis of where people migrate based on
the concept of locational utility and its role in attracting migrants. Both
simple and intuitive, these frameworks provide valuable insights into the
cost–benefit analysis conducted by individual migrants, as well as their
households and wider networks (Stark and Bloom 1985; Massey et al.
1993), when it comes to selecting the location of where to migrate.
A prodigious portion of the economic impact of immigration litera-
ture focuses on Europe and the United States. And though these seminal
debates are important, the nature and composition of immigration have
changed since their time of writing. Despite generalised agreement on the
overall positive effect of migration on aggregate global output (Özden
and Schiff 2006; Rosenzweig 2005), the effects on labour markets, most
notably wages and economic growth in host-states, are not so clear cut
(especially among certain population segments, mainly the working class
reliant of “less-skilled” employment). Could George Borjas be correct
that a drop in the skill levels of immigrants could negatively affect the
prosperity of the host state? According to Borjas, the main culprit for
increases in “lesser skilled” migrants is the change in national origin
(Borjas 1999, p. 39) from largely European to non-European migrants.
In his seminal work, David Card showed that large influxes of Cuban
migrants to the US tend to lead to a short-term decline in employment
and wages across the total population, but that this effect is negligible
after 2–3 years (Card 1990). Chiswick (1978) found similar evidence in
the United States that showed immigrants start lower but fairly quickly
outpace the growth in earnings of their native counterparts. This finding
is corroborated in the Canadian context. Studies have shown that immi-
grants have high-income growth trajectories, especially among skilled
136 S. MACISAAC
primary applicants (Mata and Pendakur 2017). However, Borjas (1999)

claims that lower education, especially among US migrant households,
is endemic and the underlying cause for migrants’ wages lagging behind
those of the remainder of the population.
In the United States, the change in immigrant composition, from
largely skilled European to less skilled South American immigration, is
crucial seeing that there exist large gaps in income and skills based on the
country of origin. In Canada, despite changes in the immigrant compo-
sition in favour of Asian immigrants, the reality is quite different in that
the skill level difference is not as based on the country of origin (Borjas
1999). Could this trend be over or understated? How do these seminal
debates apply in Canada?
There are two main reasons why Canada might attract highly
skilled immigrants. First, unlike in the United States, Canada’s “points
system” (Aydemir and Borjas 2007) discriminates based on employability,
language skills, and education. As a result, immigrants tend to be more
highly educated on average, unlike in the United States. Within Canada,
immigrants are more educated than native-born Canadians and twice
as likely to have a master’s or doctorate degree according to the 2016
census (Statistics Canada 2017). Canada’s targeting of mainly economic
migrants with the purpose of advancing the country’s prosperity has
largely been successful (Beach et al. 2007). The diversification of Cana-
dian immigration is hardly new, nor is the recognition of immigration’s
vital role in the Canadian economy. In contrast to ethnicity-based immi-
gration policies of the past, such as the Chinese Immigration Act, for
instance, Canada implemented its “points system” in October of 1967
in favour of economic and skills-based discrimination. Although this was
largely attributable to targeting economic migration, it also coincides with
the emerging culture of human rights and ethnic diversification at the
time (Triadafilopoulos 2013). The focus on economic migrants ushered a
new era of Canadian immigration policy and set the groundwork for the
economically minded policies that are still in place to this day.
Second, although Canadian policies have done their fair share in
ensuring Canada attracts migrants that are beneficial to its prosperity,
there is a simple geographic advantage that merits mention. Canada
benefits from its distinctiveness in terms of natural barriers that reduce
undocumented migration that is typically less educated or—“less-skilled”
or “unskilled”. Canada is unique in this respect since even countries
such as Australia and New Zealand share a proximity to lower income

countries.
Although refugee and other humanitarian programs are vital in
providing global assistance and actively participating in the “burden-
sharing” of hosting asylum seekers fleeing persecution, these programs
require resources. This is not to say that these forms of immigration
should be discarded. This is simply meant to be a reminder of the policy-
maker dilemma of having to reweight economic class immigrants versus
those of other classes. It goes without saying that Canada’s role in perma-
nently resettling the most refugees in 2018 was critical in fulfilling its
international obligations and moving past the cold-hearted calculus of
each immigrant’s value-added in terms of Canadian prosperity.
So, what is the impact of migration on prosperity, or economic well-
being, in the Canadian context? The next section elaborates on this
question through a careful examination of Canadian empirical evidence
in this issue area.
Spurring Economic Growth and Prosperity?

Before delving into whether immigration yields greater economic growth
and well-being prospects in Canada, it is important to underscore the
importance of labour as an input of production. Labour inputs, among
other inputs such as traditional capital (machines and infrastructure) and
land inputs, produce value but experience diminishing marginal returns
(for example, there are only so many labourers needed to operate a
particular machine or farm a piece of land). An oversupply of workers
would “crowd out” a portion of the population, thus creating unem-
ployment and reducing wages. It could also affect productivity, which,
simply put, refers to the output per unit of input. Hence, one concern of
critics is whether inflows of labour (i.e. immigration) help to fill labour
shortages or whether they unintentionally reduce wages, productivity, and
employment rates. In this section, we focus on the impacts of immigra-
tion on economic growth, productivity, education and skills, earnings, and
inequality.
It goes without saying that immigration boosts aggregate GDP
through additional consumption, but what about its per capita effects?
Boubtane et al. (2016) show that immigration has a positive impact
on per capita GDP growth for OECD countries including, somewhat
138 S. MACISAAC
surprisingly, in the case of countries with non-selective migration poli-

cies. However, Morley (2006) finds that in Canada, the United States
and Australia, economic growth affects immigration but not vice versa—
meaning that migrants immigrate to these areas because they are expe-
riencing growth, rather than causing them to grow. How does one deal
with this endogeneity or, more specifically, this reverse causality between
immigration levels and economic growth? Both Boubtane et al. (2016)
and Morley (2006) control for endogeneity using different statistical
techniques despite their distinct conclusions.
Further studies continue to add to the plethora of contradicting
evidence. For instance, a study by the Conference Board of Canada (El-
Assal and Fields 2018) forecasts two scenarios, one with no immigration
and another where annual immigration is set to 1% of the population. The
study found that GDP per capita is higher in the no immigration scenario
but that GDP growth is much higher with 1% immigration. These results
confirm neoclassical economic growth theory that an increase in popula-
tion would decrease GDP per capita but would increase GDP and GDP
growth. For the most part, this difference is attributable to a declining
population with a higher GDP per capita despite slower aggregate growth
without immigration. In light of this mixed evidence, one thing is clear
in the literature: whether negative or positive, the effects of immigration
on growth are small (Riddell et al. 2016).
Despite the mixed results when it comes to economic growth, a more
important effect is the impact immigration has on education, produc-
tivity, and wages. Due to their higher education, immigrants generally
experience higher wage growth than their native counterparts (Yssaad
and Fields 2018). The short-term outcomes of immigrants are not a
good representation of longer-term prospects (Picot et al. 2016) since the
average immigrant to Canada features higher education rates and similar
employment rates to native-born Canadians (Picot and Hou 2010). It is
worth noting however that the United States attracts a higher propor-
tion (as a percentage of its incoming immigrants) of “highly skilled
migrants” than Canada when only looking at high-achieving doctoral
graduates (Bonikowska et al. 2011). In sum, the evidence is not definitive
since there are both gains and losses across various population segments.
Furthermore, in spite of evidence of a brain gain effect, there continues to
exist a “brain waste” and deskilling problem, meaning that the talents of
many immigrants are wasted due to lack of recognition of foreign creden-

tials (Özden and Schiff 2006; Creese and Wiebe 2012; Imai et al. 2019)
(Figs. 7.2 and 7.3).
Although findings vary significantly across different immigrant classes
in Canada, economic class immigrants experience higher earnings on
average in the long-run (Sweetman and Warman 2013) despite experi-
encing initial higher rates of poverty than family class immigrants (Picot
et al. 2008). Furthermore, privately sponsored refugees perform much
better in the labour market than their government-assisted counterparts
(Sweetman and Warman 2013; Kaida et al. 2019).
Having explored growth, earnings, education, and productivity effects,
this chapter now turns to the evidence of a growing innovative and
15
13
11
5
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Immigrants, landed 5 or less years earlier
Immigrants, landed more than 5 to 10

years earlier
Immigrants, landed more than 10 years
earlier
Born in Canada
Fig. 7.2 Unemployment rate (%) of individuals 15 years or older by immigrant

status, 2006–2018 (Source Table 14-10-0083-01, Statistics Canada)
140 S. MACISAAC
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
Median wages, salaries and commissions ($)

Average wages, salaries and commissions ($)
Fig. 7.3 Wages and salaries by period of immigration, 2016 (Source 2016
Census, Statistics Canada)
entrepreneurial middle-class. Aydemir and Borjas (2007) show that

despite immigration increasing wage inequality in the United States, it has
the opposite effect in Canada. In Canada, immigration greatly contributes
to a growing middle class with immigrants catching up to their Canadian-
born counterparts in the form of wages and compensation after a little
over a decade in Canada (see Fig. 7.3). Despite varying across immi-
grant classes, immigrants have a higher proclivity for self-employment
(Li 2001). Although this is often attributed to a necessity for survival,
otherwise known as the blocked mobility hypothesis, immigrants that are
more educated and better established in Canada are shown to favour self-
employment (Li 2001). This underscores the argument that immigrants
favour self-employment for entrepreneurial reasons and runs counter to
the intuition of the blocked mobility hypothesis, which suggests immi-

grants prefer self-employment because of barriers and a crowding out
effect with regards to formal employment. The simple fact that migrants
are willing to make the leap across countries, even continents, suggests
they are potentially more risk-taking than native-born Canadians and the
entrepreneurship and self-employment could be one of its manifestations
in the labour market.
Along the same vein as seemingly higher entrepreneurship and innova-
tion levels, immigration has been known to promote trade and investment
flows. Tadesse and White (2010) document the trade-inhibiting effects of
cultural distance using a sample of 75 countries’ bilateral trade data and
find that immigrant stocks mitigates this effect by promoting exports.
Case studies from the United States (Steingress 2018) and the UK
(Ottaviano et al. 2018) corroborate the trade promoting effects of
increased migration. Albeit somewhat dated, Head and Ries (1998)
confirm these migration-trade findings in Canada using data from 136
trading partners from 1980 to 1992.
Despite immigrants’ positive role in entrepreneurship and promoting
trade, their adjustment period within the labour market upon arrival can
cause short-term fiscal drains (Riddell et al. 2016), but these decline over
time. Do immigrants help relieve the fiscal burden in the long-term? Can
immigration also help mitigate the effects of an ageing population that
is of growing concerns as Canadians begin to feel the weight of retiring
baby boomers on social services and programs? The next section identifies
the various effects immigration has on demographic changes, their fiscal
impact, and their role in filling employment gaps.
Solving Canadian Demographic

Problems and Employment Shortages?
Tensions resulting from demographic trends with a peaking labour force
and ever-increasing dependency ratios among an ageing population have
largely been relieved through immigration (Özden and Schiff 2006). In
Europe, it has been empirically shown that migration has narrowed the
fiscal gap of future generations, mainly in low-fertility countries with
rising government expenditures linked to high dependency ratios (United
Nations 2004). Not only has immigration subsided dependency pressures
on governments, but it has also contributed to filling employment gaps.
In Canada, this is achieved through a multitude of programs, including
142 S. MACISAAC
the TFW program and the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP). This
section elaborates on whether these benefits from immigration apply in
the Canadian context and what demographic as well as labour market
dynamics are at play in Canada.
Without immigration, a declining population due to low fertility rates
could affect Canada’s prosperity due to rising costs on a per capita
basis. For this reason, an ageing population has been one of the leading
demographic and economic policy challenges of the past decade and will
continue to be for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, some argue
that immigration on its own cannot solve this problem since new immi-
grant numbers fall (very) short of the rate of retiring Canadians (Riddell
et al. 2016; Robson and Mahboubi 2018). Although these authors are
correct that immigration is not an all-encompassing solution, they under-
estimate how much it can help relieve the ageing demographics burden.
One must look at the longer-term to truly see immigration’s benefits.
The main benefit is not first-generation immigrant labour coming into
Canada, but rather their children, the second-generation population, that
is the solution due to immigrants’ higher fertility rate. Forecasts of the
Canadian population show a growing second-generation population that
is going to great lengths to create a burgeoning and youthful popula-
tion segment (Dion et al. 2015; Morency et al. 2017). Although these
inter-generational effects occur over a longer period of time, they should
kick-in in time to provide relief and keep fiscal revenues up by broadening
the Canadian tax base.
Although not as acute a population ageing problem as some low
fertility rate European countries, Canada would see its population decline
from over 37 million in 2019 to around 34.3 million by 2040, assuming
a counterfactual scenario of zero immigration (El-Assal and Fields 2018).
Evidence for the positive fiscal impact of immigration and the benefits
of inter-generational tax revenues (United Nations 2004) are among the
most important benefits of immigration to a country’s prosperity. In the
Canadian context, there is evidence of such benefits for tax purposes
and public services. Akbari (1989) and Wang and Lo (2000) have docu-
mented numerous fiscal benefits from immigration. For immigrants in
Toronto admitted between 1980 and 1995, Wang and Lo (2000) find
that the average immigrant did not obtain social assistance that exceeded
the amount they paid in the form of income taxes. This supports the
life-cycle hypothesis that immigrants, like their Canada-born counter-
parts, contribute to Canadians’ prosperity through the means of indirect
public fund transfers on an inter-generational basis. Therefore, immigra-

tion serves as an important source of demographic relief that supports the
fiscal drain of rising healthcare costs and public services that come with
an ageing population.
Additionally, immigration plays an important role when it comes to
filling employment gaps, but this is not without its own consequences.
The TFW program aims to fill labour market shortages to enable the
best allocation of resources possible. This program is especially benefi-
cial in cases where there is a lack of suitable employees at any particular
wage rate. Unfortunately, there were many instances in which the arrival
of foreign workers under the program led to layoffs or drops in earn-
ings in the region, leading many to question the labour market benefits
for Canada, particularly “less-skilled” Canadians at risk of being underbid
by cheaper foreign labour (Worswick 2013). In August 2013, the federal
government changed the rules around the TFW program to address these
concerns by eliminating a rule whereby foreign workers could be paid up
to 15% less than the going wage, introduction of a fee per TFW, and other
rules aimed at mitigating undesirable labour effects. However, despite
certain adverse impacts on Canadian employment, the TFW program is
successful in raising efficiency and the proper allocation of labour in the
presence of shortages. Although this chapter has focused on national-
level impacts, it is important to consider regional provincial and territorial
effects. The PNP has largely been attributed with displacing a portion
of traditional migration to Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia to
other provinces, namely the Prairie provinces (Seidle 2013). In current
population projections, this trend is expected to continue and ensure a
greater allocation of labour outside of major urban centres. Both the
TFW program and PNP should be pushed further in providing smaller
urban centres with skilled labour (Riddell et al. 2016), particularly in the
Prairies, the Territories, and Atlantic Canada.
The Ugly Side of Immigration

Debates and the Polarised
Politicisation of Human Migration
Having explored the benefits and costs associated with immigration in
terms of Canadian prosperity, this section now turns to the rise of
anti-immigration sentiments worldwide and the large-scale dismissal of
144 S. MACISAAC
evidence and a fact-based public discourse regarding human migration.

This ugly side of the immigration debate is, unfortunately, the one to
which the general public has been the most exposed.
In 2015, the migrant crisis led to enormous influxes of refugees, mainly
from Syria and Afghanistan, westward towards Europe. With a seem-
ingly endless stream of asylum seekers crossing borders and looking for
refuge and a better life, the terrain was propitious for nativism, xeno-
phobia and fears of cultural morphism, racism, and other forms of bigotry
to emerge. Although not the primary cause, immigration acted as the
spark to rally populists across the globe. Feelings of apprehension towards
migrants, refugees in particular, have run rampant. The rise of anti-
immigration sentiments in the United States with the infamous border
wall is echoed by countless world leaders including Viktor Orban in
Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil pulling out of the Global Compact for
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and various other leaders. In June
of 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin called liberalism “obsolete”,
falsely alluding to migrants as being violent with impunity across Europe.
As has been argued, immigration clearly benefits economic growth
and productivity as well as helps stave off pressing demographic chal-
lenges. Nevertheless, these crucial benefits can carry negative externalities
in terms of local job displacement that fuels discontent and can contribute
to anti-immigrant sentiments. Federal and Provincial governments should
therefore consider how it might better deal with the social challenges of
immigration. We should not take for granted that Canada will always
be safe from populist or xenophobic domestic movements in the face
of a changing ethnic composition. The rise of discontent voices, largely
fuelled by growing inequalities and technological change, in favour of
anti-immigrant populism, is worrying enough, but the true casualty is
the heaps of empirical evidence regarding the generally positive effects of
Canadian immigration policy.
Conclusion
Shortly after his electoral win in 2015, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
stated that “Canada is back”. The claim referred to the restoration of
Canada’s foreign policy brand of multilateralism and a nostalgic idealism
(Nimijean 2018). This type of rhetoric can be politically useful. It can
symbolise Canada’s global position as a tolerant country, open to immi-

gration and welcoming of highly sought-after foreign talent. It further-
more underscores Canada’s humanitarian image. Immigration is far from
just a domestic issue, since it can be used as a symbol of Canada’s posi-
tionality globally as a middle-power open to immigration and capable of
attracting highly sought-after talent. Furthermore, it could go a long way
in re-establishing Canada’s humanitarian image of the Pearson era—albeit
not through peacekeeping but through the resettlement of refugees.
Although very far from receiving the most refugees, Canada did rank first
globally in 2018 for the permanent resettlement of refugees according to
the UNHCR (see also Chapter 3 in this volume). Many of these issues
are covered in other chapters of this volume. These images of an open
and idealist Canada could go a long way in contributing to its prosperity
through its image as the embodiment of progressive liberal democracies
and attracting human capital. Only time will tell whether Canada will
revert to the polite, multilateralist, and multicultural middle-power image
it intends to portray internationally.
In addition to accomplishing its foreign policy goals, immigration can
contribute to Canadians’ prosperity domestically. At the onset of this
chapter, we proposed answering how immigration affects Canadian pros-
perity. This chapter has examined the effects of immigration on a series of
economic factors that influence Canadian well-being and the impacts are
primarily positive across most indicators. Although immigration is hardly
the harbinger of economic collapse being promoted by anti-immigration
movements, neither is it a panacea to all of Canada’s demographic and
economic woes. As the title indicates, let us weigh the good, the bad, and
the ugly sides of the debate on the economic impacts of immigration.
• the good: as explored in this chapter, immigration provides a myriad

of economic benefits to Canada ranging from a larger and more
innovative middle class that reduces income inequality, to a more
educated population (brain gain) that partially offsets population
ageing and higher public spending, to increased aggregate growth.
• the bad: immigration is not without its adverse effects on Cana-
dian prosperity. Especially in the short-run, higher rates of poverty,
unemployment, and low earnings negatively impact prosperity and
consist of a fiscal burden. Although these effects are mitigated by
faster growth in employment and income than native-born Cana-
dians, these short-term costs should not be overlooked. The main
146 S. MACISAAC
policies in place to address these short-term costs should be geared

towards degree recognition to avoid the unnecessary deskilling of
immigrants and greater help in job market integration—whether it
be job skills or linguistic training. Current policies in place should
be expanded to curtail the short-term costs incurred and to amplify
the already positive longer-term effects.
• the ugly: the debates on immigration continue to be plagued by anti-
immigration rhetoric that often resorts to thinly veiled xenophobia
or some other form of bigotry. This uglier side of the immigra-
tion debate should be acknowledged and fought with evidence-based
policymaking. Debates on job losses and wage decreases need to
occur in the public eye with the requirement of evidence. As it
stands, debates in the public sphere on the impacts of immigration
are sorely lacking in analytical rigour and abound with demagoguery.
So, what is the telos of immigration? In the Canadian context, its

policies have made it quite clear: economic prosperity. The Canadian
economy benefits from numerous natural barriers that limit undocu-
mented migration (geographical uniqueness) and a “points system” that
continues to favour highly skilled economic migration. However, this
does not mean the policymaking relating to immigration is limited to
economic arguments about Canadian prosperity. For instance, Canada
cannot simply walk away from its responsibility to resettle asylum
seekers fleeing persecution. If anything, it means Canadian policymakers
need to balance the resettlement of refugees with the promotion of
economic migrants and keep an eye on the per capita effects on non-
immigrant Canadians. These balanced policies are necessary to avoid
anti-immigration backlash while also fulfilling Canada’s international and
humanitarian roles on the global stage.
With current levels of immigration, forecasts show the important
impacts of these waves of new Canadian residents (and Canadian citi-
zens) as well as the diversification of Canada. Based on Statistics Canada’s
projections, immigrants would make up 24.5–30% of the population by
2036 (Morency et al. 2017) and raise Canada’s low fertility rates (Dion
et al. 2015). Furthermore, immigrants and second-generation Canadians
(children of immigrants) are projected to represent nearly one in two
Canadians by 2036, as opposed to 38.2% in 2011. Without immigration,
an impossible yet interesting counterfactual, the Canadian population
would be approximately 34.3 million by 2040 according to a Confer-

ence Board of Canada report (El-Assal and Fields 2018) and would be
experiencing significant population ageing and decline. However, the
Conference Board report estimates the Canadian population as being
closer to 45 million by 2040 if Canada were to ramp up immigration to
accepting 1% of its population on an annual basis. This is only marginally
higher than the 44.2 million by 2040 forecasted if current levels of
immigration are used (status quo scenario).
So, how many immigrants should Canada accept on an annual basis?
In light of an increasingly diverse and multicultural Canada, the main
takeaway should be that policymakers focus more on integration, degree
recognition, and narrowing gaps in human capital recognition between
immigrants and non-immigrants (Reitz 2001; Houle and Yssaad 2010).
These policies are far more important and effective than the endless
quest for that miracle number of immigrants to admit on an annual
basis. Visible minorities and individuals educated abroad have long lagged
behind in earnings despite controlling for levels of education (Pendakur
and Pendakur 1998; Buzdugan and Halli 2009; Pendakur and Pendakur
2011). This is an increasingly problematic case seeing that demographic
forecasts show this segment of the population increasing over the next
decades and more than doubling according to a Statistics Canada projec-
tion reference scenario by 2036 (Morency et al. 2017). Narrowing these
gaps should be an important policy concern achieved through reforms in
credential recognition and re-accreditation programs specifically designed
to adapt to the Canadian market. This would go a long way in preventing
qualified individuals from having to entertain the idea of obtaining Cana-
dian degrees from scratch, or worse deskilling and working in low-wage
“survival employment” (Creese and Wiebe 2012).
Meanwhile, in Quebec, lower immigration levels under the current
government are being counteracted by an increase in admittances of TFW
to fill labour shortages (Shingler and Montpetit 2019). Unfortunately, I
argue these efforts are insufficient as they are only temporary solutions
to problems that require proper integration strategies. Since there is no
magic number of immigrants Canada should accept, policymakers should
instead ramp up integration efforts to better accommodate incoming
Canadians and permanent residents. Better integration and degree recog-
nition, although difficult, especially in professional and accredited fields,
are more likely to yield the desired results rather than obsessing over
148 S. MACISAAC
the exact threshold of new Canadians one chooses to admit. Integra-

tion efforts will also go a long way in preventing the marginalisation and
ghettoisation of various diasporic groups within Canadian borders.
In a world of rising populist and anti-immigrant tensions, it would be
wise to keep an eye on the perverse effects of immigration. So far, Cana-
dian foreign policy has broadly balanced the intake of asylum seekers and
economic as well as family reunification class migrants. It would be irre-
sponsible to either completely open or close the immigration flood gates,
but increased numbers of permanent residents compared to temporary
residents will go further in solving longer-run economic and demographic
gaps. Furthermore, in the midst of a turbulent storm of anti-immigrant
backlash, this could open a crucial window of opportunity in filling skill
gaps in Canada. All in all, Canada can afford to and should increase
its current levels of immigration, particularly favouring permanent resi-
dency, but its policymakers should remain wary of drastically overhauling
a largely effective and generally balanced set of policies.
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CHAPTER 8
Sustainable Development and Diaspora

Engagement in Canada
Sujata Ramachandran and Jonathan Crush
Introduction
The concept of diaspora engagement is central to global debates and
policy initiatives on the relationship between migration and development
(Brinkerhoff 2008; Chikanda et al. 2016; McIntyre and Gamlen 2019;
Merz et al. 2007; Ratha and Plaza 2011; Sahoo and Pattaniak 2014).
The concept emerged as an antidote to earlier brain drain arguments
which claimed that emigration represented a permanent and damaging
loss to countries in the global South (Walton-Roberts et al. 2019). Recog-
nizing that immigrants retain particularly close cultural, familial, social and
economic ties to their countries and communities of origin, the challenge
facing governments has been how best to harness these informal link-
ages to broader visions and practices of state-led development. There is
S. Ramachandran (B) · J. Crush

Department of Geography, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada
J. Crush
Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, ON, Canada
University of Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_8
154 S. RAMACHANDRAN AND J. CRUSH
now a large literature, for example, on the remitting behaviour of immi-

grants who collectively remitted USD529 billion in 2018, exceeding both
Official Development Assistance and Foreign Direct Investment (World
Bank 2018). Although there is general agreement that remittances have
positive social and economic development outcomes, these tend to be
non-systematic, localized and outside the purview and control of states.
Diaspora engagement policies recognize that linkages extend well beyond
remittances to include investment, trade, skills and knowledge transfer
and philanthropic giving. There are now a small number of case studies
which aim to explore the contours of diaspora philanthropy in different
geographical contexts (Geithner et al. 2004; Low 2017; Licuanan et al.
2015; White 2019).
The 2018 Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
commits signatories to ‘create conditions for migrants and diasporas
to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries’ (UN
2018). Among the proposed actions are (a) facilitating the contribu-
tions of migrants and diasporas to their countries of origin, including
by establishing or strengthening government structures or mechanisms
at all levels, such as dedicated diaspora offices or focal points, diaspora
policy advisory boards for Governments to account for the potential of
migrants and diasporas in migration and development policymaking and
dedicated diaspora focal points in diplomatic or consular missions; and
(b) developing targeted support programmes and financial products
that facilitate migrant and diaspora investments and entrepreneurship,
including by providing administrative and legal support in business
creation and granting seed capital-matching, establishing diaspora bonds,
diaspora development funds and investment funds and organizing dedi-
cated trade fairs (UN 2018, p. 28). Diasporas have also been identified
as potentially important partners for states in the implementation of the
2030 UN Sustainable Development Agenda (Foresti and Hagen-Zanker
2018; Koff 2017; Nurse 2018; Riddle 2017; Tavakoli and Raja 2017).
In the last two decades, regional organizations and national govern-
ments across the global South have developed policies and institutions
to promote diaspora engagement (Gamlen et al. 2019). According to
McIntyre and Gamlen (2019, p. 36) diaspora engagement policies ‘have
never before been so widespread’. They identified over 200 diaspora
engagement institutions (ministries, departments, directorates and other
origin-state offices) across 110 different states.
8 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT … 155
The ‘diaspora engagement option’ attempts to leverage the human,

economic and social capital of migrant groups to facilitate and enhance
the socio-economic development of their countries of origin. Glob-
ally, efforts to institutionalize this strategy and underscore the linkages
between migration and development might suggest a general consensus
among various stakeholders regarding the benefits and outcomes of dias-
pora engagement. As Kapur (2004) has argued, migrant-engagement
efforts such as remittances have become the ‘new development mantra’
and migrants are now the new heroes in development-oriented processes
(Castles 2009). However, the perceived optimism of this approach and its
merits have been tempered by sharp critiques from migration researchers
challenging its excessively celebratory tenor (Gamlen 2014).
Critics of this approach contend that migration and migrants have
‘mutated’ from being a key ‘problem’ for economic development to
becoming its primary solution (Glick-Schiller and Faist 2010, p. 7). Faist
and Fauser (2011, p. 4) maintain that the benefits of migration for devel-
opment accrue most significantly and meaningfully to receiving countries,
especially those in the global North, while the impacts for sending coun-
tries are ‘less clear-cut and heavily contested in field of development
cooperation and in academic research’. Moreover, socio-economic devel-
opment and migrant remittances and investments in sending countries
are not a consequence of migration; rather, the reverse (Faist 2010). The
emphasis needs to be on optimal forms of development supported by
solid political and institutional arrangements to augment the effects of
such activities. Based on their assessment of the World Bank’s diaspora
strategy, Pellerin and Mullings (2013, p. 112) argue that the diaspora
option to address poverty and uneven development in the global South is
‘greatly exaggerated at best, and risky at worst.’ They further claim that
this engagement fluctuates over time and operates most effectively outside
of state intervention and institutionalization. Wickramasekara (2016) has
raised similar doubts about the effectiveness of diaspora-led development
efforts, such as philanthropic contributions and knowledge networks.
He argues that there are large gaps between the potential and actual
contributions of networks which often end up dissolving due to resource
constraints and other factors. The volume, regularity and effectiveness of
philanthropic activities have also been questioned. Broadly speaking, all
of these appraisals question the significance and impacts of such activities
for migrants and sustainable development processes in various ways.
In this chapter, we examine the extent to which the Government of

Canada has bought into the diaspora engagement option and if it sees its
large and highly diverse diaspora population as a viable partner in the
implementation of its foreign policies. Conversely, since there is clear
evidence that many diaspora populations do actively engage in activi-
ties that benefit their countries of origin, it is important to understand
whether the Government has been willing to actively support and add
value to these initiatives. We argue that Government support for diaspora
initiatives has been tentative and unsystematic at best. Unlike many other
migrant-receiving countries globally, Canada has been reluctant to main-
stream diasporas into its aid policies. In the face of this tepid approach,
it is important to acknowledge that the independent development-related
contributions of Canada-based diasporas are both diverse and significant,
and relate to far more than remitting funds to family members in home
countries.
The chapter therefore makes an original contribution by elucidating
the multi-faceted, compound ways in which diasporas identify and interact
with local, national and transnational institutions, state-based and non-
state actors in both countries of settlement and origin. We support our
claims by using a case study of South African diaspora philanthropy in
Canada to destabilize overly deterministic and linear views of philan-
thropic engagement rooted in migration and development narratives. The
chapter therefore builds on previous literature exploring the ways in which
diaspora philanthropy is not confined to giving to countries of origin
but also extends to Canada-centred projects (Mehta 2016; Mehta and
Johnston 2011; Ramachandran 2016).
Regarding Canada’s Diaspora Option

A recent report by the Mosaic Institute (2016, p. 4) argues that many
diaspora groups possess the ‘legitimate experiences and expertise to
contribute to Canada’s official foreign policy and international activities.’
Another study by the Mowat Centre pointed to the need for well-
designed diaspora policies in Canada to boost Canadian economic policies
overseas (Bitran and Tan 2013). The value of diasporas in enhancing
trade and commercial linkages with other countries has also been high-
lighted (Boyle and Kitchin 2011). An earlier report by the Mosaic
Institute (2011b) observed that the ideals of democratic citizenship can
be promoted by leveraging the diasporas’ assets of special expertise,
knowledge and resources for Canadian foreign policy. Consultations with

civil society groups organized in recent years by Global Affairs Canada
have yielded similar conclusions, underlining the important potential role
of diaspora communities for Canada’s international development efforts
(Government of Canada 2017). In a recent commentary surveying fifty
years of Canadian diplomatic history, Copeland (2018) suggests that the
country’s foreign policy needs to be more public, inclusive and participa-
tory and that well-conceived forms of diaspora engagement are important
processes through which this can occur. The Mosaic Institute (2011b)
persuasively argues that to facilitate this engagement, a clearly defined set
of priorities needs to be balanced with a potential cohort of collaborators,
the enhancing of diaspora capacities, and streamlined official channels
through which these activities can occur.
Despite these recommendations being articulated and rearticulated by
various groups and organizations for nearly a decade, a clear-cut offi-
cial strategy involving the large, growing diaspora segment of Canada’s
population has yet to emerge. In this respect, the Canadian experience
represents a significant departure from that of its southern neighbour.
Through USAID (2016), its formal division for foreign assistance and
international development cooperation, the US government has engaged
its diasporas for nearly two decades and has recognized them as crucial
‘partners’ in its overseas humanitarian and development efforts. It has
identified concrete priority areas through which this engagement can be
nurtured and all of these connect with sustainable development: philan-
thropy, humanitarian response, mentorship and volunteerism. They also
offered monetary support for some Canadian programmes involving dias-
poras, such as CUSO’s international volunteering initiative (Agunias and
Newland 2012; Cuso International 2012).
Canada’s omission may appear striking given the large, expanding
and highly diversified diaspora segment among its population and
longstanding emphasis on diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism as
quintessentially ‘Canadian values’ (Kymlicka 2004; Momani and Stirk
2017). It may also be conspicuous considering the constant celebration
and invocation of ‘liberal internationalism,’ of its perceived deep tradition
of working through international and national institutions to contribute
to a more secure and equitable global order (Black 2016; Paris 2014).
Another aspect of this incongruity is that the diaspora option is not
incompatible with the values and actions of the Feminist International
Assistance policy operational since mid-2017 in which greater cooperation
and partnerships with various stakeholders are core components (Global

Affairs Canada 2018).
Diasporas have certainly not been completely disregarded by succes-
sive Canadian governments. As early as 2005, a new-founded optimism
replaced previous long-held anxieties about the constraining influence
of diasporas in Canada’s international engagement (Mackenzie 2012).
This shift was grounded in the growing belief that by involving them
more, existing and new bilateral and regional relationships could be
strengthened. Also identified was the considerable potential to work
cooperatively in the areas of education, science and technology with large
diaspora groups, such as Indians, for the mutual benefit of India and
Canada (Government of Canada 2005). But this hopeful prospectus did
not convert into concrete efforts to forge a cohesive diaspora strategy
for development cooperation by systematically identifying a comprehen-
sive range of themes and activities through which such ties could be
channeled and expanded in meaningful ways.
Since then, Canadian Government collaboration with diasporas has
mostly been limited to occasional direct overtures and ad hoc mone-
tary support for selected projects on a sporadic basis. For example, in
2009–2010, the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (DFAIT 2010) organized the Global Emerging Issues Network of
interdepartmental policy directorates to improve coordination and coher-
ence across various official divisions on such issues along with the ‘Global
Citizens’ initiative to integrate Canadians living in other countries. A
complementary CIDA-led effort with a modest budget, the Global
Citizen programme, attempted to encourage the participation of Cana-
dians, especially children and youth, in development-oriented activities
in Canada and the global South (Huijgh 2019). Diasporas (in Canada)
engagement for development is also believed to have been incorpo-
rated in the DFAIT Global Citizen programme (Mosaic Institute 2011a).
Funding has been given to CUSO International’s Volunteering Cooper-
ation Program to build the engagement of citizens, including diasporas,
to Canada’s international development efforts (Terrazas 2010). Consulta-
tive dialogues on development issues were held with selected established
immigrant groups in 2014. Nevertheless, the Canadian government’s
broad approach to the ‘diaspora option’ and ‘migration–development
nexus’ thus far can best be described as exploratory, intermittent and
oscillating and generally lacking internal consistency and coherence. A
disjointed patchwork of programmes and occasional involvement through

financial aid has defined these efforts.
This essentially uncoordinated approach to the ‘diaspora option’ has
recently resurfaced in the Canadian response to the 2030 Sustainable
Development Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In
April of 2018, the Government of Canada’s (2018c) joint communique
following the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Toronto underscored the
‘contribution of diasporas to the development of their countries of origin,’
while additionally accepting that migration can be a ‘source of prosperity,
innovation and sustainable development.’ Despite this declaration, which
echoes several general statements on migration and migrants issued by the
UN for the 2030 Agenda, the Government of Canada’s (2018a, 2018b,
2019) voluntary national review for the SDGs fails to recognize the role
of diasporas.
Canada’s first SDG review is a stocktaking exercise of progress and
charts a plan of execution to attain the goals and targets (Government
of Canada 2018a). In the review document, the growing diversity of the
country is highlighted as a strength, with immigrants and their descen-
dants constituting its major components (Government of Canada 2018a,
p. 79). Beyond that, migration is treated as synonymous with immigra-
tion, with a focus on the specific challenges faced by immigrant groups in
Canada. The institutional and other socio-economic barriers faced by new
arrivals in settling and adapting to Canada receive attention (Government
of Canada 2018a, pp. 18, 77). Although the review mentions various
strategic transnational partnerships that Canada has engaged in, namely
in the fields of education, food security, gender equality and other impor-
tant global challenges, diasporas are not identified as active contributors
or stakeholders in the SDG process in Canada or in Canada’s support
of other countries (Government of Canada 2018a, pp. 30–31; 2018b,
p. 43). As a result, the actual and potential contribution of immigrant
diasporas goes unrecognized.
Diaspora Philanthropy: South Africa Case Study

A major challenge in advocating for a more coherent approach to the dias-
pora option in Canada is the paucity of research on the engagement of
diaspora/immigrant communities for sustainable development, with only
fragmentary information available for specific groups (Mehta 2016; Crush
et al. 2013; Mehta and Johnson 2011; Sridhar 2011). This is also the
case for large, established communities with extended histories of immi-

gration in Canada. Sridhar’s (2011, p. 16) preliminary analysis for South
Asian communities in Canada and the US, for example, noted that despite
constituting 4% of Canada’s population by 2006, the ‘state of the field in
terms of understanding this community’s philanthropy appears to be in
complete disarray, relying heavily on assumptions and anecdotal evidence.’
Clemens et al. (2014, p. 123) note that ‘a common presump-
tion in the academic and policy literatures is that the main transfers
from migrants to their home countries take place through remittances.’
Donations and other types of monetary transfer have been ‘almost
completely ignored.’ Diaspora philanthropy is certainly an understudied
phenomenon in Canada and more generally, primarily because of ‘the
difficulty in accounting what qualifies as philanthropy, the underreporting
of these initiatives and the anecdotal nature of philanthropic narratives’
(Espinosa 2017). Diaspora philanthropy is not as amenable to capture
by states and the migration and development industry, despite attempts
to package it as a new form of development assistance (Koff 2017).
As Newland et al. (2010, p. 2) point out, diaspora philanthropy is a
blanket term to describe a wide variety of actors with different motiva-
tions, objectives, capacities, degrees of independence, and impacts and is
driven by complex individual and social dynamics. In addition, diaspora
philanthropy is an ‘unruly field’ which, unlike remittances, is not easily
quantifiable (Mehta 2016, p. 1). Newland et al. (2010) still provide a
useful typology for classifying forms of diaspora philanthropy (Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Diaspora philanthropy matrix
Individual donor Donor aggregation

Individual donor Multiple donors
Donation size Small Some remittances, individual Home town associations,

donations online platforms, small
foundations
Large Direct donations from Professional associations,
magnates, celebrities, sports family foundations, venture
stars, large foundations philanthropy funds
established by such individuals
Source Newland et al. (2010)

In a newer study on immigrant philanthropy in Canada, Mehta (2016)

has sceptically described it as a new form of ‘philanthro-capitalism’ in the
neoliberal era defined by growing debt and concentrated wealth which
serves to fill in glaring shortages in social welfare produced by cost-cutting
governments. These new forms of governing turn attention away from the
systemic processes and drivers of inequality that are contributing to the
‘privatization’ and ‘financialization’ of public goods, thus leaving unad-
dressed the entrenched systems of poverty. Although the numbers of
studies on Canada are limited, not all have been as pessimistic (Zhang
2012). Skulte-Ouaiss and Tabar’s study (2015) of the Lebanese dias-
pora in Canada, Australia and the US shows that many active members
participate in village/hometown associations and contribute to the devel-
opment of their villages by improving existing infrastructure, such as
roads and drinking water facilities. Similarly, Brinkerhoff’s (2014) study
of the Egyptian Coptic diaspora in four countries (including Canada)
documented their substantial capacity to engage with social causes in
their country of origin and this pattern persisted even after an extensive
period in the country of settlement and across generations through social-
ization. Giving practices evolved additionally from informal, faith-based
mechanisms to more organized, planned forms of giving character-
ized by organizational effectiveness, sustainable outcomes and donor
responsiveness.
Sinatti and Horst (2014) have questioned the assumption that because
migrants originate from elsewhere, they necessarily feel compelled to
contribute to development in those countries. Certainly, the South
African diaspora in Canada is deeply ambivalent about supporting devel-
opment in South Africa. However, a minority do see such a role for
themselves and action this impulse through philanthropy. A strong associ-
ation with Canada as ‘home’ and Canadian identity shapes these diaspora
efforts, however, even among those who profess strong bonds with
their countries of origin. As a result, Canada-centred engagement is an
important feature of philanthropic activity for the South African diaspora.
South Africa is a notable exception to the growing tendency in the
global South to reach out to their diasporas. The country’s global dias-
pora numbered over 730,000 in 2015 (Crush et al. 2017, p. 20), but
official overtures to the diaspora have been limited and there are no dedi-
cated diaspora engagement institutions. As Crush and Chikanda (2017,
p. 351) argue, ‘this is largely because the post-apartheid South African
government has traditionally written off its diaspora as development part-

ners. The diaspora is perceived as largely white (which it is) and largely
hostile to the ANC government (which it is).’ An attitudinal survey of
the South African diaspora in Canada (which numbered nearly 50,000 in
2016) show evidence of a strong and continued South African cultural
identity but low levels of remitting and other conventional diaspora and
development links with the country (Crush et al. 2013). The survey found
that 45% of respondents had never sent remittances to South Africa and
only 12% sent monthly remittances. A further 23% remitted a few times
per year (Crush et al. 2013). When assessed against immigrants in Canada
from other Sub-Saharan African countries, South Africans were the lowest
remitters (at 25%) but sent the highest remittances on average (Table 8.2)
(Dimbuene and Turcotte 2019).
South Africa is viewed by many South Africans in Canada as a ‘racial
dystopia’ with high levels of racially motivated violence directed at whites
(Crush 2013). Studies of a sub-set of the diaspora—medical doctors—
evidence particularly strong negative feelings about the country and its
government (Crush et al. 2012). On 12 out of 15 quality of life indicators
on the general survey (ranging from personal safety to children’s future
to medical services) Canada was ranked more highly than South Africa
Table 8.2 Immigrant remitters from sub-Saharan African countries in Canada,

2017
Country of origin Total amount Average amount Proportion who

remitted (CAD remitted (CAD) remitted (%)
million)
Nigeria 88.9 2900 61.2

South Africa 50.9 4595 24.9
Cameroon 46.0 2455 78.9
Ghana 45.8 2655 79.9
Ethiopia 41.5 2225 55.0
Kenya 37.3 4490 32.1
Somalia 32.3 2465 66.5
Democratic Republic of 28.9 1820 67.2
Congo
Zimbabwe 24.7 3655 51.4
Source Dimbuene and Turcotte (2019, p. 27)

by more than half of the respondents (Crush et al. 2013). The indiffer-
ence of the wider ‘disengaged’ diaspora group was in sharp contrast to
a smaller cohort of the ‘engaged’ diaspora who remained connected to
South African development and the country’s future.
The survey by Crush et al. (2013) differentiated between the engaged
(20%) and disengaged (80%) through the question: ‘I see a role for myself
in the development of South Africa.’ Both self-identity as South African
and identification with other people from South Africa were stronger
among the engaged, with 85% of the former strongly agreeing that
being from South Africa is an important part of how they see themselves
compared to 48% of the latter (Table 8.3). The equivalent figures for
emotional ties with other South Africans were 79% versus 33%. Table 8.4
shows the types of development-related activity by the engaged in the
previous year, and Table 8.5 their intended actions in the following two
years. Most respondents are not involved in any of the activities typical of
an engaged diaspora, and do not see themselves playing any role in the
future development of South Africa. However, a small minority (around
20% of those surveyed) does. Among this group, philanthropic donations
(actual and intended) to non-governmental and faith-based organizations
and programmes rated most highly (Tables 8.4 and 8.5).
Table 8.3 South

Engage (%) Disengaged (%)
African diaspora identity
Being from South Africa is an important part of how
I see myself
Strongly agree 84.4 48.3
Agree 12.7 31.5
Neither agree nor 1.8 10.6
disagree
Disagree 1.1 5.9
Strongly disagree 0.0 3.7
I feel strong ties with people from South Africa
Strongly agree 79.3 33.1
Agree 17.5 33.6
Neither agree nor 2.9 19.5
disagree
Disagree 0.4 19.2
Strongly disagree 0.0 4.5
Source Crush et al. (2013, p. 65)

Table 8.4 South African diaspora activities in previous year
% of engaged diaspora
Donated to a Canadian NGO/charity operating in South Africa 17.3

Donated to a South African NGO/charity in South Africa 14.2
Donated to a faith-based organization in South Africa 13.2
Carried out research with people in South Africa 12.2
Bought a house or property in South Africa 4.1
Purchased goods from South Africa to sell in Canada 3.7
Exported goods from South Africa to Canada 2.7
Invested in a business in South Africa 2.7
Table 8.5 South

% of engaged diaspora
African diaspora
intended activities in Make charitable donations that 54.6
next two years benefit South Africa
Volunteer work in Canada to 40.7
benefit South Africa
Fundraise for projects in South 39.7
Africa
Send money for development 38.7
projects in South Africa
Participate in exchanges 31.2
Work in South Africa 27.6
Invest in business in South Africa 22.1
For this chapter on diaspora philanthropy, we did follow-up interviews

with a selection of high-profile South Africans in Canada and internet
and social media research on diaspora-initiated and/or led organizations.
Diaspora philanthropy can be divided into four main categories: (a) South
Africa-focused philanthropy; (b) South-focused philanthropy; (c) Canada-
focused philanthropy; and (d) faith-based philanthropy (Ramachandran
2016). However, these are not mutually exclusive categories and the same
individuals or groups often contribute in more than one area.
Education-based initiatives in South Africa and other African countries
have received the greatest attention from the South African diaspora in
Canada. Education, children and youth are seen as the most important
development-centred priorities and these are connected to the preva-

lence of social disparities and economic insecurities. Superior education
opportunities at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels are seen as
holding transformative potential to positively mould the lives of children
and youth from marginal communities and help them overcome historical
legacies (in the case of apartheid) and structural inequities. High-quality
schooling and sound learning would empower them with skills and qual-
ifications, introducing new pathways for decent work leading to upward
social and economic mobility. As one respondent noted:
Education is the best way to break the cycle of poverty. Education provides
the fundamental foundation, otherwise you are wasting lives. There are
people who say we should be giving money to AIDS, this, that or the
other. But I think education is positive. It is enthusiastic and then when
you see the results of these kids and you talk to these kids and you see
how smart they are and then you think if they hadn’t gone to Get Ahead
[Project school] how miserable their lives would be or how wasteful that
potential would be, then you realize that it is all worth it.
Some respondents felt that children and youth represent the future
and well-planned ‘investing’ in the ‘future generation’ is the preferential
route to effectively tackling various global challenges, including poverty,
inequality, unemployment, climate change and health:
Africa has the fastest rate of population growth in the world and largely as
a result of poverty. So, if you want to think about the future of the world,
you have to think about young Africans. This is fundamental to the future
of the world. There is no excuse for poverty today. Industry and economy
are so productive.1
Several participants discussed the circumstances of apartheid, the highly

disparate educational resources and opportunities for the different racial-
ized groups in South Africa, and the devastating contemporary outcomes
of these stark inequalities. Consistent with the general priority accorded
to education and youth, Cape Town-born restaurateur Peter Oliver
described how an encounter with Nelson Mandela inspired him to extend
1 African Institute of Mathematical Sciences, ‘Science and Our Future: Seminar by

Professor Neil Turok,’ 31 August 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBmWMG
RGbyE.
the activities of the Leacock Foundation for Children to his country of

birth:
It was an honour for me to attend and at the event (with Mandela) and
he said, “look, we need help … the problems of Africa are immense and
at times they seem insurmountable. But let history record that at least we
tried to solve them.” I looked around the room and thought to myself, “I
wonder how many of them will do something.” Then I thought, I should
apply it to myself. I decided to go to South Africa and find a school that
is working well.
The Toronto-based Leacock Foundation (which Oliver founded in

1992) helped to develop and expand the GAP schools in South Africa’s
impoverished Eastern Cape province. The province is one of the poorest
in the country and experiences regular out-migration for livelihood
opportunities elsewhere. Poor, rural provinces like the Eastern Cape also
contain fewer government/public schools and have concomitantly weaker
pass rates at matriculation and higher secondary levels (Roodt 2018;
Statistics South Africa 2018). A latest government report reveals that this
province had the largest share of individuals without Grade 9 education
in 2017 (Department of Basic Education 2019). The Get Ahead Project
(GAP) school began in Queenstown in 1993 as a parent-organized initia-
tive in a makeshift structure to provide quality education to children from
marginal black households. Student enrolment and classes were limited to
junior levels and below 200 students.
Several capital projects have added new classrooms, and refurbished
old ones at the original GAP school in Komani (Queenstown), a town of
70,000 in the Eastern Cape Province, and provided new facilities, such
as computer labs and internet access. A second satellite school was set
up in the neighbouring town of Whittlesea and over the years, classes
have been expanded from primary level to upper grades at this second
location. A new higher secondary school, the GAP College, was created
in 2007. The current enrolment at the three GAP schools exceeds 1400
students. A central objective has been to provide students quality-focused
learning from primary to secondary levels and enable them to maintain
consistent academic performance across the various grades. The organiza-
tion offers a limited number of scholarships for students at these schools
through South African diaspora and non-diaspora sponsors in Canada to
cover their school-related costs. The Triangle of Hope programme orga-

nizes the annual winter school and extra learning programmes to improve
average student performance in which Canadian students and teachers
from several of Toronto’s schools act as peer tutors and coaches.2
Another education-focused initiative by the South African diaspora
in Canada is Education without Borders (EwB), founded by Ruth and
Cecil Hershler, which organizes after-school learning programmes in four
township government schools near Cape Town. For the last five years, the
Toronto South African Film Festival (TSAFF) has organized a three-day
event to raise funds for the activities of EwB. In the last two years, some
1000 children participated in these programmes and experienced 5–30%
improvement in their performance across various subjects (EwB 2018,
2019).
A third example is the initiative of South African-born and trained
physician, Michael Hayden, called the Masimuphelele Youth Centre in
Cape Town. The Centre opened in July 2010 in partnership with the
Desmond Tutu Health Foundation (DTHF), which has carried the oper-
ation and funding of the Centre forward as the DTHF Youth Centre.
According to a recent DTHF report:
An average of 4,500 young people aged 12-23 benefit from the Youth
Centre services each year. The Centre offers youth living in Masiphumelele
and surrounding neighbourhoods opportunities to participate in educa-
tional and recreational programmes, receive help with homework, access
the computer lab and socialise in a safe space with friends. In addition,
youth can visit the youth-friendly clinic providing sexual and reproductive
health services. In 2017, more than 1,800 HIV tests were administered and
over 180 young women enrolled into the contraception programme. Youth
Centre attendance, educational and recreational programme participation
and other data are collected on a high-tech biometric fingerprint tracking
system. Data gathered from this process suggests that convenient, confi-
dential, youth-friendly sexual and reproductive health services associated
with youth social spaces and activities can increase healthcare utilisation,
specifically contraception.3
2 The Leacock Foundation, ‘Triangle of Hope,’ http://leacockfoundation.org/what-

we-do/.
3 https://desmondtutuhivfoundation.org.za/what-we-do/desmond-tutu-hiv-founda
tion-youth-centre/.
Another diaspora organization, Malamulele Onward Canada, raises

funds for the activities of the South African NGO Malamulele Onward
which offers physical therapy programmes for children with cerebral palsy
and daily management training for their mothers in rural South Africa
and neighbouring Lesotho.4 These services are provided in 21 locations
to some 1200 children.
A rather different South African diaspora educational initiative directed
at tertiary education is the African Institute for Mathematical Sciences
(AIMS) founded by physicist Neil Turok. AIMS is a pan-African network
of institutes that provides graduate training and advanced research
avenues in African science.5 A core feature is the 10-month long inten-
sive residential graduate programme in mathematics with full scholarship
for youth from various African countries. Since its inception, some 1300
students from 41 countries have received this training (AIMS 2018). In
2008, AIMS launched the Next Einstein Initiative to create fifteen similar
institutes across Africa and five new centres have been created so far in
Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, Tanzania and Rwanda.
An affiliated programme, the AIMS Schools Enrichment Centre
(AIMSEC), is engaged in strengthening the teaching of mathematics in
African countries by organizing regular professional development courses
for primary and secondary school teachers. Gender equity is another
important component of AIMS and its programmes in order to address
the under-representation of women in STEM (science, technology, engi-
neering and math). As of 2016, 31% of the graduate students at AIMS
centres were female. The AIMS Women in STEM (AWIS) Initiative seeks
to close the gender gap by accelerating progress for women in these fields,
adopting best practices, increasing collaboration opportunities along with
enhanced investments to realize these goals. Another new programme,
the African Institute of Mathematical Sciences-The Next Einstein Initia-
tive (AIMS-NEI) fellowships for Women in Climate Change, seeks to
expand their involvement with shaping sustainable responses to climate
change.
Finally, this chapter itself comes out of work by a diaspora network
for migration and development policy, research and capacity-building in
Southern Africa established at Queen’s University in the 1990s. This
4 https://www.cpchildren.org/who-we-are.
5 https://www.nexteinstein.org/.
network—the Southern African Migration Program (SAMP)—now part-

ners diaspora researchers in Waterloo with universities in several African
countries. SAMP ‘conducts applied research on migration and develop-
ment issues, provides policy advice and expertise, offers training in migra-
tion policy and management and conducts public education campaigns
on migration-related issues.’6 SAMP established the first migration policy
training programme for migration officials in 2003 in partnership with
Wits University in Johannesburg, South Africa, and has conducted and
promoted policy-related research on a wide range of migration and devel-
opment issues including the brain drain, remittances, diaspora engage-
ment and xenophobia. The SAMP partnership model has since been
extended to create two additional networks focused on issues of rapid
urbanization and urban food security in Africa and the Global South more
generally.7
Some of these diaspora-initiated educational initiatives have received
project-based funding support from Government agencies such as the
former CIDA and Global Affairs Canada, but not particularly because
they were founded by members of the diaspora. SAMP, for example,
received $6 million in support from CIDA between 1997 and 2008,
and AIMS has received substantial financial support from the Canadian
Government and the IDRC (as well as the Toronto-based Master-
card Foundation) following Neil Turok’s relocation from the UK to
Canada to head the Perimeter Institute.8 Between 2011 and 2015, AIMS
received $20 million in Canadian government support. In 2016, Canada
committed a further $22.6 million to support the training of African
mathematical sciences on solutions for climate change.9 These commit-
ments have had a substantial impact on the ability of such networks
to operationalize their vision for building local capacity in Africa. But
they are not part of any coherent strategy to recognize and support the
‘diaspora option.’
Most of the engaged diaspora members interviewed in depth for this
chapter are long-time residents of Canada and referred to Canada as
6 www.samponline.org.
7 www.afsun.org and www.hungrycities.net.
8 https://www.idrc.ca/en/project/dfid-idrc-program-support-african-institute-mathem
atical-sciences-next-einstein-initiative.
9 https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/canada-commits-226-million-to-support-tra
ining-of-african-mathematical-scientists-on-climate-change-solutions-591896081.html.
‘home’ (the place where they conducted most of their regular personal,
social and professional lives). For some, their Canadian identity now
superseded their South African roots, and for others, the latter now played
a much weaker role in defining them and their activities. Many indicated
that after having spent extended periods in Canada, they had an equally
intense or even greater affinity with the country. Some had spent several
decades in Canada and raised their children to adulthood there. They
paid homage to the non-segregated social setting in Canada which, for
some, was their first exposure to an alternative to the racial segregation
that defined their lives under apartheid. As one participant noted:
I am so happy and relieved that we live in a place like Canada where

everyone can live together. My neighbour on this side is from India and
on the other from China. In my office, there are people from various
countries and we all work together. This is the way I want to live my life.
I don’t wish to live the way we did in South Africa.
These affinities with both Canada and South Africa have played an
important role in the development-based efforts of this group. Key South
Africans engaged in development efforts and civic work are actively
involved with local and Canada-centred causes.
Before his work with the Leacock Foundation’s GAP schools in South
Africa, for example, Peter Oliver had raised $15 million for the Juve-
nile Diabetes Foundation of Canada. The Leacock Foundation itself
aims to provide ‘fee-free, enriched literacy and leadership opportunities
to empower youth from underserved communities in Toronto, Canada
and Eastern Cape, South Africa, through a unique community partner-
ship model.’10 The Leacock Club organizes events to generate monetary
resources for the activities and programmes of the Leacock Founda-
tion for Children. The Foundation’s Triangle of Hope initiative connects
Canadian public and private schools with the GAP schools in South Africa
through student and teacher volunteer programmes and provides educa-
tional and leadership opportunities for youth in some of Toronto’s most
underserved communities (for example, St. James Town, Scarborough,
Keele/Finch, and the urban Aboriginal community).
Other South African diaspora groups fundraise for Canadian benefi-
ciaries along with South Africa-centred ones. One of these, the Nirvana
10 www.leacockfoundation.org.
Cultural Society, raise funds annually for various Canada-centred organi-

zations.11 Through its annual Diwali festival gala event, the Society has
provided donations to several Canadian organizations whose work has
a localized or Canadian focus, including Diabetes Canada and Princess
Margaret Hospital in addition to South/Southern Africa-centred ones
like the Stephen Lewis Foundation and Nelson Mandela Children Fund.
Another organization, the Canadian-Southern African Network has orga-
nized special events to contribute financially to both South African and
Canadian projects and groups.12
Another member of the South African diaspora, Zeib Jeeva, played
a major role in re-energizing the International Development and Relief
Fund (IDRF), which offers humanitarian aid and other development-
oriented programmes in several countries based on Islamic principles
of human dignity, self-reliance and social justice.13 An active partici-
pant in the anti-apartheid solidarity networks in Ontario, he was also a
founding member of Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund Canada which
raised funds for this South Africa-focused institution between 1998 and
2010. Together with its ongoing efforts in developing countries, the
IDRF supports and organizes three initiatives in Canada: Licensed to
Learn (L2L), Get Job Ready and Women Learn to Code. L2L is the
main local project of IDRF offering academic support for disadvantaged
youth in the Greater Toronto Area by conducting peer tutoring and
mentoring sessions. Get Job Ready conducts job search readiness and
preparation workshops for youth in Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver.
A partnership initiative with United Way (Greater Toronto chapter) and
Women First, Women Learn to Code provides training programme in
web design and basic computer programming. IDRF also presented an
Eid and Canada Day gift of $250,000 to Habitat to Humanity to help
rebuild fire-damaged homes in Fort McMurray, Alberta.
Some migrants have devoted their energies almost entirely to
addressing local issues in Canada. Drawing on her extensive background
as an educator and school administrator, June Cockwell, took early
retirement and established a pre-school learning programme based on
11 http://nirvanaculturalsociety.com/.
12 https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Nonprofit-Organization/Canadian-Sou
thern-African-Network-126091500793206/.
13 https://idrf.com/.
the Home Instruction for Parents of Pre-school Youngsters (HIPPY)

model in which home visitors guide mothers with young children using
curriculum-centred activities in Oakville, Milton and Burlington.14 Most
of the programme’s participants and home visitors are new immigrant
mothers from various countries whose first language is not English. In
addition, the programme offers initial employment opportunities for this
group, helps them build their local work history, and gives social support
for effective integration in Canada. She also helped to form the Halton
Poverty Roundtable (HPRT), an advocacy group which draws attention
to the needs of individuals and families in poverty in the Halton region of
Ontario, and campaigns for new multi-stakeholder programmes and poli-
cies.15 One in every four new immigrants in this region lives in poverty
and income inequalities are growing across households.
Jack Cockwell (and his Brookfield Partners Foundation) has been a
major donor to Toronto higher educational institutions. George Brown
College received its largest one-time donation of $8 million in 2015 for
a health sciences building named for Cockwell’s mother who worked as a
nurse in South Africa, volunteered with returning veterans during World
War II and resided outside Cape Town.
It is fulfilling to see my mother’s legacy carried forward in the name of a

building dedicated to creating the next generation of nurses, dental health
professionals, health and wellness workers and others who make invaluable
contributions to the population’s well-being.16
Ryerson University, where he served on the Board of Governors from

1995 to 2001 and 2005 onwards, has been the principal focus of Cock-
well’s philanthropy. Over the last few years Cockwell has donated over
$28 million, making him one of this university’s largest private sector
benefactors.17 In 2008, $5 million was gifted to the university’s nursing
programme after which it was renamed after Cockwell’s mother. Other
funds have been used to develop the Brookfield Institute for Innovation
and Entrepreneurship (BII + E).
14 https://www.hippyoakville.org/.
15 https://www.uwhh.ca/halton-poverty-roundtable/.
16 http://dialognews.ca/2015/10/17/george-brown-receives-8-million-donation/.
17 https://www.ryerson.ca/giving/news/2016/03/gift-from-cockwell-family-and-bro
okfield-partners-foundation/.
In partnership with the Government of Canada, Cockwell also offered

a matching funding programme to the Great Trail campaign, which is
shaping a network of community trails across Canada to preserve green-
ways and natural landscapes while additionally offering open spaces for
recreational public use. By reclaiming former railway lines and other
spaces, this programme converts additional areas into green spaces and
connecting corridors to benefit the health and well-being of all visitors
and contribute to sustainable communities. As of 2017, he was the single
largest donor, having contributed $5 million dollars of his own wealth
and that of his Brookfield Partners Foundation.
Many of the key diaspora philanthropists have tapped into their social
networks which do not always align with the broader South African dias-
pora. Beginning with their own financial resources, these individuals have
relied on their personal and professional networks within Canada, and
also outside of it, to form and build their projects. Likewise, fundraising
efforts are not confined to South Africans in Canada. As one noted:
We reach out to anybody. One of our biggest donors is Canadian. He

is emphatic that his money not go to Canada. He is totally committed to
what we are doing and over the years, he has given us $850,000. But there
are also South African donors who are very keen and designate that their
money go to South Africa. We also have Canadian donors who designate
that their money go to Canada.
Vanessa Judelman, for example, who established the TSAFF to support

the activities of EwB, said that she reached out to other interested indi-
viduals, especially colleagues, to form TSAFF’s core organizing committee
and several of these persons have no connections with South Africa. The
non-immigrant Canadian component has an important role in supporting
such initiatives, materially and in other ways. Programmes associated
with South African diaspora groups and organizations, such as teacher
training and student mentoring programmes, also involve individuals
whose personal histories cannot be linked to South Africa.
Conclusion
In 2013, Peter Sutherland (2013), the Special Representative of the
United Nations’ Secretary-General released this statement regarding the
migration–development nexus:
The evidence is clear: migration contributes more powerfully to develop-

ment than any other means we know…If more states work together and
make better informed policy choices, they can generate large economic
and social gains from migration, while ensuring decent living and working
conditions for migrants.
The relationship between migration and sustainable forms of develop-

ment has attracted considerable attention on a global scale for nearly two
decades, as witnessed in the active debate on its merits and limitations and
integration in policymaking at the global level. Recent developments such
as the Global Compact for Migration and the United Nations Agenda
for 2030 using the SDGs, offer renewed possibilities to broaden this
agenda. Both openly accept the multiple roles of migrant populations in
development-related processes. Nevertheless, certain aspects continue to
be privileged while others are downplayed or simply overlooked as, for
example, in the assumption that the activities of migrants as ‘diasporas’
are directed almost exclusively for the benefit of their countries of origin.
In Canada, even this over-simplified view is largely absent in Govern-
ment. The first National Review for the SDGs largely focuses on migrants
as immigrants and the hurdles to immigrant integration. The potential
role of diasporas in facilitating the SDGs within Canada and as part of
the Canadian government’s international cooperation and development-
oriented programmes is overlooked, perpetuating a longer-term pattern
of hesitation and tentativeness towards the ‘diaspora option.’ Several
reasons have been advanced for the absence of a coherent diaspora policy
in Canada: concerns about the representativeness of diaspora individ-
uals and groups, the internal heterogeneity and complexity of immigrant
communities, incompatibility between the agendas of diasporas and the
priorities of both Canada and sending countries, and the challenges of
separating partisan projects from the inclusive ones (Mosaic Institute
2011b; Boyle and Kitchin 2014; McLeod Group 2015). The absence of
systematic mapping of diaspora-led development efforts through careful
empirical research with diverse groups in Canada is another key hurdle
for evidence-based policymaking.
Our South African case study focuses on a well-integrated and highly
skilled diaspora group in Canada. While their philanthropic efforts do not
by any means eliminate the protracted challenges of poverty, inequality
and other socio-economic hardships on the local or national scale, they
do produce positive changes by trying to rectify particular weaknesses,
absences and hierarchies, and by focusing on historically disadvan-

taged groups. Our participants have acted as key catalysts by providing
concrete, reliable channels through which South-African origin individ-
uals can contribute through philanthropy, as volunteers and in other ways.
Through these efforts, they have also expanded the available repertoire
of projects through which other interested non-diaspora individuals and
the Canadian state can participate in developmental activities in Canada,
South Africa and the world.
The obvious question is whether the South African diaspora in Canada
is unique or is simply part of a broader pattern of diaspora engage-
ment within Canada and with countries of origin, that occurs outside
the purview and without the overt support of a Government of Canada
diaspora strategy. This is a question which clearly needs much further
research with diaspora populations and philanthropists from other regions
and countries. However, the South African case study does suggest
some broader conclusions which need to be tested with other dias-
poras. First, it appears that robust emotional and social bonds with
countries of origin do not necessarily convert directly or even seam-
lessly into engagement for development purposes. The South African
case shows that a sizable segment of the diaspora is disinterested and
largely unwilling to contribute to such activities in either South Africa or
Canada. One participant in our study observed candidly that wealth per
se does not automatically convert into altruism and enthusiastic support
for development-related activities: ‘Simply because people have money
does not necessarily mean that they are willing to give it for charity or
good causes. In fact, it is very difficult to get people to give money for
anything.’ While the reasons for disengagement may be specific to the
South African diaspora experience, it is likely that other diasporas have
their own context-specific reasons for disengagement.
Second, the literature on diaspora philanthropy suggests, with few
exceptions, that diasporas who engage direct their philanthropic activities
exclusively towards projects and programmes that benefit the countries
from which they originate. As the case study of the South African diaspora
in Canada suggests, this may well be the dominant form of participa-
tion, but it is certainly not the only form. The section of the South
African diaspora in Canada that is motivated to organize programmes
in South Africa with South African partners, and to fundraise for these
initiatives in Canada, has tended to focus its attention on that country’s
educational and health needs. As such, they are already playing an unrec-
ognized role in the implementation of the SDGs elsewhere, including
in other African countries. However, as the chapter suggests, diaspora
philanthropy is not simply about actions that only benefit the country of
origin. Many of the individuals and organizations concerned also actively
run similar programmes for Canadians in Canada. In some cases, dias-
pora philanthropy is directed almost exclusively to Canadian causes. In
other words, diaspora philanthropy is not bounded by the links that
diasporas maintain with their country of origin. Again, it seems likely
that South African diaspora members are not unique, a conclusion with
some supporting evidence from Jamaican Canadian philanthropists such
as Michael Lee-Chin and the youth diaspora (Pinnock 2013).
Finally, there is the Canadian government’s assumption, embedded in
its response to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and SDGs,
that Canada only has a responsibility to ensure that marginalized immi-
grants and refugees to the country should benefit from initiatives that are
consistent with the SDG goals and targets. However, important as this is,
it means that another section of Canada’s immigrant population (those
interested in diaspora philanthropy) are not overtly recognized as actual
and potential partners in the implementation of the goals within Canada
and in other countries in the Global South to which Canada gives official
development assistance. It is true that some of the South African dias-
pora initiatives in Canada discussed in this chapter have received matching
funding from the federal government but not specifically because they are
diaspora initiatives. Certainly, government has not completely ignored the
potential role of diasporas but it has not funded diaspora initiatives in any
systematic manner. And the way in which the SDGs are being viewed does
not suggest that the ‘diaspora option’ is still not seen as a key enabling
mechanism for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance going
forward.
Acknowledgements This research would not have been possible without the
generous support of IDRC for the survey of the South African diaspora in
Canada and the participation of our respondents. Our chapter is dedicated to
the memory of Jag Pillay and Matshela Molepo and their contributions to
community-building and formation of four diaspora-based groups and organi-
zations in Ontario.
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CHAPTER 9
The Road Taken: Temporary Labour

Migration in Canada’s Immigration System
Jenna Hennebry
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of some significant changes that have
been underway in Canada’s immigration system, with attention to the
growing importance of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP),
in the context of the global political economy. The chapter also points to
some of the changes which have long been called for by researchers, advo-
cates and others in Canada and at the global level, most of which have not
been adopted as part of this new direction. The net result of the changes
made, and those changes which have not been made—the road not taken
as it were—are discussed with respect to their consequences for temporary
migrants and for Canada’s immigration system. Final reflections consider
this important moment for Canada and the world as states embark on
uncharted trajectories with the implementation of the Global Compact
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.
J. Hennebry (B)
Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University,
Waterloo, ON, Canada
e-mail: jhennebry@wlu.ca

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_9
184 J. HENNEBRY
The Changing Policy Landscape of Canada’s

Immigration System in Global Context
Canada has a wide-ranging temporary migration program that formally
began through the formation of the Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Program (SAWP) through MOUs signed in 1966 with the Organization
of Caribbean States and in 1973 with Mexico. In 1984, the Domestic
Workers Program was established, and later changed to the Live-in-
Caregiver Program and newly modified Caregiver Program. In the 1990s,
with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
labour clauses were implemented to facilitate highly skilled labour migra-
tion in the region through visa regimes. Later, in early 2000s there
was a rapid expansion of temporary migration in Canada, fully imple-
menting a large-scale work permit system for temporary migrants with a
range of skill levels, international students, caregivers, etc. Since the mid-
2000s there has been a monumental growth in numbers of temporary
migrants in Canada, as well as related policy changes enacted through a
range of mechanisms including large omnibus bills, ministerial instruc-
tion and a myriad of legislative and program changes. With the breadth
and multitude of these changes, what has emerged is an immigration
system with greater differentiation of access and rights—with heightened
control and surveillance for some and greater access to employment and
permanent residency for others—with few substantive changes bolstering
human rights and social protections for vulnerable migrant workers. These
changes are consistent with global trends that have seen greater demand
from employers for flexible labour; the rising securitisation of migration,
and the externalization of migration responsibilities and control to spaces
and agents outside the state (including the private sector) (Betts and
Milner 2007; Ruhs and Anderson 2010).
In Canada, the 1990s began a period of growing demand for migrant
labour that was followed with an intensive period of policymaking. These
policies substantially expanded off the foundations of the TFWP, such
as the SAWP in 1966 and the 1994 NAFTA mobility clauses. As the
government has scrambled to manage these increasing flows, further
policy changes were enacted to respond to perceived policy problems
that arose (e.g. use of immigration consultants; replacement of Cana-
dian workers; sexual exploitation). The size of the application backlog and
processing required for the increased entries of temporary migrants has
become a policy problem adding fodder to the rationale behind enabling
9 THE ROAD TAKEN: TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION … 185
the market-driven TFWP to grow (e.g. 2011 changes specifically named

the TFWP as one means “to address backlog issues and cut wait time in
half”).1
As more changes were implemented and numbers continued to climb,
amid growing public concern about the program, the approach to poli-
cymaking has shifted from governing migration using democratic and
legislative processes aimed at nation-building through a longstanding
human capital model of economic migration coupled with a strong family
reunification system, to a system driven by market interests and micro-
managed through Ministerial instructions and myriad of programme and
operational level changes. As such, the rapid expansion of the TFWP
has created an immigration policy terrain that has become increasingly
complex, making it difficult to manage as new problems continue to be
identified across and within program streams and pathways. This expe-
rience is similar to that of earlier guest worker programs in the United
States and Europe starting in the late 1940s (Foster 2012), where busi-
ness became largely dependent on migrant workers because they planned
and built their operations around access to them, leading to demands
to improve the system to remove barriers to getting access to migrant
labour, while simultaneously leading to a growth in numbers of people
without documentation as pathways were truncated and few options for
permanent residency were available.
In agriculture, the growing dependence on temporary migrant labour
through circular migration programs is particularly acute. As retailers
pressure farmers to produce at low prices, high volumes, and for just-in-
time markets, while input suppliers such as monopolistic seed companies
entrench high costs (Corrado et al. 2018), many farm operators have
responded to the cost-price squeeze by shifting towards non-local waged
labour: evidence of “flexiprofity” as employers aim to secure short-term
profits amidst economic volatility by offloading costs onto workers (Gertel
and Sippel 2014). This trend is evident in the growth of industrial-
scale, export-oriented Mediterranean enclaves of fresh fruit and vegetable
production, which depend heavily on migrant workers (Corrado et al.
2018). Similarly, many small and medium-scale family farms have tried to
remain competitive by hiring migrant workers. The cases of Spain (Huelva
1 “Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.”

Canada Gazette. 2013. http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2013/2013-05-18/html/reg2-
eng.html (accessed October 1, 2013).
186 J. HENNEBRY
and Lleida) and Italy provide additional examples of this dependence

on temporary migrant workers. After the departure of many nationals
from farms due to instability and economic crises, the government of
Spain promoted bilateral agreements to enable the recruitment of seasonal
migrant workers. While there have been many tweaks and modifications
of such programs, often in response to public or civil society pressure,
the structural level changes required to align such programs with interna-
tional human rights frameworks have not occurred. Ironically, Canada’s
longest standing temporary migration stream, the SAWP, is recognized
internationally as a best practice (Basok et al. 2014; Hennebry and Preib-
sich 2012), though it is not aligned with international human and labour
rights norms and instruments and has come under fire by the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO), and numerous human and labour
rights organizations.
Indeed, employers often fail to comply with existing regulations and
agreements regarding seasonal work and will disregard labour rights
under circular or seasonal migration programs (Castles 2006; Corrado
et al. 2018; Delgado Wise 2018a). Moroccans in Spain (compared to
Eastern European workers such as Bulgarians) have become particularly
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation due to a confluence of factors such
as gender and racial discrimination, missing papers, insecure or precar-
ious legal status and lower levels of formal education (López-Sala 2016;
Molinero-Gerbeau and Avallone 2018). Further, seasonal and tempo-
rary work programs have been criticized for creating conditions that
enhance “deportability” of migrants, a technique of discipline used to
make migrant workers efficient and compliant for fear of loss of status
or return migration in subsequent years. And it is under the threat of
deportation that migrants accept dangerous, dirty, and degrading and
difficult jobs for low pay (Basok et al. 2014; Binford 2019). Overall,
global agri-business has been enabled by constructing migrant labour
forces as flexible, deportable, with weak bargaining power, and under
immense productivity pressures.
Further, embedded into circular labour migration schemes like
Canada’s SAWP (which is governed in part through a bilateral MOU with
Mexican and Caribbean governments) and other similar programs such
as those between Morocco and Spain, or the UK Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Scheme (pre-2013), is the logic of migration for development,
and the often touted “triple-win” of such circular regimes, benefitting
workers, sending and receiving states (Delgado Wise 2018b). But the
triple win fails to account for the social and health costs borne on migrant
workers and their families, and it has also not yielded strong evidence
of long-term development for sending countries even in longstanding
programs such as Canada’s more than 50-year-old SAWP (Hennebry and
Preibisch 2012).
The flexibilization of labour is not exclusive to the domain of agricul-
ture and is a trend which is defined through rising temporality, precarity
and vulnerability of workers across a range of sectors. This flexibilization
is a key facet of contemporary global political economy—and temporary
labour migration plays a leading role across many sectors. Such labour
migration regimes are largely driven by employer demand, and also
expands the role of the private sector throughout migration (Garapich
2008; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen 2013). Indeed, temporary
labour migration or work visa regimes necessitate the role of recruitment
agencies, immigration consultants and other intermediaries that connect
workers with employers and assist migrants in navigating increasingly
complex migration pathways.
Simultaneously, the marketized logic pervasive in many countries holds
that businesses may be the best arbiters of immigrant selection, and
many of the selections of immigrants and migrant workers are now
done privately, between businesses in the receiving country working with
recruiters, head-hunters, universities, organizations in sending countries.
In many cases the private sector is directly embedded into migration
governance systems, through the involvement of employers in perma-
nent residency applications or investors or corporations in determining
entrepreneurial migrants, and in other cases it is the product of insuf-
ficient government regulation or support in response to demands or
challenges of the system (e.g. recruiters, brokers or immigration consul-
tants). In Canada, these trends are also present, particularly with respect
to the TFWP and to transition pathways from temporary to perma-
nent status. Immigration policy the world over is entering a phase in
which employers and private groups are assuming key roles in immigrant
selection—and in many respects, Canada is leading the way.
Driven largely by the demands of the private sector, Canada’s TFWP
developed and grew in many respects in parallel with rather than inte-
grated within Canada’s immigration system—which is unsurprising to
some extent given that the program has been primarily managed under
a different department, Employment and Social Development Canada
188 J. HENNEBRY
(ESDC), from the primary department responsible for immigration and

integration—Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).
Indeed, while the initial policies that enabled temporary labour migration
to Canada (i.e. the SAWP in 1966 or the NAFTA mobility agreement
in 1994) marked out the path to come, it was the growing dependence
on and demand for TFWs by the private sector that sparked this inten-
sive period of policymaking which has clearly established a new route for
Canada’s immigration system—whether planned or not.
Temporary Migration---A Growing

Component of Canada’s Immigration System
Between 2000 and 2012 alone, the number of temporary foreign workers
(TFWs) entering Canada grew by about 84%, with 213,516 entries in
2012, while the Canadian population only grew by 13.4% in the same
period. From 2000 to 2012, TFW entries grew at about an average rate
of 539 additional entries per quarter over the last quarter; surpassing the
Economic Immigrant class since 2006.2 By 2015, total entries of high and
low-skill temporary migrants under the newly and nominally differenti-
ated International Mobility Program and the TFWP were nearly 250,000,
and by 2019 nearly 400,000 (see Table 9.1).
Table 9.1 Temporary migration to Canada, entries, 2015–2019
Year Total intl. mobility program Total temporary worker program Total
work permits permits
2015 176,280 72,965 249,245

2016 207,570 78,450 286,020
2017 222,830 78,475 301,305
2018 254,125 84,060 338,185
2019 283,280 94,330 377,610
Source “Temporary Residents: Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) and International
Mobility Program (IMP) Work Permit Holders—Monthly IRCC Updates”. Open Government Portal
(2020)
2 This includes both principal applicants and dependents in the total.

Policy growth with respect to the TFWP has grown exponentially since
2000 (see Fig. 9.1). Only a few important changes occurred prior to
2000, such as the formation of the SAWP in 1966, the Live-in Caregiver
Program (LCP) in 1981/1992 and NAFTA labour mobility agreements
in 1994. Since 2000, the changes have been incredible in scope and scale,
and they have been redefining the shape of Canada’s immigration system
and altering the fabric of multicultural Canada.
Overall of TFW-related policy changes, only 7.79% of changes
occurred prior to 2000 and 92.2% of policy changes have been enacted
since 2000. The growth in TFWP policies since 2000 is 1183.3% with
28.57% of that growth since 2010 alone. Since 1987, not only has the
absolute number of TFW-related changes rapidly grown, but also its
portion of all immigration policy (from 27 to 59%). This trend combined
with the growing numbers of entries of TFWs means that the TFWP
represents a much larger proportion of Canada’s immigration system than
ever before.
Fig. 9.1 TFW-entries verses TFW-related policy growth in Canada (Source

Data was compiled for this analysis from Citizenship and Immigration Canada
[2012], Robert [2005], Makarenko [2010], Hawkins [1972], the Canada
Gazette [2010–2019], LegisInfo [various], Department of Justice [2013–2019])
190 J. HENNEBRY
As noted in Fig. 9.2, prior to 2000 the majority of policy changes were
enacted through legislative means (68%) with only 16% of changes being
enacted through program or policy changes and 16% through Minis-
terial instruction. The distribution of changes in the period post-2000
indicates a definite departure—arguably more of an about face—down
a new road, indicating a new approach to migration governance. This
is evidenced by the majority of policy changes (77%) which have been
enacted through Ministerial instruction (Canada Gazette 2008), followed
by 13% enacted through changes in law and 10% through program level
changes. With the TFWP, this apparent governing reversal is even more
pronounced, with 79% of changes affecting temporary migration imple-
mented through Ministerial instruction, 10% through legislation and
11% through program changes. When compared with the policy changes
carried out prior to 2000 the numbers are even more surprising (in part
since the TFWP wasn’t operating fully as it is today), with no policy
changes through Ministerial instruction pertaining to temporary migra-
tion, and 33% carried out through legislative change and 67% through
program level change.
Some highly significant changes were made to Canada’s immigra-
tion system between 2000 and 2010, such as the passing of the new
Fig. 9.2 History of immigration policy changes in Canada

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA 2002), the beginning

of the low-skill temporary migration stream in 2002 (what began as the
Low Skill Pilot Project, then renamed to the Pilot Project for Occupa-
tions Requiring Lower Levels of formal Training, and now called the
Stream for Low Wage Positions), the establishment of TFWP (2002)
and the Canadian Border Security Agency (2003), the implementation
of the Post-Graduation Work Permit Program (PGWP), the Express
Entry system and the Canadian Experience Class (CEC), as well as the
changes to IRPA in 2008 which expanded Ministerial powers, among
other changes, and set the course for the incredible pace of change in
the years to come. Also in the period between 2000 and 2010 there have
been six Provincial/Territorial Annexes, Programs and Pilots related to
TFWs, some of which have enabled increased access to spousal visitor
and open work permits, and possibilities for access to permanent resi-
dency and services (e.g. open work permits for spouses of truck drivers in
Alberta; open work permits for spouses of low-skill TFWs—though these
were later cancelled in February 2013). There have also been Free Trade
Agreements with other countries which had labour mobility clauses (e.g.
Peru 2009; Columbia, signed in 2008 and came into force in 2011), and
special MOUs signed between companies/groups of employers and the
federal government to expedited processing of Labour Market Opinions
or LMOs (e.g. MOU signed with Petro-Canada in 2008 to streamline
LMO applications for the Oil Sands project).
Of the changes made through Ministerial Instructions in this period, a
few important ones stand out. First, the CEC was formed, and the Federal
Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) was modified, resulting in limiting new
federal skilled worker applicants to those with an arranged employment
offer, in specified occupations, or already in Canada as students or TFWs.
Further changes imposing mandatory language testing for principal appli-
cants in the FSWP and the CEC followed in 2010. Only test results from a
third-party language testing agency designated by the Minister, served to
embed private sector language testing services. These changes combined
have heightened the role of non-state and third-party actors, specifically
employers and language testing agencies, and have strengthened the role
of the TFWP in the FSWP of the permanent immigration system.
Between 2010 and 2013 there were a plethora of amendments to the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR) (which func-
tions at an operational level), the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act (IRPA) (the legislative level), as well as other policy domains outside
192 J. HENNEBRY
of immigration, such as changes to the Employment Insurance Regula-

tions (2012), which effectively removed access to employment insurance
benefits for migrant workers who don’t have a valid work permit or
Social Insurance Number (SIN). Previously, migrant workers while not
fully eligible, were able to take advantage of paternity benefits. This was
followed by new legislation including the Safe Streets and Communities
Act (2012), the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act (2012),
and the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act (2012) among
others which were less directly linked to immigration. The Safe Streets
and Communities Act Proposition allowed the Minister to issue instruc-
tions to guide immigration officers in issuing work permits to foreign
nationals to protect them from humiliating or degrading treatment,
including sexual exploitation, something which the immigration depart-
ment described the aim of the amendments as “deny[ing] work permits
to foreign strippers” in early media quotes, and later was framed as
preventing sexual exploitation. Bill C-31, the Protecting Canada’s Immi-
gration System Act, was legislation which enacted new “anti-smuggling”
provisions and amended the Balanced Refugee Reform Act before it came
into force. Formerly the Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing
Canada’s Immigration System Act which was voted down in 2010, and
later passed as Bill C-31, expanded Ministerial power to refuse entries,
strengthened the use of investigative detention and exclusion of refugee
claimants caught under a wide definition of “serious criminality”, and
initiated a large-scale biometric surveillance system aimed at temporary
residents. Starting in September 2013, travellers, students and workers
from certain visa-required countries were required to provide biometric
(photo and fingerprint) info upon entry to Canada, and by December
2013 biometric screening was mandatory for all temporary resident
applicants from designated countries, costing up to $300 in screening
fees.3
Later in 2012 some publicly contentious program changes involved
the introduction of the Accelerated Labour Market Opinion (formally
3 Starting September 2, 2013 the designated countries were Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica;
starting October 15, 2013 the list was expanded to include Albania, Algeria, DRC,
Eritrea, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia; and by December 7, 2013 the desig-
nated countries list included 28 countries with the addition of Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria,
Vietnam, Yemen, Palestinian Authority.
referred to as the Expedited Labour Market Opinion Process, E-LMO),

and the Directive for the Assessment of the Wage Factor on LMO Appli-
cations.4 The net result of these two changes was that employers could
receive their permission to hire temporary migrants faster for specific
occupations (sometimes in as little as five days), and high-skilled migrant
workers could be paid as much as 15% lower than the prevailing wage
while low-skilled workers could be paid as much as 5% lower.
In this period a set of changes were implemented aimed at ensuring
employers made greater efforts to hire Canadians before they were eligible
to apply for TFWs (including application fees, language and advertising
requirements), though little changes were made in this period focused on
compliance. These changes appeared to be aimed at addressing loopholes
that many employers were taking advantage of, which indicates a much
bigger ontological problem—that many employers viewed the TFWP as
part of their business model, not as a program designed to address short
term, acute labour shortages. Interestingly, despite the growing numbers
of temporary migrant workers in low-skill jobs, particularly in agriculture,
the changes did not apply to these occupations.
The most significant and positive changes have been made to one
of the longstanding streams of the TFWP, the LCP, beginning in
2010 which specified requirements for employment contracts, including
employer-paid benefits, and a number of changes with respect to the
processing of permanent residence applications. Migrant caregivers no
longer had to submit a medical examination when applying for permanent
status; the qualifying period to complete the hours required to qualify
for permanent residence was extended, and also allowed for an hours-
based calculation of the employment requirement based on 3900 hours
within a minimum of 22 months (Canada Gazette 2009). In addition,
work permits would have faster processing if their employment offer
involved providing urgent care for an elderly person or a person with
a disability. In a more recent batch of changes which came into effect
4 As a further signal of the direction being adopted with respect to reduced social
protections and support of TFWs, and despite opening Temporary Foreign Worker Units
(TFWUs) in 2008 and 2009 in a number of provinces (e.g. British Columbia) in order
to provide services to employers but also to engage in some outreach to workers and
employers in order to improve compliance, etc., these units were closed down in 2012
as a cost-cutting measure. As of 2012 only two TFWUs (Toronto and Montreal) are
responsible for processing all opinions and enquiries related to exemptions from the LMO
and/or WPs (Work Permits) and outreach is no longer provided by these units.
194 J. HENNEBRY
in 2019, the newly renamed Caregiver Program has been reorganized

into two streams of entries split according to skills, and allowing migrant
workers to bring their families upon arrival and fast tracking residency. In
the period between 2015 and 2019 the pace of change again accelerated
as the program streams continued to be tweaked. One significant change
introduced in 2019 was the open work permit for vulnerable workers.
Charting the trajectory of the TFWP is legitimately a difficult task,
given the sheer number of changes made to the system and the variable
strategies employed for implementing these changes (e.g. some aimed
at particular streams, some implemented through Ministerial instruc-
tion, others through legislation, etc.) (see Table 9.2 for a list of selected
changes 2010–2019). This is further compounded by the schizophrenic
nature of the changes—in so far as numerous changes have been imple-
mented in one year, and then been summarily reversed in the next (e.g.
the Wage Directive), or modified significantly numerous times. Addition-
ally, some of the most significant structural changes (e.g. the formation
of the lower-skilled occupations stream, the post-graduate work permit,
increased Ministerial powers, etc.) set the course for changes implemented
to the TFWP in more recent years. Rather perversely, it seems that Canada
has expended considerable efforts on managing a program of which
they have no control—as employer-driven numbers of TFWs skyrocket,
the government has appeared to be scrambling to govern this unwieldy
system.
The Road Not Taken

Despite the intensity and scope of changes to the TFWP, the familiar
expression “the more things change, the more they stay the same” may
prove apropos upon a more holistic analysis that encompasses those
aspects of the program which have not been changed. Calls for numerous
changes have been heard not just by NGOs, labour and migrant advo-
cacy groups, but also by Senate Committees, the Auditor General and
the Canadian Bar Association. Indeed, the Senate Standing Committee
on Citizenship and Immigration (House of Commons Canada 2009)
prepared a report on the program based on expert witnesses from across
the country in 2009. Interestingly, many of the recommendations put
forth in this report have not been adopted in the subsequent policy
changes. Later in 2009 the Office of the Auditor General produced a
Table 9.2 Changes to temporary migration program streams, 2010–2019
Date
06-26-2010 Expanded powers for Ministerial instruction (various)

Mandatory language testing for principal applicants in the Federal
Skilled Worker Program and the Canadian Experience Class
01-01-2010 Official language requirements for TFWs excluding some occupations
and streams
06-26-2010 Limiting new federal skilled worker applicants to those with job
offers/TFWs
04-01-2011 Maximum cumulative work period of four years (work periods
04-01-2011 Two year probation/online naming of non-compliant employers
2011 Access to PR, Spousal visas for some TFWs and not for others
2011 Extended the residency qualifying period for LCPs to up to
4 years
2011 Federal-provincial agreements, MOUs, Bilateral Trade agreements
Removal of EI benefits for those without a valid SIN/Work Permit
07-13-2012 Denial of work permits for those considered at risk for exploitation
04-26-2013 Biometric screening for TRs from designated countries
01-02-2013 CEC work experience shortened to 12 months
07-18-2013 Changes to advertising requirements, LMO application
01-29-2015 Introduce regulatory charge for employers who have made an offer of
employment
06-11-2015 Regulatory amendments to increase the Government’s ability to
encourage employer compliance with TFWP/IMP condition
06-10-2015 CIC introducing the following suit of regulatory amendments as part
of the GOC effort to address the vulnerability of immigrant women
06-12-2015 EDC’s perspective regarding the likely effect the employment of a
foreign national would have on the Canadian labour market in IRPR
with “assessment”
11-18-2016 Allow TFW who are working under a work permit (issued paragraphs
204(a), (c) or Sect. 205 of regulations) to qualify for arranged
employment in Fed. Skilled trades class
05-05-2017 Ensuring that individuals currently in the Live-in Caregiver program
are eligible for permanent residence
09-30-2017 Employers are also required to prove offer of employment information
when they make an offer of employment to a foreign national
12-08-2017 Amendment to the IRPR will establish two exemptions from LMIA
processing fees
03-26-2018 Officer is not allowed to issue work permits for foreign nationals who
have worked in Canada totalling over four years, unless applicant
follows exceptions
05-22-2019 Introduce regulatory authority for immigration officers to issue open
work permits to foreign workers who are believed to be at risk of
abuse
(continued)
196 J. HENNEBRY
Table 9.2 (continued)
Date
05-31-2019 Amendments bring consistency and clarity to current practices and

eliminate provisions that are no longer necessary
report specifically addressing the TFWP, and the Canada Bar Associa-
tion conferences and meetings in May and November 2011, and May
2012, also addressed the TFWP. The Auditor General’s Report echoed
many of the concerns that arose from the Senate hearings and report,
and highlighted concerns about abuse of temporary migrants and misuse
of the program. Then Auditor General Sheila Fraser also reviewed the
impact of controversial new powers awarded to Canada’s Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration that were passed as part of the Conservative
government’s 2008 budget bill, concluding that, “… the Department [of
Citizenship and Immigration] made a number of key decisions in recent
years without properly assessing costs and benefits, potential risks, and
impact. Some of these decisions caused significant shift in the types of
foreign workers being admitted permanently to Canada. There is little
evidence that this shift is part of any well-defined strategy to best meet
the needs of the Canadian labour market”.
Some of the most significant changes to the TFWP have been aimed
at aligning the program with labour market considerations and deterring
employers from using the program to displace Canadian workers (e.g.
language factor and advertising requirements)—with a few exceptions,
namely the changes made to the Caregiver stream. Yet, the government
has not yet introduced strong measures aimed at reducing dependence on
TFWs, such as limits on the number of years employers can hire TFWs
(as called for by Canadian Council for Refugees, 2011, 2012, 2013),
or caps on the numbers of LMOs or workers approved, which would
more definitively tackle the problems of misuse as well as growing depen-
dence on the program, particularly in the lower-skilled jobs. Many policy
options which would have added teeth to compliance, monitoring and
enforcement were not adopted, such as those recommended by the Senate
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (2009): required
meeting with accredited NGO after three months for labour compli-
ance; randomized monitoring of living and housing conditions; public
disclosure of occupational wage rate determination, etc. Moreover, the
majority of recent changes that were implemented were not applied to

low-skill occupations which have shown growing dependence on TFWs
(e.g. agriculture, caregiving, and food and hospitality services).
Also, as noted by Worswick (2013) the bulk of the regulatory changes
have been aimed at deterring employers from improperly using the TFWP,
such as bringing in TFWs after laying off higher-paid Canadian workers,
but this does nothing to address the problem of employers who do
not meet their commitments to TFWs they hire. Despite the improve-
ment to monitoring and regulation, there has been no tangible move
made towards proactive monitoring and enforcement (e.g. randomized
inspections), and this federal program still defers to uneven provin-
cial regulations with respect to health, safety, labour and recruitment
(Worswick 2013). For example, while recent reversals on the Wage Direc-
tive ensure that temporary migrants must be paid the prevailing wage in a
given occupation, Canada’s United Food and Commercial Workers union
calls for broader publication and standardization of wages for different
occupations in order to assist in the establishment and enforcement of
equal pay for temporary migrant workers comparable to Canadians.
There are no mandatory, sufficient federal regulations on health, safety,
housing and labour standards, and the system depends on voluntary
compliance with provincial legislation, and reliance on a complaints-based
system of negative rights. Without the creation of an appeals process for
labour disputes or a national ombudsperson representing workers, the
system puts unrealistic dependence on vulnerable workers to have taken
legal action against an employer in order to have any consequences for a
future LMO (not to mention that it will have no impact on the worker
directly). Without equal collective bargaining rights across all provinces
and across all sectors, this is something that is not likely to happen.
Despite the anti-smuggling rhetoric of Bill C-4, there are no federal
regulations on recruitment, and a weak patchwork of limited provin-
cial legislation (e.g. Manitoba’s Worker Recruitment and Protection Act,
2009 and Ontario’s Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act,
2010).
There has been no move towards alignment with international conven-
tions and human rights norms pertaining to migrant workers (such as
the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and
the Families), and there has actually been steps backward in terms of
social protection offered to vulnerable migrant workers in Canada, despite
growing international commitment to the Global Social Protection Floor
198 J. HENNEBRY
initiative (2013). Specifically, Canada’s removal of access to the portion

of benefits for which TFWs were eligible through the EI system (pater-
nity benefits), and no movement toward either providing full access to
employment insurance and related benefits or an exemption of TFWs and
employers from contributing to EI indicates the exact opposite direc-
tion. Relatedly, despite growing awareness and mounting evidence of
the vulnerability of TFWs, particularly those in lower-skilled streams, to
increased health risks and exploitation, minimal changes have been made
to improve access to health care and compensation systems insurance
(Hennebry et al. 2015).
Further, SAWP migrant workers and those under the Agricultural
Stream (along with many other TFWs) generally cannot leave and return
to Canada at will (as many are typically not issued multiple entry visas),
they cannot move and work anywhere in the country since work permits
are typically tied to one employer, and they also are not likely to have
access to spousal or family visas. This limited access to permanent resi-
dency and in some cases employer-specific work permits and dependence
on employers for work permit renewals, will leave the growing numbers
of low-skilled TFWs without options—increasing the likelihood that they
will fall out of status. Historically, if they encounter poor working condi-
tions or have a conflict with an employer their only option is to report
them and return home, but their precarious work and immigration status
will make them much less likely to do so than Canadian workers. It was
attention to this precarity that led the Liberal government to implement
Open Work Permit for Vulnerable workers in 2019.
In addition, a large proportion of lower-skilled temporary migrants are
working in some of the most dangerous jobs in the country, many in
agriculture where they remain without consistent protection of collective
bargaining rights across all provinces, insufficient monitoring and regula-
tion of workplace safety and housing (Hennebry 2012). Despite the fact
that regulatory changes now require employers to register with provin-
cial workplace safety insurance (WSIB in Ontario), the low-skilled are not
typically eligible for retraining or modified work if they are injured on
the job and face significant challenges accessing the provincial workplace
safety insurance systems (such as loss of housing, language, transnation-
alism, transportation) as well as difficulty accessing health services; fear of
loss, transportation and location, work schedules, insufficient insurance
or waiting period may mean going through employers (McLaughlin and
Anelyse 2017).5 This is particularly problematic for workers in the SAWP

who may fear loss of employment for reporting health and safety viola-
tions, refusing unsafe work, or seeking health care since employers have
the right to repatriate workers with impunity. While employer compli-
ance may be encouraged by new regulatory measures which included
2-year suspension and online naming of non-compliant employers on
the government website, without implementing greater monitoring or
enforcement initiatives and protections for vulnerable workers, these
measures are likely to prove ineffective.
After years of what has seemed like almost monthly policy changes
to tweak the burgeoning TFWP, and following public concerns and a
media frenzy revolving around a number of scandals connected to the
program,6 the federal government announced a review of the TFWP in
April 2013 (Parliament of Canada 2013). Despite the hope held for the
review by critics of the program, the review largely focused on the labour
market, and assessing the veracity of the job offer, with what appears to be
very carefully chosen wording avoiding the language of rights and protec-
tions for vulnerable workers. While the review was certainly a welcome
move, particularly among the concerned public, it did not appear to yield
any kind of critical thinking about the role of the TFWP in Canada’s
immigration system. Its findings were altogether rather underwhelming,
with the evaluation of the program concluding that the TFWP was found
to be “complementary to other federal economic immigration programs
and was determined to be consistent with government-wide priorities to
build a strong and competitive Canada” (Government of Canada 2012).
Eight recommendations were made and mostly focused on enhancing effi-
ciencies through “timely and efficient processing” and improved labour
market impact assessment and program efficiency. Though two of the
eight recommendations offered some hope for improved protections
for migrant workers: first, ongoing monitoring of employers, including
following up with a sample of TFWs, to ensure that job contract obli-
gations are met; and secondly, that the number of pathways open to
5 McLaughlin, Janet. Trouble in Our Fields: Health and Human Rights Among Mexican
and Caribbean Migrant Farm Workers in Canada. Doctoral diss., University of Toronto,
2009.
6 “RBC Replaces Canadian Staff with Foreign Workers | CBC News.” CBC News.
CBC/Radio Canada, April 7, 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/
rbc-replaces-canadian-staff-with-foreign-workers-1.1315008.
200 J. HENNEBRY
TFWs to transition to permanent residency should be expanded. This

last recommendation has had some traction as there has since been an
expansion of pilots aimed at enhancing access to permanent residency
in some provinces and professions, such as the Caregiver program, and
opportunities for open work permits.
Conclusion: A Fork in the Road?

The net result of the road taken, and that not taken—will have lasting
consequences for migrant workers and their families, and for Canada’s
immigration system. What has emerged is a migration governance system
characterized by growing complexity with rights differentiation across
migrant categories and heightened mobility restrictions, driven more by
labour market concerns than human rights and protections for migrants.
This complexity (Betts 2010) reflects Vertovec’s notion of “superdiver-
sity” with respect to categories of entry and other differentiations and
delineations across minority groups characterized by “the expansion in
the number and kind of migration channels and immigration statuses”
[and] “each carries quite specific and legally enforceable entitlements,
controls, conditions and limitations” (Vertovec 2011). This has conse-
quences for migrants who experience greater challenges navigating the
quagmire of migration channels with distinct rules, regulations, rights—
making it more difficult for migrants to ensure that they have fulfilled
obligations and requirements, and that their rights are protected along
the way. Not only does this complexity make it more difficult to under-
stand the system and assert rights, but it makes family separation more
likely since not all TFWs have access to spousal work permits and family
reunification, and this increases delays for those eligible for permanent
residency as families first sort out study or work permits, then attempt
transitions and sponsorship. With most families of migrant workers left
behind, prolonged family separation is typical. For those who eventu-
ally access permanent residency through a two- or sometimes three-step
process (e.g. international student, temporary foreign worker, perma-
nent resident), and then have to sponsor family members, the wait can
have deleterious consequences for their family’s well-being and negatively
impact integration in the long run—something that has long been evident
in the case of those entering under the Caregiver program (formerly the
LCP) in previous years. Indeed, it was this very problem, and the decades
of advocacy from migrant caregivers, that led to changes that permit

caregivers entering under this stream to bring their families in 2019.
The growing complexity of Canada’s immigration system is also
evident with the growing number of transition programs for international
students and highly skilled workers to work their way into Canada. An
important consequence of this new system is that the complexity has led
to a tiered system of entry whereby some migrants (mostly the highly
skilled which come predominantly from the US and Europe) can effec-
tively “work their way in” while others (predominantly the lower-skilled
from less developed countries) cannot through the creation of targeted
two-step migration pathways that provide access to permanent residency,
particularly for those with Canadian work experience and job offers in
Canada (e.g. the Canadian Experience Class).
Rapid-fire reforms, program reviews and press releases have served to
divert attention from the real problems of the TFWP and the growing
prominence of this program in Canada’s immigration system. Despite the
historical and empirical evidence from other countries about temporary
migration programs (e.g. Germany), recent reforms do not adequately
address the growing dependence of employers on migrant labour, and
further embed employer demand into the immigration system, as policy
makers continue to travel down a road being driven by the private sector
who have planned their businesses around the never ending supply of
migrant labour. After all of the policy changes since 2000, the core
dimensions of the TFWP that are attractive to employers remain unal-
tered—–they continue to have on hand, just in time, flexible, disposable
workers (mostly without the distractions of families and community ties).
And the most serious problems of the TFWP, such as the vulnerabilities
of migrant workers to exploitation, abuse and unequal access to rights
and protections, have been left largely unaddressed and in some cases
worsened.
This may mark an end to an era in Canada’s immigration history—an
era in which most newcomers to Canada arrived through family reuni-
fication or as permanent economic migrants selected through human
capital factors assumed to foster long-term integration. Ironically, this
comes at a moment in global history when the world has been turning
to Canada for leadership in the development and implementation of the
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. This may mean
Canada is at a fork in the road with respect to its immigration system,
though it may be that the intensity of changes over the last two decades
202 J. HENNEBRY
has paved the road ahead; as poet Robert Frost writes of The Road Not
Taken, “knowing how way leads on to way, I doubted if I should ever
come back”.
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CHAPTER 10
Cities of Migration: The Role of Municipal

Planning in Immigrant Settlement
and Integration
Zhixi Cecilia Zhuang
Introduction
Immigration has long been a key contributor to Canadian population
growth, economic prosperity, and social vitality and innovation. For
example, a total of 6.8 million immigrants arrived in Canada since the
early 1990s (an annual average of approximately 235,000 new immi-
grants) contributing to more than 80% of Canada’s population growth
(Hussen 2018; Statistics Canada 2016). By 2034, immigration will even-
tually account for 100% of the country’s population growth, as native
deaths will exceed native births (The Conference Board of Canada
2018). Between 2007 and 2011, the immigrant investor programme,
which granted permanent residence in exchange for a one-time invest-
ment of $800,000, accumulated $6.42 billion nationally (El-Assal 2017).
Z. C. Zhuang (B)
Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada
e-mail: zczhuang@ryerson.ca

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_10
206 Z. C. ZHUANG
Economically, the benefit of the “brain gain”—the acquisition of knowl-

edge workers from the rest of the world has given Canada significant
advantage by attracting global talents (see also Chapter 6 of this volume).
It is reported that “more than 65 per cent of foreign-born adults had a
post-secondary degree in 2017, the highest share tracked by members of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development” (Wong
et al. 2019, para. 4). Research has revealed that newcomers to Canada
have used their ethnic and cultural resources to not only provide family
support, but also develop social solidarity and contribute to community-
building. As a result, Canadian governments have sought to celebrate
diversity and promote social integration (Hussen 2018).
These social, cultural, and economic benefits are generally measured at
macro level to inform federal immigration policies (Picot 2008). What has
remained challenging is how to best understand immigrants’ settlement
and integration processes and experiences at the ground level, such as in
cities and neighbourhoods, and to clarify the impacts of global migration
on local communities, especially when it comes to municipal governance,
policies, infrastructure, and service provisions required to facilitate immi-
grant settlement and integration. Newcomers to the country inevitably
encounter and interact with other community members in public space
(e.g. streets, transit, public libraries, schools, community centres) and
like any other city inhabitants, they have various needs for employment,
education, housing, transportation, health care, religious services, leisure
spaces, and community services. As the major service provider, local
municipalities play a critical role in providing needed infrastructure and
services to support immigrant settlement and integration (Lo et al. 2015;
Teixeira 2017; Vézina and Houle 2017).
The recent waves of immigration have dramatically changed the urban
landscape of Canada’s metropolitan regions with two major conse-
quences: increasing ethnocultural diversity and growing concentrations of
immigrants in metropolitan areas. These changes have presented unprece-
dented challenges and opportunities to local municipalities, who have no
jurisdictional authority over federal immigration policies, but are never-
theless responsible for the provision of services and social and physical
infrastructure to facilitate and support immigrant settlement and inte-
gration. Despite the established settlement trajectory of contemporary
immigrants to cities and the emerging research focusing on the role of
cities in managing diversity (Ley 2007, 2008a), municipal policymakers
remain relatively uninformed about how to deal with an increasing need
10 CITIES OF MIGRATION: THE ROLE OF MUNICIPAL PLANNING … 207
for housing, transportation, infrastructure, public spaces, and services

driven by mass immigration. This often raises questions for municipalities
related to land use, building form, parking capacity, economic develop-
ment, expression of cultural identity, and community-building (Lo et al.
2015; Zhuang 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019; Zhuang and Chen 2017).
As addressed in the World Migration Report (Duncan and Popp 2017),
it is imperative to interrogate the relationship between global migration
and cities, in order to inform municipalities of appropriate policymaking
and public engagement processes within a multicultural context.
Cities are the places where newcomers start to establish civic life like
other city inhabitants. Immigrants inevitably are involved in the various
aspects of urban life, socially, economically, culturally, and physically, and
cities are rebuilt as a result. In many cases, immigrant communities have
restored social, cultural, and economic vitality to declining urban areas
and recreated a new sense of place and community (as exemplified in
the role that ethnic businesses play in urban revitalization). Yet, many
ethnic communities have not been formally recognized or supported by
municipal authorities and must continually negotiate their use of space
and fight for their rights to their spaces (Jones and Ley 2016; Poppe
and Young 2015; Zhuang 2019). Meanwhile, growing concentrations
of immigrants within a neighbourhood can also result in tensions with
some established community members, who perceive differences along
the lines of class, race, and ethnicity as threats to the stability of the
neighbourhood and their quality of life, not to mention the underlining
racism and discrimination (Jones and Ley 2016; Poppe and Young 2015;
Zaami 2015). In some cases, power dynamics and politics were in play,
where conflict was provoked around the control of local space between
co-ethnic newcomers and long-time residents (Preston and Lo 2000).
This adds more complexity to the understanding of contemporary immi-
gration and its impact on cities and local communities. If we ignore
the multifaceted nature of immigration and misinterpret its effects on
cities, we may miss the opportunity to direct positive urban growth by
promoting the potential benefits and minimizing the negative influences
associated with immigration. Policymakers and professionals at the fore-
front of urban development, such as city planners, who are key players
in the facilitation and promotion of the physical growth of cities, should
acknowledge the complexity of today’s immigration and incorporate this
knowledge in their decision-making and daily practices.
208 Z. C. ZHUANG
This chapter aims to first provide a backdrop of the increasingly diverse

demographics and the geographical distribution of today’s immigrants,
followed by the discussion of the changing immigrant settlement pattern
and its effects on cities. It will also examine the nature of immigrant
settlement and integration, and the challenges posed to municipalities.
The chapter will conclude with planning recommendations for cities of
migration.
Increasing Ethnocultural Diversity

and the Geographical Distribution of Immigrants
Early immigrants to Canada before the 1970s came predominantly from
Europe due to the discriminatory immigration policy that excluded
people outside the “favoured nation” list, which assessed immigrants on
the basis of race and national origin. The establishment of the points
system in 1967 and the new Immigration Act was a watershed event for
“new” immigration to Canada, which drew a sharp increase in the number
of skilled workers and business class immigrants with non-European
backgrounds. In 2016, nearly half (48.1%) of the immigrant popula-
tion was born in Asia versus 27.7% in Europe. Recent immigrants to
Canada predominantly come from Asia and Africa. Of the top ten coun-
tries of birth of all recent immigrants to Canada, most were Asian: the
Philippines, India, China, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and South Korea. More
than one-fifth (22.3%) of Canada’s population self-identified as visible
minority versus 4.7% in 1981 (Statistics Canada 2017a). Seven out of 10
visible minority persons were born outside Canada. As a result, Canadian
demographics are increasingly characterized by ethnocultural diversity.
From the perspective of geographical settlement distribution, immigra-
tion has been unevenly distributed across the country. According to the
2016 Canadian Census, 91.1% of immigrants lived in one of Canada’s
35 Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA), compared with 71.8% of the total
population living in these areas (Statistics Canada 2017b). Over half of
all immigrants (61.4%) and recent immigrants (56.0%) lived in just three
“gateway cities”, namely Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. Toronto
attracted the largest share of immigrants (35.9%) followed by Vancouver
(13.1%) and Montreal (12.4%). In contrast, just over one-third (35.6%)
of Canada’s total population lived in these three areas (Statistics Canada
2017a, b). These data show that contemporary immigrants tend to settle
in large urban regions, rather than in smaller urban centres or rural areas
as their predecessors had in the past. The high concentration of immigrant

settlement has implications for the Canadian urban system, especially
in increasing differences between the large cities and small to medium-
sized cities. The large cities have become more heterogeneous with a
growing diversity; while small and medium-sized cities remain distinctly
homogeneous in terms of their ethnocultural composition.
Although there are more recent immigrants settling in the Prairie
provinces (Alberta: 17.1%; Manitoba: 5.2%; Saskatchewan: 4.0%), Ontario
still has attracted the highest proportion of recent immigrants (39.0%) to
Canada between 2011 and 2016 and 53.4% of immigrants before 2011
(Ministry of Finance 2017) (Fig. 10.1). With more than three-quarters
(75.6%) of recent immigrants in Ontario choosing to settle in the Toronto
CMA, it is not surprising to find high shares of foreign-born popula-
tions in the City of Toronto (46.1%) and its surrounding municipalities
Fig. 10.1 Provincial distribution of immigrants to Canada. Produced by

Ministry of Finance (2017) (Note Percentage figures are share of Canada. Source
Statistics Canada)
210 Z. C. ZHUANG
(Markham: 58.7%; Richmond Hill: 57.4%; Mississauga: 53.4%; Brampton:

52.3%; Vaughan: 46.3%) (ibid.) (Fig. 10.2). As a comparison, immigrant
populations have a relatively lower representation in Vancouver (40.8%),
Montréal (23.4%), and Calgary (29.4%). These immigration trends have
had a strong impact on the Canadian urban system, where cities are
shaped differently by immigrants depending on the ethnic community,
city size (and rural/urban contexts), municipal planning mechanisms,
availability of services, provision of infrastructure, and local history and
context (Cullen and Walton-Roberts 2019; Dean et al. 2018; Drolet and
Teixeira 2019).
Fig. 10.2 Toronto CMA Municipalities with highest shares of foreign-born

population, 2011 and 2016. Produced by Ministry of Finance (2017) (Source
Statistics Canada)
From the Inner City to the Suburbs:

The Effects of Migration on Cities
While immigrants continue to arrive in Canada’s gateway cities, they
are no longer settling in the traditional urban centres. Instead, they are
frequently bypassing the inner city to live in the suburbs. For example,
in the Toronto region, 56.5% of immigrants have settled in suburban
municipalities (Vézina and Houle 2017). In the US, the majority of
immigrants (61%) live in suburbs (Singer and Wilson 2011), and have
significantly shaped the suburban social, cultural, political, and physical
landscapes in which they reside (Johnson 2017; Singer et al. 2008; Vicino
2013). The suburbs are becoming more complex as there is no longer
a clear separation of the industrial inner city and suburbs. Rather, “in-
between” and “post-suburban” urban spaces have been formed (Charmes
and Keil 2015). Furthermore, suburbs are no longer just the “bedroom
communities”, but encompass other aspects of civic lives such as employ-
ment, social organizations, parks, hospitals, universities, and infrastructure
(ibid.). For example, Toronto’s inner suburbs such as North York, Scar-
borough, and Etobicoke have become landing pads for many immigrants,
featuring single-family homes, high-rise apartments, ethnic shopping
malls, post-secondary schools, multiple-lane freeways, and public trans-
portation routes (Poppe and Young 2015). In Montreal, middle-class
families are moving to the suburban outskirts while recent immigrants
are moving to the inner suburbs because of the low costs of land, afford-
able housing, and construction of highways (Rose and Twigge-Molecay
2013).
Changes to immigrant settlement patterns also contribute to the trans-
formation of ethnic enclaves. Traditionally, ethnic enclaves concentrated
in the inner city and were often defined as areas with one group domi-
nating the population of a neighbourhood. Today, ethnic enclaves are
located primarily in the suburbs and are often characterized as ethni-
cally diverse and heterogeneous (Ray 2009). Another emerging trend
is that the enclaves receiving immigrants are expanding. On the other
hand, enclaves with fewer incoming immigrants are consolidating and
contracting. Nonetheless, those enclaves are not dissolving completely
yet because institutions such as churches, mosques, and ethnic businesses
remain active (Qadeer et al. 2010). It is important for municipalities
212 Z. C. ZHUANG
to understand immigrant settlement patterns, because it will inform the

provision of municipal infrastructure and the delivery of community
services in order to facilitate and support immigrant settlement and inte-
gration. However, existing literature mainly focuses on the changes to the
immigration trends and settlement patterns at the macro level (Hiebert
2009; Murdie et al. 2014; Qadeer et al. 2010; Ray 2009). Municipal
policymakers are still insufficiently informed of the challenges faced by
immigrant communities in their everyday lives, the role they play in
shaping the unprecedented ethnic neighbourhoods, and how to incorpo-
rate multiculturalism into policies and practice (Wood and Gilbert 2005).
There are existing studies as presented in the following sections that
explore the micro-level or neighbourhood-level settlement experiences
of immigrants. The findings reveal the multifaceted challenges faced by
newcomers which should be addressed more in order to inform poli-
cymakers and planning practitioners of diverse community perspectives
(McClinchey 2008).
Suburban problems in Canadian metropolitan areas are characterized
by ageing housing stocks, poverty, racialized segregation, and a lack of
services (Charmes and Keil 2015). As more immigrants are moving to
the suburbs, there is an increasing need to address the dilapidating condi-
tions of the post-war suburbs, such as housing, retailing, transportation
infrastructure, public spaces, and community services. For example, many
of the tower neighbourhoods in Toronto’s suburbs where immigrants
tend to concentrate are in dire need of repair (Ghosh 2014; Pagliaro
2018; Poppe and Young 2015). In response to this problem, the City
initiated the Tower Neighbourhood Renewal Programme through densi-
fication to tackle the devaluation of the inner suburbs. However, the
densification renewal scheme was rejected by tower residents, many of
whom were recent immigrants living in low-income households, and who
preferred “improved social and retail amenities” to high-rise development
(Poppe and Young 2015, p. 620). The densification strategy also trig-
gered single-family homeowners’ fear that higher density would attract
more low-income, immigrant, and visible minority tower renters (ibid.).
As a result, the city-wide policies of smart growth were challenged and
contested by local residents of mixed-ethnic and different socio-economic
backgrounds, which could potentially lead to inter-group tensions and
exclusions. It is not uncommon that city-wide policies often promote
template solutions, such as housing densification, transit-oriented mixed-
use developments, and suburban retrofitting of deteriorating strip malls.
However, one size does not fit all especially in a multicultural context
where local perspectives can be so diverse or even at odds with each
other. With the diversity of the demographics comes a diversity in the
approaches to city and community-building.
Finding affordable and appropriate housing is often one of the most
pressing concerns and challenges for immigrants upon their arrival in
Canada. In a study on refugees’ access to housing in metropolitan
Vancouver, Francis and Hiebert (2014) explained that refugees were
more vulnerable than economic immigrants to find housing, especially
because of the lack of resources to access affordable housing. In Calgary,
beginning in the 1990s, there has been an increasing problem of inad-
equate affordable housing which, in turn, lead to greater demands for
the construction of illegal secondary suites (van der Poorten and Miller
2017). In short, immigrants’ housing experiences in the gateway cities
are often marked by unaffordable housing, gentrification, densification,
and displacement of marginalized populations. In Vancouver’s Downtown
Eastside, there has been an ongoing process of “renoviction”, in which
recent low-income immigrants are displaced as the downtown core under-
goes reinvestment and redevelopment (Ley and Lynch 2012; Parizeau
2017).
One of the extreme implications of inadequate housing is hidden
homelessness, defined as overcrowding, couch surfing, or temporary
accommodation in shelters, as illustrated among Toronto’s newcomers
who did not earn high incomes but had to spend most of their earn-
ings on rent and housing (Gopikrishna 2012). In other cases, such as
in suburban high-rise apartments, immigrant renters had to find ways to
modify their living spaces in order to address specific needs. For example,
Bangladeshi immigrants transformed the dilapidated buildings into func-
tional spaces that allow for more social interaction and create a better
sense of home. This includes socializing in laundry rooms, turning the
corridors into mini play areas, transforming a unit into a mosque, sending
children to daycare services within the building, and opening unit doors
to neighbours (Ghosh 2014). The concentration of co-ethnic members
in ethnic neighbourhoods has become important because they provide
social and emotional networks that help immigrants develop a sense of
community and solidarity during the settlement and integration processes
(Wood et al. 2012). In many cases, immigrants can rely on the networks
in ethnic neighbourhoods to find affordable housing (Teixeira 2017).
214 Z. C. ZHUANG
Another major indicator of Canada’s multiculturalism is “ethnic retail-

ing”. The inner city that once played an important role as a reception area
for immigrants has been replaced by its suburban counterparts; ethnic
retail spaces reflect this demographic and spatial shift. Zhuang’s (2019)
study explored over 110 Chinese and South Asian retail clusters with
nearly 4000 businesses across the GTA. Ethnic retailing is most prominent
in the GTA, home to the largest share of Canada’s immigrant popula-
tion. These businesses tend to concentrate in the suburbs to service the
growing immigrant population. Yet, unlike in earlier settlements of immi-
grants in gateway cities, this clustering is not a survival or preventative
measure against discrimination, but rather it is a proactive decision by
suburban ethnic retailers who use the closer proximity to share informa-
tion and resources in a form that is termed “spatial capital” (Kaplan and Li
2006). The sharing of information and development of personal connec-
tions is crucial in ethnic economies in order to establish a client base
and offer a range of products and services that are customized specifi-
cally to the needs of the ethnic communities (Somashekhar 2014; Fong
et al. 2008). Additionally, many suburban ethnic retail places are impor-
tant community hubs that provide personal, business, and community
services beyond retailing. They also inscribe a sense of community pride
and belonging (Zhuang 2016, 2017, 2019; Zhuang and Chen 2017).
In addition to readapting conventional suburban retail spaces, ethnic
retailing has taken place in innovative condominium shopping centres
or plazas, such as Chinese condominium shopping malls, which have
contributed a unique retail form to the mainstream retail system. A
Chinese condominium shopping mall typically has the following features
that distinguish it from a mainstream shopping centre: a concentra-
tion of Asian/Chinese-oriented and operated businesses; condominium
ownership (vs. leasehold); restaurants or grocery stores as anchors (vs.
conventional department stores); variable store hours (vs. traditional
norms and practices); no control of tenant mix; and smaller store size
(Wang and Zhong 2013; Zhuang 2016; Zhuang and Chen 2017).
Though a more recent phenomenon, South Asian shopping centres and
plazas with similar features to their Asian/Chinese predecessors are also
rapidly increasing (Zhuang 2019). Many ethnic malls have attracted
immigrant entrepreneurs and investors who are in favour of commercial
condominium ownership as part of their social and economic integra-
tion process in the hosting society. Overall, ethnic retail places have
significantly changed stereotypically “uniform” suburbs, which are often
thought of as socially and physically unappealing, and contributed to

a sense of community—not only for immigrants, but for the commu-
nity at large. They also play an important role in providing critical
social, economic, and community infrastructure to support placemaking
and suburban retrofitting for municipalities. Some flagship Chinese malls
have served as the catalyst for the adjacent area’s redevelopment and
retrofitting (Zhuang 2016; Zhuang and Chen 2017), although they can
also create tensions with established community members due to land use
issues (e.g. traffic, parking, density).
Ethnic places of worship have also transformed suburban spaces as a
noticeable indicator of multiculturalism. These places work to contribute
to immigrant settlement and integration by providing religious classes
and services, extra-curricular programmes for children, English classes
and settlement support (e.g. housing, employment) for newcomers, and
shared spaces with the community at large. Local municipalities gener-
ally cannot fill these service gaps due to the lack of longer-term funding
(Ley 2008a). As Agyekum and Newbold (2016) explained, religious
sites are important because they allow immigrants to worship in their
own language, give access to familiar ethnic foods and culturally appro-
priate services, provide information of and connection with the wider
community, and maintain transnational relationships. Therefore, they
have become the critical community infrastructure to support social
cohesion and community bonding within and beyond the immigrant
community. Agrawal’s (2008) study on places of worship and neigh-
bourliness revealed that faith groups do not segregate them from the
rest of the community or make the neighbourhood an exclusive space,
although it is not uncommon for the public and the media to fear that
“these communities will become a source of tension within the broader
community, exert undue influence in political matters, and pressure local
governments to deliver services in ways that may conflict with the needs
of the wider community” (p. 41). Ley (2008b) concluded that it is impor-
tant for ethnic places of worship to transition “from co-ethnic bonding
to cross-ethnic bridging” as a broader service outlook (p. 2072).
It is worth noting that the development of ethnic places of worship
often triggers land use conflicts since various religious practices (e.g.
Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism) may not be compat-
ible with conventional planning policies that regulate Christian churches.
For example, orthodox Jews walk to worship, as a result a nearby syna-
gogue is a must and parking is not required (Bennett 1998). For mosques,
216 Z. C. ZHUANG
height restrictions need to be adjusted to build minarets and domes, and

parking requirements should be based on floor areas or pray areas, instead
of the amounts of pew seats (Qadeer and Chaudhry 2000). Research
also revealed that religious diversity has not been fully recognized by
the municipal authority, and few city-wide policies have supported the
development of ethnic places of worship and other cultural institutions
(Germain and Gagnon 2003; Qadeer and Agrawal 2011). It presents
the challenges in terms of co-existence and reasonable accommodation
of different religious groups and more critically, leads to a contested
question: “Is multiculturalism a national or a local affair?” (Germain and
Gagnon 2003, p. 296). The case of an “Assembly District” in Richmond,
British Columbia, which is home to more than 20 densely clustered
mosques, temples, and gurdwaras, illustrates how municipal policies co-
opted various religious groups to adapt agricultural lands in suburbia for
their religious needs (Dwyer et al. 2016).
However, the municipal intention to combine faith and farming to
combat suburban sprawl is a contradictory land use policy, because it not
only fails to engage the multi-faith communities in fulfilling the munic-
ipal vision of farmland protection, but also creates unexpected expansion
of religious facilities that has exceeded planning regulations. While the
district is considered by the local municipality as a successful example
of Canadian multiculturalism representing co-existence and tolerance,
it presents contested narratives at the intersection of cultural recogni-
tion, commodification, everyday multiculturalism, and interfaith bridging
(ibid.). In Toronto’s industrial districts, the massive expansion of ethnic
religious institutions has conflicted with the City’s economic development
strategy aiming to protect employment land. The concern of reducing the
City’s potential tax revenues and job growth by building places of worship
in employment zones has caused legal and political tension (Hackworth
and Stein 2012). However, this strictly economic viewpoint may under-
estimate the social, cultural, and community benefits that ethnic places of
worship contribute.
The aforementioned examples illustrate immigrants’ diverse needs for
housing, retail facilities, and religious spaces and services, the challenges
they face, and the efforts they often make to transform the space in which
they live. Central to these ethnic placemaking efforts is the creation of a
sense of place, identity, and community, which should be considered as
the cornerstone of immigrant settlement and integration. Cities of migra-
tion must strive to become welcoming communities that are diverse and
inclusive. Examples in the literature, however, have revealed issues related

to social isolation and exclusion at the neighbourhood level. For example,
Pakistani, Sri Lankan, and Bangladesh seniors in Edmonton reported
feeling lonely and isolated despite living with their extended families
because they could not drive and had to be dependent on others (Ng and
Northcott 2015). This can be addressed by improving access to public
transportation and creating drop-in visitor programmes. In another case,
Ghanaian immigrant youth, living in Toronto’s Jane and Finch neigh-
bourhood, felt excluded from Canadian society because of the stigma
associated with their neighbourhood. The youth felt like “second-class
citizens” when they were subject to racial profiling by police and were
discriminated from employment opportunities when employers noticed
their postal codes on their resumes (Zaami 2015). Such systemic racism
and discrimination in police forces and labour market is problematic
as it adversely affects the social, economic, and spatial integration of
immigrants and visible minorities into Canadian society.
Another aspect of immigrants’ exclusion from neighbourhoods is their
limited ability to participate or make an impact in planning and decision-
making processes. In the aforementioned case study of Toronto’s Tower
Neighbourhood Renewal Programme, many high-rise apartment renters
from the Caribbean, Africa, South and East Asia were not included in
the design charrette organized by the City to inform future renewal
decisions, while single-family owners actively participated and expressed
their disapproval of increasing immigrant and ethnic minority settle-
ment in the tower apartments in their neighbourhoods. As a result, it
revealed the unequal power dynamics within planning processes (Poppe
and Young 2015). Similarly, many recent immigrants and refugees living
in Maywood, a low-income suburban neighbourhood in Burnaby, British
Columbia, expressed powerlessness in changing their neighbourhood
because they continued to see the construction of more high-rise apart-
ments but little improvement to the existing living conditions (Jones and
Ley 2016). Municipalities must find equitable ways to engage marginal-
ized communities as their voices need to be heard to ensure long-term
sustainability of our diverse communities.
218 Z. C. ZHUANG
The Challenges for Municipal

Planning: Are Municipalities Ready?
Canada’s immigrant gateway cities are undergoing many changes and
facing unprecedented challenges brought forth by increasing ethno-
cultural diversity and suburbanization of immigrant settlement. Cities
have become places where immigrants experience civic life, adapt to the
built environment, integrate with local economies and communities, and
negotiate and claim their rights to city spaces. Yet, current planning poli-
cies, processes, and practices in many municipalities of major immigrant
settlement are not sufficient to address issues related to immigrant settle-
ment and integration that affect city and community-building. Moreover,
policymakers and practitioners are not well informed of immigrant expe-
riences and the challenges faced at the neighbourhood level. The lack
of policy support partially affects the municipal capacity in facilitating
immigrant integration with a wider community and engagement in the
city-building process.
Immigration is a federal policy; yet, no federal urban policy exists.
The federal government is becoming more decentralized and is down-
loading responsibility to the provincial and municipal governments. There
is a push towards privatization of businesses and reducing the social
service expenditures. These policy changes have led to increasing income
inequality in Canadian gateway cities and adversely affect immigrants
because they have reduced funding for affordable housing, social assis-
tance, and newcomer services (Lo et al. 2015). It also brought about
anti-immigrant debates and racial and class tensions as the concentration
of non-White poverty became a problem that threatened the security of
communities (Saberi 2017). While Charmes and Keil (2015) argued that
there are institutionalized integrationist measures that are place-based in
areas such as schools, community welfare and culture to address immi-
grant needs, these measures are often inadequate and unresponsive, and
municipalities must provide explicit policies and services for immigrants to
open businesses, find affordable housing, and give access to transportation
in order to ensure they have equal chances of gaining employment.
With the demographic change and increasing diversity, municipalities
should recognize the necessity of building inclusive communities that
can address the various needs of different groups and promote social
cohesion among different communities. Municipalities must consider
Canada’s multiculturalism policy, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
the Multiculturalism Act, and other provisions involving equity and

cultural rights, while actively responding to ethnic minorities’ concerns
and needs (Qadeer and Agrawal 2011). In addition to incorporating
multicultural policy in municipal programmes and services, it is imperative
to ensure equal access to and power relations within the planning process
(McClinchey 2008; Poppe and Young 2015; Jones and Ley 2016).
However, the current planning processes do not equitably and effec-
tively engage marginalized communities. They neither respond sufficiently
to the needs of ethnic minorities, nor adequately reconcile competing
interests among different groups over land use, development, and
community services. Research suggests that interculturalism may be a
more appropriate form of governance in urban neighbourhoods with a
diverse population (Galanakis 2013; Gyepi-Garbrah et al. 2014). Inter-
culturalism critiques the shortcomings of multiculturalism and tries to
address it by looking at the relationships between cultural groups and
create opportunities for interaction and collaboration between them. It
is considered as a theoretical framework that promotes communication
between social groups in public spaces. The ultimate goal of intercul-
turalism is to address the power differentials and inequalities that can
be seen in a multicultural society if it can facilitate political distribu-
tion and democratic processes. In multicultural cities, city planners must
consider how to address different groups’ cultural needs through equi-
table civic engagement and intercultural dialogues, while considering
the provision of public spaces and services that can foster and enhance
community-building. Social equity should be considered as a key goal of
municipal programmes, which demonstrates the commitment and poten-
tial to include immigrants, refugees, indigenous and racialized people,
and other marginalized members into the planning and community
engagement processes.
As one of the most diverse and multicultural countries in the world,
Canada has an untapped potential to preserve and enhance its unique
cultural heritage, which requires equitable planning policies and processes
to ensure the delivery of equitable outcomes, as cultural assets and needs
in diverse communities could be subtle, intangible, and unconventional.
The key concern of marginalization is that community members will be
excluded from the decision-making process, and hence, they do not see
the planning outcomes are for them, nor as something to which they
can meaningfully contribute. In extreme cases, strong community oppo-
sition to planning decisions could emerge from distrust and the lack of
220 Z. C. ZHUANG
communication and engagement. Planners should identify effective tools

to engage the public and enhance community empowerment and civic
leadership, as it will be vital to the success of the city and community-
building. Research has suggested that to avoid tokenism in traditional
public consultation methods, a community-powered process should be
adopted and under-represented groups should have their own spaces to
voice their concerns before the wider community convenes in the formal
process (Peinhardt and Storring 2019). It is also important to go to where
community members are and engage them in conversations “outside of
meeting rooms … in everyday spaces and at cultural events” (ibid., para.
14). Building trust and rapport with community agencies or hiring “com-
munity champions” has been proven effective in engaging marginalized
communities (Crompton 2017).
Conclusion
Immigration to Canada has tremendously contributed to population
growth, attracted human capital, and increased economic capacity and
social vitality in Canadian gateway cities. Despite these benefits, less atten-
tion has been paid to how municipalities can support immigrants in
their settlement and integration processes in order to secure a sense of
belonging and inclusion. It has also brought forth unprecedented chal-
lenges and opportunities to cities with increasing diversity. The current
settler-colonial planning paradigm and the rise of populism and anti-
immigration sentiments have exacerbated the gaps in understanding and
have renewed conflict over who owns and belongs to/in local spaces.
The strategy of reasonable accommodation attempts to address cultural
differences and systemic discrimination, yet it is contested from both the
right and left perspectives (i.e. limits of accommodation vs. primacy of the
rights of minorities) (Qadeer and Agrawal 2011).
More research is needed to obtain a place-based understanding of
how immigrants shape their communities, and how they are engaged
in decision-making and community-building. Diversity can be measured
by numbers, but integration is hard to measure. Municipalities should
consider meaningful and community- and equity-based approaches. It is
important for planning practitioners to be attentive to neighbourhood
context (e.g. existing resources, planning policies) and composition (e.g.
population size, diversity, length of time in community), and make equi-

table decisions as to whose stories are told, who get to tell the stories,
and whose voices are heard.
In May 2019, the American Planning Association (APA) released
its first-ever Planning For Equity Policy Guide, clearly stating planners’
responsibility to address issues related to social equity and inclusion. It
identifies a number of recommendations for planners to advocate for poli-
cies that apply an equity lens to a range of planning topics and focus
areas of planning practice, such as housing and neighbourhood change,
education, heritage presentation, climate change and resilience, and
mobility and transportation. Key findings include community engagement
and empowerment, equitable access to spaces, resources, and services,
outreach in under-represented communities, dialogue with public forums
to share and appreciate diverse perspectives, acknowledge inconvenient
truths, connection to the history of people of colour, women, immigrants,
and other traditionally under-recognized members of the community, and
consideration of social equity in all decision-making.
These are important and helpful planning recommendations that will
inform municipalities to develop a better understanding of diverse needs
for spaces and services, employ explicit municipal policies to support
multiculturalism and diversity, engage marginalized communities equi-
tably, deliver services that are culturally sensitive and responsive, and
plan and design meaningful public spaces and infrastructure. Through an
equity lens, diverse communities will be engaged collectively to bond with
each other and help shape and reshape the future of diverse and inclusive
Canadian cities.
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1254671.
CHAPTER 11
Managing Immigration in the Canadian

Federation: The Case of Quebec
Pierre-Loup Beauregard, Alain-G. Gagnon,

and Jean-Denis Garon
Introduction
This chapter discusses the specifics of the Quebec immigration system
both within Canada and internationally. We first introduce the consti-
tutional foundations of the current, partly decentralized, system and
we summarize the major historical events that contributed to give it
its current shape. We then present the Quebec government’s current
preferences with regards to immigration.
Knowing that Quebec is the only Canadian province that benefits
from a formal decentralization agreement with the federal government,
we discuss some key issues. First, why has Quebec been more inclined
to get involved in the field of immigration than has been the case for
P.-L. Beauregard
Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada
A.-G. Gagnon · J.-D. Garon (B)
Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada
e-mail: garon.jean-denis@uqam.ca

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_11
228 P.-L. BEAUREGARD ET AL.
other provinces? Second, given that migration is highly encouraged in

the Canadian federation, does Quebec’s right to select its own immi-
grants translate into distinct immigration outcomes? In connection with
this second question, does Quebec’s special status undermine the effec-
tiveness of the whole federation’s immigration policies? We also evaluate
the perception that Quebec is the only province to actually choose its
immigrants. Finally, we appraise the extent to which the country’s partially
decentralized immigration policy constitutes a unique case and one that
contributes to firm up Quebec as a distinct society within the Canadian
federation.
Our analysis suggests that, over time, all provincial governments have
been called to play an increasingly important role in selecting immigrants.
Today, all of them take part in the selection process of economic immi-
grants. However, while the federal government confers provinces with the
authority of selecting some of them, Quebec has been granted a special
status which evolved into a complete decentralization process for selecting
economic immigrants. This process comes with a set of obligations in
the policy field of immigration, whereas other provinces may opt not to
assume added responsibilities and let the federal government occupy the
policy field of immigration at its will.
Constitutional Foundations
and Historical Evolution
According to section 95 of the British North America Act, the provinces
and the federal government share the right to legislate in the field of
immigration. The constitution states that provinces can make laws related
to immigration within the province. It also states that the federal parlia-
ment can, from time to time, legislate in this field “into all or any of the
provinces.” Therefore, from the outset, the policy sector of immigration
offers a good ground for asymmetry and the search of provincial–federal
consensus.
While both orders of government can legislate in the field of immi-
gration, Ottawa holds the exclusive legislative powers with respect to
quarantine, citizenship, and the naturalization of aliens (sections 91(7, 11,
11 MANAGING IMMIGRATION IN THE CANADIAN FEDERATION … 229
25) and 92(10) of Constitution Acts, 1878–1982).1 However, the Cana-

dian constitution remains discreet with respect to international relations.
In practice, the design of the Constitution leaves the federal govern-
ment with a technical advantage when it comes to selecting immigrants,
since the application process often requires some groundwork that can
be conducted through Canadian offices—oftentimes embassies—that are
spread worldwide. Moreover, even if some provinces decided to select
their own immigrants, a strong degree of coordination with the federal
government would be required to apply policy measures, given that
Ottawa controls the borders and has full authority with respect to the
granting of citizenship.
Despite it being a shared responsibility between provinces and the
federal government, the former refrained from intervening for a long
time. From 1867 until the 1970s, all provinces left the federal govern-
ment alone in shaping the country’s immigration policies. One should
note, however, that federal policies were not well planned (Vineberg
1987) and mainly were aimed at populating Canada’s vast territory.
Earlier policies did not explicitly intend to fulfill specific needs of the labor
market and immigration rules were discriminatory on the bases of race
and ethnicity until the late 1960s which preferably favored white Anglo-
Saxon immigrants (Hawkins 1975; Troper 1993; Abu-Laban 2009). “In
1967, a new immigration policy explicitly banned discrimination on the
basis of race and ethnicity and introduced a ‘points system’ of selec-
tion” (Abu-Laban 2009, p. 304). Ottawa’s policy emphasis on admitting
immigrants on the basis of their labor skills then started to take over.
In the wake of the Quiet revolution, the Quebec government has
shown a constant interest in participating in the selection process of immi-
grants. In 1968, the Quebec government opened its own department of
immigration. Since Quebec wanted to be more involved in a legislative
capacity of a policy field occupied by the federal government, stepping in
required coordination and approval by the latter. In 1971, Canada and
Quebec ratified the Lang-Cloutier agreement which is named after the
two ministers. The agreement allowed Quebec to post immigration repre-
sentatives in Canadian embassies and to do counselling abroad. However,
1 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/.
Quebec’s representatives simply held an informal role and were not offi-
cially considered as immigration officers. Moreover, their work was done
under federal monitoring (Black and Hagen 1993).
Some authors argue that the rise of a nationalist movement explains
this surge of interest by Quebec (Kostov 2008). This argument is popular
but some are still dubious. Gilles Paquet (2013) argues that some
provinces—and especially Manitoba—have shown an early interest into
participating in the immigration process. However, there is little doubt
that the rise of nationalism in the 1960s with the advent of the Quiet
Revolution can explain why Quebec’s claims in this field have been
taken more seriously by Ottawa (Gagnon and Montcalm 1989, pp. 156–
166). Quebec’s Department of Immigration was established roughly in
the same period as several other new provincial institutions, such as the
Department of Education in 1964. Oddly enough, only in 1967 did the
federal government create its own Department of Manpower and Immi-
gration. In the meantime, Quebec’s ambition in terms of immigration
policy gained prominence at the time of the crafting in 1965 of the
Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. The nascent doctrine stipulated that the Quebec
government intended to play a direct international role in the fields that
are either within the realm of provincial exclusive legislative powers or
shared with the federal government.2
In 1975, an important Green paper was tabled by Bob Andras, the
federal minister of manpower and immigration. At that time, the federal
government was reviewing the objectives pursued by its own immigration
policies. This document paved the way to what would become in 1976
Canada’s first modern immigration law. The policy primarily intended
to satisfy the needs of the labor market for skills while also regulating
Canada’s population growth.
Andras’ Green paper stated explicitly that there was no constitutional
barrier that could prevent Ottawa from sharing the policy field of immi-
gration with the provinces. Accordingly, Quebec and Ottawa agreed on
a new and comprehensive immigration agreement in 1975. The Andras-
Bienvenue agreement did not grant Quebec the right to select its own
immigrants, but it was a first clear step in that direction. The Quebec
government would be allowed to post proper immigration agents abroad.
Moreover, they would no longer work under federal monitoring and
2 http://www.mrif.gouv.qc.ca/fr/ministere/historique/doctrine-paul-gerin-lajoie/50-
ans-doctrine.
could occupy their own offices, distinct from federal offices. But despite
the birth of Quebec’s immigration paradiplomacy (that is, its ability to
conduct immigration-related foreign policy as a sub-state jurisdiction) and
the fact that the province had obtained the right to make recommen-
dations on all immigration applications, its role remained initially of a
consultative character.
While the new Federal Immigration Act, 1976 only began to operate in
1978, Ottawa and the recently elected (November 15, 1976) Lévesque
government (Parti Québécois) were already negotiating a new accord.
In 1978, the Cullen-Couture agreement also established the principle
that Quebec and the federal government would “cooperate in all areas
relating to migration movements and demography” and “participate
jointly in the selection of persons who wish to settle permanently or
temporarily in Quebec” (Section 1). The new agreement gave Quebec
a veto power on immigrants that were selected by Ottawa. In practice,
this accord ultimately allowed Quebec to select its own immigrants in the
economic category—leaving humanitarian and family reunion categories
to Ottawa—and set out its own list of admission criteria. This was justi-
fied by the fact that Quebec ought to be able to exercise a larger role in
the field of culture due to its distinctive cultural composition. As a result,
Quebec was in a position to “securing political autonomy on the basis of
cultural difference” (Webber 2015, p. 40).
Although nationalism cannot explain everything, nationalist pressures
did push Ottawa to augment Quebec’s powers in several policy sectors
which include culture, education, immigration, and the labor market. The
1980s saw Ottawa providing a fair amount of incentives to encourage
other provinces to play a larger role in the field of immigration so that
Quebec would not be in a position to claim that it has a special status
within the Canadian federation (Garcea 1994).
The ensuing accords consolidated, and even augmented, Quebec’s
powers in the domain of immigration. For example, in 1991, the Gagnon-
Tremblay—McDougall Accord (1991) bestowed Quebec with broader
selection powers. Full decentralization was then achieved for economic
immigrants and integration policies and Quebec received an important
and yearly indexed compensation. Ottawa was also to have Quebec’s
approval for the share of total permanent immigration (including human-
itarian and family immigration) the latter was ready to accept yearly. This
agreement was negotiated during the Meech Lake constitutional phase
and, even though the accord failed, the immigration segment of the deal
was largely respected and an indemnification and a distinct society clause

implemented.
The 1991 agreement is still in application. Quebec’s criteria of selec-
tion evolved over time without federal interference, which was made
possible by the Gagnon-Tremblay—McDougall Accord. As of now, the
Quebec Department of Immigration, Diversity, and Inclusion (MIDI)
delivers selection certificates for five specific immigration programs,
namely, the skilled workers, experienced class, investors, entrepreneurs,
and self-employees programs.3 Adding to that, it has put in place the
Quebec Experience Program, where temporary workers and international
students can apply for a permanent residency based on their local studies
and work experiences and language proficiency. However, the federal
government retains exclusive powers for some immigration programs
(family reconciliation) as well as when it comes to admitting refugees.
Finally, it should be underlined that temporary foreign workers can work
and live in Quebec without having secured a certificate of selection. The
temporary worker status has become, in recent years, a way station toward
applying for permanent immigration—this is a general phenomenon also
observed in Australia and New Zealand, known as “two-step migration.”
We will discuss this new trend further later in this chapter.4
Quebec’s Intercultural Approach

The aforementioned agreements on immigration allow Quebec to express
its preferences through its own selection process. As one would expect,
the province’s francophone essence is prominent and complements the
other selection criteria—such as diplomas and work experiences that are
becoming more and more the key criteria. The linguistic criterion has lost
some ground over the last decade, as criteria became more directly linked
to labor market needs. Quebec emphasizes the use of French as a means
to integrate immigrants with a view to be a genuine host society. The
use of a common language, especially in the public sphere, is thought to
3 https://www.canadavisa.com/quebec-immigration-quebec-selection-certificate.html#
gs.opsgu4.
4 In 2017, Quebec received 52,388 immigrants. Of these, 57.8% were economic immi-
grants, 23.2% were from the family reconciliation program, and 17.5% were refugees
(MIDI 2018).
foster a sense of belonging and togetherness. It is also thought to facil-

itate everyone’s participation in the democratic processes and the many
institutions of the civil society.
One of the key characteristics of Quebec’s societal context is to develop
the best possible scenario for immigrants to play a central role in the
advent of a modern society in which the use of French contributes to
develop a sense of belonging and togetherness. Full participation in all
aspects of social life be it in the democratic processes, in the labor market,
or in being involved in one’s community, is then considered to be an
essential element in forging a community capable of standing up for equal
rights for all citizens. This goal is explicitly put forward in the 2015
immigration policy, Ensemble, nous sommes le Québec (Together, we are
Quebec).
The last three decades have demonstrated the extent to which
Quebec’s intercultural approach has influenced the development of
Canadian multiculturalism. In the 1970s, the politics of multicultur-
alism contributed to segment and ethnicize cultural communities in the
country. However, in the 1980s—marked by an emergent Quebecois
tradition of interculturalism that seeks to integrate different groups into a
common culture but respects their diversity—partisans of multiculturalism
began to take better social inclusion much more seriously. Meanwhile,
the politics of interculturalism in Quebec have insisted on the advent of
a society that is more inclined to encourage full participation of all of its
citizens in a shared community. This is done through the use of public
commissions of inquiry, government committees as well as a variety of
initiatives emanating from civil society.
With the passing of time, the politics of interculturalism and multicul-
turalism have been emulating each other in how they achieve social inte-
gration. Both models are based on similar premises of cultural pluralism.
The main point of demarcation between the two models relates to the
political community that acts as the main provider of national identity:
Quebec or Canada.
One point that needs to be highlighted is that successive govern-
ments in Quebec (either under the leadership of the PQ or the Liberals)
from the mid-1970s—when the Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa specif-
ically expressed Quebec’s refusal of multiculturalism policy in a letter
sent to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau—to the general election of 2018
have pursued similar goals and have acted with a view to uphold the
French fact, namely, that Quebec is a province where French is the
predominant language (Bélanger 2006; Lemieux 2012; Paquet 2014a, b).

Tensions between the recently elected Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ),
led by François Legault, and the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau
in Ottawa are largely due to the need Quebec sees to augment its
control over the selection of immigrants that choose Quebec as their host
province. This need goes beyond the obligation for immigrants to adhere
to a communal project founded on interculturalism as it invites immi-
grants to choose Quebec for its economic potential. Culture, which used
to be at the center of things (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007), has receded
as the main leitmotiv to select Quebec in favor of market needs.
Is Quebec Favored in Practice?

The immigration system is distinct from that of the other provinces.
Not only does Quebec have selection powers, but these powers come
with some specific obligations. Quebec contractually agreed to take a
series of responsibilities that other provinces leave in Ottawa’s hands.
In exchange, Quebec receives a financial compensation for providing
immigration services.5 In other words, Quebec has been granted the
possibility to “opt out” with full financial compensation. The (evolving)
political accord states that Canada withdraws from both the bureaucratic
processes relating to immigration as well as from the integration processes
in Quebec.
The Accord identifies a number of “reception and linguistic, cultural
and economic integration services” from which the federal government
withdraws. In exchange, Quebec receives a fixed compensation which
increased from a base of $75 million in 1991–1992 to $90 million in
1994–1995. The compensation then became and still is—a formula-based
one. The compensation is indexed according to the increase of federal
expenses in immigration and integration and augments with the growth
in the number of non-francophone immigrants selected by the Quebec
5 See the Canada-Quebec Accord, Annex B. The Accord does not state that Quebec
opted-out, but mentions instead that the federal government withdrew from certain
services.
government so that added resources are made available for purposes of

integration.6
Quebec benefits from a special status in that it is the only province
that acts independently of Ottawa in some immigration categories. For
example, Quebec is fully responsible for its own selection and delivers
its own certificates of selection for the categories of economic immi-
grants. But in practice, the other provinces do not necessarily need a
bilateral agreement with the federal government to have a say in the
selection process. In the rest of the federation, Ottawa simply fulfills
these obligations. Nowadays, the federal immigration policy calls for more
provincial participation in the selection and integration of immigrants.
This is a salient aspect of the current federal immigration policy with
respect to economic immigrants. Such policy is meant to satisfy the needs
of provincial labor markets in an efficient and timely matter. In connec-
tion with this, candidates can be proposed to the federal government by
the provinces.
These candidates can directly apply to the provinces, provided that
they satisfy a series of eligibility criteria, mostly related to specific provin-
cial needs and Canada’s labor markets. For example, nominees in Alberta
must hold an “eligible occupation.” Alberta also provides candidates with
a long list of “ineligible occupations.”7 Saskatchewan’s nominee program
features several application streams, such as for farmers, international
skilled workers, or entrepreneurs. It also imposes a minimum level of
proficiency in English.8
If selected, a province’s nominee can then apply to the federal govern-
ment for permanent residence and Ottawa will then make the final deci-
sion.9 While the federal government can turn down provincial requests,
it almost always agrees with a province’s selection. Approval rates by the
6 https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/
policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/federal-provincial-territorial/que
bec/canada-quebec-accord-relating-immigration-temporary-admission-aliens.html.
7 https://www.alberta.ca/ainp-selection-criteria.aspx.
8 https://www.saskatchewan.ca/residents/moving-to-saskatchewan/immigrating-to-sas
katchewan/saskatchewan-immigrant-nominee-program.
9 https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-can
ada/provincial-nominees/works.html.
federal government fluctuated between 94 and 97% over the period span-
ning from 2010 to 2015 (Canada 2017, p. 16), with a few exceptions
due to national security issues.
Although there is a strong federal–provincial cooperation with respect
to the nomination, selection, and integration processes, provinces (except
for Quebec) do not have the last word in the selection of their immi-
grants. Variation by provinces is due to this voluntary approach and to
the fact that the federal government reserves for itself the right to select
some economic-class immigrants. For instance, in 2017, Ontario only
chose 13.1% of its economic immigrants,10 but now shows an interest
for better matching the skills of its immigrants to the needs of its labor
market, in particular in the high-tech industries.11
Since there is no established devolution process, provinces (with the
notable exception of Quebec) do not receive any financial compensa-
tion for proposing their own candidates. Once nominated, the federal
government selects them just as non-nominated candidates. Moreover,
provinces are not free to set their own immigration targets. Instead, the
federal government allots each provincial government with an “allocation
of nominations” each year whereas, in the case of Quebec, the latter can
choose its own economic-class immigrants and how many of them are to
be admitted.
Latest Developments in Quebec

Among all provinces, Quebec alone has the opportunity to determine
the number of economic immigrants to be selected each year. It chooses
its list of criteria on which selection is contingent. Until August 2018,
applicants for the regular immigration streams, such as the Quebec skilled
workers and business immigrations programs, had to pass point-based
evaluations in order to be added to the list of potential candidates. Once
on the list, candidates were called upon until the selection quotas have
10 We divide the number of accepted provincial nominees by the sum of the following
classes of federal immigrants: federal economic skilled; federal economic caregivers; federal
economic business; Atlantic immigration pilot programs. For Quebec, the provincially
selected immigrants include those of the Quebec Skilled Workers program and the Quebec
Business Immigrations programs.
11 https://www.cicnews.com/2019/04/ontario-announces-new-foreign-tech-worker-str
eam-and-immigration-pilot-for-smaller-communities-0412178.html#gs.osbfxi.
Table 11.1 Evolution of the share of immigrants with respect to the total
population
2001 (%) 2006 (%) 2011 (%) 2016 (%)
Quebec 9.9 11.5 12.6 13.7

Ontario 26.8 28.3 28.5 29.1
Canada 18.4 19.8 20.6 21.9
Source Statistics Canada, 2001, 2006, and 2016 Census

Statistics Canada, 2011 National Household Survey
been attained. Table 11.1 shows that the proportion of immigrants going
to Quebec has been substantially and persistently lower than in both
Ontario and Canada as a whole. One can speculate about the reasons
that could explain this tendency. Three reasons can be suggested: (1)
Quebec has historically been a laggard within the Canadian economy;
(2) its nationalist agenda has from time to time incited immigrants to go
toward other provinces; and (3) Ottawa has recently developed a program
to encourage provinces outside of Quebec to take a larger portion of
francophone immigrants. But ultimately, Quebec’s capacity to retain its
immigrants has been undermined by Ontario’s impressive capacity to
quickly integrate this new labor force due to its multicultural features.
It is important to stress that, although Quebec chooses its economic-
class immigration, its point-based selection grid encompasses a compre-
hensive list of criteria that spans beyond the province’s immediate
economic needs. These express Quebec’s preferences in terms of family
structure, age, language mastery and, indirectly, religious beliefs, and
cultural traditions. Figure 11.1 clearly illustrates how Quebec’s preference
for French language proficiency shows into the linguistic composition of
its immigration. From 2011 to 2017, the proportion of immigrants with
at least a basic French language proficiency dropped significantly from
63.4 to 42%. Over this same time period, the proportion of incoming
immigrants selected by the provincial government declined from 69.8 to
57.8%.
This change is mainly explained by the increase in the number of
immigrants admitted by Ottawa through the Family Class category.
Immigration quotas for that category are fixed by the federal govern-
ment and applicants must be sponsored by family members that are either
citizens or permanent residents. The country-wide quota was of 17,000
Fig. 11.1 Categories of immigrants selected by Québec and French language

proficiency (Source Ministère de l’Immigration, de la Diversité et l’Inclusion,
Rapport annuel de gestion 2015–2016, and 2017–2018)
immigrants in 2018 and will increase to 20,000 in 2019, an important

rise of 17.64%. Until 2019, these immigrants were selected through a
lottery process.12
In 2008, the federal government established a new immigration
program, the Canadian Experience Class (CEC), intended at facilitating
the transition from a temporary worker to permanent resident status.
This procedure consecrated the principle that newcomers should ideally
find employment on the Canadian territory even before being selected.
Given their prior integration through the workplace, the CEC program
bolstered Canada’s capacity to integrate immigrants. In 2014, 99.2%
of the candidates declared proficiency either in French or English. The
proportion of Canadian economic immigrants (excluding Quebec) being
selected through this procedure increased from 2.11% in 2009 to 25.2%
in 2017 (Canada 2015, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the candidates
settled in the most dynamic economies of the country, namely, Ontario
12 With the recent changes in the federal program, Family Class immigrants will
henceforth be selected on a first-come-first-serve basis.
(57.6%), Alberta (22.8%), and British Columbia (16.3%) in 2014, the last
year for which we have reliable data.
Quebec responded with the Quebec Experience Program (PEQ) which
became effective in 2010 and quickly became one of the most important
pieces of its immigration system. From 2011 to 2014, temporary working
or studying immigrants receiving Quebec selection certificates augmented
from 14.1 to 23.9%, to reach an imposing 47.1% in 2017. While not all
the temporary immigrants passed through the PEQ, as it is illustrated in
Fig. 11.2, the scope of the program grew way beyond the government’s
expectations, which had set at 20% its target for immigrants who had
working experience in Quebec. Its new target was increased to 40% in
2017 (MIDI 2018).
Figure 11.2 compares the proportion of economic immigrants that
were selected through the CEC and PEQ programs. For Quebec, we
divide the number of immigrants selected through the PEQ by the total
number of immigrants selected through the other streams, namely, the
Fig. 11.2 Proportion of PEQ and CEC immigrants over the economic category
(Source Canada, 2012 to 2018 Annual report to Parliament on Immigration.
Ministère de l’immigration, de la Diversité et l’Inclusion, Rapport Annuel de
Gestion 2012 to 2016. Ministère de l’immigration, de la Diversité et l’Inclusion,
Demande d’accès à l’information #16221)
Quebec skilled workers and the Quebec business immigration programs.

For the rest of Canada, we divide the number of immigrants selected
through the CEC program by the total number of federally selected
economic immigrants. These include candidates submitted by provinces,
as well as the federal economic skilled workers, economic caregivers,
economic business and Atlantic immigration pilot programs. One can
see that, as of 2017, almost one third of Quebec’s economic immigrants
were selected through the PEQ. Moreover, Quebec relied more on this
program than other provinces that used the equivalent CEC program.
This new policy trend imposed itself as Quebec’s labor market expe-
riences a severe shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled. Moreover,
the unemployment rate is at an all-time low, in spite of a high participa-
tion level by women and individual aged 65 and over. The reliance on
immigrants who urgently fulfill Quebec’s short-term labor market needs
is consistent with the explicit guidelines of the government, which aims
at facilitating the transition from temporary to permanent status.
Finally, one must note that Quebec’s selection platform is currently
undergoing a significant transition. Upon taking power in October 2018,
the CAQ government inherited around 18,000 immigration applications
through the regular, non-PEQ, program. Some of these applications
had remained unprocessed for years. It is plausible that the increase
in the number of immigrants selected through temporary immigration
schemes caused delays of treatment for standard immigration applications.
That said, the new Minister of Immigration, Francisation et Intégration
decided to table its own reform of the immigration process and opted
to cancel the 18,000 outstanding applications while giving applicants full
reimbursement.
Quebec’s new immigration legislation received its royal sanction on
June 16, 2019. The new program, first developed under the Liberal
government and brought to fruition under the CAQ government, rein-
forces the principle that immigrants should meet the needs of the labor
market and find suitable employment in the province. Before applying,
candidates will henceforth have to fill a declaration of interest with
Quebec’s government which will be used to determine if a given candi-
date satisfies the needs of Quebec’s employers. Only after having gone
through this process will someone be allowed to apply through the new
points-based platform, called Arrima. It is noteworthy that this kind of
neoliberal selection mechanism was first developed in New Zealand in
2003, then was emulated in Australia (2012), Canada (2015) and finally
Quebec (2019) (Bedford and Spoonley 2014).
In the form of a compromise, the Quebec government has decided
to process some of the 18,000 applications that were stalled within the
previous immigration platform and which had at one point been said to
have been cancelled. Those who applied through the previous system and
who resided in Quebec as temporary immigrants at the time of applying
have been included in the new program, as well as those who physically
resided in the province at the time the law was assented.13 Finally, some of
the modalities of the new system did attract the attention of the public. In
particular, the government no longer allows foreign students who grad-
uate from a Quebec university to apply through the PEQ, a change that
particularly affects potential immigrants with a French nationality.14 The
spokesperson of the Minister of Immigration justified this change saying
that “given the shortage of labor, the government has decided to priori-
tize workers who already have a job in Quebec. They rapidly satisfy our
needs.”15
How Unique Is Canada’s Asymmetrical Model?

Canada is not unique in that it admits shared rule in the field of
immigration. However, the extent of decentralization involved with the
Quebec-Canada agreement is quite uncommon in most country-settings.
We do find some decentralized features in the immigration policies in
other federations. Most often, these take the form of bilateral devolution
agreements between central and subnational governments. This section
surveys a few relevant examples of such arrangements between central
and subnational jurisdictions in order to stress how different the Canadian
system has become.
In the United Kingdom, immigration is a policy field occupied by
the central government. Nevertheless, the Scottish government bene-
fitted from an agreement designed to encourage foreign graduates to
13 https://www.immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/informations/news/news-2019/
assent-act.html.
14 https://www.lexpress.fr/emploi/gestion-carriere/quebec-les-etudiants-etrangers-tem
porairement-exclus-de-la-voie-d-acces-rapide-au-visa_2090148.html.
15 https://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/politique/201907/10/01-5233501-immigr
ation-les-etudiants-etrangers-diplomes-au-quebec-expulses-de-la-voie-rapide.php.
settle in Scotland. However, that agreement was later incorporated in the

new, centralized, point-based system. Since then, all powers relating to
immigration have been centralized, leaving no such powers to the four
constituent units (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, England).16
In contrast, Australian states and territories did gain significant powers
in matters of selection of immigration in 1995–1996. The introduction of
the state-specific and regional migration (SSRM) initiatives allowed them
to issue special types of visas, specifying in which internal jurisdiction
migrants could settle for a period of three years. As in Canada, each state
can decide the extent of its own role in the process, thus leaving room for
asymmetry. As in Canada, each state decides to what extent it wants to
intervene in the selection process. Just like Manitoba in the second half
of the last century, the state of South Australia experienced difficulties in
attracting immigrants. Taking advantage of the new system, it has more
than tripled its proportion of landed immigrants (Hugo 2008). In 2012–
2013, it was the subnational jurisdiction that received the largest share
of all state-specific immigration.17 The state has also set up immigration
offices in some key countries to recruit potential immigrants.
Belgium shares a crucial feature with Canada: two (main) national
identities coexist: the Flemish and the French community including the
Walloon (along with a tiny German community). The Flemish and the
French communities’ integration policies greatly differ in both structure
and content (Adam 2013, p. 553). The decentralization movement in
Europe led to divergences in regional integration systems in Belgium.
Historically, the Flemish community was pursuing an interventionist
multiculturalist policy while the French community pursued a laissez-faire
assimilationist policy. However, in recent years, the Flemish community
policy seems to be heading toward a more assimilationist approach. It
is argued that this trend toward assimilationism is the result of sub-state
nationalism (Adam 2013, p. 550). Meanwhile, a de facto decentralization
of the regional integration policy has occurred in the Walloon region.
Its system now also includes local and sub-regional integration programs
for immigrants. These different structures are however not the results
of shared power in immigration: in Belgium “the federated entities have
16 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-of-powers-to-scotland-wales-and-nor
thern-ireland#background-to-devolution.
17 https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-stats/files/migration-australia-state-ter
ritories-2012-13.pdf.
full legislative and executive powers for the competencies that have been
assigned to them” (Adam 2013, p. 558). This feature limits the scope for
cooperation between levels of government.
Finally, in Malaysia, the last two states to join the Malaysian federa-
tion—Sabah and Sarawak—form what is known as East Malaysia. These
two states have considerably more autonomy than the others, notably
in terms of immigration policies (Salleh et al. 2019, p. 323). This is one
good example of de jure asymmetry (Watts 2005). Sabah and Sarawak not
only have more power in terms of international migration but also exert
control of inter-state migration from West Malaysia (Melbourne Forum
on Constitution-Building 2018). These asymmetries have led to some
important tensions and conflicts between the Malaysian government and
Sabah, the former accusing the State of systematically granting citizenship
to immigrants (see Royal Commission of Inquiry on Illegal Immigrants in
Sabah).
These few international examples show how distinct the Canadian
immigration system is. Its main distinctive characteristic is its asymmetric
character. In fact, formal constitutional asymmetries are quite rare in the
Canadian federation and federal policies tend to exhibit a high level of
uniformity (Gagnon and Garon 2019). The evolution of its immigration
system, which acknowledges the existence of Quebec’s different perspec-
tive, that it be cultural and linguistic with respect to its philosophy relating
to integration, is clearly an exception.
Conclusion
This unique case naturally raises some efficiency issues. From a normative
standpoint, one cannot demonstrate without any ambiguity that Canada’s
asymmetric decentralization is the optimal way to proceed. However, it is
common to assess the efficiency of decentralization by evaluating whether
a decentralized provision of public services is more likely to accommodate
policy preferences of the various communities in a given federation than
a centralized provision. The fact that Quebec considers itself a distinct
society and that its linguistic composition is significantly different from
the one prevailing in the rest of the country suggest that the prefer-
ences of Quebecers with respect to immigration policies are likely to
differ from those of the nine other provinces. In such circumstances, we
are of the view that decentralizing the selection of immigrants more in
favor of Quebec than is the case elsewhere in the Canadian federation

is a key element for an efficient and flexible immigration system in the
country. But, in the end, what matters most is the capacity of both orders
of government to trust each other and to develop a strategy based on
better coordination. This is a major challenge since this coordination is
influenced by political and economic uncertainties.
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CHAPTER 12
Conclusion: Will Canada’s Immigration Policy

Take an International Turn?
Howard Duncan and Yiagadeesen Samy
It is not uncommon to read that because international migration by

definition involves the people and interests of more than one state, it
ought to be subject to global governance of some form, whether to
protect the rights of migrants, to distribute more equitably the benefits
of migration among countries of origin and destination, or to reduce the
need for and prevalence of undocumented migration. Currently, there
exists no mechanism of global governance over international migration
with the exception of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. A new mechanism on labour and other forms of migration—
even as migration flows are expected to continue to increase as a result of
H. Duncan
Ottawa, ON, Canada
e-mail: howard_duncan@carleton.ca
Y. Samy (B)
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa,
ON, Canada
e-mail: yiagadeesen.samy@carleton.ca

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46754-8_12
248 H. DUNCAN AND Y. SAMY
demographic shifts and other factors such as technological disruption and

climate change—remains an unlikely development because such a gover-
nance regime would require losses of state sovereignty of a magnitude
that few if any governments would accept.
These are times of deep suspicion of international migration in many
parts of the world, and Canada is now an outlier in its immigration poli-
cies which continue to increase the number of people coming to this
country each year. Even the modest and non-binding United Nations
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and its Global
Compact on Refugees met with strong opposition from some govern-
ments who found even these relatively uncontroversial measures to be an
unacceptable threat to their national sovereignty, and they refused to sign
the agreements. Most countries of the United Nations, however, did sign
both of the Global Compacts and, in so doing, agreed to enact measures
in line with the provisions of both documents. Given the political environ-
ment of suspicion of international migration, achieving these Compacts
was something of a triumph. Although the Compacts are non-binding
and contain explicit clauses recognizing national sovereignty over migra-
tion governance, progress reports will be prepared under the auspices of
the United Nations and this may motivate some degree of compliance for
some governments. There is, however, no enforcement mechanism, and it
is safe to say that the absence of an enforcement mechanism was essential
to reaching agreement in the first place.
Canada was among the majority of countries who signed the
Global Compacts. Although these documents encourage international
co-operation on harnessing the benefits that can accrue from managed
migration and mitigating the harms that can arise from migration, as was
seen clearly in 2015 with the migration crisis in the Mediterranean, states
are not actually committed to doing so, nor is there an explicit direc-
tion for any one state on how to engage with any other on migration
management. It therefore remains an open question whether much inter-
national co-operation will come about because of these United Nations
efforts. One might characterize this as the question of whether the Global
Compacts will bring about a shift in migration policy, now mostly seen
as domestic policy, towards migration policy seen as also a matter of
foreign policy and thus something to be managed through explicit and
direct international co-operation. More broadly, we can ask whether the
Global Compacts will cause national migration policy-making to become
12 CONCLUSION: WILL CANADA’S IMMIGRATION POLICY … 249
increasingly practised by including international relations in the calcula-

tions underlying policy development. Canada was among the more active
supporters of these agreements, and it will be interesting to observe the
extent to which its future migration policy takes international relations
into consideration and, stronger, the extent to which its migration policy
takes on a foreign policy guise. Will signing the Global Compact for Safe,
Orderly, and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees
fundamentally alter Canada’s approach to policy-making on immigration,
refugee affairs, and integration? Or will the momentum for international
co-operation dissipate as other events capture the government’s attention,
leaving immigration policy firmly rooted in domestic considerations?
As we state in the introduction to this book, Canadian migration policy
has been predominantly domestic in its focus. Foreign policy consid-
erations have rarely figured in the development of Canada’s migration
policy; rather, any foreign policy on migration has been dictated by
Canada’s domestic imperatives. What has stood out since the early days
of Canada as an independent state is its conceptualization of immigration
as nation-building through population growth to settle its vast land mass
and thereby support claims over the sovereignty of its territory and later
through the development of the national economy through enlarging the
labour force and, more recently, enhancing the supply of skills, both in the
name of economic growth. The Constitution assigns joint responsibility
to the federal and provincial governments for immigration, a fact that
could restrict the degree to which policy-making becomes more inter-
national in character, the provinces having little influence on Canadian
foreign policy or international relations in general. Sections 91 and 92
of the Constitution allow both levels of government to legislate in the
field of immigration but only Ottawa can grant citizenship and the natu-
ralization of aliens. Furthermore, as Chapter 11 by Beauregard, Gagnon,
and Garon in this volume makes clear, Quebec is an exception in the
Canadian context because it selects its economic-class immigrants—not
refugees and migrants eligible from the family reunification program—as a
result of a formal decentralization agreement with the federal government
in the field of immigration.
Speaking broadly, Canada’s immigration program has always been
fundamentally a program to support domestic economic growth. Since
the 1990s, over 50% of the immigrants admitted to Canada on a perma-
nent residency visa have been classified within the economic stream with
another roughly 25% arriving through the family reunification program
(parents and grandparents only) and the remainder as refugees or asylum

seekers granted refugee status. Those admitted as economic immigrants
were welcomed for their labour, their skills, their investments, and their
entrepreneurship. As Chapter 7 by MacIsaac in this volume makes clear,
Canada’s past and future economic growth has been, and will continue to
be, linked to the inflow of migrants that fills demographic gaps and brings
well-needed skills. Immigration is not just a domestic policy issue; instead,
it should be part of Canada’s foreign policy to ensure that its prosperity as
a middle power can be maintained, if not increased, as emerging powers
continue to shift the balance of power. According to MacIsaac, Cana-
dian foreign policy has by and large found the right balance between
the numbers of asylum seekers, and economic and family reunification
migrants.
The well-known “points system” that Canada has used since the late
1960s assessed the potential that an applicant had for contributing to the
Canadian economy. Permanent resident visas were allocated according
to the principal applicant’s potential as an economic agent; his or her
immediate family were also granted permanent resident status partly
on the expectation that they, too, would become economic contrib-
utors. Similarly, members of the family class were seen in part as of
economic importance because their potential immigration to Canada
would serve among the incentives that economic immigrants would have
for choosing Canada as their destination. Refugees and asylum seekers
were also regarded as potential contributors to the economy and data
have been collected over time to determine how well they have fared
in the economy. Although the refugee resettlement program is first and
foremost to offer protection, Canada hopes that most refugees eventually
become self-sufficient and not need to rely upon government support—
this being conducive to a good life in this country. Further, despite the
fact that the principal motivation for resettling Convention refugees has
been humanitarian, Canada’s acceptance of refugees has also been part
of the image that Canada projects to the world and to itself. This posi-
tive image has guaranteed Canada a degree of leverage in the global
discussions of refugee affairs. It has also helped instil public confidence
in the overall immigration program as even refugees will contribute to
the broader society.
These points are to indicate that the objectives of Canada’s immigra-
tion program have been principally domestic. Although it is clear that
Canada’s immigration policy and program have numerous elements of
foreign policy and international relations more broadly speaking, it is a

principally domestic program that inevitably has implications for inter-
national relations as will be discussed later. The overwhelming domestic
emphasis is fully evident in the 2019–2020 Departmental Plan of Immi-
gration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), which lists three
principal objectives of the program.1 Characterized in this document as
“core responsibilities”, they are:
• Core Responsibility 1: Visitors, International Students, and

Temporary Workers
• Core Responsibility 2: Immigrant and Refugee Selection and
Integration
• Core Responsibility 3: Citizenship and Passports.
Bringing contributors to the domestic economy, whether on a perma-

nent or temporary basis, is balanced against the imperative to maintain the
security and well-being of Canadians in the design of the program. Those
admitted to Canada are carefully screened on security and health grounds
just as they are screened for their potential to contribute to Canada’s
prosperity. This emphasis on contributions to Canada is, again, why high
immigration levels remain supported by most Canadians who have confi-
dence that the government is managing immigration and refugee affairs
effectively and in their best interests.
Success is measured in terms of domestic outcomes such as immigrant
employment, wages, tax contributions vs draws on the treasury, investor
performance, and citizenship take-up rates. The immigration program and
the integration programs that are run in support of it are designed to
benefit Canada. Aside from the resettlement of refugees, the program is
not altruistic but serves the interests of Canada, particularly the economy.
This can be seen explicitly in the modifications that have been made
over the years to the points system and other aspects of the immigra-
tion program. The results of the selection process are intensely measured
and evaluated by IRCC; when conditions in the economy change, for
example, when there is a change in the demand for workers of a certain
sort, the system is adjusted in ways that may favour different types of
1 See https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publicati
ons-manuals/departmental-plan-2019-2020/departmental-plan.html (accessed January 8,
2020).
immigrants to improve outcomes for both the immigrants and Cana-

dian society. Because the program is designed principally and explicitly to
benefit Canadians, it has long enjoyed widespread public support which
continues to this day in marked contrast with public attitudes towards
immigration in many other countries.
Although the emphasis has been domestic, international relations are
not ignored by Canada’s immigration department. The 2019–2020 IRCC
Departmental Plan offers the following regarding the Department’s work
with international agencies:
IRCC will continue to engage with international partners, such as the

UNHCR, the Migration Five, the Regional Conference on Migration and
the International Organization for Migration, to advance Canada’s priori-
ties on migration-related issues, which includes the protection of refugees,
in particular vulnerable women and children. In 2019, Canada will be
appointed chair of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration,
Asylum and Refugees for a one-year term, providing an opportunity to lead
and direct discussions on pertinent international migration issues. Canada
will also continue to work closely with the United States in addressing
shared border challenges.
The Department will engage in and pursue training opportunities with

countries that are working toward establishing their own community-
based refugee sponsorship programs. This will include leading discussions
at the international level through the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initia-
tive, with the goal of increasing refugee protection spaces around the
world and bolstering global responsibility sharing. Since its launch in late
2016, the initiative has assisted with the creation of new sponsorship
programs or pilots in Argentina, Ireland, New Zealand, Germany and the
United Kingdom by bringing governments and civil society representa-
tives together in designing mechanisms that adapt Canada’s model to local
conditions.
IRCC will move forward with the Global Compact for Migration. The
Department will work with counterparts in other countries and interna-
tional organizations to advance the objectives of the Compact. IRCC will
also work with key bilateral partners on migration-related capacity building
initiatives through the Migration Policy Development Program.
IRCC is also supporting the implementation of the Global Compact on

Refugees and the development of the Compact’s three-year Strategy on
Resettlement and Complementary Pathways. The Strategy is being devel-
oped with the objectives of increasing the global pool of resettlement
places, encouraging more countries to participate in global resettlement
efforts, and increasing access to complementary pathways for refugees.2
The Canadian government has long supported the work of inter-

national agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) and been a long-standing member of such bodies as the Intergov-
ernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees and the Five
Country Conference (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom,
United States). Furthermore, it has participated in international discus-
sions on migration management including the Global Commission on
International Migration (2005) and the Global Forum on Migration and
Development (continuing) as well as the United Nations’ High-Level
Dialogues on Migration and Development (2006 and 2013) and the
discussions leading to the Global Compacts which were both adopted
in 2018.
Relations with individual countries feature, too, in the department’s
policy and programming, most notably with the United States owing to
our shared border and long history of co-operation on migration manage-
ment as well as on the more visible matters of economic co-operation,
trade, national security, and defence. Recently, the management of asylum
seeking has brought the two countries into joint action on the shared
border including through the Safe Third Country Agreement (2002)
which is designed to reduce asylum shopping and minimize the adminis-
trative costs of complying with international agreements such as the 1951
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which
Canada signed in 1969. The Safe Third Country Agreement is part of the
US–Canada Smart Border Action Plan which was adopted in response to
the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. This agreement has
been controversial from the beginning but has met with more intense
criticism from refugee advocacy groups since the Trump administration
ons-manuals/departmental-plan-2019-2020/departmental-plan.html (accessed on January
8, 2020).
took office and intensified enforcement against undocumented migrants

and those with temporary protected status within the United States. Some
critics have urged the Canadian government to withdraw from the agree-
ment claiming that the United States can no longer be considered a safe
country for refugees.3 Canada has maintained its commitment to the
agreement despite the criticisms and despite the larger inflows of asylum
seekers from the United States since 2017, a flow that the agreement was
intended to prevent but, owing to a loophole, did not do so as effectively
as hoped.
There are no agreements with other countries to supply high-skilled
workers to Canada, but there are agreements with Mexico and other
countries of the Caribbean regarding seasonal agricultural workers. These
agreements ensure a steady supply of workers to Canadian farms and offer
protections to the migrant workers. Although there are criticisms of the
program, which has existed for over 50 years, it has in general worked
to the mutual satisfaction of the governments and remains fully in place,
bringing in approximately 35,000 workers per year for Canadian farmers.
One reason that the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program succeeds to
the extent that it has is that the supply of workers exceeds the demand.
One could note that the North American Free Trade Agreement includes
provisions for migration of the highly skilled, but this is for temporary
entry only and designed to free up the operations of businesses rather
than to provide needed skills to the Canadian labour force.
The NAFTA seeks to liberalize trade between the U.S., Mexico and Canada
and abolish tariffs and other trade barriers. The Agreement opens up the
three countries’ markets by ensuring that future laws will not create barriers
to doing business. In order for trade to expand, individuals must have
access to each other’s country to sell, provide goods or services or trade
and invest. Chapter 16 of the NAFTA, entitled “Temporary Entry for
Business Persons”, provides the mechanisms to allow selected categories
of temporary workers access to each other’s market(s). Chapter 16 eases
the temporary entry of citizens of the U.S., Mexico and Canada, whose
activities are related to the trade of goods or services, or to investment. The
3 See, for example, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-us-asylum-agr

eement-could-affect-flow-of-refugees-into-canada/ (accessed on January 8, 2020).
NAFTA is a reciprocal agreement and Canadians will be afforded similar

treatment when seeking entry to the U.S. or Mexico.4
There are other aspects of the immigration program that involve rela-
tions with specific countries. Unlike most countries with immigration
programs, Canada has established visa offices in many of its embassies
overseas, an organizational structure that immediately brings immigra-
tion officials into direct contact with officials of Global Affairs Canada,
formerly the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
Decisions on which embassies will host a visa office are policy decisions,
and they may affect the mix of countries of origin of immigrants to
Canada because it is simply easier for citizens of some countries to apply
for a visa than for others. Canada does not impose a visa requirement
on citizens of all countries; citizens of many countries can enter without
having previously received an entry visa. There are numerous reasons
that the Government of Canada will require a visa for citizens of certain
countries, the most common concerning the number of asylum claims
that come from individual countries, the integrity of the passport system
of certain countries, or concerns over national security. Citizens of the
majority of countries in the world require a visa to enter Canada. When
Canada imposes a new visa requirement, this can lead to difficult rela-
tions between the two governments as was quite evident in 2009 when
Canada began requiring visas of Mexican nationals and of Czech nationals
that same year. In the latter case, the European Union became involved
because the Czech Republic had recently become an EU member state.
The relationship between migration and development has captured the
attention of the international community over the past 20 years and was,
in fact, the thin edge of the wedge that allowed the open discussion of
migration governance of the Global Compacts, development being a rela-
tively safer point around which to meet, at least by comparison to overt
governance of migration and the corresponding losses of sovereignty
this could entail. The United Nations High-Level Dialogues mentioned
earlier and the continuing Global Forum on Migration and Development
were meetings intended to explore how co-operation among migrant
ons-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/temporary-residents/foreign-workers/intern
ational-free-trade-agreements/north-american.html, section 1.2 (accessed on January 10,
2020).
sending and receiving (and transit) countries could foster development

in source societies. The culmination of these discussions could be said to
lie in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which
for the first time included references to migration. Canada has partici-
pated in all of these discussions but, to date, has not entered into explicit
migration-focussed development agreements with any one country. As the
chapter by Ramachandran and Crush (Chapter 8) in this volume argues,
domestically, the Canadian government has also failed to formulate a
diaspora policy engagement. Neither does it see diasporas as playing an
important role in the implementation of the SDGs, even if diasporas have
on their own been very active in the area of philanthropy.
One might note the absence of any explicit recruitment activities as
part of the federal government’s immigration program. Of course, other
organizations such as universities and businesses do recruit, but to a large
extent, the immigration program is designed on the assumption that
the supply of immigrants and temporary workers able to contribute to
Canada’s economy will remain high enough that explicit recruitment is
unnecessary. The points system is to help the government select the “best
and the brightest”, those who can contribute the most to the economy.
Where Canada may face challenges in the future lies with highly skilled
immigrants where the supply is far less assured, not only because of the
relatively low level of skills throughout the world, but because of the ever-
growing global competition for these skills. It is worth remembering that
the points system, now referred to as “Express Entry”, selects only the
best and the brightest of those who apply for a visa. It cannot guarantee
that the world’s best and brightest apply to immigrate to Canada. And
as argued by the Century Initiative in this volume (Chapter 6), while
Canada has done well in attracting and integrating immigrants as part of
the global competition for talent, more needs to be done to ensure that
the talents of high-skilled immigrants are fully utilized.
The Government has begun to recognize the importance for Canada
of the global competition for talent, something described as far back as
1997 in a report by McKinsey and Company.5 To this end, it has worked
to reduce visa application processing times and made it easier for those
with temporary residency, including students and high-skilled temporary
workers, to convert their status to permanent residency. These measures
5 See https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/attrac
ting-and-retaining-the-right-talent (accessed on January 8, 2020).
were intended to enhance Canada’s competitive position. Whether we will

see the beginnings of direct recruitment of skills as part of the govern-
ment’s immigration program remains to be seen. This could involve
agreements with other national governments along the lines of the
seasonal agricultural worker program.
It will be important to recognize the global nature of the competi-
tion for skills. Traditionally, Canada has regarded other countries of the
OECD as its competitors for immigrants, especially the United States
and Australia. But the demand for talent has extended well beyond the
OECD to include rapidly developing countries in the rest of the world,
most notably China and India. Despite its population of over 1.4 billion
people, China faces a dramatic demographic collapse within this century,
a currently underdeveloped education system, and a shortage of the skills
that it requires to maintain the desired high levels of economic growth.
It has made intense efforts to recruit back its citizens abroad through
programs such as the Thousand Talent Program and with considerable
success. Many Canadian citizens of Chinese origin have returned to their
homeland with estimates running to over half a million. So great is their
demand for talent that they have introduced an immigration program
to attract foreign nationals in addition to ex-patriate Chinese. Part of
the mandate of China’s new Immigration Bureau will be to engage in
international co-operation on immigration,6 perhaps with those countries
involved in the One Belt, One Road Initiative. This emphasis on “talent”
is part of China’s efforts to reduce the dependence of its economic growth
on exporting manufactured goods towards greater domestic consump-
tion and, importantly, towards innovation and domestic design. Success
here would likely result in greater migration flows to China restricting the
supply of talent available to Canada.
It is not, however, only rapidly developing economies like China’s
that will need high skills. Throughout much of the developing world,
new investments, both domestic and foreign, in resource extraction,
agriculture, health care, and education require advanced skills including
information and communications technologies to implement. Canada will
face competition for talent from all corners of the globe and no longer
only from the traditional advanced economies. This competition will
affect the degree to which Canada’s skilled immigration aspirations are
6 See http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2018/03/13/content_2814
76076498988.htm (accessed on January 8, 2020).
met, and it may require that Canada cease relying on a supply driven
intake and begin shifting towards creating a strong and sustained demand
for the world’s top talent to choose to come to Canada.
With the exceptions such as those mentioned above, Canada has
predominantly approached the relationship between international affairs
and immigration policy through the international community, especially
through the agencies of the United Nations. To a certain extent, Canada’s
interventions at the United Nations have been to protect its sovereignty
over its immigration policy and program. In this regard, its approach has
been like that of many other countries including the United States which
guards its sovereignty so vigorously that it stopped participating in the
negotiations towards the Global Compact for Migration and refused to
sign either of the 2018 Compacts. Like many countries, especially devel-
oped countries, Canada has been somewhat wary of efforts to create a
mechanism of global governance of migration as such a mechanism would
require sacrifices of sovereignty over domestic immigration and perhaps
integration policy and programs, too. Accordingly, it has not signed the
1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; its refusal to do so is in
line with virtually all states with developed economies. The 55 states that
have signed and ratified this Convention are all what would have been
considered migrant-sending countries.
Where Canada has exercised considerable global leadership in the field
of migration is with regard to refugee resettlement. This is a point rein-
forced by Milner in Chapter 3 of this volume, who argues that Canada
exerted its moral and expert authority within the refugee regime and
played a key role in the development of the UN Global Compact on
Refugees. In 2018, Canada became the world’s largest destination for
UNHCR resettled refugees, that is, refugees who were resettled through
the UNHCR’s resettlement program. This is not to be confused with
the reception of asylum seekers or refugees who cross into neighbouring
countries fleeing from war or other forms of catastrophe. These number
far greater than formally resettled refugees. Out of the approximately
26 million refugees in the world today, fewer than 100,000 per year
are formally resettled through the UNHCR program. Today, there are
an estimated 70 million displaced persons in the world, including over
40 million internally displaced, 26 million refugees, and over 3 million
asylum seekers.7 Although refugee resettlement offers a solution to a rela-

tively modest number of people, it remains an important component in
the UNHCR’s programming, one that Canada has historically supported.
Of particular importance to Canada’s global leadership on resettlement
is the Privately Sponsored Refugee Program which attracted consider-
able attention from UN member states during the negotiations for the
Global Compact on Refugees. Canada helped to establish the Global
Refugee Sponsorship Initiative which is explicitly mentioned in the Global
Compact:
Contributions will be sought from States, with the support of relevant

stakeholders, to facilitate effective procedures and clear referral pathways
for family reunification, or to establish private or community sponsor-
ship programmes that are additional to regular resettlement, including
community-based programmes promoted through the Global Refugee
Sponsorship Initiative (GRSI).8
Canada has been helping a growing number of governments to estab-

lish their own versions of the Privately Sponsored Refugee Program. This
exercise of leadership by Canada on the international migration stage,
it can be argued, is relatively new and marks a higher degree of confi-
dence for Canada in international affairs. The IRCC Departmental Plan,
as quoted above, suggests that the country will continue to play an active
role regarding the implementation of the both Global Compacts.
IRCC will move forward with the Global Compact for Migration. The
Department will work with counterparts in other countries and interna-
tional organizations to advance the objectives of the Compact. IRCC will
also work with key bilateral partners on migration-related capacity building
initiatives through the Migration Policy Development Program.
IRCC is also supporting the implementation of the Global Compact on

Refugees and the development of the Compact’s three-year Strategy on
Resettlement and Complementary Pathways. The Strategy is being devel-
oped with the objectives of increasing the global pool of resettlement
7 See https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (accessed on January 10, 2020).

8 See https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf section 95 (accessed January 10,
2020).
places, encouraging more countries to participate in global resettlement

efforts, and increasing access to complementary pathways for refugees.
This would be an appropriate intervention by Canada given its strong

reputation for managing international migration broadly speaking and
not only with regard to refugee resettlement, as well as its reputation
on immigrant integration and the management of citizenship through
naturalization. The question will be the degree of emphasis that the
government places on implementing the Global Compacts. Working
with United Nations agencies is one thing; working bilaterally with
governments elsewhere is quite another and requires considerably more
resources.
The Global Compacts adopted by the United Nations in 2018 brought
together the international community on the issue of migration in ways
never before seen. The impetus was the 2015–2016 migration crisis in
the Mediterranean region that was brought about in large measure by the
civil war in Syria. The agreements are modest, focussing on human rights
about which there is already widespread international agreement, and they
are non-binding. No country is legally obligated to act in accordance with
their principles and objectives. But despite their inherent limitations, they
are important for the United Nations which at the same time brought
the International Organization for Migration into the UN system and
established itself as the world’s pre-eminent body for migration discus-
sion and debate, something that could not have been said for it until
these compacts were developed. What will come of them is up to member
states to decide. The agreements may be of significance for Canada, too,
because Canada emerged as a major leader on the refugee compact and
was a significant player in the migration compact as well. Canada now
has an opportunity to emerge among the world’s leaders on interna-
tional migration management, to get beyond its traditional position of
protecting its sovereignty and offering guidance to the world on issues
about which it has a deserved reputation for excellence.

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CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

More information about this series at

ISSN 2523-7187 ISSN 2523-7195 (electronic)

First published in 1985, and as a product of the Norman Paterson School

2 The Political Foundations of Canadian Exceptionalism

3 Canada and the UN Global Compact on Refugees: A

4 The Coming Clash Over Migration Policy Between

5 Immigrants to Canada: Welcomed Citizens or Security

6 Canada’s Position in the Global Competition for

7 Weighing the Effects of Immigration on Canadian

8 Sustainable Development and Diaspora Engagement

9 The Road Taken: Temporary Labour Migration in

10 Cities of Migration: The Role of Municipal Planning

11 Managing Immigration in the Canadian Federation:

12 Conclusion: Will Canada’s Immigration Policy Take

Pierre-Loup Beauregard is an economic researcher and M.A. candidate

Queen’s University, the University of Alberta and the National Univer-

Jenna Hennebry is an Associate Professor at the Balsillie School of

International Relations from the London School of Economics and Polit-

appointed Dean of Continuing Studies at RMC, having served as Asso-

Fig. 2.1 Cumulative percentage of immigrant and visible minority

Fig. 7.2 Unemployment rate (%) of individuals 15 years or

Table 2.1 Percentage of population foreign-born, 1996–2016 16

Table 9.2 Changes to temporary migration program streams,

Yiagadeesen Samy, Howard Duncan, and Marshall Palmer

Migration and Canadian Foreign Policy

Y. Samy (B) · M. Palmer

© The Author(s) 2021 1

respected and has facilitated the integration of immigrants into Canadian

1 For example, see http://www.ekospolitics.com/index.php/2019/04/increased-polari

embrace of multiculturalism and its success in integrating newcomers have

global competition for talent; possible linkages between immigration

of national identities have begun to displace previously more open atti-

as potential security threats. However, according to the authors, even if

Chapter 7 by MacIsaac builds on the previous one and provides

country of origin and in Canada. In particular, this philanthropic engage-

how Canada relates to the rest of the world in its management of

The Political Foundations of Canadian

Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos and Zack Taylor

© The Author(s) 2021 13

some degree of populism is unavoidable in the politics of immigration

we emphasize the interaction of three distinctive features of the Cana-

Table 2.1 Percentage of population foreign-born, 1996–2016

1996 (%) 2006 (%) 2016 (%)

Canada 17.4 19.8 21.9

in 1996 to 21.9% in 2016. By comparison, as of 2018 the foreign-born

immigrants made up 1.7% of the foreign-born population in 1971, they

broad level of support for immigration and multiculturalism is accompa-

Canadians’ ambivalence regarding the parameters of multiculturalism

54% of Canadians held multiculturalism to be a very important element

few, if any, traces. What explains the resilience of pro-immigration poli-

Explaining Exceptionalism I: Geographic Isolation,

respect to immigration policy, Reitz notes that Canada’s preference for

Although economists in Canada (as elsewhere) have tended to view immi-

Echoing Reitz, Daniel Hiebert (2016, p. 5) notes that

framing immigration in economic terms and presenting it as a solution to

Reitz, Hiebert, and others (see Bloemraad 2012, p. x) maintain that

Multiculturalism’s importance extends far beyond what one would

who, in turn, can be counted on to support prevailing immigration

citizenship rules, and Canada’s SMP electoral system. We develop our

Explaining Exceptionalism II: Settlement Patterns,

Table 2.2 Percentage of ridings in selected regions

Representation orders 1996, 2003, 2013

Ontario 34.2 34.4 35.8