First Sino-Japanese War

The First Sino-Japanese War (25 July 1894 – 17

First Sino-Japanese War
April 1895) was a conflict between the Qing dynasty of
China and the Empire of Japan primarily over influence Part of the Century of humiliation
in Joseon Korea.[4] After more than six months of
unbroken successes by Japanese land and naval forces
and the loss of the port of Weihaiwei, the Qing
government sued for peace in February 1895.

The war demonstrated the failure of the Qing dynasty's

attempts to modernize its military and fend off threats
to its sovereignty, especially when compared with
Japan's successful Meiji Restoration. For the first time,
regional dominance in East Asia shifted from China to
Japan;[5] the prestige of the Qing dynasty, along with
the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow.
The humiliating loss of Korea as a tributary state
sparked an unprecedented public outcry. Within China,
the defeat was a catalyst for a series of political
upheavals led by Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei,
culminating in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution.

The war is commonly known in China as the War of

Jiawu (Chinese: 甲午戰爭; pinyin: Jiǎwǔ Zhànzhēng),
referring to the year (1894) as named under the
traditional sexagenary system of years. In Japan, it is First Sino-Japanese War, major battles and
called the Japan–Qing War (Japanese: ⽇ 清 戦 争 , troop movements
Hepburn: Nisshin sensō). In Korea, where much of the
Date 25 July 1894 – 17 April 1895
war took place, it is called the Qing–Japan War
(8 months, 2 weeks and 2 days)
(Korean: 청일전쟁; Hanja: 淸日戰爭).
Location Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, Yellow
Sea
Japanese victory
Contents Result

▪ Significant loss of prestige for

Background
the Qing Dynasty[1]
Korean politics
Opening of Korea ▪ Korea removed from Chinese
suzerainty[2]
Korean reforms
Japanese insecurities over Korea ▪ Korean Peninsula transferred
1882 crisis to Japanese sphere of
influence
Re-assertion of Chinese influence
Factional rivalry and ascendancy of the Min clan ▪ Treaty of Shimonoseki
Gapsin Coup
Nagasaki incident
 Bean controversy Territorial China cedes Taiwan, Penghu,
changes and the Liaodong Peninsula to
Prelude to war
Japan.
Kim Ok-gyun affair
Donghak Rebellion Belligerents
China Japan
Status of combatants
Japan Commanders and leaders
Imperial Japanese Navy Guangxu Emperor Meiji
Imperial Japanese Army Empress Dowager Cixi Emperor
China Li Hongzhang Itō Hirobumi
Imperial Chinese Army Liu Kunyi Kodama
Beiyang Fleet Song Qing Gentarō
Ding Ruchang † Yamagata
Contemporaneous wars fought by the Qing
Empire Liu Buchan † Aritomo
Ye Zhichao Nozu
Early stages Michitsura
Zuo Baogui †
Events during the war Ōyama Iwao
Opening moves Itō Sukeyuki
Sinking of the Kow-shing Strength
Conflict in Korea
630,000 men 240,616 men
Comparative Outlooks of the Japanese and
Chinese Emperors Casualties and losses
After the Declarations 35,000 dead and 1,132 dead
Defeat of the Beiyang fleet wounded[3] 3,758 wounded
Invasion of Manchuria 285 died of
wounds
Fall of Lüshunkou
11,894 died of
Fall of Weihaiwei
disease
Occupation of the Pescadores Islands
End of the war First Sino-Japanese War
Treaty of Shimonoseki
Japanese invasion of Taiwan
Aftermath
See also
References
Notes Chinese name
Citations Traditional Chinese 甲午戰爭
Bibliography Simplified Chinese 甲午战争
Further reading Literal meaning War of Jiawu –
External links referring to the
year 1894
under the
Background traditional
sexagenary
After two centuries, the Japanese policy of seclusion under the system
shōguns of the Edo period came to an end when the country was Transcriptions
opened to trade by the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854. In the
Standard Mandarin
years following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the fall of the
shogunate, the newly formed Meiji government embarked on Hanyu Pinyin Jiǎwǔ Zhànzhēng
reforms to centralize and modernize Japan.[6] The Japanese had Japanese name
sent delegations and students around the world to learn and Kanji ⽇清戦争
assimilate Western arts and sciences, with the intention of making
Japan an equal to the Western powers.[7] These reforms Kyūjitai ⽇清戰爭
transformed Japan from a feudal society into a modern industrial Literal meaning Japan‒Qing
state. War
Transcriptions
During the same time period, the Qing Dynasty also started to
undergo reform in both military and political doctrine, but was far Romanization Nisshin sensō
less successful. Korean name
Hangul 청일전쟁
Korean politics Hanja 淸日戰爭
In January 1864, Cheoljong of Joseon died without a male heir, Literal meaning Qing-Japan
and through Korean succession protocols Gojong of Korea War
ascended the throne at the age of 12. However, as King Gojong Transcriptions
was too young to rule, the new king's father, Yi Ha-ŭng, became
Revised cheongil
the Heungseon Daewongun, or lord of the great court, and ruled
Romanization jeonjaeng
Korea in his son's name as regent.[8] Originally the term
Daewongun referred to any person who was not actually the king McCune– ch'ŏngil
[8]
but whose son took the throne. With his ascendancy to power Reischauer chŏnjaeng
the Daewongun initiated a set of reforms designed to strengthen
the monarchy at the expense of the Yangban class. He also pursued an isolationist policy and was
determined to purge the kingdom of any foreign ideas that had infiltrated into the nation. [9] In Korean
history, the king's in-laws enjoyed great power, consequently the Daewongun acknowledged that any
future daughters-in-law might threaten his authority.[10] Therefore, he attempted to prevent any
possible threat to his rule by selecting as a new queen for his son an orphaned girl from among the
Yŏhŭng Min clan, which lacked powerful political connections.[11] With Empress Myeongseong as his
daughter-in-law and the royal consort, the Daewongun felt secure in his power.[11] However, after she
had become queen, Min recruited all her relatives and had them appointed to influential positions in
the name of the king. The Queen also allied herself with political enemies of the Daewongun, so that
by late 1873 she had mobilized enough influence to oust him from power.[11] In October 1873, when
the Confucian scholar Choe Ik-hyeon submitted a memorial to King Gojong urging him to rule in his
own right, Queen Min seized the opportunity to force her father-in-law's retirement as regent. [11] The
departure of the Daewongun led to Korea's abandonment of its isolationist policy. [11]

Opening of Korea

On February 26, 1876, after confrontations between the Japanese and Koreans, the Ganghwa Treaty
was signed, opening Korea to Japanese trade. In 1880, the King sent a mission to Japan that was
headed by Kim Hong-jip, an enthusiastic observer of the reforms taking place there. [12] While in
Japan, the Chinese diplomat Huang Zunxian presented him with a study called "A Strategy for Korea"
(Chinese: 朝 鮮 策 略 ; pinyin: Cháoxiǎn cèlüè).[12] It warned of the threat to Korea posed by the
Russians and recommended that Korea maintain friendly relations with Japan, which was at the time
too economically weak to be an immediate threat, to work closely with China, and seek an alliance
with the United States as a counterweight to Russia.[13] After
returning to Korea, Kim presented the document to King Gojong,
who was so impressed with the document that he had copies made
and distributed to his officials.[14]

In 1880, following Chinese advice and breaking with tradition, King

Gojong decided to establish diplomatic ties with the United
States.[15] After negotiations through Chinese mediation in Tianjin,
Caricature about the dispute
the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation was formally
between China, Japan and
signed between the United States and Korea in Incheon on May 22,
Russia over Korea, published in
1882.[15] However, there were two significant issues raised by the
the first edition of Tôbaé , 1887
treaty, the first concerned Korea's status as an independent nation.
During the talks with the Americans, the Chinese insisted that the
treaty contain an article declaring that Korea was a dependency of
China and argued that the country had long been a tributary state of China.[15] But the Americans
firmly opposed such an article, arguing that a treaty with Korea should be based on the Treaty of
Ganghwa, which stipulated that Korea was an independent state.[16] A compromise was finally
reached, with Shufeldt and Li agreeing that the King of Korea would notify the U.S. president in a
letter that Korea had special status as a tributary state of China.[16] The treaty between the Korean
government and the United States became the model for all treaties between it and other Western
countries. Korea later signed similar trade and commerce treaties with Great Britain and Germany in
1883, with Italy and Russia in 1884, and with France in 1886. Subsequently, commercial treaties were
concluded with other European countries.[17]

Korean reforms

After 1879, China's relations with Korea came under the authority of Li Hongzhang, who had emerged
as one of the most influential figures in China after playing an important role during the Taiping
Rebellion, and was also an advocate of the self-strengthening movement.[14] In 1879, Li was appointed
as governor-general of Zhili Province and the imperial commissioner for the northern ports. He was in
charge of China's Korea policy and urged Korean officials to adopt China's own self-strengthening
program to strengthen their country in response to foreign threats, to which King Gojong was
receptive.[14] The Korean government, immediately after opening of the country to the outside world,
pursued a policy of enlightenment aimed at achieving national prosperity and military strength
through the doctrine of tongdo sŏgi (Eastern ways and Western machines).[17] To modernize their
country, the Koreans tried selectively to accept and master Western technology while preserving their
country's cultural values and heritage.[17]

In January 1881, the government launched administrative reforms and established the T'ongni kimu
amun (Office for Extraordinary State Affairs) which was modeled on Chinese administrative
structures.[17] Under this overarching organization, 12 sa or agencies were created. [17] In 1881, a
technical mission was sent to Japan to survey its modernized facilities. [18] Officials traveled all over
Japan inspecting administrative, military, educational, and industrial facilities. [18] In October,
another small group went to Tianjin to study modern weapons manufacturing, and Chinese
technicians were invited to manufacture weapons in Seoul. Additionally, as part of their plan to
modernize the country, the Koreans had invited the Japanese military attaché Lieutenant Horimoto
Reizō to serve as an adviser in creating a modern army.[19] A new military formation called the
Pyŏlgigun (Special Skills Force) was established, in which eighty to one hundred young men [20] of the
aristocracy were to be given Japanese military training.[21] The following year, in January 1882, the
government also reorganized the existing five-army garrison structure into the Muwiyŏng (Palace
Guards Garrison) and the Changŏyŏng (Capital Guards Garrison).[17]

Japanese insecurities over Korea

During the 1880s, discussions in Japan about national security focused on the issue of Korean reform.
The political discourse over the two were interlinked, as the German military adviser Major Jacob
Meckel stated, Korea was "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan".[22] What made Korea of strategic
concern was not merely its proximity to Japan but its inability to defend itself against outsiders. If
Korea were truly independent, it posed no strategic problem to Japan's national security but if the
country remained undeveloped it would remain weak and consequently would be inviting prey for
foreign domination.[23] The political consensus in Japan was that Korean independence lay, as it had
been for Meiji Japan, through the importation of "civilization" from the West. [22] Korea required a
program of self-strengthening like the post-Restoration reforms that were enacted in Japan. [23] The
Japanese interest in the reform of Korea was not purely altruistic. Not only would these reforms
enable Korea to resist foreign intrusion, which was in Japan's direct interest, but through being a
conduit of change they would also have opportunity to play a larger role on the peninsula. [22] To Meiji
leaders, the issue was not whether Korea should be reformed but how these reforms might be
implemented. There was a choice of adopting a passive role which required the cultivation of reformist
elements within Korean society and rendering them assistance whenever possible, or adopting a more
aggressive policy, actively interfering in Korean politics to assure that reform took place. [24] Many
Japanese advocates of Korean reform swung between these two positions.

Japan in the early 1880s was weak, as a result of internal peasant uprisings and samurai rebellions
during the previous decade. The country was also struggling financially, with inflation as a result of
these internal factors. Subsequently, the Meiji government adopted a passive policy, encouraging the
Korean court to follow the Japanese model but offering little concrete assistance except for the
dispatch of the small military mission headed by Lieutenant Horimoto Reizo to train the
Pyŏlgigun.[24] What worried the Japanese was the Chinese, who had loosened their hold over Korea
in 1876 when the Japanese succeeded in establishing a legal basis for Korean independence by ending
its tributary status.[25] Chinese actions appeared to be thwarting the forces of reform in Korea and re-
asserting their influence over the country.[25]

1882 crisis

In 1882, the Korean Peninsula experienced a severe

drought which led to food shortages, causing much
hardship and discord among the population. Korea was on
the verge of bankruptcy, even falling months behind on
military pay, causing deep resentment among the soldiers.
There was also resentment towards the Pyŏlgigun on the
part of the soldiers of the regular Korean army, as the
formation was better equipped and treated.[19] Woodblock print depicting the flight of the
Additionally, more than 1000 soldiers had been discharged Japanese legation in 1882
in the process of overhauling the army; most of them were
either old or disabled, and the rest had not been given their
pay in rice for thirteen months.[21]

In June of that year, King Gojong, being informed of the situation, ordered that a month's allowance
of rice be given to the soldiers.[21] He directed Min Gyeom-ho, the overseer of government finances
and Queen Min's nephew,[26] to handle the matter. Min in turn handed the matter over to his steward
who sold the good rice he had been given and used the money to buy millet which he mixed with sand
and bran.[21] As a result, the rice became rotten and inedible. The distribution of the alleged rice
infuriated the soldiers. On July 23, a military mutiny and riot broke out in Seoul. Enraged soldiers
headed for the residence of Min Gyeom-ho, who they had suspected of having swindled them out of
their rice.[21] Min, on hearing word of the revolt, ordered the police to arrest some of the ringleaders
and announced that they would be executed the next morning. He had assumed that this would serve
as a warning to the other agitators. However, after learning what had transpired, the rioters broke into
Min's house to take vengeance; as he was not at his residence the rioters vented their frustrations by
destroying his furniture and other possessions.[21]

The rioters then moved on to an armory from which they stole weapons and ammunition, and then
headed for the prison. After overpowering the guards, they released not only the men who had been
arrested that day by Min Gyeom-ho but also many political prisoners as well.[21] Min then summoned
the army to quell the rebellion but it had become too late to suppress the mutiny. The original body of
mutineers had been swelled by the poor and disaffected citizenry of the city; as a result the revolt had
assumed major proportions.[21] The rioters now turned their attention to the Japanese. One group
headed to Lieutenant Horimoto's quarters and killed him.[21] Another group, some 3,000 strong,
headed for the Japanese legation, where Hanabusa Yoshitada the minister to Korea and twenty seven
members of the legation resided.[21] The mob surrounded the legation shouting its intention of killing
all the Japanese inside.[21] Hanabusa gave orders to burn the legation and important documents were
set on fire. As the flames quickly spread, the members of the legation escaped through a rear gate,
where they fled to the harbor and boarded a boat which took them down the Han River to Chemulpo.
Taking refuge with the Incheon commandant, they were again forced to flee after word arrived of the
events in Seoul and the attitude of their hosts changed. They escaped to the harbor during heavy rain
and were pursued by Korean soldiers. Six Japanese were killed, while another five were seriously
wounded.[21] The survivors carrying the wounded then boarded a small boat and headed for the open
sea where three days later they were rescued by a British survey ship, HMS Flying Fish,[27] which took
them to Nagasaki. The following day, after the attack on the Japanese legation, the rioters forced their
way into the royal palace where they found and killed Min Gyeom-ho, as well as a dozen other high-
ranking officers.[27] They also searched for Queen Min. The queen narrowly escaped, however,
dressed as an ordinary lady of the court and was carried on the back of a faithful guard who claimed
she was his sister.[27] The Daewongun used the incident to reassert his power.

The Chinese then deployed about 4,500 troops to Korea, under General Wu Changqing, which
effectively regained control and quelled the rebellion.[28] In response, the Japanese also sent four
warships and a battalion of troops to Seoul to safeguard Japanese interests and demand reparations.
However, tensions subsided with the Treaty of Chemulpo, signed on the evening of August 30, 1882.
The agreement specified that the Korean conspirators would be punished and ¥50,000 would be paid
to the families of slain Japanese. The Japanese government would also receive ¥500,000, a formal
apology, and permission to station troops at their diplomatic legation in Seoul. In the aftermath of
rebellion, the Daewongun was accused of fomenting the rebellion and its violence, and was arrested by
the Chinese and taken to Tianjin.[29] He was later carried off to a town about sixty miles southwest of
Beijing, where for three years he was confined to one room and kept under strict surveillance. [30]

Re-assertion of Chinese influence

After the Imo Incident, early reform efforts in Korea suffered a major setback. [31] In the aftermath of
the incident, the Chinese reasserted their influence over the peninsula, where they began to directly
interfere in Korean internal affairs.[31] After stationing troops at strategic points in the capital Seoul,
the Chinese undertook several initiatives to gain significant influence over the Korean government. [32]
Two special advisers on foreign affairs representing Chinese interests were dispatched to Korea: the
German Paul Georg von Möllendorff, a close confidant of Li Hongzhang, and the Chinese diplomat Ma
Jianzhong.[33] A staff of Chinese officers also took over the training of the army, providing the
Koreans with 1,000 rifles, two cannons, and 10,000 rounds of ammunition. [34] Furthermore, the
Chingunyeong (Capital Guards Command), a new Korean military formation, was created and
trained along Chinese lines by Yuan Shikai.[33]

In October, the two countries signed a treaty stipulating that Korea was a dependency of China and
granted Chinese merchants the right to conduct overland and maritime business freely within its
borders. It also gave the Chinese substantial advantages over the Japanese and Westerners and also
granted them unilateral extraterritoriality privileges in civil and criminal cases. [34] Under the treaty
the number of Chinese merchants and traders greatly increased, a severe blow to Korean
merchants.[33] Although it allowed Koreans reciprocally to trade in Beijing the agreement was not a
treaty but was in effect issued as a regulation for a vassal.[31] Additionally, during the following year,
the Chinese supervised the creation of a Korean Maritime Customs Service, headed by von
Möllendorff.[31] Korea was reduced to a semi-colonial tributary state of China with King Gojong
unable to appoint diplomats without Chinese approval,[35] and with troops stationed in the country to
protect Chinese interests.[nb 1]

Factional rivalry and ascendancy of the Min clan

During the 1880s two rival factions emerged in Korea. One was a small group of reformers that had
centered around the Gaehwadang (Enlightenment Party), which had become frustrated at the limited
scale and arbitrary pace of reforms.[31] The members who constituted the Enlightenment Party were
youthful, well-educated Koreans and most were from the yangban class.[31] They were impressed by
the developments in Meiji Japan and were eager to emulate them.[31] Members included Kim Ok-
gyun, Pak Yung-hio, Hong Yeong-sik, Seo Gwang-beom, and Soh Jaipil.[36] The group was also
relatively young; Pak Yung-hio came from a prestigious lineage related to the royal family and was 23,
Hong was 29, Seo Gwang-beom was 25, and Soh Jaipil was 20, with Kim Ok-gyun being the oldest at
33.[36] All had spent some time in Japan; Pak Yung-hio had been part of a mission sent to Japan to
apologize for the Imo incident in 1882.[31] He had been accompanied by Seo Gwang-beom and by Kim
Ok-gyun, who later came under the influence of Japanese modernizers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi.
Kim Ok-gyun, while studying in Japan, had also cultivated friendships with influential Japanese
figures and became the de facto leader of the group.[36] They were also strongly nationalistic and
desired to make their country truly independent by ending Chinese interference in Korea's internal
affairs.[33]

The Sadaedang was a group of conservatives, which included not only Min Yeong-ik from the Min
family but also other prominent Korean political figures that wanted to maintain power with China's
help. Although the members of the Sadaedang supported the enlightenment policy, they favored
gradual changes based on the Chinese model.[33] After the Imo incident, the Min clan pursued a pro-
Chinese policy. This was also partly a matter of opportunism as the intervention by Chinese troops led
to subsequent exile of the rival Daewongun in Tianjin and the expansion of Chinese influence in
Korea, but it also reflected an ideological disposition shared by many Koreans toward the more
comfortable and traditional relationship as a tributary of China.[36] Consequently, the Min clan
became advocates of the "dongdo seogi" (Adopting Western knowledge while keeping Eastern
values) philosophy, which had originated from the ideas of moderate Chinese reformers who had
emphasized the need to maintain the perceived superior cultural values and heritage [17] of the Sino-
centric world while recognizing the importance of acquiring and adopting Western technology,
particularly military technology, in order to preserve autonomy. Hence, rather than major
institutional reforms such as the adoption of new values such as legal equality or introducing modern
education like in Meiji Japan, the advocates of this school of thought sought piecemeal adoptions of
institutions that would strengthen the state while preserving the basic social, political, and cultural
order.[36] Through the ascendancy of Queen Min to the throne, the Min clan had also been able to use
newly created government institutions as bases for political power; subsequently with their growing
monopoly of key positions they frustrated the ambitions of the Enlightenment Party. [36]

Gapsin Coup

In the two years proceeding the Imo incident, the members of the Gaehwadang had failed to secure
appointments to vital offices in the government and were unable to implement their reform plans. [37]
As a consequence they were prepared to seize power by any means necessary. In 1884, an opportunity
to seize power by staging a coup d'état against the Sadaedang presented itself. In August, as hostilities
between France and China erupted over Annam, half of the Chinese troops stationed in Korea were
withdrawn.[37] On December 4, 1884, with the help of Japanese minister Takezoe Shinichiro who
promised to mobilize Japanese legation guards to provide assistance, the reformers staged their coup
under the guise of a banquet hosted by Hong Yeong-sik, the director of the General Postal
Administration. The banquet was to celebrate the opening of the new national post office. [37] King
Gojong was expected to attend together with several foreign diplomats and high-ranking officials,
most of whom were members of the pro-Chinese Sadaedang faction. Kim Ok-gyun and his comrades
approached King Gojong falsely stating that Chinese troops had created a disturbance and escorted
him to the small Gyoengu Palace, where they placed him in the custody of Japanese legation guards.
They then proceeded to kill and wound several senior officials of the Sadaedang faction. [37]

After the coup, the Gaehwadang members formed a new government and devised a program of
reform. The radical 14-point reform proposal stated that the following conditions be met: an end to
Korea's tributary relationship with China; the abolition of ruling-class privilege and the establishment
of equal rights for all; the reorganization of the government as virtually a constitutional monarchy; the
revision of land tax laws; cancellation of the grain loan system; the unification of all internal fiscal
administrations under the jurisdiction of the Ho-jo; the suppression of privileged merchants and the
development of free commerce and trade, the creation of a modern police system including police
patrols and royal guards; and severe punishment of corrupt officials.[37]

However, the new government lasted no longer than a few days.[37] This was possibly inevitable, as
the reformers were supported by no more than 140 Japanese troops who faced at least 1,500 Chinese
garrisoned in Seoul,[37] under the command of General Yuan Shikai. With the reform measures being
a threat to her clan's power, Queen Min secretly requested military intervention from the Chinese.
Consequently, within three days, even before the reform measures were made public, the coup was
suppressed by Chinese troops who attacked and defeated the Japanese forces and restored power to
the pro-Chinese Sadaedang faction.[37] During the ensuing melee Hong Yeong-sik was killed, the
Japanese legation building was burned down and forty Japanese were killed. The surviving Korean
coup leaders including Kim Ok-gyun escaped to the port of Chemulpo under escort of the Japanese
minister Takezoe. From there they boarded a Japanese ship for exile in Japan. [38]

In January 1885, with a show of force the Japanese dispatched two battalions and seven warships to
Korea,[39] which resulted in the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1885, signed on 9 January 1885. The treaty
restored diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea. The Koreans also agreed to pay the Japanese
¥100,000 for damages to their legation[39] and to provide a site for the building of a new legation.
Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, in order to overcome Japan's disadvantageous position in Korea
followed by the abortive coup, visited China to discuss the matter with his Chinese counterpart, Li
Hongzhang. The two parties succeeded in concluding the Convention of Tianjin on May 31, 1885. They
also pledged to withdraw their troops from Korea within four months, with prior notification to the
other if troops were to be sent to Korea in the future.[39] After both countries withdrew their forces
they left behind a precarious balance of power on the Korean Peninsula between the two nations. [39]
Meanwhile, Yuan Shikai remained in Seoul, appointed as the Chinese Resident, and continued to
interfere with Korean domestic politics.[39] The failure of the coup also marked a dramatic decline in
Japanese influence over Korea.[40]

Nagasaki incident

The Nagasaki incident was a riot that took place in the Japanese port city of Nagasaki in 1886. Four
warships from the Qing Empire's navy, the Beiyang Fleet, stopped at Nagasaki, apparently to carry out
repairs. Some Chinese sailors caused trouble in the city and started the riot. Several Japanese
policemen confronting the rioters were killed. The Qing government did not apologize after the
incident, which resulted in a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan.

Bean controversy

A poor harvest in 1889 led the governor of Korea's Hamgyong Province to prohibit soybean exports to
Japan. Japan requested and received compensation in 1893 for their importers. The incident
highlighted the growing dependence Japan felt on Korean food imports.[41]

Prelude to war

Kim Ok-gyun affair

On March 28, 1894, a pro-Japanese Korean revolutionary, Kim Ok-gyun, was assassinated in
Shanghai. Kim had fled to Japan after his involvement in the 1884 coup, and the Japanese had turned
down Korean demands for him to be extradited.[42] Many Japanese activists saw in him potential for a
future role in Korean modernization; however, Meiji government leaders were more cautious. After
some reservations, they exiled him to the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands. Ultimately, he was lured to
Shanghai, where he was killed by a Korean, Hong Jong-u, in his room at a Japanese inn in the
International Settlement. After some hesitation, the British authorities in Shanghai concluded that
rules against extradition did not apply to a corpse and turned his body over to Chinese authorities. His
body was then taken aboard a Chinese warship and sent back to Korea, where it was cut up by the
Korean authorities, quartered and displayed in all Korean provinces as a warning to other purported
rebels and traitors.[42][43]

In Tokyo, the Japanese government took that as an outrageous affront.[42] Kim Ok-gyun's brutal
murder was portrayed as a betrayal by Li Hongzhang and a setback for Japan's stature and dignity. [42]
The Chinese authorities refused to press charges against the assassin, but he was even allowed to
accompany Kim's mutilated body back to Korea, where he was showered with rewards and honors. [44]
Kim's assassination had also called Japan's commitment to its Korean supporters into question. The
police in Tokyo had foiled an earlier attempt during the same year to
assassinate Pak Yung-hio, one of the other Korean leaders of the 1884
uprising. When two suspected Korean assassins received asylum at the
Korean legation, that had instigated a diplomatic outrage ad well.[44]
Although the Japanese government could have immediately used Kim's
assassination to its advantage, it concluded that since Kim had died on
Chinese territory, the treatment of the corpse was outside its authority.[44]
However, the shocking murder of the Korean inflamed Japanese opinion
since many Japanese considered the Chinese-supported actions to be
directed against Japan as well. To the Japanese, the Chinese had also
showed their contempt for international law when they set free the
suspected assassin, who had been arrested by British authorities in
Shanghai and then, in accordance with treaty obligations, turned over to the Kim Ok-gyun
Chinese for trial. Nationalistic groups immediately began to call for war photographed in
with China.[44] Nagasaki in 1882. His
assassination in China
would contribute to
Donghak Rebellion tensions leading to the
First Sino-Japanese
Tensions ran high between China and Japan, but war was not yet inevitable, War.
and the fury in Japan over the Kim's assassination began to dissipate.
However, in late April, the Donghak Rebellion erupted in Korea. Korean
peasants rose up in open rebellion against oppressive taxation and incompetent financial
administration of the Joseon government. It was the largest peasant rebellion in Korean history. [45]
However, on June 1, rumors reached the Donghaks that the Chinese and Japanese were on the verge
of sending troops and so the rebels agreed to a ceasefire to remove any grounds for foreign
intervention.[45]

On June 2, the Japanese cabinet decided to send troops to Korea if China did the same. In May, the
Chinese had taken steps to prepare for the mobilization of their forces in the provinces of Zhili,
Shandong and in Manchuria as a result of the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula. [46] However,
those actions were planned more as an armed demonstration to strengthen the Chinese position in
Korea than as preparation for war against Japan.[46] On June 3, King Gojong, on the recommendation
of the Min clan and at the insistence of Yuan Shikai, requested aid from the Chinese government in
suppressing the Donghak Rebellion. Although the rebellion was not as serious as it had initially
seemed and so the Chinese forces were not necessary, the decision was made to send 2,500 men under
the command of General Ye Zhichao to the harbor of Asan, about 70 km (43 mi) from Seoul. The
troops destined for Korea sailed on board three British-owned steamers chartered by the Chinese
government, arriving at Asan on June 9. On June 25, a further 400 troops had arrived. Consequently,
by the end of June, Ye Zhichao had about 2,800-2,900 soldiers under his command at Asan. [46][47]

Closely watching the events on the peninsula, the Japanese government had quickly become
convinced that the rebellion would lead to Chinese intervention in Korea. As a result, soon after
learning of the Korean government's request for Chinese military help, all Japanese warships in the
vicinity were immediately ordered to Pusan and Chemulpo.[46] By June 9, Japanese warships had
consecutively called at Chemulpo and Pusan.[48] A formation of 420 sailors, selected from the crews of
warships anchored in Chempulo, was immediately dispatched to Seoul, where they served as a
temporary counterbalance to the Chinese troops camped at Asan.[49] Simultaneously, a reinforced
brigade of approximately 8,000 troops (the Oshima Composite Brigade), under the command of
General Ōshima Yoshimasa, was also dispatched to Chemulpo by June 27.[50]
According to the Japanese, the Chinese government had violated the Convention of Tientsin by not
informing the Japanese government of its decision to send troops, but the Chinese claimed that Japan
had approved the decision.[43] The Japanese countered by sending an expeditionary force to Korea.
The first 400 troops arrived on June 9 en route to Seoul, and 3,000 landed at Incheon on June 12.[51]

However, Japanese officials denied any intention to intervene. As a result, the Qing viceroy Li
Hongzhang "was lured into believing that Japan would not wage war, but the Japanese were fully
prepared to act".[52] The Qing government turned down Japan's suggestion for Japan and China to co-
operate to reform the Korean government. When Korea demanded that Japan withdraw its troops
from Korea, the Japanese refused.

In early June 1894, the 8,000 Japanese troops captured the Korean king Gojong and occupied the
Gyeongbokgung in Seoul. By June 25, they had replaced the existing Korean government with
members of the pro-Japanese faction.[51] Even though Qing forces were already leaving Korea after
they found themselves unneeded there, the new pro-Japanese Korean government granted Japan the
right to expel Qing forces, and Japan dispatched more troops to Korea. The Qing Empire rejected the
new Korean government as illegitimate.

Status of combatants

Japan

Japanese reforms under the Meiji government gave significant priority to the creation of an effective
modern national army and navy, especially naval construction. Japan sent numerous military officials
abroad for training and evaluation of the relative strengths and tactics of Western armies and navies.

Imperial Japanese Navy

The Imperial Japanese Navy was

modeled after the British Royal
Navy,[53] at the time the foremost
naval power. British advisors were
sent to Japan to train the naval
establishment, while Japanese
students were in turn sent to
Britain to study and observe the
Royal Navy. Through drilling and
tuition by Royal Navy instructors,
Japan developed naval officers
expert in the arts of gunnery and
seamanship.[54] At the start of
Itō Sukeyuki, Commander-in- hostilities, the Imperial Japanese The French-built Matsushima,
Chief of the Japanese Combined Navy comprised a fleet of 12 flagship of the Imperial Japanese
Fleet modern warships, (the protected Navy during the Sino-Japanese
cruiser Izumi being added during conflict
the war), eight corvettes, one
ironclad warship, 26 torpedo boats, and numerous auxiliary/armed
merchant cruisers and converted liners. During peacetime, the warships of the Imperial Japanese
Navy were divided among three main naval bases at Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo and following
mobilization, the navy was composed of five divisions of seagoing warships and three flotillas of
torpedo boats with a fourth being formed at the beginning of hostilities.[55] The Japanese also had a
relatively large merchant navy, which at the beginning of 1894 consisted of 288 vessels. Of these, 66
belonged to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha shipping company, which received national subsidies from the
Japanese government to maintain the vessels for use by the navy in time of war. As a consequence, the
navy could call on a sufficient number of auxiliaries and transports.[55]

Japan did not yet have the resources to acquire battleships and so planned to employ the Jeune École
doctrine, which favoured small, fast warships, especially cruisers and torpedo boats, with the offensive
capability to destroy larger craft. The Japanese naval leadership, on the eve of hostilities, was
generally cautious and even apprehensive,[56] as the navy had not yet received the warships ordered in
February 1893, particularly the battleships Fuji and Yashima and the protected cruiser Akashi.[57]
Hence, initiating hostilities at the time was not ideal, and the navy was far less confident than the
army about the outcome of a war with China.[56]

Many of Japan's major warships were built in British and French shipyards (eight British, three
French and two Japanese-built) and 16 of the torpedo boats were known to have been built in France
and assembled in Japan.

Imperial Japanese Army

The Meiji government at first modeled their army after the French Army. French advisers had been
sent to Japan with two military missions (in 1872–1880 and 1884), in addition to one mission under
the shogunate. Nationwide conscription was enforced in 1873 and a Western-style conscript army [58]
was established; military schools and arsenals were also built. In 1886, Japan turned toward the
German-Prussian model as the basis for its army,[58] adopting German doctrines and the German
military system and organisation. In 1885 Klemens Meckel, a German adviser, implemented new
measures, such as the reorganization of the command structure into divisions and regiments; the
strengthening of army logistics, transportation, and structures (thereby increasing mobility); and the
establishment of artillery and engineering regiments as independent commands. It was also an army
that was equal to European armed forces in every respect.[58]

On the eve of the outbreak of the war with China all men
between the ages of 17 and 40 years were eligible for
conscription, but only those who turned 20 were to be
drafted while those who had turned 17 could
volunteer.[58] All men between the ages of 17 and 40,
even those who had not received military training or
were physically unfit, were considered part of the
territorial militia or national guard (kokumin).[58]
Following the period of active military service (gen-eki),
which lasted for three years, the soldiers became part of
the first Reserve (yōbi) and then the second Reserve
(kōbi). All young and able-bodied men who did not Japanese troops during the Sino-Japanese War
receive basic military training due to exceptions and
those conscripts who had not fully met the physical
requirements of military service, became third Reserve (hojū).[58] In time of war, the first Reserve
(yōbi) were to be called up first and they were intended to fill the ranks of the regular army units. Next
to be called up were the kōbi reserve who were to be either used to further fill in the ranks of line units
or to be formed into new ones. The hojū reserve members were to be called up only in exceptional
circumstances, and the territorial militia or national guard would only be called up in case of an
immediate enemy attack on or invasion of Japan.[58]

The country was divided into six military districts (headquarters Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Sendai,
Hiroshima and Kumamoto), with each being a recruitment area for a square infantry division
consisting of two brigades of two regiments.[58] Each of these divisions contained approximately
18,600 troops and 36 artillery pieces when mobilized.[59] There was also an Imperial Guard division
which recruited nationally, from all around Japan. This division was also composed of two brigades
but had instead two-battalion, not three-battalion, regiments; consequently its numerical strength
after mobilization was 12,500 troops and 24 artillery pieces.[59] In addition, there were fortress troops
consisting of approximately six battalions, the Colonial Corps of about 4,000 troops which was
stationed on Hokkaido and the Ryukyu Islands, and a battalion of military police in each of the
districts. In peacetime the regular army had a total of fewer than 70,000 men, while after mobilization
the numbers rose to over 220,000.[59] Moreover, the army still had a trained reserve, which, following
the mobilization of the first-line divisions, could be formed into reserve brigades. These reserve
brigades each consisted of four battalions, a cavalry unit, a company of engineers, an artillery battery
and rear-echelon units. They were to serve as recruiting bases for their front-line divisions and could
also perform secondary combat operations, and if necessary they could be expanded into full divisions
with a total of 24 territorial force regiments. However, formation of these units was hindered by a lack
of sufficient amounts of equipment, especially uniforms.[59]

Japanese troops were equipped with the 8mm single-shot Murata Type 18 breech-loading rifle. The
improved eight-round-magazine Type 22 was just being introduced and consequently in 1894, on the
eve of the war, only the Imperial Guard and 4th Division were equipped with these rifles. The division
artillery consisted of 75mm field guns and mountain pieces manufactured in Osaka. The artillery was
based on Krupp designs that were adapted by the Italians at the beginning of the 1880s; although it
could hardly be described as modern in 1894, in general it still matched contemporary battlefield
requirements.[59]

By the 1890s, Japan had at its disposal a modern, professionally trained Western-style army which
was relatively well equipped and supplied. Its officers had studied in Europe and were well educated
in the latest strategy and tactics. By the start of the war, the Imperial Japanese Army could field a total
force of 120,000 men in two armies and five divisions.

China

The prevailing view in many Western circles was that the modernized Chinese military would crush
the Japanese. Observers commended Chinese units such as the Huai Army and Beiyang Fleet.[nb 2]
The German General Staff predicted a Japanese defeat and William Lang, who was a British advisor to
the Chinese military, praised Chinese training, ships, guns, and fortifications, stating that "in the end,
there is no doubt that Japan must be utterly crushed".[61]

Imperial Chinese Army

The Qing Dynasty did not have a unified national army, but was made up of three main components,
with the so-called Eight Banners forming the elite. The Eight Banners forces were segregated along
ethnic lines into separate Manchu, Han Chinese, Mongol, Hui (Muslim) and other ethnic
formations.[62] Bannermen who made up the Eight Banners got higher pay than the rest of the army
while the Manchu received further privileges. In total, there were 250,000 soldiers in the Eight
Banners, with over 60 percent kept in garrisons in Beijing, while the remaining 40 percent served as
garrison troops in other major Chinese cities.[63] The Green Standard Army was a 600,000-strong
gendarmerie-type force that was recruited from the majority Han Chinese population. Its soldiers
were not given any peacetime basic military training, but were expected to fight in any conflict. The
third component was an irregular force called the Braves, which were used as a kind of reserve force
for the regular army, and which were usually recruited from the more distant or remote provinces of
China. They were formed into very loosely organized units from the same province. The Braves were
sometimes described as mercenaries, with their volunteers receiving as much military training as their
commanders saw fit. With no fixed unit organization, it is impossible to know how many battle-ready
Braves there actually were in 1894.[63] There were also a few other military formations, one of which
was the Huai Army, which was under the personal authority of the politician, general and diplomat Li
Hongzhang and was created originally to suppress the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864). The Huai
Army had received limited training by Western military advisors; [63] numbering nearly 45,000 troops,
it was considered the best-armed military unit in China.[64]

Although the Chinese had established arsenals to produce firearms, and a large number of them had
been imported from abroad, 40 percent of Chinese troops at the outbreak of the war were not issued
with rifles or even muskets.[65] Instead they were armed with a variety of swords, spears, pikes,
halberds, and bows and arrows.[65] Against well-trained, well-armed, and disciplined Japanese troops,
they would have little chance. Those units that did have firearms were equipped with a heterogeneity
of weapons, from a variety of modern rifles to old-fashioned muskets; this lack of standardization led
to a major problem with the proper supply of ammunition.[66]

The Imperial Chinese Army in 1894 was a heterogeneous mixture of modernized, partly modernized,
and almost medieval units which no commander could have led successfully, resulting in poor
leadership among Chinese officers.[67] Chinese officers did not know how to handle their troops and
the older, higher-ranking officers still believed that they could fight a war as they had during the
Taiping Rebellion of 1850–1864.[68] This was also the result of the Chinese military forces being
divided into largely independent regional commands. The soldiers were drawn from diverse provinces
that had no affinity with each other.[69] Chinese troops also suffered from poor morale, largely
because many of the troops had not been paid for a long time.[68] The low prestige of soldiers in
Chinese society also hindered morale, and the use of opium and other narcotics was rife throughout
the army.[68] Low morale and poor leadership seriously reduced the effectiveness of Chinese troops,
and contributed to defeats such as the abandonment of the very well-fortified and defensible
Weihaiwei. Additionally, military logistics were lacking, as the construction of railroads in Manchuria
had been discouraged. Huai Army troops, although they were a small minority in the overall Imperial
Chinese Army, were to take part in the majority of the fighting during the war. [63]

Beiyang Fleet

The Beiyang Fleet was one of the four modernised Chinese navies in the late Qing dynasty. The navies
were heavily sponsored by Li Hongzhang, the Viceroy of Zhili who had also created the Huai Army.
The Beiyang Fleet was the dominant navy in East Asia before the First Sino-Japanese War. The
Japanese themselves were apprehensive about facing the Chinese fleet, especially the two German-
built battleships — Dingyuan and Zhenyuan – to which the Japanese had no comparable
counterparts.[56] However, China's advantages were more apparent than real as most of the Chinese
warships were over-age and obsolescent;[56] the ships were also not maintained properly and
indiscipline was common among their crews.[70] The greater armor of major Chinese warships and the
greater weight of broadside they could fire were more than offset by the number of quick-firing guns
on most first-line Japanese warships, which gave the Japanese the edge in any sustained exchange of
salvos.[56] The worst feature of both Chinese battleships was actually their main armament; each was
armed with short-barreled guns in twin barbettes mounted in
echelon which could fire only in restricted arcs. The short barrels
of the Chinese main armament meant that the shells had a low
muzzle velocity and poor penetration, and their accuracy was also
poor at long ranges.[71]

Tactically, Chinese naval vessels entered the war with only the
crudest set of instructions — ships that were assigned to
designated pairs were to keep together and all ships were to fight
end-on, as far forward from the beam as possible, a tactic dictated
by the obsolescent arrangement of guns aboard Chinese
warships.[71] The only vague resemblance of a fleet tactic was that
all ships were to follow the visible movements of the flagship, an
arrangement made necessary because the signal book used by the
Chinese was written in English, a language with which few officers
in the Beiyang Fleet had any familiarity.[71]
Empress Dowager Cixi built the
When it was first developed by Empress Dowager Cixi in 1888, Chinese navy in 1888.
the Beiyang Fleet was said to be the strongest navy in East Asia.
Before her adopted son, Emperor Guangxu, took over the throne
in 1889, Cixi wrote out explicit orders that the navy should continue to develop and expand
gradually.[72] However, after Cixi went into retirement, all naval and military development came to a
drastic halt. Japan's victories over China has often been falsely rumored to be the fault of Cixi. [73]
Many believed that Cixi was the cause of the navy's defeat because Cixi embezzled funds from the navy
in order to build the Summer Palace in Beijing. However, extensive research by Chinese historians
revealed that Cixi was not the cause of the Chinese navy's decline. In actuality, China's defeat was
caused by Emperor Guangxu's lack of interest in developing and maintaining the military. [72] His
close adviser, Grand Tutor Weng Tonghe, advised Guangxu to cut all funding to the navy and army,
because he did not see Japan as a true threat, and there were several natural disasters during the early
1890s which the emperor thought to be more pressing to expend funds on.[72]

Beiyang Fleet
Major combatants

Ironclad
Dingyuan (flagship), Zhenyuan
battleships

Armoured
King Yuen, Laiyuan
cruisers
Dingyuan, the flagship of the
Protected Beiyang Fleet
Chih Yuen, Ching Yuen
cruisers

Torpedo cruisers – Tsi Yuen, Kuang Ping/Kwang Ping,

Cruisers
Chaoyong, Yangwei

Coastal warship Pingyuan

Corvette Kwan Chia

Approximately 13 torpedo boats; numerous gunboats

Other vessels
and chartered merchant ships

Zhenyuan
Contemporaneous wars fought by the Qing Empire
While the Qing Empire was fighting the First Sino-Japanese War, it was also simultaneously engaging
rebels in the Dungan Revolt in northwestern China, where thousands lost their lives. The generals
Dong Fuxiang, Ma Anliang and Ma Haiyan were initially summoned by the Qing government to bring
the Hui troops under their command to participate in the First Sino-Japanese War, but they were
eventually sent to suppress the Dungan Revolt instead.[74]

Early stages
1 June 1894: The Donghak Rebel Army moves toward Seoul. The Korean government requests help
from the Qing government to suppress the revolt.

6 June 1894: About 2,465 Chinese soldiers are transported to Korea to suppress the Donghak
Rebellion. Japan asserts that it was not notified and thus China has violated the Convention of
Tientsin, which requires that China and Japan must notify each other before intervening in Korea.
China asserts that Japan was notified and approved of Chinese intervention.

8 June 1894: First of about 4,000 Japanese soldiers and 500 marines land at Jemulpo (Incheon).

11 June 1894: End of the Donghak Rebellion.

13 June 1894: The Japanese government telegraphs the commander of the Japanese forces in Korea,
Ōtori Keisuke, to remain in Korea for as long as possible despite the end of the rebellion.

16 June 1894: Japanese foreign minister Mutsu Munemitsu meets with Wang Fengzao, the Qing
ambassador to Japan, to discuss the future status of Korea. Wang states that the Qing government
intends to pull out of Korea after the rebellion has been suppressed and expects Japan to do the same.
However, China retains a resident to look after Chinese primacy in Korea.

22 June 1894: Additional Japanese troops arrive in Korea. Japanese prime minister Itō Hirobumi tells
Matsukata Masayoshi that since the Qing Empire appear to be making military preparations, there is
probably "no policy but to go to war". Mutsu tells Ōtori to press the Korean government on the
Japanese demands.

26 June 1894: Ōtori presents a set of reform proposals to the Korean king Gojong. Gojong's
government rejects the proposals and instead insists on troop withdrawals.

7 July 1894: Failure of mediation between China and Japan arranged by the British ambassador to
China.

19 July 1894: Establishment of the Japanese Combined Fleet, consisting of almost all vessels in the
Imperial Japanese Navy. Mutsu cables Ōtori to take any necessary steps to compel the Korean
government to carry out a reform program.

23 July 1894: Japanese troops occupy Seoul, capture Gojong, and establish a new, pro-Japanese
government, which terminates all Sino-Korean treaties and grants the Imperial Japanese Army the
right to expel the Qing Empire's Beiyang Army from Korea.

25 July 1894: First battle of the war: the Battle of Pungdo / Hoto-oki kaisen

Events during the war

Opening moves

By July 1894, Chinese forces in Korea numbered 3,000–3,500 and were outnumbered by Japanese
troops. They could only be supplied by sea through Asan Bay. The Japanese objective was first to
blockade the Chinese at Asan and then encircle them with their land forces. Japan's initial strategy
was to gain command of the sea, which was critical to its operations in Korea. [75] Command of the sea
would allow Japan to transport troops to the mainland. The army's Fifth Division would land at
Chemulpo on the western coast of Korea, both to engage and push Chinese forces northwest up the
peninsula and to draw the Beiyang Fleet into the Yellow Sea, where it would be engaged in decisive
battle. Depending on the outcome of this engagement, Japan would make one of three choices; If the
Combined Fleet were to win decisively, the larger part of the Japanese army would undertake
immediate landings on the coast between Shan-hai-kuan and Tientsin in order to defeat the Chinese
army and bring the war to a swift conclusion. If the engagement were to be a draw and neither side
gained control of the sea, the army would concentrate on the occupation of Korea. Lastly, if the
Combined Fleet was defeated and consequently lost command of the sea, the bulk of the army would
remain in Japan and prepare to repel a Chinese invasion, while the Fifth Division in Korea would be
ordered to hang on and fight a rearguard action.[76]

Sinking of the Kow-shing

On 25 July 1894, the cruisers Yoshino, Naniwa and Akitsushima of the

Japanese flying squadron, which had been patrolling off Asan Bay,
encountered the Chinese cruiser Tsi-yuan and gunboat Kwang-yi.[76]
These vessels had steamed out of Asan to meet the transport Kow-
shing, escorted by the Chinese gunboat Tsao-kiang. After an hour-long
engagement, the Tsi-yuan escaped while the Kwang-yi grounded on
rocks, where its powder magazine exploded.

The Kow-shing was a 2,134-ton British merchant vessel owned by the

Indochina Steam Navigation Company of London, commanded by
Captain T. R. Galsworthy and crewed by 64 men. The ship was
chartered by the Qing government to ferry troops to Korea, and was on
her way to reinforce Asan with 1,100 troops plus supplies and
equipment. A German artillery officer, Major von Hanneken, advisor to
Depiction of the sinking of the the Chinese, was also aboard. The ship was due to arrive on 25 July.
Kow-shing and the rescue of
some of its crew by the The Japanese cruiser Naniwa, under Captain Tōgō Heihachirō,
French gunboat Le Lion, from intercepted the Kow-shing and captured its escort. The Japanese then
the French periodical Le Petitordered the Kow-shing to follow Naniwa and directed that Europeans
Journal (1894) be transferred to Naniwa. However, the 1,100 Chinese on board,
desperate to return to Taku, threatened to kill the English captain,
Galsworthy, and his crew. After four hours of negotiations, Captain
Togo gave the order to fire upon the vessel. A torpedo missed, but a subsequent broadside hit the Kow
Shing, which started to sink.

In the confusion, some of the Europeans escaped overboard, only to be fired upon by the Chinese. [77]
The Japanese rescued three of the British crew (the captain, first officer and quartermaster) and 50
Chinese, and took them to Japan. The sinking of the Kow-shing almost caused a diplomatic incident
between Japan and Great Britain, but the action was ruled in conformity with international law
regarding the treatment of mutineers (the Chinese troops). Many observers considered the troops lost
on board the Kow-shing to have been the best the Chinese had.[77]

The German gunboat Iltis rescued 150 Chinese, the French gunboat Le Lion rescued 43, and the
British cruiser HMS Porpoise rescued an unknown number.[78]

Conflict in Korea

Commissioned by the new pro-Japanese Korean government to

forcibly expel Chinese forces, on July 25 Major-General Ōshima
Yoshimasa led a mixed brigade numbering about 4,000 on a rapid
forced march from Seoul south toward Asan Bay to face Chinese
troops garrisoned at Seonghwan Station east of Asan and Kongju.

The Chinese forces stationed near Seonghwan under the

command of General Ye Zhichao numbered about 3,880 men.
They had anticipated the impending arrival of the Japanese by
Korean soldiers and Chinese
fortifying their position with trenches, earthworks including six
captives
redoubts protected by abatis and by the flooding of surrounding
rice fields.[79] But expected Chinese reinforcements had been lost
on board the British-chartered transport Kowshing.[80] Units of the Chinese main force were
deployed east and northeast of Asan, near the main road leading to Seoul; the key positions held by
the Chinese were the towns of Seonghwan and Cheonan. Approximately 3,000 troops were stationed
at Seonghwan, while 1,000 men along with General Ye Zhichao were at headquarters at Cheonan. The
remaining Chinese troops were stationed in Asan itself.[81] The Chinese had been preparing for a
pincer movement against the Korean capital by massing troops at Pyongyang in the north and Asan in
the south.[82]

On the morning of 27-28 July 1894, the two forces met just outside Asan in an engagement that lasted
till 7:30am the next morning. The battle began with a diversionary attack by Japanese troops,
followed by the main attack which quickly outflanked the Chinese defences. The Chinese troops,
witnessing that they were being outflanked, left their defensive positions and fled towards the
direction of Asan. The Chinese gradually lost ground to the superior Japanese numbers, and finally
broke and fled towards Pyongyang abandoning arms, ammunition and all their artillery. [83] The
Japanese took the city of Asan on July 29, breaking the Chinese encirclement of Seoul. [79] The
Chinese suffered 500 killed and wounded while the Japanese suffered 88 casualties. [84]

Comparative Outlooks of the Japanese and Chinese Emperors

On 1 August 1894, war was officially declared between China and Japan. The rationale given by the
rulers of both nations might best be assessed by the comparison of the declarations issued from each,
the language and tone being markedly different. In the case of Japan:

We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on a Throne occupied by the same
dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make proclamation to all our loyal and brave
subjects, as follows:

We hereby declare war against China, and we command each and all of our competent
authorities, in obedience to our wish and with a view to the attainment of the national aim,
to carry on hostilities by sea and by land against China, with all the means at their disposal,
 consistently with the Law of Nations.

During the past three decades of our reign our constant aim has been to further the
peaceful progress of the country in civilisation; and, being sensible of the evils inseparable
from complications with foreign states, it has always been our pleasure to instruct our
Minister of State to labour for the promotion of friendly relations with our Treaty Powers.
We are gratified to know that the relations of our Empire with those Powers have yearly
increased in good will and in friendship. Under the circumstances, we were unprepared for
such a conspicuous want of amity and of good faith as has been manifested by China in her
conduct towards this country in connexion with the Korean affair.

Korea is an independent state. She was first introduced into the family of nations by the
advice and guidance of Japan. It has, however, been China's habit to designate Korea as
her dependency, and both openly and secretly to interfere with her domestic affairs. At the
time of the recent insurrection in Korea, China despatched troops thither, alleging that her
purpose was to afford a succour to her dependent state. We, in virtue of the treaty
concluded with Korea in 1882, and looking to possible emergencies, caused a military force
to be sent to that country.

Wishing to procure for Korea freedom from the calamity of perpetual disturbance, and
thereby to maintain the peace of the East in general, Japan invited China's cooperation for
the accomplishment of the object. But China, advancing various pretexts, declined Japan's
proposal. Thereupon Japan advised Korea to reform her administration so that order and
tranquillity might be preserved at home, and so that the country might be able to discharge
the responsibilities and duties of an independent state abroad. Korea has already
consented to undertake the task. But China has secretly and insidiously endeavoured to
circumvent and to thwart Japan's purpose. She has further procrastinated and
endeavoured to make warlike preparations both on land and at sea.

When those preparations were completed she not only sent large reinforcements to Korea,
with a view to the forcible attainment of her ambitious designs, but even carried her
arbitrariness and insolence to the extent of opening fire upon our ships in Korean waters.
China's plain object is to make it uncertain where the responsibility resides of preserving
peace and order in Korea, and not only to weaken the position of that state in the family of
nations - a position obtained for Korea through Japan's efforts - but also to obscure the
significance of the treaties recognising and confirming that position. Such conduct on the
part of China is not only a direct injury to the rights and interests of this Empire, but also a
menace to the permanent peace and tranquillity of the Orient. Judging from her actions, it
must be concluded that China from the beginning has been bent upon sacrificing peace to
the attainment of her sinister object. In this situation, ardent as our wish is to promote the
prestige of the country abroad by strictly peaceful methods, we find it impossible to avoid a
formal declaration of war against China. It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and
valour of our faithful subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the glory of
the Empire be augmented and completed.

Given this 1st day of the eighth month of the 27th year of Meiji...

— Proclamation of the Japanese Meiji Emperor, [85]

Issued in the name of the Meiji Emperor, the tenor of the Japanese declaration of war appears to have
had at least one eye fixed on the wider international community, using phrases such as 'Family of
Nations', the 'Law of Nations' and making additional references to international treaties. This was in
sharp contrast to the Chinese approach to foreign relations (historically noted for refusing to treat
with other nations on a diplomatic footing, and instead insistent on such foreign powers paying
tribute to the Chinese Emperor as vassals - see Tributary system of China). In keeping with the
traditional Chinese approach to its neighbours, the Guangxu Emperor thus proclaimed:

Korea has been our tributary for the past two hundred odd years. She has given us tribute
all this time, which is a matter known to the world. For the past dozen years or so Korea
has been troubled by repeated insurrections and we, in sympathy with our small tributary,
have as repeatedly sent succour to her aid, eventually placing a Resident in her capital to
protect Korea's interests. In the fourth moon (May) of this year another rebellion was
begun in Korea, and the King repeatedly asked again for aid from us to put down the
rebellion. We then ordered Li Hung-Chang [Li Hongzhang] to send troops to Korea; and
they having barely reached Yashan the rebels immediately scattered. But the Wojen,
without any cause whatever, suddenly sent their troops to Korea, and entered Seoul, the
capital of Korea, reinforcing them constantly until they have exceeded ten thousand men.
In the meantime the Japanese forced the Korean king to change his system of government,
showing a disposition every way of bullying the Koreans.

It was found a difficult matter to reason with the Wojen. Although we have been in the
habit of assisting our tributaries, we have never interfered with their internal government.
Japan's treaty with Korea was as one country with another; there is no law for sending
large armies to bully a country in this way, and compel it to change its system of
government. The various powers are united in condemning the conduct of the Japanese,
and can give no reasonable name to the army she now has in Korea. Nor has Japan been
amenable to reason, nor would she listen to the exhortation to withdraw her troops and
confer amicably upon what should be done in Korea. On the contrary, Japan has shown
herself bellicose without regard to appearances, and has been increasing her forces there.
Her conduct alarmed the people of Korea as well as our merchants there, and so we sent
more troops over to protect them. Judge of our surprise then when, halfway to Korea, a
number of the Wojen ships suddenly appeared, and taking advantage of our
unpreparedness, opened fire upon our transports at a spot on the sea-coast near Yashan,
and damaged them, thus causing us to suffer from their treacherous conduct, which could
not be foretold by us. As Japan has violated the treaties and not observed international
laws, and is now running rampant with her false and treacherous actions commencing
hostilities herself, and laying herself open to condemnation by the various powers at large,
we therefore desire to make it known to the world that we have always followed the paths
of philanthropy and perfect justice throughout the whole complications, while the Wojen,
on the other hand, have broken all the laws of nations and treaties which it passes our
patience to bear with.

Hence we have commanded Li Hung-Chang [Li Hongzhang] to give strict orders to our
various armies to hasten with all speed to root the Wojen out of their lairs. He is to send
successive armies of valiant men to Korea in order to save the Koreans from the dust of
bondage. We also command the Manchu generals, viceroys and governors of the maritime
provinces, as well as the commanders-in-chief of the various armies, to prepare for war
and to make every effort to fire on the Wojen ships if they come into our ports, and utterly
destroy them. We exhort our generals to refrain from the least laxity in obeying our
commands in order to avoid severe punishment at our hands. Let all know this edict as if
addressed to themselves individually.

Respect this!
 — Proclamation of the Chinese Guangxu Emperor, [86]

In the latter declaration of the Chinese Emperor, the palpable disdain for the Japanese can be
surmised from the repeated use of the term Wojen (which translates to the intentionally-offensive
term 'dwarf' ). This use of the pejorative to describe a foreign nation was not unusual for Chinese
official documents of the time—so much so that a major bone of contention between Imperial China
and the Treaty Powers of the day had previously been the habitual use of the Chinese character 夷
('Yi'...which literally meant 'barbarian'), to refer to those termed otherwise as 'Foreign Devils'
(typically, those powers occupying the Treaty Ports). The use of the term 'Yi' (夷) by Chinese Imperial
officials had in fact been considered so provocative by the Treaty Powers that the collective bundle of
accords known as the Treaty of Tientsin (negotiated in 1858 to end the Second Opium War) explicitly
proscribed the Chinese Imperial Court from using the term 'Yi' to refer to officials, subjects, or citizens
of the four belligerent powers (namely, the Russian Empire, France, Great Britain and the United
States of America), the signatories seemingly feeling it necessary to extract this specific demand from
the Xianfeng Emperor's representatives.[87] In the thirty-five years elapsing since the Treaty of
Tientsin, however, the language of the Chinese Emperors would appear to change little with regards to
its neighbor Japan.

After the Declarations

By 4 August, the remaining Chinese forces in Korea retreated to

the northern city of Pyongyang, where they were met by troops
sent from China. The 13,000–15,000 defenders made defensive
repairs to the city, hoping to check the Japanese advance.

On 15 September, the Imperial Japanese Army converged on the

city of Pyongyang from several directions. The Japanese assaulted
Japanese soldiers of the First Sino- the city and eventually defeated the Chinese by an attack from the
Japanese War, Japan, 1895 rear; the defenders surrendered. Taking advantage of heavy
rainfall overnight, the remaining Chinese troops escaped
Pyongyang and headed northeast toward the coastal city of Uiju.
Casualties were 2,000 killed and around 4,000 wounded for the Chinese, while the Japanese
casualties totaled 102 men killed, 433 wounded, and 33 missing. In the early morning of 16
September, the entire Japanese army entered Pyongyang.

Qing Hui Muslim general Zuo Baogui, from Shandong province, died in action in Pyongyang from
Japanese artillery in 1894 while securing the city. A memorial to him was constructed. [88]

Defeat of the Beiyang fleet

In early September, Li Hongzhang decided to reinforce the Chinese forces at Pyongyang by employing
the Beiyang fleet to escort transports to the mouth of the Taedong River.[89] About 4,500 additional
troops stationed in the Zhili were to be redeployed. On September 12, half of the troops embarked at
Dagu on five specially chartered transports and headed to Dalian where two days later on September
14, they were joined by another 2,000 soldiers. Initially, Admiral Ding wanted to send the transports
under a light escort with only a few ships, while the main force of the Beiyang Fleet would locate and
operate directly against the Combined Fleet in order to prevent the Japanese from intercepting the
convoy.[89] But the appearance of the Japanese cruisers Yoshino and Naniwa on a reconnaissance
sortie near Weihaiwei thwarted these plans.[89] The Chinese had mistaken them for the main
Japanese fleet. Consequently, on September 12,
the entire Beiyang Fleet departed Dalian
heading for Weihaiwei, arriving near the
Shandong Peninsula the next day. The Chinese
warships spent the entire day cruising the area,
waiting for the Japanese. However, since there
was no sighting of the Japanese fleet, Admiral
Ding decided to return to Dalian, reaching the
port in the morning of September 15.[89] As
Japanese troops moved north to attack
Pyongyang, Admiral Ito correctly guessed that The Battle of the Yalu River
the Chinese would attempt to reinforce their
army in Korea by sea. On 14 September, the
Combined Fleet steamed northwards to search the Korean and Chinese coasts in order to bring the
Beiyang Fleet to battle.[90]

The Japanese victory at Pyongyang had succeeded in pushing Chinese troops north to the Yalu river,
in the process removing all effective Chinese military presence on the Korean Peninsula. [91] Shortly
before the convoy's departure, Admiral Ding received a message concerning the battle at Pyongyang
informing him about the defeat. Subsequently, it made the redeployment of the troops to the mouth of
the Taedong river unnecessary.[89] Admiral Ding then correctly assumed that the next Chinese line of
defence would be established on the Yalu River, and decided to redeploy the embarked soldiers
there.[89] On September 16, the convoy of five transport ships departed from Dalian Bay under escort
from the vessels of the Beiyang Fleet which included the two ironclad battleships Dingyuan and
Zhenyuan.[89] Reaching the mouth of the Yalu River, the transports disembarked the troops, and the
landing operation lasted until the following morning.

On September 17, 1894, the Japanese Combined Fleet encountered the Chinese Beiyang Fleet off the
mouth of the Yalu River. The naval battle, which lasted from late morning to dusk, resulted in a
Japanese victory.[92] Although the Chinese were able to land 4,500 troops near the Yalu River by
sunset the Beiyang fleet was near the point of total collapse—most of the fleet had fled or had been
sunk and the two largest ships Dingyuan and Zhenyuan were nearly out of ammunition.[93] The
Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed eight of the ten Chinese warships, assuring Japan's command of
the Yellow Sea. The principal factor in the Japanese victory was its superiority in speed and
firepower.[94] The victory shattered the morale of the Chinese naval forces.[95] The Battle of the Yalu
River was the largest naval engagement of the war and was a major propaganda victory for Japan.
[96][97]

Invasion of Manchuria

With the defeat at Pyongyang, the Chinese abandoned northern Korea and took up defensive positions
in fortifications along their side of the Yalu River near Jiuliancheng. After receiving reinforcements by
10 October, the Japanese quickly pushed north toward Manchuria.

On the night of 24 October 1894, the Japanese successfully crossed the Yalu River, undetected, by
erecting a pontoon bridge. The following afternoon of 25 October at 17:00, they assaulted the outpost
of Hushan, east of Jiuliancheng. At 20:30 the defenders deserted their positions and by the next day
they were in full retreat from Jiuliancheng.

With the capture of Jiuliancheng, General Yamagata's 1st Army Corps occupied the nearby city of
 Dandong, while to the north, elements of the retreating
Beiyang Army set fire to the city of Fengcheng. The Japanese
had established a firm foothold on Chinese territory with the
loss of only four killed and 140 wounded.

An illustration by Utagawa Kokunimasa
of Japanese soldiers beheading 38
Chinese POWs as a warning to others
The Japanese 1st Army Corps then split into two groups with
General Nozu Michitsura's 5th Provincial Division advancing
toward the city of Mukden (present-day Shenyang) and
Lieutenant-General Katsura Tarō's 3rd Provincial Division
pursuing fleeing Chinese forces west along toward the
Liaodong Peninsula.

By December, the 3rd Provincial Division had captured the towns of Tatungkau, Takushan, Xiuyan,
Tomucheng, Haicheng and Kangwaseh. The 5th Provincial Division marched during a severe
Manchurian winter towards Mukden.

The Japanese 2nd Army Corps under Ōyama Iwao landed on the south coast of Liaodong Peninsula
on 24 October and quickly moved to capture Jinzhou and Dalian Bay on 6–7 November. The Japanese
laid siege to the strategic port of Lüshunkou (Port Arthur).

Fall of Lüshunkou

By 21 November 1894, the Japanese had taken the city of Lüshunkou (Port Arthur) with minimal
resistance and suffering minimal casualties. Describing their motives as having encountered a display
of the mutilated remains of Japanese soldiers as they invaded the town, Japanese forces proceeded
with the unrestrained killing of civilians during the Port Arthur Massacre with unconfirmed estimates
in the thousands. This event was at the time widely viewed with skepticism, as the world at large was
still in disbelief that the Japanese were capable of such deeds—it seemed more likely to have been
exaggerated propagandist fabrications of a Chinese government to discredit Japanese hegemony. In
reality, the Chinese government itself was unsure how to react and initially denied the occurrence of
the loss of Port Arthur to the Japanese altogether.

As we entered the town of Port Arthur, we saw the head of a Japanese soldier displayed on
a wooden stake. This filled us with rage and a desire to crush any Chinese soldier. Anyone
we saw in the town, we killed. The streets were filled with corpses, so many they blocked
our way. We killed people in their homes; by and large, there wasn't a single house without
from three to six dead. Blood was flowing and the smell was awful. We sent out search
parties. We shot some, hacked at others. The Chinese troops just dropped their arms and
fled. Firing and slashing, it was unbounded joy. At this time, our artillery troops were at
the rear, giving three cheers [banzai] for the emperor.

— Makio Okabe, diary[98]

By 10 December 1894, Kaipeng (present-day Gaizhou) fell to the Japanese 1st Army Corps.

Fall of Weihaiwei

The Chinese fleet subsequently retreated behind the Weihaiwei fortifications. However, it was then
surprised by Japanese ground forces, who outflanked the harbor's defenses in coordination with the
navy.[99] The Battle of Weihaiwei was a 23-day siege with the
major land and naval engagements taking place between 20
January and 12 February 1895. Historian Jonathan Spence notes
that "the Chinese admiral retired his fleet behind a protective
curtain of contact mines and took no further part in the
fighting."[100] The Japanese commander marched his forces over
the Shandong peninsula and reached the landward side of Revisionist depiction of Chinese
Weihaiwei, where the siege was eventually successful for the delegation, led by Admiral Ding
Japanese.[100] Ruchang and their foreign advisors,
boarding the Japanese vessel to
After Weihaiwei's fall on 12 February 1895, and an easing of harsh negotiate the surrender with Admiral
winter conditions, Japanese troops pressed further into southern Itō Sukeyuki after the Battle of
Manchuria and northern China. By March 1895 the Japanese had Weihaiwei. In reality, Ding had
fortified posts that commanded the sea approaches to Beijing. committed suicide after his defeat,
Although this would be the last major battle fought, numerous and never surrendered.
skirmishes would follow. The Battle of Yinkou was fought outside
the port town of Yingkou, Manchuria, on 5 March 1895.

Occupation of the Pescadores Islands

Even before the peace negotiations were set to begin at Shimonoseki, the Japanese had begun
preparations for the capture of Taiwan. However, the first operation would be directed not against the
island itself, but against the Pescadores Islands, which due to their strategic position off the west coast
would become a stepping stone for further operations against the island.[101] On March 6, a Japanese
expeditionary force consisting of a reinforced infantry regiment with 2,800 troops and an artillery
battery were embarked on five transports, and sailed from Ujina to Sasebo, arriving there three days
later.[101] On March 15, the five transports, escorted by seven cruisers and five torpedo boats of the 4th
Flotilla, left Sasebo heading south. The Japanese fleet arrived at the Pescadores during the night of
March 20, but encountered stormy weather. Due to the poor weather, the landings were postponed
until March 23, when the weather cleared.[102]

On the morning March 23, the Japanese warships began the bombardment of the Chinese positions
around the port of Lizhangjiao. A fort guarding the harbor was quickly silenced. At about midday, the
Japanese troops began their landing. Unexpectedly, when the landing operation was underway, the
guns of the fort once again opened fire, which caused some confusion among the Japanese troops. But
they were soon silenced again after being shelled by the Japanese cruisers.[102] By 2:00pm,
Lizhangjiao was under Japanese control. After reinforcing the captured positions, the following
morning, Japanese troops marched on the main town of Magong. The Chinese offered token
resistance and after a short skirmish they abandoned their positions, retreating to nearby Xiyu Island.
At 11:30am, the Japanese entered Magong, but as soon as they had taken the coastal forts in the town,
they were fired upon by the Chinese coastal battery on Xiyu Island. The barrage went unanswered
until nightfall, as the Chinese had destroyed all the guns at Magong before they retreated, and
Japanese warships feared entering the strait between the Penghu and Xiyu Islands due to the
potential threat posed by mines. However, it caused no serious casualties among the Japanese forces.
During the night, a small naval gunnery crew of 30 managed to make one of the guns of the Magong
coastal battery operational. At dawn, the gun began shelling the Chinese positions on Xiyu, but the
Chinese guns did not respond. Subsequently, the Japanese crossed the narrow strait, reaching Xiyu,
discovering that the Chinese troops had abandoned their positions during the night and escaped on
board local vessels.[102]
The Japanese warships entered the strait the next day and, upon discovering that there were no mine
fields, they entered Magong harbor. By March 26, all the islands of the archipelago were under
Japanese control, and Rear Admiral Tanaka Tsunatsune was appointed governor. During the
campaign the Japanese lost 28 killed and wounded, while the Chinese losses were almost 350 killed or
wounded and nearly 1,000 taken prisoner.[102] This operation effectively prevented Chinese forces in
Taiwan from being reinforced, and allowed the Japanese to press their demand for the cession of
Taiwan in the peace negotiations.

End of the war

Treaty of Shimonoseki

The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on 17 April 1895. China

recognized the total independence of Korea and ceded the
Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan and Penghu Islands to Japan "in
perpetuity".[103] The disputed islands known as
"Senkaku/Diaoyu" islands were not named by this treaty, but
Japan annexed these uninhabited islands to Okinawa Prefecture
in 1895. Japan asserts this move was taken independently of the
treaty ending the war, and China asserts that they were implied as Japan–China peace treaty, 17 April
part of the cession of Taiwan. 1895

Additionally, China was to pay Japan 200 million taels

(8,000,000 kg/17,600,000 lb) of silver as war reparations. The Qing government also signed a
commercial treaty permitting Japanese ships to operate on the Yangtze River, to operate
manufacturing factories in treaty ports and to open four more ports to foreign trade. Russia, Germany
and France in a few days made the Triple Intervention, however, and forced Japan to give up the
Liaodong Peninsula in exchange for another 30 million taels of silver (equivalent to about 450 million
yen).

After the war, the Qing government paid 200 million Kuping taels, or 311,072,865 yen, making the
war a net profit for Japan, as their war fund was only 250,000,000 yen. [104]

Japanese invasion of Taiwan

"The cession of the island to Japan was received with such disfavour by the Chinese
inhabitants that a large military force was required to effect its occupation. For nearly two
years afterwards, a bitter guerrilla resistance was offered to the Japanese troops, and large
forces — over 100,000 men, it was stated at the time — were required for its suppression.
This was not accomplished without much cruelty on the part of the conquerors, who, in
their march through the island, perpetrated all the worst excesses of war. They had,
undoubtedly, considerable provocation. They were constantly ambushed by enemies, and
their losses from battle and disease far exceeded the entire loss of the whole Japanese
army throughout the Manchurian campaign. But their revenge was often taken on
innocent villagers. Men, women, and children were ruthlessly slaughtered or became the
victims of unrestrained lust and rapine. The result was to drive from their homes
thousands of industrious and peaceful peasants, who, long after the main resistance had
been completely crushed, continued to wage a vendetta war, and to generate feelings of
 hatred which the succeeding years of conciliation and good government have not wholly
eradicated." – The Cambridge Modern History, Volume 12[105]

Several Qing officials in Taiwan resolved to resist the cession of Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, and on 23 May declared the island to be an independent Republic of Formosa. On 29
May, Japanese forces under Admiral Motonori Kabayama landed in northern Taiwan, and in a five-
month campaign defeated the Republican forces and occupied the island's main towns. The campaign
effectively ended on 21 October 1895, with the flight of Liu Yongfu, the second Republican president,
and the surrender of the Republican capital Tainan.

Aftermath
The Japanese success during the war was the result of the
modernisation and industrialisation embarked upon two decades
earlier.[107] The war demonstrated the superiority of Japanese
tactics and training from the adoption of a Western-style military.
The Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy
inflicted a string of defeats on the Chinese through foresight,
endurance, strategy and power of organisation. Japan's prestige
rose in the eyes of the world, and the victory reflected the success
of the Meiji Restoration. Japan suffered only a small loss of lives
Satirical drawing in the magazine
and treasure in return for the dominance of Taiwan, the
Punch[106] (29 September 1894),
Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula in China. Its decisions of
showing the victory of "small" Japan
abandoning the policy of isolation and learning advanced policy
over "large" China
from Western countries also became a good example for other
Asian countries to follow. As a result of the war, Japan started to
have equal status with the Western powers,[108] and its victory
established Japan as the dominant power in Asia.[109][nb 3] It also heightened Japanese ambitions of
aggression and military expansion in Asia. Because Japan had benefited a lot from the treaty, it
stimulated Japanese ambition to continue to invade China and made the Chinese national crisis
unprecedentedly serious. The degree of semi-colonisation was greatly deepened. After Japan's victory,
the other imperialist powers thought that they could also get benefits from China. They then started to
partition China over the next few years.

For China, the war revealed the high level of corruption present in the government and policies of the
Qing administration. Although the Qing court had invested heavily in modern ships for the Beiyang
Fleet, the institutional weakness of the Qing did not allow the development of effective naval
power.[110] Traditionally, China viewed Japan as a subordinate part of the Chinese cultural sphere.
China had been defeated by European powers in the 19th century, but defeat at the hands of an Asian
power was a bitter psychological blow. Xenophobic sentiment and agitation grew, which would
culminate in the Boxer Rebellion five years later. The Manchu people were devastated by the fighting
during the First Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Rebellion, with massive casualties sustained during
the wars. It was then driven into extreme suffering and hardship in Beijing and northeastern
China.[111]

Japan had achieved what it had set out to accomplish and ended Chinese influence over Korea, but it
had been forced to relinquish the Liaodong Peninsula (Port Arthur) in exchange for an increased
financial indemnity. The European powers, especially Russia, had no objection to the other clauses of
the treaty but felt that Japan should not gain Port Arthur since they had their own ambitions in that
part of the world. Russia persuaded Germany and France to join in applying diplomatic pressure on
Japan, which resulted in the Triple Intervention of 23 April 1895.

Korea proclaimed itself the Korean Empire and announced its

independence from the Qing Empire. The Japanese-sponsored
Gabo reforms of 1894–1896 transformed Korea. Legal slavery was
abolished in all forms, the yangban class lost all special privileges,
outcastes were abolished; equality of law was declared; equality of
opportunity in the face of social background was established, child
marriage was abolished; Hangul was to be used in government
documents, Korean history was introduced in schools, the Chinese Convention of retrocession of the
calendar was replaced with the Gregorian calendar, education was Liaodong Peninsula, 8 November
expanded, and new textbooks were written.[51] 1895

Although Japan had succeeded in eliminating Chinese influence

over Korea, Russia seemed to reap the initial benefits. In 1895, a pro-Russian official attempted to
remove the King of Korea to the Russian legation, and a second attempt later succeeded. Thus, for a
year, the King reigned from the Russian legation in Seoul. The concession to build a Seoul-Inchon
railway that had been granted to Japan in 1894 was revoked and granted to Russia. Russian guards
guarded the king in his palace even after he had left the Russian legation.

China's defeat precipitated an increase in railway construction in the country, as foreign powers
demanded China make railway concessions.[112][113]

In 1898, Russia signed a 25-year lease on the Liaodong Peninsula

and proceeded to set up a naval station at Port Arthur. Although
that infuriated the Japanese, they were more concerned with the
Russian encroachment in Korea than in Manchuria. Other
powers, such as France, Germany, and Britain, took advantage of
the situation in China and gained land, port, and trade
concessions at the expense of the decaying Qing dynasty. Qingdao
was acquired by Germany, Guangzhouwan by France, and
Weihaiwei and the New Territories by Britain.[114]

Tensions between Russia and Japan would increase in the years

after the First Sino-Japanese War. During the Boxer Rebellion, an
eight-member international force was sent to suppress and quell
the uprising; Russia sent troops into Manchuria as part of that
force. After the suppression of the Boxers, the Russian
government agreed to vacate the area. However, by 1903, it had
actually increased the size of its forces in Manchuria.
Western Powers tried to divide their
Negotiations between the two nations (1901–1904) to establish interests and influence in China in
mutual recognition of respective spheres of influence (Russia over the aftermath of the First Sino-
Manchuria and Japan over Korea) were repeatedly and Japanese War.
intentionally stalled by the Russians.[115] They felt that they were
strong and confident enough not to accept any compromise and
believed that Japan would not go to war against a European power. Russia also had intentions to use
Manchuria as a springboard for further expansion of its interests in the Far East. In 1903, Russian
soldiers began construction of a fort at Yongnampo but stopped after Japanese protests.[116]

In 1902, Japan formed an alliance with Britain, the terms of which stated that if Japan went to war in
the Far East and a third power entered the fight against Japan, Britain would come to the aid of the
Japanese.[117] That was a check to prevent Germany or France from intervening militarily in any
future war against Russia. Japan sought to prevent a repetition of the Triple Intervention, which
deprived it of Port Arthur. The British reasons for joining the alliance were to check the spread of
Russian expansion into the Pacific area,[118] to strengthen Britain's focus on other areas, and to gain a
powerful naval ally in the Pacific.

Increasing tensions between Japan and Russia were results of Russia's unwillingness to compromise
and the prospect of Korea falling under Russia's domination and thus coming into conflict with and
undermining Japan's interests. Eventually, Japan was forced to take action. That would be the
deciding factor and catalyst leading to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05.

See also
▪ History of China
▪ History of Japan
▪ History of Korea
▪ History of Taiwan
▪ Military history of China
▪ Military history of Japan
▪ Sino-Japanese relations

References

Notes
1. A Korean historian stated that "the Chinese government began to turn its former tributary state
into a semi-colony and its policy toward Korea substantially changed to a new imperialistic one
where the suzerain state demanded certain privileges in her vassal state".[34]
2. "On the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, China appeared, to undiscerning observers, to possess
respectable military and naval forces. Praise for Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army and other Chinese
forces was not uncommon, and the Peiyang Navy elicited considerable favourable comment.
When war between China and Japan appeared likely, most Westerners thought China had the
advantage. Her army was vast, and her navy both outnumbered and outweight Japan's. The
German general staff considered a Japanese victory improbable. In an interview with Reuters,
William Lang predicted defeat for Japan. Lang thought that the Chinese navy was well-drilled, the
ships were fit, the artillery was at least adequate, and the coastal forts were strong. Weihaiwei, he
said, was impregnable. Although Lang emphasized that everything depended on how China's
forces were led, he had faith that 'in the end, there is no doubt that Japan must be utterly
crushed'."[60]
3. "A new balance of power had emerged. China's millennia-long regional dominance had abruptly
ended. Japan had become the pre-eminent power of Asia, a position it would retain throughout the
twentieth century". Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perception, Power, and
Primacy.

Citations
1. Paine 2003, p. 303.
 2. Kim 2012, p. 304.
3. Jowett 2013, p. 37.
4. "...Japan was at the forefront of hegemonic wars in a quest to extend the Japanese hegemony
over Korea to the entire Asia-Pacific region – the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–95 to gain
dominance in Korea" The Two Koreas and the Great Powers, Cambridge University Press, 2006,
page 2.
5. Paine 2003, pp. 3.
6. Jansen 2002, p. 343.
7. Jansen 2002, p. 335.
8. Kim 2012, p. 279.
9. Kim 2012, p. 281.
10. Kim 2012, p. 284.
11. Kim 2012, p. 285.
12. Seth 2011, p. 234.
13. Seth 2011, pp. 234–235.
14. Seth 2011, p. 235.
15. Kim 2012, p. 287.
16. Kim 2012, p. 288.
17. Kim 2012, p. 289.
18. Kim 2012, p. 290.
19. Keene 2002, p. 372.
20. Kim 2012, p. 289; Keene 2002, p. 373.
21. Keene 2002, p. 373.
22. Duus 1998, p. 49.
23. Duus 1998, p. 51.
24. Duus 1998, p. 52.
25. Duus 1998, p. 50.
26. Kim 2012, p. 282.
27. Keene 2002, p. 374.
28. Seth 2011, p. 236.
29. Keene 2002, p. 376.
30. Keene 2002, p. 377.
31. Seth 2011, p. 237.
32. Kim 2012, p. 293; Seth 2011, p. 237.
33. Kim 2012, p. 293.
34. Duus 1998, p. 54.
35. Kim 2002, p. 293.
36. Seth 2011, p. 238.
37. Kim 2012, p. 294.
38. Kim 2012, p. 294; Paine 2003, p. 59.
39. Kim 2012, p. 295.
40. Paine 2003, p. 59.
41. Seth, p. 445
42. Jansen 2002, p. 431.
43. James McClain, "Japan a Modern History", 297
44. Elleman 2001, p. 96.
45. Paine 2003, p. 113.
46. Olender 2014, p. 42.
47. James Z. Gao, "Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800–1949)", 120
48. Olender 2014, pp. 42-43.
49. Olender 2014, p. 43.
50. Olender 2014, p. 44.
51. Seth, Michael J (2010). A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=WJtMGXyGlUEC). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 225.
ISBN 978-0-7425-6716-0.
52. Kwang-Ching 1978, p. 105.
53. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 12.
54. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 36.
55. Olender 2014, p. 39.
56. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 38.
57. Schencking 2005, p. 81.
58. Olender 2014, p. 30.
59. Olender 2014, p. 31.
60. Kwang-Ching 1978, pp. 268–269.
61. Kwang-Ching 1978, p. 269.
62. Jowett 2013, p. 21.
63. Jowett 2013, p. 24.
64. Jowett 2013, p. 19.
65. Jowett 2013, p. 27.
66. Elleman 2001, p. 99.
67. Jowett 2013, pp. 24–25.
68. Jowett 2013, p. 38.
69. Jowett 2013, p. 25.
70. Sondhaus 2001, pp. 169–170.
71. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 39.
72. Chang 2013, pp. 182–184.
73. Chang 2013, pp. 160–161.
74. "董福祥与西北马家军阀的的故事 – 360Doc个人图书馆" (https://web.archive.org/web/20181214121
754/http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0526/12/1256060_29592130.shtml). Archived from the
original (http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0526/12/1256060_29592130.shtml) on 2018-12-14.
Retrieved 2014-10-30.
75. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 40.
76. Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 41.
77. Paine 2003, p. 133.
78. Sequence of events, and numbers of rescued and dead, taken from several articles from The
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Bibliography
▪ Chang, Jung (2013). The Concubine Who Launched Modern China: Empress Dowager Cixi. New
York: Anchor Books. ISBN 9780307456700.
▪ Duus, Peter (1998). The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea. University of
California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-92090-3.
▪ Elleman, Bruce A. (2001). Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989. Routledge.
ISBN 978-0-415-21474-2.
▪ Schencking, J. Charles (2005). Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, And The Emergence Of The
Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868–1922. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-4977-0.
▪ Keene, Donald (2002). Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912 (https://archive.org/det
ails/emperorofjapanme00keen). New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-12341-9.
▪ Kim, Jinwung (2012). A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict.
New York: Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-00024-8.
▪ Evans, David C; Peattie, Mark R (1997). Kaigun: strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
ISBN 978-0-87021-192-8.
▪ Jansen, Marius B. (2002). The Making of Modern Japan (https://archive.org/details/makingofmode
rnja00jans). Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-00334-7.
▪ Jansen, Marius B. (1995). The Emergence of Meiji Japan. Cambridge University Press.
ISBN 978-0-521-48405-3.
▪ Jowett, Philip (2013). China's Wars: Rousing the Dragon 1894-1949. Bloomsbury Publishing.
ISBN 978-1-47280-673-4.
▪ Kwang-Ching, Liu (1978). John King Fairbank (ed.). The Cambridge History of China. Volume 11,
Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911 Part 2 (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press.
ISBN 978-0-521-22029-3.
▪ Lone, Stewart (1994). Japan's First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China,
1894–1895. New York: St. Martin's Press.
▪ Olender, Piotr (2014). Sino-Japanese Naval War 1894–1895. MMPBooks.
ISBN 978-83-63678-30-2.
▪ Paine, S. C. M. (2017). The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the
Pacific War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-01195-3.
▪ Paine, S.C.M (2003). The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy.
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-81714-1.
▪ Palais, James B. (1975). Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea. Harvard University Asia Center.
ISBN 978-0-674-68770-7.
▪ Seth, Michael J. (2011). A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present. Rowman & Littlefield.
ISBN 978-0-742-56715-3.
▪ Sondhaus, Lawrence (2001). Naval Warfare, 1815–1914. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-21477-3.
▪ Willmott, H. P. (2009). The Last Century of Sea Power: From Port Arthur to Chanak, 1894–1922,
Volume 1. Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-25300-356-0.
▪ Zachmann, Urs Matthias (2009). China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the
Japanese Discourse on National Identity, 1895-1904. Routledge. ISBN 978-0415481915.

Further reading
▪ Kim, Chong Ik Eugene, and Han-kyo Kim. Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Univ
of California Press, 1967).
▪ Mutsu, Munemitsu. (1982). Kenkenroku (trans. Gordon Mark Berger). Tokyo: University of Tokyo
Press. ISBN 978-0-86008-306-1; OCLC 252084846 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/252084846)
▪ Morse, Hosea Ballou. (1918). The international relations of the Chinese empire (https://archive.org
/details/internationalrel1917mors2) vol 2 1861–1893
▪ Shan, Patrick Fuliang (2018). Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal, The University of British Columbia
Press. ISBN 9780774837781.
▪ Morse, Hosea Ballou. (1918). The international relations of the Chinese empire (https://archive.org
/details/internationalrel1917mors3) vol 3 1894–1916

External links
▪ 程映虹︰從"版畫事件"到《中國向西行進》Peter Perdue 濮德培和中國當代民族主義 (https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20101126223946/http://ncn.org/view.php?id=74846) (in Chinese)
▪ Detailed account of the naval Battle of the Yalu River (http://www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/1894
YaluBattle.htm) by Philo Norton McGiffen
▪ Under the Dragon Flag – My Experiences in the Chino-Japanese War (http://www.gutenberg.org/e
books/16407) by James Allan
▪ Print exhibition at MIT (http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_02/index.html)
▪ The Sinking of the Kowshing – Captain Galsworthy's Report (https://web.archive.org/web/2008031
1074213/http://www.russojapanesewar.com/galsworthy.html)
▪ SinoJapaneseWar.com A detailed account of the Sino-Japanese War (http://SinoJapaneseWar.co
m)
▪ The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: as seen in prints and archives (http://www.jacar.go.jp/engli
sh/jacarbl-fsjwar-e/index.html) (British Library/Japan Center for Asian Historical Records)
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