REMREV1 Compilation of Digests

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Taft Avenue corner Menlo St.,

Pasay City
COMPILATION OF CASE
DIGESTS
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE SUBJECT
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1

FIRST SEMESTER OF A.Y. 2019 – 2020
WEDNESDAY (5:30PM – 8:30PM)
SUBMITTED TO
ATTY. HENEDINO M. BRONDIAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
CASE NO. TITLE PAGE NO.

1 PCGG v. Dumayas 12
2 Escobal v. Garchitorena 13
3 Serana v. Sandiganbayan 14
4 Duncano v. Sandiganbayan 15
5 De Lima v. Guerrero 16
6 City of Manila v. Judge Cuerdo 17
7 CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co. v. Prov. of Nueva Ecija 18
8 Lomondot v. Balindong 19
9 Municipality of Tangkal, Lanao Del Norte v. Balindong 20
10 Dev. Bank of the Phil. v. Carpio 21
11 Unduran v. Aberasturi 22
12 LBP v. Dalauta 23
13 People v. Henry T. Go 24
14 Resident Marine Mammals v. Angelo Reyes 25
15 Regulus Dev. Inc. v. De la Cruz 26
16 Duero v. CA 27
17 Gonzaga v. CA 28
18 Manila Bankers v. Ng Kok Wei 29
19 Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA 30
20 Figueroa v. People 31
21 Agan, Jr. v. Phil. International Air Terminal Co., Inc. 32
22 Liga ng mga Barangay v. Atienza, Jr. 33
23 St. Mary Crusade Foundation, Inc. v. Riel 34
Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction and Development
24 35
Co.
25 Bureau of Customs v. Gallegos 36
26 Katon v. Palanca 37
27 Pat-og Sr. v. Civil Service Commission 38
28 First Sarmiento Property Holdings v. Phil. Bank of Communications 39
B. RULES 1 – 5
29 Alday v. FGU Insurance 41

30 Korea Technologies v. Lerma 42
31 Mercado v. CA 43
32 Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nationale de Paris 44
33 Ruby Shelter Builders v. Formaran 45
34 St. Louis University v. Cobarrubias 46
35 Gipa v. Southern Luzon Institute 47
36 Reyes v. People 48
37 Sy – Vargas v. Estate of Ogsos 49
38 Camaso v. TSM Shipping Inc. 50
39 Dynamic Builders v. Presbiterio 51
40 Relucio v. Lopez 52
41 De Castro v. CA 53
2
42 Orquiola v. CA 54
43 China Banking Corp. v. Oliver 55
44 Lotte Phils. Co. Inc. v. De la Cruz 56
45 Carabeo v. Dingco 57
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association v. Fil Estate Ecocentrum
46 58
Corp.
47 Navarro v. Escobido 59
48 Land Bank v. Cacayuran 60
49 Divinagracia v. Parilla 61
50 Enrique Vda. De Santiago v. Vilar 62
51 Pacific Consultants International Asia v. Schonfield 63
52 Biaco v. Countryside Rural Bank 64
53 BPI Savings Bank v. Sps. Yujuico 65
54 Planters Dev. Bank v. Ramos 66
C. RULES 6 – 9
55 Alba v. Malapajo 68
56 Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy 69
57 Metrobank v. CPR Promotions 70
58 Valdez v. Dabon 71
59 Republic v. Sandiganbayan 72
60 Caneland Sugar Corp. v. Alon 73
61 Alma Jose v. Javellana 74
62 Medado v. Heirs of Antonio Consuing 75
63 COA v. Paler 76
64 Basan v. Coca – Cola Bottlers Phils. 77
65 Uy v. CA 78
66 Bandillon v. LFUC 79
67 People v. Arojado 80
68 Powerhouse Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. Rey 81
69 Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Segundina Cebrero 82
70 Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc. v. Wesleyan University 83
71 Go Tong Electrical Supply v. BPI Family Savings Bank 84
72 Benguet Exploration Inc v. CA 85
73 Asian Const. & Dev. Corp. v. CA 86
74 Salvador v. Rabaja 87
75 BDO v. Tansipek 88
76 Bitte v. Jonas 89
D. RULES 10 – 13
77 Yujuico v. United Resources Management Corp. 91

78 Lisam Enterprises v. Banco De Oro 92
79 Tiu v. Phil. Bank of Communications 93
80 Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. CA 94
81 Palileo v. Planters Development Bank 95
82 Heirs of Numeriano Miranda v. Miranda 96
E. RULE 14
83 Valmonte v. CA 98
84 Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp. v. Tan 99
85 E.B. Villarosa v. Benito 100
3
86 Mason v. CA 101
87 Spouses Jose v. Spouses Boyon 102
88 Manotoc v. CA 103
89 DOLE Phil. v. Quilala 104
90 Santos v. PNOC 105
91 Fortune Life Insurance Co. v. COA 106
92 Ong v. Co 107
93 Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. v. RCBC 108
94 Green Star Express v. Nissin Universal Robina Corp. 109
95 Guy v. Gacott 110
96 Carson Realty and Management Corp. v. Red Robin Security Agency 111
97 G.V. Florida Transport Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corp. 112
98 Sunrise Garden Corp. v. CA 113
99 Tujan – Militante v. Nustad 114
F. RULES 15 – 19
100 Republic v. Dimarucut 116

101 Blay v. Bana 117
102 Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy 118
103 Acampado v. Cosmilla 119
104 Laude v. Ginez – Jabalde 120
105 De Guzman, Jr. v. Ochoa 121
106 Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison 122
107 Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez 123
108 Anonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Jalandoni 124
109 Fernandez v. CA 125
110 Rodriguez v. CA 126
111 People v. Perez 127
112 Ching v. Cheng 128
113 Yao v. Perello 129
114 Pinlac v. CA 130
115 Chipongian v. Benitez – Lirio 131
G. RULES 23 – 32
116 Rep. v. Heirs of Enrique Oribello 133

117 Metrobank v. Sandoval 134
118 Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes 135
119 Go v. People 136
120 Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos 137
121 Allied Agri – Business Development Co. Inc. v. CA 138
122 People v. Webb 139
123 Afulugencia v. Metro Bank 140
124 Disini v. Sandiganbayan 141
125 People v. Bustamante 142
126 Spouses Marano v. Pryce Gases Inc. 143
127 Phil. Health Ins. Corp. v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital 144
128 Duque v. Spouses Yu 145
H. RULES 33 – 36
129 Republic v. Gimenez 147

130 Bernardo v. CA 148
4
131 Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Del Rosario 149
132 Cabador v. People 150
133 Claudio v. Saraza 151
134 Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading Corporation 152
135 Macapagal – Arroyo v. People 153
136 Adolfo v. Adolfo 154
137 Republic v. Shell Petroleum Corporation 155
138 COMGLASSCO Corporation v. Santos Car Check Center 156
139 Phil. Bank of Communications v. Go 157
140 FASAP v. PAL 158
I. RULE 37
141 Mendezona v. Ozamis 160

142 Chua v. People 161
143 Padilla – Rumbaua v. Rumbaua 162
144 Senit v. People 163
145 People v. Li Ka Kim 164
J. RULES 40 – 45
146 Heirs of Arturo Garcia v. Municipality of Iba 166

147 Estinozo v. CA 167
148 Heirs of Sps. Reterta v. Spouses Mores 168
149 Manaloto v. Veloso III 169
150 Latorre v. Latorre 170
151 Spouses Alfredo v. Borras 171
152 People v. Corpuz 172
153 PAL v. CA 173
154 Augusto v. Risos 174
155 Escueta v. Lim 175
156 Springfield Development Corp. v. RTC Judge of Misamis Oriental 176
157 Yuk Ling Ong v. Co 177
158 De Vera v. Santiago 178
159 PNCC v. Asiavest 179
160 Maravilla v. Rios 180
161 Fortune Life Insurance v. COA 181
K. RULE 38
162 The Prov. Gov’t of Aurora v. Marco 183

163 Thomasites Center for International Studies v. Rodriguez 184
L. RULE 47
164 Diona v. Balanque 186

165 Santos v. Santos 187
166 Lasala v. National Food Authority 188
167 Mangubat v. Morga – Seva 189
168 Sibal v. Buquel 190
169 Frias v. Alcayde 191
5
M. RULE 39
170 Villareal, Jr. v. MWSS 193

171 Davis v. Davis 194
172 Sarto v. People 195
173 Bañez v. Bañez 196
174 Santos v. COMELEC 197
175 City of Iligan v. Principal Management 198
176 FEBTC v. Toh 199
177 Stronghold Insurance v. Felix 200
178 Fajardo v. Quitalig 201
179 RCBC v. Magwin Marketing Corp. 202
180 Villaruel v. Fernando 203
181 Morta v. Bagagñan 204
182 Serrano v. CA 205
183 D’ Armoured Sec. Agency v. Orpia 206
184 Perez v. CA 207
185 Panotes v. Townhouse Dev. Corp. 208
186 Fujiki v. Marinay 209
187 RCBC v. Serra 210
188 City of Cebu v. Dedamo 211
189 PSALM v. Maunlad Homes, Inc. 212
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
190 Serrana v. Sandiganbayan 215

191 Garcia v. Sandiganbayan 216
192 Escobal v. Gachitorena 217
193 People v. Henry T. Go 218
194 Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan 219
195 People v. Benipayo 220
196 Lacson v. Executive Secretary 221
197 Sanchez v. Demetriou 222
198 Disini v. Secretary of Justice 223
B. RULE 110
199 Jimenez v. Sorongon 225

200 People v. Valdez 226
201 Miguel v. Sandiganbayan 227
202 People v. Soria 228
203 Union Bank v. People 229
C. RULE 111
204 Solidum v. People 231

205 Castillo v. Salvador 232
206 Lim v. Kou Co Ping 233
207 Casapunan v. Laroya 234
208 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson 235
209 People v. Romero 236
210 Magestrado v. People 237
6
211 Pimentel v. Pimentel 238
212 J.M. Dominguez v. Liclican 239
D. RULE 112
213 Fenequito v. Vergara 241

214 Burgundy Realty Corporation v. Reyes 242
215 Abando v. Bayona 243
216 Heirs of Nestor Tria v. Obias 244
217 Uy v. Javellana 245
218 People v. Valencia 247
219 PCGG v. Navarro - Gutierrez 248
220 De Lima v. Reyes 249
E. RULE 113
221 Saraum v. People 251

222 Comerciante v. People 252
223 Luz v. People 253
224 Antiquera v. People 254
225 People v. Vasquez 255
F. RULE 114
226 Zuño v. Cabebe 257

227 Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia 258
228 Leviste v. CA 259
229 Enrile v. Sandiganbayan 260
230 Napoles v. Sandiganbayan 261
231 Altobano – Ruiz v. Pichay 262
G. RULE 115
232 Del Castillo v. People 264

233 Miguel v. Sandiganbayan 265
234 People v. Lara 266
235 Sanico v. People 267
236 People v. Ayson 268
237 Villareal v. People 269
H. RULE 116
238 People v. Estomaca 271

239 People v. Pangilinan 272
240 Daan v. Sandiganbayan 273
241 People v. Janjalani 275
242 ABS – CBN Corporation v. Gozon 277
243 Enrile v. People 279
I. RULE 117
244 People v. Lacson 282

245 Panaguitan v. DOJ 284
246 People v. Dumlao 285
7
247 Soriano v. People 286
248 Cerezo v. People 287
249 Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products 288
250 People v. De Leon 289
J. RULE 118
251 Estipona v. Lobrigo 291
K. RULE 119
252 Salvanera v. People 293

253 Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos 294
254 Jimenez v. People 295
255 People v. De Grano 296
256 Asistio v. People 298
257 Cabrador v. People 299
258 People v. Tan 300
259 Imperial v. Joson 301
260 People v. Sandiganbayan 302
261 Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan 303
262 People v. Jose Go 305
263 People v. Pepino 306
264 People v. Dominguez 307
L. RULE 120
265 Llamas v. CA 309

266 People v. Monteclaros 310
267 Hipos, Sr. v. Bay 311
268 People v. Lorenzo 312
269 People v. Baron 313
270 Abellana v. People 314
271 People v. Asis 315
272 Basilonia v. Villaruz 316
273 Morillo v. People 317
M. RULE 121
274 Estino v. People 319

275 Briones v. People 320
276 Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan 321
277 Lumanog v. People 323
278 Payumo v. Sandiganbayan 324
N. RULES 122 – 125
279 Macapagal v. People 326

280 People v. Morales 327
281 Quidet v. People 328
282 Balaba v. People 329
283 People v. Olivo 330
284 Guasch v. Dela Cruz 331
285 People v. Taruc 332
8
286 Tiu v. People 333
287 Colinares v. People 334
288 Villareal v. People 335
289 Dungo v. People 337
290 Manansala v. People 338
O. RULE 126
291 Miclat v. People 340

292 People v. Maracios 341
293 People v. Tuan 342
294 Esquillo v. People 343
295 Spouses Marimla v. People 344
296 People v. Punzalan 345
9
CIVIL PROCEDURE
10
JURISDICTION
11
SANDIGANBAYAN
PCGG v. Dumayas
G.R. No. 209447 August 11, 2015 Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: UCPB and COCOLIFE filed separate civil cases wherein they both assert entitlement over certain
shares of some Coconut Industry Investment Fund Companies. They sought for the declaration of their rights
over the said shares. However, the said claims were opposed by the PCGG and the latter filed their motion
to dismiss the respective cases. The said cases were later on consolidated. The RTC issued an omnibus order
denying the motion to dismiss filed by the PCGG.
PCGG contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the acts performed by PCGG pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions, particularly those relating to the issuance of writs of sequestration, and that all cases
involving ill-gotten wealth assets are under the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On the
other hand, UCPB and COCOLIFE argue that since they have properly alleged a case for declaratory relief,
jurisdiction over the subject matter lies in the regular courts such as the RTC of Makati City. Moreover, the
subject matter of their petitions is the declaration of their rights under corporate documents, which in turn
relate to UCPB and COCOLIFE’s investments not sourced from the coconut levy funds. Hence according to
them, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction if the subject matter of the case does not involve or has no
relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
immediately enjoining the respondent judge from proceeding with the hearing of the petitions for declaratory
relief.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over suit involving the
sequestered coco levy assets and coco levy funds?
HELD:
It is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has jurisdiction over the disputed
UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged "ill-gotten wealth" of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case involved the performance of contractual
obligations relative to the UHC shares is of no importance. The benchmark is whether said UHC shares are
alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests
of orderly administration of justice dictate that all incidents affecting the UHC shares and PCGG's right of
supervision or control over the UHC must be addressed to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the
law and courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost
time, wasted effort, more expenses, and irreparable injury to the public interest.
12
Escobal v. Garchitorena
G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004 Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: Arnel Escobal is a member of the Philippine National Police. While Escobar was conducting
surveillance on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Cafè Bar and Restaurant, he somehow got involved in a
shooting incident, resulting in the death of Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. Escobal was then charged with the crime
of murder. When petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence, he filed a Motion to Dismiss the
case arguing that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC denied the motion but ordered the conduct of a preliminary
hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his
office as a member of the PNP. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed
the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the
jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a
salary grade of “27” as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The RTC, however, reversed itself
in the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and
to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions
or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the
complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan. The Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan ordered the return of the records to the RTC. It reasoned that the RTC retained jurisdiction
over the case since petitioner had a salary grade of “23.” Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its
case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity
of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial. Petitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the Order of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a criminal case of murder against a member
of the PNP with salary grade of 23?
HELD:
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public
officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office
of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to
merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his
office because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the
petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge
of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it
ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed
the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
Sandiganbayan.
13
Serana v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008 Reyes, R.T., J.
FACTS: Serana, in her capacity as student regent of UP, received from the Office of President Estrada, a
financial assistance in the amount of P15 Million for the renovation of a certain school building in UP.
Apparently, the said project did not materialize. Consequently, Serana’s successor as student regent instituted
a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. The said office charged Serana with estafa. She claimed that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity
as UP student regent because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa;
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case against Serana as student regent of
UP?
HELD:
Yes. Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin
requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A)
of PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is committed in relation to their office.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regent, it has jurisdiction over the other officers
enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers
only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD
No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or
manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
14
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Danilo A. Duncano is, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary
Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office
of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6713. Duncano filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
contending that the SB has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official of the executive
branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below
Salary Grade 27.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the SB considering he is a Reg. Director
with SG 26.
HELD:
Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch
with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades. While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose
positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
15
De Lima v. Guerrero
G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: The Senate and House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of
dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison, inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support
of their testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the filing of four complaints against Senator Leila De
Lima ("Sen. De Lima"), et al. with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). The four complaints were
consolidated. The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016. Sen. De Lima filed an
Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition
of the DOJ Panel and the Secretary of Justice. Sen. De Lima argued that the Office of the Ombudsman
("Ombudsman") has exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints. The case should also be
referred to the Ombudsman because of evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel and the Secretary of
Justice.
In the absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the
conduct of the preliminary investigation. In its Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2017, the DOJ Panel
recommended the filing of informations against Sen. De Lima. Accordingly, three informations were filed
against Sen. De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. On February 23, 2017,
Judge Guerrero issued an Order finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against Sen. De
Lima and her co-accused. On February 24, 2017, the PNP and CIDG served the warrant of arrest on Sen. De
Lima.
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information
HELD:
To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4 (b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in
relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested
upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA
9165 was committed in relation to the public officials' office.
The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs
specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-related cases.
With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and
untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily
identifiable.
The Court has held that an offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the public office of the accused
when that office is an element of the crime charged. However, even if public office is not an element of the
offense, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan obtains when the relation between the crime and the office is
direct and not accidental such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office.
16
COURT OF TAX APPEALS
City of Manila v. Judge Cuerdo

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014 Peralta, J.
FACTS: The City of Manila, through its treasurer, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to
December 2002 private respondents. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents
pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered
the local business taxes. Private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under
protest. They later filed before the RTC of Pasay City a complaint denominated as one for “Refund or
Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The RTC granted. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA
dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA
ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed
with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under
Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case
HELD:
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court,
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect
to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in
the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA,
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA
includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is
vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the
authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax
cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed
necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the
transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
17
CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co. v. Prov. of Nueva Ecija
G.R. No. 196278 June 17, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered into a contract relative to the
construction and development of the Casecnan Multi-Purpose Irrigation and Power Project. Such contract
was amended as to the payment of taxes. The amendment stated that NIA must reimburse petitioner for real
property taxes (RPT) provided the same was paid upon NIA's directive and with the concurrence of the
Department of Finance.
Petitioner’s real property tax was eventually assessed by the Provincial Assessor. Petitioner paid the
assessment under protest, their protest having been dismissed from the Local Board of Assessment Appeals,
up to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Its administrative remedies having been dismissed, Petitioner
appealed with the RTC of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, while also praying for an injunction on the collection of
the arrears in its real property tax payments. The RTC dismissed the appeal and injunction.
Upon reaching the CA, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari as it held it was the Court of Tax Appeals
that had jurisdiction over the case, the main issue of the case being the validity of the assessment and the
collection of the RPT against petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over the appeal of CE Casecnan
HELD:
It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an interlocutory order of the
RTC relating to a local tax case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. It is conferred by law
and not by the consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it cannot
decide the case on the merits and must dismiss it.
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with
special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local
tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it
effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions
of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this
purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with
the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. Given these, it is settled that it is the
CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
18
SHARI’A COURTS
Lomondot v. Balindong
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the Sharia’h District Court (SDC), a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages with prayer for mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order against the respondents. They
allege that respondents illegally entered and encroached their land.
The SDC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. Respondents filed an appeal but was dismissed.
Hence, petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for demolition. The SDC
granted the motion. However, the motion for the writ of demolition was held in abeyance as the parties were
negotiating on the payment of the land the respondents encroached. Finally, the SDC denied the motion for
the writ of demolition. Petitioners filed with the CA-Cagayan de Oro City a petition for certiorari assailing
the orders of the SDC. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the Sharia’h
District Courts are not among those courts, bodies, or tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Sec. 9 of BP
129.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
HELD:
The Shari'a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over
all cases tried in the Shari'a District Courts. It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. The decisions of the Shari'a Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without
prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.
19
Municipality of Tangkal, Lanao Del Norte v. Balindong
G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017 Jardeleza, J.
FACTS: The heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo filed a Complaint with the Shari'a District Court against the
petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. They
alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with the
Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the way for the construction of the
municipal hall and a health center building. Private respondents claimed that the Municipality of Tangkal
neither paid the value of the land within the agreed period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they
prayed that the land be returned to them as successors-in-interest of Macalabo.
The Municipality of Tangkal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it
cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint
for recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the appropriate RTC of Lanao del Norte. The
Shari'a District Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal's motion to dismiss. It held that since the mayor of
Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court
has original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil courts." The Municipality of Tangkal elevated
the case to the SC via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
The matters over which Shari'a district courts have jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective
administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims, it has a catchall provision
granting Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. The Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with
regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the
general jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action must
be filed before the regular courts.
20
RESIDUAL JURISDICTION
Dev. Bank of the Phil. v. Carpio

G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: On August 21, 2001, a complaint for delivery of certificates of title, damages, and attorney’s fees
was filed against the petitioner before the RTC. Complainants. Prayed for the issuance of a writ of seizure,
pending hearing of the case, for delivery of their certificates of title they claimed to be unlawfully detained
by DBP and GFSME. They alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to DBP for safekeeping
pursuant to the loan agreement they entered into with DBP. The same certificates of title were turned over
by DBP to GFSME because of its call on GFSME's guarantee on their loan, which became due and
demandable, and pursuant to the guarantee agreement between DBP and GFSME. As prayed for, the RTC
issued the Writ of Seizure accompanied by Plaintiff's Bond for Manual Delivery of Personal Property.
On September 5, 2001, DBP filed its Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of Seizure on
the ground of improper venue, among others. Abad, et al. filed their Opposition and later, their Supplemental
Opposition, to which they attached the Delivery Receipt showing that the court sheriff took possession of
228 certificates of title from GFSME. The RTC granted DBP's omnibus motion and dismissed the case for
improper venue. After opposition by the complainants, the RTC issued an order directing them to return the
228 certificates of title.
Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court for the nullification and reversal of
the January 27, 2003 Order of the RTC. The same was dismissed by the Court. On September 18, 2003, DBP
filed its Motion for Writ of Execution of the January 27, 2003 Order before the RTC. On December 16, 2003,
the RTC issued the corresponding Writ of Execution. The Sheriff's Return of Service, however, indicated
that Abad, et al. failed to deliver the certificates of title.
In its Order, dated May 17, 2004, the RTC denied the subject motion explaining that the resolution of the
motion was no longer part of its residual power. It pointed out that although there was indeed an order to
return the 228 certificates of title to DBP, it was not made as a result of a trial of the case, but as a consequence
of the order of dismissal based on improper venue.
DBP filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA which dismissed the same. It noted that DBP
did not move for reconsideration of the September 25, 2001 Order of dismissal. It considered the RTC
decision as final and executory. It added that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provided that the
claim for damages against the bond must be filed before trial or before appeal was perfected or before the
judgment became executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court reached the residual jurisdiction stage
HELD:
Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; to approve
compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are done prior
to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already been perfected
or despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case of a petition for review under Rule 42,
before the CA gives due course to the petition.
The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to
have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached
upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior
to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains
its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
21
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Unduran v. Aberasturi
G.R. No. 181284 April 18, 2017 Peralta, J.
FACTS: For resolution are petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's en banc Decision dated October 20, 2015, wherein the petition was deniedn
and the Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners maintain
that it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), not the regular courts, which has
jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved.
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that (1) the NCIP and not the regular
courts has jurisdiction over the case under the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing exemptions thereto;
(2) the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by the IPRA; (3) the
IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from themselves or fellow IPs but more
from non-IPs; (4) the IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government mandated to realize the rights of
IPs; (5) in the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction to
resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs; (6) the jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims
and disputes involving the rights of IPs is not limited to IPs of the same tribe; (7) harmonizing the related
provisions of the IPRA supports the argument that the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights
whether or not the parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs; (8) the NCIP as quasi-judicial agency provides IPs
mechanisms for access to justice in the fulfillment of the State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's
human rights; (9) the NCIP has the competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration of
justice with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights; and (10) recognition and
enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice systems fulfill the State's obligations as duty bearers
in the enforcement of human rights.
ISSUE: Whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties are ICCs/IPs, or primary and
concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and exclusive to the exclusion of said courts, on all matters
involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.
HELD:
Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative
body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. Given that the provisions of the enabling
statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers that an
administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency.
It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the
defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely on the defendant. Suffice it also to state that the Court is unanimous in denying the petition for review
on certiorari on the ground that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and amended
complaint based on the allegations therein is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The Court maintains that the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and disputes involving rights of
IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between
or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have
jurisdiction.
22
LBP v. Dalauta
G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Eugenio Dalauta was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City. The land
was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as reflected in the Notice of Coverage, which Dalauta
received on February 7, 1994. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for
the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low. The case was referred to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan
City. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted where the valuation made by LBP was affirmed
in the PARAD Resolution dated December 4, 1995.
On February 28, 2000, Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting
as SAC. He alleged that LBP's valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed
in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for determining the just compensation of lands
covered by CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme.
The SAC rendered a decision fixing the just compensation to ₱2,639,557.00 as value of the land and
₱100,000.00 for the farmhouse. When LBP’s MR was denied, LBP filed a petition for review before the CA
arguing, among others, that the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when the DARAB decision
sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained finality. The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance
of the case. It reiterated that the SAC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The appellate court stated that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the SAC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials the original jurisdiction in
compensation cases and make the SAC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
Hence, this petition by LBP reiterating its position that the SAC should not have taken cognizance of
Dalauta’s petition because the PARAD’s Resolution has long attained finality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the petition for determination of just
compensation because it was filed beyond the 15-day prescriptive period or, specifically, more than five (5)
years after the issuance of the PARAD Resolution?
HELD:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
There may be situations where a landowner, who has a pending administrative case before the DAR for
determination of just compensation, still files a petition before the SAC for the same objective. Such recourse
is not strictly a case of forum shopping, the administrative determination being not res judicata binding on
the SAC. Nevertheless, the practice should be discouraged. Everyone can only agree that simultaneous
hearings are a waste of time, energy and resources. To prevent such a messy situation, a landowner should
withdraw his case with the DAR before filing his petition before the SAC and manifest the fact of withdrawal
by alleging it in the petition itself. Failure to do so, should be a ground for a motion to suspend judicial
proceedings until the administrative proceedings would be terminated. It is simply ludicruous to allow two
procedures to continue at the same time.
23
SPLIT JURISDICTION
People v. Henry T. Go
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Respondent was charged with violation of RA 3019 for conspiring with then DOTC Sec. Arturo
Enrile, now deceased, in relation to contracts entered by them which is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Respondent filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as he is only a private individual
and not a public officer. Independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he
was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official
authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to
the filing of the Information?
HELD:
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion
for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an
accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent
court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him.
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB
over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to
Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the
prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
24
EPISTOLARY JURISDICTION
Resident Marine Mammals v. Angelo Reyes

G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) entered into an
agreementfor the exploration, development and production ofpetroleum resources at the offshore of Tanon
Strait. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging
that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead
themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards
of God's Creations," using Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. as basis for their claim in asserting their right to enforce
international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour
autrui. As representatives, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness
among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the
government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have
the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction." Public
respondents argued that the Resident MarineMammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3of the
Rules of Court requires parties to an action to beeither natural or juridical persons. They also contested the
applicability of Oposa, pointingout that the petitioners therein were all naturalpersons, albeit some of them
were still unborn. As regards the Stewards, the public respondentslikewise challenged their claim of legal
standing on theground that they are representing animals, whichcannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the
publicrespondents argued that the Stewards are not the realparties-in-interest for their failure to show how
theystand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition
HELD:
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent
the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build
awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary
steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust
doctrine.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the benchmark
in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized
both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as
real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals. While we, as humans, may feel the need to
nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore,
speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering
of animals and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury. There is no valid reason in law
or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on behalf of animals. To have
done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans,
can claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is
designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for
themselves, which of course includes compassion for all living things.
25
EQUITY JURISDICTION
Regulus Dev. Inc. v. De la Cruz

G.R. No. 198172 January 25, 2016 Brion, J.
FACTS: Dela Cruz leased two units of petitioner’s apartment. The contract of lease provides for a period of
one-month subject to automatic renewals. Petitioner sent respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two
subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City. The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s
favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals due. The respondent appealed
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal, the respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC
due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA
reversed the two lower courts and dismissed the ejectment case. This decision became final and executory.
Petitioner then filed a motion praying for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned with the RTC.
The RTC granted the motion. The CA also upheld the RTC’s order and held that they were issued pursuant
to its equity jurisdiction. The CA ruling became final and executory as the SC denied respondent’s petition
for insufficiency in form. The petitioner then returned to the RTC for the issuance of the lease payments
deposited by respondent. However, the withdrawn deposits were insufficient to cover the rentals due from
2001 to 2004. Hence, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying that the RTC to levy upon the
respondent’s property to satisfy the judgment credit. The RTC granted the motion. Respondent went to the
CA. The CA initially denied the petition on MR, the CA reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC directing
the levy of the respondent’s property. The CA held that while the approval of the petitioner’s motion to
withdraw the consigned rentals and the posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC
had no jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property. The CA explained that the approval of the levy
on the respondent’s real property could not be considered as a case pending appeal, because the decision of
the MTC had already become final and executory. As such, the matter of execution of the judgment lies with
the MTC where the complaint for ejectment was originally filed and presented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property
HELD:
The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable
to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when
the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to
prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.
The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the
subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277.
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case.
The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing
more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment
case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly
issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
26
JURISDICTIONAL ESTOPPEL
Duero v. CA
G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel entered and occupied petitioner's land
covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in
the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the land
was his, and requested the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands, private respondent
remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership
with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and
Inocencio Ruena.Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's
basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas recognized and
bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was
not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the
land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and
summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was
responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Private
respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in
his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the Petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2. Whether the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC after
he has successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom
HELD:
1. None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691 amending BP
129.
2. No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional
because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the
parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may
assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The
appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the
action
Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action
'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court)
Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The decision of the RTC and its Order that private respondent turn
over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are annulled and set aside.
27
Gonzaga v. CA
G.R. No. 144025 December 27, 2002 Corona, J.
FACTS: Petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc. Said lot
was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as
security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but
on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error,
private respondent, through its general manager, informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered
to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their
house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No.
19 was foreclosed by SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19
and demanded from private respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be
executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private
respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file an action for reformation of contract and damages with
the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint. A writ of execution was then issued by the RTC. Petitioners
filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case as
it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private
respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment
premised on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The CA denied the petition
relyin mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.
HELD:
Yes. While an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any
stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such
party from attacking its jurisdiction. held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy:
“A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.
“It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question
that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party
is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated—
obviously for reasons of public policy.”
Here, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action
for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial
court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise
the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after
the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first
raise the issue of jurisdiction—and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners
thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
28
Manila Bankers v. Ng Kok Wei
G.R. No. 139791 December 12, 2003 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff Manila Banker Life Insurance Corporation entered into a contract to sale of a
Condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces with respondent, Eddy Ng Kok wei. Complete payment was
made by respondent, and subsequently a Contract to sell in in favor of Ng Kok Wei was executed by plaintiff.
Plaintiff failed to perform its obligation to deliver the condominium unit, upon demand of respondent hence
the latter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a complaint for specific performance and
damages. During the pendency of the case, the respondent receives the condominium unit, hence the case
was only for damages. Regional Trial Court, rendered a decision in favor of respondent and order plaintiff to
pay for damages. Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which the CA affirmed in toto the trial
court decision.
Plaintiff then filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, contending that the trial court has
no jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is estopped to assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner’s active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. It is an
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In
effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in
estoppel and can no longer question the trial court’s jurisdiction.
29
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013 Perez, J.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
attachment against Sps. Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Respondent in her answer alleged that her husband
Manuel is already dead. During the trial, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
1. Complaint failed to plead an indispensable party;
2. Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of
BP 129 as amended by RA 7691;
3. Trial court erred in ordering substitution of deceased Manuel by his heirs;
4. Trial court must also dismiss case against Lolita in accordance to Section 6, Rule 86.
However, RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of time or after 6 years. Respondent filed a
petition for certiorari to the CA which granted the petition on the ground that when petitioner filed the
complaint, Manuel was already dead such being the case, the trial court could not have acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Manuel. Further, that the issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding,
even for the first time on appeal. The complaint should have impleaded the estate of Manuel as defendant,
not only the wife, considering that the estate of Manuel is an indispensable party.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may still assail the question of jurisdiction of Manuel on her motion to
dismiss?
HELD:
The Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject
matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.
Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court's
jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no
application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are
pertinent herein.
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses
which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a
motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the
defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule
9 of the Rules of Court.
30
Figueroa v. People
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008 Nachura, J.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTC found
him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the
case. The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4 years with the
petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The
petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised
at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches
will not be applicable. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute
laches notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the CA
HELD:
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court.
At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party,
knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in
good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced,
due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle
of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and
revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more
or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied
rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with
great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a
most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in
attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No
laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
31
HIERARCHY OF COURTS
Agan, Jr. v. Phil. International Air Terminal Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 15001 May 5, 2003 Puno, J.
FACTS: In 1989, The DOTC conducted studies on NAIA’s capability to cope with the traffic development
up to 2010. In 1993, business tycoons Gokongwei, Gotianun, Sy, Tan, Ty, and Yuchengco formed the Asia’s
Emerging Dragon Group (AEDC) and submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the
DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA Terminal III under a Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement (BOT)
under BOT Law (RA6957, amended by RA 7718). DOTC began the bidding process for the NAIA Terminal
III project by forming the PBAC (Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee). AEDC’s primary
competitor was the PAIRCARGO consortium (composed of Pair Cargo, PAGS, and Security Bank) filed
their bid, which AEDC questioned since the former allegedly lacked financial capability. The Government,
through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the
“Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession Agreement).
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and
II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport
services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and
provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
Consequently, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their
employment upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed before this Court a petition for
prohibition. During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, on
November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacañang Palace, stated
that she will not “honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as)
null and void.” Several petitions of prohibition filed by NAIA Terminal I & II’s int’l service providers, their
employees, and congressmen alleging that the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA, & its supplements
are contrary to the Constitution, BOT Law, & its IRR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitration step taken by PIATCO will not oust this Court of its jurisdiction over
the cases.
HELD:
The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts and
appellate courts generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are
required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending
allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depends on disputed facts for decision
cannot be brought immediately before the appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. It goes without
saying that when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary.
32
Liga ng mga Barangay v. Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004 Davide, Jr., C.J.
FACTS: Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to Section
492 of RA No. 7160 (LGC), constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that “the liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and 5 members of the board of
directors.” All other matters not provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of
LGUs shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the
provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws
to govern its internal organization. Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Liga came out with its
Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002, setting the
synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila, together with
independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters.
Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for the election
of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both
chapters 30 days after the barangay elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him
that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga
through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council. Mayor
signed and approved the city ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with the Supreme Court
HELD:
Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here
a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should
be allowed.
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA in certain
cases.
33
St. Mary Crusade Foundation, Inc. v. Riel
G.R. No. 176508 January 12, 2015 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: The petitioner claimed in its petition that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and
lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Respondent Judge dismissed the petition. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, alleging that the respondent judge had unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon him; that the judge acted without
and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of discretion to the further damage and prejudice of herein
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus is proper in the Supreme
Court
HELD:
The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ
of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extra-ordinary or compelling reasons that
justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from
unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental
and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. There being no special, important or
compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
34
Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction and Development Co.
G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018 Leonen, J.
FACTS: In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it administered
to Offshore Construction. Three (3) properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease and were leased for five
(5) years. All their lease contracts also made reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations,
which included a provision for lease renewals every five (5) years upon the parties' mutual agreement.
Offshore Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises. However, Intramuros
and the Department of Tourism halted the projects due to Offshore Construction's non-conformity with
Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th centuries' Philippine-Spanish architecture in the
area. Consequently, Offshore Construction filed a complaint with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order against Intramuros and the Department of Tourism before the Manila RTC.
Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where they affirmed the validity of the two (2)
lease contracts but terminated the one (over Revellin de Recoletos). The Compromise Agreement retained
the five (5)-year period of the existing lease contracts and stated only certain areas that may be occupied by
Offshore Construction. During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental
fees, despite several demand letters. Intramuros tolerated the continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore
Construction would pay its arrears. As of July 31, 2004, these arrears allegedly totaled P6,762,153.70.
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment.
The MTC granted Offshore’s motion and dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. First, it
pointed out that there were two (2) pending cases at the time Intramuros filed its complaint: one for specific
performance filed by Offshore Construction against Intramuros, and another for interpleader against Offshore
Construction and Intramuros filed by 4H Intramuros, Inc. (4H Intramuros), which claimed to be a group of
respondent's tenants. The Metropolitan Trial Court found that the cause of action in Intramuros' complaint
was similar with those in the specific performance and interpleader cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Intramuros Administration committed forum shopping when it filed its ejectment
complaint despite the pending cases for specific performance and interpleader.
HELD:
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the
doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated.
The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is whether the elements of
litispendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
Simply put, when litispendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither can forum shopping exist.The requisites
of litispendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar by prior
judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.As observed by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, there is an identity of parties in the specific performance and interpleader cases,
and the Complaint for Ejectment. However, there is no identity of asserted rights or reliefs prayed for, and a
judgment in any of the three (3) cases will not amount to res judicata in the two others. A final judgment in
the specific performance case will not affect the outcome of the ejectment case. As pointed out by petitioner,
respondent's right to possess the leased premises is founded initially on the Contracts of Lease and, upon
their expiration, on petitioner's tolerance in hopes of payment of outstanding arrears. The July 27, 2004
Memorandum of Agreement subject of the specific performance case cannot be the source of respondent's
continuing right of possession, as it expressly stated there that the offsetting was only for respondent's
outstanding arrears as of July 31, 2004. Any favorable judgment compelling petitioner to comply with its
obligation under this agreement will not give new life to the expired Contracts of Lease, such as would repel
petitioner's unlawful detainer complaint.
35
Bureau of Customs v. Gallegos
G.R. No. 220832 February 28, 2018 Tijam, J.
FACTS: On December 20, 2006, the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) member-countries,
including the Philippines, signed the Protocol to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window (ASW
Protocol), under which the member-countries agreed to develop and implement their National Single
Windows (NSW) based on international standards and best practices as established in international
agreements and conventions concerning trade facilitation and modernization of customs techniques and
practices. The announcement of the shortlist of eligible consultants and of the Highest Rated Bid (HRB) was
delayed, due among others, to the interview of private respondent's Project Team Members, requested by
former Deputy Commissioner Primo Aguas. The said interview, however, was neither required by law nor
regulation.
On April 23, 2015, Commissioner Lina was appointed as BOC Commissioner. He wrote a Letter dated May
6, 2015 addressed to petitioner DBM-PS Executive Director Jose Tomas C. Syquia (Director Syquia).
Commissioner Lina requested for the discontinuance of the procurement process of the PNSW 2 project, in
line with Section 41(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement
Reform Act. This provision grants to the head of the procuring agency the right to reject bids for justifiable
and reasonable grounds where the award of the contract will not redound to the benefit of the government.
Acting upon Commissioner Lina's letter, Director Syquia issued on May 7, 2015, a Notice of Cancellation,
aborting the bidding process for PNSW 2 project.
Private respondent, through a Letter dated May 22, 2015, moved for a reconsideration of the Notice of
Cancellation, but the same was denied in petitioner BOC's Resolution dated July 31, 2015. This prompted
the private respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (WPPI) and Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (WPMI), before the RTC against the petitioners. The petition prayed that
a judgment be rendered annulling the decision of Director Syquia embodied in his Notice of Cancellation,
made pursuant to Commissioner Lina's May 6, 2015 Letter and commanding the petitioners to refrain from
cancelling, and, instead to continue the last remaining process of the competitive bidding for the PNSW 2
project, which is the signing of the contract and issuance of the Notice to Proceed. Pending such proceedings,
the private respondent likewise prayed that the RTC restrain the petitioners from withholding or reducing the
appropriation, or returning the appropriation for the project to the Bureau of Treasury, so as not to render
ineffectual any judgment that may be issued by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos (respondent Judge) gravely abused in his discretion when
he issued the omnibus order and the injunctive writ
HELD:
The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, CA and the RTC to issue the writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. Stated differently, although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
CA and the RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special,
extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the
hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford
time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to
it. Absent any showing of any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition will cause the dismissal of the recourse, as in this case.
36
RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE
Katon v. Palanca
G.R. No. 151149 September 7, 2004 Panganiban, J.
FACTS: On August 2, 1963, herein George Katon (Katon) filed a request with the District Office of the
Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as
Sombrero Island. Thereafter an inspection, investigation and survey was undertook by Mandocdoc by virtue
of an order issued by the Bureau of Forestry District Office of Puerto Prinsesa, Palawan. As a result the
subject land was certified and released as an agricultural land. Records show that respondents (Fresnillo,
Gapilango and Palanca) filed and were issued homestead patents for various hectares within the Sombrero
Island. Katon now challenges the validity of the homestead patents and asked for the reconveyance of the
lands to him before the RTC. Respondents then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that on the ground
of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect
a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. RTC granted the motion to dismiss
by the respondents. Aggrieved Katon filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. At first the CA ruled on
the merits of the case but on the MR, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of
the case. However, the CA still dismissed the case pursuant to its “residual prerogative” under Section 1 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. It ruled that petitioner’s action was brought 24 years after the issuance of
Palanca’s homestead patent. Under the Public Land Act, such action should have been taken within ten years
from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from the submission of petitioner
himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six hectares of the island since 1965, or
33 years before he took legal steps to assert his right to the property. His action was filed beyond the 30-year
prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the Civil Code. Petitioner contends that the CA
erroneously invoked its “residual prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu
proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative
refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise
even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals properly exercised its power of Residual Prerogative
HELD:
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2)
litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the
action has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked
by the defendant.
In Gicano v. Gegato, trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred.
37
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
Pat-og Sr. v. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Complainant Bang-on was second year high school student who was punched by the petitioner on
his stomach for not falling in line properly.
Complainant filed an administrative case to the CSC-CAR. CSC-CAR found the petitioner guilty of simple
misconduct. Pat-Og then filed an appeal before the CSC which affirmed the finding of CSC-CAR and ordered
the dismissal of Pat-Og. Pat-Og then filed an MR questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over
the case. He contended that administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially
heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
The CSC dismissed the MR. It ruled that Pat-og was estopped from challenging its jurisdiction considering
that he actively participated in the administrative proceedings against him, raising the issue of jurisdiction
only after his appeal was dismissed by the CSC. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the
CSC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over an administrative case involving a public-school
teacher?
2. Whether or not petitioner is already estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of CSC?
HELD:
1. Yes. In the case of Puse vs. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC, Department of Education and the
Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
2. Yes. At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped
from raising the issue.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by
two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be
proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the
exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of
jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-
CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his
motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if
favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
38
INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION
First Sarmiento Property Holdings v. Phil. Bank of Communications

G.R. No. 202836 June 19, 2018 Leonen, J.
FACTS: On June 19, 2002,First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a P40 million loan, which was secured by
a real estate mortgage over parcels of land. On September 15, 2003, the loan was increased
to P100,000,000.00. On January 2, 2006, PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real
Estate Mortgage, claiming that it sent First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed
to pay the principal amount and accrued interest on the loan. On December 27, 2011, First Sarmiento
attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage with the RTC. However, the Clerk of
Court refused to accept the Complaint in the absence of the mortgaged properties' tax declarations, which
would be used to assess the docket fees.On December 29, 2011, the mortgaged properties were auctioned
and sold to PBCOM as the highest bidder. On January 2, 2012, First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage and paid a filing fee of P5,545.00. First Sarmiento claimed in its Complaint
that it never received the loan of P100 million from PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. RTC issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order for 72 hours,
enjoining the registration of the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds-Bulacan and directed the parties
to observe the status quo ante. PBCOM opposed that RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's
Complaint because the action for annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should
have been based on the fair market value of the mortgaged properties.
On January 24, 2012, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Malolos City, Bulacan issued a certificate
of sale to PBCOM. On April 3, 2012, RTC-Malolos dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
ruled that following the ruling in the case of HGC vs. R. II Builders and NHA, that an action for annulment
or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objective and nature of the action which is to
recover real property.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint for annulment of real
estate mortgage.
HELD:
To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or relief sought must be ascertained. If the principal relief is for
the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of pecuniary estimation.
However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a
claim over a sum of money or real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
39
RULES 1 - 5
40
RULE 1
Alday v. FGU Insurance

G. R. No. 138822 January 23, 2001 Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
FACTS: FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU) filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati against Evangeline Alday (Alday) amounting to P114,650.76. Alday filed her Answer
by way of counterclaim and asserted that it is FGU who owes them P104,893.45 in direct commissions, profit
commissions, and bonuses from July 1, 1986 to December 7, 1986 and for premium reserves amounting to
P500,000. She also prayed for attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages
for the allegedly unfounded actions filed by FGU. FGU then moved to strike out Alday’s answer and to
declare her in default for filing the answer out of time. The motion was denied. FGU again moved to dismiss
Alday’s counterclaim by contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of
non-payment of docket fees. Alday also in response, asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as
exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that FGU be declared in default for failing
to answer such counterclaim.
The trial court ruled in favor of FGU by dismissing Alday’s counterclaim and consequently denied Alday’s
motion. It found Alday’s counterclaim to be merely permissive and that failure to pay the docket fees
prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. Alday moved for reconsideration but was
denied. The Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the trial court, and her motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence this petition.’
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is bound to pay for docket fees for her counterclaims
HELD:
Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which requires “a logical
relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.”
Non – payment of docket fees does not result in automatic dismissal. In Suson, the Court explained that
although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not
result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent
and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper
docket fees for her permissive counterclaim.
41
Korea Technologies v. Lerma
G.R. No. 143581 January 7, 2008 Velasco, Jr. J.
FACTS: Petitioner Korean Technologies (KOGIES) and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby
KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant for respondent. Respondent unilaterally
cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the
machineries and equipment it delivered. Petitioner opposed informing the latter that PGSMC could not
unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment on mere
imagined violations by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against
respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it had
the full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as
stipulated in the contract. KOGIES filed a motion to dismiss respondent’s counterclaims arguing that when
PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping,
and that its failure to do so was a fatal defect. The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s motion to dismiss
respondent’s counterclaims as these counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.
ISSUE: Whether or not payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were required in the
respondent’s Answer with counterclaim.
HELD:
NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in
accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at
the time the Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, “A
compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be
contained therein.” As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an
initiatory pleading which requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit
reversible error in denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims. At the time
PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees
for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under
Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory
counterclaim or cross-claims.
42
Mercado v. CA
G.R. No. 169576 October 17, 2008 Corona, J.
FACTS: Mercado had been distributing San Miguel Corporation’s (SMCs) beer products in Quiapo, Manila
since 1967. SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line allowing him to withdraw goods on credit. To
secure his purchases, Mercado assigned three China Banking Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit to
SMC and executed a continuing hold-out agreement. He also submitted three surety bonds from Eastern
Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO). Later, SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the
items he withdrew on credit. Consequently, citing the continuing hold-out agreement, it asked CBC to release
the proceeds of the assigned certificates of deposit. CBC approved SMBs request and informed Mercado.
Mercado then filed an action to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment in the RTC
of Manila. Thereafter, SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended that Mercado
delivered only two CBC certificates of deposit. SMC also filed a third-party complaint with EASCO.
However, Mercado filed an urgent manifestation and motion seeking the dismissal of the complaint. He
claimed that he was no longer interested in annulling the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of
assignment. The RTC, however, denied the motion.
During trial, Mercado acknowledged the accuracy of SMCs computation of his outstanding liability as of
August 1991. Thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered Mercado and EASCO to jointly and
severally pay SMC. Aggrieved, Mercado and EASCO appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insisting that
Mercado did not default in the payment of his obligations to SMC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision in toto. EASCO filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court but eventually
agreed to settle its liability with SMC. The petition was terminated. Meanwhile, Mercado passed away and
was substituted by his heirs. The petitioners subsequently filed a petition asserting that the decision of the
CA was void on the ground that the SMC’s counterclaim was permissive in nature and that inasmuch as SMC
did not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
ISSUE: Whether or not SMC’s counterclaim is permissive in nature which requires payment of docket fees
before the court could acquire jurisdiction of the claim?
HELD:
A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any party) may be compulsory or
permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court
and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.
When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment (which he
executed as security for his credit purchases, he in effect sought to be freed from them. While he admitted
having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by the assailed accessory
contracts. For its part, aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore sought to
collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased on credit. Thus, Mercado’s complaint and
SMCs counterclaim both touched the issues of whether the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of
assignment were valid and whether Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would
essentially support or refute Mercado’s claim and SMCs counterclaim. Based on the foregoing, had these
issues been tried separately, the efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated. Clearly,
SMCs counterclaim, being logically related to Mercado’s claim, was compulsory in nature. Consequently,
the payment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
43
Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nationale de Paris
G.R. No. 151242 June 15, 2005 Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit facilities of Banque Nationale de Paris
(BNP). To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners (Automotive, Asea and Autocorp)
executed a corporate guarantee to the extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently entered into
three trust receipt agreements, under which Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and
hold them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it would
deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it. In case the vehicles are not sold,
Proton would return them to BNP, together with all the accompanying documents of title. Proton failed to
deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles. BNP then demanded from Automotive,
Asea and Autocorp the payment of the amount of US$1,544,984.40 representing Proton's total outstanding
obligations. These guarantors refused to pay. So, BNP filed before the Makati RTC a complaint against
petitioners praying that they be ordered to pay US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest and other related
charges subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid.
The Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees which BNP paid at ₱352,116.30. The petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees and thus prevent the
trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The RTC denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss. It ruled
that the docket fees were properly paid since it is the Office of the Clerk of Court that computes the correct
docket fees, and it is their duty to assess the docket fees correctly, which they did. According to the RTC,
even granting arguendo that the docket fees were not properly paid, the court cannot just dismiss the case.
The Court has not yet ordered (and it will not in this case) to pay the correct docket fees. The CA affirmed
the RTC, ruling that Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the
principal amount being claimed in the pleading in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. Citing
Administrative Circular No. 11-94, petitioners argue that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees as the
said circular provides that in the assessment thereof, interest claimed should be included. There being an
underpayment of the docket fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not BNP paid the correct docket fees.
2. Whether or not the complaint filed by BNP should be dismissed on the ground that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since it failed to pay the correct docket fees.
HELD:
1. No. When the complaint in this case was filed in 1998, Rule 141 had been amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94 which provides for the inclusion of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs in the total amount claimed as basis for the
computation of docket fees. The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by taking
into consideration "the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in litigation. (Additionally,
the petitioners have adequately proven with documentary evidence that the exchange rate when the
complaint was filed was USD 1 = Php 43.21, and not Php 43.00 as determined by the Clerk of Court.
This overturned the disputable presumption of regularity of the Clerk’s application of the exchange
rate.).
2. No. True, in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, hence,
it concluded that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It bears emphasis, however,
that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion when
this Court held that in the former, there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding
to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to
abide by paying the additional fees as required.
44
Ruby Shelter Builders v. Formaran
G.R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009 Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Ruby Shelter Builders obtained a loan of more than P95M from Tan and Obiedo, secured by real
estate mortgages over five parcels of land. The loan became due, but Ruby Shelter was unable to pay it. Tan
and Obiedo then granted Ruby Shelter an extended period within which to settle its indebtedness through a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). In turn, the MOA required that Ruby Shelter execute simultaneously,
by way of dacion en pago, Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Tan and Obiedo, covering the same parcels of
land subject of the mortgages. The MOA further gives Ruby Shelter an opportunity to redeem any of the
parcels of land and provides for the nullification of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Otherwise, Tan and Obiedo
could already present the Deeds to the Office of the Register of Deeds to acquire TCTs in their names.
Ruby Shelter defaulted in its obligation, so Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the
Register of Deeds. They were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of land in their names. This prompted
Ruby Shelter to file a complaint against Tan, and Atty. Reyes (the notary public who notarized the MOA)
for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages before the RTC. Upon filing its complaint, Ruby
Shelter paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees. The Clerk of Court initially considered
the case as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due
thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Tan, on the other hand contended that
the case involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in accordance with Section
7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Since
Ruby Shelter did not pay the appropriate docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said
case.The RTC granted Tan’s Omnibus Motion. It was held that both Ruby Shelter and Tan must pay the
docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Particularly, Ruby
Shelter was ordered to pay additional filing fees.
The RTC Clerk of Court computed that Ruby Shelter must pay P720,392.60 as additional docket fees. Ruby
Shelter then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA denied the same, holding that Ruby Shelter
filed the complaint to have the deeds of sale cancelled and ultimately, to recover the possession of the same,
thusit is a real action. Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid cannot be assessed in
accordance with Section 7(b), but must comply with Section 7(a).
ISSUE: Whether or not the actionfile by Ruby Shelter is a real action.
HELD:
In Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held that "in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or,
as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one ‘affecting title to real
property or for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on a real property.’"
Obviously, respondent’s complaint is a real action involving not only the recovery of real properties, but
likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto. Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the
Rule requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees."
We note, however, that neither the "assessed value" nor the "estimated value" of the questioned parcels of
land were alleged by respondent in both his original and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended
complaint is that the disputed realties have a "BIR zonal valuation" of ₱1,200.00 per square meter. However,
the alleged "BIR zonal valuation" is not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of
the realty. Having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in his
complaint the assessed value of his real properties in controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed.
As such, his complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this
ground alone, respondent’s complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.
45
St. Louis University v. Cobarrubias
G.R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010 Brion, J.
FACTS: Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the union of faculty
and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the following provision that for teaching
employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five
(5) years, shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them
shall be suspended. Petitioner placed respondent on forced leave for failing to achieve the required rating
points. Respondent sought recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery, but to no avail. Respondent filed
a case with DOLE but circulation and mediation again failed. The parties submitted the issues between them
for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). Respondent argued that the CA already resolved
the forced leave issue in a prior case between the parties, ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail
their evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force
during the same five-year period. Petitioner argued that said CA decision is not yet final. The VA dismissed
the complaint. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but
failed to pay the filing fees and to attach the material portion of the records. Motion for reconsideration was
filed, complying with the procedural lapses, and CA reinstated the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee
within the reglementary period
HELD:
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance
with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the
VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of
court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a
sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed
period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the
decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.
Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to
provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
46
Gipa v. Southern Luzon Institute
FACTS: SLI (Southern Luzon Institute, an educational institution in Bulan, Sorsogon) asserts absolute
ownership of a 7,516-squaremeter parcel of land situated in Brgy. Poblacion, Bulan, Sorsogon. However,
petitioners (defendants in the court a quo) who were occupying a portion of said land refused to vacate it
despite demand prompting SLI to file a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages
against petitioners (defendants) Alonzo Gipa et.al., The defendants asserted in their answer that they did not
heed the demand as they believe that they have the right over the land they occupy and which was also
occupied by their predecessors-in-interest which, according to them, dates back to as early as 1950.
Impugning SLI’s claims, the defendants averred that SLI had not even for a single moment taken possession
of the subject property and was merely able to procure a title over the same thru fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation.
The RTC (court a quo) ruled in favor of SLI. The petitioners appealed to the CA. Their appeal was initially
dismissed since it was not shown that the appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid. Through
a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) with an attached Certification that they already paid the appeal fee, the
CA reinstated the appeal. Subsequently however, the CA required the petitioners to pay within 10 days from
receipt of minute resolution the amount of 30.00 pesos as legal research fund. It was received by their counsel
on March 13, 2006. Even after a lapse of 9 months, the petitioners still failed to comply with this directive
resulting in the dismissal of their appeal.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari and are invoking the principle of liberality in the
application of technical rules considering that they have paid the substantial amount of ₱3,000.00 for docket
and other legal fees and fell short only by the meager amount of ₱30.00. They assert that they come under
the exception, in the name of substantial justice and fair play.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of liberality in the application of the rules should be applied despite the
non-payment of the 30-peso legal research fund to perfect the appeal?
HELD:
No. The procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the
docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing
that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order
of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed
from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the
CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal.
Suffice it to say that concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on
the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Those who
seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally
meritorious reasons warranting such departure.
47
Reyes v. People
FACTS: Petitioner, in a complaint filed by private respondent Salud M. Gegato, was charged with Grave
Threats before MCTC Bayugan, Agusan Del Sur. Before arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
based on the ground of jurisdiction and that the crime is not Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code, but Other Light Threats under Article 285, paragraph 2 of the same Code. MCTC found the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner
guily beyond reasonable doubt of Light threats. Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review. However, instead of filing a petition for review within the
15- day period allowed by the CA, petitioner filed a second Motion for Extension of Time asking for another
15 days within which to file his petition for review. Afterwhich, petitioner filed his petition. Thereafter, the
CA, in its Resolution8 dated August 2, 2007, dismissed the petition. The petitioner filed three Motions for
Reconsiderations before the CA, all of which were denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the right of the petitioner to file an appeal under Rule 45 may be barred by filing
three motions for reconsiderations
2. Whether or not the right to appeal may be barred by failure to pay correct docket fees on time
HELD:
The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of settled
exceptions. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared:
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been
oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those
situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and
effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were
not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement
of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper
disposition of his cause.
The circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules. Petitioner failed to present
compelling justification or reason to relax the rules of procedure.
48
Sy – Vargas v. Estate of Ogsos
G.R. No. 221062 October 5, 2016 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico (Fermina), represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
Catalino V. Noel, entered into a Contract of Lease (lease contract) covering five (5) parcels of agricultural
land owned by the latter. Based on the contract, Ogsos, Sr. agreed to pay the Heirs of Fermina 230 piculs or
290.95 liquid-kilogram (lkg.) of centrifugal sugar every crop year, starting from crop year 1994-1995 to crop
year 2000-2001, as lease rental. The contract was subsequently extended for three years and the lease rental
was modified. Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, claimed that the lease rentals
from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 1998-1999 were not paid. Thus, they filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against respondents to recover the unpaid lease rentals.
In their Answer, respondents alleged that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as embodied in
the lease contract and its subsequent amendments. They denied abandoning the leased premises and claimed
that sometime in December 1998, petitioner and Kathryn unlawfully took possession of the leased premises
and appropriated for themselves the sugarcane ready for harvest under the pretext that they would apply the
proceeds thereof to the unpaid rent. Respondents filed a counterclaim for lost profits plus damages that it had
sustained when petitioner took over the possession of the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating
respondents' crops planted therein. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss respondents' counterclaim arguing
that the same were permissive and that respondents had not paid the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, denied
the said motion, declaring respondents' counterclaim as compulsory; thus, holding that the payment of the
required docket fees was no longer necessary. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents' counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not permissive in
nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is required?
HELD:
Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required
to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect
to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action.
On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed
separately in another case.
49
Camaso v. TSM Shipping Inc.
G.R. No. 223290 November 7, 2016 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Camaso alleged that on July 15, 2014, he signed a contract of employment with respondents TSM
Shipping (Phils), Inc., Utkilen, artd Jones Tulod (respondents) to work as a Second Mate on-board the vessel
"M/V Golfstraum," for a period of six (6) months and with basic monthly salary of US$1,178.00. On October
18, 2014, he joined his vessel of assignment. Prior to said contract, Camaso claimed to have been working
for respondents for almost five (5) years and boarded eight (8) of their vessels.
Sometime in November 2013, Camaso complained of a noticeable obstruction in his throat which he
described as akin to a "fishbone coupled [with] coughing.” By February 2014, his situation worsened as he
developed lymph nodules on his jawline, prompting him to request for a medical check-up while in
Amsterdam. As Camaso was initially diagnosed with tonsillar cancer, he was recommended for medical
repatriation to undergo extensive treatment. Upon repatriation to the Philippines on September 8, 2014, he
reported at respondents' office and was referred to a certain Dr. Nolasco of St. Luke's Medical Center for
testing. After a series of tests, it was confirmed that Camaso was indeed suffering from tonsillar
cancer. Consequently, he underwent eight (8) chemotherapy sessions and radiation therapy for 35 cycles
which were all paid for by respondents. He likewise received sickwage allowances from the latter. Thereafter,
respondents refused to shoulder Camaso's medical expenses, thus, forcing the latter to pay for his treatment.
Believing that his sickness was work-related and that respondents remained silent on their obligation, Camaso
filed the instant complaint for disability benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement of medical and hospital
expenses, and other consequential damages before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
docketed as NLRC Case No. OFW (M) 07-09270-14. After efforts for an amicable settlement between the
parties failed, they were ordered to file their respective position papers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Camaso's petition for certiorari before it for nonpayment
of docket fees
HELD:
Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of a case.
It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically
cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no
intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
50
RULE 2
Dynamic Builders v. Presbiterio

G.R. No. 174202 April 7, 2015 Leonen, J.
FACTS: Dynamic Builders bid for the construction of a rubble concrete seawall along the Respondent
municipality’s shoreline which had been found by the BAC to be unresponsive. Dynamic Builders sought
reconsideration but was denied.Dynamic Builders lodged a formal protest against Respondent Presbitero to
set aside the BAC’s decisionbut the protest was also denied.
Dynamic Builders filed a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC of Bago City Negros Occidental for assailing
the decision of Respondent Presbitero denying Dynamic Builders Motion for Reconsideration and pursuant
to Art XVII Sec 58 of RA No. 9184, known as the Government of Procurement Reform Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated the rules against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity
of suits and forum shopping
HELD:
Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action.” Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that “if two
or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.” The splitting of a cause of action
“violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening
the dockets of the courts.”
Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the
ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court.
This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public respondent's Decision and Resolution on the protest —
the same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In
essence, petitioner seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before separate courts. This
violates the rule against forum shopping.
51
RULE 3
Relucio v. Lopez
G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002 Pardo, J.
FACTS: Angelina Lopez filed a petition for “Appointment as Sole Administrtrix of Conjugal partnership of
Properties, Forfeiture, etc” against Alberto Lopez and Imelda Relucio. Angelina alleged that sometime in
1968, her husband, Alberto, abandoned her and their 4 children; that he arrogated unto himself full and
exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain
and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that Alberto, after
abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with Relucio since 1976.
It was further alleged that Alberto and Relucio, during the period of their cohabitation, have amassed a fortune
which are in the names of Alberto and Relucio. It was also averred that Alberto has sold, disposed of,
alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away properties, assets and income belonging
to the conjugal partnership with the Angelina and either spent the proceeds thereof for his sole benefit and
that of Relucio and their two illegitimate children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the
reach of the private- respondent and their four children.
Relucio filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action
against her. An order was issued denying the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and
defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the Relucio’s
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Relucio’s inclusion as a party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete
adjudication of the controversy
HELD:
No. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other
persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is
against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly
support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists. The accounting of
conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage
between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground.
A real party in interest is one who stands “to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.” In this
case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630. If petitioner is not a
real party-in-interest, she cannot be an indispensable party.
An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Petitioner’s
participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a
judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and
give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez’ conjugal partnership with
respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment
would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in
Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined
as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action. Respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J.
Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support
to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his
conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent.
52
De Castro v. CA
G.R. No. 115838 July 18, 2002 Carpio, J.
FACTS: Petitioners De Castro were co-owners of four (4) lots located in EDSA. In a letter Francisco Antigo
was authorized by the De Castro’s to act as a real estate broker in the sale of properties5% of which will be
given to him as commission. Antigo found Times Transit Company, as a prospective buyer which desired to
buy two (2) lots only.
Antigo however only received P43, 893 as commission and asserted that his commission should be P325,500
which is 5% of the agreed price of P7,050,000 paid by Times Transit Corporation to the De Castro’s for the
two (2) lots. Francisco Artigo then sued petitioners Constante De Castro and Corazon De Castro to collect
the unpaid balance of his broker’s commission from the De Castro’s. One of the defenses advanced by the
De Castro’s is that the complaint failed to implead their other siblings who were co-owners as well. The De
Castro’s argue that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead all of the co-owners of
the two (2) lots. The former claimed that the Artigo knew that the two (2) lots were owned by the other
siblings. The De Castro’s contend that failure to implead such indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint
since, Artigo as agent of all the four (4) co-owners, would be paid in funds by the other co-owners. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower courts, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case for failure to implead indispensable parties.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the Courts
action in litigation and without whom no final determination can be had of an action. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their presence. Whenever it appears to
the court in the course of the proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the
Court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party.
However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case. Under
the note sent by De Castro to Antigo, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between the two parties,
whether Constante appointed Antigo as agent, in Constante’s individual or representative capacity, or both.
The De Castros cannot seek dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable
parties.
53
Orquiola v. CA
G.R. No. 141463 August 6, 2002 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689 located in Tandang Sora, QC. This parcel
of land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, registered in the name of
Herminigilda Pedro. Pedro sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots and
Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots. Certain portions of the
subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola
(1964). Sometime in 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly
encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation
replaced Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said
corporation.
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and
severally liable for encroaching on plaintiff’s land. To prohibit Judge Baclig of the RTC-QC from issuing a
writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution, petitioners
filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction on
April 17, 1998 on the ground that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, and since
they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith
cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due
process of law. CA dismissed the petition and held that the petitioners were considered privies who derived
their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision in the Civil Case Q-12918 can be enforced against petitioners even
though they were not impleaded thereto?
HELD:
NO, petitioners are not privies (interested in the outcome of the action) and cannot be bound by the judgment
against Lising and his predecessors-in-interests. The Medina doctrine relied upon by the CA is markedly
different from the one before the court. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the
commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918 and petitioners acquired the registered title in their own names.
In other words, the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners
could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising’s Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free
from any third-party claim.
No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound
by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a
party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.
54
China Banking Corp. v. Oliver
G.R. No. 135796 October 3, 2002 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: In August 1995, Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain Mercedes M. Oliver opened a joint account in China
Banking Corporation at EDSA Balintawak Branch.Thereafter, Lim and Oliver applied for a P17 million loan
and offered a collateral. On November 17, 1995, Lim and Oliver executed in favor of Chinabank a promissory
note for P16,650,000, as well as a Real Estate Mortgage on the property. The mortgage document showed
Mercedes Oliver’s (Oliver One) address to be No. 95 Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City.
Later, respondent claiming that she is Mercedes M. Oliver with postal office address at No. 40 J.P. Rizal St.,
San Pedro, Laguna, filed an action for annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title with damages against
Chinabank and the Register of Deeds. Respondent (Oliver Two), claimed that she was the registered and
lawful owner of the land subject of the real estate mortgage; that the owners duplicate copy of the title had
always been in her possession; and that she did not apply for a loan or surrender her title to Chinabank. She
prayed that: (1) the owners duplicate copy surrendered to Chinabank as well as the original title with the
Registry of Deeds be cancelled; (2) the mortgage be declared null and void; and (3) the Registry of Deeds be
ordered to issue a new and clean title in her name. Chinabank moved to dismiss the case for lack of cause of
action and non-joinder of an indispensable party, the mortgagor. The RTC denied the Motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgagor Mercedes Oliver (Oliver One) is an indispensable party to the case?
HELD:
No. An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an
action. It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of
the case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title is
declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver One’s absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in
resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner.
Oliver Two’s Complaint was for annulment of mortgage due to petitioner’s negligence in not determining
the actual ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgage’s annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in the
Registry of Deeds custody. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her complaint without necessarily
impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an indispensable party in the case filed by
Oliver Two. Chinabank has interest in the loan which, however, is distinct and divisible from the mortgagor’s
interest, which involves the land used as collateral for the loan.
A party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those
already parties to the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank and
mortgagor Oliver One. The latter’s participation in this case will simply enable petitioner Chinabank to make
its claim against her in this case, and hence, avoid the institution of another action. Thus, it was the bank who
should have filed a third-party complaint or other action versus the mortgagor Oliver One.
55
Lotte Phils. Co. Inc. v. De la Cruz
G.R. No. 166302 July 28, 2005 Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: An illegal dismissal case was filed by Erlinda Dela Cruz, et. al against Lotte Phils. Co. Inc. and 7J
Maintenance and Janitorial Services. They alleged that they were hired by 7J Maintenance and Janitorial
Services, and was assigned with Lotte Phil, Co., Inc., herein petitioner to perform piece works and as
repackers or sealers. They were dispensed with their services due to the expiration of the service contract
between 7J Maintenance and herein petitioner and that they were told by 7J that the latter will call them if
they will be needed for work. However, they were never called back.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment declaring 7J being the respondent’s employer and that the former
was guilty of illegal dismissal. Respondents then appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission,
praying that herein petitioner be declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely a labor-only
contractor. NLRC’s decision affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. A motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari, thereafter, was filed by the respondents before the Court of
Appeals. Lotte Phils. Co moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the respondents failed to implead
7J which was the party-in-interest to the said case. The rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the Court of Appeals declared Lotte as the
real employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was merely the agent of
Lotte.
ISSUE: Whether or not 7J Maintenance should have been impleaded in the petition before the Court of
Appeals as an indispensable party.
HELD:
Yes. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is
"the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case". Thus, without the presence of
indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be affected by the
outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of
respondents. The Court of Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was not
impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of respondents. Plainly, its decision directly
affected 7J.
In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added
by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the
latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.
Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, respondents failed to include
it in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire
jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion is
necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties with due
process and fair play.
56
Carabeo v. Dingco
G.R. No. 190823 April 4, 2011 Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: Domingo Carabeo (Carabeo) and Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (Sps. Dingco) entered into
a contract “Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa” whereby Carabeo agreed to sell his rights over a
land situated in Bataan to the spouses for P38,000.00 Sps. Dingco tendered their initial payment of P10,000
upon the signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on September 1990. When they were about
to pay the remaining balance, Carabeo requested them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going
“squabble” over the land. The spouses continued giving Carabeo small sums of money which totaled P9,100
due to the spouses’ inability to pay the amount in full. Despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted
that Carabeo accept the remaining balance of P18,900 but Carabeo remained firm in his refusal, reasoning
out that he would register the land first. In 1994, Sps. Dingco learned that the problem has been settled.
Hence, they offered to pay the balance but Carabeo declined, drawing them to file a complaint before the
Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, thus, a complaint for specific performance was filed
before RTC Bataan.
Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of object certain,
the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land. In any event, petitioner alleged that if
the validity of the kasunduan is upheld, respondents’ failure to comply with their reciprocal obligation to pay
the balance of the purchase price would render the action premature. For, contrary to respondents’ claim,
petitioner maintained that they failed to pay the balance of ₱28,000 on September 1990 to thus constrain him
to accept installment payments totaling ₱9,100. After the case was submitted for decision, Carabeo passed
away. The records do not show that petitioner’s counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the
complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16,
Rule 3, Rules of Court. The trial court ruled in favor of Sps. Dingco ordering Carabeo to sell his right over
the land. Carabeo’s counsel filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Carabeo causes the dismissal of the action filed by Sps. Dingco; their
action being an action in personam
HELD:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued
for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action
which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected
being incidental. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner
is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that
the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by
respondents, and since the action involves property rights, it survives.
It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was
not informed of petitioner’s death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering
his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner’s legal representatives or successors-
in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.
In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of
Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who,
it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court’s decision had thereby
become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.
57
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association v. Fil Estate Ecocentrum Corp.
G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Juana Complex and its residents and other neighbor subdivision filed a complaint for damages
against Fil-Estate for they were deprived of the use of Lapaz Road. The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al.
were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and
Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through
right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten
(10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to
SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the
residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again. JCHA et al prayed for immediate
issuance of TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Fil-Estate from stopping and intimidating them
in their use of Lapaz Road. TRO was issued for period of 20 days and conducted hearing for propriety of
writ of preliminary injunction. Fil-Estate filed motion to dismiss arguing that it failed to state a cause of
action and was improperly filed as a class suit. RTC issued writ of PI. Fil-Estate file a motion for
reconsideration – denied. Fil-Estate filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA where it restated
its first argument and added that the issuance of writ PI that JCHA failed to show that they had clear right to
use Lapaz Road and that Lapaz Road is torrens registered and neither there was voluntary or legal easement.
CA granted the petition WPI annulled because JCHA failed to prove their clear and present right over the
road. CA found that complaint sufficiently state the cause of action that had been using the road for more
than 10yrs and it was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained class suit because
there was common interest and that the individuals were numerous and impractical to include all of them.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was improperly filed as class suit.
HELD:
No. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous
or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned. The suit is clearly one that
benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road.
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown
to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed
manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and
claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of
petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in
Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
58
Navarro v. Escobido
G.R. No. 153788 March 5, 2012 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Karen Go filed 2 complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages
against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed for the issuance of writs of replevin for the seizure of
2 motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession which were eventually granted. In his Answers, Navarro alleged as
a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a
party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase – the actionable documents on which the complaints
were based. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause of action. Acting
on the presumption that Glenn Go’s leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had
sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen
Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest
HELD:
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article
487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action,
for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who
filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises.
The name appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing
business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph
of the Complaint. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly
benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is
the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action
because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to
consider in a trial on the merits.
59
Land Bank v. Cacayuran
G.R. No. 191667 April 17, 2013 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: The Municipality of Agoo entered into two loans with LBP in order to finance a Redevelopment
Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality authorized the mayor Eufranio
Eriguel to enter into a P4M loan with LBP for the Public Plaza and again for the amount of P28M to construct
a commercial center called Agoo People’s Center within the Plaza’s premises. The Municipality used as
collateral a 2,323.75 sqm lot at the south-eastern portion of the Plaza. acayuran and other residents opposed
the redevelopment of the Plaza as well as the means of the funding. They claim that these are highly irregular,
violative of the law, and detrimental to public interest resulting in the desecration of the public plaza.
Cacayuran’s request for the documents relating to the plaza’s redevelopment was not granted. Cacayuran
invokes his taxpayer right and files a complaint against LBP and officers of the municipality but does not
include the municipality itself as party defendant. He questioned the validity of the loan agreements and prays
that the redevelopment is enjoined. The municipal officers moved for the dismissal but were denied. LBP
asserted that Cacayuran did not have any cause of action because he was not privy to the loan agreements.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Agoo should be deemed an indispensable party to the case.
HELD:
It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however,
must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds
derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
Sec 7, Rule 3 mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it is the party whose interest
will be affected by the court’s action and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. His
legal presence is an absolute necessity. Absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to act. Failure to implead any indispensable party is not a ground
for the dismissal of the complaint. The proper remedy is to implead them. In this case, Cacayuran failed to
implead the Municipality, a real party in interest and an indispensable party that stands to be directly affected
by any judicial resolution. It is the contracting party and the owner of the public plaza. It stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment of the case. The decision of the RTC, affirmed with modification by the CA, and
finally affirmed by the SC is not binding upon the Municipality as it was not impleaded as defendant in the
case.
60
Divinagracia v. Parilla
G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a parcel of land located at Iloilo City. During his
lifetime, he contracted two marriages. The first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children,
namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr. The second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7)
children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado,
Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo.
According to Santiago, he bought the respective interests of majority of the heirs over the subject land, as
embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22, 1989
which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares, namely, Ceruleo,
Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children). However, Santiago
was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the subject document registered because the latter’s
refusal to surrender the said title. Santiago to file a Complaint dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and
for receivership. The RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the
subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. The CA set aside the RTC Rulings
stating that Felcon‘s siblings, as well as Maude‘s children, are indispensable parties to the judicial partition
of the subject land and, thus, their non-inclusion as defendants in Santiago‘s complaint would necessarily
result in its dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Felcon‘s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude‘s children
are indispensable parties to Santiago‘s complaint for judicial partition.
HELD:
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the
suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a
party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of
the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a
judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the
initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order.
The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. x x x(Underscoring supplied; emphases
in the original)
In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for
the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on
the merits.
61
RULE 4
Enrique Vda. De Santiago v. Vilar

G.R. No. 225309 March 6, 2018 Tijam, J.
FACTS: Spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos (Spouses Zulueta), registered owners of several
parcels of land, obtained various loans secured by the mother titles from the GSIS. When Spouses Zulueta
defaulted in their payment, GSIS extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgages wherein the latter emerged as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was then issued. GSIS, however, consolidated its title on all of the three
mother titles, including the 78 lots which were expressly excluded from the mortgage contract. Thereafter,
Spouses Zulueta were succeeded by Antonio Zulueta (Antonio), who transferred all his rights and interests
in the excluded lots to Eduardo Santiago (Eduardo). Claiming his rights and interests over the excluded lots,
Eduardo, through his counsel, sent a letter to GSIS for the return of the same. Antonio, as represented by
Eduardo, filed an Action for Reconveyance of the excluded lots against the GSIS. Subsequently, Antonio
was substituted by Eduardo. Upon Eduardo's demise, however, he was substituted by his widow, herein
petitioner Rosario. Later, respondent Antonio Vilar (Vilar) filed a Verified Omnibus Motion (for Substitution
of Party-Plaintiff With Authority to Implement Writ of Execution Until Full Satisfaction of the Final
Judgment of the Court) before the RTC. In his motion, Vilar alleged that after Antonio transferred his rights
and interests to Eduardo, the latter assigned to Vilar 90% of his interest in the judgment proceeds of the
reconveyance case. Further, Vilar averred that he and Eduardo agreed that the Deed of Assignment shall still
take effect despite the fact of substitution. The CA granted Vilar’s petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in impleading Vilar as party-plaintiff in substitution of Rosario.
HELD:
Verily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the widow of the original
party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination of the propriety of the action of the trial court in merely noting
and not granting his motion would necessarily affect her interest in the subject matter of litigation as the
party-plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Court differs with the CA in ruling that the petition for certiorari filed before it merely
delves into the issue of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court. Guilty of repetition, the final
determination of the case would pry into the right of Rosario as party-plaintiff before the lower court who is
entitled to the proceeds of the judgment award. As it is, the CA did not actually rule on the issue of grave
abuse of discretion alone as its corollary ruling inquired into the right of Rosario. In ruling for Vilar's
substitution, the right of Rosario as to the proceeds of the judgment award was thwarted as the CA effectively
ordered that the proceeds pertaining to Rosario be awarded instead to Vilar.
Likewise, the Court finds merit in Rosario's contention that her failure to participate in the proceedings before
the CA constitutes a denial of her constitutional right to due process. Hence, failure to implead Rosario as an
indispensable party rendered all the proceedings before the CA null and void for want of authority to act.
62
Pacific Consultants International Asia v. Schonfield
FACTS: Respondent Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen who was employed by Pacific Consultants
International of Japan (PCIJ), and was assigned as Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI), a local subsidiary of PCIJ,
sector manager in the Philippines. The General Conditions of Employment appended to the employment
contract of Schonfeld with PCIJ stated that for “Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment
of the conditions of employment, as well as any question arising between the Employee and the Company
which is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company and which can not be settled
amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to both parties through written submissions, by the Court of
Arbitration in London.”
Schonfeld’s employment was eventually terminated. Schonfeld filed with the Labor Arbiter a case for illegal
dismissal against Petitioners. In its defense, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss wherein it argued that the
Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, and argued that venue was improperly laid, citing the
arbitration clause in the General Conditions of Employment.
The LA held in favor of Petitioners, stating that the Philippines was merely the duty station, and that PCIJ
remained its employer. It was upheld by the NLRC upon appeal, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
The CA held that Schonfeld was an employee of PPI; and, on the issue of venue, the appellate court declared
that, even under the contract of employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a case related
thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues between the parties were to be
resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the
complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue can be brought to venues other than those specified in the contract
HELD:
The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations
in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.
If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place
named by them. In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in
no other court save '," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except '," or words of equal import were stated in the
contract.
63
Biaco v. Countryside Rural Bank
G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007 Tinga, J.
Biaco. Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank as evidenced by promissory notes. As
security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank
covering the parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real estate
mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans
on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand . The written demand, however,
proved futile prompting respondent bank to file a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses
Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco
through Ernesto at his office. Ernesto received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an
answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon motion of the respondent bank. The
respondent bank was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court who was then
appointed by the court as Commissioner.
RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent. In case of non-payment within the period, the Sheriff of this
Court is ordered to sell at public auction the mortgaged Lot, a parcel of registered land to satisfy the mortgage
debt, and the surplus if there be any should be delivered to the defendants spouses Ernesto and Ma. Threresa
Chaves Biaco. In the event however[,] that the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgage[d] property is
not enough to pay the outstanding obligation, the defendants are ordered to pay any deficiency of the
judgment as their personal liability. Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision
contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings.
According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6)
months after its finality. . She moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because
summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could
not be made. Petitioner further argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be
deemed void for lack of jurisdiction over her person. CA ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are
actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Noting that the spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the case,
the Court of Appeals further ruled that the fraud committed by one against the other cannot be considered
extrinsic fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there was no fraud perpetrated by respondent upon her
thereby violating her right to due process?
HELD:
The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e., whether the
action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court likewise apply according to the nature of the action.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is
an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly
try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the
res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby
it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which
the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.
64
BPI Savings Bank v. Sps. Yujuico
G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: BPI extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the
Spouses Yujuico’s loan. Because there was a deficiency, BPI sued the spouses to recover such deficiency in
the Makati RTC (where the principal office of BPI is located). The spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated no
cause of action; and that the plaintiff’s claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished. Makati RTC
denied the Motion. The spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration while BPI filed its comment/opposition
to the Motion. The respondents then filed their reply, in which they raised for the first time their objection on
the ground of improper venue. They contended that the action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a
supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that should have been
brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the properties were located.
Makati RTC denied the MR. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC opining that a suit for recovery of the
deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is
precisely to enforce the mortgage contract. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must
necessarily be the same venue as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Thus, the suit for judgment
on the deficiency filed by BPI against the spouses, being an action emanating from the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage contract between them, must necessarily be filed also at the RTC of Manila, not at the RTC
of Makati. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was properly laid.
HELD:
It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants
of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to
or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court
declares all other actions as personal actions. such actions may include those brought for the recovery of
personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal
action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.
65
Planters Dev. Bank v. Ramos
G.R. No. 228617 September 20, 2017 Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS: The facts show that in July 2012, Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos applied for several credit
lines with Planters Development Bank (PDB) for the construction of a warehouse in Barangay Santo Tomas,
Nueva Ecija. The said application was approved for P40,000,000.00, secured by Real Estate Mortgage dated
July 25, 2012 over properties owned by the spouses. Subsequently, Spouses Ramos requested for additional
loan and PDB allegedly promised to extend them a further loan of P140,000,000.00, the amount they
supposed was necessary for the completion of the construction of the warehouse with a capacity of 250,000
cavans of palay. Despite the assurance of the bank, only P25,000,000.00 in additional loan was approved and
released by PDB, which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over four (4) real properties.
Due to financial woes, Spouses Ramos were not able to pay their obligations as they fell due. They appealed
to PDB for the deferment of debt servicing and requested for a restructuring scheme but the parties failed to
reach an agreement. On April 23, 2014, PDB filed a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. On June 18, 2014, Spouses Ramos
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgages and Promissory Notes, Accounting and
Application of Payments, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against
PDB and its officers also before the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Instead of filing an Answer, PDB
filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the venue of the action was improperly laid considering that
the real estate mortgages signed by the parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising therefrom shall be
filed in Makati City only. It further noted that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and must therefore
be dismissed. The RTC denied the Urgent Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the autonomy of contract wherein
venue can be waived. The CA likewise denied the petition for certiorari filed by DBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulation as to venue between the parties must be upheld
HELD:
Yes. Based on the foregoing, the general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4 thereof, i.e., where
a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed in writing before the filing of the action
on the exclusive venue thereof.
Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or restrictive. "Written stipulations as to venue
may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive
in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As
in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.
In view of the foregoing, the RTC should have granted the Urgent Motion to Dismiss filed by PDB on the
ground that that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint being one for annulment of real estate
mortgages and promissory notes is in the nature of a personal action, the venue of which may be fixed by the
parties to the contract. In this case, it was agreed that any suit or action that may arise from the mortgage
contracts or the promissory notes must be filed and tried in Makati only. Not being contrary to law or public
policy, the stipulation on venue, which PDB and Spouses Ramos freely and willingly agreed upon, has the
force of law between them, and thus, should be complied with in good faith.
66
RULES 6 – 9
67
RULE 6
Alba v. Malapajo
G.R. No. 198752 January 13, 2016 Peralta, J.
FACTS: On October 19, 2009, petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr., filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Roxas City, Branch 15, a Complaint against respondents Raymund D. Malapajo, Ramil D. Malapajo and the
Register of Deeds of Roxas City for recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or cancellation of
title and damages alleging, among others, that he was the previous owner of a parcel of land Bolo, Roxas
City, covered by TCT No. T-22345; that his title was subsequently canceled by virtue of a deed of sale he
allegedly executed in favor of respondents Malapajo for a consideration of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00); that new TCT No. T-56840 was issued in the name of respondents Malapajo; that the deed of
sale was a forged document which respondents Malapajo were the co-authors of.
Respondents Malapajo filed their Answer with Counterclaimcontending that they were innocent purchasers
for value and that the deed was a unilateral document which was presented to them already prepared and
notarized. Respondents counterclaimed for damages and for reimbursement of petitioner's loan from them
plus the agreed monthly interest in the event that the deed of sale is declared null and void on the ground of
forgery.Petitioner filed a Reply to Answer and Answer to (Permissive) Counterclaim stating, among others,
that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of respondents' permissive counterclaim; and, that
assuming without admitting that the two real estate mortgages are valid, the rate of five percent (5%) per
month uniformly stated therein is unconscionable and must be reduced. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the
Case for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss had been Filed alleging that respondents’
counterclaims are in the nature of a permissive counterclaim, thus, there must be payment of docket fees and
filing of a certification against forum shopping; and, that the supposed loan extended by respondents’ mother
to petitioner, must also be dismissed as respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. Respondents filed
their Oppositionthereto.The RTC denied petitioner's motion since respondents’ counterclaims are
compulsory and later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether respondents’ counterclaim, i.e., reimbursement of the loan obtained from them in case the
deed of absolute sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery, is permissive in nature which requires
the payment of docket fees and a certification against forum shopping for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over the same.
HELD:
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such
a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof,
except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, necessarily connected with the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the court acquire
jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action.
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another
case.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the following tests: (a)
Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants’ claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the defendants’ counterclaim?
and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
68
Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy
G.R. No. 155701 March 11, 2015 Reyes, J.
FACTS: Antonio Lim Tanhu was the original owner of the lot which is the subject matter of the controversy.
Allegedly, he sold the lot to Spouses Cabansag; then Spouses Cabansag sold the same to Serafin Uy
(respondent). Serafin then filed a petition before the RTC praying for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
TCT in his name. The petition was initially granted but subsequently nullified because Lim Teck Chuan
(petitioner) filed his Opposition alleging that he is one of the 6 legitimate descendants of Antonio and that
the original TCT was not lost and has always been in his custody. In the meantime, a certain Henry Lim sold
the same lot to Leopolda Cecilio by virtue of an Affidavit of Sole Adjudication/Settlement of the Estate of
Antonio Lim Tanhu with Deed of Sale.
Serafin then filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title impleading Leopolda, Henry and the petitioner. Leopolda
averred that she is a buyer in good faith and for value. Petitioner set up a counterclaim against Serafin and a
cross-claim against Lopeolda contending that the property was never transferred and encumbered to any
person during Antonio’s lifetime. During the proceedings, both and Serafin and Leopolda entered into an
amicable settlement and they both filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss (MTD) on the main ground that the case
had become moot and academic since Serafin’s title to the subject lot had been allegedly quieted. Petitioner
opposed the MTD on the ground that he was not included in the settlement. The RTC, however, granted the
MTD and it also dismissed petitioner’s counterclaim and cross-claim. Petitioner filed directly with the SC a
petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s counterclaim or cross-claim could be prosecuted in the same action
despite the dismissal of the main complaint?
HELD:
Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his complaint to which a
counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to
have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the
corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should
he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed,
he must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to
dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available to him regardless of whether his
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.
69
Metrobank v. CPR Promotions
G.R. No. 200567 June 22, 2015 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: Because the respondents’ defaulted in their loan obligation to petitioner (MBTC), MBTC filed a
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages securing the loan obligations. According
to MBTC, despite the foreclosure sale, there remained a deficiency balance of PhP2,628,520.73, plus interest
and charges as stipulated and agreed upon in the promissory notes and deeds of real estate mortgages. Despite
petitioner’s repeated demands, however, respondents failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner
filed an action for collection of sum of money against respondents before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor
of petitioner that there, indeed, was a balance, and that respondents were liable for the said amount, as part
of their contractual obligation. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration, prompting for petitioner to file
an appeal. The CA reversed the court a quo and ruled in favor of respondents and ordered that Metrobank to
refund or return to the defendants-appellants the amount representing the remainder of the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale (because there was overpayment). Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting
among others that respondents never set up a counterclaim for refund of any amount, but the same was denied,
hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering a refund to the respondent despite their failure to set it up
as a counterclaim?
HELD:
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have, in several cases, utilized the
following tests:
1. Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s
counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort
and time by the parties and the court? This test is the "compelling test of compulsoriness."
Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-à-vis the
amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed
by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed
in order to prove their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other
since these two actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially
unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions. And
finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and
needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same
parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence. The only difference here would be in the findings of
the courts based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of whether or not the bid prices
substantially cover the amounts due.
Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for
payment of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, we rule that respondents failed to timely raise the
same. It is elementary that a defending party’s compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he
files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. As it appears from the records,
what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price,
respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant’s Brief filed before the CA.
Unfortunately, respondents’ belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to
timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents’ claim for the excess, if any, is already
barred. With this, we now resolve the substantive issues of this case.
70
Valdez v. Dabon
A.C. No. 7353 November 16, 2015 Per Curiam
FACTS: Nelson Valdez charged Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals (CA), with
gross immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous relationship with his wife, Sonia Valdez, which was
made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation. Respondent Atty. Dabon
strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming that the same was baseless and unfounded and that the
complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his reputation. In his
Comment, Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and unlawful acts through sexual assaults,
abuses, threats and intimidation. He posited that the allegations of spouses Nelson and Sonia in their
respective affidavits were nothing but pure fabrication solely intended to malign his name and honor.
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
rendered his Report and Recommendation, finding that the charge against respondent Atty. Dabon had been
sufficiently proven and it was also adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP and denied
Atty. Dabon’s Motion of Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dabon’s denial of the complaint against him constitutes negative pregnant
HELD:
To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to whether
or not he would admit his extramarital liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan stated in
his report, Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same time, he
seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and
intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did
not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the
person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself.
In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of
some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted. It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his
denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof,
he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.
71
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003 Corona, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs
and Imelda R. Marcos.
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow
in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs.
Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
In their Answer, particularly, in paragraph 22, they stated that:
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents

clandestinely stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and
layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents’
aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
ISSUE: Whether or not paragraph 22 of the Answer constitutes negative pregnant
HELD:
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative
pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least
an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied
by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was
focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that Respondents clandestinely stashed
the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate
entities.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum
of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed
admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
72
Caneland Sugar Corp. v. Alon
G.R. No. 142896 September 12, 2007 Austria – Martinez, J.
FACTS: On July 15, 1999, Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Silay City, Branch 40, a complaint for damages, injunction, and nullity of mortgage against the
Land Bank of the Philippines (respondent) and Sheriff Eric B. de Vera, praying for the following reliefs:
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with the
auction sale of petitioners property; declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be held; declaration of
nullity of the mortgage constituted over petitioners property in favor of respondent; and award of damages.On
July 21, 1999, the RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the auction sale set on July 23, 1999, as agreed
upon by the parties. Notwithstanding said directive, another foreclosure sale was scheduled on October 15,
1999. Per RTC Order dated October 14, 1999, the October 15 scheduled sale was held in abeyance; but re-
scheduled the sale on November 15, 1999 for the following reasons:
However, P.D. 385 provides that it shall be mandatory for government financial institution to foreclose
collaterals and/or securities for any loan, credit accommodations and/or guarantees granted by them
whenever the arrearages on such account, including accrued interest and other charges amount to at least
20% of the total outstanding obligation as appearing in the books of the financial institution. Moreover, no
restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court against any government
financial institution in any action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure
provided by said law. x x x the defendant Land Bank of the Philippines and Eric B. De Vera, Sheriff of this
Court, are hereby authorized to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on November 15, 1999.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Order, but this was denied. Petitioner then
filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction which it denied
due course and dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, which was
eventually denied by the CA. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not
enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties subject of this case.
HELD:
Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioner’s bone of contention before the
RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture
and Mortgage Participation on its property covered by TCT No. T-11292. It does not categorically deny that
these promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions are, in fact, negative
pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which
are not squarely denied. As defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant is
a "form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied
while the fact itself is admitted."
73
RULE 7
Alma Jose v. Javellana

FACTS: Margarita Jose Alma Jose, sold two parcel of land to herein respondent, Ramon Javellana by deed
of conditional sale. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the
balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration
being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become
incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner
Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for
registration. Margarita and Juvenal died, thus it was the petitioner’s obligation to register the properties under
Torrens Title. However she refuse to comply, instead she introduce some improvements in the land. Thus,
respondent commenced on an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was
already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. In the appeal the CA
mad by the respondent, the petitioner countered that, the respondent was guilty of forum shopping, since
while pending appeal, she also filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed. The CA in its
decision on the appeal, reversed the RTC’s decision, it ruled that, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita with respect to the
parcels of land; that Margaritas undertaking under the contract was not a purely personal obligation but was
transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently bound to comply with the obligation; that the action had not
yet prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible brought by Javellana
who had actual possession of the properties. MR was also denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA should outrightly dismiss the respondents appeal, since she was guilty of
forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the
subject matter of his appeal pending in the CA.
HELD:
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when,
in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity
of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts;
and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. For forum shopping to exist, both
actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical
causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned,
two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought. The first danger, i.e.,
the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize considering that the
appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an
independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge
to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA
had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
74
Medado v. Heirs of Antonio Consuing
FACTS: Petitioner Spouses Medado and the estate of the late Antonio Consing represented by Soledad
Consing executed Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage for the former’s acquisition from the latter of
a property. Subsequent to the sale, the Estate of Consing offered the subject property to the government via
Department of Agrarian Reform’s Voluntary Offer to Sell. The Estate of Consing, instituted with the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City an action for recission and damages against Petitioner for alleged failure
of to meet the conditions in the agreement.
During the pendency of the case, the Land Bank of the Philippines issued in favor of the respondent
compensations to the subject property. These prompted the petitioner to file an action for injunction with
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order with the RTC of Cadiz City against respondent and
LBP. RTC granted the injunction, respondents then filed a petition for certiorari against RTC judge, stating
that it violated the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping, however such petition’s verification and
Certificate of forum shopping was signed by Soledad alone. CA granted the petition, hence Spouses Medado
filed a petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a plaintiff in this case Soledad can sign on behalf of the co-plaintiffs in a certificate
against non-forum shopping?
2. Whether or not the filing of the complaint for injunction during the pendency of the action for
rescission and damages violates the rule against forum shopping?
HELD:
In addition, the allegations and contentions embodied in the CA petition do not deviate from the claims
already made by the heirs in Civil Case Nos. 00-11320 and 797-C, both specifically mentioned in the SPA.
We emphasize that the verification requirement is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations
in the pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith. We rule that there was no deficiency in the petition's verification and
certification against forum shopping filed with the CA.
In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in
the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or
certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case
and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on
forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The
rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is
because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum
shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed
the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not
jurisdictional.
75
COA v. Paler
G.R. No. 172623 March 3, 2010 Corona, J.
FACTS: Celso M. Paler was a supervising legislative officer of the Commission on Appoints. He filed a
request for a vacation leave lasting for 74 working days, which was favorably recommended by his immediate
supervisor, the director of the Technical Support Service. By virtue of this favorable recommendation, he
went to the United States. Thereafter, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped
from the roll of employees due to continuous absence without leave effective on indicated date on the letter.
Paler moved for reconsideration but was denied for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Paler
later appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC reversed and set aside the decision of the
Commission Chairman. The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CSC.
The Commissioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43. The CA affirmed
the decision of the CSC. A motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA. Hence, the Commissioner
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by a petition for review under Rule 45. In his comment, Paler
questioned the authority of the Commission Secretary, Atty. Tiu, to file the petition and sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission Secretary has the authority to sign the certification of non-forum
shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman?
HELD:
First, we tackle Atty. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping.
The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the
Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the
verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in
the petition could sign the verification. With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the
established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.
In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to
prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler’s allegation of his lack of authority.
This renders the petition dismissible.
76
Basan v. Coca – Cola Bottlers Phils.
G.R. No. 174365 – 66 February 4, 2015 Peralta, J.
FACTS: The petitioners Basan et al., who were working as route helpers, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with money claims against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, alleging that respondent
dismissed them without just cause and prior written notice required by law.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners and found that since they were performing activities necessary
and desirable to the usual business of petitioner for more than the period for regularization, petitioners are
considered as regular employees, and thus, their dismissal was done contrary to law in the absence of just
cause and prior written notice. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Coca-cola then filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that
petitioners were regular employees. The CA reserved the ruling of the NLRC. The petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration but was thereafter denied. Hence, this petition with the Supreme Court by way of a
petition for review under Rule 45. Coca-cola contended in its comment that the petition should be denied due
course for its verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the petition should be given due course even though its verification and certification of
non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners
HELD:
On the procedural issue, we hold that while the general rule is that the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them, petitioner
Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with the procedural
requirement. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct. Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the certification requirement. Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by
petitioner Basan does not necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with substantial
justice to overlook petitioners’ procedural lapses. Indeed, the application of technical rules of procedure may
be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice.
77
Uy v. CA
G.R. No. 173186 September 16, 2015 Jardeleza, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Carmencita Naval-Sai filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed with Damages
before the RTC in Kidapawan City against petitioner. The subject of the complaint was the deed of sale
allegedly executed between Naval-Sai and petitioner involving Lots No. 54-B-8 and No. 54-B-9. Naval-Sai
prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void ab initio because the alleged sale between her and
petitioner was a forgery. Naval-Sai argued that she never sold the lots and that her signature in the purported
deed of sale is spurious. Petitioner claimed that he and Naval-Sai entered into a valid contract of sale and
that the lots were sold for value. The corresponding TCTs were issued in his name shortly thereafter and
since then, he had been in complete control of the properties. Petitioner also raised special and affirmative
defenses of, among others, non-compliance with the requisite certification of non-forum shopping and
prescription. He asserted that jurisdiction has never been acquired over the parties and the subject matter
because the certification against forum shopping in the Amended Complaint was defective, for having been
merely signed by Naval-Sai's counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that there was substantial compliance with
the requirements on certification of non-forum shopping.
HELD:
A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties,
issues and causes of action. It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
We have ruled that the general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where we exercised leniency and relaxed the
rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.
The rules on forum-shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
"should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subve1i its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.”
78
Bandillon v. LFUC
G.R. No. 202446 September 16, 2015 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Petitioners Eduardo Bandillion, et al. (employees) are truck drivers and employees of respondent
La Filipina Uygongco Corporation (LFUC). They filed a complaint for violation of labor standard laws
against the latter before the DOLE Region VI.3 Upon inspection, a finding of "no violation" was made by
the Labor Enforcement Officer, which was affirmed by DOLE Regional Director. The employees filed an
appeal with the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE Secretary). Thus, on June 4, 2003, Acting DOLE
Secretary Imson issued an Order overturning the previous order of the DOLE-VI Regional Director. Upon a
denial of its motion for reconsideration by DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, LFUC filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition, however, and affirmed the
decision of the DOLE Secretary. The motion for reconsideration filed by LFUC was likewise denied by the
court. A petition for certiorari was filed before SC which was likewise denied. Consequently, the employees
filed a Motion for Execution before the DOLE Region VI to enforce the DOLE Secretary's Order of June 4,
2003. After being served with the writ, LFUC filed a Petition14 for certiorari and injunction dated August
15, 2008 with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the writ of execution.
In 2011, the CA rendered its decision remanding the case to DOLE VI Regional Director for re-computation
of awards and reception of evidence of the parties on the ground that that the office of DRD arrived at its
computation without any evidence from the parties. The employees filed an MR to no avail Hence the petition
for review on certiorari filed by the employees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition must fail on the ground that several employees concerned did not sign
the SPA authorizing their union president and co-petitioner Payda to file this petition and to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping.
HELD:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements
already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective,
verification and certification against forum shopping:
1. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading
if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with
in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there
is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons."
5. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6. Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party- pleader is unable to sign, he
must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
79
People v. Arojado
G.R. No. 207041 November 9, 2015 Peralta, J.
FACTS: In an Information dated March 23, 2009, herein respondent was charged with the crime of murder
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz. The case was raffled to RTC Roxas City. On June
16, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information filed against him on the ground that the
investigating prosecutor who filed the said Information failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue
of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter
No. 1922 (B.M. No.1922) which was promulgated by this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated June 3,
2008. RTC dismissed the case and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to indicate the date and number of MCLE Compliance Certificate in the
information would result to its dismissal
HELD:
In this case, YES. But for the next cases, the trial court should not dismiss but simply require the investigating
prosecutor to number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance. Section 1, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the written statements of the respective claims and defenses
of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under
Section 2 thereof are the complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule
110 of the same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. In accordance with the above definitions, it is
clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a person with an offense,
is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a plaintiff’s cause or cause of action.
The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of the principle on liberal construction of procedural
rules by arguing that such liberal construction "may be invoked in situations where there may be some
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules." The prosecution has
never shown any reasonable attempt at compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922. Even
when the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was filed, the
required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance was still
not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested
leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be
granted.
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to
indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance,
this Court issued an En Bane Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing
the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the
amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue
of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction
of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine
and/or disciplinary action.
80
Powerhouse Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. Rey
G.R. No. 190203 November 7, 2016 Jardeleza, J.
FACTS: Powerhouse hired herein respondent employees as operators for its foreign principal, Catcher
Technical Co. Ltd./Catcher Industrial Co. Ltd. (Catcher), based in Taiwan, each for the duration of two years
commencing upon their arrival at the jobsite. They were deployed on June 2, 2000. Sometime in February
2001, Catcher informed respondent employees that they would be reducing their working days due to low
orders and financial difficulties. The respondent employees were repatriated to the Philippines on March 11,
2001. Respondent employees then filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against Powerhouse and
Catcher before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which were later consolidated upon their motion. They alleged that
on March 2, 2001, Catcher informed them that they would all be repatriated due to low orders of Catcher.
Initially, they refused to be repatriated but they eventually gave in because Catcher stopped providing them
food and they had to live by the donations/dole outs from sympathetic friends and the church. Furthermore,
during their employment with Catcher, the amount of NT$10,000.00 was unjustifiably deducted every month
for eight to nine months from their individual salaries. On the other hand, Powerhouse maintained that
respondent employees voluntarily gave up their jobs following their rejection of Catcher's proposal to reduce
their working days. It contended that before their repatriation, each of the respondents accepted payments by
way of settlement, with the assistance of Labor Attache Romulo Salud. During the proceedings before the
LA, Powerhouse moved to implead JEJ International Manpower Services (JEJ) as respondent on account of
the alleged transfer to the latter of Catcher's accreditation. JEJ submitted its position paper, arguing that the
supposed transfer of accreditation to it did not affect the joint and solidary liability of Powerhouse in favor
of respondent employees. It averred that any contract between JEJ and Powerhouse could not be enforced in
the case as it involved no employer-employee relationship and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not Powerhouse is liable for the monetary claims.
HELD:
Yes. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all monetary claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarity liable with
the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. Such liabilities shall continue during the
entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment
or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract
The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need
of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3)
the General Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment Specialist
in a labor case. The rationale applied in these cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a
position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.
81
Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Segundina Cebrero
FACTS: On January 24, 1991, Segundina Cebrero, through her attorney-in-fact Remedios Muyot,
executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property located in Sampaloc, Manila covered by TCT
No. 158305 registered under the name of Cebrero's late husband Virgilio Cebrero (Virgilio) as security for
the payment of the amount of P8 million, pursuant to an amicable settlement dated January 11, 1991 entered
into by the parties in the case of annulment of revocation of donation in Civil Case No. 83-21629. In the said
settlement, Josefina Gabriel recognized Cebrero's absolute ownership of the subject property and
relinquished all her claims over the property in consideration of the payment of the said P8 million. Upon
Cebrero's failure to pay the amount within the period of extension until December 31, 1991, Gabriel filed in
1993 an action for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage docketed as Civil Case No. 92-62638. The RTC
ruled in Gabriel's favor and ordered Cebrero to pay the P8 million and interest, or the subject property shall
be sold at public auction in default of payment.
On November 27, 1996, Eduardo Caniza (Caniza), allegedly in behalf of Gabriel, instituted a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of sale and of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 225341 of the subject property
registered under Progressive, a single proprietorship represented by its President and Chairman, respondent
Manuel C. Chua (Chua).
In their Answer, respondents alleged that Gabriel has no legal capacity to sue as she was bedridden and
confined at the Makati Medical Center since 1993. The complaint should be dismissed because Caniza signed
the verification and certification of the complaint without proper authority. On October 14, 1997, Gabriel
died during the pendency of the case, thus her heirs substituted her. The RTC ruled for the Heirs of Gabriel,
but the CA reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defect was cured when Caniza, being one of the heirs, substituted Gabriel when
she died during the pendency of the case before the trial court
HELD:
The substitution of heirs in a case ensures that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented
in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. The purpose behind the rule on
substitution is to apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to the jurisdiction of the court in
lieu of the deceased party by operation of law. It is for the protection of the right of every party to due process.
Proper substitution of heirs is effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to
obviate any future claim by any heir that he or she was not apprised of the litigation.
82
RULE 8
Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc. v. Wesleyan University

G.R. No. 190203 November 7, 2016 Jardeleza, J.
FACTS: From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007 FME, a domestic corporation dealing with medical
equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the WESLEYAN
UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, INC. (Wesleyan) hospital. According to FME, Wesleyan has failed to pay its
full obligation but on February 11, 2009 both FME and Wesleyan entered into agreement that FME would
reduced Wesleyan’s liabilities and provided for a term of payment. However, such agreement was then
retracted by FME when it changed management. FME claims that such contracts should be rescinded as it
would be disadvantageous to FME due to the economic lesion it would suffer and that such agreement was
entered without prior board approval from FME. FME then filed a complaint for sum of money in the RTC
due to Wesleyan’s failure to heed their demands. Wesleyan then filed a motion to dismiss but was denied.
Thus, Wesleyan filed their answers and admitted the following: (a) the four transactions for the delivery and
installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the Wesleyan University; (c) the payments
made by the Wesleyan University; (d) the balance still due to the petitioner; and (e) the execution of the
February 11, 2009 agreement. The Wesleyan denied the rest of the complaint "for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof”, inasmuch as the alleged transactions
were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines.
FME then filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the Wesleyan had admitted the
material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The Wesleyan
opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material
allegations in the complaint. The RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings of the petitioner. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent sufficiently denied the material allegations in the petitioner’s
complaint.
HELD:
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the defending
party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are considered. It is error for the
trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another
case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer raises
an issue of fact. The first is by the defending party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of
which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an
averment, and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material allegation of
ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only the remainder. The third is done by the defending party
who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment
made in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material averment in the complaint not so specifically
denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the amount of unliquidated damages.
83
Go Tong Electrical Supply v. BPI Family Savings Bank
G.R. No. 187487 June 29, 2015 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Go Tong Electrical applied and was granted a loan by DBS Bank of the Philippines (formerly BSA)
which is covered by a Promissory Note. Go also executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement (CSA)
covering any and all obligations undertaken by Go Tong Electrical. Because of its failure to pay the loan,
respondent file a complaint for sum of money against it. In their Answer with Counterclaim (Answer),
petitioners merely stated that they "specifically deny" the allegations under the complaint. The RTC ruled in
favor of respondent. The CA sustained the RTC's ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was able to sufficiently deny the allegations in the respondent’s complaint.
HELD:
While the failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not preclude a
party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations,
estoppel and want of consideration [nor] bar a party from raising the defense in his answer or reply and prove
at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express the true agreement
of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing," none of
these defenses were adequately argued or proven during the proceedings of this case.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden
rests on the defendant, i.e., petitioners, to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to
prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof of non-payment is
not needed for it is presumed.
84
Benguet Exploration Inc v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for damages against Seawood
Shipping and Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd. Rogelio Lumibao, marketing assistant of Benguet,
was in charge of exportation. His responsibilities included the documentation of export products,
presentations with banks, and other duties connected with the export of products. He explained that private
respondent Seawood Shipping was chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport copper concentrates. The bill
of lading stated that the cargo, consisting of 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates, was loaded
on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union. It was insured by Switzerland Insurance
(marine insurance policy was marked. When the cargo was unloaded in Japan, however, Rogelio Lumibao
received a report dated August 19, 1985, from a surveyor in Japan stating that the cargo was 355 metric tons
short of the amount stated in the bill of lading. For this reason, petitioner Benguet made a claim of the loss
to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. In its letter, dated August 21, 1985, petitioner Benguet
made a formal demand for the value of the alleged shortage. As both Seawood Shipping and Switzerland
Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought these cases against Seawood Shipping and
Switzerland Insurance.
Ernesto Cayabyab had been with Benguet for 13 years and, at the time of his testimony, he was secretary of
Nil Alejandre, manager of Benguet. According to Cayabyab, he was sent to the warehouse at La Union to
assist in the loading of the copper concentrates. These copper concentrates were to be loaded on the ship
Sangkulirang No. 3. Cayabyab said he was present when the cargo was loaded on the ship, as evidenced by
the Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and the Mate's Receipt all dated July 28, 1985. According
to Cayabyab, the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate would go around the boat to determine how much was
loaded on the ship. Cayabyab stated that he saw petitioner Benguet's representative and his immediate
superior, Mr. Alejandre, and the Inspector of Customs, Mr. Cardenas, sign the Certificate of Weight.
Cayabyab also witnessed the ship captain sign the Certificate of Weight, which stated therein that 2,243.496
wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the ship. Cayabyab likewise confirmed the authenticity
of the Mate's Receipt, saying that he witnessed the Chief Mate sign the document.
Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented, i.e., Bill of Lading,
Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mate’s Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of
its witness, Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is a prima facie presumption that their contents are
true.
ISSUE: Whether the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented were properly established
by the testimony of the plaintiff’s witness, resulting to prima facie presumption that their contents are true.
HELD: NO. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that “the
party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the
party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such
as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.” Genuineness and due
execution of the instrument means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of
different import on its face from the one executed.
It is equally true, however, that 3⁄4 execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot
involve other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable
a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from
introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced
in evidence.
85
Asian Const. & Dev. Corp. v. CA
G.R. No. 160242 May 17, 2005 Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: Monark (MEC) filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Asian Construction
(ACDC), alleging that ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida mobile floodlighting systems from
MEC, but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals therefor; that various equipment from MEC were leased
by ACDC for the latter’s power plant; and, that ACDC also purchased and took custody of various equipment
parts from MEC, which, despite demands, MEC failed to pay. ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer
with third-party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corporation (Becthel). In its answer, ACDC admitted
its indebtedness to MEC, but alleged the following special and affirmative defenses: that Becthel incurred an
obligation with ACDC and refused to pay the overdue obligation; and that the equipment covered by the
lease were all used in Becthel’s construction project. MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a third-party
complaint against Becthel on the ground that ACDC had already admitted its principal obligation to MEC;
that the transaction between MEC and ACDC on one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel on the other,
were independent transactions.
In addition, MEC filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that there was no genuine issue as to
ACDC’s obligation to MEC. ACDC opposed the motion, alleging that there was a genuine issue with respect
to the amount being claimed by MEC, and that it had a third-party complaint against Becthel in connection
with the reliefs sought against it which had to be litigated. In its reply, MEC alleged that the demand of
ACDC in its special and affirmative defensespartook the nature of a negative pregnant, and that there was a
need for the hearing on its claim for damages.
RTC denied the motion of ACDC for leave to file a third-party complaint, and granted the motion of MEC
(which the RTC considered as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings). It ordered ACDC to pay MEC the
amount alleged. CA affirmed the ruling, adding that since MEC prayed for judgment on the pleadings, it
waived its claim for damages other than the amount alleged; hence, there was no longer a genuine issue to
be resolved by the court. It also held that the transaction between ACDC and Becthel did not arise out of the
same transaction on which MEC’s claim was based.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third-party complaint should prosper
HELD:
NO, the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a
defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-party which he, otherwise, would assert in another
action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then be adjudicated
in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial right. Neither does it abridge,
enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. This right to file a third-party complaint against a
third-party rests in the discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint is actually independent of,
separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed
separately from the original complaint.
The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to
the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability
of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff
and the defendant. There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and
a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.
The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be recovery against the third-
party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show possibility of recovery. In determining the sufficiency
of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint must be
examined. A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.
86
RULE 9
Salvador v. Rabaja
FACTS: Spouses Salvador were registered owners of a lot in Mandaluyong which were rented out by Sps.
Rabaja. Sps. Salvador decided to sell the lot through their agent Gonzales. Sps. Salvador and Rabaja entered
into a contract to sell. Sps. Rabaja made several payments totaling P950,000.00 which were received by
Gonzales. However, Sps. Salvador complained to Sps. Rabaja that they did not received any payment from
Gonzales. This prompted sps. Rabaja to suspend payment and as a consequence they received a notice to
vacate for non-payment of rentals.
Sps. Salvador instituted an action for ejectment while sps. Rabaja filed an action for rescission of contract.
The MeTC ruled in favor of sps. Salvador in the ejectment case, the RTC reversed the ruling and it was
overturned by the CA. The decision of the CA was not appealed therefore it became final and executory. In
the rescission case, the RTC declared sps Salvador in default for failure to attend the pre-trial conference and
allowed sps. Rabaja to present their evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favor of sps. Rabaja. It held that
what was executed was a contract of sale and not contract to sell and could be validly rescinded. It also stated
that Gonzales who was duly equipped with SPA was the attorney-in-fact of sps. Salvador. The CA affirmed
the said ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-trial conference warrants the presentation
of evidence ex-parte by Spouses Rabaja
HELD:
Yes. In the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pre-trial conference
does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only
declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, if a
defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte.
From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed adverse consequences. If the
absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then
the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment based on the
evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from
the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having
forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. The stringent application of the rules on pre-
trial is necessitated from the significant role of the pre-trial stage in the litigation process. Pre-trial is an
answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940
Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. “The
importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized.” There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador
and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice.
Spouses Salvador aver that their non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update
his calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be
considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could
no longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the
RTC to present evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants. Considering that Gonzales as co-
defendant was able to attend the pre-trial conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The RTC
could only render judgment based on the evidence presented during the trial.
87
BDO v. Tansipek
G.R. No. 181235 July 22, 2009 Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank (PCIB). PCIB, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against John Tansipek (respondent).
Tansipek failed to answer the third-party complaint and he was declared in default for failure to do so. He
filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Order of Default but was denied by the RTC. Tansipek then filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the CA assailing the Default Order and the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration. The CA dismissed the Petition for failure to attach the assailed Orders. Later, the CA denied
respondent Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time. He did not appeal said
denial to the Supreme Court.
On the third party complaint, Tansipek is ordered to pay PCIB all amounts that the latter shall have to pay to
JOCI on account of this case. Tansipek appealed the Decision to the CA. The CA ruled that it was an error
for the trial court to have acted on PCIB’s motion to declare Tansipek in default. The CA, thus, remanded
the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default is correct?
HELD:
No. Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very beginning. He should have
filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule
9 of the Rules of Court:
(b) Relief from order of default.—A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before
judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In
such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
interest of justice.
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified;
and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of
(1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration may be treated as
a Motion to Lift Order of Default, his Petition for Certiorari on the denial thereof has already been dismissed
with finality by the CA. Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the CA to the Supreme Court. The dismissal
of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial of Tansipek’s Motion, thus, constitutes a bar to the retrial of
the same issue of default under the doctrine of the law of the case.
It is important to note that a party declared in default is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the
main case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of
the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the Decision’s
being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.
88
Bitte v. Jonas
G.R. No. 212256 December 9, 2015 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: In 1985, Rosa Elsa Jonas authorized her mother Andrea Serrano thru SPA, to sell a property located
in Davao City. The property was mortgaged to Mindanao Development Bank (MDB). In 1996, Cipriano
Serrano (brother of Elsa Jonas, son of Andrea) offered to Spouses Bitte. In the same year, Jonas revoked the
SPA. After the final negotiation, Elsa Jonas withdrew from the transaction. Spouses Bitte filed a Complaint
for Specific Performance against Jonas, Andrea and Cirpriano to transfer the title over the property. In 1998,
while the case is pending, Andrea executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Spouses Bitte. MDB foreclosed
the property for failure to pay the loan. Spouses Bitte were able to redeem the property, then sold the same
to Spouses Yap. In 1999, Spouses Jonas also filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale
against Spouses Bitte. The two cases were consolidated in 2001. Spouses Bitte failed to attend the pre-trial.
The counsel for Spouses Bitte withdrew and a new one entered his appearance and filed a verified motion
for reconsideration. Spouses Bitte once again failed to appear in the pre-trial and were, thus, declared non-
suited. Jonas then presented her evidence ex parte.
RTC ruled that the sale was valid and directed the Spouses Bitte to pay the balance. The CA reversed the
decision, and rendered the deed of sale null and void. Spouses Jonas called the attention of the Court and
contended that since the RTC has declared the Spouses Bitte in default, they have already lost the legal
personality to resort to this petition before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Bitte have already lost the legal personality to resort to this petition
before this Court, as they were declared in default by the RTC.
HELD:
NO. Spouses Jonas claim that the door to any reliefs for Spouses Bitte, be it through motion for
reconsideration or this subject petition, was closed by the finality and immutability of the RTC declaration
of their default. In other words, it is their stand that the petitioners do not have the right to obtain recourse
from this Court.
Spouses Jonas are mistaken. The rule is that “right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and
can be done on grounds that the amount of judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for,
or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary
to law”. If a party who has been declared in default on the basis of the decision having been issued against
the evidence or the law, that person cannot be denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in
the appellate court. Despite being burdened by the circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all
other remedies available to question not only the judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal before
this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
89
RULES 10 - 13
90
Yujuico v. United Resources Management Corp.
G.R. N. 211113 June 29, 2015 Perez, J.
FACTS: To secure the loan of SRADEC from United Resources Asset Management, Inc, several
stockholders, including Yujuico, of STRADEC executed Pledge Agreements whereby they pledged a certain
amount of their stocks in the said company in favor of United Resources. Not having been able to comply
with its loan obligations, a Notice, signed by Atty. Nethercott, informing them about the impending auction
sale were sent to STRADEC and its stockholders. Nethercott claims that he is United Resources’ attorney-
in-fact. As response, Yujuico filed before the RTC an injunction complaint seeking to enjoin the sale at public
auction mentioned in Atty. Nethercott's notice. In his complaint, Yujuico asserts that the planned auction sale
is void as Nethercott was not authorized to initiate the sale in behalf of United Resources. However, the
auction sale pushed through with United Resources emerging as the winning bidder. Thereafter, the RTC
issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which effectively prevented United Resources from appropriating the
stocks it had purchased during the auction sale. Nethercott filed his answer denying the material allegations
of the injunction complaint. However, United Resources agreed with Yujuico that the sale was void and that
it never authorized Nethercott to cause the sale. It pointed out that since United Resources never sanctioned
the sale, thus, it should not be liable for the prejudice caused by the sale and asked for the dismissal of the
case. Yujuico then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment grounded on Atty. Nethercott's lack of authority
to cause the auction sale of pledged stocks; hence, there was no longer any genuine issue left to be resolved
in trial. However, the resolution of the motion was deferred due to the TRO issued by the SC which remained
in effect for more than a year. United Resources then changed its counsel and then filed an answer with
compulsory counterclaim. In its amended answer, it now claims that Nethercott was duly authorized by the
Board to cause the sale. RTC allowed the said amended answer despite Yujuico’s protest. But on Yujuico’s
MR, RTC set aside its previous resolution, explaining that it cannot admit the amended answer as leave of
court was not obtained prior to its filing. In compliance, United Resources filed the pertinent motion which
was granted by the RTC. In a petition for certiorari in the CA, the CA sustained the allowance by the RTC
of the amended answer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended answer of United Resources may still be allowed.
HELD:
Yes. A party in a civil action may amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended
only once and before a responsive pleading is served or if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply,
within ten days after it is served. Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court.
As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings
with liberality. Hence, so long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or
with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended
pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.
Here, United Resources filed its motion for leave seeking the admission of its amended answer more than
two (2) years after it filed its original answer. Despite the considerable lapse of time between the filing of the
original answer and the motion for leave, the RTC still granted the said motion and was later affirmed by the
CA. Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of
Rule 10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129. Hence, allegations (and admissions) in a pleading—even if not
shown to be made through "palpable mistake"—can still be corrected or amended provided that the
amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10.Nevertheless, even if we are to apply Section 4 of Rule 129 to the
present case, we still find the allowance of United Resources’ amended answer to be proper. To our mind, a
consideration of the evidence that United Resources’ plans to present during trial indubitably reveals that the
admissions made by United Resources’ under its original answer were a product of clear and patent mistake.
91
Lisam Enterprises v. Banco De Oro
FACTS: This case involves a Complaint for Annulment of mortgage with prayer for TRO and PI with
damages filed by petitioners against respondents. Petitioner Lolita Soriano alleged that she is a stockholder
of Lisam Enterprises Inc and a member of its Board of Directors, designated as Corporate Secretary.
Petitioners also alleged that defendants Soriano falsified a board resolution and executed a real estate
mortgage above the LEI’s property in favor of PCIB. RTC issued a TRO then, after hearing, issued a writ of
PI enjoining PCIB, now BDO, from proceeding with the auction sale of subject property. BDO filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state cause of action, and litis pendencia.
RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. While waiting for the
resolution of said motion, petitioners also filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint amending paragraph
13. RTC denied both the MR and the Motion to admit Amended Complaint holding that no new argument
had been raised by petitioners in their MR and that the Amended Complaint can no longer be admitted
because it absolutely changed petitioners’ cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ amended complaint, filed after the order of dismissal but before its
finality, should have been admitted by the court.
HELD:
No. Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners’
complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said parties. A responsive pleading having been
filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter
of right. Amendments are generally favored; it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such
liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order
dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had
not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay.
Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity
for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined.
Hence, the Court overrules the trial court’s denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders
the admission of the same.
The requisites for filing a derivative suit are as follows: (a) the party bringing the suit should be a shareholder
as of time of the act or transaction complained of; (b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies; (c) the
cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the harm having been or being caused to the corporation
and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.
A reading of the amended complaint will reveal that all the foregoing requisites had been alleged therein.
Hence, the amended complaint remedied the defect in the original complaint and now sufficiently states a
cause of action.
As to the contention of BDO that admitting the amended complaint after they pointed out a defect in the
original would be unfair to them, the Court held that they should have been well aware that due to changes
by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense.
It should not have been a surprise to them that petitioners would redress the defect in the original complaint
by substantially amending the same, which course of action is now allowed under the new rules.
92
Tiu v. Phil. Bank of Communications
G.R. No. 151932 August 19, 2009 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by its officers applied for a real estate loan with
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM). One of its loans was not guaranteed by a collateral, so the
bank required all the members of the Board of Directors of the Corp. to become sureties. A Surety Agreement
was executed by its Directors and acknowledged by a notary public on the same date. All copies of the Surety
Agreement, except two, were kept by bank. (One copy was retained by the notary public for his notarial file
and the other was sent to the Records Management and Archives Office). The bank then demanded payment.
Unable to collect, the bank’s counsel filed a complaint before the RTC for collection against the directors.
On their answer, the directors alleged among other things, that they were not personally liable on the
promissory notes, because they signed the Surety Agreement in their capacities as officers of the corp. They
claimed that the Surety Agreement attached to the complaint were falsified, considering that when they
signed the same, the words in his personal capacity did not yet appear in the document. They attached a copy
from the Records Management and Archives Office). Because of this development, the bank’s counsel
searched for and retrieved the file copy of the Surety Agreement. It was discovered that the insertion was
ordered by the bank auditor, in accordance with bank standard operating procedures. However, the notary
public was never informed of the insertion. The bank then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with
Motion for Leave of Court to Substitute Annex A of the Complaint wherein it attached the duplicate original
copy retrieved from the file of the notary public. RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution of the altered
document with the original Surety Agreement. Aggrieved, petitioners sought recourse before the CA via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which dismissed the petition for lack of merit
Hence, the current petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution of the document should have been allowed?
HELD:
Yes. With respect to the bank’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto, after
petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment
by leave of court. The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was
not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially
alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the
higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
actions and proceedings.
Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice.
That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise
or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the altered surety
agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have submitted it in the first place
instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that, through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to
the complaint was the copy wherein the words IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY were inserted to conform
to the banks standard practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. The
Bank’s counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the
substitution of the surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously
resolved.
Moreover, the opposing party could not be prejudiced by the substitution since they can still present the
substituted documents, as part of the evidence of their affirmative defenses. Besides, they are not precluded
from filing the appropriate criminal action against the bank for attaching the altered copy of the surety
agreement to the complaint. The substitution of the documents would not, in any way, erase the existence of
falsification, if any.
93
Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. CA
G.R. No. 133657 May 29, 2002 Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: Petitioner (Remington Industrial Sales Corp) filed complaint for sum of money and damages arising
from breach of contract against Industrial Steels with Ferro Trading GMBH as principal defendant, and
respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and BS separately moved for dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action. RTC denied the motions and the MR. ISL filed answer. British Steel separately filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA claiming that complainant failed to show that it had
committed any act or omission violating Remington’s rights. Complaint only stated that BS and Ferro were
just mere suppliers of goods for ISL. Remington then sought to amend the complaint by incorporating
additional FACTS to have a cause of action against BS by using Sec 2, Rule 10, stating that it can amend its
complaint as a matter of right because respondent (BS) has not yet filed a responsive pleading.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint against BS for lack of cause of
action under the original complaint even if it was already amended as a matter of right, and sufficient causes
of action are averred in the amended complaint.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint because it the amendment made by Remington was
done in a timely manner and as a matter of right, which was before BS gave its answer in accordance to Sec
2, Rule 10 of the ROC. The decision of the CA will result into multiple suits. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD
BE ALLOWED INSTEAD OF IT BEING DISMISSED. Sec 2, rule 10 - Before the answer, a complaint may
be amended as a matter of right. It can amend to introduce a new cause of action or change in theory. During
this time, rights of defendant have not yet been violated because he hasn’t filed an answer yet. Considerable
leeway is given the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PRIOR the filing of
answer. Sec 3, rule 10 - After the answer, substantial amendment of complaint is not allowed without leave
of court. RATIONALE: any material change in the allegations already contained in the complaint could
prejudice the rights of defendant who has alerady set up his defense in the answer.
94
Palileo v. Planters Development Bank
G.R. No. 193650 October 8, 2014 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: George Philip Palileo and Jose Dela Cruz (petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for specific
performance and/or sum of money and damages with prayer for the issuance of writs of preliminary
attachment and preliminary injunction against Planters Development Bank. Summons was served to PDP
and it filed its answer. However, PDP failed to attend the last pre-trial hearing and it failed to file its pre-trial
brief. Thus, Palileo and Dela Cruz were allowed to present their evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favor
of Palileo and Dela Cruz. PDP received a copy of the RTC Decision on July 17, 2006. On July 31, 2006,
PDB filed by private courier service — specifically LBC — an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
New Trial. Petitioners’ copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise
sent on July 31, 2006 by courier service through LBC, but in their address of record — Tupi, South Cotabato
— there was no LBC service at the time. On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was
simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well.
The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground that it violated the Rule on Motions as it set the hearing
on August 18, 2006 or 16 days after filing (under the Rules; it must not be later than 10 days). Since the
Motion was pro-forma, it did not toll the running of the reglementary period thus making the RTC’s decision
final and executory. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the decision of the RTC but on MR, the CA
decided to relax the rules and held that the Motion was not pro-forma considering that the address of the trial
court as well as that of the opposing counsel is too distant from the office of the counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not PDP’s Omninus Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial was filed late?
HELD:
Yes. PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed one day too late. The bank
received a copy of the trial court’s June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days — or up to
August 1, 2006 — within which to file a notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new
trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court. Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only
on August 2, 2006.
Its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be trivialized. Service and filing
of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules. This is not to mention that PDB sent a
copy of its omnibus motion to an address or area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time.
Realizing its mistake, PDB refiled and resent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper
mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired. Thus, the RTC’s
decision had become final and executory by the failure of PDP to file a timely appeal.
95
Heirs of Numeriano Miranda v. Miranda
G.R. No. 179638 July 8, 2013 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioners filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Annulment of Titles and
Specific Performance against the parties including respondent herein. The RTC rendered a decision ordering
respondent to indemnify the petitioner and the latter were ordered to immediately vacate the subject property
and to pay monthly rental to the former. Petitioners did not file any appeal, hence, the RTC Decision became
final and executory.The RTC then issued a Writ of Execution which was not implemented.
Five years thereafter, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a "Break-Open and
Demolition Order" in order to compel petitioners to vacate his property, the RTC denied the Motion.
Respondent filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment which was granted. Petitioners then filed a Notice of
Appeal via LBC. The RTC and the CA denied the Notice of Appeal, finding it barred by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Notice of Appeal was filed on time.
HELD:
No. The Notice of Appeal was not filed on time. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be
filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from."
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by
registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing
is the date of receipt.
In this case, however, the counsel for the Heirs of Miranda, Sr. filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier,
a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing
of their Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of
pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;"
instead, "the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading."
Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the
16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal
was filed out of time.
96
RULE 14
97
Valmonte v. CA
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: This case revolves around a controversy between squabbling sisters over a certain real property.
Lourdes Valmonte, a non resident, was sued by her sister Rosita Dimalanta for the partition of an apartment
building and an accounting of the rentals therein. Atty. Alfredo Valmonte, Lourdes’s husband was likewise
impleaded on the said case. In a letter sent by Lourdes to Rosita, she instructed Rosita to refer to her husband
as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Upon service of summons, Atty.
Alfredo Valmonte only accepted his and refused to accept the summons directed against his wife on the
ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf.
Atty. Alfredo Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. His wife, however, did not file her
Answer. For this reason Rosita, moved to declare Lourdes Valmonte in default. Apparently, the RTC denied
the said motion. Consequently, Rosita filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Rosita. Spouses Valmonte now assail the decision of the CA
contending that there was no valid service of summons in so far as Lourdes Valmonte is concerned.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte
HELD:
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally
served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a
Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a
resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be
summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as provided
in 17 and 18 of the same Rule. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may
be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17.
Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte
cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place,
service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required
by Rule 14, Sec. 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to
consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her
failure to file an answer. In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, Sec. 17. As provided in Sec. 19, such leave
must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf
and setting forth the grounds for the application. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order
granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to
file an Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against
a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days
from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice. Lourdes A. Valmonte
did not appoint her husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent's attorney that
"all communications" intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the
latter's address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact
the letter was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it appears that it was written in
connection with the negotiations between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the
partition of the property in question.
98
Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp. v. Tan
FACTS: Millenium Industrial Corporation executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over its real property
in favor of Respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed to secure payment of petitioner’s
indebtedness to Respondent.
Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the Regional Trial Court.
Summons and copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd Cinches,
described in the Sheriff’s return as a draftsman, a person of sufficient age and discretion working therein. He
is the highest-ranking officer of defendant’s Corporation, to receive processes of the Court. Petitioner moved
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid service of summons upon it. As a
result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, Section 13 of
the Rules of Court and contended that service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the Sheriff’s return was
valid as he is not the one of the authorized persons on whom summons may be served and that in fact he was
not even its employee. Hence this petition before the High Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not summons upon a draftsman was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. Petitioner contends that the enumeration contained in Rule 14 is exclusive
and that service of summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule.
However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other than those mentioned
in the above rule may be justified.
The Court enumerated requisites for substantial compliance, namely: (a) there must be actual receipt of the
summons by the person served. In example transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the
Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt for the sheriff’s return; and (c) there
must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons was
actually served.
The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on
service of summons is attained. There is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With
respect to the third there is no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the service of
summons to any of the officers of the corporation. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of
summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown.
99
E.B. Villarosa v. Benito
G.R. No. 136426 August 6, 1999 Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
FACTS: E.B. Benito is a limited partnership with principal office at Davao City and with branch offices at
Parañaque City and Cagayan De Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent, Imperial Development
Corporation, executed a Deed of Sale with development agreement wherein the former agreed to develop
certain parcels of land belonging to Imperial. On April 3, 1998, Imperial filed a complaint for breach of
contract against E.B. Benito before the RTC Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, were served
upon the defendant, through its BRANCH MANAGER Engy. Sabulbero at Cagayan De Oro City Branch.
E.B. Benito moved to dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons thus, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner. On the other hand, Imperial contended that the
service is valid alleging that there was a substantial compliance with the rule as it was served through its
branch manager. RTC: denied the motion to dismiss and held that there was a valid service of summons.
Hence, this petition was filed by EB Villarosa contending that the trial court committed GAD amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of
summons on its Branch Manager.
HELD: No. Sec 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. This provision revised the former Sec 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which
provided that: If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership
duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its
directors.
The rule now states “general manager” instead of only “manager”. As held by Justice Regalado, the aforesaid
terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially
the word “agent”. Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Sec 13 of Rule (old rule)
has been held improper. The purpose of which is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him. Accordingly, the service of summons upon the branch manager at its branch in CDO, instead
to the general manager at its principal office in Davao City is improper
Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an AGENT of the corporation is NO LONGER
authorized.” “The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section11, Rule 14. The rule now
states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and
"treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase “agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the
new rule.” “A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over
a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise
the service is insufficient. . .” The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for
the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation.
100
Mason v. CA
G.R. No. 144662 October 13, 2003 Quisumbing. J.
FACTS: Spouses Mason owned two parcels of land located along EDSA in Pasay City. They entered into a
lease contract with Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation, where Columbus undertook to construct a
building worth P10 million at the end of the third year of the lease. For failure to comply with this stipulation,
the Spouses filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against Columbus before the RTC.
Summons was served upon Columbus through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the
summons described her as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriff’s return indicated that she is a secretary to the
corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.Columbus failed to file its answer, hence,
spouses Mason filed a motion to declare it in default. The motion was granted and the spouses were allowed
to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. The trial court ruled in favor
of the spouses. That decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, Columbus filed a motion to
lift order of default, which was opposed by the spouses. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court denied the motion to lift order
of default on the ground that the decision has already become final and executory. Consequently, the spouses’
Motion for Execution was granted. Columbus filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Undaunted, it filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution but was also denied for being
dilatory. It then appealed to the CA, which ruled in its favor. The CA pointed out that Columbus was not
properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Spouses Mason filed a
motion for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review. Spouses Mason stressed that even
though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk of Columbus, there was substantial compliance with
Section 11, Rule 14 because the summons actually reached said corporation. This can be gleaned from the
motion to lift order of default where Columbus did not question the validity of the service of summons but
explained that its failure to answer was due to its impression that the case would not be pursued by the spouses
on the ground that payments were already made to them. The spouses also cited Millenium Industrial
Commercial Corporation v. Tan, and maintained that this Court, by referring to E.B Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd. v. Judge Benito, effectively ruled that said provision is the statement of the general rule on service of
summons upon corporation and the substantial compliance rule is the exception.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid service of summons on Columbus for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction?
HELD: No. The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in E.B. Villarosa which applies squarely to the
instant case. In the said case, the Court held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as
service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which revised Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Also in that case, the Court
discarded substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and ruled that the enumeration under
the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio
unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to
liberalize the rule, strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is stressed.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke the ruling in Millenium to support their position for said case is not on
all fours with the instant case. It must be stressed that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court
were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by
spouses Mason where the doctrine of substantial compliance was upheld must be deemed overturned
by Villarosa, which is the later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present
evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The
service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. The Court will deprive Columbus
of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if compliance with the rules on service of
summons will be disregarded.
101
Spouses Jose v. Spouses Boyon
G.R. No. 147369 October 23, 2003 Panganiban, J.
FACTS: A complaint for specific performance was lodged by Spouses Jose against Spouses Boyon to
compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. Public
respondent Judge N.C. Perello issued summons to Spouses Boyon. As per return of the summons, substituted
service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to
Spouses Boyon failed. Spouses Jose filed an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by
Publication which the RTC granted. Thereafter, the RTC judge, without a written motion, issued an Order
declaring Spouses Boyon in default for failure to file their respective answers. Spouses Jose were then
allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. Ultimately, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Jose. Helen Boyon,
was then residing in USA, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the RTC. Spouses
Boyon then filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons
effected by the court a quo. The RTC denied the said motion, stating that the defaulted spouses already lost
their standing in court. Spouses Boyon filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Meanwhile,
Spouses Jose moved for the execution of the RTC judgment and the same was granted. Spouses Boyon filed
before the CA a Petition for certiorari questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA ruled that the RTC
never acquired jurisdiction over Spouses Boyon because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First,
the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons because he did not
specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of
promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by
publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore an
action in personam. Thus, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Spouses Jose aver,
among others, that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons was invalid. They submit that although
the case filed before the trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an
action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the service of summons upon Spouses Boyon is valid.
HELD: No. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of
summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done
by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is
preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to
the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must:
a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;

b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and,
c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in
the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant.
It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or
in the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements
of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. In the instant case, it appears that the
process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting
any genuine effort to locate Spouses Boyon. The only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive,
Camella Homes, Alabang, to try to serve the summons personally. While the Return of Summons states that
efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo
Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents.
Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their
whereabouts.
102
Manotoc v. CA
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2002 Velasco, Jr. J.
FACTS: The Estate of Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment rendered by the United
States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, USA in a case against Imee Marcos-Manotoc for the wrongful
death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines
allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of
Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court. The trial court issued a
Summons addressed to Manotoc at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room
104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served
upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of Manotoc at that condominium unit. When Manotoc
failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default through an Order. Manotoc, by special
appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over
her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons, averring that: (1) the address of defendant
indicated in the Complaint was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business; (2) the party (de la
Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the
procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant
was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Manotoc presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that he saw
defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two times. She also presented her Philippine
passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card issued by the Immigration Service of Singapore to show
that she was a resident of Singapore. She claimed that the person referred to as "Mrs. Manotoc" may not even
be her, but the mother of one Tommy Manotoc. On the other hand, Trajano presented the lead counsel in a
case involving the Marcoses who testified that he participated in the deposition taking of Marcos, Jr. The
counsel confirmed that Marcos, Jr. testified that Manotoc’s residence was at the Alexandra Apartment,
Greenhills. The trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss, relying on the presumption that the sheriff’s
substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and that such presumption stood in
the absence of proof to the contrary. The trial court likewise discarded Manotoc’s plea for reconsideration
for lack of merit. Manotoc then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA. The CA adopted
the findings of the trial court. Manotoc filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid substituted service of summons for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over Manotoc.
HELD:
NO. A meticulous scrutiny of the Sheriff’s Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious
efforts to serve the Summons on Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why
those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many occasions several attempts were made to
serve the summons x x x personally," "at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for the reason
that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises."
Besides, apart from the allegation of Manotoc’s address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that
respondent Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate
Mantooc. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were "informed, and
so [they] allege" about the address and whereabouts of Manotoc. Before resorting to substituted service, a
plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means. More
so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioner’s residence or house is doubtful or has not been clearly
ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued persistently.
103
DOLE Phil. v. Quilala
G.R. No. 168723 July 9, 2008 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: All Season Farm Corporation filed an action for the recovery of a sum of money, accounting and
damages against Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh Division) (DOLE) and several of its officers. According
to DOLE, an alias summons was served upon it through a certain Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed
by DOLE Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate from Dole. Thus, DOLE filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole
due to improper service of summons; (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (c) All Season was
not the real party in interest; and (d) the officers of Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged
acts performed in their official capacities as corporate officers of Dole. This was denied by the RTC. In the
CA, DOLE filed a petition for certiorari contending that the alias summons was not properly served. The
appellate court, however, ruled otherwise. It reasoned that DOLE’s president had known of the service of the
alias summons although he did not personally receive and sign it. It also held that in today’s corporate setup,
documents addressed to corporate officers are received in their behalf by their staff. In this Petition for
Review, DOLE assails the validity of the service of summons on it consequently questioning whether or not
jurisdiction over it was acquired by the RTC. nt All Season, for its part, contends that the trial court had
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner received the alias summons through its president. More
so, petitioner had admitted that it received the alias summons in its Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Time filed on May 5, 2003.
ISSUE: Whether or not the service of summons was valid.
HELD:
No. Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal assistant, not employed by herein petitioner
and who is not one of the designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over petitioner. Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is
restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must
therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.
Contrary to private respondents claim that it was received upon instruction of the president of the corporation
as indicated in the Officers Return, such fact does not appear in the receiving copy of the alias summons
which Marifa Dela Cruz signed. There was no evidence that she was authorized to receive court processes in
behalf of the president. However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary appearance in
the action is equivalent to service of summons. Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of
Appearance with Motion for Time. It was not a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of
the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the
receipt of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading. Consequently,
petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the
RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily
to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
104
Santos v. PNOC
G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008 Corona, J.
FACTS: PNOC Exploration filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos, Jr. with the
RTC of Pasig City for the unpaid balance of a car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a
member of its board of directors. Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be
located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, upon respondent’s motion,
the trial court allowed service of summons by publication.
Respondent then moved for the reception of its evidence ex parte upon the failure of the petitioner to file its
answer within the prescribed period. Thereafter, the case was submitted for a decision in favor of respondent.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, he alleged that the affidavit of service submitted by
respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the
clerk of court. He also alleged that rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court applies only to actions in rem, and not actions in personam like a complaint for sum of money. Hence,
he filed a Petition for Review with SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of summons by publication to Petitioner Santos.
HELD: Yes. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem.
Moreover, service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or
principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the
summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered
mail to the defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit
"showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid,
directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address."
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of
court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make
the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him when he filed the
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." This was equivalent to service of
summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
105
Fortune Life Insurance Co. v. COA
FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum
of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod,
the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment
for lack of legal basis. Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On November 15, 2012, the COA
issued its decision denying the petition, holding that only municipal or city governments are expressly vested
with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to
comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion.
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari but the petition for certiorari was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner complies with the rule on proof of service.
HELD: No. The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz:
Section 13. Proof of Service. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and
the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the
affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the
paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either
or both are not submitted.
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr.,
who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail “under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449,
70453, 70458, 70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition.”14
The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the
registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts,
not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. This was the
reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the
requirement of proof of service.
106
Ong v. Co
FACTS: Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (British-Hong Kong national), and respondent Benjamin Co (Filipino
citizen), were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church. Co filed two petitions for declaration
of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity on two different occasions. Co stated in the first petition
that Ong’s address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. Co indicated in the second petition that Ong’s
address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. The RTC issued summons.
In the Server’s Return, process server stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with
the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on Ong. The
said documents were received by a security officer.
On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision finding Co’s marriage with Ong as void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was
served on Ong but she failed to file her responsive pleading within the reglementary period. Sometime in
November 2008, Ong, received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing
her to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation
proceedings.
When Ong appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1)
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; (2) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; (3) Decision
dated December 11, 2002 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (4)
their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
HELD:
NO. The Court held that there is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. In the present case,
petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person because there was an invalid substituted
service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendant's voluntary appearance in court.
The requirements for substituted service of summons (laid down in the Manotoc case) are the following: 1.
Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service; 2. Specific Details in the Return and ; 3. A Person of Suitable Age
and Discretion.
The summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was issued on July 29, 2002. In his server‘s return, the process
server resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server
immediately opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the
summons. The server‘s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server
to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons
was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally.
In the case at bench, the stringent requirements in Manotoc vs. CA were not met and the Court is not inclined
to uphold the CA’s denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service of summons.
107
Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. v. RCBC
G.R. No. 183370 August 17, 2015 Peralta, J
FACTS: RCBC filed against Nation Petroleum and its directors/officers a complaint for civil damages
arising from estafa in relation to violations of the Trust Receipts Law. Summons and all pertinent papers
were served by the sheriff on the corporation thru Claudia Abante, a liaison officer, upon telephone
instruction of corporate secretary Melinda Ang. Copies were also served to other individual defendants in
their given addresses, but they allegedly refused to acknowledge receipt causing a substituted service on their
respective househelpers.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was a valid service of summons upon the corporation through its liaison officer who
acted as the agent of the corporate secretary.
2. Whether there was a valid service of summons upon the individual officers/directors of the
corporation.
HELD:
1. Yes. There was a valid and effective service of summons upon petitioner corporation through its
liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary. It is clear that Abante, in receiving
the summons, did so in representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers
competent under the Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical person.
While it may be true that there was no direct physical handing of the summons to Ang, the latter at
least be charged with having constructively received the same, which amounts to a valid service of
summons. Having herself instructed Abante to receive the summons, Ang, and for that matter,
petitioner corporation, is thus now precluded from impugning the jurisdiction of the trial court on
the ground of invalid service of summons. In point in this regard is the principle of estoppel which,
under our remedial laws, is an effective bar against any claim of lack of jurisdiction. Under said
doctrine, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
2. No. It appears that the sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons
without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate the individual petitioners. The “reasonable
time” within which to personally serve the summons – 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the
sheriff as stated in Manotoc – has not yet elapsed at the time the substituted service was opted to.
Remarkably, based on the Sheriff’s Report and the narration of petitioners, the personal service of
summons upon the corporation and the individual petitioners as well as the levy of their personal
and real properties were all done in just one day. Manotoc stresses that for substituted service of
summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure in order to prove
impossibility of prompt service. To reiterate, “several attempts” means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates.
108
Green Star Express v. Nissin Universal Robina Corp.
FACTS: On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (URC) owned
figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.'s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting
in the death of the van's driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The criminal complaint was dismissed due to insufficiency of
evidence. Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the RTC of San
Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons. On
February 6, 2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service.
The RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial
compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC. The CA upon appeal reversed the
decision of the RTC and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over NURC through proper service of summons
HELD:
No. It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical
entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court state: Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical
entity. — When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Here, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004. Green Star
claims that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo, the general manager of the corporation.
Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriffs Return.
The Return did not even state whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio,
the supposed assistant manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo
simply refused to sign and receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf.
However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC's motion to dismiss
to attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to support such allegation,
the same was likewise not presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA that
said affidavit first surfaced.
Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated persons
under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC, although the
corporation may have actually received the summons. To rule otherwise will be an outright circumvention
of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice.
109
Guy v. Gacott
G.R. No. 206147 January 13, 2016 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Sometime on March 3, 1997, Atty. Gacott (Gacott) from Palawan purchased two (2) brand new
transreceivers from Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) in Manila through its employee Rey Medestomas
(Medestomas), amounting to a total of PI 8,000.00. On May 10, 1997, due to major defects, Gacott personally
returned the transreceivers to QSC and requested that they be replaced. Medestomas received the returned
transreceivers and promised to send him the replacement units within two (2) weeks from May 10, 1997.
Time passed and Gacott did not receive the replacement units as promised. QSC informed him that there
were no available units and that it could not refund the purchased price. Despite several demands, both oral
and written, Gacott was never given a replacement or a refund. The demands caused Gacott to incur expenses
in the total amount of P40,936.44.
Thus, Gacott filed a complaint for damages. Summons was served upon QSC and Medestomas, afterwhich
they filed their Answer, verified by Medestomas himself and a certain Elton Ong (Ong). QSC and
Medestomas did not present any evidence during the trial. RTC ruled in favor of Atty. Gacott and issued a
Writ of Execution. Gacott learned that QSC is a partnership and not a corporation. He is also discovered that
petitioner was appointed as General Manager of QSC. To execute the judgment, Gacott instructed the sheriff
to proceed with the attachment of one of the motor vehicles of Guy. Sheriff attached Guy’s vehicle by virtue
of the Notice of Attachment upon Personalty. Thereafter, Guy filed his Motion to Lift Attachment Upon
Personalty, arguing that he was not a judgment debtor and, therefore, his vehicle could not be attached. RTC
denied his motion. Not satisfied, Guy moved for reconsideration and argued that he was neither impleaded
as a defendant nor validly served with summons and, thus, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Guy?
HELD:
NO. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam - the power of the court to render a personal
judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the
action - is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions
in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the
complaint in court. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the
proper service of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action.
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, the service
of summons may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such provision provides an
exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. The records of this
case reveal that QSC was never shown to have been served with the summons through any of the enumerated
authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. The
CA was obviously mistaken when it opined that it was immaterial whether the summons to QSC was served
on the theory that it was a corporation.
Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction over the defendant,
the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the service of summons may be cured by
the defendant's subsequent voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing a responsive
pleading such as an answer.
110
Carson Realty and Management Corp. v. Red Robin Security Agency
G.R. No. 225035 February 8, 2017 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: On October 2, 2008 at around 12:51 in the afternoon, when a copy of Alias Summons dated
September 9, 2008 issued in the entitled case together with a copy of the complaint and annexes attached
thereto was brought for service to the President/General Manager of CARSON REALTY &
MANAGEMENT CORP., in the person of Marcial M. Samson and/or Nieva A. Cabrera at its office address
at Unit 601 Prestige Tower Condominium, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, 1605 Pasig City, undersigned
was informed by the secretary of the company in the person of Ms. Vina Azonza that the above mentioned
persons were not around and there was no one in the company authorized to receive the aforesaid summons.
That the undersigned went back to the said office on October 16, 2008 at around 3:08 in the afternoon and
was entered by Ms. Lorie Fernandez, also an employee of the company who is authorized to receive the said
process.
On October 27, 2008, at around 2:23 in the afternoon, undersigned tried again to serve the same process to
the President/General Manager of Carson Realty & Management Corp. but with the same result. Finally, on
October 28, 2008 at around 1:03 in the afternoon, the undersigned went back to the said company to
personally serve the Alias Summons together with the other pertinent documents, just the same, the
President/General Manager of the company was not around, hence, substituted service of summons was
resorted to by leaving the copy of the Alias Summons at the company's office through its employee, Ms.
Lorie Fernandez, however, she refused to acknowledge receipt of the process.
ISSUE: Whether or not Carson was properly declared in default
HELD:
Yes. In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However, because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted
service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons. Before substituted
service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that
the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who
is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the defendant.
111
G.V. Florida Transport Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corp.
G.R. No. 201378 October 2017 Jardeleza, J.
FACTS: The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages against GV Florida and its
bus driver Arnold Vizquera (Vizquera) before the RTC. This action arose out of a vehicle collision between
the buses of VLI and GV Florida along Capirpiwan, Cordon, Isabela on May 1, 2007. In its complaint, VLI
claimed that Vizquera's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and GV Florida failed to exercise
due diligence in supervising its employee. In its Answer, GV Florida alleged that the Michelin tires of its bus
had factory and mechanical defects which caused a tire blow-out. This, it claimed, was the proximate cause
of the vehicle collision.
On April 8, 2008, GV Florida instituted a third-party complaint against TCC. According to GV Florida, on
March 23, 2007, it purchased from TCC fifty (50) brand new Michelin tires, four (4) of which were installed
into the bus that figured in the collision. It claimed that though Vizquera exerted all efforts humanly possible
to avoid the accident, the bus nevertheless swerved to the oncoming south-bound lane and into the VLI bus.
GV Florida maintains that the "proximate cause of the accident is the tire blow out which was brought about
by factory and mechanical defects in the Michelin tires which third-party plaintiff GV Florida absolutely and
totally had no control over."
The RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC. In the return of summons, it appears that the sheriff served
the summons to a certain Cherry Gino-gino (Gino-gino) who represented herself as an accounting manager
authorized by TCC to receive summons on its behalf. TCC filed a Special Entry of Appearance with an Ex-
parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleading and/or Motion to Dismiss. Therein, it stated
that the summons was received by Gino-gino, its financial supervisor. The RTC granted TCC's prayer for
extension of time to file a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss. TCC eventually filed a motion to
dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint. First, it argued that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it
due to improper service of summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not summons was validly served against TCC
HELD:
No, there was improper service of summons on TCC. We, however, apply jurisprudence and rule that in cases
of improper service of summons, courts should not automatically dismiss the complaint by reason of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The remedy is to issue alias summons and ensure that it is
properly served.
In the present case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While she is not
one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find that TCC has voluntarily appeared before
(and submitted itself to) the RTC when it filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation as to the court's
jurisdiction over it.
112
Sunrise Garden Corp. v. CA
G.R. No. 158836 September 30, 2015 Leonen, J.
FACTS: In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo
City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway.3 The request was approved
through the enactment of Resolusyon Big. 027-99. The Technical Committee created by City Ordinance No.
08-98 posted notices to property owners that would be affected by the construction of the city road.Sunrise
Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay Mayamot, and Sunrise Garden
Corporation. Armed guards allegedly hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden
Corporation's contractor from using an access road to move the construction equipment.
On January 24, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.The trial court issued
a temporary restraining order on February 15, 2002 against Hardrock.On March 19, 2002, the trial court
ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, subject to the posting of a bond by Sunrise Garden
Corporation. On March 22, 2002, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. Thereafter, armed guards
of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., blocked Sunrise
Garden Corporation's contractor's employees and prevented them from proceeding with the construction. A
Motion to cite K-9 Security Agency in contempt was filed on October 11, 2002 by Sunrise Garden
Corporation.On November 11, 2002, K-9 Security Agency, joined by First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. and represented by the same counsel, opposed the Motion to cite them in contempt, raising
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over their persons, since they were not bound by the Amended Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc when it sought to enforce the preliminary injunction.
HELD:
No, it did not. Indeed public tria court acted with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction when it
sought the enforcement of its amended writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner, who was never a
party to the pending case. Worse, it threatened petitioner with contempt of court for not following an unlawful
order.
Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1st sentence provides, thus: "No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and
prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. . ." In the case at bench, petitioner was not only not
impleaded as party to the case, but that it was never given prior notice regarding the writ of injunction.
Public respondents' [referring to the Republic] assertion that notice was already made to Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc. is specious. There is no showing at all as to the relationship between Hardrock Aggregates,
Inc. and petitioner. Since there is nothing to prove and establish that Hardrock, Inc. and petitioners are one
and the same, then they should be treated as separate and distinct personalities.
While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service
of summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.”
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this
rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to
file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by
the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among
others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
113
Tujan – Militante v. Nustad
G.R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017 Tijam, J.
FACTS: Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad, as represented by Atty. Lucila, filed a petition before the RTC praying
that Ma. Hazdina A. Tujan-Militante be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the
owner's duplicate copy of the TCTs which were all issued in Nustad's name. She averred that Tujan-Militante
has been withholding the said titles. Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion
to Dismiss and Annul Proceedings averring that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she
was not able to receive summons. The RTC denied Tujan-Militante's Motion and ruled that it has jurisdiction
over the case. Tujan-Militante filed an MR and alleged that the Power of Attorney executed by Nustad in
favor of Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. She likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is representing a
Norwegian, who is not allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from the dismissal of the case, she
prayed that the OSG and the LRA be impleaded. Moreover, she prayed for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit. RTC denied the MR.
Tujan-Militante filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the
person of Tujan-Militante, but nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by Tujan-Militante's filing of her
Motion. Tujan-Militante’s MR, was likewise denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Tujan-Militante through voluntary
appearance?
HELD:
Yes. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However, it
is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. By seeking affirmative reliefs from the
trial court, a party is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Here, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the ground
of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which sought for
affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask
for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court's jurisdiction.
114
RULES 15 – 19
115
RULE 15
Republic v. Dimarucut
G.R. No. 202069 March 7, 2018 Caguioa, J.
FACTS: Respondents met sometime in 2002 and became friends. This friendship immediately progressed
and turned into an intimate romantic relationship, leading to Nailyn's pregnancy in March 2003. Two months
later, the Respondents wed in civil rights on May 18, 2003.Nailyn gave birth to the Respondents' first child,
Ayla Nicole, on November 11, 2003.12 Years later, on December 13, 2007, Nailyn gave birth to Respondents'
second child, Anyelle.
It appears, however, that Respondents' whirlwind romance resulted in a problematic marriage, as Alvin filed
a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage (RTC Petition) before the RTC on September 22,
2009. The OSG filed an MR and sent the notice to the adverse party through registered mail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic complied with the 3 day notice rule
HELD:
No. The requirements outlined in the cited provisions can be summarized as follows:
1. Every written motion which cannot be acted upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party
must be set for hearing;
2. The adverse party must be given: (a) a copy of such written motion, and (b) notice of the
corresponding hearing date;
3. The copy of the written motion and the notice of hearing described in (ii) must be furnished to the
adverse party at least three (3) days before the hearing date, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC
(3-day notice rule); and
4. No written motion that is required to be heard shall be acted upon by the receiving court without
proof of service done in the manner prescribed in (iii).
Perusal of the foregoing shows that the Republic failed to comply with the first and third requirements.
Notably, while the Republic furnished Alvin and Nailyn's respective counsels with copies of the MR and
Notice of Hearing, the Republic did so only by registered mail.51 As a result, Alvin received notice of the
Republic's MR only on August 11, 2010.52 Hence, even if the RTC construed the Republic's typographical
error to read August 6, 2010 instead of July 6, 2010, the Republic would have still failed to comply with the
3-day notice rule.
The 3-day notice rule was established not for the benefit of movant but for the adverse party, in order to avoid
surprises and grant the latter sufficient time to study the motion and enable it to meet the arguments interposed
therein. The duty to ensure receipt by the adverse party at least three days before the proposed hearing date
necessarily falls on the movant.
Accordingly, the "strict and rigid application, [of procedural rules] which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed."
Here, the State's policy of upholding the sanctity of marriage takes precedence over strict adherence to Rule
15, for the finality of the RTC Decision necessarily entails the permanent severance of Alvin and Nailyn's
marital ties. Hence, the RTC should have exercised its discretion, as it did have such discretion, and set the
MR for hearing on a later date with due notice to the parties to allow them to fully thresh out the Republic's
assigned errors. The CA thus erred when it affirmed the RTC in this respect.
116
RULE 17
Blay v. Bana
G.R. No. 232189 March 7, 2018 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on account of his
psychological incapacity. However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to
Withdraw his petition. Respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court and prayed that her
counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's independent adjudication. In turn, petitioner filed his
reply, averring that respondent's counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to
her failure to file a manifestation therefor within 15 days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw. In particular,
petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required manifestation only on March 30, 2015. However,
respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence,
respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial court her desire to prosecute her
counterclaims in the same action. The RTC granted petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw petition. Further, it
declared respondent's counterclaim "as remaining for independent adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner
15 days to file his answer thereto. The case was elevated to the CA which dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, holding that under Section 2, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been filed by the defendant before the service upon him of the
petitioner’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for
independent adjudication before the same trial court
HELD:
As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in this case - the rule is that the dismissal shall
be limited to the complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that instead of an ‘action’ shall not be
dismissed, the present rule uses the term ‘complaint’. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere
dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the
defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action."
117
Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy
FACTS: Antonio Lim Tanhu was the original owner of the lot which is the subject matter of the controversy.
Allegedly, he sold the lot to Spouses Cabansag; then Spouses Cabansag sold the same to Serafin Uy
(respondent). Serafin then filed a petition before the RTC praying for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
TCT in his name. The petition was initially granted but subsequently nullified because Lim Teck Chuan
(petitioner) filed his Opposition alleging that he is one of the 6 legitimate descendants of Antonio and that
the original TCT was not lost and has always been in his custody. In the meantime, a certain Henry Lim sold
the same lot to Leopolda Cecilio by virtue of an an Affidavit of Sole Adjudication/Settlement of the Estate
of Antonio Lim Tanhu with Deed of Sale.
Serafin then filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title impleading Leopolda, Henry and the petitioner. Leopolda
averred that she is a buyer in good faith and for value. Petitioner set up a counterclaim against Serafin and
a cross-claim against Lopeolda contending that the property was never transferred and encumbered to any
person during Antonio’s lifetime.
During the proceedings, both and Serafin and Leopolda entered into an amicable settlement and they both
filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss (MTD) on the main ground that the case had become moot and academic
since Serafin’s title to to the subject lot had been allegedly quieted. Petitioner opposed the MTD on the
ground that he was not included in the settlement. The RTC, however, granted the MTD and it also dismissed
petitioner’s counterclaim and cross-claim. Petitioner filed directly with the SC a petition for review under
Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s counterclaim or cross-claim could be prosecuted in the same action
despite the dismissal of the main complaint?
HELD:
A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the
complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his
counterclaim in the same action. In the instant case, the petitioner's preference to have his counterclaim (and
cross-claims) be prosecuted in the same action was timely manifested.
118
RULES 18 - 19
Acampado v. Cosmilla
G.R. No. 198531 September 28, 2015 Perez, J.
FACTS: The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Document filed
by respondents against petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6. In their Amended
Complaint6docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 6644, respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of
their share on the subject property was effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and is
therefore null and void. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 31 March 2005
dismissing the complaint of the respondents for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that the
signatures of the respondents in the SPA were forged.Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on 6 May 2005 seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision. For failure of the
respondents, however, to comply with the requirement of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for Reconsideration in Order11
dated 16 May 2005.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Respondents may be admitted despite lack
of notice and hearing
HELD:
The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to
the court which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse
party is therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition
to the prayer of the movant. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which dees not
afford the adverse party a chance to oppose should simply be disregarded. Principles of natural justice
demand that a right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The foregoing requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the
time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the
motion becomes pro forma.20 A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive
and which the court has no authority to act upon. It bears stressing that a motion without notice and hearing,
is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that cannot be acted by the court. It presents no question that the court
can decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. Indisputably, any
motion that does not contain proof of service and notice to the adverse party is not entitled to judicial
cognizance. Considering that the running of the period towards the finality of the judgment was not stopped,
the RTC Decision dated 31 March 2005 became final and executory. Every litigation must come to an end
once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable.39 For just as a losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law
119
Laude v. Ginez – Jabalde
G.R. No. 217456 November 24, 2015 Leonen, J.
FACTS: On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) was killed at the Celzone Lodge on
Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City, allegedly, at 19yearold.US Marine Pemberton. On October 15,
2014, a Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before
the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor. On October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp
Aguinaldo, the general headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Public Prosecutor filed an
Information for murder against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court in Olongapo City. A warrant of
arrest against Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014.7 Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge
Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde. on December 19, 2014, and he was then arraigned. On the same day, Marilou S.
Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. “The [M]otion was [scheduled]
for hearing on December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m.” According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the
Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also “furnished a
copy of the [M]otion personally . . . at the hearing of the [M]otion. On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-
Jabalde Denied petitioners’ Urgent Motion for lack of merit and petitioners filed a Motion for Recon si
deration.17 On February 18, 2015, Judge Ginez-Jabalde issued an Order18 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioners argue that “[r]espondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Com
pel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody o[f] Accused to the Olongapo City Jail [based]
on mere technicalities[.]”24 In particular, they argue that the three-day rule on motions under1997 Rules of
Court is not absolute, and should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances.
Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the threeday notice rule is satisfied when there is an opportunity
to be heard, which was present in this case since Pemberton’s counsel and the Public Prosecutor were present
in the hearing of the two Motions filed by petitioners. Petitioners allege that the court noted their attendance,
and were able to make comments during the December 22, 2014 Motion hearing.28 They assert that the rights
of Pemberton were not compromised in any way earliest possible date. Petitioners further argue that Judge
Ginez-Jabalde should not have dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail “considering that the Urgent Motion raised issues
that are of transcendental importance and of primordial public interest
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC is correct in dismissing the urgent motion file by the petitioner on the
ground of non-compliance with the three-day notice rule.
HELD:
Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to obtain the concurrence of the Public
Prosecutor to move for an interlocutory relief in a criminal prosecution cannot be excused by general
exhortations of human rights. The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified.
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given
notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement
renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural due process.
In Jehan Shipping Corporation:
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not
intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that
may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion
before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be
affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap
of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so
will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party
must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the
arguments of the movant.
120
De Guzman, Jr. v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 169292 April 13, 2011 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Ochoa filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and action seeking the
annulment of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and damages against petitioners De
Guzman. Petitioners, filed a first motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of
action. The RTC judge denied the motion to dismiss, soon after the petitioners again filed another motion to
dismiss, this time on the ground of defective verification and certificate of forum shopping. RTC judge again
denied the motion to dismiss and the Motion of Reconsideration.
Elevated to Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari, which in turn was denied, on the ground that the
petitioner’s ground is deemed waived when it failed to raise it in their first motion to dismiss. Hence, a
petition for review filed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to raise a defective verification and certificate of forum shopping on a
first motion to dismiss may be raised again in a subsequent motion to dismiss?
HELD:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor finally
disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an
appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in such cases is to file an answer,
go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.
Only in exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
that the Court allows the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By "grave abuse of discretion," we mean such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal-to perform the duty enjoined by or to.act all in contemplation of law.
121
Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison
FACTS: The Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog,
Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public
officials of the Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison, before the Office of the
Ombudsman relative to the alleged highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several
millions of pesos. The alleged calamity funds were expended without a State of Calamity having been
declared by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially
overpriced. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.The Office of the Ombudsman found basis to proceed
with the administrative case against the impleadedprovincial officials of Samar. In his counter-affidavit,
Sison vehemently denied the accusations and asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a
certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated,
and that funds are available. He averred that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in
the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding and that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached
in the letter-complaint bore his signature.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials of the
Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and dismissing him from service. Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review
under Rule 43. CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman against Sison. The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to
Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed
resolution. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the
adverse decision rendered by the CA?
HELD:
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an
interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its
main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole
controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in
litigation, and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment.
122
Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision dated February 14, 2005 and Supplemental
Resolution dated July 12, 2005 found herein respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
imposing the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory penalties. Pursuant to the Order from the
Deputy Ombudsman to enforce said Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution, the BSU-BOR issued a
resolution, to implement the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, herein respondents filed a petition
for injunction with prayer for issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction before the RTC of Batangas City,
against the BSU-BOR. The gist of the petition before the RTC is that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from
enforcing the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because the same are still on appeal
and, therefore, are not yet final and executory. However, such petition was dismissed for lack of cause of
action. De Chavez filed a notice of appeal and Motion for Issuance of TOR and/or Injunction with the CA.
The CA issued a Resolution granting respondents’ prayer for a TRO enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing
its subject resolution.
Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene with the Motion to Recall Temporary
Restraining Order. Respondents opposed said motion and then filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. The CA denied the motion of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether an injunction is proper to prevent BSU-BOR from enforcing the Office of the
Ombudsman's Joint Decision dated February 14, 2005 and Supplemental Resolution dated July 12, 2005
HELD:
No, in this case, the assailed Resolution of the CA is patently erroneous, and that granting the Office of the
Ombudsman the opportunity to be heard in the case pending before the lower court is of primordial
importance. Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution
is in danger of being impaired, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in defending its right
to have its judgment carried out. The CA patently erred in denying the Office of the Ombudsman's motion
for intervention.
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to
the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances. However, such
discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be
exercised in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the
Ombudsman's powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.
123
Anonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Jalandoni
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010 Perez, J.
FACTS: Rodolfo died. His brother filed at RTC Petition for Issuance of letters of administration. Anonuevo
et al intervened. They said their mother Sylvia was daughter of Isabel and john. But at the time of Rodolfo’s
death, their grandmother Isabel was the lawful wife of Rodolfo based on a marriage certificate. Rodolfo’s
brother opposed their intervention because the birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and John were
married. Therefore, Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo was null and void. Anonuevo et al however argued that the
entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia could not be used as proof that Isabel and John were indeed married.
Further, such statement of marriage in the birth certificate is just to save face and is customary.
ISSUE: Whether or not Añonuevo et al intervene?
HELD:
A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic
demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed
to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or
proceeding, to intervene therein.
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a case—
the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made
in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused.
That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.
124
Fernandez v. CA
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12 – 201 –
February 19, 2013 Reyes, J.
CA – J
FACTS: Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez, and Antonio Henson were elected to the board of directors
of NADECOR. In a regular stockholder’s meeting where two groups were vying for control over the
company, Calalang, De Jesus, Romulo, Ayala, Lazatin, Fernandez, Nitorreda, Engle were Elected. Gatmaitan
was also elected as Corporate Secretary. Thereafter, Ricafort/s, claiming to be stockholders of record, sought
to annul the said meeting held. They filed a complaint before the RTC of PASIG. Ricafort/s alleged that they
were not given due notice of the said meeting thus they were not present and were not able to exercise their
right. RTC agreed with the Ricaforts. Four separate Petition for Certiorari were filed by the members of the
board with the CA, all with application for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
The CA denied such applications, but on the same day nevertheless, the 11th division issued a TRO. During
the effectivity of the TRO, the old Board of Directors assumed the functions of the new one in order to
prevent any hiatus and not to prejudice the corporation. All the CA petitions were consolidated as well as the
other cases. On February 17, 2012, the respondents Ricafort filed their Comment Ad Cautelam to the petition
in CA-G.R. No. 122784.The petitioners therein thereafter filed three (3) urgent motions to resolve their
application for writ of preliminary injunction, on March 8, on May 22, and again on June 6, 2012. The Writ
of Preliminary Injunction was granted by the CA 14th Division, which not for long was questioned.
Complainants filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to annul the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA’s Special 14th Division. Complainants also filed an
Administrative case against the Justices of the 14th Division of the CA alleged in this administrative
complaint that the respondent Justices are guilty of grave misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service,
gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and manifest partiality.
ISSUE: Whether the Ricaforts have a legal personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the CA 14th Division.
HELD:
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a
party in the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he
cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger. Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in
the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said
action to annul or stay the injurious writ. Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain
an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated differently, if a petition
for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to
question the assailed order.
125
Rodriguez v. CA
G.R. No. 184589 June 13, 2013 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho filed before the CFI of Rizal an Application for Registration
of a piece of land, measuring 125 hectares, located in San Mateo, Rizal. On November 16, 1965, the CFI
rendered a Decision evaluating the evidence presented by the parties as follows: It has been established that
the parcel of land under consideration was formerly several smaller parcels owned and possessed by the
several people, all of whom in January 1960, executed instruments of conditional sale of their respective
parcels of land in favor of [Landicho], x x x, and on July 20, 1965 all of them executed jointly a final deed
of absolute sale x x x which superseded the conditional sale. The applicant is entitled to the benefits provided
by Section 48, of C.A. No. 141, as amended. The CFI confirmed the title of the applicant, Purita Landicho to
the parcel of land under consideration and orders the registration thereof in her name and personal
circumstances aforementioned. The opposition of the Director of Lands was dismissed. Upon finality, a TCT
was issued instead of an OCT. After several sales, respondent Philippine Chinese Charitable Association,
Inc. (PCCAI), under TCT No. 482970, became owner on July 15, 1975. MEANWHILE, A. Doronila
Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI) instituted Civil Case No. 12044 entitled A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v.
CA, which was still pending before the RTC of Pasig City as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the
subject property. While still pending in court, ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to
Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was issued on March 25, 1983. On November 14, 1996,
Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of herein petitioner
Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died. On May 18, 2005,
Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion alleging therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order
dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N- 5098 which confirmed Landicho’s title over
the subject property has not been executed alleging that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in
Landicho’s name. As Landicho’s successor-in- interest to the subject property, Rodriguez prayed that the
Register of Deeds for Marikina City issue OCT in his name. Concerning the aforementioned Omnibus
Motion, Rodriguez himself submitted TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but alleged that said certificate of title was
fictitious. Thus, the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the
hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 and to bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration No. SM-02-
0229; and to testify in connection therewith. On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified
Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing
that it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal interest therein as the registered owner
of the subject property under TCT No. 482970. PCCAI likewise pointed out that Rodriguez himself submitted
a copy of TCT No. 482970, only alleging that said certificate was fictitious. PCCAI averred that Rodriguez
maliciously failed to allege in his Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and subsisting, there
being no direct action or final court decree for its cancellation. Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion constituted a
collateral attack on the title of PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. Consequently,
PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 so it could protect its vested
rights and interests over the subject property; to note and admit its Answer-in- Intervention; and to deny
Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion for utter lack of merit. RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by PCCAI is proper even though it was filed after
rendition of judgement by the trial court.
HELD:
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in
the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been
rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and
executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was
allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues
raised by the parties.
126
People v. Perez
G.R. No. 142556 February 5, 2003 Per Curiam
FACTS: The prosecution alleges that, on January 17, 1997, about noontime, in SitioBaco, Barangay
Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, six-year old MayiaPonseca(victim) was walking along Sulok on her way to
her house in SitioCamiling when appellant Jesus Sebunga Perez approached her. Appellant introduced
himself as Johnny and immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen. Still in shock,
Mayia fell down. At that point, a dog arrived and barked at them. Thereafter, the appellant raped the victim.
The accused-appellant after being arrested was charged for the crime of rape. During pre-trial the prosecution
and defense stipulated on the following facts:
1. The identity of the accused;

2. The accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof;
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth
certificate;
4. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal examination to which a medico-
legal certificate was issued by Dr. Editha Divino.
The prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate of the victim Mayia O. Ponseca as Exhibit A, and
the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. EdithaDivino as Exhibit B. As a defense, appellant avers during
the incident, he left the fishpond and walked home to Barangay Alwa which was about thirty meters from
the fishpond. After trial, the trial Court convicted him for the crime of statutory rape. Hence, this automatic
review.
In his Reply Brief, appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. Appellant maintains that the death
penalty cannot be imposed on him for failure of the prosecution to prove Mayia’s age by independent
evidence. Appellant points out that while Mayia’s birth certificate was duly marked during the pre-trial, it
was not presented and identified during the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayia’s minority must not only be
specifically alleged in the Information but must also be established beyond reasonable doubt during the trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulation during the pre-trial on the victim’s age is binding on the accused.
HELD:
At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the criminal case. Appellant,
assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial Agreement which, as incorporated in the Pre-Trial Order, stated that:
". . . . 3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth
certificate; . . . ." During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayia's birth certificate as Exhibit
"A". The prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence which included Exhibit "A", a certified true copy of
Mayia's birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit "A" without any objection from the defense. . .
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15, 1998, which
was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on
cross-examination that she was "8 years old last May 23." Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May
23, 1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7) months old on January
17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution has indisputably proven that Mayia was
below seven years old at the time appellant raped her.
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking
for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e)
modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful defenses; and (f) such
matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. Facts
stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the parties.
127
Ching v. Cheng
G.R. No. 175507 October 8, 2014 Leonen, J.
FACTS: Antonio Ching owned several businesses including Po Wing Properties. While he was unmarried,
he had children from two women: Ramon Ching with Lucina Santos; and Joseph and Jaime Cheng with
Mercedes Igne. When Antonio was weak, he entrusted to Lucina the distribution of his estate to his heirs if
something were to happen to him. Lucina, then handed, all the property titles and business documents to
Ramon Ching for safekeeping. Fortunately, Antonio Ching recovered from illness and allegedly demanded
that Ramon return all the documents. In 1996, Antonio was murdered. Ramon Ching alleged that he was
summoned to execute an affidavit of settlement of estate declaring him to be Antonio’s sole heir. After a year
of investigation, the police found Ramon to be its primary suspect. Thus, Chengs filed a complaint filed a
complaint (first case) for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the RTC of Manila. The
complaint was amended, with leave of court, to implead additional defendants, including Po Wing Properties,
of which Ramon was a primary stockholder. Po Wing Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, which was granted by the RTC. In 2002, Chengs and Lucina filed
a complaint (second case) for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and
the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents against Ramon and Po Wing
Properties.However, Chengs and Lucina filed a motion to dismiss their complaint in the second case, praying
that it be dismissed without prejudice, which was also granted. Thus, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and argued that the dismissal should have been with prejudice
under the "two dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the
previous dismissal of the first case.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case,
as per the "two-dismissal rule?
HELD:
Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence,
the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the prior
dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case before
any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done through notice by the plaintiff and
confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been pleaded by the
defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. It requires leave of court, and
the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The
case is dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal
is with prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals
upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to dismiss.
128
Yao v. Perello
G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003 Corona, J.
FACTS: On September 17, 1999, the HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell between
petitioner and PR Builders, and ordering PR Builders to refund Lincoln Yao(Yao) the amount of
P2,116,103.31, as well as to pay damages in the amount of P250,000. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ
of execution against PR Builders. Persuant to the writ, the sheriff levied on a parcel of land located in Laguna
which is registered under the name of the private respondent Bernardine Villarin(Villarin).
Villarin then filed with the RTC a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from proceeding with the
public auction. Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the execution sale; that
the property regime between private respondent and her husband was complete separation of property, and
that she was not a party in the HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer for
the separate liability of her husband. Later on, such petition was granted. Aggrieved, Yao then filed a motion
for intervention which was denied for being filed too late.
ISSUE: Whether or not Yao has the right to intervene
HELD:
To allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or
otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set
forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private respondent's petition for prohibition and lifting the
levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002, after the lapse of 15 days, the
said resolution had already become final and executory.
129
Pinlac v. CA
G.R. No. 91486 January 19, 2001 Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a Petition for Quieting of Title over three vast parcels of land known as Lot Nos.
1, 2 & 3. Lot No. 1 was covered by TCT No. 5690, while Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were originally covered by OCT
No. 614 and OCT No. 333, respectively. The trial court rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners
and against the defendants who were declared in default, including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles
(Vilma) Subdivision whose properties were within Lot No. 2. The defaulted title owners of Vilma filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial Decision of the trial court, which was granted.
The appellate court ruled that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondents
because of defective service of summons by publication. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said
decision was also denied. Consequently, it filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, but the
Court only affirmed CA’s decision. Aggrieved, petitioner then, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
contending among others that the disposition of the trial court with respect to Lot No. 3, should not have been
annulled by the Court of Appeals because the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents
concerned only Lot No. 2. The Court then, issued a Resolution partially granting petitioners motion for
reconsideration by reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dispositive portion of the trial court’s Partial Decision
pertaining to Lot No. 3. However, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a
Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered declaring among other that, the OCT No. 333 was
a valid and existing title in line with the decisions this Honorable Court had already rendered, hence, this
case.
ISSUE: Whether a Motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention filed by the Republic were proper
taking into account that a partial Resolution by the Supreme Court has already been rendered?
HELD:
The Partial Decision was a judgment by default, which is generally looked upon with disfavor, for it cannot
pretend to be based on the merits of the controversy. As in this case, the judgment by default may amount to
a positive and considerable injustice to private respondents. Hence, justice and equity demand that this case
be litigated anew. It is evident that the reopening of the case would not amount to an exercise in futility nor
is it intended to further delay the final resolution of this controversy. The court a quo should give all the
necessary parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort to technicalities.
The conclusion that the Partial Decision of the court a quo is void finds support in Rule 10, Section 5(c) of
the then Rules of Court, which provides: "(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim
states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail
to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented." In fact, the court a quo enumerated in the Partial Decision those who filed responsive
pleadings. Considering that petitioners in their complaint stated a common cause of action against all the
named respondents, the court a quo should have heard the case as against all respondents, the defaulted
respondents included. However, the trial court, unmindful of the above-quoted rule, proceeded to receive
evidence ex parte only against the defaulted respondents. The trial court's disposition is not only violative of
the rules but also a clear negation of the defaulted respondents' limited rights.
130
Chipongian v. Benitez – Lirio
G.R. No. 162692 August 26, 2015 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian, the petitioner’s sister. Isabel had
predeceased Vicente. The couple had no offspring. After the death of Isabel, Vicente and petitioner executed
an extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of Isabel, whereby the latter waived all his rights to the estate
of Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to petitioner, however, Vicente executed an affidavit on the same
date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the paraphernal properties of Isabel. Upon the
death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Feodor), a
nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente in the RTC. In its order
dated May 13, 1994, the RTC appointed Feodor the administrator of Vicente’s estate. On May 20, 1994, it
issued the letters of administration to Feodor.
The petitioner intervened in the Special Proceedings. He sought the partial revocation of the May 13, 1994
order in order to exclude the paraphernal properties of Isabel from inclusion in the estate of Vicente. He cited
the affidavit of Vicente in support of the partial revocation. Petitioner specifically moved for the exclusion
of the paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicente’s estate. The RTC granted the Motion and admitted the
complaint-in-intervention of the petitioner. The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint-in-
intervention, holding that petitioner was negligent in asserting his right within a reasonable time which
warrants the presumption that he had either abandoned it or declined to assert it but also cast doubt on the
validity of his claim. It took note of the fact that purported affidavit was executed simultaneously with the
deed of extrajudicial settlement which was published but the affidavit was not and why it was only after 12
long years that he brought it out.
The RTC went on to cite Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules which provides a limitation of 2 years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with either Sec 1 of the Rule, within which an heir or
other person deprived of his lawful participation in the estate may compel the settlement of the said estate in
the Courts for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. The petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the judgment but was denied. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was denied due
course for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. He filed a MR vis-à-vis the order denying due
course his notice of appeal. Petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari in the CA which affirmed the order
of the RTC. The petition was dismissed. Petitioner sought a reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the present petition for review should be denied for failure of petitioner to file a record on
appeal, as mandated under Sec. 2 (a) Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
Intervention is "a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceedings." If an intervention makes a third party a litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in-
intervention should form part of the main case.
The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention constituted "a final determination in the lower court of the rights
of the party appealing. For the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal
was 30 days from notice of the final order dismissing the intervention. The start of the period of 30 days
happened on September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel received the decision dismissing his intervention.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner lost his right to appeal through his failure to file the record on appeal,
and rendered the dismissal of his intervention final and immutable. With this outcome, we no longer need to
dwell on the denial of due course to his notice of appeal because of the late payment of the appellate court
docket fees.
131
RULES 23 - 33
132
Rep. v. Heirs of Enrique Oribello
G.R. No. 199501 March 6, 2013 Carpio, J.
FACTS: This is an action filed by MatiledApog and Aliseo San Juan claiming to be the actual occupant of
a parcel of land in Olongapo City for the annulment of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent (MSA) and issued to
Oribello by the Director of Lands.
After investigation, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR found that there were fraud and
misrepresentation in the issuance of the sales patent, warranting for its reversion suit. Consequently, OSG
(PETITIONER) representing DENR instituted a complaint for reversion and cancellation of title before the
RTC of Olongapo City. The case was thereafter consolidated with a civil case for a complaint for recovery
of possession filed by Oribello against Apog and San Juan.
RTC then issued an Order dated 12 September 1997 stating “that because of failure of the Petitioner to appear
on the scheduled dates of trial which result to delay in the early termination of the cases pending since 1992,
it is hereby deemed to have abandoned the case for the government.” However, the trial of the consolidated
cases continued and the reception of evidence of the private parties proceeded.Later, the RTC issued an Order
for the dismissal of the consolidated cases without prejudice for non – substitution of the deceased plaintiff
(Oribello) and his counsel. Petitioner filed MR, contending that the Order applied exclusively to case for
recovery of possession and did not affect the other civil case for reversion of property. Petitioner prayed that
it be allowed to present its evidence. RTC granted the MR.
Aggrieved, Oribello’s heirs (RESPONDENTS) filed a Manifestation and Motion. That on issued RTC’s
order dated 12 September 1997, as a consequence of the petitioner’s inaction, such order became final. RTC
ruled in favor of the defendants (respondents). Petitioner appealed. CA affirmed the RTC’s Order.
ISSUE: Whether or not consolidated cases, without any order of severance, cannot be subject of multiple
appeals.
HELD:
"Consolidation" is used in three different senses:
1. Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as
such. (quasi-consolidation)
2. Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action
in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are
pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one
complaint. (actual consolidation)
3. Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a
single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is not necessary
to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a
judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is
within the sound discretion of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under
the Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the other cases before a party can appeal an adverse
ruling on such case.
133
Metrobank v. Sandoval
G.R. No. 169677 February 18, 2013 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: The Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages
in Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos and other defendants, for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and dummies. Among the properties subject of the action were two parcels of land
registered in the names of Spouses Genito. As it appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two
parcels of land and was in possession of the properties by virtue of writ of possession, the Republic moved
for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The motion
was granted by the Sandiganbayan. When its presentation of evidence against the original defendants is about
to terminate, Republic moved to hold separate trial against Asian Bank. Asian Bank sought the deferment of
any action on the motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the Republic. Furthermore, Asian Bank contended that if a separate trial without
having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as
an additional defendant would amount to deprivation of its day in the court. The Republic, in its reply,
maintained that separate trial is proper because it has entirely different and independent cause of action from
the original defendants. Nonetheless, Sandiganbayan granted Republic's motion for separate trial. Metrobank
commenced Special civil action for Certiorari as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank.
ISSUE: Was Republic entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank?
HELD:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.1 But a separate trial may be denied if a party is
thereby deprived of his right to be heard upon an issue dealt with and determined in the main trial.
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting
separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues
will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the
general rule must apply.
134
Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes
G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993 Narvasa, C.J.
FACTS: American President Lines (APL) instituted an action against Dasmariñas Garments to recover the
sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses. Dasmariñas Garments filed an Answer with Counterclaim. APL on the other
hand, filed a motion during the hearing praying that it intended to take the depositions of Kenneth H. Lee
and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a commission or letters rogatory be
issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei.
Five days later, APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate
office in Taiwan in view of its “one China policy,” there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President
“presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asian Exchange Center, Inc.,” it was necessary—
and it therefore prayed—“that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces,
Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901,112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1,
Taipei, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the forenamed persons.
Dasmariñas Garments opposed the motion on the grounds that the motion was fatally defective in that it does
not seek that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction, the Issuance of letters rogatory was
unnecessary because the witnesses can be examined before the Philippine Court and the Rules of Court
expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition
The RTC ruled in favor of the motion of the APL and affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to take the testimonies of plaintiffs Taiwanese witnesses, Kenneth H. Lee
and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) should be allowed.
HELD:
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts
resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.
Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse
party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are
meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses
but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to
make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may
have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual
foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission
or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all
the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open
court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at
the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual
oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay;
the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his
testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking
of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time
that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
135
Go v. People
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the MeTC of Manila
for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the RPC. Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the
charge. The prosecution’s complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9,
2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that
he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon
doctor’s advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. Notwithstanding
petitioners’ Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to
submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. The RTC reversed the MeTC. The RTC held that Section 17,
Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since
there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution
witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused
to meet the witness against him face to face.
The CA reversed the RTC and affirmed the MeTC’s decision ruling that no rule of procedure expressly
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every
opportunity to cross examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the
oral deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of
the witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deposition of a prosecution’s main witness outside the country should be allowed.
HELD:
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either
upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to
administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official,
commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional
requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
136
Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008 Nachura, J.
FACTS: Risos, Yongco, Abarquez, and Atty. Bonje were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Document before the RTC. The case, arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage
allegedly committed by Risos, et. al. where they made it appear that Concepcion De Manguerra, the owner
of the mortgaged Gorodoproperty, affixed her signature to such document. Concepcion who was a resident
of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to
upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment. The Manguerra’s
counsel filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition due to her weak physical condition and old age, which
limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC of Cebu granted the motion and directed that Maguerra’s
deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. After several motions for change of venue of
the deposition-taking, Manguerra’s deposition was finally taken at her residence.
Aggrieved, Risos, et. al. assailed the RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. The
CA nullified the RTC orders, declaring that the examination of prosecution witnessesis governed by Section
15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. According
to the CA, the latter provisiononly applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15,
Rule 119, Manguerra’s deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is
pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing
the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deposition of a prosecution witness not taken before the court where the action
is pending may be allowed?
HELD:
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge.
This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives
the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to
support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe
the witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the
different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either
to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12,
and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow
the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
137
Allied Agri – Business Development Co. Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. 118438 December 4, 1998 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Cherry Valley filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Allied Agri-Business for
not paying the total purchase price. Allied through its President wrote Cherry Valley, inviting it to be a
stockholder in a new corporation to be formed by Allied, which was rejected by Cherry Valley. Allied filed
an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. Cherry Valley served Allied’s counsel a request
for admission. Allied filed its comments/objections alleging that the request was improper for not having
been pleaded in the complaint and that the admissions requested are matters which respondent had the burden
to prove through its own witness during the trial. In its reply, Cherry Valley maintained that there was no
need on its part to produce a witness to testify on the matters requested for admission. Allied failed to submit
a sworn answer hence, Cherry Valley filed a motion for summary judgment. RTC rendered judgment. Allied
appealed to CA and contended that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of lack of personality
to sue on the part of Cherry Valley.
ISSUE: Whether or not Allied’s failure to submit an answer to the request for admission is an admission
HELD:
The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite
trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of
which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall
be deemed admitted unless within a period designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15)
days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom
the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.[12] Upon service of request for admission, the party
served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of which an admission is
requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit the truth of the matters of which
admission is requested by serving upon the party requesting a written admission of such matters within the
period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within such further
time as the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement denying specifically the
matter of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which an admission is requested.
138
People v. Webb
G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010 Abad, J.
FACTS: Hubert Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide, filed a Motion to Take Testimony
by Oral Deposition, to take the testimonies of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S., before the proper
Philippine consular authorities since the Philippine court had no jurisdiction over them and may not therefore
be compelled by subpoena to testify. Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the
aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly ‘material and indispensable’ to establish his
innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court has no application in criminal cases. The trial court denied the motion but was thereafter reversed by
the CA on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not deposition of the defense’s witnesses outside the country may be allowed in this
case?
HELD:
No. It need not be overemphasized that the factual circumstances only serves to underscore the immutable
fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely
corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying respondent’s motion to take them, the trial court was
but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction
thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record.
It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred
sixty four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be produced or testified
to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, we sustain the proposition that the trial judge
commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in
the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved.
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The deposition taking
cannot be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner
and in consonance with the spirit of the law.
The time within which to file and serve written interrogatories is explicitly fixed by the rules, that is, in civil
cases before responsive answer is filed with leave of court or without leave of court after the filing of
responsive answer; and in criminal cases before the setting of the arraignment and pre-trial conference. The
admissions made in the verified answer to the written interrogatories may already be considered during the
pre-trial conference and would definitely aid the parties for purposes of a plea-bargaining.
139
Afulugencia v. Metro Bank
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014 February 5, 2014
FACTS: Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of
mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against
respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the RTC
of Malolos City. Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion
must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the hearing
renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules,
Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to appear and testify in
court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories; that petitioners have
not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners
were merely fishing for evidence. On October 19, 2006, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the defective notice was cured by the filing of
Metrobank’s Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to notice. They further argued that Metrobank’s
officers – who are the subject of the subpoena – are not party-defendants, and thus do not comprise the
adverse party; they are individuals separate and distinct from Metrobank.
ISSUE: Whether or not an adverse party can be required to take the witness stand (Sec. 6 of Rule 25) without
complying with the notice and hearing requirement under Sec. 4 and 5 of Rule 15
HELD:
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not
served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open
court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to
maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written
interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if
it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated
as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior
written interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony,33 compelling the adverse
party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a
party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other
mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its
own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be
worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry
to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it
takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise
prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own
judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the
parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their
own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the court’s precious time,
if not pointless entertainment.
140
Disini v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 169823 – 24 September 11, 2013 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Disini, herein petitioner, was charged for two information for corruption of public officials, Art 212
in relation to Art 210 (RPC) and violation of RA 3019. For failure to file a responsive pleading, petitioner
was declared in default. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for Leave to File
and Admit Attached Answer, together with an Answer to Amended Complaint with Compulsory
Counterclaims. He maintained that he was unaware of the civil case pending against him because he never
received summons or other processes from the court, nor any pleadings from the parties of the case. His only
fault, he averred, was that he was ignorant of the proceedings in the case because of the absence of a proper
notice. Petitioner asked the respondent court to look at his meritorious defenses. He then invoked the
liberality of the courts in lifting default orders to give both parties every opportunity to defend their cases,
and pointed out that the proceedings, being in their pre-trial stage, would not be delayed by petitioner’s
participation therein. Sandiganbayan denied his motion to lift order of default. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
In his Petition, petitioner originally sought the nullification of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on
the theory of lack of jurisdiction over his person, premised on the alleged impropriety in the service of
summons. However, petitioner subsequently filed several motions with the Sandiganbayan which sought
various affirmative reliefs from that court, sans any qualification of the nature of its appearance and without
reserving or reiterating its previous objection on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. One of
the motions is a Motion for Leave To Take Deposition.
ISSUE: Whether or not by filing a Motion for Leave To Take Deposition, the petitioner is deemed to have
waived his objections to the lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?
HELD:
Yes. It is important to note that there are two instances when the defendant can take depositions under Section
1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject of the
action; and (2) after an answer has been served. Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant. By seeking this relief (Motion for Leave To Take Deposition), petitioner is
deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, petitioner may
be held to have waived his objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction over his person by seeking affirmative
relief through the said provision.
While petitioner bewailed the mode of service of summons on him and questioned the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction over his person, he has rendered his own arguments moot by his voluntary appearance or
submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of
jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative
relief other than the dismissal of the case.
To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged
is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information
in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period
of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the
time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
141
People v. Bustamante
G.R. No. 189836 June 5, 2013 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: Accused-appellant was found guilty of the crime of rape by means of threat and intimidation for
having sexual intercourse with his daughter. On appeal, the accused-appellant attacks credibility the of
AAA’s testimony. In his defense, appellant interposes denial while also ascribing ill motive on the part of
the victim, his own biological daughter, for accusing him of rape. Accordingly, appellant implores this Court
to review the same and render a judgment reversing his conviction for the crime of rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the private complainant.
HELD:
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things. Jurisprudence is likewise instructive that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on
the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
With regard to the allegation that the accusation of rape was motivated by ill will and revenge, this Court is
not surprised at this rather common excuse being raised by offenders in rape cases. We have consistently
held that such alleged motives cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of complainants who
remained steadfast throughout the trial. Jurisprudence tells us that it is against human nature for a young girl
to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when
her charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her own father.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the victim to be a credible witness and
her testimony worthy of full faith and credit. After a careful review of the records of this case, we find no
reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts.
It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion
that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and categorical
testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of the complainant and the negative
statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence.
142
Spouses Marano v. Pryce Gases Inc.
G.R. No. 196592 April 6, 2015 Brion, J.
FACTS: Spouses Maraño filed a free patent application for a 9,074 sqm parcel of land in Damulaan, Leyte
denominated as Lot No. 4299. The application was subsequently granted and petitioners were issued with an
Original Certificate of Title No P-43553. Petitioners filed an ejectment complaint against Pryce Gases,
Incorporated alleging that the latter illegally entered the subject lot and constructed a building thereon.
Municipal Trial Court granted petitioners’ complaint but was reversed by the Regional Trial Court. On further
appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to MTC for trial as a reivindicatory action under the ordinary
rules of civil procedure. Spouses Maraño filed an action to quiet title against Pryce Glass. A month later
Pryce Glass filed a complaint for reconveyance against petitioners. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
respondent’s complaint. Respondent moved to amend its complaint to cancellation of petitioners’ certificate
of title. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia in view of pending reivindicatory action.
RTC dismissed petitioners’ motion.
In the reivindicatory action, MTC ruled in respondent’s favor and declared Pryce Glass as the owner of
subject lot. CA rendered decision affirming RTC’s resolution that dismissed petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
CA held that no litis pendentia exists between the reivindicatory action and amended complaint for
cancellation of certificate of title.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint for cancellation of title should be dismissed because the question of validity
of certificate of title is already being litigated in the reivindicatory action
HELD:
Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of certificate of title, we find
that the consolidation of the reivindicatory action and the cancellation of certificate of title case to be the
appropriate remedy in the present situation. Consolidation is proper when two or more actions pending, not
necessarily, before the same court involve a common question of law or fact.27In such cases, the court may:
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions, order all the actions consolidated,
and make such orders concerning the proceedings therein for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary costs and
delay.
Considering that the validity of the petitioners’ certificate of title is the crucial issue in both the reivindicatory
action pending appeal before the RTC and the cancellation of certificate of title case filed by the respondent,
these two cases should be consolidated in order to avoid the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions and
for the orderly administration of justice. And since the issue of validity of the petitioners’ certificate of title
has been subjected to a full-blown trial before the MTC and is now the subject of appeal before the RTC,
allowing the cancellation of certificate of title case to proceed independently and separately would be
needlessly circuitous and would necessarily delay the resolution of the present issue.
143
Phil. Health Ins. Corp. v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint with its Legal Prosecution Department against Respondent for the
administrative offense of filing multiple claims, which is penalized under R.A. No. 7875. Respondent
allegedly filed two (2) claims of the same amount of Phil health benefits involving the same patient for the
same diagnosis and covering the same period of confinement.
The parties were directed to file their respective position papers, which herein Petitioner complied with its
order. Respondent moved to defer the submission of its position paper pending the answer of the PHIC
President and CEO to the written interrogatories as well as the inspection and copying of the original
transmittal letter and all other claims that accompanied the complaint. According to respondent these modes
of discovery were availed of because its representatives were denied and/or not given access to documents
and were not allowed to talk to PHIC personnel with regard to the charge. Respondent elevated the issue to
the Court of Appeals via petition for Certiorari. The latter revered the resolution and order of the arbitration
department. In that ruling the grave abuse of discretion was committed. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the Resolution and Order of the PHIC
Arbitration Department, which denied respondent’s resort to modes of discovery.
HELD:
Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the adverse party or parties any facts or matter that
are not privileged and are material and relevant to the subject of the pending action. Like other
modes of discovery authorized by the Rules, the purpose of written interrogatories is to assist the parties in
clarifying the issues and in ascertaining the facts involved in a case. On the other hand, the provision on
production and inspection of documents is to enable not only the parties but also the court (in this case, the
PHIC Arbitration Department) to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case
pending before it. It must be shown, therefore, that the documents sought to be produced, inspected and/or
copied/photographed are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.
In this case, the question contained in the written interrogatories filed and received were sought to elicit facts
that could already be seen from the allegations as well as attachments of the complaint. The interrogatories
were frivolous and need not be answered. He may issue subpoenas requiring attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of documents and other materials. We likewise find as self-serving the allegation
of Respondent that its representatives were denied access to the documents pertaining to the subject petitioner
claimed. No iota of evidence, documentary or testimonial was submitted to substantiate this convenient
excuse.
144
Duque v. Spouses Yu
FACTS: The herein petitioner Lilia S. Duque and her late husband, Mateo Duque (Spouses Duque), were
the lawful owners of a 7,000-square meter lot in Lambug, Badian, Cebu, covered by Tax Declaration (TD)
No. 05616 (subject property). On August 28, 1995, Spouses Duque allegedly executed a Deed of Donation
over the subject property in favor of their daughter, herein respondent Delia D. Capacio (Capacio), who, in
turn, sold a portion thereof, i.e., 2,745 square meters, to her herein co-respondents Spouses Bartolome D. Yu,
Jr. and Juliet O. Yu (Spouses Yu). Spouses Duque lodged a Verified Complaint for Declaration of Non-
Existence and Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale and Cancellation of TD (Complaint)
against the respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu, claiming that the signature in
the Deed of Donation was forged. Spouses Duque then prayed (1) to declare the Deeds of Donation and of
Absolute Sale null and void; (2) to cancel TD No. 01-07-05886 in the name of respondent Juliet Yu (married
to respondent Bartolome Yu); and (3) to revive TD No. 05616 in the name Mateo Duque (married to
petitioner Lilia Duque). In her Answer, respondent Capacio admitted that the signature in the Deed of
Donation was, indeed, falsified but she did not know the author thereof.
A Motion for Admission by Adverse Party under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court (Motion for Admission) was
filed by respondents Spouses Yu requesting the admission of the genuineness and due execution of certain
documents, including the Deed of Donation, Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Tax Declaration covering the
subject land. Spouses Duque were directed to comment thereon but they failed to do so. By their silence, the
trial court, in an Order dated November 24, 2008, pronounced that they were deemed to have admitted the
same. Thus, during trial, instead of presenting their evidence, respondents Spouses Yu moved for demurrer
of evidence in view of the aforesaid pronouncement. Spouses Duque vehemently opposed such motion. The
trial court granted the demurrer to evidence and, thereby, dismissed the Complaint. Spouses Duque sought
reconsideration, which was denied. The CA upheld the ruling of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of Spouses Duque to comment on the Motion for Admission amounts to
admission of the genuineness and due execution of the subject documents?
HELD:
Once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact, the
party to whom such request is served has 15 days within which to file a sworn statement answering it. In case
of failure to do so, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. This rule,
however, admits of an exception, that is, when the party to whom such request for admission is served had
already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters
in a request for admission have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party,
the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably
expect a response to the request and, thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied
admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. The rationale is that "admissions by an adverse party as a mode of
discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of
the allegations in a pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the
pleadings; or else, it constitutes an utter redundancy and will be a useless, pointless process which petitioner
should not be subjected to.
145
RULES 33 to 36
146
RULE 33
Republic v. Gimenez
G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016 Leonen, J.
FACTS: The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez
Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by the
Gimenez Spouses as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
Marcos. Documentary and testimonial evidence were presented by the Republic and accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 to file its formal offer of evidence.
However, despite the repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date of the termination of the
presentation of evidence, Republic failed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued
a Resolution declaring that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.
Ignacio Gimenez then filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He argued that the Republic
showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action. Later, Fe Roa Gimenez filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined
Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence. Two days after, Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss,
the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached
Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan on its second Resolution denied the Republic’s Motion for
Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition. The Republic
contends, among others, that the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
respondents and dismissed the case despite a "prima facie foundation (based on the pleadings and documents
on record) that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income
or declared lawful assets."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Demurrer to Evidence?
HELD:
To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence
shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought." The order of dismissal must be clearly supported
by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits:
As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is
imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which
it is based.
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence
essentially deprives one party of due process.
147
Bernardo v. CA
G.R. No. 119010 September 5, 1997 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Four counts of violation of BP 22 was charged against Paz Bernardo before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Two of the cases were dismissed due to the Affidavit of Desistance executed by private
respondent Florlita, the remaining two cases were left to be disposed of by the trial court. After presenting
its last witness, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits. After the prosecution had
formally offered its evidence, in open court, the counsel of the defense respectfully ask for leave of court to
file demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecutor failed to elicit facts where the checks were issued
and where they were actually dishonored. However, the prosecution objected and showed the properly
marked exhibits and testimonial evidences for that matter. In view of such objections, the court denied the
grounds of the defense for demurrer. The defense, however, reiterated that they will file their demurrer to
evidence without leave of court and the court considered the motion dilatory. Further, the court considered
that the defense waived their right to present evidence and that the case is deemed submitted for decision.
Bernardo assailed the order of the respondent judge by way of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
the Court of Appeals. She argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in considering her
to have waived her right to present evidence after the denial of her motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence. The CA rendered a decision modifying in effect the order of the lower court by directing the trial
court to set the case for trial for reception of evidence for the petitioner. Petitioner moved for partial
reconsideration but was denied. The petitioner submits, among others, that when the trial court denied her
motion, it was in effect a denial only of the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and not the demurrer
to evidence itself and, therefore, the order of the respondent appellate court allowing petitioner to present
evidence was premature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to present evidence after the denial of her demurrer
to evidence.
HELD:
The new rule on demurrer to evidence was first incorporated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure that
when a motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence is denied the accused has a right to present evidence
in his behalf. Earlier the rule was, when after the prosecution has rested its case, and the accused files a
motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case
for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. The rule was further modified in 1988 to the
effect that only when the accused files a demurrer or motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence without
express leave of court that the accused may be deemed to have waived his right to present evidence and the
case considered submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If the accused has
obtained prior leave of court, in case of denial of his motion to dismiss, he retains his right to present
evidence in his behalf. The court may also motu proprio dismiss the case on insufficiency of evidence, but
before doing so, it should give the prosecution an opportunity to be heard and to oppose the motion. Under
the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can
still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after
his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing
his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.
148
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000 Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed and
delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note. Radiowealth filed a complaint for
the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. During the trial, Jasmer
Famatico, the credit and collection officer of Radiowealth, presented in evidence the Spouses’ check
payments, the demand letter, Spouses’ customer’s ledger card, another demand letter and Metropolitan Bank
dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution
of any of these pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him.
Spouses Del Rosario filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. The RTC dismissed
the case. The CA reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Del Rosario may still present evidence after the appellate court’s reversal
of the dismissal on demurer of evidence?
HELD:
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva
Transit v. Javellana pronounced: "The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The
defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted,
to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff's evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus
established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the
dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of
contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive
the defendant's evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed
before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine
is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally
receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs
in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary
to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly
excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The
rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and
the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf and
he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff's case and evidence. In
such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on
the merits on the basis of plaintiff's evidence." In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the
plaintiff's evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the
trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the
dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in
addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage
prolonged litigations.
149
Cabador v. People
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009 Abad, J.
FACTS: Antonio Cabador was charged with the crime of murder, in conspiracy with Atty. Valerio. After
presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its
documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. However, the public prosecutor asked for three extensions
of time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006. Nevertheless, the prosecution did not make the
required written offer. Cabador then filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Unknown to
Cabador, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006, the prosecution asked the RTC for another extension of the
period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his
motion to dismiss. The RTC issued an Order treating Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a demurrer to
evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his
right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision. Cabador filed
a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. The CA denied Cabador’s petition and affirmed the
lower court’s actions. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence
filed without leave of court?
HELD:
To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must
consider:
1. The allegations in it made in good faith;
2. The stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and
3. The primary objective of the party filing it.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's right to
speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of
the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. The fact is that Cabador
did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state what evidence the
prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of
the crime charged. His so-called demurrer did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He
cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally
made its formal offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Here, after the
prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits, the same day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court
still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on
the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since
Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the trial
court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had
intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
150
Claudio v. Saraza
FACTS: The case traces its roots to Civil Case No. 04-0661-CFM, for annulment of sale, power of attorney
and mortgage with prayer for damages filed before the RTC on September 28, 2004 by petitioners Mamerta
Lopez Claudio (Mamerta), Eduardo L. Claudio, Asuncion Claudio-Contegino (Asuncion), Ana Claudio-
Isulat, Dolores Claudio-Mabini, and Fermin L. Claudio (Fermin) against respondents Florentino Claudio
(Florentino) and Spouses Federico and Norma Saraza (Spouses Saraza).
The complaint alleged that Porfirio Claudio (Porfirio) and his wife, Mamerta, during their marriage, acquired
ten (10) parcels of land in Pasay City including the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 142989; that on June 18, 2004, Florentino made it appear that his parents, Porfirio and Mamerta Claudio,
sold to him the lot covered by TCT No. 142989 for P500,000.00 thru a deed of absolute sale sometime in
October 2003; that the said deed of sale was void because the signatures of the vendors were forged and there
was no consideration for the sale; that the signatures of petitioners Fermin and Asuncion appearing in the
same deed of sale, expressing their conformity to the conveyance, were likewise forged; and that
subsequently, Florentino sought the registration of the said property in his name before the Register of Deeds
of Pasay City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the Spouses’ demurrer to evidence
HELD:
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is filed after
the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the evidence,
which his adversary produced, is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue.
151
Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading Corporation
G.R. No. 191849 September 29, 2015 Perez, J.
FACTS: Felipe filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against MGM Motors, and Ayala
General Insurance Co.,. He claims that he purchased on installment basis a Nissan Terrano Wagon through
MGM Motors' authorized representative Jane Sarmiento. After it was delivered to him, he insured it with
Ayala Insurance. However, the vehicle was reportedly stolen while parked in Adriatico Street. As a result,
he tried to claim from Ayala Insurance but it was refused. During a negotiation, MGM and Felipe agreed to
the amount of 1,020,000 as full payment and as a consequence, Felipe’s mother issued a post dated check in
such amount but it bounced. A case for BP 22 was filed against Felipe’s mother. During the trial of this case,
Only two pieces of evidence were admitted by the trial court: (1) the Official Receipt dated 7 May 1998
issued by MGM Motors wherein it acknowledged receipt of P200,000.00 from petitioner; and (2) the
testimony of his father Alberto that he was present when petitioner paid P200,000.00 to MGM Motors. MGM
Motors and Ayala Insurance filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence. The RTC
granted it and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the demurrer to evidence was correctly granted?
HELD:
Yes. The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff has been able to
show that he is entitled to his claim, and it is incumbent upon the trial court judge to make such a
determination.
Well-established is the rule that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. There is no
dispute that the only pieces of evidence admitted in court are the testimony of Alberto and the receipt showing
MGM Motors receiving P200,000.00 from petitioner as partial payment of the subject car. The allegation
that the purchase of the vehicle was on an installment basis was not supported by any evidence. The receipt
of a partial payment does not suffice to prove that the purchase was made on an installment basis. Petitioner
did not present any document to prove said allegation while MGM Motors produced a sales invoice wherein
it was stated that the mode of payment is "COD" or cash on delivery.
In the same vein, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation against Ayala Insurance. Petitioner has the
burden of proof to show that a loss occurred and said loss was covered by his insurance policy. Considering
that the trial court only admitted two pieces of evidence in petitioner's favor and none of those tend to prove
loss of the subject car and coverage thereof under the insurance policy, petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs
he had prayed for.
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.
There is a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. The resolution
of a question of fact necessarily involves a calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and the relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations. It is for
this reason that this Court defers to the factual findings of a trial judge, who has had the distinct advantage
of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and determining from their demeanor whether they were
speaking or distorting the truth.
152
Macapagal – Arroyo v. People
FACTS: On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision annulling and setting aside the resolutions
issued by Sandiganbayan and granting petitioner’s respective demurrers, and dismissing the criminal case
against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.
On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the reconsideration of
the decision.
In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting of
the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival
of the charge against them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy.
Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove
the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well
as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the
crime of plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the charge; that to
sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the
accusation against her because the information did not necessarily include the crime of malversation; and
that even if the information did so, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the
re-opening of the case for that purpose. Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in
urging the Com1 to deny the motion for reconsideration.
In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was denied its
day in court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of
evidence in order to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the information
sufficiently included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations against them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions for certiorari were improper remedies in light of Section 23, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of their demurrer prior to the judgment
in the case either by appeal or by certiorari
HELD:
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of
a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion;
and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. It must be stressed
that a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Where the issue or question
involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision — not the jurisdiction of the court — the
same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.
153
RULE 34
Adolfo v. Adolfo
G.R. No. 201427 March 18, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition for judicial separation of
property against his estranged wife. Parties were married on November 26, 1966, the union bore one child;
that during the marriage, they acquired through conjugal funds real properties that later on the parties
separated due to irreconcilable differences. Since reunion was no longer feasible, petitioner suggested a
separation of the conjugal property, but respondent adamantly refused; that respondent denied petitioner's
co-ownership of the subject property, claiming the same as her paraphernal property; that several earnest
eﬀorts to amicably settle the matter between them proved unavailing; and that a judicial separation of
property is proper under the circumstances and pursuant to Article 135 (6) of the Family Code. Petitioner
thus prayed that judgment be rendered decreeing a separation of the conjugal property.
Respondent contended that she is the sole owner of the property which is her paraphernal property inherited
from her mother. That petitioner is lazy, gambler drunkard, wife abuser and neglectful father. Respondent
bought on installment a tricycle for the petitioner's use in business, but he kept the proceeds thereof to himself
and used the same in his gambling and drinking sprees; that respondent alone took the initiative to support
the family and found ways to take care of the daily needs of her child. One day, petitioner destroyed the roof
of the house that was then being built; that petitioner subsequently abandoned her and their child in 1968,
and transferred to Davao City where he took a mistress and begot four children by her; that in 1986, petitioner
returned to Cebu City seeking reconciliation with respondent; that respondent took petitioner back, but in
1987 they once more separated; that thereafter, respondent never again saw or heard from petitioner.
Civil Case No. MAN-2683, Respondent sold the property to her brother, her brother mortgaged it to DBP,
foreclosed and DBP sold it to the Garcias and the latter sold it to respondent with new TCT. Respondent
executed a deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons but refused to partition even Gingoyons paid the taxes and
selling expenses. That when the sale to the Gingoyons was made, the subject property constituted conjugal
property of her marriage with petitioner; when the Garcias executed the deed of sale, the subject property
became a conjugal asset; since petitioner did not sign the deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons as he was in
Davao at the time and knew nothing about the sale, the sale was null and void. RTC nullified the DOS.
Meanwhile during the pre-trial of Civil Case No. MAN-4821, respondent failed to file her answer. Then RTC
found that it’s a conjugal property and dismissed the case. Respondent appealed to CA. Decision was reversed
and set aside. Petitioner moved to reconsider but in a March 2, 2012 Resolution, he was rebuﬀed. Hence, the
present Petition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Order granting petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper.
HELD:
It stated that in a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there are no ostensible issues at all on account
of the defending party's failure to raise an issue in his answer, while in a proper case for summary judgment,
such issues exist, although they are sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown by affidavits, depositions or
admissions. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a
summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment
on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of
the failure of the defending party's answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary
judgment, issues apparently exist — i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet
no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the
answer — but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by
affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
154
RULE 35
Republic v. Shell Petroleum Corporation

G.R. No. 209324 December 9, 2015 Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: The Republic, represented by the Bureau of Customs (BOC), filed a collection suit in the RTC for
the payment of P10,088,912.00 still owed by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. (PSPC) after the invalidation
of the Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) assigned to it by Filipino Way Industries (FWI). PSPC filed a petition
for review with the CTA but it was denied. With the resumption of proceedings in the RTC, PSPC filed a
motion for summary judgment arguing that there is no basis for the Republic’s claim considering that the
subject TCC’s were already fully utilized for the payment of PSPC’s customs duties and taxes, that
Republic’s cause of action had already prescribed; and that PSPC is an innocent transferees/purchaser for
value. The RTC denied but on motion for reconsideration, it reversed its earlier ruling. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether Summary Judgment is proper in this case.
HELD:
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow
a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the
court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.35 Even if on their
face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such
issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law.
The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact.
For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial
as to constitute a genuine issue. Genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived.
155
COMGLASSCO Corporation v. Santos Car Check Center
FACTS: On August 16, 2000, respondent Santos Car Check Center Corporation (Santos), owner of a
showroom, leased out the said space to petitioner Comglasco Corporation (Comglasco), an entity engaged in
the sale, replacement and repair of automobile windshields, for a period of five years. On October 4, 2001,
Comglasco advised Santos through a letter that it was pre-terminating their lease contract effective December
1, 2001. Santos refused to accede to the pre-termination, reminding Comglasco that their contract was for
five years. On January 15, 2002, Comglasco vacated the leased premises and stopped paying any further
rentals. Santos sent several demand letters, which Comglasco completely ignored. On September 15, 2003,
Santos sent its final demand letter, which Comglasco again ignored. On October 20, 2003, Santos filed suit
for breach of contract.
Summons and a copy of the complaint, along with the annexes, were served on Comglasco on January 21,
2004, but it moved to dismiss the complaint for improper service. The RTC dismissed the motion and ordered
the summons served anew. On June 28, 2004, Comglasco filed its Answer. Santos moved for a judgment on
the pleadings, which the RTC granted. It held that Comglasco must pay Santos its unpaid rentals to fulfill its
obligations in the contract. On appeal, Petitioners question the CA upheld the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in allowing judgment on the pleadings
HELD:
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the
allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial
court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no
controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. Come to think of
it, under Rule 35, on Summary Judgments, Comglassco had recourse to move for summary judgment,
wherein it could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the parties’ lease, but it did not do
so.
156
Phil. Bank of Communications v. Go
FACTS: On September 30, 1999, respondent Jose C. Go obtained two loans from PBCom, evidenced by
two promissory notes, embodying his commitment to pay P17,982,222.22 for the first loan, and P80 million
for the second loan, within a ten-year period from September 30, 1999 to September 30, 2009. To secure the
two loans, Go executed two (2) pledge agreements, both dated September 29, 1999, covering shares of stock
in Ever Gotesco Resources and Holdings, Inc. The first pledge, valued at P27,827,122.22, was to secure
payment of the first loan, while the second pledge, valued at P70,155,100.00, was to secure the second loan.
Two years later, however, the market value of the said shares of stock plunged to less than P0.04 per share.
Thus, PBCom, as pledgee, notified Go in writing on June 15, 2001, that it was renouncing the pledge
agreements. Later, PBCom filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against Go and his wife, Elvy T. Go. PBCom alleged that Spouses Go defaulted on
the two (2) promissory notes, having paid only three (3) installments on interest payments covering the
months of September, November and December 1999. Consequently, the entire balance of the obligations of
Go became immediately due and demandable. PBCom made repeated demands upon Spouses Go for the
payment of said obligations, but the couple imposed conditions on the payment, such as the lifting of
garnishment effected by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Go’s accounts Spouses Go filed their
Answer with Counterclaim denying the material allegations in the complaint.
PBCom filed a verified motion for summary judgment stating that the Answer interposed no specific denials
on the material averments in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the complaint such as the fact of default, the entire amount
being already due and demandable because of default, and the fact that the bank had made repeated demands
for the payment of the obligations. Spouses Go opposed the motion for summary judgment arguing that they
had tendered genuine factual issues calling for the presentation of evidence. The RTC granted PBCom’s
motion in its judgment. The Spouses Go moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA in its decision
reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC and ordered the remand of the records to the court of origin
for trial on the merits. The CA disagreed with the conclusion of the RTC that the Spouses Go admitted several
paragraphs of the complaint. It found the supposed admissions insufficient to justify a rendition of summary
judgment in the case for sum of money, since there were other allegations and defenses put up by Spouses
Go in their Answer which raised genuine issues on the material FACTS in the action
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there exists a genuine issue as to material FACTS in the
action?
HELD:
The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to three material facts, which have to be addressed
during trial: first, the fact of default; second, the amount of the outstanding obligation, and third, the
existence of prior demand.
Under the Rules, following the filing of pleadings, if, on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, "except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law," summary judgment may be rendered.
“Genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is
no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves
for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or
that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly
no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.
157
RULE 36
FASAP v. PAL
G.R. No. 178083 July 22, 2008 Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: PAL contends that the October 2, 2009 resolution focused on an entirely new basis that of PAL's
supposed change in theory. It denies having changed its theory, however, and maintains that the reduction of
its workforce had resulted from a confluence of several events, like the flight expansion; the 1997 Asian
financial crisis; and the ALPAP pilots' strike.38 PAL explains that when the pilots struck in June 1998, it had
to decide quickly as it was then facing closure in 18 days due to serious financial hemorrhage; hence, the
strike came as the final blow.
In its comment, FASAP counters that a second motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading; that
PAL failed to prove that it had complied with the requirements for a valid retrenchment by not submitting its
audited financial statements; that PAL had immediately terminated the employees without prior resort to less
drastic measures; and that PAL did not observe any criteria in selecting the employees to be retrenched.
FASAP stresses that the October 4, 2011 resolution recalling the September 7, 2011 decision was void for
failure to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the participation of Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona who later on inhibited from G.R. No. 178083 had further voided the proceedings; that the
1987 Constitution did not require that a case should be raffled to the Members of the Division who had
previously decided it; and that there was no error in raffling the case to Justice Brion, or, even granting that
there was error, such error was merely procedural.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution dated October 4, 2011 in A.M. NO. 11-10-1-sc (recalling the
September 7, 2011 Resolution) void for failure to comply with Section 14, Rule VIII of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
It is argued that the assailed Resolutions in the present cases have already become final, since
a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon
express leave first obtained; and that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable, however unjust the result of error may appear.
The contention, however, misses an important point. The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only
to final and executory decisions. Since the present cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-
ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be considered
unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final.
158
RULE 37
159
Mendezona v. Ozamis
G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002 De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS: A deed of sale with usufructuary rights dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamis, then 86
years old, in favor of petitioners, her nephews, was sought to be annulled by private respondents alleging that
the same was simulated for absence of consideration and that the vendor was not in full possession of her
faculties during its execution. Nine (9) other important documents signed either before or after April 28, 1989
were, however, not assailed by respondents. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. It held
that the property was sold under a valid contract, voluntarily and deliberately entered into while the vendor
was of sound mind, for sufficient and good consideration without force or undue influence. The trial court
found that it was unfair for respondents to claim unsoundness of mind of the vendor when it benefits them
and otherwise when it disadvantages them. On appeal, the trial court's decision was reversed. It found that
there was no consideration, as petitioners failed to present the checks evidencing payment and that at the time
of the execution of the document, the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamis were already seriously impaired.
Petitioners moved for a new trial and/or reception of evidence claiming that RTC Judge Durias whose name
had cropped up as possible witness as early as the pre-trial of the case, could testify as to the mental condition
of the vendor. This was denied.
It was held that an evidence already existing as early as the pre-trial conference cannot be considered as a
newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial; that a notarized document duly acknowledged before a
notary public has in its favor the presumption of regularity, admissible in evidence without further proof of
its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit; and that a person is presumed to be of sound mind at
any particular time and the condition is presumed to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Judge Durias may be considered as newly discovered evidence
HELD:
A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there
is concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the
evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of
such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the
evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.
We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-
trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the
defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of
suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness. Neither
can Judge Durias' testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be
testified to by Judge Durias which were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by
the petitioners at the trial below.
160
Chua v. People
G.R. No. 196853 July 13, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were long-time friends and neighbors. On different
dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of varying amounts to See.
However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due to insufficient
funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the checks. Hence, See filed on
December 23, 1993 a Complaint for violations of BP 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City. On April 25, 1994, the prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing of charges against
Chua. Accordingly, 54 counts of violation of BP 22 were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. During the course of the trial, the prosecution formally offered as its
evidence the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 marked as Exhibit "B." Chua, however, objected to its
admissibility on the grounds that it is a mere photocopy and that it does not bear any proof that he actually
received it. In view of these, Chua filed on April 14, 1999 a Motion to Submit Demurrer to Evidence.8 Per
Chua's allegation, however, the MeTC failed to act on his motion since the judge of said court vacated his
post.
Later, the defense, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. It again pointed out that the demand
letter dated December 10, 1993 attached to See's affidavit-complaint is a mere photocopy and not
accompanied with a Post Office Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. At any rate, it argued that
while the November 30, 1993 demand letter contains Chua's signature, the same should not be given any
probative value since it does not contain the date when he allegedly received the same. Hence, there is simply
no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period that the law affords an issuer to make good the check from
the date of his notice of its dishonor
The MeTC denied the defense's Demurrer to Evidence and Motion for Reconsideration on January 12, 2007
and May 23, 2007 respectively. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the MeTC upon Chua’s
appeal. Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Chua argued against the probative value of the demand letter dated
November 30, 1993 by pointing out that: (1) for more than 10 years from the time the case was filed, the
prosecution never adverted to its existence. He thus surmised that this was because the document was not
really missing but in fact inexistent - a mere afterthought as to make it appear that the second element of the
offense is obtaining in the case; (2) the subject demand letter is not a newly discovered evidence as it could
have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence; and, (3) his counsel's admission of the
physical existence of the subject demand letter and Chua's signature thereon does not carry with it the
admission of its contents and his receipt of the same. The CA also followed the decision of the lower courts
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it considered the demand letter dated 30
NOVEMBER 1993 as a newly-discovered evidence
HELD:
The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the
evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the
latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece
of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so
much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the
knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable
diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due
diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the
phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In other words, the
concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The movant for a new trial
must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably
and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to
obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.
161
Padilla – Rumbaua v. Rumbaua
FACTS: Petitioner (Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
the respondent (Edward Rumbaua) before the RTC on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Republic
of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition. The
Regional Trial Court nullified the marriage of the petitioner but on appeal to the CA by the OSG, the CA
reversed the ruling of the RTC and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage. The petitioner moved to
reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion. Hence, this petition. The petitioner prays, among
others, that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings; in the event the Court cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set
aside and the RTC’s decision be reinstated. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the
fault of her former counsel, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary
insufficiencies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the remand of the case for reception of additional evidence should be allowed.
HELD:
No. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally
proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment
or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for
new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could
not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights
have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved
party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as
basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for
declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in handling the
case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a
new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted
as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could
be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or
learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view
to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.
162
Senit v. People
G.R. No. 192914 January 11, 2016 Reyes, J.
FACTS: Petitioner (Napoleon Senit) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an Amended Information which was filed with Branch 10 of the
RTC in Malaybalay City. Such information stemmed from a collision of the Super Five Nissan Bus driven
by the petitioner and the Toyota pick-up vehicle owned and driven by private respondent Toor, Sr., with his
wife, son and housemaid riding with him. Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned. Trial thereafter
ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from his
employment and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was not presented
as a witness by his new counsel. The RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the petitioner of the
crime charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not a motion for new trial or to re-open the case to allow the petitioner to present evidence
should be allowed?
HELD:
No. No errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the substantial rights of the petitioner, have been
committed during trial. The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites
are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it
would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it."
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the motion for
new trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial. The Court
believes that the petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this opportunity into
waste by not being diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal case against him and inform his
counsel of his whereabouts.
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already terminated resulting to his failure to
attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cases that:
It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case.
It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and
cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is also its
responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for them.
163
People v. Li Ka Kim
G.R. No. 148586 May 25, 2004 Vitug, J.
FACTS: The Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID) of PNP-Region IV received a report
from an informer, named "Boy," that a certain alias "Ed," known to be a drug dealer operating in the southern
part of Metro Manila, was looking for a buyer of shabu. PO2 Trambulo, an officer of RIID, made initial
contact with Ed through a phone call using Boy’s cellular phone. Boy introduced PO2 Trambulo to Ed as
"Rollie," a buyer of shabu. The parties agreed to meet at a mall in Parañaque City. The buy-bust operation
was successfully carried-out where Ed was arrested. An Information was then filed against Ed for violation
of R.A. 6425, as amended.
Acting upon advice of counsel, Ed did not enter any plea during his arraignment; the court was thus
constrained to enter a plea of "not guilty" in his behalf. At the trial, PO2 Trambulo pointed to Ed as being the
seller of the confiscated shabu and positively identified the brown paper bag given to him by Ed containing
the prohibited drug which he marked "CVT.” On the other hand, Ed denied the allegations. The RTC
convicted Ed and decreed the penalty of death. It debunked Ed’s defense of denial. The court found it hard
to believe that Ed would be singled out by the police officers from scores of people at the mall. The court
likewise noted that the car, as well as the license plate, used by Ed had been stolen, and that he was an
undocumented alien as so shown by the letter of the Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation to the
State Prosecutor. Ed then filed a motion to remand the case for new trial. In his motion, he asked for a new
trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, because of newly discovered evidence,
i.e., his passport which would establish his true identity as Huang Xiao Wei, a Chinese National, and as
having entered the Philippines as a tourist.
ISSUE: Whether or not the passport can be considered as newly discovered evidence as a ground for new
trial
HELD:
NO. The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative,
or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.
Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Ed’s passport could have easily been presented and produced
during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of his passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the
case. Ed was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most
importantly, Ed even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei, that bolsters
the conclusion that he deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise. Also, the totality of
evidence presented is convincing and points to Ed as being a person engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. The
testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying him to be a seller of illegal drugs appears to be categorical
and unfabricated.
164
RULES 40 - 45
165
Heirs of Arturo Garcia v. Municipality of Iba
FACTS: The late Melecio Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in
Poblacion, Iba, Zambales. Bueno brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of
Iba, Province of Zambales, claiming that in 1983, the Municipality of Iba had constructed the public market
on a substantial portion of his land without his consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality
of Iba to vacate the property had remained unheeded. The MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. The Municipality
of Iba then filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied the same. The Municipality of Iba thus filed its
petition for certiorari in the RTC of Iba, Zambales to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The RTC
granted the petition for certiorari. The herein petitioners-heirs, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon his
death, moved for the reconsideration of the judgment granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC denied
the same.
Aggrieved, the Heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. The CA dismissed the petition for review for not being the proper mode of appeal. It observed that the
assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The Heirs filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, the present case. Although admitting that their
petition for review under Rule 42 was inappropriate, the Heirs maintain that they substantially complied with
the requirements of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, and pray that the Court exercise its equity jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Petition for Review under Rule 42, despite being an improper remedy, may be
treated as an Ordinary Appeal under Rule 41?
HELD:
The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or
lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition
for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to
seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first
instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a
court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its
discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or not.
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have always looked at appeal as not
a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners should
have faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited their
privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly
invoked only in cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases
like now where a liberal application would directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the
utter disregard of the Rules of Court.
166
Estinozo v. CA
G.R. No. 150276 February 12, 2008 Nachura, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Estinozo while in Sogod, Southern Leyte, represented to private complainants
Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and
Mariza Florendo that she was one of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting
workers to be sent abroad. She then asked from the said complainants the payment of placement and
processing fees totaling P15,000.00.Private complainants paid the fees, went with petitioner to Manila. On
the promised date of their departure, however, private complainants never left the country. Came November
1986 and still they were not deployed.
Complainants then filed seven separate Informations for Estafa against petitioner with the RTC of Maasin,
Southern Leyte. On request of petitioner, the cases were consolidated and jointly heard by the trial
court.During the trial, in her defense, petitioner testified, among others, that she was an employee of the COA
who worked as a part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment Agency owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez; that she
received the amounts claimed by the complainants and remitted the same to Ramirez; that complainants
actually transacted with Ramirez and not with her and that she was only forced to execute the promissory
notes.
On November 9, 1994, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of estafa.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.On May 30,
2001, within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review,
petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 28, 2001, the CA, in the its Resolution, denied the said motion pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA but the appellate
court denied the same, on August 17, 2001. Displeased with this series of denials, petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing all the issuances of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy availed of by
the petitioner.
HELD:
No. The petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate court’s issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order
or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review on certiorari. Considering that, in this case,
appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil
action for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is
no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The
nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those
questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal,
not certiorari as a special civil action.
167
Heirs of Sps. Reterta v. Spouses Mores
FACTS: The Heirs of Reterta filed an action for quieting of title and reconveyance against the Spouses
Mores in the RTC of Trece Martires City averring that they were the true owners of such land having inherited
the same from their father who has been granted the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation and for
the continuous possession by him and his predecessors-in-interest of the land. They also assert that they only
discovered of an affidavit purportedly signed by their father waiving his rights, interests and participation in
the land in favor of one Lorenzo Mores. Spouses Mores filed a Motion to Dismiss against their complain
citing lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the land, the same being a friar land and not part of public domain,
the rightful jurisdiction is with the Director of Lands. The RTC granted such motion. The Heirs timely filed
their MR but it was denied. Therefore, the Heirs assailed such dismissal via petition for certiorari under R65.
The CA affirmed such decision stating that the heirs still have the remedy of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was the correct remedy.
HELD:
The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available
notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition
for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded
that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the
petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or
other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court
has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable
damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his
judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is
involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient
ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or
an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A
remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not
mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside
for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.
168
Manaloto v. Veloso III
G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: A complaint for Breach of Contract and damages was filed on RTC Quezon City by respondents
against petitioners, due to the plaintiffs distribution of the MeTC decision on the homeowners of Horseshoe
Village where the respondent lives in an earlier case of Unlawful detainer between respondents and plaintiff,
despite respondent filing an appeal to the RTC, which case the respondent embarrassment and humiliation.
RTC dismiss the complaint for violating the rules against splitting of casuse of action, lack of jurisdiction,
and failure to disclose the pendency of a related case, which the respondent received on September 26, 2003.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 10, 2003, which was denied, such order of denial
was received by respondent on February 20, 2004. Hence, respondent filed a Notice of appeal on March 1,
2004, which the RTC dismiss the respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time.
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 27 order dismissing his appeal on April 30, 2004 and he
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the same on May 3, 2004. The RTC, in another Order dated May 31,
2004, granted respondent's latest motion. Court of Appeals agree with the RTC that the appeal was filed out
of time, however modified the order of the RTC which states that petitioners were indeed liable to respondent
for damages which led to the petitioner to file a petition for review.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the filing of the Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period
2. Whether or not the fresh period rule can be applied retroactive?
HELD:
1. No. Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule," according to which, an ordinary appeal from
the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt
of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
A party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the final order denying his motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3.
In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-
Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days
thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-
Branch 227 denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which
the respondent received on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the
order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under
the fresh period rule, respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days,
and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610
2. Yes. The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when
Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules
are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
169
Latorre v. Latorre
G.R. No. 183926 March 29, 2010 Nachura, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Generosa Latorre filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Collection
and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own son, Luis
Esteban Latorre, and one Ifzal Ali. Petitioner averred that, respondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of
Lease over a 1,244-square meter real property, situated at Makati City. Under the said contract, respondent,
as lessor, declared that he was the absolute and registered owner of the subject property. Petitioner alleged
that respondent's declaration therein was erroneous because she and respondent were co-owners of the subject
property in equal shares. Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal
because the dispute was clearly between petitioner and respondent. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent,
stating that the case filed by the plaintiff involves recovery of possession of a real property situated at Makati
City, the same should have been filed and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly,
has jurisdiction to hear the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Hence, this Petition, claiming that
the RTC erred in treating the venue as jurisdiction and in treating petitioner's complaint as a real action.
Petitioner came directly to the Supreme Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation
to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was correct in going directly to the Supreme Court?
HELD:
This Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1)
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45,
is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given
to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a
question of fact.
170
Spouses Alfredo v. Borras
G.R. No. 144225 June 17, 2003 Carpio, J.
FACTS: Sps. Alfredo were the registered owners of the land in issue. They mortgaged said property for Php
7,000 with the DBP. To pay the debt, Sps. Alfredo sold the land to Sps. Borras for P 15,000, the buyers to
pay the DBP loan and its interest and the balance to be paid in cash to the sellers. Sps. Borras took possession
of the land, but later found out that Sps. Alfredo likewise sold the property to several buyers in January 1994.
On March 7, 1994, sps. Borras filed a complaint for specific performance against Godofredo before RTC
Bataan. The RTC ruled in favor of the sps. Borras and was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the factual findings of the court are well supported by evidence. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petition may be given due course
HELD:
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of
facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater
force when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual findings.
For the first time, petitioners, sps Alfredo contends that they did not deliver the title of the subject land to
sps. Boras. The CA could have passed upon this issue had petitioners raised this earlier. It is not necessary
that the seller himself deliver the title of the property to the buyer because the thing sold is understood as
delivered when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.
Also, petitioners involve the absence of approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to nullify the sale. Petitioners never raised this issue before the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.
171
People v. Corpuz
G.R. No. 148198 October 1, 2003 Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: Information: The accused was charged with the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing
that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same
casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and
as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men’s necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale,
and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to
meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him,
but to no avail.
Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant. However, he admitted obtaining
a loan from sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt
was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject
pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming (with modification) the judgment of conviction against
her, despite the prosecution's failure to prove her guilt of the crime of Estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses
and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and
monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the
trial court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.
The Supreme Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
The petitioner contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were
supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by
private complainant. This argument is untenable. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money
or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material
ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
172
PAL v. CA
G.R. No. 127473 December 8, 2003 Austria – Martinez, J.
FACTS: Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 53), Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a
complaint for damages against petitioner. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence
presented by private respondents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment
of the trial court in toto and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition of
PAL, petitioner arguing that while ordinarily, the findings of the CA are accepted as conclusive by this Court,
there are instances when the Court may make its own findings such as when the appellate court based its
findings on speculation, surmises or conjectures
Petitioner invokes exception (b). The truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality
of their testimonies. In the present case, it cannot be said that the quality of the testimony of petitioner’s lone
witness is greater than those of the private respondents. Fojas testified that when respondents went to the
check-in counter, there were no more persons in that area since all the passengers already boarded the plane.
However, the testimonies of Manuel Baltazar and Judy Amor point to the fact that many passengers were not
able to board said flight, including confirmed passengers, because of overbooking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling
HELD:
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only
questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the appellate
court are generally binding on us especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court. This
is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. However, this general rule
admits of exceptions, to wit:
a. where there is grave abuse of discretion;
b. when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
c. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
d. when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts;
e. when the factual findings are conflicting;
f. when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
g. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and,
h. where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are
not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
It is a well-entrenched principle that absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any palpable error
in its findings, this Court will not question the probative weight accorded by the lower courts to the various
evidence presented by the parties. As we explained in Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs. ICC Leasing &
FinancingCorporation:
173
Augusto v. Risos
G.R. No. 131794 December 10, 2003 Calleja, Sr., J.
FACTS: Felisa Augusto and her siblings, were the co- owners of a parcel of land located in Barrio Mactan,
Opon, Cebu. On April 20, 1961,Felisa, Jose, Magdalena and Alfonso, all surnamed Augusto, sold the
property to Guillermo Omolon for P200.00. Guillermo Omolon and his wife, Cleofe Omolon, caused the
aforesaid document to be registered in the Office of the City Assessor of Lapu-Lapu City. Guillermo Omolon
died intestate and was survived by Cleofe Omolon. Sometime in July 1995, Cleofe Omolon filed a petition
for the reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 4429, before the RTC and on January 10, 1997, the RTC
granted the same. However, upon presentation of the aforesaid order to the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Lapu- Lapu City, Cleofe was informed that the owner’s copy had already been issued to Ruben Augusto,
pursuant to an Order issued by the court dated August 23, 1996, and that based on the record, the same was
in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival. Hence, on May 14, 1997, Cleofe filed a petition before the RTC,
alleging that as lawful co-owner and possessor of Lot No. 4429, she had every right to have and hold the
owner’s duplicate of the said OCT. She prayed that after due proceedings, the respondents Ruben Augusto
and Atty. Noel Archival be ordered to surrender the owner’s copy of the said title: In their Comment on the
petition, therein respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival alleged, inter alia, that the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Felisa, Magdalena, Alfonso and Jose, all surnamed Augusto, was falsified and
fictitious, and, thus, null and void.
On October 22, 1997, the RTC issued an order directing Atty. Noel Archival to produce the owner’s copy of
OCT No. 3560 within 10 days to allow the annotation of Cleofe’s interest, upon which the owner’s duplicate
copy of the title may thereafter be returned. The respondents therein filed a “Motion for a Partial
Reconsideration” of the Order alleging that Cleofe’s interest over the property had been sufficiently protected
by the annotation of her adverse claim. The court issued an Order denying the motion of the respondents
therein. On November 26, 1997, the respondents filed a notice of appeal from the said order to the Court of
Appeals. On December 5, 1997, the RTC issued an order denying due course therefor, on its perception that
the orders subject thereof were interlocutory; hence, not appealable.
ISSUE: Whether the October 22, 1997 Order was final and appealable.
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final order, and
not from an interlocutory one. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates
a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined. An order or judgment is deemed final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the
rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate
branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no issue is left for future
consideration, except the fact of compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final and appealable.
In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.
174
Escueta v. Lim
G.R. No. 137162 January 24, 2007 Azcuna, J.
FACTS: Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property, with
preliminary injunction and issuance of [a hold-departure order] from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio
and the heirs of Baloloy. As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots
have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a simulated deed of sale involving
said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor; and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta
has raised doubts and clouds over respondent’s title. In their separate amended answers, petitioners denied
the material allegations of the complaint. The Baloloys failed to appear at the pre-trial. Upon motion of
respondent, the trial court declared the Baloloys in default. They then filed a motion to lift the order declaring
them in default, which was denied by the trial court in an order. Consequently, respondent was allowed to
adduce evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a partial decision. The judgment is rendered in
favor of [respondent] and against [petitioners, heirs] of Luz R. Baloloy. Atty. ArsenioVillalon, Jr., the former
counsel of record of the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision on April 5, 1994. On July 4, 1994,
the Baloloys, through their new counsel, filed a petition for relief from judgment which was denied by the
trial court for being filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment was filed beyond the reglementary period
HELD:
Yes. The 60-day period for filing a petition for annulment of judgment is reckoned from the time the party
acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same.
Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either of
the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken;
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of
action or defense, as the case may be.
There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above rule. the 60-day period is reckoned from
the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment, or proceedings and not from the date he
actually read the same.The evidence on record as far as this issue is concerned shows that Atty.
ArsenioVillalon, Jr., the former counsel of record of the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision
dated June 23, 1993 on April 5, 1994. At that time, said former counsel is still their counsel of record. The
reckoning of the 60-day period therefore is the date when the said counsel of record received a copy of the
partial decision which was on April 5, 1994. The petition for relief was filed by the new counsel on July 4,
1994 which means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30 days beyond the 60-day period. Moreover, the
records further show that the Baloloys received the partial decision on September 13, 1993 as evidenced by
Registry return cards which bear the numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr. Alejandrino Baloloy.
The Baloloys, apparently in an attempt to cure the lapse of the aforesaid reglementary period to file a petition
for relief from judgment, included in its petition the two Orders dated May 6, 1994 and June 29, 1994. The
first Order denied Baloloys’ motion to fix the period within which plaintiffs-appellants pay the balance of
the purchase price. The second Order refers to the grant of partial execution, i.e. on the aspect of damages.
These Orders are only consequences of the partial decision subject of the petition for relief, and thus, cannot
be considered in the determination of the reglementary period within which to file the said petition for relief.
175
Springfield Development Corp. v. RTC Judge of Misamis Oriental
G.R. No. 142628 February 6, 2007 Austria – Martinez, J.
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issue
presented for resolution is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to annul final judgment
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Petra Capistrano Piit and Springfield
owned a lot which the DAR placed it as a property under the coverage of RA. 6657 (CARP). After DARAB
gave due course to the Notice of Coverage, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC
of Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision and all its subsequent proceedings.
The RTC issued an Order dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to annul the judgment of DARAB
2. Whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA.
HELD:
1. NO. The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A.
No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure adopted on December 26,1988 specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of
its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, award or ruling by the
Board or its Adjudicators on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof,
to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding section.
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator
appealed from, shall be immediately executory.
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the
DARAB decisions to the CA. The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of
certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of
rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-
equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in
sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995,
as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.
2. No. As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does
not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee
Farms, Inc. v. Semillano,30 the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts." This was reiterated in Galang v. Court of
Appeals,31where the Court ruled that that the CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
annulment of judgment of a final decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Recent
rulings on similar cases involving annulments of judgments of quasi-judicial bodies are also quite
instructive on this matter.
176
Yuk Ling Ong v. Co
FACTS: Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin Co, a Filipino
citizen, were married in the Philippines. Respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity before the RTC. Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa
Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. The RTC issued summons. In his Server’s Return,
process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the
copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The
said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer. The RTC found respondent’s
marriage with petitioner as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. It stated that summons was served on petitioner on August 1, 2002, but she failed to file her
responsive pleading within the reglementary period. The public prosecutor also stated that there were no
indicative facts to manifest collusion. Thus, the RTC concluded that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
before the CA claiming that she was never notified of the cases filed against her. She prayed that the RTC
decision be nullified on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. CA found the petition for
annulment of judgment to be devoid of merit. It held that there was no sufficient proof to establish that
respondent employed fraud to insure petitioner’s non-participation in the trial of the aforementioned case.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment by the RTC rendered without acquiring jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant can be annulled under Rule 47?
HELD:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly
provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to
reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the
burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the
courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves
the service of summons or other processes on the petitioner.
Since there was no valid service of summons upon the petitioner, the RTC’s decision must be voided for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The favorable judgment enjoyed by respondent cannot be
categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought against an adversary, who was ignorant of the existing
dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision must also be undone.
177
De Vera v. Santiago
G.R. No. 179457 June 22, 2015 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Wilfredo De Vera, et al. filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or possession with damages
against Santiago, et al. before the MTC alleging that they have allegedly been in actual and continuous
possession and occupation of their respective portions of the land since 1967, without disturbance from any
third person. Later on, however, they discovered that their respective lots covered by Lot 7303 were already
covered by Free Patent Titles in the names of Santiago which were acquired through manipulation,
misrepresentation, fraud and deceit. In their Answer, Santiago, et al. specifically denied the material
allegations in petitioners' complaint and countered that they are the owners of the land. MTC ruled in favor
of Santiago. On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MTC.
Santiago filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA granted the
petition for review, and annulled and set aside the Decisions of both the RTC and the MTC on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction (the assessed value of the land is more than 20,000 and therefore the CA ruled that the
MTC had no jurisdiction when it took first cognizance of the case and consequently, the RTC cannot render
a valid judgment when the case was appealed to it). For the same reason, the CA declined to resolve and
deemed as moot and academic the other factual issues raised in the petition. The CA also ruled that assuming
arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case, it nonetheless has no authority to declare as null and
void the Original Certificates of Title (Free Patents) registered in the name of respondents because the said
titles were issued four (4) years prior to the filing of the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance. The CA
denied De Vera's motion for reconsideration of its Decision. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in annulling the decision of RTC for lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
Thus, while the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case for reconveyance and
recovery of ownership and possession of a land with an assessed value over P20,000.00, the same cannot be
said of its ruling with respect to the RTC. Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, if the MTC tried a
case on the merits despite having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on
appeal by the RTC.
The Court explained that the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of
dismissal issued without trial of the case on the merits, while the second paragraph deals with an appeal from
an order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the same ground
for dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. Verily, the second paragraph refutes respondents' contention that
Section 8, Rule 40 refers solely to cases where the MTC dismissed a case filed therein without a trial on the
merits and an appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of dismissal. Therefore, the RTC correctly
proceeded to decide the case on the merits despite the MTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
178
PNCC v. Asiavest
G.R. No. 172301 August 19, 2015 Leonen, J.
FACTS: PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an
associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into
contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia.
PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the
due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction
contracts and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC. These contracts were understood to
be governed by the laws of Malaysia. There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction
contract, prompting the State of Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's
performance bonds. It "entered into a compromise agreement with the State of Pahang by paying the reduced
amount. Consequently, the corporation demanded indemnity from PNCC by demanding the amount it paid
to the State of Pahang. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of
money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian laws. PNCC
filed Motions for extension of time to file its Answer on May 18, 1994, June 2, 1994, and June 17, 1994. The
trial court granted these motions, with the last one set to expire on July 3, 1994. On July 4, 1994, PNCC filed
a Motion for another five-day extension.
The trial court denied this Motion on July 13, 1994. On July 27, 1994, the trial court declared PNCC in
default for failure to file any responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to
present its evidence ex parte. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad. On January 30, 1995, the trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default. It
also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively
cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the two Malaysian corporations,
Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. and Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd., should have been impleaded as parties
HELD:
No. Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court enumerates the required contents of an appellant's brief. In
paragraph (e), the appellant's brief must include "[a] clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law
to be submitted to the court for its judgment.
Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient. This doctrine applies in conflicts of
law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the most
convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. It is a device "designed to frustrate illicit
means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation
(or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
179
Maravilla v. Rios
G.R. No. 196875 August 19, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: In 2003, respondent Joseph Rios filed a criminal case against petitioner Teddy Maravilla for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries before the MTCC The MTCC ruled in favor of
petitioner and acquitted him Upon appeal the RTC affirmed the MTCC decision but ordered petitioner to pay
P256k in actual and compensatory damages Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition because it was defective in substance for:
1. failing to incorporate a written explanation why the preferred personal mode of filing under Section
11, Rule 13 was not availed of; and
2. Some relevant and pertinent pleadings and documents, which are necessary for a better
understanding and resolution of the instant petition, were not attached therein
Petitioner’s MR was denied because while he attached to his motion certain portions of the record of the case,
petitioner still failed to comply with Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. There are allegations
in the petition that draw support from the transcripts of stenographic notes, formal offer of evidence by the
respondent, and the Order of the trial court that admitted said formal offer of evidence. The petitioner,
however, had not appended the aforesaid documents to the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the R42 petition due to technicalities
HELD:
Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for review shall be
accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition. Section 3 of the same rule states that failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the requirements regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that there are three guideposts in determining the necessity of
attaching pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under Rules 42 and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which
are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will
support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of
grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown
that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the
material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a
certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or
reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that
it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect that the
significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is whether the accompanying documents
support the allegations of the petition.
180
Fortune Life Insurance v. COA
G.R. No. 213525 November 21, 2017 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a MOA
concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former
obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher
to COA-Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic
Act No. 7160. Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. The COA denied the petition,
holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the LGC only municipal or city governments are expressly
vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s
failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of the Government Procurement
Reform Act. The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision and filed its motion for reconsideration.
However, the COA denied the motion. Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12,
2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on
August 19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and
verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents
.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 was filed within the reglementary period
following the fresh period rule under Neypes Doctrine.
HELD:
A second motion for reconsideration, albeit prohibited, may be entertained in the higher interest of justice,
such as when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous but also patently unjust and potentially
capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the moving party. The showing of
exceptional merit to justify the acceptance of the petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration was not
made herein. Hence, we deny the Second Motion for Reconsideration.
For sure, the petitioner's non-compliance with the rule on proof of service and the petitioner's unjustified
reliance on the Fresh Period Rule as the basis to extend the period for filing of the special civil actions
for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court were already enough ground to dismiss the petition
for certiorari. We need not remind that the Fresh Period Rule applies only to appeals in civil and criminal
cases, and in special proceedings filed under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45, and Rule 122.
Hence, liberality could not be extended to the petitioner. According to Ginete v. Court of Appeals, only
matters of life, liberty, honor or property may warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory
character. That is not the situation of the petitioner herein. It is also true that other justifications may be
considered, like: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (5) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. But, again, the petitioner has not shown the attendance of any of such
justifications for excepting its petition for certiorari from the stricture of timeliness of filing.
181
RULE 38
182
The Prov. Gov’t of Aurora v. Marco
G.R. No. 202331 April 22, 2015 Leonen, J.
FACTS: This factual milieu of this case revolves on the validity of the appointment of Hilario Marco made
by former Governor Ramoncita Ong, further affirmed by the CSC through its resolutions. The Province, filed
before the CSC a Petition for Relief on the ground of extrinsic fraud. According to him, the CSC deprived
the Province of an opportunity to be heard when it failed to implead the Province as an indispensable
party. He reiterated that Marco's appointment was void since the Province had no funds to pay for Marco's
salaries.
The CSC denied outright the Petition for Relief in the Resolution and ruled that Provincial Administrator
Ocampo had no legal personality to file the Petition for Relief absent an authorization from the Provincial
Governor. Moreover, a petition for relief was not allowed under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service. Thus, Provincial Administrator Ocampo erred in filing a Petition for Relief. Provincial
Administrator Ocampo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, this time with a written authority to file from
Governor Bellafior Angara-Castillo annexed to the Motion. The Civil Service Commission denied the Motion
for Reconsideration in the Resolution. It ruled that its April 14, 2008 Resolution had become final and
executory considering that the Province did not file a motion for reconsideration of this Resolution within
the reglementary period. Consequently, Marco requested the Civil Service Commission to implement the
Resolution; the Commission granted Marco's request. Provincial Administrator Ocampo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Quash "Execution," arguing that the April 14, 2008 Resolution had already
been implemented. As the Civil Service Commission had ordered, the Province reflected the April 14, 2008
Resolution.in Marco's appointment papers and in his Service Record.
In the Resolution, the CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash "Execution." It
noted that the Province still refused to reinstate Marco despite the April 14, 2008 Resolution and thus clarified
that this Resolution necessarily resulted in the approval of Marco's appointment and his reinstatement as
Cooperative Development Specialist II. A Petition for Review under Rule 43 with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order was filed before the Court of Appeals. For the first time, the Province argued that
Marco was a midnight appointee since Governor Ong appointed him during the last five (5) days of her
tenure. Therefore, Marco's appointment was void. In the Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition
for Review and affirmed the implementation of the Civil Service Commission's April 14, 2008 Resolution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the April 14, 2008 Resolution already became final and executory since there
was no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period. Although the Province filed a Petition
for Relief before the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeals held that the remedy of a petition for
relief is not allowed under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Moreover, the
Province failed to prove the extrinsic fraud that allegedly prevented it from filing a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the Civil Service Commission correctly denied the Petition for Relief. The Province
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution. The Province filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court.
ISSUE: Whether the Resolution dated July 6, 2010, which ordered the implementation of the April 14, 2008
Resolution, was void for varying the terms of the April 14, 2008 Resolution
HELD:
The rule prohibiting appeals from orders of execution is based on the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments. Under this doctrine, a final and executory judgment "is removed from the power and jurisdiction
of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke it." The judgment remains
immutable even if it is later on discovered to be erroneous. The doctrine "is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the
courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law. To allow courts to amend final [and executory]
judgments will result in endless litigation." The doctrine of immutability of final judgments applies to
decisions rendered by the Civil Service Commission.
183
Thomasites Center for International Studies v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 203642 January 27, 2016 Reyes, J.
FACTS: On July 29, 2004, Rodriguez, 34, Rillera, 36, and Padrigon, 30, all graduates of the University of
the Philippines and holders of teaching licenses from the Professional Regulation Commission, were hired
by Dr. Jae Won Park and Dr. Cheol Je Cho (Dr. Cho), Korean nationals and President and Academic Dean,
respectively, of TCIS. The parties executed no written contracts but the respondents were promised a monthly
salary of P25,000.00 plus shares of stock. As soon after classes opened on December 20, 2004 at the Crown
Peak Hotel in Subic Bay, disagreements arose between the respondents and the American teachers on the
question of salaries. At the meeting called by Dr. Cho on January 7, 2005, the American teachers threatened
to resign unless the respondents were terminated On May 8, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision
finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed, and directed TCIS and Dr. Cho to reinstate them with
full back wages in the total amount of P1,125,000.00, plus 10% as attorney's fees. Dr. Cho received a copy
of the decision on June 21, 2006. On February 19, 2007, TCIS re-filed its petition for relief, with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, before the NLRC. It claimed that the LA
did not acquire jurisdiction over it since the summons and notices were addressed to Dr. Cho, who did not
represent TCIS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Relief is tenable.
HELD:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there
is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be
either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented
by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot
avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for
relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing a petition for relief from judgment
must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period
of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these
periods is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the
State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order
or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.
184
RULE 47
185
Diona v. Balanque
G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: The Balangues, obtained a loan secured by a real estate mortgage from Diona. Upon their default
in their obligation despite demand, Diona filed a complaint against them. The RTC ruled in favor of Diona.
Thereafter petitioner filed a motion for execution, alleging that the Balangues failed to timely appeal.
However, the Balanguesfiled a Motion to Set Aside Judgment alleging that not all of them were served with
summons. Nevertheless, the RTC granted the motion for execution and imposed 5% monthly interest. The
Balangues filed a motion to correct/amend judgment, alleging that in their agreement with Diona, the latter
only demands for 12% per annum, and not 5% monthly. The same motion was granted by the RTC.
This prompted Diona to file a petition for certiorari via Rule 65. The appellate court held that the RTC
exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest and at the same time, acted with grave abuse
of discretion when it subsequently reduced the rate of interest to 12% per annum. The Balangues then
subsequently filed a petition for annulment of judgment and execution sale with damages with the CA,
contending that the obligation did not carry any interest as it was merely a verbal agreement. The CA initially
denied the petition but on the Balangues’ motion, it reinstated and granted such motion later on.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the RTC granting 5% monthly interest was properly annulled under
Rule 47.
HELD:
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based
only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process
as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final
and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown
for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought
by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support
thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the
pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court
expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope
of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard
with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a
complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was
declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the
evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the
defendant is declared in default because Section 3 (d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits
the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint.
186
Santos v. Santos
G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014 Leonen, J.
FACTS: RTC Tarlac City declared Celerina Santos presumptively dead after a petition was filed by her
husband Ricardo Santos for purposes of remarriage. Ricardo contracted his second marriage afterwards.
Ricardo alleges that (1) he and his wife Celerina leased an apartment in San Juan, Metro Manila and
eventually moved to Tarlac a year later, (2)their business did not prosper causing Celerina to work in Hong
Kong as a domestic helper, (3) after Celerina’s departure, she was never heard of again, (5) despite diligent
efforts to locate Celerina, he never found the same and (6) Celerina’s family and friends never gave him any
information as to the whereabouts of his wife.
Apparently, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA raising as grounds extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina claims that she was denied due process and that Ricardo
misrepresented to the court as to her true residence since she properly resides in Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City and not Tarlac City. Celerina further claims that (1) she never resided in Tarlac, (2) she never
worked as a domestic helper in Hong Kong and (3) she was never absent for 12 years since it was Ricardo
who left the Conjugal dwelling to cohabit with another woman. The CA dismissed Celerina’s petition
contending that her proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her
reappearance pursuant to Art. 42 of the Family Code. Celerina filed a MR but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA’s dismissal of Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment was proper?
HELD:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to
annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared
presumptively dead has never been absent.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has
become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner." The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when
the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud
were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial
which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair
submission of the controversy.
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately
made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence. Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was
absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper
of general circulation. Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to
oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively dead. Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting
Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were false. Celerina further claimed that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court
of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
187
Lasala v. National Food Authority
FACTS: Alberto Lasala, through his company PSF Security Agency, used to provide security guard services
to the National Food Authority. Lasala's employees who were deployed to the NFA filed with the NLRC a
complaint for underpayment of wages and nonpayment of other monetary benefits. The NLRC ruled for the
employees and held Lasala and the NFA solidarily liable for the employees' adjudged monetary
award. Consequently, the sheriff garnished the NFA's P383,572.90 worth of bank deposits with the
Development Bank of the Philippines. Believing that it had no liability to Lasala's employees, the NFA filed
with the RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City, a complaint for sum of money with damages and an application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Lasala. In response, Lasala filed an answer with
counterclaim and opposition to the prayer for preliminary attachment. Lasala also filed a counterclaim against
NFA. Initially, the trial court granted the NFA's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
However, this writ was eventually nullified when Lasala questioned it with the Court of Appeals. The trial
court dismissed the NFA's complaint for failure of the lawyer deputized by the OGCC, Atty. Mendoza, to
present the NFA's evidence-in-chief, due to his repeated hearing absences. The NFA replaced Atty. Mendoza
and administratively charged him with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interests of the service, and gross neglect of duty. It subsequently employed Atty. Atty. Cahucom as its new
counsel. Although the NFA's complaint was dismissed, Lasala's counterclaim remained, and he presented
evidence to support it. Interestingly, Atty. Cahucom, the NFA's new counsel, did not submit any evidence to
controvert Lasala's counterclaim evidence. When asked during trial, Atty. Cahucom simply waived his right
to cross-examine Lasala and did not exert any effort to counter his testimony. Despite the huge award to
Lasala, the NFA failed to appeal its case to the CA. Atty. Cahucom did not inform the NFA's management
about the trial court's adverse ruling. When asked to explain, he reasoned out that he only discovered the
decision after the lapse of the period for appeal. Having lost its chance to appeal, the NFA filed with the trial
court a petition for relief from judgment (petition for relief) grounded on excusable negligence. In its petition,
the NFA through Atty. Cahucom, attributed its failure to appeal to one of the NFA's employees. Allegedly,
this employee received the copy of the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision but did not inform Atty.
Cahucom about it. It was only after the lapse of the period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration and
an appeal that the NFA learned about the adverse ruling. The trial court denied the petition. In the meantime,
then NFA Administrator Arthur C. Yap had assumed his position. One of his first instructions was the legal
audit of all NFA cases. In doing this, the NFA management found out that the two lawyers (Attys. Mendoza
and Cahucom) assigned to the case against Lasala, grossly mishandled it; hence, causing a huge and unjust
liability to the NFA in the amount of P52,788,970.50. Thus, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, the NFA, now through the OGCC, filed with the CA a petition and an amended petition for
annulment of judgment of the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision which had granted a substantially
higher award than what Lasala originally prayed for in his counterclaim. The CA granted the petition and
annulled the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of NFA’s counsels constitutes valid ground to annul the decision of
the trial court?
HELD:
Because it is an exceptional relief, the Rules provide that only two grounds may be availed of in a petition
for annulment. These are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of judgment may only be
resorted to if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies, are
no longer available without the petitioner's fault.
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined
in the former suit. Its elements are the following: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the
judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and cause of action. There is res judicata when all these requisites concur.
188
Mangubat v. Morga – Seva
G.R. No. 202611 November 23, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: In 1974, Gaudencio Mangubat and his filed with RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages against respondent Belen Morga-Seva and two other defendants. The
RTC ruled in favor of the Mangubat. Since Belen and her co-defendants' appeal to the CA and later to this
Court were both unsuccessful, the RTC Decision became final and executory. In 1988, Gaudencio and his
children as heirs of the deceased Aurelia filed with the same court a Complaint for Revival of the Decision.
They averred that the writ of execution could not be implemented because Belen and her co-defendants
evaded service thereof. And since five years had already lapsed from the date of its entry, Gaudencio and the
heirs prayed for the revival of the RTC Decision. Gaudencio, assisted by Atty. Reynaldo L. Herrera (Atty.
Herrera) and Belen by Atty. Junnel M. Relativo, entered into a Compromise Agreement. The RTC approved
the agreement. Upon its finality, the Writ of Execution was ordered issued by the said court. Subsequently in
behalf of all the heirs, Abner filed a Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void. It was alleged
therein that Gaudencio acted only on his own behalf when he entered into the compromise agreement with
Belen, hence, the same is null and void for want of consent and participation of the heirs who were
indispensable parties
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Annulment of Final Order can be granted.
HELD:
The Petition fails. It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under
certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments. Hence,
it is allowed only on two grounds, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Abner anchors his Petition for
Annulment of Final Order on lack of jurisdiction. He posits that the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the case
when its 2001 Decision became final, hence, any issuance subsequent thereto is made without any
jurisdiction. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not
merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means
absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the
law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or
subject matter is conferred by law."The RTC's jurisdiction over petitions for revival of judgment had already
been upheld by the Court. It was held that "[a]n action for revival of judgment may be filed either 'in the
same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in
any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.'" Here, the Complaint
for revival of judgment was filed in the same court which rendered the Decision. Undoubtedly, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. There is therefore no valid ground for the Petition for Annulment of Final Order
that Abner filed with the CA. In any event, Abner's Petition for Annulment of Final Order was not the proper
remedy to nullify the September 25, 2006 Order which is an interlocutory order. "An interlocutory order
refers to a ruling respecting some point or matter between the commencement and end of the suit, but is not
a final adjudication of the claims and liabilities of the parties that are in dispute in that suit.50 The 2006 Order
merely dealt with the incidental matter of causing the transfer of the title to the property covered by TCT
under the name of Belen in accordance with the final and executory 2001 RTC Decision after Abner refused
to comply with the directive to deliver the owner's copy thereof.
In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an
abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of
or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not
vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is
conferred by law." The RTC's jurisdiction over petitions for revival of judgment had already been upheld by
the Court. It was held that "[a]n action for revival of judgment may be filed either 'in the same court where
said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place
designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general. An interlocutory order refers to a
ruling respecting some point or matter between the commencement and end of the suit, but is not a final
adjudication of the claims and liabilities of the parties that are in dispute in that suit.
189
Sibal v. Buquel
FACTS: Respondents Pedro Buquel, Santiago Buquel, Jr., Rosalinda Buquel and Francisco Buquel inherited
from their parents a parcel of land consisting of 81, 022 sq.m. Sometime in January 1999, petitioner Camilo
Sibal and Tobi Mangoba took possession of a portion of the property which belonged to Santiago, Sr.
Thereafter, the Buquels made several demands against Sibal and Mangoba for them to vacate and turn over
the property, but the latter refused to do so. Hence, they filed a complaint before the Tuguegarao RTC for
recovery of possession and damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the Buquels and ordered among others, the
restoration to them of their peaceful possession of the land in question, specifically on the share of Santiago
Buquel; Jr. This judgment has become final and executory. Consequently, Sibal filed a Petition for
Annulment of the RTC Decision before the CA, where he raised lack of jurisdiction and that the Buquels
were guilty of extrinsic fraud. Sibal asserts that the negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense
during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6429 resulted in violation of his right to due process. The CA
dismissed petition for lack of merit as well as the Motion for Reconsideration, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the RTC should be annulled because of the negligence of the
petitioner’s counsel?
HELD:
As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the adverse party, and the
fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic
if the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.
What is certain, for purposes of application of Rule 47, is that mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated
to the extrinsic fraud under Rule 47. By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in
character, i.e., it relates to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation which is committed outside
of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the
cause, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. And even in the presence of fraud, annulment
will not lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by one's own lawyer. In the latter case,
the remedy of the client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where judgment
had been rendered.
190
Frias v. Alcayde
FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent entered into a contract of lease involving a residential house and lot.
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondent for non-compliance with his
obligations. MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the
premises and pay rentals. Respondent filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment with the RTC averring that
the decision of the MeTC does not bind him since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
ISSUE: Whether or not petition for annulment of judgment was the proper remedy
HELD:
For purposes of summons, this Court holds that the nature of a petition for annulment of judgment is in
personam, on the basis of the following reasons:
1. A petition for annulment of judgment is an original action, which is separate, distinct and
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. It is not a continuation
or progression of the same case. Thus, regardless of the nature of the original action in the decision
sought to be annulled, be it in personam, in rem or quasi in rem, the respondent should be duly
notified of the petition seeking to annul the court's decision over which the respondent has a direct
or indirect interest.
2. A petition for annulment of judgment and the court's subsequent decision thereon will affect the
parties alone. It will not be enforceable against the whole world. Any judgment therein will
eventually bind only the parties properly impleaded.
Assuming arguendo, that a petition for annulment of judgment is either an action in rem or quasi in rem, still
the observance of due process for purposes of service of summons cannot be deliberately ignored. For courts,
as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the
same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction.
191
RULE 39
192
Villareal, Jr. v. MWSS
FACTS: Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed a case entitled “Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System v Orlando Villareal and other persons claiming Rights Under Him” for unlawful detainer, for being
prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action. On appeal by MWSS, Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision reversing the MeTC’s judgment and oredering Orlando and all persons claiming rights under him
to vacate the premises and surrender possession thereof to MWSS. RTC Clerk of Court issued an Entry of
Judgment/Order stating that the RTC’s Decision has become final and executory. Within a period of 2 years,
MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with MeTC. Orlando filed his comment/opposition
praying that the motion be held in abeyance pending compliance by MWDD with the provision of Section
23 of RA 7279, Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. More than 10 years from filing of MWSS’
motion for execution, MeTC granted the motion and issued a Writ of Execution.
Pursuant to writ of execution, MeTC Sheriff III sent a notice to vacate and pay to Orlando. Petitioner Daniel,
on behalf of Orlando, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the Writ of Execution and
Sheriff’s Notice to Vacate and Pay arguing that the 5 year period under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules was
violated since the execution was done more than 10 years from finality of decision. MWSS commented that
the 5 year period within which to enforce judgment by mere motion run only against judgment obligee and
not the court that will decide it. RTC dismissed the petition and affirmed the Writ of Execution and Sheriff’s
Notice.
ISSUE: Whether issuance of Writ of Execution after 10 years from filing the motion.
HELD:
No. Execution may be either through motion or an independent action. Execution by motion is only available
if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years from the date of its entry. On the other
hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for execution by
motion had already elapsed.
The winning party may file the motion for execution within the five (5)-year period; and the Supreme Court
(SC) should issue the actual writ of execution pursuant to the motion within the same period. There are
instances where the Supreme Court (SC) allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five (5) years
upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, i.e., the delay is cause or
occasioned by actions of at the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In this case, there is an absence of any showing on the part of MWSS that the execution of the RTC’s decision
was stayed “by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ
of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise,” or by any circumstance that
would further delay its implementation.
Orlando merely filed a comment to MWSS’ motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. He cannot be
faulted in doing so. There is neither a law nor a rule which prevents him from filing a comment. Apparently,
the delay was not brought about by the filing of the comment; but instead, the period within which the MeTC
acted upon it.
193
Davis v. Davis
G.R. No. 233489 March 17, 2018 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent entered into a Contract to Sell over a real property. The Petitioners gave
a down payment which prompted respondent to issue a contract of sale upon full payment.
However, after full payment respondent failed and refused to execute such contract which prompted
Petitioner to file an action for Specific Performance. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner which was also
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgement may be executed.
HELD:
This Court sustains the petitioners' position. Considering that the delay was not due to the fault of the
petitioners but of the respondents, who deliberately sold the subject property to another to avoid the outcome
of the case filed against them, and which delay incurred to their benefit/advantage, it is only logical, just, and
equitable that the period during which an action for annulment of title and document was being litigated upon
shall be deemed to have interrupted or tolled the running of the five-year period for enforcement of a
judgment by mere motion.
Otherwise, the respondents were rewarded for escaping the fulfilment of their obligation. Therefore, in
computing the time limited for suing out an execution, the time during which execution is stayed should be
excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor. It bears stressing that the
purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors
from sleeping on their rights.
194
Sarto v. People
G.R. No. 206284 February 28, 2018 Martires, J.
FACTS: Redante Sarto was charged of bigamy filed by Fe (wife on the 2nd marriage). During Pre-trial
Redante admitted that he had contracted 2 marriages but interposed the defense that his 1st marriage had
been legally dissolved by divorce in a foreign country obtained by Maria Socorro (wife on the 1st marriage)
who acquired prior Canadian citizenship. Redante only presented the certificate of divorce. RTC found
Redante guilty of bigamy because of his failure to present competent evidence proving the alleged divorce
decree. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not recognition of foreign divorce decree before the Philippine court is proper before it
be effected.
HELD:
Yes. A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the
Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a divorce
decree could be extended in this jurisdiction. Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need not be
obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that purpose. Philippine courts may recognize the foreign
divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which the divorce
was secured is mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial
notice of foreign laws. For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself
must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may
be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is presented and admitted in evidence.
195
Bañez v. Bañez
G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: The RTC of Cebu decreed legal separation between Aida and Respondent Gabriel on the ground of
sexual infidelity. Dissolution of conjugal property and division of the net conjugal assets forfeiture of
Gabriel’s half share in the net assets in favor of common children; payment of 100,000 as attorney’s fees and
surrender of a Mazda car and small residential house to petitioner and common children 15 days from receipt
of decision was also decreed by the same court. Respondent appealed. Aida filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. The RTC gave due course to the execution pending appeal and issued a writ of execution
commanding the sheriff to order the respondent to vacate the house and surrender the Mazda car. It also
ordered the petitioner to post bond to answer for all damages that respondents may suffer. The CA set aside
the judgment.
Upon motion, Aida prayed that she and her children be allowed to occupy the house for she did not have the
chance to occupy it and besides, she posted a bond for damages that respondent may suffer. Respondent on
the other hand argued that Aida chose not to live in the house for she owned two houses in the US where she
resides.
ISSUE: Whether or not the execution pending appeal is justified?
HELD:
Execution pending is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that
may result from issuance of writ. Otherwise, the writ may become a tool of oppression and inequity.
In this case, considering the reason cited by Aida, there is no superior or urgent circumstances that outweigh
the damages which the respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. She did not refute the
respondent’s allegations that she did not intend to use the house for she owned two houses in the US where
she resides. Merely, putting up a bond is not sufficient to justify her plea for execution pending appeal.
196
Santos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 155618 March 26, 2003 Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: An Election Protest was filed by Edgar Santos before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Petitioner
Edgar Santos and respondent Pedro Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of
Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 2001 elections. After the votes were counted and canvassed, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor. After trial and revision of
the ballots, the trial court found that Santos garnered 2,181 votes while Panulaya received only 2,105. Santos
was proclaimed and declared by the trial court as the duly elected Municipal Mayor. Santos thereafter filed
a motion for execution pending appeal. Meanwhile, before the trial court could act on Santos’ motion,
Panulaya filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 20-2002, assailing the
decision of the trial court. Likewise Panulaya appealed the trial court’s decision to the COMELEC, where it
was docketed as EAC No. A-12-2002.
The COMELEC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which effectively enjoined the trial court from
acting on Santos’ motion for execution pending appeal. Subsequently, the COMELEC dismissed SPR No.
20-2002. Hence, it directed the trial court to dispose of all pending incidents in SPL Election Protest No. 1-
M(2001) with dispatch. Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order which upholds and approves the Motion
for Execution Pending Appeal. After Santos posted the required bond, the trial court issued the Writ of
Execution, thereby installing Santos as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental. Accordingly,
Santos took his oath of office and thereafter assumed the duties and functions of his office.
Later, Panulaya filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition in SPR
No. 20-2002, and later on filed a supplemental petition. He also filed another petition with the COMELEC
docketed SPR No. 37-2002. On September 2002, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order directing the
parties to maintain the status quo ante and enjoining Santos from assuming the functions of Mayor. Santos
filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Order. However, the COMELEC First Division did not refer
the said motion to the COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Santos brought the instant special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court. On October 2002, the COMELEC issued a Resolution in SPR No. 37-
2002 granting the petition, setting aside the trial court’s Order granting Santos’ Motion for Execution pending
Appeal as well the Writ of Execution and ordering that Santos is enjoined from assuming the function of
mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental until the final determination of the election appeal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos’ motion for execution pending appeal should be allowed.
HELD:
Yes. The grant of execution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the trial court. A
valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order. The following constitute good reasons and a combination of two or
more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the
electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length
of time that the election contest has been pending.
The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after
almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with the
plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year
term of the Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court
in the election protest, had to be respected and given meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the
candidate judicially determined to have been chosen by the people.
197
City of Iligan v. Principal Management
G.R. No. 145260 July 31, 2003 Panganiban, J.
FACTS: This case involves the construction of a Sports Complex, which upon completion shall be turned
over to Iligan City. A Memorandum of Agreement on a turn-key arrangement was drawn by Mayor Quijano,
upon approval of City Council, with LBDRC and PMGI as Developer-Financing Manager. PMGI has
accomplished 78.27% of the project, but had to be stopped due to refusal of some occupants to vacate the
premises claiming they have not been paid their disturbance compensation. PMGI requested Iligan for a
deductive change order to enable it to collect project equivalent of accomplishment at P10,957,800. City of
Iligan claimed that PMGI’s accomplishment was only 52.89% or equivalent to P6,958,861.59 based on
Accomplishment Report. City refused to pay for the reason that the mutually agreed price of P14M shall only
be paid after the completion of the project and acceptance by it.
PMGI filed a complaint against the City for rescission of the MOA and damages. After filing of City’s
answer, a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed by PMGI which claimed there was no genuine
issue. Trial court granted the said Motion. Thereafter, City of Iligan filed a notice of appeal. A motion for
execution pending appeal was filed by PMGI which alleged that when appeal is clearly dilatory, order of
execution upon good reasons may be issued with discretion of court. The trial court granted immediate
execution pending appeal. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court stating that it did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal since appeal filed by petitioner was
a dilatory tactic and is not allowed in the first place.
ISSUE: Whether or not there were good reasons to allow immediate execution pending appeal
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that there are three requisites for the execution of a judgment pending appeal:
a) a motion must be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; b) there must be good
reasons for execution pending appeal; and c) the good reasons must be stated in a special order. Execution
pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the general rule. Normally, execution cannot be obtained until
and unless (a) the judgment has become final and executory; (b) the right of appeal has been renounced or
waived; (c) the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d) having been filed, the
appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin—in which case,
execution shall issue as a matter of right.
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a judgment should not be
allowed except if, in the court’s discretion, there are good reasons therefor. Good reasons consist of
compelling circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it become illusory; or the
prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who
may have no recourse but to delay. In the case, the ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending
appeal lies within sound discretion of trial court and appellate court will not normally disturb such finding.
Intervention by latter may be proper, if it is shown there has been an abuse of discretion.
198
FEBTC v. Toh
G.R. No. 144018 June 23, 2003 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Tomas Toh, Sr. filed a complaint against Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) for the recovery of
his bank deposits in the amount of P2,560,644.68 plus damages. Toh Sr. claimed that FEBTC debited the
said amount from his account without his consent and knowledge and applied the same as payment for the
Letters of Credit availed of by Catmon Sales International Corporation (CASICO). Toh Sr. filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted. Toh Sr. then filed a Motion for
Discretionary Execution by invoking Section 2 of Rule 39 on the ground of old age (79 years old) and the
probability that he may not be able to enjoy his money deposited in FEBTC. While this Motion was pending,
FEBTC filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC granted the Motion for Discretionary Execution and the trial court
held that discretionary execution may be issued upon good reasons by virtue of Section 2(a), 7 Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Citing De Leon v. Soriano, where we held that the approach of the end of one’s
life span is a compelling cause for discretionary execution pending appeal, the trial court used the
circumstance of Toh’s advanced age as a "good reason" to allow execution pending appeal. FEBTC then
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA held that
the fact that the lower court already ordered the execution of its judgment did not constitute a situation of
extreme urgency as to justify petitioner’s by-passing the remedy of reconsideration. The appellate court
declared it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in granting discretionary execution.
For the trial court had determined that Toh Sr. was already 79 years old and given his advanced age, might
not be able to enjoy the fruits of a judgment favorable to him if he were to wait for the eventual resolution of
the appeal filed by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not old age constitutes a good reason to allow execution pending appeal.
HELD:
Yes. Discretionary execution is permissible only when “good reasons” exist for immediately executing the
judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal. “Good reasons”
are compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the
prevailing party may, after the lapse of time, become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse
party who may apparently have no case except to delay. The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or
give examples of “good reasons” to justify execution. The determination of what is a good reason must,
necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ of
execution must necessarily be controlled by the judgment of the judge in accordance with his own conscience
and by a sense of justice and equity, free from the control of another’s judgment or conscience. It must be so
for discretion implies the absence of a hard and fast rule. In this case, the trial court granted Toh’s motion for
discretionary execution due to his advanced age.
Toh is already 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be denied that he is already of advanced
age. Not a few might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. But no one could claim with certainty that his tribe
would be always blessed with long life. It concluded that old age is a “good reason” to allow execution
pending appeal as any delay in the final disposition of the present case may deny private respondent of his
right to enjoy fully the money he has with FEBTC.
Here, Toh obtained a favorable judgment in the trial court. But that judgment in Civil Case No. MC-99-643
is still on appeal before the Court of Appeals. It might even reach this Court before the controversy is finally
resolved with finality. As well said in Borja, “while we may not agree that a man of his years is practically
moribund, the Court can appreciate his apprehension that he will not be long for this world and may not enjoy
the fruit of the judgment before he finally passes away.
199
Stronghold Insurance v. Felix
G.R. No. 148090 November 28, 2006 Carpio, J.
FACTS: Garon filed an action for sum of money against Project Movers Readly and Dev. Co. & Stronghold
Insurance Company RTC granted Garon’s motion for summary judgment ordering Project Movers to pay
Garon and Stronghold be jointly and solidarily liable to Mrs. Garon in the amount of P12,755,139.85. Garon
filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Stronghold moved for reconsideration. Trial Court granted
Garon’s motion for execution pending appeal and ordered Garon to post a bond of P20M for any damage
Project Movers and Stronghold may sustain by reason of executing pending appeal. Stronghold filed a
petition for certiorari assailing trial court’s order and writ of execution pending appeal. CA dismissed the
petition and lifted TRO it issued. It sustained the trial court in issuing the writ of execution pending appeal
on ground of illness of Garon’s husband. While it was not Garon who was ill, Garon needed the money to
support her husband’s medical expenses and to support her family.
ISSUE: Whether or not illness of the a party’s spouse is good reason to justify execution pending appeal.
HELD:
Yes. Execution pending appeal is an exception to the general rule. The requisites for the grant of an execution
of a judgment pending appeal are the following: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice
to the adverse party; (b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; (c) the good reasons must
be stated in the special order. Good reasons consist of exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to
outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer should the appealed judgment be reversed
later.
The mere filing of a bond by a successful party is not a good reason to justify execution pending appeal as a
combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution.
200
Fajardo v. Quitalig
A.M. No. P – 02 – 1535 March 28, 2003 Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Sheriff Rodolfo Quitalig was charged by Reverend Fernando Fajardo with conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and/or dereliction of duty. Complainant filed a case of ejectment against
Datuin. Fernando (Complainant) won. The decision was appealed to the RTC but was dismissed. The
decision became final and executory. Complainant claimed that after the Writ of Execution was served,
defendant (Datuin) asked for a period of 2 weeks for her to remove her property. After 2 weeks he went to
Sheriff Quitalig so that the Writ shall be implemented. In executing the Writ, respondent did not do anything
except to ask Defendant Datuin to bring out her personal properties. In addition, a TRO was issued according
to respondent. The Office of the Court Administrator found Respondent to have been negligent in the
performance of his duty as a sheriff. The writ was issued on March 7, 2000 and served on March 9, 2000.
The TRO did not ripen into an injunction. The writ was only implemented only on August 24, 2000 which
was more than 4 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sheriff was remiss in his duty in implementing the writ of execution.
HELD:
YES. The SC agreed with the findings of the OCA. Respondent only enforced the Writ dated March 7, 2000
only on August 24, 2000. Respondent should have immediately implemented and made a return of the Writ
after duly serving it upon the Defendant on March 9, 2000. He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff.
He should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he was unable to enforce the Writ because another
court has issued a TRO. His failure to make a return of a writ within the required period is nonfeasance.
As frontline officials of the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the
performance of their duties. Hence, they must see to it that the final stage in the litigation process is completed
without unnecessary delay. The sheriff is primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all
court processes and writs originating from the court and its branches, including such as may be properly
delegated to him by other courts.
201
RCBC v. Magwin Marketing Corp.
G.R. No. 152878 May 5, 2003 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner RCBC filed on March 4, 1999 a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito
Sy and Anderson Uy. On April 26, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of attachment. On June 4, 1999 the writ
was returned partially satisfied since only a parcel of land purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was
attached. In the meantime, summons was served on each of the defendants who filed their respective answers,
except for Gabriel Cheng who was dropped without prejudice as party-defendant as his whereabouts could
not be located. On September 21, 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ of attachment which on 18 January
2000 the court a quo denied. Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial, and for 6 months petitioner
and respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, undertook restructuring of the indebtedness of respondent
. Petitioner approved a debt payment scheme for the corporation, with only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed
his signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the terms and conditions of the restructuring. RTC
Makati City, on its own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without prejudice the case for failure of
petitioner as plaintiff to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time. Petitioner then filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference alleging that only defendant Nelson Tiu had
affixed his signature on the already approved defendant Magwin Marketing Corporations request for
restructuring of its loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to the terms and conditions specified in the letter
sent by RCBC. This motion was followed by petitioner’s Supplemental Motion to Plaintiffs Manifestation
and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference affirming that petitioner could not submit a compromise
agreement because only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature. Respondent Anderson Uy opposed
the submissions of petitioner while respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy
neither contested nor supported them. The trial court denied petitioners motion to calendar case for pre-trial
for failure of the plaintiff to submit a compromise agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred when it did not allow the parties to set the case for pre-trial and
dismiss the case after no compromise agreement was submitted.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner cannot be said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end. The court may dismiss
a case on the ground of non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power is whether
under the circumstances plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not acting on his
complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party’s conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible,
contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-
appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the
desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure
to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts
should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
Dismissing the civil case and compelling petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly and
circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not resolving, the disagreement. In the absence of clear lack of
merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final
disposition of the cases before the court.
202
Villaruel v. Fernando
G.R. No. 136726 September 24, 2013 Carpio, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Villaruel, Jr. is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office (ATO),
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto
E. Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and
Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC). Petitioner issued a
memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the Office of DOTC
Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995. Respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B.
Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the
detail order. In compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary Cal at
DOTC. Without acting on respondents request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19
July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under preventive suspension for 90 days without pay pending
investigation for alleged grave misconduct. Respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order
and to order their return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also
sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary
Garcia the action taken on respondents request for reconsideration of the detail order. Secretary Garcia replied
to the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the continuous
detail of respondents.Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate
respondents to their mother unit. Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The RTC
ruled in favor of respondents. The decision eventually became final and executor. Meanwhile, the Office of
the Ombudsman found respondent Abarca guilty of violating Section 7 (d) of RA 6713. Petitioner contends
that with such Ombudsman’s Resolution, the execution of the trial court’s decision becomes unjust and
inequitable.
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman’s Resolution renders the execution of the trial court’s decision unjust and
inequitable.
HELD:
No. Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may
no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. True, this rule admits
of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. This, however, is not the case here. In the present
case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the trial courts decision. The Ombudsman
issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 while the trial courts decision became final and executory on 14
June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the
execution of the decision of the trial court. Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca
guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court
holding petitioner liable for damages. The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely
different from the action instituted by respondents before the trial court. The two actions, which are clearly
separate and distinct from each other, presented two different causes of action. Petitioners’ cause of action
arose from respondents alleged violation of certain provisions of RA 6713 whereas respondents cause of
action resulted from petitioners refusal to recall respondents to their mother unit at CATC. In the
administrative case before the Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents were guilty of violating RA
6713. In contrast, the issue in the civil action before the trial court was whether respondents were entitled to
the issuance of the writ of mandamus and damages.
203
Morta v. Bagagñan
A.M. No. MTJ – 03 – 1513 November 12, 2003 Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Complainants charged Judge Antonio C. Bagagnan, MTC, Guinobatan, Albay and Sheriff Danilo
O. Matias, RTC-Br. 14, Ligao, Albay, with gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and delay in the
disposition of Civil Cases Nos. 481 and 482, a complaint for Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Complainants, plaintiffs in the aforesaid cases, alleged that the respondent judge refused to issue
a writ of possession in their favor despite the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in the said case had
already become final and executory. Complainants further alleged that their Motion for contempt against one
of the defendant in Civil Case No. 481 remained unresolved despite the fact that more than one year had
already elapsed since its filing. As against the respondent Sheriff, the complainants averred that there was
delay in the implementation of the Writ of Execution in both civil cases and the required reports thereon.
After investigation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the charges against the
respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit. On the other hand, the OCA found that the respondent
Sheriff failed to implement the Writ of Execution promptly and efficiently. It recommended that he be
ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Although the OCA recommended that the respondent judge be absolved of all charges, the Court found him
guilty of undue delay in resolving a pending motion, an infraction that also constitutes a violation
of Administrative Circular No. 1, for which he was fined P1,000.00. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
trial court judges, as paragons of justice in the first instance, to dispose of the court's business promptly and
to decide cases and motions within the required periods. Hence, the unexplained failure of judges to decide
cases and resolve motions and incidents within the reglementary period of 90 days, which is fixed by the
Constitution and the law, renders them administratively liable.
With respect to the charges against the respondent sheriff, the Court found the respondent sheriff guilty of
simple neglect of duty for which he was fined in the amount equivalent to his one-month salary. According
to the Court, the respondent sheriff was remiss in his duty to implement the Writ fully in Civil Cases Nos.
481 and 482. Time and time again, the Court has impressed upon those tasked to implement court orders and
processes to see to it that the final stage in the litigation process — the execution of judgment — be carried
out promptly. Any inordinate delay in the execution of judgment is truly deplorable and cannot be
countenanced by the Court. Moreover, the respondent sheriff failed to submit a periodic report of the actions
he had taken on the Writ "every 30 days from the date of receipt" as required by the Rules. The excuse
proffered by respondent sheriff — heavy work load — cannot absolve him from administrative sanctions. As
an officer of the court, he should at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his
duties. Respondent judge was fined P 11,000.00, while respondent sheriff was imposed a fine equivalent to
his one (1) month salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acted correctly
HELD:
We agree with the OCA that respondent judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of execution/possession.
His action was consistent with the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 123417 affirming that of the MTC as
to damages. Besides, the latter's Order directing defendants not to molest complainants in their peaceful
possession was rendered moot when they were ousted from the disputed lots by virtue of the final and
executory judgments in Civil Case No. 1920 and DARAB Case No. 2413. Indeed, the execution of a final
judgment may be refused, as in this case, when there has been a change in the situation of the parties that
would make its execution inequitable.
204
Serrano v. CA
G.R. No. 123896 June 25, 2003 Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: The Spouses Serrano were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon.
The couple mortgaged the said properties in favor of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as
security for a loan of P50,000. The couple was able to pay only the amount of P18,000. The Spouses Serrano
eventually sold the house and lot to the Spouses Emilio and Evelyn Geli. However, Emilio Geli and his
children failed to settle the amount with the GSIS. GSIS filed a complaint against Emilio Geli and his children
with the Regional Trial Court, the trial court rendered judgment ordering the rescission of the said deed.
During the pendency of the appeal, GSIS foreclosed the real estate mortgage over the property where it was
the highest bidder. Emilio Geli paid the redemption price to the GSIS. Emilio Geli did not inform the Spouses
Serrano and the CA that he had paid the redemption price to the GSIS. The CA dismissed the appeal of
Emilio Geli and his children on the ground that the appellants failed to pay the requisite docket fees despite
notices from the appellate court. No motion for the reconsideration of the resolution was filed. Thus, the said
dismissal of the appeal became final and executory. The Court of Appeals issued an Entry of Judgment.
After the remand of the records, the Spouses Serrano filed with the RTC a motion for the execution of the
trial court’s Decision. The defendants filed a motion to quash the same claiming that defendant Emilio Geli
had already redeemed the subject property in 1988 from the GSIS. According to the defendants, this
constituted a supervening event that would make the execution of the trial court’s decision unjust and
inequitable. The trial court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion of the defendants. The heirs of
Emilio Geli filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The appellate court rendered the assailed
decision in favor of the heirs of Emilio Geli.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a writ of execution was proper despite the payment of the redemption
price.
HELD:
Yes. Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party. It
is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court to enforce its own judgment once it becomes final and
executory.
It may happen, however, that new facts and circumstances may develop or occur after a judgment had been
rendered and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new matters had developed after the appeal has been
dismissed and the appealed judgment had become final and executory, which the parties were not aware of
and could not have been aware of prior to or during the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in
existence at that time.
In the second situation, the execution may be stayed, notwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed
judgment by this Court. It is required, however, that the supervening facts and circumstances must either
have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or create a substantial change in the rights or
relations of the parties therein which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or
inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice.
In this case, the payment by Emilio Geli of the redemption amount to the GSIS for the account of the
petitioners was made while the appeal of the private respondents from the summary judgment of the RTC
was pending. The summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become final and executory.
It behooved the said respondents to prosecute their appeal and file their brief, where they should have invoked
the payment of the redemption price as a ground for the reversal of the trial courts summary judgment in their
favor. The respondents failed to do so, and allowed the decision of the trial court to become final and
executory. Consequently, the enforcement of the summary judgment of the trial court can no longer be
frustrated by the respondents payment, through Emilio Geli.
205
D’ Armoured Sec. Agency v. Orpia
G.R. No. 151325 June 27, 2005 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: On February 9, 1995, the respondents were employed as guards by D Armoured Security and
Investigation Agency, Inc,, petitioner, Fortune Tobacco filed with the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal
and various monetary claims against petitioner and Fortune Tobacco. The LA ruled in favor of the
respondents. From said decision, Fortune Tobacco filed an appeal before NLRC. Petitioner, on the other
hand, did not appeal. Hence, only the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was dismissed and became final
and executor. Thus, the award became sole liability of petitioner. The LA issued a writ of execution.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash or Recall Writ of Garnishment. It was denied. Petitioner appealed before
NLRC but was also dismissed. Petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance
a writ of preliminary injunction.
In a decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner's monthly receivables from the
Foremost Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are not exempt from execution?
HELD:
We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not appealable,
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.2 On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.
Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to deny the instant petition.
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties are exempt from execution.
Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads:
'SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. - Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
x x x (i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal services within
the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family. ' The exemption under this
procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the substantive law which proscribes the
execution of employee's wages, thus:
ART. 1708. The laborer's wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for
food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.' Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works are
manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present
support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any other [Gaa v. Court of Appeals, 140
SCRA 304 (1985)]. It stands to reason that only natural persons whose salaries, wages and earnings are
indispensable for his own and that of his family's support are exempted under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. Undeniably, a corporate entity such as petitioner security agency is not covered by the
exemption
206
Perez v. CA
G.R. No. L – 56101 February 20, 1984 Melencio – Herrera, J.
FACTS: CONGENERIC issued what was in effect a promissory note in the amount of P111,973.58 in favor
of bearer No. 049, later identified as Ramon C. MOJICA, or an entity owned by him. Thereafter,
CONGENERIC issued another bearer promissory note for the sum of P208,666.67, also in favor of MOJICA
or an entity owned by him. MEVER Films, Inc. borrowed P500,000.00 from CONGENERIC, the former
issuing in favor of the latter a negotiable promissory note to mature on August 5, 1974.
On July 3, 1974, CONGENERIC received P200,000.00 from Corazon, and issued to her, as BEARER 209,
a confirmation of sale numbered 0366. On August 5, 1974, MEVER paid P100,000.00 to CONGENERIC/
On August 6, 1974, CONGENERIC paid MOJICA the interest due on Bill 1298, the principal being rolled-
over to mature on October 4, 1974. The roll-over was annotated on the original of Bill 1298. On August 13,
1974, CONGENERIC paid MOJICA the interest due on Bill 1419, the principal being rolled-over to mature
on October 11, 1974. The roll-over was annotated on Bill 1419. On September 9, 1974, MOJICA assigned
Bill 1298 and Bill 1419 to MEVER through a notarized deed.
On July 14, 1975, CORAZON filed suit before the CFI against MEVER for the recovery of P100,000.00,
plus interest, damages, and attorney’s fees. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of CORAZON and,
upon her filing a bond, she was able to have execution pending appeal. MEVER had to pay her P131,166.00
under the Trial Court’s judgment. On Mever’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has authority to rule on issues not raised on appeal
HELD: Yes. We note that the xerox copies of Bill No. 1298 and Bill No. 1419 attached by MEVER to its
Brief do not contain the "roll-over" notations. However, MEVER’s own exhibits before respondent Appellate
Court, Exhibits "3" and "3-A", do show those notations and MEVER must be held bound by them. And
although this issue may not have been squarely raised below, in the interest of substantial justice this Court
is not prevented from considering such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below
(Heirs of Enrique Zambales v. CA, 120 SCRA 897 [1983]). The Supreme Court is clothed with ample
authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision (Tumalad v. Vicencio, 41 SCRA 146 [1971]).
207
Panotes v. Townhouse Dev. Corp.
G.R. No. 154739 January 23, 2007 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: This case stemmed from a complaint filed with the National Housing Authority in April 1979 by
Rogelio Panotes, petitioner, then president of the Provident Village Homeowners Association, Inc., against
Provident Securities Corporation, owner-developer of the Provident Village in Marikina City. The complaint
alleges that PROSECOR violated Sections 19, 20, 21, 38, and 39 of P.D. No. 957. One of the violations
complained of was its failure to provide an open space in the said subdivision.
During the proceedings before the NHA, an ocular inspection showed that the subdivision has no open space.
The NHA found, however, that Block 40, with an area of 22,916 square meters, could be utilized as open
space. Thus, in its Resolution dated August 14, 1980, the NHA directed PROSECOR to provide the Provident
Village an open space which is Block 40. PROSECOR was served copies of the NHA Resolution and the
letter on August 22, 1980. Considering that PROSECOR did not appeal from the NHA Resolution, it became
final and executory. When Panotes filed a motion for execution of the NHA Resolution, it was found that the
records of the case were "mysteriously missing." Hence, his motion "was provisionally dismissed" without
prejudice.
Meanwhile, PROSECOR sold to City Townhouse Development Corporation (CTDC), respondent, several
lots in the subdivision. Among the lots sold were those comprising Block 40. CTDC was unaware of the
NHA Resolution ordering PROSECOR to have Block 40 utilized as open space of Provident Village.
Eventually, Panotes was succeeded by Araceli Bumatay as president of the Provident Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. On July 17, 1990, she filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a
complaint for revival of the NHA Resolution dated August 14, 1980. Impleaded therein as defendant was
CTDC, whom she alleged as successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA Resolution dated August 14, 1980 may be enforced against CTDC
HELD:
No. An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a
previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon
motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment
debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.
Here, the original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and
PROSECOR, not between petitioner Araceli Bumatay and respondent CTDC. Strangers to a case, like CTDC,
are not bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not divest the rights of a party who has not and
never been a party to a litigation. Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action
and not against one who did not have his day in court.
208
Fujiki v. Marinay
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013 Carpio, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In
2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved. Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and
they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). A few days after the filing of the petition,
the Regional Trial Court immediately dismissed the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket since Fujiki failed to comply with Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare
their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary
civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply. Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753) in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
HELD:
No, it does not. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody
is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is
"to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
209
RCBC v. Serra
FACTS: Federico Serra is the owner of a 374 square meter parcel of land located in Masbate. Serra and
RCBC entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to RCBC
for 25 years. Serra further granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement within 10 years. RCBC
informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy the property. However, Serra replied that he was
no longer interested in selling the property. RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
against Serra in the RTC Makati. The RTC Makati initially dismissed the complaint. However, the RTC
Makati reversed itself and ordered Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC.
Serra appealed to the CA. Meanwhile, Serra donated the property to his mother, Leonida Ablao. Ablao, then,
sold the property to Liok. A new land title was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for
Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao
and Serra before the RTC Masbate. Meanwhile, the CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the order of
the RTC Makati in the Specific Performance case. The decision in the Specific Performance case became
final and executory upon entry of judgment. The RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC, declaring the
donation in favor of Ablao and the subsequent sale to Liok null and void. The CA affirmed the RTC Masbate
decision. Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for
Certiorari, before this Court. This Court found neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the
CA’s part. RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific Performance case. RCBC alleged
that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of the decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent
transfers made by Serra. Thus, the period to execute by motion was suspended during the pendency of the
Annulment case. Serra filed his comment and opposition to the motion. Serra insisted that the motion for
execution was already barred by prescription and laches, and that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as
lien in the original title the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. The RTC Makati denied RCBC’s motion
for execution as well as the motion for reconsideration. Thus, RCBC filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not RCBC is barred from having its 05 January 1989 decision executed through motion
after the lapse of five years?
HELD:
No. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five
years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This
Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five years.
These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the
judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. Where the delays were occasioned by the
judgment debtor’s own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditor’s control,
the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively
interrupted or suspended.
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and
executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor
of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao,
who then transferred it to Liok. Serra’s action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay
in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the
Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the
Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and
RCBC’s motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBC’s motion is deemed filed within the five-
year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion. This Court has reiterated that the purpose of
prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights. Far
from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance with law.
On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict
compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict
enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
210
City of Cebu v. Dedamo
G.R. No. 142971 May 27, 2002 Davide, Jr., C.J.
FACTS: The present controversy is an off-shoot of civil case for eminent domain over two (2) parcels of
land owned by spouses Spouses Dedamo, filed by the petitioner before the RTC of Cebu City. The petitioner
immediately took possession of the lots after depositing P51,156.00 with the PNB. During the pendency of
the case, the petitioner and Spouses Dedamo entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby the latter agreed
to part with the ownership of the parcels of land in favor of the former in consideration of P1,786,400.00 as
provisional payment and just compensation in an amount to be determined by a panel of commissioners.
They recommend the sum of P20,826,339.50 as just compensation and it was approved by the RTC. The
RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and then by the Court, when the matter was elevated for review. When
the said decision became final and executory, the case was remanded for execution to the RTC, before which,
a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo. The RTC granted the motion
and ordered the issuance of the writ. In the meantime, Spouses Dedamo passed away and they were
substituted in the case by herein respondent. The petitioner paid the respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50
which is the difference between the just compensation due and the provisional payment already made. The
respondent filed a motion before the RTC to order the petitioner to pay interest on the just compensation
computed from the time of actual taking of the lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be denied on the ground of res judicata in the mode of
conclusiveness of judgment?
HELD:
Yes. A perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the issues
similarly raised and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a
fact or question already settled in a previous case.
The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who can no longer
question the respondent’s entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Courts determination
in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who
cannot re-litigate the said matter anew through the present recourse. Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942
bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is inextricably related to the ruling in the former.
211
PSALM v. Maunlad Homes, Inc.
FACTS: Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Malolos
City, Bulacan, an unlawful detainer case against National Power Corporation (NPC). The MTCC issued its
Decision, ordering NPC to vacate the subject premises and surrender physical possession thereof to
respondent. The NPC appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan.
However, it affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Respondent filed a Motion for Execution which was opposed
by the NPC. The NPC also filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. RTC denied the MR and
granted respondent's motion for execution. A Writ of Execution pending appeal was issued. The sheriff
served a Notice of Demand of payment to the NPC. Respondent then filed an urgent motion for issuance of
a Break Open Order since the sheriff who tried to implement the writ of execution, by serving the notice of
levy on the NPC Warehouse at Barangay Lagundi, Mexico, Pampanga, was prevented by the security guards
assigned therein. The NPC argued that the warehouse is being used both by it and the Power Sector Assets
and Liabilities Management Corporation (herein petitioner PSALM), an entity created and existing by virtue
of Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law); that the said law
provides that the ownership and all generation assets, IPP contracts and other NPC disposable assets are
transferred to PSALM; and that as of the moment, the ownership of the said items stored in the said warehouse
cannot be established with certainty as they are in the process of determining what properties may be retained
by the latter.
The sheriff issued a Notice of Levy on execution pending appeal of personal properties/sale of seven (7) units
transformer radiator fins, one (1) unit power transformer and four (4) pieces angle bars. Petitioner PSALM
filed an Affidavit of third-party claim with the sheriff pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
and alleging that it is the owner of the levied properties pursuant to the EPIRA Law. It also filed a
Manifestation with Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Order with the RTC arguing that it is
the owner of the subject properties pulled out by the sheriff by operation of law; that it is not a party to the
instant case and therefore cannot be bound by the judgment therein; that the obligation to pay respondent had
not been transferred to it. It also prayed for the nullification of the levy of its properties and restoring their
immediate possession to it. RTC denied the motion of PSALM. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari assailing Break Open Order, the notice of levy on execution pending appeal, the Order dated
denying the motion for issuance of Status Quo Order and the third-party claim, and the notice of sale on
execution of personal properties. It alleged that it has no adequate remedy available from the writs and
processes issued by the RTC, and that it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
orders despite the fact that petitioner is the owner of the subject properties. The CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari for being an incorrect remedy. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third-party claim of PSALM was proper
HELD:
No. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not
have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third
person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. Thus, if the
property levied by virtue of a writ of execution is claimed by a third person who is not the judgment obligor,
Section 16 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of such third party
claimant.
212
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
213
JURISDICTION
214
Serrana v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008 Reyes, R.T., J.
FACTS: Hannah Eunice Serana was appointed by then President Estrada as a student regent of UP. She
discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. Serana, with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
President Estrada gave P15M to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex, however, failed to materialize. The successor of Serana thus filed a
Complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Serana and her brother for estafa. Serana moved to quash
the Information claiming that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or
over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. She likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person as she was not a public officer. Since it was not alleged in the Information that it
was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her
official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa?
2. Whether Serana is a public officer?
3. Whether the offense charged was committed in relation to her office?
HELD:
1. Yes. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by PD 1606, as amended, not by RA 3019, as
amended which defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties. Relying on Sec.
4 of PD 1606, Serana contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Serana isolated the first paragraph of Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. Sec. 4(B) of PD 1606 reads: “B. Other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.” Plainly, estafa is one
of those “other felonies.”
2. Yes. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in PD 1606. While the first part
of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Serana falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.
Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of GOCCs, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. The BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, Serana is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by
P.D. No. 1606.
3. Yes. Here, the Information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent
of U.P., “while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother,
JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government x x x.”
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Sec. 4(A) of PD 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office. As long as the public office is facilitated to commit the crime, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offense.
215
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 170122 October 12, 2009 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: The Republic, through Ombudsman, pursuant to RA 1379, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Petition
for the Forfeiture of Funds and Properties that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, his wife, Clarita, and their
children had allegedly amassed and acquired (Forfeiture I: P143+M).This was followed by the filing of
another forfeiture case (Forfeiture II: P202+M).Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing
of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (Plunder Case)
under an Information which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at P303+M. The plunder
charge, as the parties’ pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both
forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture, the following events transpired in relation to the case: The corresponding
summonses were issued and all served on Garcias. Earlier, the SB issued a Writ of Attachment in favor of
the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before the SC. Instead of an Answer, the Garcias
filed a Motion to Dismisson the ground of the SB’s lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for
forfeiture. The SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared the same motion as pro forma and hence without
tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in default. Despite the
standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I with the Plunder
Case, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249. This was denied for the reason that
the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
criminal case of plunder. The Garcias filed another Motion to Dismiss and/or to Quash Forfeiture I. But the
SB merely noted the motion in view of movants’ having been declared in default which has yet to be lifted.
With respect to Forfeiture, petitioner and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss and/or to Quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject
matter thereof which is now covered by the plunder case, which the SB denied.
ISSUE: Whether the SB 4th Division has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as both
cases are now covered or included in the Plunder Case against the Garcias
HELD:
Yes. The Plunder did not absorb the Forfeiture Cases. Let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction
over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. The civil
liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus, such liability is
based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action
of forfeiture arises when a public officer or employee acquires during his incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary and to his other lawful income. Such amount of property
is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Thus, if the respondent public official is
unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the
court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property
aforesaid shall become property of the State.
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action
separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in the
criminal case absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In Sec. 4 of RA 7080,
for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is “sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth.” On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of
evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. The forfeitable nature of the properties under the
provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the
respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.
216
Escobal v. Gachitorena
FACTS: Arnel Escobal is a member of the Philippine National Police. While Escobar was conducting
surveillance on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Cafè Bar and Restaurant, he somehow got involved in a
shooting incident, resulting in the death of Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. Escobal was then charged with the crime
of murder. When petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence, he filed a Motion to Dismiss the
case arguing that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC denied the motion but ordered the conduct of a preliminary
hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his
office as a member of the PNP. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed
the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the
jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a
salary grade of “27” as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The RTC, however, reversed itself
in the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and
to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions
or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the
complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan. The Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan ordered the return of the records to the RTC. It reasoned that the RTC retained jurisdiction
over the case since petitioner had a salary grade of “23.” Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its
case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity
of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial. Petitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the Order of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a criminal case of murder against a member
of the PNP with salary grade of 23?
HELD:
No. For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers in relation
to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender
and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in
the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that
would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not
contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties.
Moreover, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below “27,” the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the
case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior
Inspector, with salary grade “23.” He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence,
the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged.
217
People v. Henry T. Go
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Respondent was charged with violation of RA 3019 for conspiring with then DOTC Sec. Arturo
Enrile, now deceased, in relation to contracts entered by them which is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Respondent filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as he is only a private individual
and not a public officer. Independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he
was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official
authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to
the filing of the Information?
HELD:
Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The
only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish
the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he
should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer.
If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case
where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If two or more
persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation
of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said,
written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to
have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive
or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the
conviction of the survivor or survivors.
218
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 169727 – 38 August 18, 2006 Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: A Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was held, which concluded that the Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. former
AFP-RSBS President, be prosecuted. They were finally charged with Estafa through falsification of public
documents and violation of Sec ( e) of R.A. 3019 with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Petitioner alleged that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction because the AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation and that he does not fall under Salary Grade 27 as required in Section 4 of R.A. 8249, in as much
as his position as AFP-RSBS President is not even includen under the Compensation and Classification Act
of 1989.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion, likewise the Motion for Reconsideration. The Petitioners then filed a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the plaintiff as a former AFP-RSBS
President.
HELD:
Yes. AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the nature of
public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or managers of government owned or controlled
corporations. Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes.
As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge against
petitioner is estafa through falsification of public document in the performance of his duties and in relation
to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
219
People v. Benipayo
G.R. No. 154473 April 24, 2009 Nachura, J.
FACTS: Photokina Marketing Corporation, filed a complaint for libel before the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City against Alfredo A. Benipayo, then chairman of the COMELEC in relation to his speech which was
published in Manila Bulletin. Benipayo questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City and the subsequent filing of Information with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. He
argued that he was an impeachable officer and thus, he could not be criminally prosecuted before any court
during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. The RTC
Quezon City dismissed the case and ruled that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the case, thus, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction in the case?
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that criminal and civil actions for damages in case of written defamations shall
be filed simultaneous or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment
of law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or
modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over
defamations in writing or by similar means.
Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over
the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a
general law.
The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar
to the expansion of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written
defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office. The broad general
phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, cannot be
construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of
the RTC.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by
expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment,
it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. A later enactment like RA
7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction
that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates
of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted
by a general law on the MTC.
220
Lacson v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999 Martinez, J.
FACTS: Panfilo Lacson, the then head of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, was among those
charged before the Sandiganbayan Second Division for the murder of the members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang after an encounter along Commonwealth Avenue. The accused police officers all filed motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan on the contention that none of them receive a salary
equivalent to Salary Grade 27.
An amended information was filed that resulted to the transfer of the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
No, the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the case. For a crime to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur:
1. The offense committed is a violation of:

a. R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
b. R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth);
c. Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery);
d. Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases); or
e. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
2. the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee
holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and
3. the offense committed is in relation to the office
The Sandiganbayan law requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to
his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. We find the amended informations for
murder against Lacson et al wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
While the information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in
relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim
by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
221
Sanchez v. Demetriou
G.R. No. 111771 – 77 November 9, 1993 Cruz, J.
FACTS: Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several
persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing
of Allan Gomez. The panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion. PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear
for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of
August 13, 1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp. Sanchez was positively identified by
Aurelio Centeno and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed extrajudicial confessions implicating
him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then... placed
on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. Prosecutors immediately conducted an
inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel. Warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez.
This warrant was issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section
8, in relation to Section 11, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center,
Camp Crame, where he remains confined.
Prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio
L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo
Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court
issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a
miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and
the relationship of an employee in the trial court with one of the accused. Ordered the transfer of the venue
of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information’s substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition
respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
No. The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and
prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we held only two years ago in the
case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[9] this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."
It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or
omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusive authority but... rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-
involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence
upon the authority of the panel of... prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's
office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense
can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not... even alleged in the information that the
commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official
functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo... follow... the crime of rape
with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor
or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense... and his office. It follows that the said crime,
being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
222
Disini v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014 Abad, J.
FACTS: The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or
computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him,
among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research,
study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for
special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges,
trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual
accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater
information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a
number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One
of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the
latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can
use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or
credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit
trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this
reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems
and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and
memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites
that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the
duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on
the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court
extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012,
enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction over cases covered by RA 10175?
HELD:
Sec. 21 provides that the RTC shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the provisions of RA 10175
including any violation committed by a Filipino national regardless of the place of commission. Jurisdiction
shall lie if any of the elements was committed within the Philippines or committed with the use of any
computer system wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such commission any damage is caused
to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was committed, was in the Philippines. There
shall be designated special cybercrime court manned by specially trained judges to handle cybercrime cases.
223
RULE 110
224
Jimenez v. Sorongon
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012 Brion, J.
FACTS: In 2003, Jimenez, the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and
Avgoustis listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment, alleging that Antzoulatos, et al. An Information was then filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Mandaluyong. Subsequently, the City Prosecutor reconsidered resolution and filed a motion
with the RTC to withdraw the information. The RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found
the existence of probable cause to hold Antzoulatos, et al. for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against Antzoulatos, et al. Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for
reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest, which was denied. Alamil filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of
arrest., which was denied for being moot and academic. Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the
inhibition of Judge Capco- Umali, for being biased or partial.
Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve Alamil’s motion for
reconsideration and the Jimenez's motion to expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided
by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon. The RTC granted Alamil’s motion for reconsideration, and treated the motion
for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. Jimenez moved for
reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent
Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC, which was denied. The RTC ordered the motion
expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity. Jimenez filed
a notice of appeal. Alamil moved to expunge the Jimenez' notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did
not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.
The RTC denied the Jimenez's notice of appeal since Jimenez filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor
General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA.
Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records. Jimenez elevated his case to the CA
via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, which was dismissed outright by the CA for Jimenez’s lack of legal
personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration that followed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez, the private complainant, has legal personality in assailing the RTC Orders.
HELD:
NO. It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate
or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is
dismissible.
Procedural law basically mandates that "all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before
the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several
cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine. While there may be rare occasions when the offended
party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due
process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.
225
People v. Valdez
FACTS: On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the
canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon
City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones,
which was held later in the evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman, and his
wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 o’clock
in the evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at
the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrella’s family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the
party. At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and
Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai
teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to customers who were buying
jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo
and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did
not heed his mother’s warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out
of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo
unahin na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was
continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the
scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and
fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger
machine. After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime (p.
10, TSN, February 6, 2001). The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced
them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions. In
this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the State’s witnesses by pointing to inconsistencies and
weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that
the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
HELD:
No. It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information. In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated: For complaint or information to be sufficient, it
must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if
it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must
be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging
the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him
so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
226
Miguel v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012 Brion, J.
FACTS: Vice Mayor and other local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the petitioner, Fernando Miguel, of violations of R.A.
3019 (Antigraft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed
Koronadal Public Market.
The Ombudsman directed the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit. After moving for an extension, the
petitioner filed his counter-affidavit. Thereafter, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner
and some other private individuals for violation of RA 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification
of Public Documents under Art. 171 par. 4 of the RPC. The Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations
with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct
a reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner 10 days to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner asked for another 3-day extension and afterwhich
another 20-day extension. Despite the given extensions, the petitioner still failed to file his counter-affidavit
prompting prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare the petitioner to have waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence. Ombudsman approved the resolution. After several extensions sought and granted,
the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. The
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this, despite the
OSPs earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his counter-
affidavit. After the arraignment, the OSP file a Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite. The petitioner filed his
Vigorous Opposition based on the obvious and fatal defect in the information. The Sandiganbayan
promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendent lite. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied
his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of the suspension order.
ISSUE: Whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order against
the petitioner.
HELD:
No. In Bedruz vs Sandiganbayan, the court considered the opposition of the accused (Motion to Suspend
Pendente Lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing.
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the
information/suspension, the court believed that the pleadings filed for and against them achieved the goal of
the procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not by just oral arguments but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda and other position papers. Since a pre-
suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against a mandatory suspension under RA 3019,
then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled
that to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.
227
People v. Soria
G.R. No. 179031 November 14, 2012 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: On February 26, 2000, "AAA" and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father Soria brought
home for merienda. After eating, "AAA" went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, Soria also entered the room
and positioned himself on top of "AAA", took off her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. "AAA"
felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful. At that point,
appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. This whole incident was witnessed by
"AAA’s" brother, "BBB". Soria then denied committing the alleged rape and states that the filing of the case
was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man residing in their community.
According to Soria, he could not have molested "AAA" because he treated her well. In fact, he was the only
one sending his children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom comes home.
RTC then find Soria guilty of committing the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. The CA then affirmed
the decision of the RTC but with modification. The CA stated that there was only simple rape because the
prosecution failed to present the birth certificate of “AAA” as competent proof of her minority.Still insisting
his innocence, Soria appealed to this Court stating among others that he should be acquitted of the crime of
rape since there is no evidence that would establish the fact of sexual intercourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Information is defective for alleging various ways of committing the offense?
HELD:
No. The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through
sexual intercourse under par. 1 of Art. 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as described in par. 2 thereof. The
Informationstated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of “AAA,” which constituted rape by
sexual intercourse under the par. 1 of Art. 266-A. At the same time, the Information alleged that appellant
used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause ambiguity, they
only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not invalidate the
Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the case.
Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been
committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the
different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The
allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a
description of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of
multifariousness. Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been
waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be convicted of rape through
sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial. (Appellant is
guilty of rape by sexual assault and not through sexual intercourse.)
228
Union Bank v. People
G.R. No. 192565 February 2012 Brion, J.
FACTS: Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from Union
Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and
Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe, filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City; and filed and raffled to the
MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under
oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other
action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,
arguing, among others, that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over he perjury case. Second, she
argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury – the
willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the
other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was
no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was
charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by
making a false affidavit. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash and subsequently denied
Tomas’ motion for reconsideration. Union Bank and Tomas filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-
Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTCMakati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
which was dismissed. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied Union Bank and Tomas’ motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the review under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not Makati City, where the Certificate Against Forum Shopping was notarized, is the
proper venue for the case of perjury.
HELD:
Yes. Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where
the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The
reason for this rule is twofold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such
that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused
on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In
determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over
it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that subject to existing
laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
229
RULE 111
230
Solidum v. People
G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Two days after his birth, Gerald Gercayo, who was born with an imperforate anus, underwent
colostomy, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. In 1995, Gerald,
then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro
Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and
Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and Dr. Fernando
Solidum. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for
two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move. Ma.
Luz Gercayo (Luz) then lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office
filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum. Dr. Solidum was pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He
then filed an appeal to the SC. The SC acquitted Dr. Solidum because circumstances, taken together, did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Dr. Solidum, through his acquittal, is exempt from civil liability.  
2. Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila should be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the accused.
 
HELD:
1. YES. The circumstances that have been established do not present the factual and legal bases for
validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm
and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that
caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable
would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability
must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
2. NO. In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng
Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard
was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect.
Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made
a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly
enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched
here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with.
Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a
corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art,
occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However,
Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in
charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for
profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his
duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the
hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which
did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
231
Castillo v. Salvador
FACTS: Castillo met Salvador through a common friend in December 2000 and became close since then.
Salvador told Castillo that his friends were engaged in freight and remittance business. Salvador enticed
Castillo to go to Hong Kong to see for herself the viability of the business. Moreover, Ramon (Salvador’s
brother) suggested to use Salvador’s name to attract overseas contract workers. Castillo and her husband
went to Hong Kong and Bangkok where they witnessed Salvador’s popularity among Filipino domestic
helpers. Later on, Castillo had deeply fallen in love with Salvador who acted as a father to her children during
the period of her annulment with her husband. It was also at this time that she agreed to embark on the
remittance business. She together with her mother and Ramon went to Hong Kong and had the Phillip
Salvador Freight and Remittance Int’l Ltd. registered. A Memorandum of Articles of Incorporation and
Certificate of Incorporation were issued. They rented an office space which they registered as their office
address. Castillo agreed with Ramon that any profit derived from the business will be equally divided among
them. The business did not operate yet as the capital for actual operation was still being raised. When Castillo
already had the money, she handed the US$100,000.00 to Salvador at her mother’s house in Las Piñas,
witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. In the same month, Castillo and Ramon went to Hong
Kong and found out that the proposed business never operated. Salvador told Castillo that the money was
deposited in a bank. However, Salvador later on confessed that he used the money to pay for his other
obligations. Hence, said amount was never returned at all.
During the trial, Castillo testified that Salvador intended to marry her once the legal impediment is removed.
She also admitted being blinded by her love for Salvador which made her follow all advice given by him and
Ramon. She did not ask for a receipt for the US$100,000.00 because it was for the operational expenses of
the business which will be for their future. Further, despite the amount being not returned, she still deposited
P500k in Salvador’s UCPB account as well as to Ramon’s. She also gave US$2,000.00 to Salvador while the
latter was in US.
In his examination, Salvador denied having received said amount but admitted of their affair. RTC found
Salvador guilty of Estafa while Ramon was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
Salvador appealed to CA which reversed the decision of the RTC, thus acquitting him. Castillo filed the
petition, alleging that even if CA decided to acquit Salvador, it should have at least retained the amount of
damages to Castillo.
ISSUE: W/N civil liability should be retained despite Salvador’s acquittal
HELD:
No. The law recognizes 2 kinds of acquittal, one on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of which closes the door to civil liability and the second, based on reasonable doubt
on the guilt of the accused which is not exempt from civil liability. The acquittal of CA is based on reasonable
doubt, hence, Salvador is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only.
However, no civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.In discrediting petitioner’s allegation
that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how
she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the
source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of
the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3)
petitioner’s claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the
way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud
perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been swindled.
232
Lim v. Kou Co Ping
FACTS: FR Cement Corporation (FRCC) issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement
dealers and traders, Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt (FCCT). FCCT then sold the withdrawal authorities covering
50,000 bags of cement to respondent Co for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag. Co then sold the
same withdrawal authorities to petitioner Lily Lim for the alleged amount of P3.2 million or P64.00 per bag.
Lim, using the withdrawal authorities, withdrew 2,800 bags of cement from FRCC. He then sold some of the
withdrawal authorities covering 10,000 bags back to respondent Co. Sometime within the same year, FRCC
no longer allowed Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities.
According to Co and the manager of FCCT, the plant implemented a price increase and would only release
the goods once Lim paid for the price difference or agreed to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected
and maintained that the withdrawal authorities were not subject to price fluctuations.
Lim filed a criminal case of estafa against Kou Co Ping regarding the undelivered bags of Cement. The RTC
of Pasig acquitted Kou Co Ping for insufficiency of evidence. Lim appealed the case to CA. During the
pendency of the appeal, Lim filed a civil action against Kou Co Ping in the RTC of Manila. Kou Co Ping
filed a motion to dismiss the civil case in RTC Manila on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping.
RTC Manila dismissed the said motion. Kou Co Ping filed an appeal to the CA. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages
during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
HELD:
No, A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal
offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability
that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based
on “an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31
of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that
may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision
of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”). Because of the distinct
and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may
pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
233
Casapunan v. Laroya
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002 Carpio, J.
FACTS: The two vehicles, one driven by Avelino Casupanan, and the other owned by one Robert Capitulo
and driven by Mario Laroya, were involved in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case
was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss
the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC
granted the motion and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in
the criminal case.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended
party even without reservation. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. Similarly, the accused can file a civil
action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case.
To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection
of the law. Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
The order of dismissal on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
234
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson
G.R. No. 205972 November 9, 2016 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Caterpillar is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of footwear,
clothing and related items, among others. Its products are known for six core trademarks, namely,
"CATERPILLAR", "CAT" "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN" "CAT AND DESIGN", "WALKING
MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN (Core Marks), all of which are alleged as
internationally known. Samson, doing business under the names and styles of Itti Shoes Corporation, Kolm's
Manufacturing Corporation and Caterpillar Boutique and General Merchandise, is the proprietor of various
retail outlets in the Philippines selling footwear, bags, clothing, and related items under the trademark
"CATERPILLAR", registered in 1997 under Trademark Registration No. 64705 issued by the Intellectual
Property Office (IPO). On July 26, 2000, upon application of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, in Makati City issued Search Warrants Nos. 00-022 to 00-032,
inclusive, all for unfair competition, to search the establishments owned, controlled and operated by Samson.
The implementation of the search warrants on July 27, 2000 led to the seizure of various products bearing
Caterpillar's Core Marks. Caterpillar filed against Samson several criminal complaints for unfair competition
in the Department of Justice (DOJ), Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a civil action
against Samson and his business entities, with the IPO as a nominal party - for Unfair Competition, Damages
and Cancellation of Trademark with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction Samson filed petitions for review with the Office of the Secretary of Justice to appeal
the joint resolutions in LS. Nos. 2000-1354 to 2000-1364 and LS. Nos. 2001-042 to 2001-067. the DOJ,
through Secretary Hernando B. Perez, issued a resolution denying Samson's petition for review in I.S. Nos.
2000-1354 to 2000-1364. Samson's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on May 26, 2003 RTC
granted Samson's Motion to Suspend Arraignment, and suspended the arraignment and all other proceedings.
CA reversed and set aside the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Lim in I.S. No. 2001-042 to 2001-067,
and directed the Chief State Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the criminal informations filed against
Samson in court. The resolution on the order dated June 26, 2001, whereby the RTC of Valenzuela City,
Branch 172, had quashed the 26 search warrants upon motion of Samson. Consequently, the goods seized
and confiscated by virtue of the quashed search warrants could no longer be admitted in evidence
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court a quo did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the criminal proceedings on account of a prejudicial
question; and
2. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of
Justice finding that there was no probable cause to charge Samson with unfair competition.
HELD:
1. CATERPILLAR failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. There is no
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
of each other. The common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168
of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446,
which as admitted by SAMSON also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar
2. A civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial question
by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair competition. A prejudicial
question is that which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issues to be determined in the criminal case. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action will necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
235
People v. Romero
G.R. No. 112985 April 21, 1999 Pardo, J.
FACTS: Appellants Romero and Rodriguez, General Manager and Operation Manager, respectively, of
Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation (SAIDECOR), were charged with widescale estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 based on a complaint filed by Ernesto A. Ruiz, a radio
commentator. SAIDECOR, engaged in solicitation of funds and investments from the public, guaranteed an
800% return on investment within fifteen (15) or twenty-one (21) days. Appellants issued postdated a check
in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) Philippine Currency, but when
presented, was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The trial court, after joint trial, acquitted appellants of
violation of B.P. 22 but convicted them of Estafa for widescale swindling. The trial court held that the crime
was committed by a syndicate and sentenced appellants to life imprisonment. Hence, this appeal. During the
pendency of the appeal, appellant Rodriguez died.
The appealed decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court but modified the penalty to an indeterminate one
for failure of the prosecution to establish that the corporation was a syndicate as defined under the law. The
Court found that deception was employed on Ruiz by appellants and entered into a Ponzi scheme where
appellant fraudulently represented that Ruiz investment would have an 800% return in 15 or 21 days. It is
sometimes called a pyramid scheme because a broader base of gullible investors must support the structure
as time passes.
Death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
However, the claim for civil liability survives if based on a source of obligation other than delict.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes criminal and civil liability
HELD:
The Court notes that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto Rodriguez, died pending appeal. Pursuant to the
doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
236
Magestrado v. People
G.R. No. 148072 July 10, 2007 Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Elena Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Francisco Magestrado with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
information for perjury against Magestrado. The latter was alleged to have subscribed and sworn to an
Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Espejo of Quezon City, falsely alleging that he lost Owner’s Duplicate
Certificate of TCT No. N-173163 when in truth, the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
173163 was mortgaged to Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P758,134.42. As a consequence
of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan, thus,
making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the said Librojo.
During the pendency of the criminal action, Magestrado before the MeTC, filed a motion for suspension of
proceedings based on a prejudicial question. He alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (first civil case), a
case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the QC RTC, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98-
34308 (second civil case), a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending
before the QC RTC, Branch 77, must be resolved first before the criminal case may proceed since the issues
in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action. The MeTC
found such motion to be without merit, holding that the said civil actions were not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of Magestrado. He then filed a MR, which was denied by the MeTC. This prompted him to file
a Petition for Certiorari, Rule 65, before the RTC alleging that the MeTC judge has committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the criminal
proceedings. The RTC likewise found that there was no prejudicial question, holding that the civil cases are
principally for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether or not he executed
the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163, whereas the criminal
case is for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to support his
petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he committed
perjury is the issue in the criminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Magestrado
then appealed to the CA via Rule 65; the same was likewise dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal action against
Magestrado.
HELD: No. A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based;
(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.If
the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in
the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.Neither
is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
of each other.
237
Pimentel v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010 Carpio, J.
FACTS: On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito R. Pimentel with the RTC Quezon City. Less than four months thereafter, Joselito received
summons to appear before the RTC in Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage between Maria and Joselito on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent
motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question. He asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of the civil case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City denied the motion, holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is
not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. It held that the issues in
the parricide case are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the
validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari with
application of WPI and/or TRO before the Court of Appeals, assailing the denial of RTC Quezon City. The
CA dismissed the petition. The CA ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would
be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action in annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question;
HELD:
NO. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the
civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Further, the resolution of the civil action
is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.There is a prejudicial
question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case.
A prejudicial question is defined as:“x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.”
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the
issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution
of their marriage, in case the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is granted, it will have no effect
on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
238
J.M. Dominguez v. Liclican
G.R. No. 208587 July 29, 2015 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc.
(JMD) held at the Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new set of directors was conducted. Conflict
ensued when petitioners Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not allowed to vote on the ground that
they are not registered stockholders of JMD. As pointed out, it was their mother and grandmother, both
deceased, who are the stockholders in JMD, and that there is still no settlement of their respective estates to
effectively transfer their shares in the company to Patrick and Kenneth Pacis. But since the remaining
stockholders with outstanding shares constituted a quorum, the election of officers still proceeded. In reaction
to the foregoing developments, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC Baguio
Branch 59 for nullification of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs.
Meanwhile, petitioner stockholders immediately took hold of corporate properties, represented themselves
to JMD’s tenants as the true and lawful directors of the company, and collected and deposited rents due the
company to its bank account.
Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners, executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging respondents

Liclican and Isip with qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint that Liclican and Isip, without any
authority whatsoever, conspired to withdraw the amount of P852,024.19 from the corporation’s savings
account with the Equitable-PCI Bank; and that the following day, they issued a check in the amount of
P200,000, payable to cash, and to be drawn against JMD’s account with Robinson’s Savings Bank. In a
separate complaint, the corporation claimed that respondents Liclican and Isip likewise issued a check
payable to one Atty. Francisco Lava, Jr. for P200,000 to be debited from the corporation’s account. Judge
Tiongson-Tabora of RTC Baguio found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. In due time,
respondents lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, to annul and set aside the two Orders by the RTC,
branch 7 anchored, among others, on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question. According to
respondents, petitioner stockholders, by filing the complaint-affidavit, are already assuming that they are the
legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-corporate dispute pending in the RTC, Branch
59. The CA granted the petition, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case constituted a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of criminal
proceedings
HELD:
YES. As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence
of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Here, the CA aptly observed the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case. To
be sure, the Civil Case involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD’s meetings, election
and acts of its directors and officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between
the two contesting groups of officers should rightfully be seated at the company’s helm. Without resolution
of the civil case, petitioners’ authority to commence and prosecute the Criminal case against respondents for
qualified theft in JMD’s behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the criminal
proceedings.
239
RULE 112
240
Fenequito v. Vergara
FACTS: An Information for falsification of public documents was filed with the MTC of Manila by the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila against herein petitioners. Herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. After respondent’s Comment/Opposition was filed, the MeTC
issued an Order dismissing the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. Aggrieved, respondent, with the
express conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The RTC rendered judgment setting aside the Order of the MeTC and directing the said court to proceed to
trial. Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. The CA rendered its presently
assailed Resolution dismissing the petition. The CA ruled that the Decision of the RTC is interlocutory in
nature and, thus, is not appealable. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds that the (1) CA erred in outright dismissal of the
petition on the ground that the remedy is improper and (2) RTC Ruling is final and unappealable. The
petitioners relies on “Strict enforcement of the Rules may be suspended whenever the purposes of justice so
require.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC ruling is final and unappealable
HELD:
No. A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding
or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Upon the other
hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be
done upon its merits. The RTC Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of
petitioners’ motion to quash because it leaves something more to be done x xx, i.e., the continuation of the
criminal proceedings until the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined. Specifically, the MeTC has
yet to arraign the petitioners, then proceed to trial and finally render the proper judgment. Petitioners contend
that the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report, submitted as evidence by respondent to the
prosecutor’s office, showed that the findings therein are not conclusive and, thus, insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause.
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned
Document Report No. 048-03 that the document examiner found that the signatures appearing in the
questioned Deed of Sale as compared to the standard signatures “reveal divergences in the manner of
execution and stroke structure [which is] an indication that they WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND
THE SAME PERSON.” The Court agrees with the prosecutor’s pronouncement in its Resolution dated
September 22, 2003, that although the findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory were qualified by the statement
contained in the Report that “no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact that questioned signatures
are photocopies wherein minute details are not clearly manifested,” the fact that an expert witness already
found that the questioned signatures were not written by one and the same person already creates probable
cause to indict petitioners for the crime of falsification of public document.
In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the ruling of the RTC that the offense
charged was committed and that herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof.
241
Burgundy Realty Corporation v. Reyes
G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a criminal case of Estafa against the Respondent for misappropriating the funds
given by the former to the latter to purchase parcels of land. The respondent admitted that she in fact received
the said amount from the petitioner, but she gave the money to a certain Mateo Elejorde whom she filed a
criminal case for misappropriating the said funds. That she has no intention to take the said amount for her
personal benefit. The prosecutor found probable cause against the respondent and filed information before
the RTC. Respondent appealed the said resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice, which was
first denied but subsequently granted on reconsideration. DOJ ordered the prosecutor to withdraw the said
information. Petitioner asked the CA for review with was denied. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether probable cause exist in filing the information against the accused
HELD:
Yes, that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary
investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case.13 Its purpose is to determine
whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof. 0054hat in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for
the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation
does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow
the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.
242
Abando v. Bayona
A.M. No. MTJ – 12 – 1804 July 30, 2012 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: In People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr. complainant filed the Information in the MTCC,
Bacolod, which was eventually raffled to Judge Bayona. In connection with the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against accused, Respondent issued an order directing complainant to present additional evidence,
relevant records and documents to enable his court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause.
The complainant failed to produce some of the requested documents and respondent did not accept the
explanations made.
Complainant executed an administrative complaint through the OCAwhere he alleged that respondent was
guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct. He asserted that respondent unduly
burdened himself by obsessing over the production of the records of the preliminary investigation, especially
Jarder’s Resolution. Judge Bayona, in his comment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor
Abanado, reiterated the importance of the Jarder’s Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
The OCA submitted its report and recommendation noting Judge Gellada’s Order which held that the
resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor. In such case, the resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded, and no
longer forms an integral part of the records of the case and it need not be annexed to the information filed in
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an executive function.
HELD:
Yes. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. The courts must consider
the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations whenever the
actions of a public prosecutor are put in question. The Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service
(DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the
information only as far as practicable. Such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
243
Heirs of Nestor Tria v. Obias
G.R. No. 175887 November 24, 2010 Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional Director of Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), and
currently Officer-in-Charge of 2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur, was shot by a gunman while
waiting to board his flight to Manila. Subsequently, NBI investigated the incident. NBI Regional Director
Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended to Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the
indictment of Roberto “Obet” Aclan y Gulpo, Juanito “Totoy” Ona y Masalonga and Atty. Epifania “Fanny”
Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria. During the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor, respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit denying that she was in anyway involved
with the killing of Engr. Tria. Respondent asserted that from the totality of evidence gathered by the NBI, it
has not established prima facie the existence of conspiracy as to implicate her in the death of Engr. Tria.
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur issued a resolution directing the filing of an information
for murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence as against herein
respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias.Petitioners appealed to the Department of Justice, which modified the
resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and directing the latter to include respondent in the information for
murder filed against Aclan and Ona.
Respondent Obias, along with Aclan and Ona, filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ’s resolution, to
which the DOJ denied. An Information against Aclan, Ona, and Obias was then filed with the RTC.
Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the DOJ under the provisions of Administrative Order No. 18,
series of 1987. In a letter dated December 3, 2001 addressed to respondent’s counsel, the DOJ denied
respondent’s notice of appeal on the ground that pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated
November 4, 1983, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993, appeals to the Office
of the President where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is “reclusion perpetua to death,” shall
be taken by petition for review. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her notice of
appeal. However, the DOJ denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration stating that the proper procedure
is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was
considered closed and terminated. OP dismissed the murder charge. CA affirmed OP’s decision
ISSUES:
1. Whether the non-referral by Office of the President to DOJ of respondent’s motion for
reconsideration violated the latter’s right to due process
2. Whether CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s dismissal of murder charge
HELD:
1. No. Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, in case the investigating prosecutor conducts a
hearing where there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness, “the parties can be
present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit
to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.” Hence,
Non-referral by the Office of the President (OP) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) of the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration is not violative of due process.
2. Yes. The Court holds that the OP in reversing the DOJ Secretary’s ruling, and the CA in affirming
the same, both committed grave abuse of discretion. Clearly, the OP and CA arbitrarily disregarded
facts on record which established probable cause against the respondent.
This Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records
of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions
244
Uy v. Javellana
A.M. No. MTJ – 07 – 1666 September 5, 2012 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: The present administrative case arose from a verified complaint for gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others. The same was filed by herein petitioners Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of the
PAO.
They have alleged, among others, the complete disregard of the respondent judge of the rules of procedure.
Some of their allegations were:
1. In People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, the respondent issued a warrant of arrest after the
filing of the said case despite Sec. 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure;
2. In People v. Celeste, for Trespass to Dwelling, respondent did not grant the motion to dismiss for
non-compliance with the Lupon requirement of Secs. 18 and 19;
3. In People v. Celeste, respondent refused to dismiss the complaint outright even if the same was
patently without basis or merit as all the affidavits were hearsay evidence;
4. In People v. Lopez, for Malicious Mischief, the respondent did not apply the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure and conducted a preliminary examination and investigation in accordance with
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial.
In his comment, respondent judge discounted the allegations of the attorneys as baseless, untruthful, intrigues,
malicious and a harassment to intimidate him. He then sought the dismissal of the complaint filed against
him.
The Office of the Court Administrator in its report dated January 2, 2006, found that respondent is liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure in
cases which are supposed to be under said rule. The OCA recommended his suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed a gross ignorance of the law in conducting a
preliminary investigation and examination in a case governed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
HELD:
The court ruled in the affirmative. Under Sec. 1 of the same set of rules, it defines the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, namely:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of the rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. Violations of Batas Pambansang BIlang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law);
5. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment
not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (PhP 1,000.00) or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising
therefrom: Provided, however: That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos
(PhP 10,000.00).
The cited cases in the administrative complaint deal with malicious mischief, and the same is punished by
Art. 328 and 329 of the Revised Penal Code. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio
and People v. Lopez were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief under Art. 328, then Art. 329
should apply. If the amounts of the alleged damage to property in both cases were PhP 6,000.00 and PhP
3,000.00 respectively, are proven, then the appropriate penalty would be arresto mayor, in its medium and
maximum periods under Art.329, which would be imprisonment for two months and one day to six
months.
The two cases are clearly governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
245
In People v. Lopez, respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required
or justified. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation
prior to the filing of a criminal case under said rules.
The commencement of an action under said rules shall be made in the following manner:
SEC. 11. How commenced. –The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila
and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of
his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court’s
files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the case
may be dismissed.
SEC. 12. Duty of Court. –

(a) If commenced by complaint. –On the basis of the complaint and the affidavits and other
evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for being patently
without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in custody.
(b)If commenced by information. –When the case is commenced by information, or is not
dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an order which, together
with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the prosecution, shall require the
accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence
in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days
from receipt of said order. The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after
receipt of the counter affidavits of the defense.
SEC. 13. Arraignment and trial. –Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or
information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the
accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for
arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and if he enters a plea
of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation
be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by
law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously
established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just
six (6) months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in
People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to
promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights
of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.
Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and
defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
The respondent judge is forthwith suspended for three months and one day.
246
People v. Valencia
G.R. Nos. 94511 – 13 September 18, 1992 Nocon, J.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Alejandro Valencia appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
in 2 Criminal Cases convicting him of Homicide with the use of an unlicensed firearm and Less Serious
Physical Injuries. Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three,
respectively, and her mother, are residents of 2008 F. Muñoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of March
19, 1989, as she was about to eat supper, she noticed appellant standing five steps away from the open door
of her house and holding a sumpak, a homemade shotgun. Seized with fear, she closed the door. After a few
moments, she heard a burst of gunfire. This was followed by cries of pain from her children inside the house.
Seeing her children bloodied, she immediately went outside and shouted for help. As she did so, she saw
appellant running away, carrying the sumpak.
Two neighbors assisted Jimenez in bringing the injured children to the Philippine General Hospital. That
same evening, Patrolman Renato Marquez, a homicide investigator, interviewed Jimenez at the hospital about
the shooting incident. Since she was still experiencing shock over the incident Jimenez forgot to mention the
name of appellant as the one who shot her children. Acting on the report of a barangay tanod, Patrolmen
Roberto Cajiles, Romeo de la Peña and Carlos Castañeda, assigned at the Ong Detachment, Police Station
No. 5, conducted an investigation of the shooting incident in the house of Jimenez. At the time, Jimenez and
her injured children were already in the hospital. Nevertheless, Pat. Cajiles was able to interview the mother
of Jimenez, the barangay captain, a certain Josie, and appellant’s brother, Rolando, who all mentioned
appellant as the gunwielder. Moreover, the policemen discovered the presence of six pellet holes and one big
hole with the size of the circumference of a shotgun bullet on the door of the house of Jimenez. Three pellets
were also found at the crime scene.
Early next morning, the three policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of Sonia Castillo, his
aunt, where he believed appellant was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and took him to the
Ong Detachment for initial investigation. He was indorsed to the police headquarters for further investigation
in the evening of March 22, 1989. At 12:20 a.m. of the following day, one of the injured children, Annabelle,
died as a result of the gunshot wounds she suffered. The other child, Samuel Jr., who was shot in the right
forearm, was discharged from the hospital one week after the incident, but needed 2 more weeks for healing.
On March 26, 1989, Arlyn Jimenez executed a sworn statement wherein she identified appellant as the culprit.
On March 30, 1989, a certain Ramon Bacnotan executed a sworn statement and turned over to the police the
sumpak allegedly used by appellant in the shooting of the two children. 2 Criminal Cases were filed against
Valencia, for Homicide with the use of an unlicensed firearm and Less Serious Physical Injuries. When
arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial then proceeded resulting in accused-appellant’s
conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the finding of the court of Accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
correct in spite of the fact that there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and that no sufficient
evidence exists proving his guilt.
HELD:
Yes. A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court 23 should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7. 24 Under said Section 7, Rule 112, 25 the prosecuting officer can file the Information
in court without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accused-appellant’s case. Since the
records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had
been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, 27 the Court can
only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, 28 when he did, in fact, pleaded
"Not Guilty" upon his arraignment
247
PCGG v. Navarro - Gutierrez
G.R. No. 194159 October 21, 2015 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: PCGG filed against former officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
namely, Ferry, Tengco, Zosa, Zalamea, Castell, and Sison, as well as former officers/stockholders of National
Galleon Shipping Corporation(Galleon), namely, Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque charging them of violating
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.PCGG alleged that on October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos
(President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No.13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identifyvarious anomalous loans entered into
by the Philippine Government in the past. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the assistance of a
Technical Working Group (TWG) examined and studieddocuments relative to loan accounts extended by
GFIs to various corporations during the regime of the late PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)
-one of which is the loan account granted by the DBP to Galleon.TWG found anomalies after examining the
loans of Galleon. PCGG then files a case against the individual officers. Only Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and
Castell filed their counter-affidavits. In their defense, Roque stated that he was only a minorstockholder and
in no position to influence such loan. Zalamea was only chairman of DBP after the transaction. Tenco
arguedthat the charges already prescribed, and Castell argued that his job is only supervision of employees.
Ombudsman found no probable cause against them hence the case was dismissed on the basis that pieces of
evidenceattached to the case records were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual
respondents, consideringthat the documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of executive summaries
and technical reports, which arehearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value.PCGG move for
reconsideration but was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in finding no
probable causeto indict the respondents.
HELD:
Yes. It must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should
be filed. Nonetheless, theCourt is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a
charge of grave abuse of discretion. Graveabuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. TheOmbudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and grossas to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplationof law. The Court's
pronouncement in Ciron v. Gutierrez is instructive on this matter, to wit:xxx this Court's consistent policy
has been to maintain noninterference in the determination of the Ombudsman of theexistence of probable
cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is basednot
only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsmanbut upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered
by innumerable petitionsassailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaintsfiled before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled toreview the exercise of discretion on the part of
the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file aninformation in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.
Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable
basis to believethat a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for
it. Being merely based on opinionand belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure aconviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's]evidence. The presence and absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that maybe passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, aswell as the admissibility
of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminaryinvestigation
level."
248
De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016 Leonen, J.
FACTS: Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of
several radio shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio
Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers,
Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he
shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando
"Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special
panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel was composed of
Senior Assistant Prosecutor Edwin S. Dayog, Assistant State Prosecutor Bryan Jacinto S. Cacha, and
Assistant State Prosecutor John Benedict D. Medina.
Petitioners' position was that the First Panel "appear[ed] to have ignored the rules of preliminary
investigation" when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the
determination of the existence of probable cause. They assert that respondent was not deprived of due process
when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was not prevented from presenting controverting evidence to
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's additional evidence. Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the
disposition of the case was already within the discretion of the trial court.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu proprio the
reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new evidence to the
First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues that all parties had already been
given the opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a
reinvestigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD:
The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that may cause
a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but
is not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes its
determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest.
249
RULE 113
250
Saraum v. People
FACTS: Saraum was charged with Illegal Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs stemming from
a buy – bust operation conducted by the police. During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run
towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also
saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a
"shabu" pot session.
By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date and
time in question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law when he
was held by men with firearms. They were already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors.
Believing that he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge
only when he was brought to the court. He plead not guilty during his arraignment and was released on bail.
The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum and
Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory
explanation with regard to his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of the
seized items that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have
adequately explained the respective uses of the items to prove that they were indeed drug paraphernalia.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saraum’s arrest was valid
HELD:
Yes, in arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute
a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime
and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw
the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in
seizing them. Considering that Saraum's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were
likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are,
therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated
drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the
judgment of conviction.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection thereto when he
did not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before
his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed
waived."
251
Comerciante v. People
G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on
him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets
containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines,
maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule,
especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid warrantless arrest was effected against the accused
HELD:
No. "Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement.
That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this
should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself
in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to
discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a companion and handing
over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a
reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct
a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should
be deemed unlawful. CAacTH
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante.
As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
252
Luz v. People
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012 Sereno, J.
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o'clock in the
morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion
Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused
for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving
said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante
were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy
and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about
two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two
(2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims
that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or
charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs committed on 10 March 2003. It found
the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to
contain shabu.The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was validly arrested
HELD:
No. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter.
253
Antiquera v. People
FACTS: The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio
Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board
a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they
saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men
came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw
accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz,
who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room.
This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he and Cruz were
asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three armed
police officers forced themselves into the house. One of them shoved him and said, "D'yan ka lang, pusher
ka." He was handcuffed and someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought
accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the charges against them. They
were shown a box that the police said had been recovered from his house.
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught
accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession.
Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and
credit to their testimony and rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid warrantless arrest was executed
HELD:
No. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal,
the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia
that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an
invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
254
People v. Vasquez
G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS:
The accused argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he
was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a
warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained
as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible,
the appellant posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he
was able to prove that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an
employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens
in court.
he RTC gave more credence to the prosecution's evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The trial court held that the
appellant did not present any evidence that would show that the police officers in this case were impelled by
an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted
that the volume of the shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for
illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the
possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers.
The appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale
and illegal possession of shabu.
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of an arrest may be raised on appeal
HELD:
No, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v.
Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters
his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was
cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter
is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in
a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful.
Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless
seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid.
255
RULE 114
256
Zuño v. Cabebe
A.M. OCA No. 03 – 1800 –
Novermber 26, 2004 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
RTJ
FACTS: On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused
to a speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an Order granting bail to the
accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused
Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge issued the Order without the
accused's application or motion for bail.
In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued the Order dated November 5,
2002 granting bail to the accused without any hearing, "the same was premised on the constitutional right of
the accused to a speedy trial." There was delay in the proceedings due to complainant's frequent absences
and failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court, resulting in the cancellation of the hearings.
The prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not bail may be granted without prior hearing
HELD:
No. The requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain professional
competence; and by the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He
must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live
up to these standards.
It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with knowingly rendering unjust judgment, gross
ignorance of the law and partiality. We ruled that in order to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order, respondent judge must have acted in bad faith, with malice or in willful disregard of the
right of a litigant.
257
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People's Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by
the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional
arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent.
That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with
the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733,
raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed in the
same case a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high
"flight risk."
ISSUE: Whether or not bail may be granted in extradition cases
HELD:
Yes. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light
of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In
the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing,
the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.
258
Leviste v. CA
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010 Corona, J.
FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the
matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled
that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.
ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a
penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending
appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
No. It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner's urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage; where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant's case falls within the
first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the
demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant's case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court's stringent
discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the
presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the
existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding
that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding
will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
259
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile
respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition. On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan
issued its resolution denying Enrile's motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody
of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. On the same day that the warrant
for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. Enrile argued that he
should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must
further be seriously considered. Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to
bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution
has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering
the presence of two mitigating circumstances — his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has
not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not
be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition,
and his social standing. The Ombudsman contends that Enrile's right to bail is discretionary as he is charged
with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine
whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not Enrile should be entitled to bail
HELD:
Yes, while the general rule is, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest,
or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty
under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once
it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. The decision
whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power
to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon
his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and
his private lives, his long years of public service, and history's judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile's health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
260
Napoles v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 224162 November 7, 2017 Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS: On July 7, 2014, Napoles filed her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is
insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the State
witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistleblowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias,
and baseless. Citing the res inter alios acta rule, Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these
whistleblowers are inadmissible against her.
In the first assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution dated October 16, 2015, the Petition for Bail of Napoles was
denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be granted bail
HELD:
No. The trial court is thus granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the
part of the accused. The trial court may also deny the application for bail when the accused is a flight risk,
notwithstanding the prosecution's evidence on the guilt of the accused.
In exercising this discretion, the trial court should receive the parties' evidence at a hearing duly scheduled
for this purpose. The prosecution and the accused are granted reasonable opportunity to prove their respective
positions: on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, and on the
part of the defense, the opposite. The hearing is summary and limited to the determination of the weight of
evidence for purposes of granting or denying bail. The denial or refusal must be supported by a summary of
the prosecution's evidence.
Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. This was the burden that the
prosecution assumed in the subsequent hearings that followed the filing of Napoles' Petition for Bail before
the Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh
the evidence of the prosecution and the defense.
At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are limited to the determination of whether there is a
strong presumption of Napoles' guilt. It is merely a preliminary determination, and the Sandiganbayan may
deny admission to bail even when there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles. Thus, the prosecution
can discharge its burden by proving that the evidence against Napoles shows evident proof of guilt or a great
presumption of guilt.
261
Altobano – Ruiz v. Pichay
A.M. No. MTJ – 17 – 1893 February 19, 2018 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Complainant Ruiz and Paran are the accused in an adultery case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
2562, which is pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Trece Martires City, Cavite,
presided by Judge Gonzalo Q. Mapili, Jr. On March 19, 2014, accused Paran was apprehended at his
residence in Quezon City by police authorities from Parañaque City by virtue of the Warrant of Arrest dated
March 12, 2014 issued by Judge Mapili. He was detained for several days at the Parañaque City Police
Station.
On March 22, 2014, accused Paran filed an application for bail before Branch 78, MeTC, Parañaque City,
which was promptly approved by respondent Judge Pichay after the accused posted a cash bond of
P12,000.00. Ruiz voluntarily surrendered before Judge Mapili and was temporarily released on bail upon
posting a cash bond of P12,000.00.
Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay had no authority to approve Paran's application for bail since the latter already
had a pending criminal case for adultery in another court, and he was actually arrested in Quezon City which
was outside Judge Pichay's territorial jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting bail to the accused
HELD:
Yes. In Judge Español v. Judge Mupas, the Court held that judges who approve applications for bail of
accused whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross ignorance of the law. In Lim v. Judge
Dumlao, the Court held that:
The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may
grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and
that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within
the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the law is straightforward and the
facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.
Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is
expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve [the
accused's] bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves
little room for error.
It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom
behind them and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict compliance therewith at all times
in their respective jurisdictions.
262
RULE 115
263
Del Castillo v. People
FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu,police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of
petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13,
1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St.,Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to
petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they
were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence
is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met
petitioner's wife and informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search
the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of
his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances
and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the subject ran for
cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men
returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del
Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover.
His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able
to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. The contents of the four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory
examination, the result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride,or shabu.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information which was
later affirmed by the CA on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of innocence was overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant's
control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner
as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The
records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established
that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used
the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in
the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure to
prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status
of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary
is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
264
Miguel v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012 Brion, J.
FACTS: On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials of Koronadal
City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao (Ombudsman) charging the petitioner, among others, with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and
the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project).
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-
affidavit. On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit. 7 In
its July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some private
individuals which reads: That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation
to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with the private
[individuals] . . . acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to
participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design
and Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing
the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants
from participating in said prequalification. A reinvestigation was ordered and conducted.
After two extensions for the submission of his counter – affidavit, Prosecutor Ruiz asked
the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the other accused private individuals.
He pleaded not guilty.
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a
pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition
to challenge the validity of his suspension order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order
against the petitioner
HELD:
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information
so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits
of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs
its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to
quash.
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano likewise
emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension
hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a
suspension order.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is
given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension
under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was
conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been
accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
265
People v. Lara
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012 Reyes, J.
FACTS: On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, the accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and
confederating together with one unidentified person who is still at-large, stole from Joselito M. Bautista cash
money amounting to P230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.
represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill,
shot Joselito M. Bautista with the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly
caused his death. Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3)
witnesses: Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3
Calix).
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested
without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings
including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him
in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already
attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assistance of counsel is necessary in a police line up
HELD:
No. Contrary to Lara's claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up
did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the
assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong's identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is
deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a
police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence,
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted
by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because
during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is
usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the
line-up.
266
Sanico v. People
G.R. No. 198753 March 25, 2015 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: The petitioner and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing and theft of minerals
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu (MCTC). In due course, the MCTC
rendered its judgment on April 2, 2009, convicting the accused. On April 22, 2009, Sanico's counsel filed a
notice of appeal in the MCTC. Consequently, on January 5, 2010, the RTC, Branch 25, in Danao City
ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC dismissed the
case.
On April 26, 2010, one Atty. Dennis Cañete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a motion for
reconsideration 7 vis-à-vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on
appeal because he had been beset with problems due to his wife's debilitating illness which eventually
claimed her life, as well as his counsel, Atty. Baring's own medical condition which caused her to forget how
she got this case and whom to contact as principal counsel hereof.
On June 1, 2010, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration because of its lack of verification and
affidavit of merit; and because the supposed sickness of Sanico's wife and the lapses of Atty. Baring were
not justifiable reasons. On June 23, 2010, Sanico, through Atty. Cañete, filed a petition for review in the
CA, contesting his conviction, and assailing the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the memorandum
on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the client shall be bound by the negligence of his counsel
HELD:
No. Without doubt, the petitioner could reasonably expect that his counsel would afford to him competent
legal representation. The mere failure of the counsel to observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the
protection of the interests of the petitioner as the client — as manifested in the multiple defects and
shortcomings discovered in the petition for review — was gross negligence in any language because the
defects were plainly avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines existing in the Rules of
Court. If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was so serious that
the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be re-opened to give to the
client another chance to present his case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly the right to
have his conviction reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the altar of
technicalities.
267
People v. Ayson
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989 Narvasa, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL),
assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in
the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the
matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct
and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. On the day before the investigation, February
8, 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten note.
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo
R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and
PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were
to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's
findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the
money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his
obligation, and proferred a "compromise . . . to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in
the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that
he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign
his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at
all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge was correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of the accused
HELD:
The right against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded
to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself."
It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It
simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer
any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for
some crime.
The right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena,
to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is
only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If
not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
268
Villareal v. People
G.R. No. 151258 February 1, 2012 Sereno, J.
FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo's Restaurant to have dinner.
Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what
to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing,"
they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
They were able to survive the first and second day. After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal,
then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny
could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day
was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and incoherent mumblings.
Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they
realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed
his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the case for violation of the accused’s right to speedy
trial
HELD:
Yes. The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14 (2) and 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays. The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial,
or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable
motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay,
the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the
accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the
dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy. As we have previously discussed,
however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies. The rule on double jeopardy is not
triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness
thereof. Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents
double jeopardy from attaching.
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA's dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
269
RULE 116
270
People v. Estomaca
G.R. Nos. 117485 – 86 April 22, 1996 Regalado, J.
FACTS: Melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the second husband of Melita's mother. Melita has a
full-blood younger brother around twelve (12) years old. She has two (2) half-blood sisters (from) the first
marriage of her mother who are residing in Manila. Melita claims that she was first raped in July 1993, at
their residence at Barangay Tiolas, San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Proceeding upon the capital nature of the offenses involved, the trial court, after appellant ostensibly waived
the presentation of evidence for his defense, required the prosecution to adduce evidence purportedly to
establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, on June 29, 1994, the complainant herself, Melita
Estomaca, appeared in court and testified that she was raped by her father once in December, 1993 and, again,
on March 6, 1994. Both incidents, according to her, took place inside their residence at Sitio Tan-agan,
Barangay Tiolas in San Joaquin, Iloilo at nighttime and that, on those two occasions, she tried to resist her
father's assaults to no avail. After the last rape, she gathered enough courage to flee from their home, and
thereafter she reported the incidents to her mother who was then living separately from them. Apparently,
appellant was later apprehended and has since been under detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid arraignment was conducted
HELD:
Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or
by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses
stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his
plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly
followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal
thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
No valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in Alicando the arraignment of
appellant therein was void, the judgment of conviction rendered against him was likewise void, hence in
fairness to him and in justice to the offended party that case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours with the aforementioned cases on the particular determinant
issue, we have perforce to yield to the same doctrine and disposition.
271
People v. Pangilinan
G.R. No. 171020 March 14, 2007 Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Alfredo Pangilinan was charged with 2 informations for the rape of his daughter, AAA. He was
arrested and detained with no recommendation for bail which prompted him to file a petition for bail.
The trial court was convinced that private complainant was raped several times by her father during the month
of September 1995, and once on 5 January 1997. It accorded credence to the testimony of private complainant
who, at 12 years old testified in a spontaneous and direct manner. It found private complainant to be
immature, innocent, naïve, unfamiliar with sex and incapable of inventing or fabricating charges against her
own father when the sexual assaults were committed in September 1995 and January 1997 when she was
only 10 or 11 years old.
The trial court brushed aside appellant's defense of denial. It said it is simply unbelievable for a ten-year old
girl to be as malicious as appellant described his daughter. It explained that the minor inconsistencies in
private complainant's testimony did not in any way affect her credibility.
On 9 June 1999, the trial court, having discovered that appellant had not yet been arraigned, scheduled his
arraignment. On 17 June 1999, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio,pleaded not guilty to the
charges against him. Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it adduced during the hearing for the
petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence the trial court admitted, the trial court deemed
the cases submitted for decision.
In its Decision dated 9 September 1999, the trial court convicted appellant of two counts of rape and imposed
on him the capital punishment for each count.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arraignment was valid
HELD:
Yes. appellant assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only
after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial
to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against
him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the
time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred
on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise
the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to
him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.
Appellant's belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel
participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel
even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel's active participation in the hearings is a clear
indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected
and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently
arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being
convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been
violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect.
272
Daan v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 163972 – 77 March 28, 2008 Austria – Martinez, J.
FACTS: Said accused, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three
counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00,
respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period
making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato,
Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition
to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same
with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary
surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused
proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document
by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their
plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer
to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the
accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual.
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioner's Motion to
Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent
reason was presented to justify its approval.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying Daan’s motion to plea bargain
HELD:
Yes. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118
of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference, viz.:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. — In all criminal cases cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment
and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court,
order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
273
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. — All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in
section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its
evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made
during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be
made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of
guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however
use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty
for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely
to the sound discretion of the trial court
274
People v. Janjalani
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011 Sereno, J.
FACTS: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus
terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30
in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus
conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor
obliged and let them in.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus was
going to stop at Ayala Avenue. As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not
want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated
bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately
got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire
quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where
the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours
after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before
the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group — Abu Solaiman — announced over radio station
DZBB that the group had a Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview
sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine's Day bombing incident. In another
exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident.
Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for
the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and
confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group — namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and
"Jane Does" — were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea
of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge, accused Asali
pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges.In the
light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable
to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled
"guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense
counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas.
The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After
the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting the accused’s plea of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry
HELD:
Yes. As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges . . . must refrain
from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration,
judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands
fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.”
275
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death
penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused
might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it
was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in
this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if
the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty
plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death
would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges,
as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or
duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their
guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence
proving his commission of the offense charged.
276
ABS – CBN Corporation v. Gozon
G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015 Leonen, J.
FACTS: Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for
his release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was
released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July 2004.
Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both . . . GMA Network, Inc. . . . and
[petitioner] made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event.
ABS-CBN "conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and the subsequent press conference." ABS-CBN allowed
Reuters Television Service (Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo
agreement.
ABS-CBN alleged that under the special embargo agreement, any of the footages it took would be for the
"use of Reuter's international subscribers only, and shall be considered and treated by Reuters under 'embargo'
against use by other subscribers in the Philippines. . . . [N]o other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be
allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without the latter's consent."
GMA-7, to which Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, Soho, Dela Peña-Reyes, and Manalastas are connected,
"assigned and stationed news reporters and technical men at the NAIA for its live broadcast and non-live
news coverage of the arrival of dela Cruz." GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News Network
(CNN). It received a live video feed of the coverage of Angelo dela Cruz's arrival from Reuters.
GMA-7 immediately carried the live newsfeed in its program "Flash Report," together with its live
broadcast. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages
of ABS-CBN. GMA-7's news control room staff saw neither the "No Access Philippines" notice nor a notice
that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual
Property Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in granting the Motion to Suspend
HELD:
Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the accused's
arraignment in certain circumstances only:
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall
be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. (12a) (Emphasis supplied)
In Samson v. Daway, this court acknowledged the applicability of Rule 116, Section (c) in a criminal
prosecution for infringement under the Intellectual Property Code. However, this court emphasized the limits
of the order of deferment under the Rule:
277
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the . . . provision
limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. We clarify that the suspension of the
arraignment should always be within the limits allowed by law.
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas' arraignment after
the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8,
2005. It was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full
control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo,
failure to proceed with the arraignment "disregards the requirements of due process [and] erodes the Court's
independence and integrity.”
278
Enrile v. People
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile,
Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for
lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail), and (2)
a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information, on June 10,
2014, and June 16, 2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June 20, 2014. On June
24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions. On July 3, 2014, the
Sandiganbayan denied Enrile's motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case
against the accused.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date,
he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).
PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Court's denial of Enrile's motion for bill of particulars essentially on the
following grounds:
(1) The details that Enrile desires are "substantial reiterations" of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information;
and
(2) The details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, stating that he would orally move to
reconsider the Sandiganbayan's denial if he would not be given time to seek a reconsideration. The
Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of Enrile's motion
for bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to deliberate on the motion. After five (5)
minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayan's denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile's arraignment. The Sandiganbayan responded
by directing the doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be arraigned. After he was
declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enrile's arraignment. Enrile entered a "no plea," prompting
the Sandiganbayan to enter a "not guilty" plea on his behalf.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion for Bill of
Particulars
HELD:
Yes. The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the
accused of the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be
such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means.
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against
surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to
prove any item of factual information included in the bill of particulars.
279
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the court it
should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the nature of the crime charged
in each case and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is
filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of
discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown.
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts or is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or
whimsical exercise of power.
280
RULE 117
281
People v. Lacson
G.R. No. 149453 May 28, 2002 Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: Before the Court is the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28,
2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 on the dismissal
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the
said court. The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing
of eleven persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99- 81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for
said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the
requirements for its application are attendant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requirements for valid motion to quash were attendant
HELD:
NO. Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable
by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one
(1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable
by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Having invoked said rule before the
petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional
(sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the
criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein.
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to
mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on
the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution6 without the criminal case having been revived. The
public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order
of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes
on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or with my conformity, the
writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction
or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to.
282
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional
dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may
be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would
not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the
accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the
statute of limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the
filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be
no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a
criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies
or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new
preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the
new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases.
For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the
decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct
a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to
have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondent contended
therein that until after the trial court shall have personally determined the presence of probable cause, no
warrant of arrest should be issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant
should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1. A judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be
conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution
to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and
2. Warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime
until the resolution of this incident. Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for. The respondent did
not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the
cases.
283
Panaguitan v. DOJ
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008 Tinga, J.
FACTS: Cawili borrowed money from petitioner. As payment for the loan, Cawili and Tongson jointly
issued three checks in favor of petitioner. The checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or
by closure of the account. Petitioner filed a complaint for violation of BP 22. The prosecutor found probable
cause only with respect to Cawili as Tongson’s defense that his signatures on the checks had been falsified.
Petitioner then filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even while the case against Cawili was already filed in
court. The Chief State Prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation and to refer the
falsified document to the NBI. After reinvestigation, still only probable cause with respect to Cawili was
sustained. In the city prosecutor’s resolution, it was held that the case with respect to Tongson had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe
after four (4) years. n this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on
20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and
not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had
already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg.
22 imputed to him had already prescribed. Ultimately, the DOJ held that the action on the crime has
prescribed.
In justifying its resolution, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do
not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not
provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90
of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the running of the prescriptive period tolled upon the filing of the information in
court or upon the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Upon filing with the prosecutor for preliminary investigation. Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses
under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. Act 3326 provides:“Sec. 2.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation
of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once
a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense
is halted. “the term ‘proceedings’ should now be understood either executive or judicial in character”. To
rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control.
284
People v. Dumlao
G.R. No. 168918 March 2, 2009 Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao, La’o and others
with violation of the Section 3(g) of R.A. no. 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information
alleged that the respondent-members of the Board of Trustees of GSIS entered into a contract of lease-
purchase with respondent La’o, a private person whereby GSIS agreed to sell to La’o, a GSIS-acquired
property consisting of a land and building known as the Government Counsel Centre for P2 Million on an
instalment basis with annual interest and amortization and grant La’o the right to sub-lease the ground floor
during the period of lease, from which he collected yearly rentals in excess of the yearly amortization causing
gross disadvantage to the government. During arraignment, Dumlao pleaded not guilty, and as agreed by
prosecution and respondents, a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Exhibits was submitted to the
court. The Joint Stipulation admitted additional facts: (1) 3 members of the Board, Dumlao being one of
them, signed the Minutes; (2) 7 members of the Board were present during the board meeting; and (3) the
documentary evidence of was authentic and duly executed. It was further decided for the pre-trial to be
terminated limiting the course of the subsequent trial to “matters not disposed of... unless modified by the
court.” Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. He stated that the prosecution’s main thrust against him was the alleged approval by the GSIS Board
of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. He argued that the Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board.
Since the signatures of fellow respondents did not appear in the minutes of the meeting, these people did not
participate in the Lease-Purchase Agreement. There was no quorum of the board; thus no resolution
approving the Agreement. Since the resolution was not approved, he was innocent. He added that the person
liable was Atty. Javellana who actually executed the contract. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Dumlao. It
found that the minutes shows that the Board failed to approve the Lease-Purchase Agreement in question.
As evidenced by the Joint Stipulation, of the 7 members, only 3 signed. It did not validly pass a resolution
because at least a majority of 4 votes were required. Therefore prosecution had no cause of action against
Dumlao. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not insufficiency of evidence is a ground for Motion to Dismiss.
HELD:
No. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss/Quash are limited to those enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the RRCP.
The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused
is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that
such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The ground raised by Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. And after examining the information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically
admitted, will prove all the elements of Section 3(g) as against respondent Dumlao. Therefore, the motion to
quash should not have been granted. It can also be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it
did not consider the ground invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense);
otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlao’s motion.
From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the case because of insufficiency
of evidence. According to Sec. 3, Rule 117 of RRCP, insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of
a Motion to Quash. It is only a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case as
provided in Sec. 23, Rule 119 of RRCP on demurrer to evidence. In the case at bar, Sandiganbayan dismissed
the case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity
to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused’s culpability. It was therefore
erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider the
ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at
the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
285
Soriano v. People
G.R. No. 225010 November 21, 2018 Tijam, J.
FACTS: State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, with violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General Banking Act,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related
Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules)
An information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was also filed against Soriano and
Ilagan. The informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000,
respectively, and were raffled to Branch 14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga Dime. Another information for
violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against Soriano, this time, covering the
P15,000,000.00 loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Mañaol.
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document for obtaining said
loan. The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch
77, presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman. Petitioners Soriano and Ilagan filed an MQ before both
salas. Petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was
charged with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly
securing fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute an
offense. Both salas of RTC denied the MQ. Petitioners filed a Rule 65 before the CA but it was dismissed.
Petitioners filed a Rule 45 before the SC. 
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2 judges correctly denied the Motion to Quash
HELD:
YES. Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more than one (1)
offense is charged. They point that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru
falsification of commercial document for allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they claim that the
informations were duplicitous; hence, they should be quashed.
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section
3(e), Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous
information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By duplicity of charges is meant a single
complaint or information that charges more than one offense.15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Otherwise
stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than
one offense.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with
more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense only, because all the charges filed
against him proceed from and are based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues
that he cannot be charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document, considering that he is already
being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.
286
Cerezo v. People
G.R. No. 185230 June 1, 2011 Nachura, J.
FACTS: On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents
Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo
(Mapalo).Finding probable cause to indict the respondents, the OP-QC filed the information with the RTC.
Respondents then filed a motion for reconsideration before the OP-QC.OP-QC then acting on the motion of
the respondents reversed its earlier finding and recommended the of the information. Consequently, a motion
to dismiss and withdraw information was filed before the RTC which the court granted. Aggrieved, petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality,
considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the DOJ. The RTC deferred
action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ. The SOJ promulgated his resolution reversing
and setting aside the OP-QC’s resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for
libel.RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, conformably with
the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. CA found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of the case. CA annulled the impugned RTC Orders, ruling that all the elements of double
jeopardy exist.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy to warrant the dismissal of the case
HELD:
No. Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial
court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It
is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the
ruling of the SOJ is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
Here, it is obvious from the Order of the RTC dismissing the criminal case that the RTC judge failed to make
his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed
to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on
the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and
judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution
appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents.The same holds true
with respect to the Order, which reinstated the case.
The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary.
It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites
are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
Since we have held that the Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of
the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal
of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
287
Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products
FACTS: Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of
Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June
9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).
On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz,
then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s
motion for reconsideration. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC
of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit
on May 23, 2005. Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005. Co then
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 171096. We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.There being no motion for
reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006. Before the MeTC Branch
50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge
Ortiz, Co filed a “Motion for Permanent Dismissal” on July 13, 2006. Uy opposed the motion, contending
that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In
spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion.
When the court subsequently denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006, Uy filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated
September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of
the criminal cases.Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the
petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
Petitioner’s contention: Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to
speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on
June 9, 2003, there was already a “vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay, which is in violation of
Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandating that the entire trial period should not exceed 180 days from
the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over
the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion because its revival would
already put him in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner on the ground of denial of his
right to speedy trial constitutes final dismissal of these cases.
HELD:
NO. Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any
evidence that the alleged “vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay in the trial was attended with malice
or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court
has emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.”
In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in
view of the entirety of the proceedings.The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b)
reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely,
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be
given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. “While the Court recognizes the accused's right to
speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for
an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.”
288
People v. De Leon
G.R. No. 197546 March 23, 2015 Perez, J.
FACTS: The accused-appellant were charged with robbery with homicide under an information which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence and/or intimidation against [sic] person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob
one EMILIO A. PRASMO, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned, while
victim/deceased Emilio A. Prasmo was walking along A. Bonifacio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches,
this City, together with his wife and daughter in-law, accused pursuant to their conspiracy armed with
sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and .38 cal. revolver rob EMILIO A. PRASMO and took and carried away
₱7,000.00, Philippine currency, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, with evident premeditation, abuse
of superior strength and treachery, accused with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon EMILIOA. PRASMO by then and there shooting and hacking the victim with the use of said weapons,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Emilio A. Prasmo.
When arraigned, all the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty except accused Antonio. Thus, the
RTC ordered a reverse trial in so far as Antonio is concerned. The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the information but found guilty all the accused guilty of the
crime of murder. Contrary to the charge of robbery with homicide the accused id=s guilty of the crime of
murder because the prosecution failed to establish the crime of robbery. The RTC held that in order to sustain
a conviction of robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself. The CA
affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC and found all the accused guilty of the crime of murder.
However, contrary to the findings of the RTC with regard to the crime of robbery, CA reversed the ruling of
the RTC and found accused danilo guilty of the separate crime of robbery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused de leon was placed in double jeopardy when the appellate court also
found him guilty of robbery based on the same information filed where he was already found guilty of murder
HELD:
YES. Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid Information for
robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack
of sufficient evidence, which amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed the
conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery was not proven. The RTC Decision which found
accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of robbery with homicide on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone.
As it stands, the acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final
and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.
In fact, the Court cannot, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict
of acquittal of the trial court due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government oppression through the abuse
of criminal processes. The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial. As we discussed, the acquittal
of the accused-appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible.
289
RULE 118
290
Estipona v. Lobrigo
FACTS: Estipona was charged with an offense under RA 9165. Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the
Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to
enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Judge Lobrigo did not allow
him to do so because Section 23 specifically prohibits plea bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona argues that
Section 23 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases is
unconstitutional for encroaching upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure
HELD:
Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional
It violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the sole prerogative of
the Supreme Court. The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by Supreme Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather
than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the
present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent
of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full
control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any
lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
291
RULE 119
292
Salvanera v. People
G.R. No. 143093 May 21, 2007 Puno, C.J.
FACTS: Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane. As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner
was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried
Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter.
All the accused have been arrested and detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large. Petitioner
applied for bail while the prosecution moved for the discharge of the accused Abutin and Tampelix as state
witness. The trial court granted the bail and denied prosecution’s motion for the discharged of the said
accused. It then appealed to the CA and contended that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witness. It aslso claimed
that it was premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioner’s application for bail. The CA
sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused to become state witness and cancelled the bail bond of
petitioner Salvanera. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed serious error when it ruled that the “substantial corroboration”
requirement under Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court was satisfied by the prosecution
HELD:
NO. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be
present, namely:
1. Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
2. The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
3. The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
4. The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
5. The trial court is satisfied that:
a. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b. There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
c. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the
exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness." The
corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will be
testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the
acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are
corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory
testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other
respects." It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or
evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and
Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness
becomes manifest." As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the
conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because
only they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime,
as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of
the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission
of the crime.
293
Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008 Nachura, J.
FACTS: Respondents (Risos, et. al.) were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC. The case, arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed
by respondents where they made it appear that petitioner (Concepcion De Manguerra), the owner of the
mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Concepcion who
was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical
Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment. The
counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition due to her weak physical condition and
old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC of Cebu granted the motion and directed that
Concepcion’s deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. After several motions for change
of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken at her residence.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. The CA
nullified the RTC orders, declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific
provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the judge or the
court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City;
and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deposition of a prosecution witness not before the court where the action is
pending may be allowed.
HELD:
NO. No. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that
the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the
accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same
manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure apply
suppletorily to criminal cases. It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of
civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules
of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23
suppletorily or otherwise.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before
the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, there is nothing in the rule which
may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within
the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court
may not introduce exceptions or conditions.
294
Jimenez v. People
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012 Brion, J.
FACTS: In a motion to discharge an accused to become a state witness, it is still the trial court that determines
whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications satisfies the
procedural norms. This is a symbiotic relationship as the trial court largely exercises its prerogative based on
the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda naming Manuel J.
Jimenez and several others as co-conspirators. His statements detailed where the alleged steel casing
containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver near the place which he
pointed. Montero filed a motion for discharge as a state witness for the prosecution, to which Jimenez
opposed. The motion to discharge was granted by Judge Zaldy B. Docena stating that the prosecution had
presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of granting the
said motion.
Jimenez opposed Judge Docena’s ruling averring that the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to discharge because: (1)the requirements for granting a motion were not properly
complied; (2)there is no absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero; (3)Montero’s testimony do not
corroborate with the prosecution’s evidence; (4) and Montero is favored as a state witness though he appears
to be the most guilty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Docena gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the motion to discharge
Montero as a state witness.
HELD:
No. Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner.To resolve a motion to
discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, itonly require that that the
testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on
all points.A trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute
certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of
the accused. It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the
accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in
reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely
exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
295
People v. De Grano
FACTS: Lacaba and the De Granos, Joven and Armando, were charged of the crime of murder, together
with their co-accused Genil and the Landichos, Leonides and Domingo, who remained at-large. Lacaba and
the De Granos pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. They filed a motion for bail contending that the
evidence against them was not strong. However, the prosecution moved that the venue be transferred from
Batangas to Manila as one of the accused was then the incumbent mayor of Laurel, Batangas. Before the
transfer, the RTC of Batangas deferred the resolution of the motion and allowed the prosecution to present
its evidence. Thereafter the hearing of the application for bail ensued before the RTC of Manila and the court
found that the evidence to prove treachery and evident premeditation was not strong. Thus, their motion for
bail was granted. The prosecution then filed a MR but was denied. The prosecution then filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA but the same was denied. On appeal to the SC, the order of the RTC granting bail was
set aside. Upon De Granos’, et. al. motion for reconsideration, the SC remanded the case to the RTC because
the RTC deferred the rendition of its decision as to the merits of the case. The RTC then found De Granos,
Landicho, and Lacaba guilty of murder. However, only Lacaba was present at the promulgation. Lacaba, et.
al., then filed a Joint MR praying that the RTC Decision be reconsidered and set aside.The prosecution
pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except
Lacaba, were at-large. Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their
right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court. The RTC modified
its earlier decision by acquitting the De Granosand downgrading the conviction of Landicho and Lacabafrom
murder to homicide. Lacaba then filed a Notice of Appeal which the RTC granted.
The People then filed a petition for certiorari via Rule 65 before the CA. It alleged that it had no other plain,
adequate, and speedy remedy, considering that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However,
by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not only reversible errors of judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Consequently, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy. However, the petition was
dismissed by the CA in a Resolution as it was not filed by the OSG and that the assailed orders were only
photocopies. On MR, the CA once again dismissed the same on the ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy.
HELD:
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. By way of exception,
a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but only
upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event, the accused cannot
be considered at risk of double jeopardy.
Sec. 14(2),Art. III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the
trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or
of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative.
At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.Theaccused who failed to
appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However,
within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
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promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of
said remedies within 15 days from notice.
Here, when the Decision was promulgated, only Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without
surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, the De Granos and Landicho joined Lacaba in their
MR. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who
were at-large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion. The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it
entertained the joint MRwith respect to the respondents who were at-large. It should have considered the
joint motion as a MR that was solely filed by Lacaba. Being at- large, the De Granos and Landico have not
regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Thus, the De Granos and
Landicho, were not placed in double jeopardy becausefrom the very beginning, the lower tribunal hadacted
without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null
and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.
However, with respect to Lacaba, the RTC committed no reversible error when it entertained the MR. He
was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction
over his person. Consequently, the RTC’s ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide
stands. For Lacaba and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies.
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Asistio v. People
FACTS: Asistio was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines(Republic Act No. [RA] 6938). Asistio, as the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, entered into a contract with Coca Cola Products in
her own personal capacity to the damage and prejudice of the said Cooperative. The school principal sought
for the accounting of all the transactions entered into during Asistio’s tenure. Apparently, Asistio questioned
the school principal’s authority to demand transparency from her. The principal formed an auditing
committee to investigate. Based on the documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual
deliveries and sales, and the financial statements prepared by petitioner, the audit committee found that
petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its members for 3 years.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way
of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged (Violation
of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable. The
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal, hence final and cannot be appealed?
2. Whether or not the right of the accused against double jeopardy has been violated?
HELD:
1. No. In this case, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC
did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence
based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case the RTC order of dismissal
does not operate as an acquittal hence may still be subject to an appeal under Rule 41 of the ROC.
2. No. The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this
appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of
a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of
jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. There
is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving
for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence he is deemed to have waived his protection
against double jeopardy.
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Cabrador v. People
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009 Abad, J.
FACTS: On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of
Quezon City of murder. On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years of
intermittent trial, the RTC required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary
evidence within 15 days from notice. But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time. Still, the
prosecution did not make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further,
he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not
been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his
alleged part in the crime charged.
On August 31, 2006, the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a demurrer
to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his
right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision. Cabador
questioned the RTCs actions before the CA. The latter denied his petition and affirmed the lower courts
actions. Petitioner seek the help of Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer
to evidence.
HELD:
No, the motion filed by Cabador was not a demurrer to evidence.
Supreme Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right
to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground
of denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and
oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged
the trial.
It can be said that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out how trial in the case had painfully dragged on
for years. The gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutors
absence. This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecutions repeated motions for extension of
time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked his right to speedy
trial. But the RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated
Cabador’s motion as a demurrer to evidence.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer and the prosecution
was not yet deemed to have rested its case on that date. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had
presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime
charged. His so-called demurrer did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no
documentary exhibit. Thus, the petitioner’s motion to dismiss cannot be treated as a demurrer to evidence.
299
People v. Tan
FACTS: Information for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1, in relation to Sections 32 (a)-1 and 56 of the Revised
Securities Act were filed against Tan in the RTC. After arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges
and trial commenced. He made his formal offer of evidence. RTC issued an Order admitting some (Exhibits
A, B, W and X) but denied admission of all the other exhibits. Tan filed a MR but this was denied by the
RTC. He filed an omnibus motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and to admit the attached demurrer
to evidence. RTC granted the motion for leave to file the demurrer and admitted the attached demurrer. The
RTC issued an Order granting the respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA assailing the Orders of the RTC. CA denied the petition, ruling that the dismissal of a criminal
action by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which
reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy applies in this case.
HELD:
Double jeopardy applies. In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court explained the general rule that the grant of
a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and cannot be appealed. The elements of
double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. The rule on
double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the only
instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
This exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it
conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Thus, the
question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the RTC violate petitioner’s right
to due process?" Petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the
factual antecedents which led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the demurrer to evidence,
no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived
at after due consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly observed by the CA, RTC extensively discussed
its position on the various issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s
decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World
Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as common
shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired. Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental
philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has
been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes.
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Imperial v. Joson
G.R. No. 160067 and G.R. No.
November 17, 2010 Perez, J.
171622
FACTS: A collision happened along the portion of the National Highway in Concepcion, Sariaya, Quezon.
The Isuzu ten-wheeler truck collided with a Fuso six-wheeler truck. After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler
truck, the Isuzu ten-wheeler further rammed into a KIA Besta Van. There were multiple damages on the
vehicles. Much more tragic than that, the accident resulted in one death, the owner of the KIA Besta Van,
and seven of its passengers, all suffered serious physical injuries.
A criminal complaint for a Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical
Injuries, and Damage to Property was filed against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial on 16 May
2001. During the course of the case, there have been 9 postponements. Petitioner claims that his right so
speedy trial has been violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the postponements of the pre-trial conferences were violate of the Petitioner's right
to a speedy trial.
HELD:
No. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates commencement of the trial
within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order and the continuous conduct thereof a period not exceeding
180 days, Section 3 A(1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence.
In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the schedules hearings of the case" and to give
particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Viewed in the context of the above
discussed procedural antecedents as well as the further assignment of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a
consequence of Prosecutor Sia's subsequent transfer to another government office, we find that the CA
correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the
case before the Sariaya MTC were violate of this right to a speedy trial.
301
People v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Respondent Barcenas is a vice-mayor who failed to liquidate cash advances in their audit. A
criminal case was filed against himto which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented a state auditor
as its sole witness. Thereafter, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
Respondent filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidencewhich the Sandiganbayan granted.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the demurrer to evidence.
HELD:
No. In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not
be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not
subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its
very power to dispense justice.
In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion such as the denial of the prosecution’s rights to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine,
the error committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the
prosecution because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
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Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan
G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Sally Go filed a complaint-affidavit accusing Benjamin and Resally de Asis Delfin of having
committed the crime of bigamy. On 7 March 1982, Benjamin married Sally Go and had 2 children. Later,
Sally Go learned that Benjamin had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on 5
January 2001 under the false name, Benjamin Sojayco. Benjamin fathered two children with Resally.
Futhermore, Sally Go discovered that Benjamin married a certain Azucena Alegre in Caloocan. City
Prosecutor of Caloocan conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of as information for bigamy against Benjamin Jr and Resally for having contracted
a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally married to Sally Go. The information was
duly filed. After arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty the charge against them, the
prosecution presented and offered its evidence. Benjamin and Resally separately filed their respective
motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. This was granted by RTC. Benjamin Jr filed his demurrer
to evidence, praying that the criminal case for bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution
to present sufficient evidence of his guilt arguing that he was not legally married to Sally God because of the
existence of his prior marriage to Azucena and prosecution failed to show that he and Benjamin Sojayco Jr.
are one and the same person. Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against Benjamin and Really for
insufficiency of evidence reasoning that prosecution failed to prove eyond reasonable doubt that Benjamin,
Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with Resally. Court of
Appeals granted Sally’s petition and ordered the remanding of case to RTC for further proceedings. CA held
that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were sufficient to deny the demurrer to
evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the
letters and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage
to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.’s admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a
relationship. It was further stated that a judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able
to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sally Go had legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite lack of
consent of either Office of Solicitor General or Office of the City Prosecutor
2. Whether Benjamin’s right against double jeopardy was violated when CA reversed RTC order
dismissing the criminal case
HELD:
1. No. In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only
be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. If a criminal case is dismissed by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only
by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the
said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.Nowhere
in Sally’s petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is apparent that her only
desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners. Because bigamy is a criminal
offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute the case on appeal. Thus, Sally Go did not have the requisite
legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.
2. Yes. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground by insufficiency of evidence because to do so
will place the accused in double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
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acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for the crime of
bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them before the
proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed
after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s order dismissing
the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy.
304
People v. Jose Go
FACTS: Fictitious loans in favor of two entities were approved after which two manager’s checks
representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two different
entities. Without any documents issued by the supposed borrowers assigning the supposed loan proceeds to
the two payees.
Thereafter these two manager’s checks together with several others were encashed and then deposited into
the accounts of herein Respondent Go. Then several automatic transfers were made from Go’s savings
account to his current account which were then used to fund the latter’s previously dishonored checks. OCBC
receiver came to the conclusion that the signatures were falsified. Two counts of estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents were filed by the PDIC against Go. The CA affirmed the RTC’s order granting Go’s
demurrer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there’s sufficient evidence not to warrant demurrer to evidence.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The trial court effectively failed to weigh the prosecution’s evidence
against respondent, which it was duty-bound to do as trier of facts. Considering that the case involved
hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositor’s money not to mention that banking industry is impressed
with public interest.
The trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in
resolving issues. Demand is not an element of the felony. Furthermore as beneficiary of the proceeds. Go is
presumed to be the author of the falsification. It is irrelevant that the proceeds of supposed loans were made
payable to entities other than the alleged borrowers. The bottom line is that they are encashed using bank
funds and current accounts used to fund personal checks.
305
People v. Pepino
G.R. No. 174471 January 12, 2016 Brion, J.
FACTS: Two men and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat,
Paraniaque City, and pretended to be customers. Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup,
Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other man looted the
"'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go with them. Kidnappers called Edward's father and
demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward's father told the kidnappers that he did not have that
amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. When
Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He
drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader. Edward was
invited to identify some suspects from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two females.
Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. Only Pepino only Gomez were arraigned while others
remained at large. RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. RTC
held that they were positively identified in police lineup. The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed
to have waived any objection to the illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the information
before entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial. Only Gomez appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Edward's identification of her during trial might have been preconditioned by the
"suggestive identification" made during the police lineup
HELD:
No. The illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when
all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the
warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had
commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward - before and after
the gun had been pointed at him - to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition,
Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least once a day" during the four days that he was detained.
Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota Corolla vehicle. In
addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and among
those whom he saw there was Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants
of the car when he was about to be released. On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her
identification of Pepino as the person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and who
brought him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she was very near when Pepino was
taking away her husband; and that she could not forget Pepino's face.
Police lineup conducted at the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup;
Edward was not compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have been
ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only two, or if there had been a separate
lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males and two females in the lineup did
not render the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to
Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among those already presented
to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before the police lineup was made. In this sense, the
appellants were already the focus of the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial
investigation when the out-of-court identification was conducted. Nonetheless, the defense did not object to
the in-court identification for having been tainted by an irregular out-of-court identification in a police lineup.
They focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants' arrests. The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to
the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more favorable to him
306
People v. Dominguez
FACTS: An Information was filed against Mendiola and the respondents for Carnapping with Homicide. Of
the respondents, Taiban and Jacinto remained at large. A hearing was conducted on the prosecution's motion
that Mendiola be discharged as an accused to become a state witness. Mendiola gave his testimony and was
cross examined by the counsel for the defense.The RTC issued an Order granting the motion to discharge
Mendiola as an accused to become a state witness. Thereafter, Mendiola was found dead. RTC issued the
assailed Order directing that the testimony of Mendiola be stricken off the records, since Mendiola's
testimony was offered only for the purpose of substantiating the motion for him to be discharged as a state
witness, and does not yet constitute evidence in chief. Thus, the defense counsel limited his questions during
cross-examination to only those matters relating to Mendiola's qualifications to become a state witness and
expressly reserved the right to continue the cross-examination during trial proper. The trial court likewise
cited Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court,noting that there is a requirement that Mendiola must testify
again as a regular witness during trial proper to secure his acquittal. Noncompliance with this requirement,
according to the RTC, amounted to the deprivation of respondents of their constitutional right to due process,
and of their right to confront the witnesses against them.The issue was elevated to the Court of Appeals via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court. It thus dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Mendiola should be stricken off the records of Criminal Case.
HELD:
No. The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render his testimony during the
discharge proceeding inadmissible. The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge
proceeding will only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state witness.
However, the motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the motion for discharge, approved.
Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already automatically deemed part of the records of Criminal
Case and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule. Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete, contrary to
how Miranda paints it to be. The contents of his lengthy narration were more than sufficient to establish his
possession of all the necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, under Section 17, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court to be eligible as a state witness. The argument of incompleteness even contradicts
respondent Miranda's own position since he does not contest here the RTC's Order granting Mendiola's
motion to be a state witness, only the admissibility of his testimony following his demise.
Respondent raised that Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court makes it mandatory that the state witness
be presented during trial proper and that, otherwise, his failure to do so would render his testimony
inadmissible. On this point, Miranda, the RTC and the CA are mistaken in their interpretation of the rule,
which pertinently provides: “Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. - The order indicated
in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future
prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in
accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge.”
While respondent Miranda is correct that the motion hearing is different from the presentation of evidence in
chief, it is precisely because of this distinction and separability that the validity of the discharge proceeding
should remain untouched despite the non-presentation of Mendiola during trial on the merits. True, the
provision requires the accused to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies as a state witness.
However, noncompliance therewith would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an acquittal;
it does not speak of any penalty to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the
discharge proceeding inadmissible. On the contrary, the testimonies and admissions of a state witness during
the discharge proceedings may be admitted as evidence to impute criminal liability against him should he
fail or refuse to testify in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge,
militating against the claim of inadmissibility.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is GRANTED.
307
RULE 120
308
Llamas v. CA
G.R. No. 149588 September 29, 2009 Nachura, J.
FACTS: Petitioners Francisco Llamas and Carmelita Llamas were charged before the RTC with the crime
of “Other Forms of Swindling.” After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court. In its Resolution, the CA further denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. Assailing the
aforesaid issuances of the CA, petitioners filed before the SC their Petition for Review. The Court, however,
denied the same for petitioners’ failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2000, the judgment of conviction became final and executory.
With the consequent issuance by the RTC of the Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, petitioner Carmelita
for her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco because
he was nowhere to be found. Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest,
raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. There being
no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant
proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the CA’s decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of annulment of judgment can be availed of in criminal cases.
HELD:
No. The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. Sec. 1, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the following: “annulment by the
Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”
The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47
from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory
application to criminal cases. Sec. 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides: “the provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and
48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed
civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Rule.”
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. When there
is no law or rule providing for this remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowed. Here, petitioners are invoking
the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a decision in a criminal case. The Court cannot allow such recourse, there
being no basis in law or in the rules.
309
People v. Monteclaros
G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009 Puno, C.J.
FACTS: Two informations were filed charging Bartolome Tampus of raping ABC, 13 years old, and Ida
Montesclaros, mother of ABC, for giving permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape ABC. The trial court
convicted Tampus of 2 counts of rape, as principal. Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in one of criminal
cases. The trial court appreciated in Ida’s favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish
the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9)
of the RPC.
Pending resolution of the appeal before the CA, Tampus died and his appeal was dismissed. Thus, the appeal
before the CA dealt only with that of Ida. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. It
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she
was completely deprived of intelligence. On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending
physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the CA to have diminished the
exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of relationship may be appreciated although the same
was not alleged in the information.
HELD:
NO. the Supreme Court held that although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship
with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this
was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying
circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court
proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage,
every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of
the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the Information
did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying
circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable
by Reclusion Perpetua.
310
Hipos, Sr. v. Bay
G.R. No. 174813 – 15 March 17, 2009 Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Two information for the crime of rape and one information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
were filed against Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel and two others before Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by Judge Bay. On 23 February 2004, private
complainants, AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Information had been filed against petitioners and their co-
accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases. On 19 May 2004,
Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that
there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged. On 10 August 2004, the Office of
the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Information filed against
petitioners. 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss
the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004,
holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information before Judge Bay. On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw
Information in an Order of even date. Petitioners filed petition for mandamus by virtue of the resolution of
the city prosecutor finding no probable cause against the accused and subsequently filing motion to withdraw
information.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is proper for the withdrawal of information already lodged in the court
HELD:
No. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the
reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused.
However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or
the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge
refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Information can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he
cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay
did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Information; he had already acted on it by denying the same.
Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Information, the proper
remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge
Bay.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial
court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Information by the City Prosecutor's
Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Once a criminal complaint or an
information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused
rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The rule is settled that once a
criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains
the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court
is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case.
311
People v. Lorenzo
G.R. No. 184760 April 23, 2010 Perez, J.
FACTS: 2 Informations were filed against accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas charging him with
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Estanislao was accused of possessing illegal
drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Trial ensued. The
prosecution presented as its lone witness, PO1 Noel P. Pineda, who was a 78 member of the buy-bust team.
Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-appellant Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before
the witness stand and presented their version of the facts. Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-
up, accused-appellant Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their version of
the facts.
RTC rendered a Decision convicting Lorenzo for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, but
acquitting Estanislao. Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals,
questioning the procedure followed by the police operatives in the seizure and custody of the evidence against
him. The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC. Hence, this petition. Lorenzo
questions his conviction on the basis of reasonable doubt. The defense anchors its claim on the failure of the
prosecution to adopt the required procedure under Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, on the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzo’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged.
HELD:
No. The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed
out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the
offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of
the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. In both illegal sale and illegal possession
of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty.
Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. PO1 Pineda testified
that it was their confidential agent who purchased the shabu from accused appellant and that he only retrieved
it from said informant. He further testified that he marked the retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two
other sachets of shabu that were allegedly seized from the accused, but it was not certain when and where the
said marking was done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter. The
Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of the
transaction. The lone prosecution witness was at least four meters away from where accused-appellant and
the poseur-buyer were. From this distance, it was impossible for him to hear the conversation between
accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer.
312
People v. Baron
FACTS: On July 19, 1995, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court charging Rene Baron
y Tangarocan (appellant), Rey Villatima (Villatima), and alias "Dedong" Bargo (Bargo) with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Juanito Berallo (Berallo). The Information
contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about 9 o’clock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery and
with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab to death
one Juanito Berallo in order to rob, steal and take away certain properties and inflicting injuries upon the
person of Juanito Berallo which directly caused his death.
Only the appellant was arrested. Villatima and Bargo remain at-large to date. Appellant entered a plea of "not
guilty" when arraigned. After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
RTC founded the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In his appeal to the CA’ the accused stated that
the trial court failed to appreciate his defense of exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or
uncontrollable fear, CA denied.
ISSUE: Whether the defense of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear shall be appreciated.
HELD:
No. There is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime.
However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral
facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator.
The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more than 10 hours
and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape or at least request for
assistance from the people around him.
313
Abellana v. People
FACTS: An Information was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document
in connection with a Deed of Sale over a certain parcel of land owned by the spouses Alonto. After trial in
the RTC, the trial court foundthat petitioner had no intention to defraud and that the spouses Alonto actually
signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary public for its notarization.
Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. The trial court sentenced
petitioner with imprisonment, ordered him to restore full ownership and possession of the land to Sps. Alonto,
and in case of his failure to do so, he shall pay Sps. Alonto the value of the properties. He was further adjudged
to pay damages and costs of suit to Sps. Alonto. On appeal, CA acquitted petitioner as it opined that the
conviction for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged
violated petitioner’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Nevertheless, the imposition of the civil liability was sustained.
ISSUE:Whether petitioner could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court
and the CA?
HELD:
NO. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended
party in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
In case of exoneration of the accused, the civil liability may still arise when one, by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly
liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, Court found that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause
any damage to spouses Alonto. Moreover, the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed
of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when
on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and
the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted
to the spouses Alonto.
314
People v. Asis
FACTS: Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and
N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder. The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation.
Thus, the RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious
Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor
of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted. All three complainants moved
for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages.
Calvez without the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the
criminal aspects. For said reason, Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its
supplement. The trial court dismissed Majait’s motion for reconsideration while Calvez’s motion to withdraw
was granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed Calvez’ appeal for not bearing the conformity of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno’s Indorsement of the October 11,
2005 letter4 of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition outright for being a wrong
remedy.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA is correct in denying outright the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being a
wrong remedy.
2. Whether the petition can be given due course without violating the rights of the accused.
HELD:
1. No. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal
whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-
acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is
not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning
the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy, the
Court has held: Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void.
2. No. What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be
resolved without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An
appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence
and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari
can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of
discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, it was written: Petitioner, via a petition for
review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public
respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the former abused her discretion in
disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs. The petition
smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent
from the decision of public respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties.
Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on
hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered,
weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is
merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where
the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
315
Basilonia v. Villaruz
G.R. Nos. 191370 – 71 August 10, 2015 Peralta, J.
FACTS: A decision was promulgated against petitioners for criminal cases. Petitioners filed a Notice of
Appeal which the trial court granted, and the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed on appeal for failure of
petitioners to file their brief despite extensions of time given. The Resolution was entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgment. Thereafter, the entire case records were remanded to the trial court.
Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete, claiming to be
the son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. He alleged, among
others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not
been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his request. The trial court granted the motion for
execution, to which petitioners opposed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution which was filed almost
twenty (20) years after the date of entry of judgment.
HELD:
Yes, as the penalty has not yet prescribed, and petitioners have yet to serve their sentence.
The prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the RPC applies only to those who are convicted by final
judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty, and that the period for prescription
of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest
time, they were never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment
by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not run in their favor. Needless to state,
respondent trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for
execution and in eventually granting the same.
316
Morillo v. People
G.R. No. 198270 December 9, 2015 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing
themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio
Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from
petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties
agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery
and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of
which shall be via postdated checks.
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at
the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery,
respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga
branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the
checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however,
dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent
and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks
and assured petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at
Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account
from which they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands
from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution
Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo
Malong.
ISSUE: Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
Yes. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which
means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a
criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred –
in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where
the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving
violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered
in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed
that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC
IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision
in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
317
RULE 121
318
Estino v. People
G.R. Nos. 163957 – 58 April 7, 2009 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: Pursuant to COA-ARMM Office Order, a special audit team was created upon the request of the
Provincial Government of Sulu. An audit of the disbursement vouchers and payrolls was then conducted by
COA State Auditor II Mona Balabaran and her team. The COA Special Audit Report stated that there were
anomalies in the payment of salary differentials, allowances, and benefits, among others. The Ombudsman
then filed three Informations against petitioners for violations of RA 3019. They were convicted of the crime
charged. They filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, i.e., evidence of
payment of RATA, on their honest belief that these are no longer necessary because Balabaran testified that
the subject of the charge was the non-payment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the
RATA nor the 1998 re-enacted budget.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for New Trial must be granted
HELD:
Yes. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction
becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly
discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was
unnecessary. In their Supplemental Motion and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed that they no longer
presented the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of the charge was
the non-payment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the 1998 re-enacted
budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were precluded from presenting pieces of evidence
that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998 re-enacted budget because the prosecution’s
evidence was confined to alleged non-payment of RATA under the 1999 budget.
In this instance, we are inclined to give a more lenient interpretation of Rule 121, Sec. 2 on new trial in view
of the special circumstances sufficient to cast doubt as to the truth of the charges against petitioners. The
situation of the petitioners is peculiar, since they were precluded from presenting exculpatory evidence during
trial upon the honest belief that they were being tried for non-payment of RATA under the 1999 budget. This
belief was based on no less than the testimony of the prosecution’s lone witness, COA Auditor Mona
Balabaran. Even Associate Justice Palattao of the Sandiganbayan had to clarify from Balabaran which budget
she was referring to. Balaraban, however, made it very clear that the unpaid benefits were those provided
under the 1999 budget.
It is understandable how petitioners could have thought that they need not present any more evidence to prove
payment of the RATA under the 1998 budget. Apparently, the COA Auditor who prepared the report and
testified on it established that the trial was about non-payment of benefits under the 1999 budget. That budget
was not approved during petitioners’ stint in Sulu. Faced with conviction, nevertheless, they deserve a chance
to prove their innocence. This opportunity must be made available to the accused in every possible way in
the interest of justice. Hence, petitioners should be allowed to prove the authenticity of the vouchers they
submitted and other documents that may absolve them. A remand of the case for a new trial is in order. This
procedure will likewise grant the prosecution equal opportunity to rebut petitioners’ evidence.
319
Briones v. People
G.R. No. 158009 June 5, 2009 Brion, J.
FACTS: S/G Dabbin Molina (S/G Molina) is a security guard of Fuentes Security and Allied Services owned
by Johnny Fuentes (Fuentes); in the course of his employment with the security agency, S/G Molina was
issued a .38 caliber revolver (firearm).
On January 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., S/G Molina and S/G George Gual (S/G Gual) were manning the
northwest gate of BF Homes Northwest, Parañaque. Somewhere on Jakarta Street, they noticed Romulo
Bersamina, a homeowner, being mauled by four (4) individuals, two (2) of whom were later identified as
Briones and his brother, Vicente Briones (Vicente), who were both residents of BF Homes.
S/G Molina and S/G Gual approached the group to stop the mauling; it was at this point that S/G Molina lost
his firearm to Briones. How he lost it — whether there was accompanying violence or intimidation — is the
submitted issue in this case.
S/G Molina subsequently reported the incident to his supervisor, Arthur Alonzo, and to SPO1 Manuel Plete.
The police arrested Briones after conducting an investigation.
Briones denied any participation in the mauling and the firearm grabbing, and claimed that he was in his
house when the incident happened.
On January 8, 1998, a criminal information was filed against Briones before the RTC of Parañaque City, for
robbery. The RTC found Briones guilty of simple theft under paragraph 3, Article 309 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended (Code). The RTC gave greater weight to the prosecution's evidence consisting of the
positive testimony of S/G Gual, and rejected Briones' defenses of denial and alibi. The RTC ruled that Briones
can only be held liable for simple theft, as the elements of violence and intimidation — the attendant
circumstances that must be present in the crime of robbery — were not duly proven. The RTC found that the
principal prosecution witness, S/G Gual, merely testified that he (Briones) grabbed the firearm of S/G
Molina.
The CA found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293, in relation to paragraph 5 of Article 294, of the
Code, and not of theft; the CA ruled that force and intimidation attended the taking of S/G Molina's firearm,
as Briones approached S/G Molina with the intent of taking his firearm away.
ISSUE: Whether or not a new trial is justified under the circumstances
HELD:
No. From the facts, it does not appear that Briones was denied competent legal representation in the
proceedings before the RTC.
Lastly, for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the
following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence
could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits
of the case and produce a different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial,
the other conditions were not established.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence,
have been discovered before the trial in the court below. The determinative test is the presence of due or
reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial. Under the circumstances, Briones
failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the firearm; his allegation in his Omnibus
Motion that he told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded negative results, is purely
self-serving. He also now admits having taken the firearm and having immediately disposed of it at a nearby
house, adjacent to the place of the incident. Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the
location of the subject firearm, but did not do anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial
below.
320
Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 184537 April 23, 2010 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: An Information dated On September 13, 2000 both petitioners were charged with having violated
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the government. This case was initially
raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319. In a
Resolution promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted petitioners’ Motion to Quash and
dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages
caused the government, an essential element of the crime charged." In a Memorandum dated July 1, 2003,
the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the possibility of having the
information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information dated
August 17, 2007, this time, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, with the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving
unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation dated June 4, 2008 which was strongly opposed by
the prosecution. On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed Resolution denying
the petitioners’ motion for preliminary investigation. The graft court found that there is no substituted
information or substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 6, 2008, submitting that the two Informations
substantially charged different offenses. On August 13, 2008, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, although the
newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination
HELD:
No, it did not. Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act which reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers
and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should
have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the
disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly
held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however indicate that
each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or
under both.
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the
evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment.
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant way back in
November 29, 2000, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly
found evidence because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn
321
affidavit was among the documents considered during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed
document to petitioners’ Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation, offered to dispute the charge that no
public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject project.
The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness,
whim or caprice. It committed no error in refusing to order the conduct of another preliminary investigation.
As sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary as there was
neither a modification of the nature of the offense charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary
investigation anew will only delay the resolution of the case and would be an exercise in futility in as much
as there was a complete preliminary investigation actively participated by both petitioners.
322
Lumanog v. People
G.R. No. 182555 February 8, 2011 Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: The accused-movants strongly assail the weight and credence accorded to the identification of the
accused by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo. Cesar Fortuna
submitted an Affidavit executed by a certain Orencio Jurado who claims to be one of the police officers
initially assigned to investigate the case. Fortuna contends that said belated statement would certainly cast
doubt on the procedures undertaken by the police authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Affidavit of Jurado qualifies as newly discovered evidence?
HELD:
No. Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument that there was no
positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of
conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was “newly discovered” pursuant
to Sec. 2, Rule 121. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise
of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below. Movant failed to show that the
defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons
involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case.
Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will
justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw
that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all
the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.
323
Payumo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 151911 and G.R. No.
July 25, 2011 Mendoza, J.
154535
FACTS: A composite team of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police units allegedly fired
at a group of civilians instantly killing one civilian and wounding seven others, including Edgar Payumo.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the trial, the accused interposed the defenses
of lawful performance of duty, self-defense, mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted that the incident was a
result of a military operation, and not an ambush as claimed by the prosecution.
The Fifth Division promulgated its judgment dated November 27, 1998, convicting the accused of the crime
of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their Supplemental Omnibus Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and for New Trial because there was serious irregularity during the trial due to the erroneous
admission of the testimonies of the witnesses of the petitioners, such should be taken anew and to afford the
accused the opportunity to present in evidence the records of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO)
relative to the shooting as to whether it was an ambush or the result of a military operation. The omnibus
motion was granted.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
nullifying the order of conviction and granting new trial, Edgar Payumo and et. al, filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the scheduled hearings for a second new trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted new trial in
favor of the accused
HELD:
Yes, it must be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a
ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain the
decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted; would not have changed the decision.
It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before
or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such records could have been easily
obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable
diligence.
324
RULES 122 - 125
325
Macapagal v. People
FACTS: On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa
for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the value of the
unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely
moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner
allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 3, 2009, but the
same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regional trial court of manila, Branch 9 gravely erred in denying the notice of
appeal filed by the herein petitioner.
HELD:
No. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision
or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is
not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides
that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party
can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of
appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an
outright dismissal.
326
People v. Morales
FACTS: Morales was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of
shabu. As summarized by the CA, PO1 Roy and the informant met Morales at the parking lot of Jollibee
restaurant while PO3 Rivera positioned himself at the side of a parked car where he can easily have a clear
view of the three. After PO1 Roy was introduced by the informant to Morales as a buyer of "shabu", the latter
immediately produced a sachet containing the said prohibited drugs and handed the same to him. PO1 Roy
raised his left hand as the pre-arranged signal. Thereafter, PO3 Rivera went to the area, introduced himself
as a police officer and frisked Morales from whom he recovered the marked money and a matchbox, where
the suspected "shabu" was placed, and two (2) aluminum foils. They informed Morales of his constitutional
rights and brought him to the police station while the two (2) small transparent heat sealed sachets containing
the suspected prohibited drugs and paraphernalia were turned over to the crime laboratory for examination,
and which was later, found to be positive for shabu. Upon arraignment, Morales, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to both charges read in Filipino. He testified that he is a resident of Dolores, Quezon where he
worked in a fertilizer store. He was in Manila at that time to bring money for his parents who live at Cruz na
Ligas. As his mother did not give him enough money for his fare back to Quezon, he sidelined as a parking
attendant at Philcoa. However, sometime that afternoon, two male persons in civilian clothes suddenly
approached him and his co-attendant, identified themselves as policemen and poked their guns at them. The
said policemen handcuffed them and proceeded to frisk them. He averred that nothing was found on him and
yet the policemen still brought him to the police station. As witnesses for the accused, his employer and his
mother were likewise presented. The trial court rendered a Decision finding Morales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This was affirmed by the CA in
toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not appeal is meritorious on the ground that the guilt of Morales was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt
RULING:
YES. At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal throws
the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold
that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply
where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence
presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception. In actions
involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the
accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in
possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of RA 9165, were not observed. The records utterly
failed to show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures despite their mandatory nature as
indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of the law. More importantly, the testifying police officers
did not state that they marked the seized drugs immediately after they arrested Morales and in the latter’s
presence. Neither did they make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence
of Morales. There was likewise no mention of any representative from the media and the Department of
Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an
inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed.
Even PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer, was not certain as to the identity of the confiscated shabu.
327
Quidet v. People
G.R. No. 170289 April 8, 2010 Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Rosie Quidet, Feliciano Taban, and Aurelio Tubo were charged with homicide for the
death of Jimmy Tagarda. On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide for the
stab wounds sustained by Jimmy’s cousin, Andrew Tagarda, arising from the same incident. Upon
arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in the criminal case of frustrated homicide.
Meanwhile, in criminal case of homicide, Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo
maintained their innocence. Accordingly, the trial court rendered a partial judgment sentencing Taban.
RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo guilty of homicide and all three accused (petitioner,
Tubo and Taban) guilty of frustrated homicide. From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA. CA
affirmed with modifications. In upholding the conviction of the accused for homicide, the CA held that
conspiracy was duly established as shown by the concerted acts of the accused in inflicting mortal wounds
on Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the death of Jimmy. The CA, however,
disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the accused are liable for frustrated homicide with respect to the
injuries sustained by Andrew. According to the CA, the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew
because the latter successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have
healed within five to seven days even without medical treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is merely
attempted homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy was not duly established as to warrant the review of the factual findings
by the trial court?
HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the
testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case,
this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life
in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.
In the instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide. Both the trial
court and the CA ruled that the evidence duly established conspiracy. We disagree. To determine if petitioner
conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of petitioner
before, during and after the stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several facts of substance which
militate against the finding that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo. For failure of the prosecution to
prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner’s liability is separate and individual. Considering that
it was duly established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and Andrew and absent proof of the extent of the injuries
sustained by the latter from these acts, petitioner should only be made liable for two counts of slight physical
injuries.
328
Balaba v. People
FACTS: State Auditors of the Provincial Auditor’s Office conducted an examination of the cash and
accounts of the accountable officers of the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol. The State Auditors
discovered a cash shortage of P56,321.04, unaccounted cash tickets of P7,865.30 and an unrecorded check
of P50,000 payable to Irenorio Balaba, or a total shortage of P114,186.34. Three demand letters were sent to
Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the accounts. Unsatisfied with Balaba’s explanation, in an
Information, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds.
RTC found Balaba guilty. Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he would file his Appeal
before the CA. Balaba then filed his Appellant’s Brief.The OSG, instead of filing an Appellee’s Brief, filed
a Manifestation and Motion praying for the dismissal of the appeal for being improper since the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal. CA dismissed Balaba’s appeal and declared that it
had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the SB has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
case.Balaba filed a MR and asked that he be allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper court, the SB.
CA denied Balaba’s motion.
ISSUE Whether or not the CA should not dismiss the appeal and instead of certify the case to the proper
court?
HELD:
No. Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the SB. Sec. 4(c),
par. 3 of RA 8249, which further defined the jurisdiction of the SB, reads: “The SB shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTCs whether in the exercise of their
own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.” There is nothing in said paragraph which can
conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s appeal before the CA instead of the SB. Clearly, the CA is bereft
of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.
An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating
the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said
period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are
forwarded to the CA. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 50 would apply. It reads: “An appeal
erroneously taken to the CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.”
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the
period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his Notice of
Appeal on 14 January 2003. The CA issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December
2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal
from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it
dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
329
People v. Olivo
G.R. No. 177768 July 27, 2009 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Accused-appellants Olivo, Danda and Zafra were charged in an Information dated November 29,
2000, as follows: The undersigned accuses CHARMEN OLIVO Y ALONG alias Lipay, NELSON DANDA
Y SAMBUTO alias Teng, and JOEY ZAFRA Y REYES, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed
as follows: That on or about the 21st day of November 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force,
violence, and intimidation against persons, to wit: by then and there armed with guns forcibly entered the
hardware store of Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta located at Eagle Street, Sitio Veterans B, Bgy. Bagong
Silangan, this City, then announced that it was [a] HOLD-UP and ordered Maricel Permejo, storekeeper
thereat, at gunpoint to give them the money of said store, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously took, rob and carry away the total amount of P35,000.00 Philippine Currency, representing the
days earnings of said hardware store, that on the occasion of and by reason of the said robbery and in
pursuance of their conspiracy, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one MARIANO
CONSTANTINO Y ZOLETA, by then and there shooting him with a gun hitting him on the trunk and
extrem[i]ties, thereby inflicting upon said Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Mariano
Constantino [y] Zoleta. CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on January 22, 2001, all of the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. The RTC convicted
the accused-appellants. Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court Appeals, which was dismissed by the latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present appeal have an effect over Zafra.
HELD:
Yes. Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of
evidence before them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence
presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during the trial. We cannot convict
appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence relied upon by the trial
court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction
must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence. In
view of the foregoing, acquittal of the accused-appellants is in order. One final note. The other accused, Joey
Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants and who was likewise convicted on the same
evidence, does not appear to have perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The record does not
show the reason therefor. Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.27 Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and applicable
to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the
acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a),
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who
failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed.
330
Guasch v. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 176015 June 16, 2009 Puno, C.J.
FACTS: An information was filed against petitioner Guasch for estafa in the RTC Manila, for allegedly
dishonored of a check for payment of a loan. After petitioner entered her plea of not guilty and after the
prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a Motion with Leave to Admit Demurrer to Evidence. RTC granted
the motion and order the dismissal of the case. Respondent received the order on June 28, 2005 but only filed
a Manifestation with attached Motion to Amend Order to include a finding of civil liability of petitioner only
on July 14, 2005. RTC denied such motion on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of
15 days.
Respondent, filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which the CA granted, stating that the
matters of paramount importance outweigh rules of procedure. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied. Hence a petition for Review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to amend was filed beyond the reglementary period, making it final and
executory.
HELD:
No. as a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly
enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge
of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and,
second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts
exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course
to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements
are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.
Here, it cannot be said that petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if respondent's Motion to Amend for the sole
purpose of including the civil liability of petitioner in the order of acquittal shall be allowed. Foremost,
petitioner admits her civil obligation to respondent. Respondent concededly has an available remedy even if
his Motion to Amend was denied, which is to institute a separate civil action to recover petitioner's civil
liability. However, to require him to pursue this remedy at this stage will only prolong the litigation between
the parties which negates the avowed purpose of the strict enforcement of reglementary periods to appeal,
that is, to put an end to judicial controversies. Not only will that course of action be a waste of time, but also
a waste of the resources of both parties and the court as well.
331
People v. Taruc
G.R. No. 185202 February 18, 2009 Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged with the crime of murder in connection with the
death of Emelito Sualog. In 2005, The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced him to death. Upon
automatic review by the CA, the court ordered counsel to furnish it with the present and complete address of
Taruc. The PAO lawyer informed the CA that Taruc escaped from prison and has no means of knowing the
current whereabouts of the accused-appellant. The Warden of the Bataan Provincial Jail conveyed to the CA
that accused-appellant was indeed committed to said jail on 10 November 2000 but escaped at about 11:00
p.m. on 23 August 2002. The CA affirmed the RTC decision but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Accused, thru PAO, filed his Notice of Appeal to the SC, hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has lost his right to appeal
HELD:
YES. An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of the judgment in a
criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the trial court, promulgation of judgment shall be made in
accordance with Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5. If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of
the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against
the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment,
however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows the Court of Appeals, upon motion
of the appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant who eludes the jurisdiction of
the courts over his person.
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The Court of Appeals
may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule,
except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal
Once an accused escape from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court. It is indisputable that accused-appellant herein, by escaping
from jail, was not present at the promulgation by the RTC of its Decision dated 29 June 2005 in Criminal
Case No. 8010, finding him guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-appellant failed to surrender and file the
required motion within 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already deprived
him of any remedy against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, including the right to appeal the same. The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of the accused-
appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what
was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court
but a duty to review all death penalty cases.
332
Tiu v. People
G.R. No. 162370 April 21, 2009 Carpio, J.
FACTS: The case stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by Edgardo Postanes
(Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for
grave threats against Postanes. Upon motion of Pasion, the two criminal cases were consolidated and jointly
heard before the MeTC of Pasay City. After trial, MeTC rendered judgment dismissing both charges on
ground of insufficiency of evidence.
Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC. Afterwards, Tiu, through his counsel,
filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City. The RTC of Pasay City rendered a decision declaring
void the judgment of the MeTC and ordered the case to be remanded in the MeTC. Postanes moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.
Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the decision of the RTC. The Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and affirmed the dismissal of the two cases. In annulling the RTC
decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC has granted upon the State, through the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of acquittal which right the government does not have.
ISSUE: Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal
of Postanes by the MeTC
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General.
Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel. Settled
is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of
Appeals. Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail.
On the issue of double jeopardy, the Court ruled that the elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint
or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3)
the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case
was dismissed without his express consent.
These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal
Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal
can be had. Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just
what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription not to put any person
"twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. "Further, as found by the Court of Appeals,
there is no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order
of dismissal of the criminal case.
333
Colinares v. People
FACTS: Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide by
the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of
prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum
probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On
appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of
Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be
entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the Probation Law,
no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment
of conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of
frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
HELD:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case to the RTC.
Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set
aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court
follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from
the erroneous judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.
334
Villareal v. People
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014 Sereno, C.J.
FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo's Restaurant to have dinner.
Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what
to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing,"
they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
They were able to survive the first and second day. After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal,
then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny
could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day
was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and incoherent mumblings.
Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they
realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed
his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
ISSUE: Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged
them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them.
HELD: Only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief being
sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the
constitutional edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond
contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment
in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right
to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory.
Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the
underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes
compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial
where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial
consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers
and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had
attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and resources are once again employed
against the defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make
the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
335
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer
blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on
double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very
jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually
takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e.,
whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the
question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden
— a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law
or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility.
336
Dungo v. People
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and the Resolution of
the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding petitioners Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal,
Jr., guilty of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049. On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches,
Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty
other members and officers conducted initiation rite. Marlon Villanueva, a neophyte was subjected to
physical harm. After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was
ignored by Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed
a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard as
he heard that Dungo had done the same. RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section
4 of the Anti- Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit, after which a petition for review on
certiorari to the SC was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 45 to the SC is the correct manner of appeal in this
case.
HELD:
NO. An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated
October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed
is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31 According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the
Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter
judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed by
the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the
Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised
by the parties.32 Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court
in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45
under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions
of law. Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons.
In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may:
(1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13(c), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the
Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the RTC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the
petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence of
conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that would require an examination of the evidence
presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems
it proper to open the whole case for review.
337
Manansala v. People
G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2019 Bersamin, J.
FACTS: On October 18, 1994 the PNP-Olongapo City conducted a test-buy operation against Manansala, a
suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a
search warrant from the RTC-Olongapo City to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in
Manansala’s residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City.
SPO4 Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by the Barangay Chairman conducted the search
of Manansala’s house at around 5:30 a.m. the next day. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana
leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a
cabinet. All the seized articles were inventoried, but instead of finding him guilty of the crime charged after
trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8 of the same law. On appeal, Manansala assigned as
one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC that the trial court had erred in convicting him for illegal
possession of prohibited drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession
of marijuana in violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana in
violation of Section 4. The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing, falling under
the more embracing term known as "drug pushing". The alleged act of allegedly knowingly selling or pushing
prohibited drugs by the accused was however, not sufficiently proven. The member of the team who is alleged
to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the accused was not presented as a witness, hence,
the testimony of SPO4 Bolina, to the effect that during the surveillance conducted prior to the application of
the search warrant, a member of the team acting as poseur buyer was able to buy marijuana from the accused,
cannot be given weight, being hearsay. On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction and affirmed
with modification the decision of the lower court. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 necessarily
includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof under Section 8 of the same law
HELD:
Yes. Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission
of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The element of sale must be unequivocally
established in order to sustain a conviction. In this case, the trial court correctly held that the prosecution
failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that accused was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal sale of
marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of the same. While no conviction for the
unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the established principle is
that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in
possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are
probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In this case, it has been satisfactorily
ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused were the same prohibited drugs subject of
the original Information. In this light, we find that the court a quo committed no reversible error in convicting
the accused- appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana
penalized under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As
borne by the records, it has been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that the lawful search conducted at
the house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045 grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP
Forensic Chemist.
338
RULE 126
339
Miclat v. People
FACTS: Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp. Dela
Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO,
Caloocan City Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the Caloocan Police
Station — Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3
Moran), was dispensed with after petitioner's counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the
prosecution. On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The testimonies of
Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was
dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature. On July 28,
2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense charged,
rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. In affirming
the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence presented by the
prosecution were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unwarranted search was valid
HELD:
Yes. At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant. For the exception in Section 5
(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made,
the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.
In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
340
People v. Maracios
G.R. No. 188611 June 16, 2010 Nachura, J.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165. When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty. On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San
Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected
transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint
was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When
the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed
to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation. At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay
Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him
that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion.
The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag
with an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof.
While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its
contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers
on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew. When the jeepney reached the poblacion,
PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the
black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3)
other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of
the women got away. PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant
Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor
of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later,
the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime
laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. The accused claimed that her right against an unreasonable search
was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was
hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayoc's purpose for
apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier.
Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid
HELD:
Yes. Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this
had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial
warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because
of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence
against the person arrested.
341
People v. Tuan
G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: At around nine o'clock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry
Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2
Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain "Estela Tuan" had been selling
marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. Present at that time were Police Superintendent Isagani
Neres, Regional Officer of the 14th Regional CIDG; Chief Inspector Reynaldo Piay, Deputy Regional
Officer; and other police officers.
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around one o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two
informants to the accused-appellant's house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellant's house, while
SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of
accused-appellant's house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to
the CIDG regional office, SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from
accused-appellant. When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez
prepared an Application for Search Warrant for accused-appellant's house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge
Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch
IV, at about one o'clock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three o'clock, Judge
Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search
Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable cause.
SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the presence of Magno and
Pascual. They continued their search on the second floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-appellant's
room, below which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six o'clock that evening,
accused-appellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-appellant to open a built-in cabinet,
in which they saw eight more bricks of marijuana. PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items confiscated
from accused-appellant and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and recovered from the
house and in accused-appellant's presence. The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) for examination.
The Court of Appeals held that the contested search and consequent seizure of the marijuana bricks were
done pursuant to the Search Warrant validly issued by the MTCC. There was no showing of procedural
defects or lapses in the issuance of said Search Warrant as the records support that the issuing judge
determined probable cause only after conducting the searching inquiry and personal examination of the
applicant and the latter's witnesses, in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. Hence, the
appellate court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched
HELD:
Yes. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant
was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant's
residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
342
Esquillo v. People
G.R. No. 182010 August 25, 2010 Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: On the basis of an informant's tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas),
proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct
surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as "Ryan."
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he
glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow
cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance.
While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started
acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and
inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however,
petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested
her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.
Defendant claims that While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which
they claimed contained shabu and recovered from her. In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against
her was "planted," stemming from an all too obvious attempt by the police.
ISSUE: Whether or not the stop and frisk principle was correctly applied by the CA
HELD:
Yes. What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct
has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid "stop-
and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's possession —
later voluntarily exhibited to the police operative — was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she
placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And,
at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the
police officer had identified himself.
343
Spouses Marimla v. People
G.R. No. 158467 October 16, 2009 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime
Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search:
(1) petitioners' house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and (2) the premises on
Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation of Section 16, Article III
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI Lagasca's
request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of
witness Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy
made at petitioners' house. A warrant was thereafter issued and a search conducted which resulted to the
finding of several prohibited drugs.
Petitioners contend that the application for search warrant was defective. They aver that the application for
search warrant filed by SI Lagasca was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head, Director Wycoco, but
instead endorsed only by Deputy Director Nasol and that while SI Lagasca declared that Deputy Director
Nasol was commissioned to sign the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, the same was not duly
substantiated. Petitioners conclude that the absence of the signature of Director Wycoco was a fatal defect
that rendered the application on the questioned search warrant void per se, and the issued search warrant null
and void "because the spring cannot rise above its source”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid search warrant was issued by the Executive Judge
HELD:
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases,
the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of
petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves
the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under
the Constitution.
It may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI,
PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose
territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
344
People v. Punzalan
G.R. No. 199087 November 11, 2015 Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: The prosecution established that on November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in the morning, Intelligence
Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) and her team implemented a search warrant issued on October 28,
2009 by then Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to (i) make an immediate search of the
premises/house of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, Vima Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene
Punzalan-Razon and Felix Razon who are all residents of 704 Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay 175,
Malibay, Pasay City; and (ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity — of assorted
dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the court.
Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be occupied by the accused-
appellants, a sketch of the compound describing the house to be searched was prepared and attached to the
search warrant.
When they were already outside the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, which is a three-storey structure,
IA1 Sandaan knocked on the door. A woman, later identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly
opened the door. When they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they
have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but was not successful since the PDEA
agents pushed the door open. The team was able to enter the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were
both surprised when found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant infront of
accused-appellants. Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the table
which led to their arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid
HELD:
Yes. The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises of different persons named
therein is valid as there is no requirement that only one search warrant for one premise to be searched is
necessary for its validity. Also, the address of the accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly
and adequately described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be searched was attached to the
records and such description of the place was unquestionably accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and
were able to successfully conduct their operation in the premises described in the search warrant.
The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the law. Despite accused-appellants' assertion that they were arrested outside their house and
were made to board a van parked along the street beside the river and were not allowed by the PDEA agents
to witness the search conducted inside the house, the trial court was convinced that accused-appellants Jerry
and Patricia Punzalan were in fact inside their house and were physically present during the conduct of the
search.
345

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ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

Taft Avenue corner Menlo St.,

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1

CASE NO. TITLE PAGE NO.

29 Alday v. FGU Insurance 41

77 Yujuico v. United Resources Management Corp. 91

100 Republic v. Dimarucut 116

116 Rep. v. Heirs of Enrique Oribello 133

129 Republic v. Gimenez 147

141 Mendezona v. Ozamis 160

146 Heirs of Arturo Garcia v. Municipality of Iba 166

162 The Prov. Gov’t of Aurora v. Marco 183

164 Diona v. Balanque 186

170 Villareal, Jr. v. MWSS 193

II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

190 Serrana v. Sandiganbayan 215

199 Jimenez v. Sorongon 225

204 Solidum v. People 231

213 Fenequito v. Vergara 241

221 Saraum v. People 251

226 Zuño v. Cabebe 257

232 Del Castillo v. People 264

238 People v. Estomaca 271

244 People v. Lacson 282

251 Estipona v. Lobrigo 291

252 Salvanera v. People 293

265 Llamas v. CA 309

274 Estino v. People 319

N. RULES 122 – 125

279 Macapagal v. People 326

291 Miclat v. People 340

City of Manila v. Judge Cuerdo

Dev. Bank of the Phil. v. Carpio

Resident Marine Mammals v. Angelo Reyes

Regulus Dev. Inc. v. De la Cruz

Agan, Jr. v. Phil. International Air Terminal Co., Inc.

Pat-og Sr. v. Civil Service Commission

First Sarmiento Property Holdings v. Phil. Bank of Communications

Alday v. FGU Insurance

ISSUE: Whether or not the actionfile by Ruby Shelter is a real action.

Dynamic Builders v. Presbiterio

ISSUE: Whether or not it was improperly filed as class suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest

Enrique Vda. De Santiago v. Vilar

ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was properly laid.

In their Answer, particularly, in paragraph 22, they stated that:

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents

ISSUE: Whether or not paragraph 22 of the Answer constitutes negative pregnant

Alma Jose v. Javellana

ISSUE: Whether or not Powerhouse is liable for the monetary claims.

Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc. v. Wesleyan University

ISSUE: Whether or not the third-party complaint should prosper

ISSUE: Whether or not the Notice of Appeal was filed on time.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte

ISSUE: Whether or not summons upon a draftsman was valid.

a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;

ISSUE: Whether or not the service of summons was valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carson was properly declared in default

ISSUE: Whether or not summons was validly served against TCC

ISSUE: Whether or not Añonuevo et al intervene?

1. The identity of the accused;

ISSUE: Whether or not Yao has the right to intervene

ISSUE: Was Republic entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank?

ISSUE: Whether or not the demurrer to evidence was correctly granted?