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Carel, Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility. The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time
Carel, Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility. The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time
International
10.1080/09672550701602916
RIPH_A_260143.sgm
0967-2559
Original
Taylor
02007
00
Havi
havi.carel@uwe.ac.uk
000002007
HannahCarel
and
& Article
Francis
(print)/1466-4542
Francis
Journal of Philosophical
(online) Studies
Havi Carel
Abstract
The confusion surrounding Heidegger’s account of death in Being and Time
has led to severe criticisms, some of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent
and obtuse. I argue that Heidegger’s critics err by equating Heidegger’s
concept of death with our ordinary concept. As I show, Heidegger’s concept
of death is not the same as the ordinary meaning of the term, namely, the
event that ends life. But nor does this concept merely denote the finitude of
Dasein’s possibilities or the groundlessness of existence, as William Blattner
and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested. Rather, I argue, the concept of death has
to be understood both as temporal finitude and as finitude of possibility. I
show how this reading addresses the criticisms directed at Heidegger’s death
analysis as well as solving textual problems generated by more limited inter-
pretations of the concept.
Keywords: death; Heidegger; finitude; mortality; being-towards-death;
temporality
Introduction
The concept of death plays a pivotal role in Being and Time; it is a central
element of Dasein’s structure and existence. Heidegger claims that death
defines the limit of Dasein’s existence, thus structuring it ontologically. This
limit has an existential significance because of Dasein’s ability to anticipate
death, an ability that structures Dasein’s existence as a movement towards
death, or what Heidegger calls being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode).
But what does Heidegger mean by being-towards-death? Is it the fact that
every living creature is constantly moving towards death? Is it Dasein’s
capacity to understand its finitude? And in what sense is death a possibility,
as Heidegger says (Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson translation
(hereafter BT), p. 307; Sein und Zeit (hereafter SZ), p. 262)? The confusion
surrounding Heidegger’s analysis of death has led to severe criticisms, some
of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent or obtuse. In the words of one
recent commentator, ‘Heidegger’s allegedly deep analysis of death does not
the ordinary sense, i.e. the event that ends life. But nor does his concept of
death merely denote the finitude of Dasein’s possibility, or the groundless-
ness of existence, as William Blattner and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested.
Rather, Heidegger’s concept of death must be understood as involving both
temporal finitude and finitude of possibility. I argue that this interpretation
makes sense of the relevant sections of Being and Time. It follows that
Heidegger’s analysis of death is capable of withstanding many of the criti-
cisms levelled against it.
I begin by outlining the criticisms of Heidegger’s concept of death. I then
present an alternative interpretation of death as limitation of possibility (the
Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation) and show what is still lacking in this view.
Finally I show how my suggested dual interpretation overcomes the criti-
cisms, improves on the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation and provides a
coherent account of Heidegger’s concept of death.
p. 284; SZ, p. 240). Philipse describes this claim as ‘an empirical platitude’
because death, like any other bodily affair, cannot be removed or taken away
from that particular body (1998: p. 358). Edwards says of the same thesis that
it is true, but trite (1979: p. 13). It is true that someone could die instead of
me, but also that no one can deliver me from my death. ‘Heidegger’s state-
ment does not assert any fact over and above the fact that I am going to die:
it simply reasserts this fact and hence it is not a discovery or an insight or a
contribution to our understanding of anything’ (1979: p. 14).
A fourth and final problem identified by both critics concerns Heidegger’s
pronouncements on the possibility of an afterlife.1 Philipse points to a
contradiction between §49 and §53 of Being and Time. In §49 Heidegger
says that his analysis does not rule out ontic notions of an afterlife, whereas
in §53 he makes unqualified statements about the terminal nature of death.
Philipse argues that if Heidegger wants to leave open the question of an
afterlife, he cannot claim that death is the end of all possibility, as this claim
rules out the ontic possibility of an afterlife. If Heidegger thinks that death
is indeed the final point, he cannot claim that his analysis is compatible with
any notion of afterlife (1998: pp. 370–1). According to Edwards, this contra-
diction shows ‘that much of the time the distinction between “ontological”
and “ontic” questions is exceedingly nebulous’ (1979: p. 41).
These criticisms may seem devastating for Heidegger’s analysis of death.
Edwards and Philipse seem to have demonstrated that Heidegger’s analy-
sis is inconsistent, plagued by linguistic trickery and contains nothing of
philosophical value. However, both critiques stem from a failure to make
two key distinctions. The first is the distinction between death and demise.
The second is between the ordinary meaning of the term ‘possibility’
(Möglichkeit) and the specific sense Heidegger gives it in Being and Time.
This specific sense of ‘possibility’ is crucial for understanding what
Heidegger means when he defines death as a possibility. As we will see in
the final part of the paper, once these two fundamental points are clari-
fied, Edwards’ and Philipse’s seemingly powerful criticisms prove to be
groundless. But first it is necessary to explicate the death/demise distinc-
tion and present Dreyfus’ and Blattner’s interpretation of the concept of
death.
Dasein’s life; the term reserved for that is demise (ableben). All organisms
perish (verenden), but Dasein perishes in a particular way, indicated by the
special term ‘demise’. It demises rather than perishes because of Dasein’s
unique way of being, namely, existence, which Heidegger takes to be
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distinct from non-human animals’ way of being. Because Dasein exists, and
is engaged in an interpretation of its existence, it is also aware of its demise.
Heidegger captures this by distinguishing perishing from demise. But
demise is not death, and certainly not dying (sterben).
Demise is distinct from perishing, or other animals’ way of ending,
because it is ‘an intermediate phenomenon’, not entirely fact and not
entirely interpretation. This is based on Heidegger’s general distinction
between factuality (Tatsächlichkeit) and facticity (Faktizität). For Heidegger
factuality is ‘the factum brutum of something present-at-hand’ (e.g. that I am
5 feet 4 inches tall), while facticity is the same fact viewed through the prism
of Dasein’s being (that I interpret myself as short) (BT, pp. 82, 174; SZ,
pp. 56, 135). Perishing is factual, for it is a biological fact that organic life is
finite. Demise is the factical interpretation of that fact, which is unique to
Dasein as self-interpreting (ibid. and see also Dreyfus, 1991: p. 309).
Another common misinterpretation of demise is seeing it as the inauthen-
tic end of one’s life, as opposed to authentic dying. This interpretation is
inconsistent and forces those who understand demise in this way to admit
that there is certain instability in Heidegger’s use of the term ‘demise’
(Mulhall, 2005: p. 302). But Heidegger does not say that demise is inauthen-
tic death. Rather, he says that when Dasein relates inauthentically to its
death, it turns its attention to demise instead (Blattner, 1994: p. 55). Dasein
transforms anxiety in the face of death into fear of a future event, its demise.
Demise is taken as a substitute for death, that can be dealt with by tranquil-
ization, whereas anxiety cannot be similarly assuaged. So death and demise
are clearly not the same. In this erroneous interpretation death is reduced
to an ontic event because it is not understood as an existentiale, a way to be
(Leman-Stefanovic, 1987: p. 62).
By saying that Dasein is towards its end (Sein zum Ende), Heidegger
picks out another feature of Dasein’s existence, which gives it its finite struc-
ture. This feature is the focus of Dreyfus’ and Blattner’s interpretations of
Heidegger’s concept of death, to which I now turn. Armed with this new
interpretation we will be able to return to the Edwards/Philipse critiques
and provide a definitive reply to them.
world, and therefore have no intrinsic meaning for Dasein. The only
ownmost possibility is nullity, the groundlessness of Dasein’s being. So
death in Heidegger’s sense, claims Dreyfus, is not the existentiell or ontic
possibility of demise, but the existential ontological possibility of not
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having any possibilities. Not only is this existential nullity not exposed in
demise, it is also covered over by thinking about death as an event that has
not yet happened to me. As Dreyfus writes, ‘The cover up consists in
assuming that the anxiety of death is a response to the end of being alive or
to the possibility of that end rather than to the true condition of Dasein’
(1991: p. 311).
This interpretation of death as the existential condition of lack of all
possibilities is further supported by Heidegger’s identification of being-
towards-death with anxiety (BT, p. 310; SZ, p. 266). Anxiety is the affective
state allowing Dasein to uncover its groundlessness, its inability to project
itself into a for-the-sake-of-which. In anxiety Dasein is cut off from its possi-
bilities, which are usually taken up unreflectively and provide a mostly
transparent, shared framework of everyday life. Once these possibilities are
removed, the background that provides Dasein’s world and actions with
intelligibility disappears as well, leaving Dasein unable to project itself into
any particular possibility.
Thus Dasein is, but is entirely unable to proceed in any intelligible
pursuit. All action becomes impossible. It is the state of being cut off from
the world and therefore incapable of action that being-towards-death and
anxiety share. Heidegger picks this state out in his distinction between genu-
ine (echt) and non-genuine (unecht) attitudes. This distinction is not analo-
gous to the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction, and merits attention.
As Heidegger points out in his discussion of understanding, understand-
ing can be either authentic or inauthentic, but it is further qualified as genu-
ine or not genuine. Genuine understanding must express being-in-the-world
as a whole, whereas non-genuine understanding is partial or reductive, and
loses the holistic character of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The moment of
anxiety or authentic being-towards-death qualifies as authentic but non-
genuine. These states are authentic because they disclose the world as a
whole, but they are non-genuine because they cut Dasein off from its world
and leave it unable to act (Dreyfus, 1991: p. 194).
The result of anxiety is Dasein equipped with authentic understanding
but unable to enact it. In order to achieve authentic and genuine under-
standing Dasein must be resolute, which allows it to act with a ‘sight which
is related primarily and on the whole to existence’, which Heidegger calls
transparency or perspicuity (Durchsichtigkeit) (BT, p. 186; SZ, p. 146).
Death and anxiety are both conditions in which action is ruled out, in which
Dasein is unable to be.
A similar interpretation is proposed by Blattner (1994). He bases his
rejection of the idea that death in Being and Time is the ending of one’s life
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unable to understand itself by projecting itself into some possible way to be’
(p. 50). This is so because Heidegger defines death as a possibility (of
impossibility); this possibility is not a theoretical or logical concept, but an
existentiale.
Possibility does not mean a free-floating ability-to-be. Rather, possibility
always involves an affective or motivational understanding, which requires
Dasein already to take up an attitude towards a certain possibility, already
to be caught up in concrete possibilities, rather than abstractly contemplate
them (BT, p. 183; SZ, p. 144). On Blattner’s reading, in anxiety all possibil-
ities become equally irrelevant for Dasein, and although it still is, it is
unable to be in the thick sense of throwing oneself into a definite possibility.
Blattner concludes that in anxiety Dasein is, but is unable to be (it is unable
to press into possibilities), and this matches Heidegger’s characterization of
death as the possibility of impossibility (1994: p. 62).
Dreyfus and Blattner both understand anxiety as an extreme case of
breakdown of Dasein’s world (Dreyfus, 2005: pp. xix–xx).2 Both point to an
experience of complete helplessness, of finitude, as the ontological break-
down Heidegger calls death. If we look at Dreyfus’ most recent formulation
of what Heidegger means by death, we find the view that death is the struc-
tural condition that an individual’s identity can always be lost. Dying is the
‘resigned, heroic acceptance of this condition’ (2005: p. xxx). This formula-
tion is close to Blattner’s idea of death as being unable to be anything; or in
Dreyfus’ terms, losing one’s identity.
Dreyfus and Blattner have offered what I take to be the most coherent
interpretation of the difficult passages on death found in Being and Time.
The view that death is the inability to be, in the thick sense of being as press-
ing into possibility, and that this constant threat of loss of identity delineates
Dasein’s existence, I refer to as the Dreyfus/Blattner view.3
Crucially the Dreyfus/Blattner view states that death is neither demise
nor authentic demise, contrary to what Edwards and Philipse believe. When
Heidegger discusses death, being-towards-death and anxiety, he is not
referring to physical death or to our attitude towards physical death. In this
respect the Dreyfus/Blattner view is clearly correct. This position shows that
the Edwards/Philipse criticism is based on a fundamental misunderstanding
of the text.
Heidegger states, for the most part Dasein ends unfulfilled (BT, p. 288; SZ,
p. 244). Neither death nor demise is seen as a fulfilment or culmination of
Dasein’s existence.
Philipse also runs together death and demise. In the above passage
Heidegger does not mention demise, but speaks of being-towards-the-end
(Ende). A little later he stipulates: ‘Let the term “dying” stand for that way
of Being in which Dasein is towards its death.’ Dasein can demise ‘only as
long as it is dying’ (BT, p. 291; SZ, p. 247). Demise is enabled by, and not
identical with, dying.
The third criticism is directed against Heidegger’s statement that death is
non-substitutable (BT, p. 284; SZ, p. 240). Philipse thinks that this claim is
‘an empirical platitude’ (p. 358). But this statement is neither empirical nor
self-evident. Heidegger is not making the trivial claim that every Dasein
must eventually physically cease to be alive. Rather, he is spelling out the
ontological structure of Dasein as finite in the sense of not having possibili-
ties of its own, or being the null basis of a nullity (BT, p. 331; SZ, p. 285).
Thus Philipse’s claim that non-substitutability characterizes not only
death but also all bodily functions is irrelevant, because death is not a bodily
event. Heidegger is treating death as an ontological condition. As such it is
non-substitutable, but it also has additional features, such as being an
ownmost possibility that is not to be outstripped, which are absent in other
bodily functions. Non-substitutability is a necessary but insufficient condi-
tion of death. Although it is true that no one can sneeze my sneezes, ‘sneez-
ing fails to match up to the two other elements in Heidegger’s tripartite
existential characterization of death’ (Mulhall, 2005: pp. 303–4).
We can understand ‘ownmost’ in either an analytic or an existential sense.
The analytic sense is simply the fact that when I have a sensation or percep-
tion they are mine; they belong to me by definition. The existential sense of
ownmost is different. It is the condition of owning up to or taking responsi-
bility for something. It is the existential significance that is required for a
correct understanding of the term ‘ownmost’.
A further argument can be made even under Philipse’s mistaken interpre-
tation of demise as non-substitutable. Philipse is correct in saying that all
bodily functions are non-substitutable. It is also true, as Philipse and many
other commentators before him point out, that this fact is suppressed in
Being and Time because it lacks a discussion of embodiment (Philipse, 1998:
p. 360; Levinas, 1969, pp. 125ff.; Chanter, 2001: pp. 78ff.; Carman, 1994:
p. 215; Taminiaux, 1997: p. 45). But this does not render insignificant the fact
that demise is non-substitutable. Carman argues that Philipse plays down the
importance of death by assimilating it to what Philipse takes to be trivial
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mental and bodily analogues. But this attempt fails, Carman says, because
there is nothing trivial about the mineness of bodily and mental phenomena
(2003: p. 277n.).5 Indeed, demise and birth are the most significant of bodily
events: the founding and closing off of a life. Their significance is not fully
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Conclusion
Heidegger’s concept of death has been widely misunderstood and misin-
terpreted. These misinterpretations are the basis of criticisms of the
concept which are ultimately unjustified. I have proposed a new reading of
Heidegger’s concept of death that overcomes the criticisms, suggesting that
the concept refers to two kinds of finitude: temporal finitude and finitude
of possibility. I have shown why the Dreyfus/Blattner interpretation is
insufficient on its own and how the combination of the two kinds of fini-
tude provides a comprehensive and robust notion of death that is no
longer susceptible to the Edwards/Philipse criticisms.
Notes
1 Philipse and Edwards make a few additional minor criticisms, but these will not
be addressed here for reasons of space and because they are inessential and
derived from the main criticisms discussed here. For the full critical account see
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TEMPORAL FINITUDE AND FINITUDE OF POSSIBILITY
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