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    Policy Networks, Policy Communities & The Problems of Governance - Michael M. Atkinson & William D. Coleman

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    Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance MICHAEL M. ATKINSON and WILLIAM D. COLEMAN This ere reviews and enauates the erature on policy networks and policy commits that has emerged in the comparative publi pay eld "eargues ha these concept are important novation eau hey suggest «renewed attempt to be bak encompassing and discriminating in dese ing the pig prose: encompassing because they refer 10 tre and relationships inthe pay process tha ak us beyond pita bureaucratic Felatonships; discriminating becuse they sugest the presence of many ommuits and diferent types of networs. Yet f the concepts are going to continue to mate a contiuton, some probes mast be resoved. The arte suggests ther that ae particalrly important: network and com Imunity concepts encounter estces in incorporating the influence of ma ropoiizal institution and the per of pia dicours; they have some “fully in accommodating the intrationaiation of any policy do- Inains; they have not addesed well the sues of plicy innovation and ig change ‘The past decade has witnessed two important and related changes in the academic study of public policy. Fst, society-driven models of the policy process have given way to models in which the institutions of the state are understood to have considerable autonomy. The idea that policy emanates from interests that are organized in solely has not, by ‘any means, been ently eclipsed, but there has been a general recog. nition that original images of responsive politicians end compliant bu- feaucrats need to be amended, Stadents of comparative sate theory have led this revival of interest in the autonomous role of state inst tutions, but rational choice theorists have aststed by emphasizing the selFinterested behavior of state ofcils. Although researcher in these traditions have itl in common methodologically (or ideologically for that matter), they share the belie that the state is not an inert entity ‘shaped by historical struggles and liable to capture by society's strongest interests, Rather, the sate is an active agent, molding sodety and the interests of officeholders sometimes a8 much as, or more than, the interests ofeizens. ir: An nation! ou of ay ad Aditi Va 8,2 Ap 192 (Gleam te Iteration Pla sence Aeocaton ESN SIRS” POLICY NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE 155 Second, traditional pluralist conceptions ofthe organization of societal interests have been expanded and, to some degree at leat, amended, ‘Models of the policy process in which a host of groups compete with ‘one another fo organize and representa ich variety of interests shared by overaping segments of society ae now sen 1 be relevant oly in stlected instances. Whatever its genealogy, pluralist imagery has given way to a vaviely of altemative models that stress the difcltes of organizing and maintaining interests, the uneven character of organi- zation, the privileged status of business, and variations in state capac. “To some extent, these changes in conceptual apparatus ae inked $2 changes in the real word. Its eich, for example, to note that govers- ‘ments have grown in size and complenty. Some areas of governance, in particular the management of macro-economic policy instruments, began only with the Second World War. Other areas, including the expansion of social welfare systems were responses tothe Great Depres= sion. Part of the Keynesian legacy is that politcal authories in ad- vanced capitalist societies are now held responsible for ensuring that their citizens enjoy a minimum standard of socal wellbeing. Conse- {quenlly, where It was once assumed that the decsions of firms and individuals alone created economic dislocation, governments are now ‘obliged to share a large measure of responsiblity Public sector managers have discovered that in shouldering this re- sponsibility, they cannot rly exclusively on traditional organizational forms styled on the Weberian model of bureaucracy. Accordingly, state ‘managers have searched for new means to accomplish unfamiliar, and ‘often unwelcome, tasks, Independent regulatory agencies were among the first organizational innovations. They have been followed in recent years by med corporations, joint ventures and, most recently, service- ‘rented public bureaucracies. For moder sates, the problem has be- come one of maintaining wlkimate contol yet sharing the exercise of public authority. Publi officals want to escape blame, but also to aim Gredit. They want to husband politcal power, but they mast mobilize Social forees to obtain it in the first place. As a result, the range of borganized groups and sate forms has expanded considerably. ‘Of course, changes in policymaking models are aso a function of Intellectual dynamics. Postwar pluralist imagery wat direct reaction agains the idea that constitutional formulae — for example, ministerial ‘esponsibility or the separation of powers — were the sole or primary key to understanding govemance, Pluralst descriptions of the policy process directed attention away fom the strcture of the state and foward the more fluid, less predictable world of group politics. The ‘subsequent retum to institutions and the structure of government — ‘captured conveniently in the phrase, “bringing the state back in” — thas been an almost predictable reaction tothe reaction. Although pli- rast models were orginally defended as realistic rather than idealistic, these versions of the policy process are no longer seen as entirely authentic themselves. Somehow, room had to be made for the state's Capacity to define legitimate interests, shape politcal organization, and ‘Incorporate societal actors into policymaking, Those who never doubled the importance of legislatures, executives and bureaucracies are now Invited t propose their vn version of sate-socety relationships "Policy network" and the related notion of “policy community” con- stitte fwo of the most important conceptual innovations to emerge from this more catholic approach to the policy process. Although these terms have diferent meanings indifferent hands, they suggest ¢ e- ‘newed attempt tobe both encompassing and discriminating in desenb- {ng the policy process: encompassing because they refer to actors and relationships in the policy process that ake us beyond politica burea- ‘atic relationships; discriminating because they suggest the presence ff many communities and different types of networks. They allow that the word ofstate-society relations is richly varied and deny that there |s any advantage in working toward a single mode In this article we evaluate recent attempts to define and use the policy community/policy network concepts, then turn our attention to three ‘ts of problems that beset these conceptual formulae. Fist, we spec Ulae on whether these notions are nothing more than minor variations fon the dominant pluralist theme. The weakness of pluralist versions of the state is refleted in the probleme that network and community ‘concepts encounter in incorporating the influence of macropolitcl in Stiutions and the power of politcal discourse. Second, given that these concepts have been developed primal for study at national and sub- rational levels, It Is not clear how they can accommodate the interna- Sonalization of many policy domains. Finaly, while its evident that networks and communities change, very itl theorizing has been done fn the subject of diachronic dynamics. [NETWORKS AND COMMUNITIES Most students ofthe policy process want to generalize. They may be experts in ome or another policy area, but they typically aspie to say Something about policymabing in genera dell something that op ples toa number of diferent pli pytems. Hence the search for Frage bullet,” concept or image that tavels across poly domains and pli systems yet aia some measure of relevance and di tietveness. Such a concep would encourage comparisons, suggest FOLCY NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES & PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE, 157 hnypotheses and help draw together knowledge of an increasingly frag- ‘mented policy process. ‘Such ffagmentation has become a particularly significant obstade to the generation ofa coherent body of knowledge. Study after study has shown us that, within the same politcal system things work differently in agriculture, transportation, monetary policy, and so on. We have been forced to accept that, in advanced expitalist economies, the policy process differs considerably across policy domains, Nor do sectors pro- Vide a way out: studies ofthe same policy sector across different states Yl diverse findings as well. Some domains are dominated by afew Actors representing smite st of interests; in others the organizational ‘cology is complex and the interests are widely varied. Many policy domains remain the preserve of conventional tade associations, but ‘many others also contain singleissue groups, professional lobbyists, and think tanks under varied sponsorship. Tinan increasing numberof policy areas, posessing technical capacity and detailed information has become crical to effective patipatin, For those who have such expertise, the exchange of information be- tneeen sate and private ators can create privileged relationships from Which the uninitiated are excluded. In some ofthese policy arenas the technical requirements are so demanding that societal actors have been delegated the authority to implement policy. In others the state has resources at last as impressive as those possessed by the most powerful forces in society. Here state actors jealously guard thelr prerogatives and resist collaboration or even information sharing, ‘So, generalizations do not come easly. Researchers now recognize that in all countries the patter of governance will vary (sometimes significantly) across policy subsystems, The dominant pattern In agi culture may be fundamentally diferent from the one that prevails in, Say, energy. Any images oF models ofthe policy process have to be Sulliciently elastic to stretch across a variety Of polly sectors. Policy network” and "policy community” are one set of concepts that appear to possess the requied elastic. For many years socolo- fists employed the concept of a network in studies of socal commu ‘ication in mall groups and in large organizations. More recently, the concept has been used in the study of communication patterns that favor product innovation in congeries of small firms (Powell 1985) Political scientists have used the term "policy network" more loosely to refer to dependency relationships that emerge between both organiza- tions and individuals who are in frequent contact with one another in particular policy areas (Benson 1982, 148) The term "policy community” has a more anthropological flavor. Hecio and Wildavsky (1978) for ex- ample, used this term fo denote the “shared feamework" within which = [MICHAEL M. ATKINSON snd WILLIAM D. COLEMAN the Treasury decision-making takes place. Although the term has been employed in a number of ways since, it sill suggests "a commonly understood belie system, code of conduct, and established pattern of behaviour” (Pross 1986, 98) “The metaphoric character ofthese terms in political science has invited Aefinitional disputes. For example, there are those who propose that “network” should be the master concept, and that policy community is best understood as a type of network Thus Rhodes defines policy community as a network characterized by stable relationships, esti: tive membership, vertical interdependence and insulation from other networks and institutions (Rhodes 19866). Networks that are less stable, less restrictive and so on, are given different names. Wilks and Wright (2987) employ an alternative approach. For them, the policy community refers to all actors or potential actors who share either an interest in & policy area or a common “policy focus” and who, over time, succeed In shaping policy. They reserve the term “policy network” for desebing ‘the nature ofthe "inking process” that occurs within this community CColeman and Skogstad (199s) adopt essentially the same distinction. For them, a policy network refer to “the properties that characterize the relationships among the particular set f actors that forme around an issue of importance tothe policy community” (Coleman and Skog- stad 1990, 26). Thus the community refers tothe actors; the network refers to the relationships among acters. particularly inthe subvgovern- ‘Although some have suggested that this dispute be settled by def- rtional fat (Jordan 1950), i seems unlikely that forced closure wil end the terminological debate that has emerged. Part of the reason that researchers ude identical terms to refer to rather different phenomena is thatthe phenomena themselves — relationships among, societal ac tors, politicians and bureaucrats — are rather more complex than fist imagined. All researchers seek roughly the same objective: a way of desenbing complex relationships In particular policy areas that will assist in understanding policy outcomes. However, ax concepts, neither ‘network nor community can convey very mach ofthis complexity. They are broad, inclusive terms that have so far retained thelr essentially ‘metaphorical qualities. Lending more precision to these concepts =. (quires farther conceptual refinement and itis this endeavor that lads {e terminological disagreements (Ofcourse, the reason these concepts are attracting any interest at Js thelr evident relevance for two key questions of policy analysis, namely who participates and who wields power. On the fst of these ‘questions, who participates, bath “network” and “community” convey the impression of order in the midst of chaos. Those who have sdied POLICY NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES & PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE 197 1 in advanced capitalist systems Know that interpersonal land interorganizational relations have become extraordinarly complex For researchers the inital task is to trace interactions, fist atthe level of individuals, then groups and finally communities. Sociologists are [past masters at this enterprise. By breaking down social exchanges ino their component parts and then reassembling them into networks, they hhave worked toward theories that explain how paricla patterns are sustained (e.g, Wier and Anderson, 198). "Hugh Hedbo's concept of “issue network" echoes this sociological approsch. He uses the term to suggest a policymaking process that is ‘Hagmented and populated by a wide and unpredicable number of ts (Heo 1978). Heco focuses his discussion at the micro level, that is on the relaonships that prevail among individuals. The backgrounds ofthese individuals and their career profiles are the key to the emerging system he finds, a system that borders on chaos Kies (1982) study of networks in Switzerland, which borrows even more direcly from Sociological network analysis, reveals, in contrast, @ highly structured and ordered polities system. 'Not everyone shares thie preference for anchoring networks and communities in exchanges among individuals. Others have employed the term “network” exclusively at the meso level, the level of groups ‘nd organizations (Rhodes 1990). Rather than buld their networks from the batiom up, beginning with individuals in contact with one ancther, they have begun with public and private organizations in a system. But whatever the level of analysis, communities or networks have conceptual appeal because they convey, simultaneously, the impression of inclusiveness and excusiveness. Networks have shape and identity, but they are also open systems that do not have clear boundaries, Communities suggest a more organic connection among participants, but they too ae relatively open. The question then becomes: how open? ‘And with that question comes several others: what fs the price of ‘sdmission and how integrated ie the network or community? ‘As Jordan (199) points out, eary formations ofthe network concept by American politcal séentists used expressions such a= "whitipools of activity” and “web of relationships in the subsystem” 0 convey the lage of fuid relationships tha invalved participants from a variety of ‘nastutiona sites in decentralized systems of mutual dependence. Sub- sequent research uncovered considerable variation inthe integration of networks. Pethaps the most integrated network isthe sovalled “Iron trlangle,” a concept developed in the 1960s in the United States to dlescnbe a mutually supportive relationship between relevant congres- Sonal committees, inlerest assocations and government bureaus. Co- ‘operation is Based on the support that each party gives the others in a closed process in which politcal and economic surpluses are privately spproprated. this image sil enoys considerable currency, its appli iy beyond the American congressional system has aay been suspect. Some of these triangular and, in pariamentary systems, bipartite trac. tures have proven remarkably resistant to outside intrusion, a9 Wilson's (1950) study of "wilderness polities” in Canada illustrates, But the pat terns one of increasing complet. Even in the United States, the ton triangle concept applies only fo inited and perhaps shrinking number ‘of policy areas (Jordan 1961, 99, anything hs characterized the policy ‘process in recent years i the entry of 2 prolferation of voumtary ‘sociations and publ interest groups that were previously thought (0 be unorganized and virtually unorganzable (Walker 1983; Olsen 1966). ‘These groupe, and other institutional actors such a loal governments, corporations, and universities (Salisbury 1984), have interupted oy relationships and given legislator and others the tools to break up even iron tangles ‘So while iron tangles may est, they it on a continuum as exer lars of one ofthe mos integrated ofa wide range of policy networks. ‘This variation in networks has been ilustated well by Lauimann and Knoke whose study of the energy and health sectors in the United ‘States has set the standard among sociologists who alm a the cael ssection of policy networks. Calling health and energy “policy do- tains,” these authors develop exchange modes of organization in. teraction in which “resources” are the medium of exchange and “events” the conditions under which organizational exchange takes place (Laumann and Knoke 1967). Among other thing, thir analysis Indicate thatthe health domain is characterized by networks far more Integrated than those found in energy and that dierent organizations dlominate in each domain professional organizations in helt, business tions in energy, Bat each domain possesses an underlying sa Seat danty ya amueamenar “This is frst step in the use ofthe network and community concepts, butit doesnot take us far enough. For one thing Laumann and Knoke's research confi what casual observers already recognize, namely that Specific decision-making events draw on only sited numberof those ‘who might potentially be involved. The fact that policy networks are ‘elsively open-ended means that ii not posible to pedi with any Contidence just who wil paripate in which event. Thus the authors Conclude thatthe energy and health domaine ae highly differentiated and that policy outcomes “ae the product of decentralized contention ‘mong a plurality of organizations” (Laumann and Knoke 1987, 375 ‘0. Ths Conclusion isa sound and cautous one, Buti 8 not very POLICY NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES & PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE 16 ‘encouraging. Networks can be identified, but that information alone Part ofthe problem is methodological. The network and community concepts, to their credit, have refocused attention on politcal actors in interaction. By their nature, communities suggest people in commini- Cation with one another; networks suggest contact These concepts ‘return individual actors to center stage and invite researchers to map ‘ther relations with one another. The difficulty is that sophisticated attempts to map interactions and create complex network typologies too often pay inadequate attention to the content of relationships. We are told that networks consist of exchange relationships, but what is the structural context in which these exchanges fake place? Are there relationships of power and dependency that tanscend and color indi- idual wansactions? Ifthe answer to this last question is “yes,” then we will ave to reach ‘beyond transactional analysis to posit the structural conditions in which Interaction occurs. That, networks will have tobe distinguished from ‘one another by more than their level of integration, their degree of ‘openness or even by the coalitions that have formed around certain policy options. As Scharpf points out, even when the substance of policy choices is factored into the analysis of networks, the connection between the networks on the one hand, and process and outcome variables on the other, it often underdeveloped (Echarpt 1990), To bridge that gap it willbe necessary to focus on institutional variables, such as the level of centralization and professionalism that characterizes organizations in a network, and on Ideological variables, such as the intellectual foundations of dominant world views in pardcula policy “This kind of network analysis has already begun. The structural prop ties of state agencies and organized interests have been used to gen- crate a typology of policy networks based on distinctive patterns of power and dependency. Policy networks have been described as cor porats,state-drected, collaborative or pluralist — not simply on the basis of who participates, but also on the basis of the distrbution of organizational resources within the network (Coleman and Skogstad 1960s; Atkinson and Coleman 1989; Cawson, et al 1987). Tis structural interpretation of policy networks does not inckide an ideological di- ‘mension, but there is no reason why networks cannot also be distine {ished in terms of ideological resources The point is that research Premised on an appreciation ofthe content and structure of networks ‘wil have to press well beyond the question of how integrated or open they are. The later properties are probably best understood as fetures| of the policy community. Networks, on the other hand, should be ie MICHAEL M, ATKINSON and WILLIAM D. COLEMAN distinguished bythe properties that characterize the relationships inside ‘these communities. "Ambiguities surrounding the use of these terme should not be al- lowed t0 overshadow the fact thatthe concepts of network and com- ‘munity have assisted public policy studies, They have sifted attention from policymaking in national natisatons to policymaking in subeys- tems and sectors. In the proces, institutionally imposed boundaries 19 research have been broken down and replaced by 4 more uid and less restricted view of the policy process. The orginal idea that groups are ‘exclusively policy advocates has given way to the view that some ‘groups, pariculatly those with appropriate organizational qualities, are ‘apable of sharing in the exercise of politcal power. Moreover, societal parlcipation inthe policy process is by no means restricted to interest {roups, The network and community concept Ienve open to empirical esearch the question of which societal actors, possessed of which i Stitutional properties, participate in a given policy domain. Any actors holding technical knowledge — whether these be expert committees of trade associations, large corporations, universities, private research in- stitutes, or even trade unions — have become potentially racial partic pans in the policy process of any advanced capitalist economy. Just as the network and community concepts have brosdened and Aeepened the analysis of societal actor, they also have forced a recon- ‘eration of the role of formal Iireancate ineiitione in the poly process, From this perspective i is no longer clear that technical and Policy knowledge can always be marshalled and managed in hierar hie, In many instances rigid bureaucrat stractures are giving way £9 Sell-organizing networks as means of coping with the complesity ce- ited by conditions of reciprocal interdependence (Scharpf 199). Simi Tanly, networks are also ways of compensating for the deficiencies of market coardination, since price signals cannot be relied upon to pro- ‘duce mutually beneficial exchanges or optimal levels of cooperation. Inshort, networks and communities are natural conceptual responses to both the limits of maskets and hierarchical arrangements, 10 the ‘enormous expansion inthe types of societal actors involved in policy making and tothe dspersion of specialized policy resources (Kenis and ‘Schneider 191)..As Pross (198, 132) has noted, there i iti point in continuing to work with concepts designed fr a period when “I land government were much less complicated” (Pross 1986, 132). Une fortunately, ts not posable to conclude with a complete endorsement ‘of the theorizing that has been done or the research that has been Conducted under this conceptual umbrella. Apart fom the concepéal {sues already touched upon, those sho would use the networklcam- munity concepts must cope with thre challenges: theorizing the con POLICY NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES & FROSLEMS OF GOVERNANCE 163 nection between networks, communities and broader politcal institu: ‘Sons integrating international levels of decisionmaking into studies that have been confined tothe nation state only; and conceptualizing pattems of change in networks, REAGGREGATING THE STATE: THE PROBLEM OF PLURALISM. By breaking the policy process into sectoral and subsectoral compo- rents, the poicy community and policy network concepts have count fered the tendency to generalize haphazardly about macropotital pro- cesses. For example, this research has offered a exigue ofthe strong Slataweak state distinction and has argued for a more nuanced appre ‘dation of strength and weakness based on the characteristic of sectoral policy networks (Atkinson and Coleman 1989). Nevertheless, some oom must be left for the reintegration of macropoiical structures into the analysis of policy outcomes. Having disaggregated the stale, re searchers inthis tadltion are faced with the problem of reaggregating I They must consider how sectoral networks and communities affect the pattern of policy outcomes at the macro level and how national pollical institutions condition policy networks and policy communities, So far, this question has not dominated theorizing. On the contrary, the study of policy networks has tended t0 reinforee an image of the state traditionally found in pluralist theory. In this version, sate thority is seriously fragmented, agencies and bureaus ae in open coat petition, a rich variety of interest groups compete for the attention of Policymakers, and disjointed incrementalism is the dominant policy Style: Moreover, research under the network and community bannet thas uncovered patterns of interaction that reinforce the pluralist mes sage. In their search fora ceneror ore within the complicated system Of policy networks in the United States, John Heinz and his collengues (0980) turned up very litle. Using reputational techniques and the analysis of interactions, they identified set of Washington lobbyists (Cnotables” in their words) whose contacts with one anther form the basis fr elite networks in four policy domains: heath, energy labor and agriculture. Remarkably, they (1990, 380-1) found very few gen- teraliss, that is, people who are active across these areas: “Even though fur list of notables inchudes Washington representatives of great prom inence, accomplishment, and reputed influence, we fnd no dentable ‘core’ actos.” What Heing eal did find was a well developed division oflabor in which the structure of networks is dictated bythe substantive specialization ofthe representative Little wonder then that those whose work has been primarily at the micro and meso levels have concladed that “the modem industrial polity is complex of formal organizations in confit with one anater ‘ver the collective aloetion of saceresourcsr" (Latmann and Kooke Ibe, 8,977) and that te best way fo dene the ove stute of Paley domaine i elt intrest group pluakam (Rhodes and Marsh {opt Some students of pac commurites prefer to tet theses ‘separate entity, rather tan one that shares athonty with groupe {Pre 1986 12) but the concept pert end methodologic ols ‘ot setwork anys mite against tis presumption Se-organiing networks are ot lnited by itetonal boundaries and there i no “Sroping le that preverts them fom expanding fo ince Sate cfc or public bureaucraces(charpt 19904) Thus Lumana and Koke probably capture the imphcntars best when they Sse the Bate at “a complex system of government and nongovermental or- {unzstons that stopp for power and Tlegmacy tn the making of Publ poles affecting domin pariopane”(Latmann and Kaoke {967 The disncion between state and sey Virually spears in this formulation and “the appropiate unt of analysis forse of Policy formation is not theese nderstood in the taiitonal sense Ett the state a coleeton of poy arenas incorporating both govern: ‘mental and private acre” (Laman snd Keak 1987, 9) “the binding of «plurals view ofthe sate and network analyse cemphasze the hes of vation in power eaonships tthe scr Std sabectoa level, bt courage comperson a the level of na Strats ithe ste nothing tore tan" calecon of Plcy irene then ite fo thse arenas that we should presumably repair ‘Comparisons of poly arenas diferent sates make see, bt forts tocompar the pices of whole nations (e.g Zysman 198; Katzen 1985) te probably mingle. Nero aay gives witnsystem ‘aration pre of place and dacourage those who belve tha difer “nt mato practices snd adios ave » poten impact on poy butcomes ‘The fac hat many stadens of networks and communes Seom tobe sated with ater anemic view othe stat i perecty Understandable under these circumstance, the sate an be scree" fly dieggregated and if poly networks hold the ey to understand Tutcomes, then there is ite incentive to reconstate the St or concsve oi anyhing tert an sembly of organ Sonal sors Loge then, comparative public policy wil ake the form of compasdoe within sectors taro ations ‘However isnot quite co eny to dems macropoticl structures, Researchers have foun tical expan control difereces in poly by refer to secon varibles lone. Tis problem emerged Aickny inthe esearch onconpoatam and corporat poly networks ‘Ate outset, the concept wat used to characeiaegovernace srange- POLICY NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES & PROSLEMS OF GOVERNANCE 165 ‘ments at the macropolitial level which involve negotiations between the state and “socal partners,” usually over economic policy. More recently, the concept has come to be used to denote a model of pol ‘ymaking in which the state bargains with Interest associations Who ‘monopolize representation in particular sectors of the economy and "sssume various responsibiles for implementing policy (Schmatter 1982; CCaveson 1986). In closed forums, societal and state actors develop con- sensual arrangements for both generating and distributing resources, ‘The key to corporatism isthe organization of societal interests. Both political order and policy solutions are made possible by the organiza. tion of political interests into hierarchies of groups that bargain with the state over celtic policy Issues. In its most complete form, these Inierachies incorporate all organized interests into peak organizations capable of entering into tripartite negotiations of investment and pro- duction decisions. Thus we have a combination of hierarchy and net ‘work ‘The corporatist model has been widely adapted for study at the sectoral level although not without criticism, see Cox 1988), But it has rot been possible to shake off the impact of macro-poltcl structures ‘The political organization ofthe dairy sector, probably the policy domain most consistently organized slong corporatist lines, Ulustrates the pro- found impact ofthese vanable. There are its tr, bond silanes among, the dairy industries in westem democracies: protectionism Ie ‘common, lobbying is highly developed, and interest asoations pa ticipate in poliey formulation and implementation. Yet there are impor. lant differences as well bargaining takes place within comprehencive peak associations in Austria and Sweden, but notin other counties the delegation of authority to interest assodations is more extensive in ‘Austria, Sweden, Switveland and Germany than its in Balan, the United States and Canada These kinds of diferences are not readily explained by cross-country vasations in industry stracure or ln bi renucratic expertise related to dairying, To account for differences in the networks that have emerged, researchers have been obliged to resort to broader, macropolital factors. Research inspized by the corporatist agenda has taken us beyond the (by now) uncontroversial view that the policy proces fs likely to be diferent from one domain or sector to another, tothe point at which ‘we must acknowledge thet at least some ofthese differences are differ fences in kind, not degree It isnot merely a matter of haw many actors are involved, or how frequent their contacts are with one another: ‘onporatis research has shown that relationships differ in thelr fund ‘mental assumptions. These fundamental assumptions ar often derived from macro-pelical anangements. For example, the competitive ad ry [MICHAEL M, ATKINSON and WILUAM D. COLEMAN verearial character of American poles has been invoked to account for the resistance to corporatist forms in the United States. Corporatst and collaborative networks are simply less likely to develop in instutional events ut me ray pale, Da pee os wr rot equally encouraged in all systems, so no one should be surprised that more restrictive and hierarchical networks will emerge where the virtues of pluralism have a weaker holdover the politeal imagination In shorts notwithstanding the growing populanty of network studies and the continued vitality of pluralist models of policymaking, thoughts ‘of jetsoning macro-level variables seer rather premature. Bven among those who urge the use ofthe network and community concepts, there {san acknowledgement that system-level noms se the context in which networks are formed. For eample, Maurice Wright, after reviewing the Institutional norms of parliamentary government in Britain — the rule ‘of law, natural justice, and parlamentay privilege — suggests that “thas and other sytemic norms provide the genera contours of policy and chou the del of whch ie led i Sie lvl of eet Ploy ‘Stee and within them, ssctors and subsectors (Waght 198 i. eee ere sees ee Seema ervey lee cen es ehawlour of ember of te poly community (ayward 1967, 19) theta g swat ered ls el poy he? Abahepeoeeprogt sty meteor ei ips ees a nara oe Seca Se ee eer cn ttc oe ta ot a es oe i eee ee seein wae ee a eee eee Heme th ere te erat Rie cae ata oon a ee seis eo ee a an SE ee a ae eed SI aly, ki Bee eco aana eer areeg a a epr te hrpeden nee epee) POLICY NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES & PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE. 167 ‘hese macrolevel variables cannot be invoked haphazardly; they must be consciously connected to the development of policy networks. Cole- man has shown, for example, how national policy styles — the “dul polity” in France, the “accommodative, liberal corporat polity” in Germany, and the “adversary py” in Bein, the United States and ~ affect the level of integration and cooperation within the ‘Sisnes action of these counties (Caan 150), Avery pot ites atthe national level generally retards business mobilization, However, within some policy domains, such as environmental reg- ulation and occupational health and safety, there may be significant dliferences within adversary systems. In these domains, Briain, for feample, has developed a relatively informal and fexble system of regulation that places minimal demands on business; in the United States, responsibie agencies rely heavily on thelr rulemaking authority and often display an infleble attitude toward their “cents” (Vogel 1986) The point is that a propery specified model of policy outcomes will ave to define macro level variables accurately and apprecate that thelr effects may differ from one policy domain to another within the same system, ‘Model specification is made more dificult by the fat thatthe rela- tionship between network and community variables, on the one hand, and macro-level variables onthe other, isa reciprocal one. The operation ‘Of networke, for example, will eventually change neional poy styles, albeit very slowly. Ifthe emergence of particular types of networks ‘hanges the manner in which policy Is made in advanced industal ‘economies, then presumably these networks cannot but gradually in- ‘uence the evolution of the sate, Progress toward a multvievel model of the policy proces, in which networks and communities play a cial role, will be hampered by a slavish devotion to pluralist images ofthe state, Although the modern state may be a highly fragmented and divided ent, ts not reducible tots parts nor can it be dissolved into a collection of policy networks. In constitutional democracies, no policymaking institution is an entirely independent entity. The state consist of set of executive, adminis tive, deliberative and adjudicative institutions whose peculiar character and relationship to one another wil influence the integration of policy Communities, the structure of policy networks andthe values nurtured {in both. The cancept of the state recognizes that these insiutions ae Grawn together in the practice both of normal polite, that is the au= thontatve allocation of values, as well as of exss polis, those more dramatic occasions on which the state uses is coercive tools to enforce compliance. The state's capaci to structure and restructure, ofganize ws MICHAEL M. ATKINSON snd WILLIAM D. COLEMAN and reorganize, will differ from system to system, but proceeding to Bnalyze the policy process aif broad state institutions are relevant is 2 misuse ofthe concepts of network and community. “THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF POLICY DOMAINS “The concept of poly network has been developed primary oases zafona pocymaing fom a domeste pot f view: When two oF Store counter ae compre the say nomaly inves the analyse Gr respective domestic networks Thos, whether he stdin are cme partie or ited to one county theses ion the idenieston of Exstlatons of rabonal or cubnatonal ate spences, pcan, ir ‘erat groups, and polls pric. In short wth he important excep fon of poy analy within federal rpc, ply networks have ‘eu obese at» single level of» pital system “Yet the need to incorporate oth nasonal snd iteration level into policy nays has biome Increasing pressing over he past fo Eccles: The tof plc sessed by intertatonal negations, ‘thee’ ats rene! ora global level, has lengthened considera. ‘Secomminitone(Cowhey 198), tanking (Kapsten 1988; Moran 1951), ecuries tring (Mort 1990191; Chuppe Haworth ana Wat tine 990, enironmenal regulation (Grant, Peterson and Whitson {th to name but fo Tis powing interdependence of atone and international arenas should sot tre Sevpments inthe Policy sewers approach inthe fst place specs in interationl relations have encoun- ‘ered the se lterdpendene I eaponse, they have ean hey Gn the same sets of rarabes that ate cual to stadents of Poy ‘ctor Second international ations theorists hve empayed game theory to model ply processes tat take place atoll n short the concep! challenges posed by the international of poy ‘etwork can be met in part at lesb capatsng om te work of iMternatoal reais theent ‘Specs inintematnal itons have begun to distinguish what aight be called ado! foreign poy fom em, emerging een of intematioal poligmmalng (Wnt 198,303, in conan fo ta tional fori polcy these new poy sveas tend to be more Fle ented tan power-reted snd to depend lesson csc iplomacy Sut more on managing technical experise and anes, Accordingly, ‘inka notes, te cult! and sara cimension of reign poy fie way to demands imposed by bureaucrat procedures, inforeaton [iting and inoue manegerent In adon, thew more ech and fulcoresed: intentional negotntons have am Increasingly pro FOLICY NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE 167 ‘nounced impact on national policymaking and on the day-to-day ives of individual citizens, [Not surprisingly, then, some of the policy analysis emerging from international lations resembles the study of domestic policy networks. Winham’s study ofthe Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations admirebly ‘lustrates the convergence. In assessing the factors that determine suc. ‘ess at the negotiating table, he stresses the importance of contol over domestic politics (1986, 343). “Control” in the context refers to the ability of national representatives to deal with three sors of pressures: domestic economic interest groups, the constellation of concerned Dur reaucratic agencies, and “intemal” governments (national governments in the EEC, states or provinces in the United States and Canade) Variations inthe intensity of these pressures across nation-states (in terest groups were stg in the US, provinces important in Canada, the bureaucracy in Japan is then used to explain developments atthe negotisting table. In effect, Winham is arguing that inorder fo account for the wists and tums of interational trade negotiations, one has 0 understand the structure of domestic policy networks. eter Covhey (1990) reaches similar conclusions in hie consideration ofthe “international regimes” literature. Drawing upon a stady of te Jecommunications, he argues that traditional approaches to interna ‘ional regimes have sighted the role of domestic oles. He writes: “National politicians have heen unlikaly to accept any global cepimne that falls (0 reinforce the prefered domestic regime. Global regime change, therefore, has been mos likly to occur when new coalitions ‘sucessfully challenge domestic regulatory bargains in counties with significant impact on the world market” (1950, 171). “Coalition” i the key word in this statement: it requires an examination ofthe strichure of domestic policy networks, thet intemal divisions and the interests oftheir members: Infact, Cowhey describes domestic politics a8 “the primary source of regime change” (1990, 173). [Not ony is there some convergence in policy analysis between inter- rational relations approaches and policy networkpalicy community approaches, but international lations research has also Yieded some theoretical progress for studying mult-level policy networks, Robert Putnam's work on “two-level games” represents one sophisticated at- tempt to treat these interational-domestec linkages. He begins with an ssertion that echoes Winham and Cowhey: "Amore adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international rela: tions must stress pols: pares, socal Gases, interest groups (both ‘economic and non-economic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional arrangements" (1986, 422). In this formulation, the emphasis on domestic political » [MICHAEL M, ATKINSON an WILLIAM D. COLEMAN

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