17 CAMPAIGNS OF

THEBES, 379–362 BC
Sławomir Sprawski

In the early 370s BC the Thebans freed themselves from Sparta’s domination and
challenged its hegemony over Greece. In the course of heavy fighting, they man-
aged to unite Boeotia under their leadership and to break Sparta’s military power at
Leuctra in 371. Putting an end to Sparta’s ascendancy, the Thebans briefly tried to
take its place, carrying out military interventions in the Peloponnese and in
Thessaly in the 360s. These efforts came to a halt after the death of its most out-
standing political leader and general, Epaminondas, in the indecisive Battle of Man-
tinea in 362.

Boeotian War (379–371)1

The war between Thebes and Sparta began at the end of 379, when the Thebans
overthrew the pro-Spartan regime in their city and forced the Spartan garrison to
leave the Cadmea, the Theban citadel. Thereafter the Spartans tried to maintain
control over the cities of Boeotia and to preserve their dominant position in central
Greece. With this in mind, they decided to launch a direct attack against Thebes.
However, the campaign of the young King Cleombrotus, which directly followed
the coup in Thebes, did not achieve any major results other than to leave a strong
garrison of about 3,000 men in Thespiae. In the years 378 and 377, successive expe-
ditions were led by the much more experienced general, King Agesilaus. Although

1
Sources: Plut. Ages. 27.4; Plut. Mor. 412b; Diod. Sic. 15.37; 81.2; Stephanus Byzantinus s.v. Tegyra.
Modern discussions: Buckler (1995); Sprawski (2004).

The Encyclopedia of Ancient Battles, First Edition. Edited by Michael Whitby and Harry Sidebottom.
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
2 The Classical Greek World

I L L Y R I A M A C E D O N I A

Potidaea

E P I R U S

Larissa
T H E S S A L Y
Cynoscephalae 364 Pherae
Pharsalus
Ambracia

LO
C RI S
AETOLI A S
CI EUBOEA
HO
Delphi P Tegyra Chalcis
375
BOEOTIA
Leuctra 371 Thebes
Dyme Marathon
ACHAEA
Elis Sicyon Athens
ELIS Corinth
Olympia AR
ARCADIA GO
LI
Mantinea 362 Argos S
Megalopolis

Messene Sparta
MESSENIA
LACONIA

Gytheum

0 Miles 80

0 130
Kilometers

MAP 17.1 The campaigns of Thebes.

the Spartans committed considerable forces, these campaigns did not have substan-
tial results, either. The Thebans, now supported by the Athenians, avoided a major
battle and instead stuck to minor skirmishes and defending the stockade built
around their territory. Agesilaus’ involvement in the fighting in Boeotia drew
the Spartans’ attention away from the Athenians, who created the so-called Second
Athenian League, thereby recapturing a portion of their old influence and begin-
ning to regain their dominance at sea.
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 3

Military expeditions came to a stop in 376, when Cleombrotus, who had now
replaced Agesilaus, who was ill, failed to cross Mount Cithaeron, which marked
the border of Boeotia. The Spartans focused on the naval war with the Athenians
(see Chapter 15: Fourth-Century BC Greek Wars), leaving behind weakened garri-
sons in Boeotia.

Tegyra (375)
The Spartans were able to push reinforcements for their troops into Boeotia by
crossing the Gulf of Corinth and the territory of Phocis. In spring 375, the Spartan
garrison of Orchomenus attacked nearby Locris. When the news that the
Spartans had left Orchomenus reached the Thebans, the latter decided to take
this opportunity and launch an attack on this enemy city, anticipating that
the city would not be heavily guarded. Pelopidas was sent on the mission with
only the Sacred Band and a handful of horsemen. The Sacred Band was an elite
squadron comprising 300 hoplites, created soon after the coup of 379. These
picked soldiers were kept on standby and paid for by the city; their splendid train-
ing and outstanding bravery made the combat value of these men so great that
they fought in the front line of the Theban hoplite phalanx, or at any point of
particular danger.
When the Thebans reached Orchomenus, it appeared that the Spartans had
wisely reinforced its defenses by stationing additional troops in the city. Not
equal to launching an attack in these circumstances, Pelopidas turned to
retreat. On his way back, he took the road that circled Lake Copais to the
north. In a twist of fate, the Spartans who were returning from Locris under
the command of two polemarchs, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, were traveling
at exactly the same time by the same route toward Orchomenus: both sides,
unaware of the fact, were marching toward an unavoidable clash. Pelopidas
had 300 hoplites and some cavalry, so the Spartan forces, which consisted of
two morai (regiments), were more numerous, although their exact number
is hard to determine.
The enemies met unexpectedly not far from Orchomenus, near the tem-
ple of Apollo Tegyraios on the northern shore of Lake Copais (Polygyra).
Details of the fighting are sketchy, since the contemporary Xenophon chose
to ignore this embarrassing reverse for his Spartan friends. Plutarch, however,
probably had access to information in the later fourth-century historian
Callisthenes, and his account corresponds well with the topography of
the area.
As soon as he observed the Spartans, Pelopidas quickly ordered his horse-
men, who had so far been covering the rear, to charge the enemy. His inten-
tion was to stop the Spartans, who were marching in column, from forming a
phalanx and to buy time for his own infantry to prepare for combat. Despite
4 The Classical Greek World

the attack, the Spartans managed to line up in battle array and the Theban cav-
alry withdrew. Pelopidas, outnumbered and fearing envelopment, wanted to
settle the battle quickly as any delay might worsen his situation. The citizens
of Orchomenus and the Spartan garrison, alarmed by the Thebans’ presence,
must have already been on standby; if they had grasped the situation, they
might have tried to attack the Thebans from behind, but they did not.
Pelopidas arrayed his 300 elite hoplites in a close formation to break through
the enemy phalanx and open the retreat to Thebes. The Spartans advanced,
confident of victory, but in the violent clash both their polemarchs and many
soldiers fighting by their side were killed. The Thebans managed to
break through the Spartan lines, as they had done at Coronea in 394. When
that happened, confusion spread through the Spartan troops, which led to a
partial disruption of their phalanx. The chaos increased when the Theban cav-
alry made to cut through the weakened Spartan front. Noticing that the forma-
tion of one of the Spartan wings had broken, Pelopidas took the opportunity
and led his men against those Spartans who were still maintaining order and
forced them to flee. Plutarch asserts that the Spartans opened their ranks to
permit the Thebans to escape and were then surprised when Pelopidas chose
to attack rather than take advantage of this opportunity; this is a possible
development, but not particularly plausible since the tactic was not easy to exe-
cute in the heat of battle and the Spartans had already lost their commanders,
had suffered other casualties, and were perhaps starting to panic as they
realized that the victory their superior numbers had promised was not going
to materialize. It is more likely that the Thebans just broke through the
Spartan formation, which was probably already disrupted, but the Spartans
may have invented the story of a deliberate parting of the ranks to disguise
this further humiliation. Pelopidas then pursued the enemy, but not for any
great distance; after putting up a trophy, he led his troops speedily back to
Thebes.
The Spartan casualties were probably not very high and the battle did not
produce significant political consequences. It did, however, prove the growing
military skills and discipline of the Sacred Band and Pelopidas as its commander.
The defeat made clear that the Spartans were unable to overcome the Thebans
and protect their Boeotian allies, but what made them end the current war in
Boeotia were defeats suffered in sea battles against the Athenians and growing
resentment among their own allies. When maintaining hegemony over central
Greece proved impossible, the Spartans responded to the appeal of the Persian
king Artaxerxes and in summer 375 they agreed to sign a peace treaty that
was in fact a renewal of the King’s Peace of 386. In Theban tradition, Tegyra
was later regarded as a prelude to the Battle of Leuctra: it was the first
pitched battle lost by the Spartans in which they outnumbered their opponents,
and it was also counted among the greatest achievements of Pelopidas and the
Sacred Band.
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 5

Leuctra (371)2
After signing the peace treaty of 375, which proclaimed the autonomy of all parti-
cipating states, the Spartans were forced to withdraw their garrisons from Boeotian
cities, giving up any further defense of their allies. When the peace collapsed in 373,
and Sparta and Athens renewed military activity, the Thebans took advantage of
the situation to deal with Plataea and Thespiae, which had refused to join the
Boeotian League. Plataea was conquered and destroyed, and its population was
forced into exile. The walls of Thespiae were brought down as well, and its citizens
were forced to join the Boeotian League. These events chilled relations between
the Thebans and the Athenians but also ensured Theban control over the whole of
Boeotia with the exception of Orchomenus.
As a result, the Athenians initiated an attempt to renew the common peace.
When the treaty was about to be signed in June 371, the Thebans first agreed
to sign up on their own behalf, but the next day they insisted on substituting

THEBANS

BOEOTIANS

Epaminondas Pelopidas
Theban cavalry

Cleombrotus
Spartan cavalry

SPARTAN ALLIES
SPARTANS

MAP 17.2 The Battle of Leuctra.

2
Sources: Xen. Hell. 6.4.4–16; Plut. Pel. 23; Plut. Ages. 28.3–6; Paus. 9.13.9–12; Diod. Sic. 15.53–56, a
somewhat different and less trustworthy sequence of events. Modern discussions: Campaign:
Buckler (1980) 46–69; Tuplin (1987); Stylianou (1997) 398–407. Topography: Pritchett (1965)
49–58. Epaminondas’ innovations: Buckler (1985); Hanson (1988) 190–192. Pelopidas and the Sacred
Band: DeVoto (1992) 9–14.
6 The Classical Greek World

Boeotians for Thebans: the change of one word would have entailed that the par-
ties to the peace accepted the existence of the Boeotian League under Theban lead-
ership. The Spartans rejected the demands and concluded that the Thebans were
opposed to granting autonomy to Boeotian cities, which meant a rejection of the
terms of the common peace. As a result, the Thebans were excluded from the
treaty, which deprived them of their former Athenian allies and gave the Spartans
a ready excuse to restart a war under the slogan of defending the terms of the com-
mon peace and restoring freedom to the Boeotian cities.
The Spartan authorities ordered Cleombrotus, who was stationed with large
forces in Phocis awaiting the end of negotiations, to launch an immediate attack
against Thebes. The decision was easily taken, since the authorities realized that
the Thebans would not receive support from their allies and would have to rely
solely on Boeotian resources.
Cleombrotus began the campaign by entering Boeotian territory. Theban forces
under Epaminondas were expecting an attack and blocked the main road from
Phocis to Boeotia near Coronea. This road ran between the slopes of Mount
Helicon and the shore of Lake Copais through narrows that were easy to defend.
Cleombrotus, however, decided not to fight on ground favorable to the Boeotians.
Having learned what positions the enemy was holding, he opted to avoid them by
going around the southern part of Mount Helicon. To do so, he chose a mountain
route that had not been used by substantial bodies of troops: this ran through
Ambryssus and Stiris to the city of Thisbe, on the southern slope of Mount Helicon.
The route into that city was guarded by a Boeotian unit led by Chaires, which the
Spartans easily defeated. Afterward, Cleombrotus marched to the southwest part
of Boeotia, to the port of Creusis on the Gulf of Corinth, where he captured 12
Theban ships. Only then did he march north, toward Thebes. He made a stopover
at Leuctra, located in the territory of the Thespians, and set up camp. This move
surprised the Boeotians, who had failed to prevent Cleombrotus from entering the
very heart of their country, but it also surprised the Spartans themselves, some of
whom had suspected the king of trying to avoid battle. However, Cleombrotus
managed to reach the vicinity of Thespiae, a city that had traditionally supported
the Spartans, and find an advantageous place for battle not far from the border of
the territory of Thebes.
Even though Cleombrotus had hesitated earlier, having reached Leuctra, he was
ready to fight a decisive battle. The king needed a success, since some Spartans had
accused him of incompetence (in contrast to Agesilaus’ successes) in campaigning
against the Thebans. The impression that Cleombrotus’ maneuver must have left
on the Thebans and the Boeotians was also significant. Psychological war was an
extremely important element of this campaign. The Thebans were aware that by
rejecting the peace treaty they had taken a major gamble: they were fighting not
only to maintain their dominant position in Boeotia but also to preserve their own
city. Theban leaders expected their Boeotian allies would quickly abandon them in
the case of defeat and that control of the city would pass to their political
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 7

opponents, which meant exile for them. The Boeotians, especially those who had
been forced into joining the league, were in no hurry to fight against the Spartans,
who were espousing their independence. The main burden of the fighting had to
be shouldered by the Thebans themselves, so maintaining high morale and a belief
in the likelihood of success must have been a concern for their leaders. Perhaps this
was related to the appearance of predictions and tales about miraculous signs that
foretold victory to the Thebans and defeat for the Spartans.
It is difficult to assess the number of soldiers on each side. Cleombrotus probably
had approximately 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. These forces included four
morai of Lacedaemonians, drafted from 35 of the 40 age classes. We can estimate
that this comprised around 2,300 hoplites, 700 of whom were Spartiates, citizens
with full rights. The most valuable group was a unit of select hoplites called the
hippeis, amounting to probably 300 men, who fought at the king’s side. The
Spartans also had their own cavalry, which, however, was not of the greatest com-
bat value. It consisted of people whose physical condition was less good than that of
the highly trained infantry; they did not serve on their own horses but, when mobi-
lization was ordered, applied to rich Spartans who provided them with horses and
necessary equipment.
The remainder of Cleombrotus’ army consisted of mercenaries and allies. These
included peltasts (lightly armed javelin men) from Phocis, cavalry from Heraclea
and Phlius, and probably hoplites from Arcadia and other regions of the
Peloponnese. However, the Spartan allies were not very keen on fighting. The
campaign had lasted quite a long time and, after the wait in Phocis for the results
of peace negotiations, they were hoping for a swift return home and an end to a war
that was not in their interests. Sparta was perceived by them as the main beneficiary
of this new campaign, through gaining revenge for past failures and by reducing
Theban power.
The number of the Boeotian forces can be estimated at 6,000–7,000 hoplites and
probably 700 cavalry. Most of these came from the city of Thebes itself, which
could have mobilized around 4,000 hoplites. The rest (including the Thespians)
came from other Boeotian cities, but in the end these troops did not participate
in the battle. Immediately before the battle, the Boeotian forces were reinforced
by a unit led by Bacchylides, who had been protecting the border crossing on
Mount Cithaeron. We know that there were no allies from outside Boeotia on
the battlefield. The most valuable unit was the Sacred Band of 300 hoplites.
The army was commanded by the seven Boeotarchs, the most important of whom
turned out to be Epaminondas, who convinced the others to engage in battle. Later
tradition attributes the choice of tactics to him. The other leaders included
Pelopidas, who commanded the Sacred Band.
The battle was fought on the fifth day of the month of Hecatombaion, probably
around July 8, 371, 20 days after the peace congress in Sparta had ended. After the
last discussions in the Spartan camp, around noon the soldiers were given some
wine for encouragement and then preparations for battle started. When it became
8 The Classical Greek World

clear that a clash was inevitable, the noncombatants and others who did not want to
fight tried to leave the Boeotian camp. The Spartans sent the peltasts and allied
cavalry, who forced them to return to camp, probably in order to create confusion
and weaken their opponents’ morale.
Afterward, soldiers on both sides started to take up their positions. The battle-
field chosen by Cleombrotus stretched over 1.5 kilometers between foothills that
bounded it to the north and south. The Spartans located their camp on the south-
ern, steeper hill, and the Thebans occupied the hills on the opposite side. Between
them, there was a stretch of flat land without any natural obstacles that could
hinder cavalry or infantry maneuvers. The battle is described, mainly from the
Spartan perspective, by Xenophon: as an experienced officer he should have under-
stood the tactics of the two sides, but he detested the Thebans and was deeply upset
by this catastrophe for his Spartan friends, so he may not have recorded all factors
that contributed to the Theban triumph. Plutarch, probably following Callisthenes,
preserves some information in his lives of Pelopidas and Agesilaus, but no biogra-
phy of Epaminondas survives, which is unfortunate since this might have offered
more evidence of his tactical thinking.
In line with usual practice, Cleombrotus placed his allies on the left flank and the
Spartan units on the right. The king himself took up position with his guard of hip-
peis; it was customary for the king to place himself between the first and the second
regiment, which together created the right flank of the phalanx. The Spartans were
lined up in a phalanx 12 rows deep, a little more than their standard formation of
eight rows. This was perhaps in response to the tactic employed by the Thebans at
Coronea and Tegyra, where their deep formation managed to fight its way through
the Spartan phalanx. In this deployment, the front line of the Spartan phalanx must
have numbered around 190 men. The array of the allied units on the left flank is
unknown. In an unorthodox move, Cleombrotus placed his cavalry in front of the
phalanx rather than in the customary positions on its wings.
The Boeotian command decided to line up the Thebans on the left flank opposite
the Spartans, with the other Boeotians on the right flank facing the Spartans’ allies.
Shifting the main weight of the fighting to the left wing was not a completely new
tactic, but it was still rare on Greek battlefields. This was the first of some unor-
thodox tactical decisions that are usually attributed to Epaminondas. The Thebans,
aware of their alienation and the unreliability of their allies, chose to decide the
battle in a direct clash with the Spartan forces, as they had in the second stage
of the Battle of Coronea: as a result they wanted to settle the battle by crushing
the right flank of the Spartan phalanx, where Cleombrotus was positioned. The
second unorthodox move was to form up the Theban phalanx in a close and excep-
tionally deep order, in this case not fewer than 50 rows. The Thebans had long
preferred phalanxes much deeper than 8 to 12 rows, although the benefits of this
formation are not entirely clear. This resulted in a much shorter front for the pha-
lanx, which at Leuctra may have consisted of no more than 80 men. The remaining
Boeotians were probably lined up in a much shallower formation so as to balance
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 9

the disproportion between the widths of the opposing lines. The Boeotians, follow-
ing in Cleombrotus’ footsteps, positioned their cavalry in front of the phalanx.
The tactical ploy of Epaminondas and the Theban commanders was to launch a
quick attack that focused on the position of Cleombrotus and his entourage. They
expected that, if they managed to gain the upper hand there, they would force the
rest of the enemy army to retreat. The tactic was simple but brilliant. Although
Cleombrotus’ army outnumbered the Boeotians, the Theban forces may have been
more numerous than the Spartan element, and this radically increased the chance
of success.
We can only guess what Cleombrotus’ plans were. Although he positioned the
cavalry in front of his phalanx and started the battle with a cavalry attack on the
enemy’s cavalry, Cleombrotus must have realized that his horsemen were of much
lesser combat value than those of the Boeotians. We can therefore infer that the
cavalry’s role was to draw attention away from a maneuver that was meant to
decide the battle: taking advantage of his well-trained and disciplined Spartan units,
Cleombrotus probably planned, emulating the battles of Mantinea (418) and
Nemea (394), to march toward the enemy’s left wing, outflank it, and launch an
attack perpendicular to the original orientation of the formation. To this end,
he had to line up his units in a marching column and lead them toward the enemy’s
left flank, then deploy his troops in battle array positioned perpendicularly to the
original direction of the attack: this was complicated but possible, especially if the
risky initial phase was concealed from the enemy.
The battle was begun by Cleombrotus, who sent his cavalry against the enemy’s
horsemen while at the same time alerting the Spartan hoplites. As the cavalry took
up the center of the battlefield, Cleombrotus began the maneuver of approaching
the enemy’s left flank. However, almost at once the Spartan plans were disrupted:
some Spartans failed to observe the precise starting moment and began to execute
the maneuver too late. In the meantime, the Spartan cavalry quickly lost the skir-
mish and were driven from the battlefield; as they fled, they crashed into the rows
of marching hoplites, which made it even more difficult for them to complete the
maneuver.
It was in these circumstances that the Thebans launched their attack.
Epaminondas, probably anticipating the enemy’s move, took advantage of the
confusion caused by the cavalry’s retreat and immediately attacked the Spartan
right flank before it managed to complete its maneuver. The swiftness of the
attack on the right wing meant that the clash happened there earlier than on
the left wing: some ancient writers described this tactic as an oblique phalanx,
which was what the Boeotian formation in effect became even if it had not been
marshaled in this way. As a result the Spartans lost the element of surprise and,
importantly, had to attack the front, rather than the side, of the enemy phalanx,
which comprised the very best Theban troops: their spearhead was the Sacred
Band under Pelopidas, which matched the Spartans in combat training, morale,
and determination.
10 The Classical Greek World

The Thebans gained the upper hand from the very first clash as they drove their
orderly formation into the hastily formed Spartan troops. Moreover, Cleombrotus
probably suffered a fatal blow right at the beginning of the violent encounter; car-
ried off behind the lines, he quickly died. The Spartans initially managed to put up
strong resistance, relying on their innate discipline and fierce pride, but soon con-
fusion must have arisen in their troops: this, combined with the weighty Theban
attack, caused increasingly heavy losses. The king’s death was followed by the pro-
gressive elimination of his entourage and the hippeis; Deinon (who was leading a
mora) and his entourage also perished. Finally, under the weight of the Theban
attack, the Spartan right began to retreat. Seeing this, the two morai on the left
of the Spartan force, which had been involved in the battle to a much lesser extent,
decided to retreat in a disciplined fashion. The forces of the Spartan allies and the
remaining Boeotians also clashed but without much determination, since they
were awaiting the result of the fighting between their masters on the other wing;
thus they had little bearing on the course and result of the battle. After retreating to
their camp, some Spartans insisted on launching another attack to prevent the
Thebans from putting up a victory trophy. Realization of the extent of their losses,
however, put a stop to that plan. Approximately 1,000 Lacedaemonians, including
400 of the 700 Spartiates present, died in the battle. Such an extraordinary casualty
rate must have been demoralizing. The heaviest losses were probably suffered by
the two morai fighting with Cleombrotus on the right flank, so that it was probably
the remaining two morai on the Spartan right that felt ready to continue fighting—
but they could not do so alone. The majority of the command decided to ask for a
truce. What was decisive was not only the substantial losses but also the attitude of
the Spartans’ allies, many of whom could not hide their happiness at seeing the
Spartans defeated.
The Spartan troops, defeated but not destroyed, remained blockaded in their
camp awaiting the decision of the Spartan command. The Thebans did not allow
them to leave but neither did they dare to attack them on their own. Instead, they
appealed for help to their allies: Athens and the leader of the Thessalians, Jason of
Pherae. The Athenians did not hide their displeasure at how events had unfolded
and refused to help: they had hoped to see the Thebans humiliated, since they
regarded them as selfish allies who had expanded their power in Boeotia by allow-
ing the Athenians to bear the brunt of conflict with Sparta throughout the 370s.
Jason did decide to intervene, sending his fleet toward the coast of Boeotia and
personally setting off with a mercenary force of 500 cavalry and 1,000 infantry.
After arriving at Leuctra, instead of joining the fighting against the Spartans, he
offered to mediate. As a result, an agreement was signed that permitted the
Spartans free passage to leave Boeotia; this they promptly did, marching off toward
the Peloponnese. In Sparta, news of the defeat and the blockade of the surviving
soldiers in the camp led the ephors (the five annual magistrates at Sparta) to mobi-
lize all available forces, including the two remaining regiments, and call up even the
oldest age classes obligated to military duty. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, was
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 11

appointed general of a scratch force that he led toward Boeotia. In answer to the
Spartans’ appeal, allies from Achaea, Corinth, Phlius, Mantinea, and Tegea also
sent troops. The campaign ended near Megara when the forces retreating from
Leuctra met the ones marching from the Peloponnese. Without engaging in
any further actions, Archidamus led the army home.
The victory allowed the Thebans to continue their domination of the Boeotian
League; it also established their reputation as outstanding warriors who could suc-
cessfully resist Sparta. The win also strengthened Epaminondas’ position among
the Thebans and brought him fame as a great general. Although Xenophon, his
contemporary, did not mention his presence at Leuctra, probably out of jealousy
of the one man most responsible for destroying Spartan power, later authors iden-
tified him as the main architect of victory. There has been much discussion of his
innovations, which secured victory: some believe these revolutionized battle tactics
whereas others play them down, relying on the account of Xenophon, who saw
nothing extraordinary in the Theban tactics. Even if Epaminondas’ actions were
not completely innovative, he certainly showed his ability to act unconventionally,
making full use of the advantages he held.

Theban hegemony (370–362)3

The aftereffects of the Spartans’ defeat at Leuctra initially did not seem overly seri-
ous. Gradually, however, the cities in the Peloponnese rejected their leadership and
the Thebans eagerly exploited this opportunity to dismantle Sparta’s power.
A series of treaties with cities in central Greece and the Peloponnese, as well as
military interventions outside Boeotia, marked the beginning of Thebes’ ascend-
ancy in Greece, which lasted until 362 BC and is usually referred to as Theban
hegemony. Under the leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Thebes became
the strongest Greek city in military terms but was unable to play the role of political
leader, as Athens and Sparta had done.

Epaminondas’ first invasion of the Peloponnese (370–369)

Right after the battle, the Thebans, who were slightly overwhelmed by their sur-
prise triumph, did not take full advantage of their victory but agreed to let the
Spartans leave their camp at Leuctra without hindrance. Despite the defeat, the
Spartans easily received support from their Peloponnesian allies for Archidamus’
campaign. Initially, the Thessalian leader Jason of Pherae benefited most from
the departure of Spartan troops from central Greece: by destroying the walls of
Hyampolis and the Spartan colony of Heraclea, he secured himself free access
3
Sources: Xen. Hell. 6.5.1–7.1.45; Diod. Sic. 15.62–70, 72. Modern discussion: Buckler (2003)
296–319.
12 The Classical Greek World

to Phocis, with which he was at war, and a further intervention was anticipated.
Athens attempted to take advantage of Sparta’s defeat by summoning a peace con-
gress to renew the common peace, but they failed to take over hegemony from
Sparta. It only gradually became clear how seriously Leuctra had undermined
Sparta’s authority in the cities of the Peloponnese, where parties hostile to Sparta
began to seize power; their new leaders naturally decided to make political moves
that had previously been thwarted by Sparta. The Spartans were unable to force the
Eleans to curb their territorial ambitions, or the Arcadians to abandon development
of an Arcadian League. The Eleans and Arcadians responded to Sparta’s military
intervention by making an alliance, together with Argos, with the Thebans. The
latter subordinated Orchomenus, thereby uniting the whole of Boeotia under
their leadership; they strove for hegemony over central Greece by making a series
of alliances, an initiative that was made easier by Jason’s unexpected death in
summer 370.
In winter 370–369, when the Spartans attacked the Arcadian city of Mantinea, its
allies appealed to the Thebans for help. In response, Epaminondas and Pelopidas
arrived in the Peloponnese with an army of approximately 5,000 men, of whom
many were allied contingents from Acarnania, Euboea, Heraclea, Locris, Malis,
Phocis, and Thessaly. The Thebans, together with the Arcadians, Argives, and
Eleans, decided to invade Spartan territory. After crossing the border, they
marched south along the right bank of the Eurotas, devastating the land. Some
Spartan helots (serfs tied to the land) and perioikoi (inhabitants lacking full citizen
rights) defected to their side, further worsening the Spartans’ already precarious
situation.
Facing the gravest danger, the Spartans made the decision to emancipate 6,000
helots and to call for reinforcements from those allies who remained loyal to
them—that is, Corinth, Pellene in Achaea, and Phlius. Having much smaller forces
than the invaders, Agesilaus chose to defend only the city. In these circumstances,
Epaminondas and his army decided not to attack the city, but, having crossed the
Eurotas near Amyclae, they marched further south toward the port of Gytheum,
which they failed to capture. The army then marched back north and, continuing to
plunder the land, turned toward Messenia. There, Epaminondas declared the
Messenians free from Spartan rule and founded the city of Messene at the foot
of Mount Ithome, calling all Messenians and other willing Greeks to create a
new state. With this brilliant move, he weakened Sparta considerably and perma-
nently by removing a large part of its territory and much of the servile population
that had underpinned its military regime. Since Sparta could not accept this loss,
Messene became its natural enemy.
In response to such a heavy blow, Agesilaus convinced the Spartans that they
must appeal for help to their great rivals, the Athenians. The latter, alarmed by
the quick rise of Theban power, finally decided to abandon their recent allies
and sign an alliance with Sparta against them. They immediately sent a unit com-
manded by the general Iphicrates to help. However, fighting did not come to pass
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 13

because the moment they arrived in the Peloponnese the Thebans and their allies
decided to end the campaign.

Epaminondas’ second invasion of the Peloponnese (369)

Epaminondas led the Boeotians to the Peloponnese for the second time in the sum-
mer of 369. He was summoned by Thebes’ allies in the Peloponnese, and the aim of
the campaign was to detach from Sparta those cities that remained loyal.
Anticipating an attack, the Spartans and their allies tried to block the entrance to
the Peloponnese through the isthmus. To this end, they built fortifications in the
form of ditches and palisades not far from Corinth, to link the Gulf of Corinth and
the Saronic Gulf. The Athenians, led by Chabrias, defended Corinth, while the
Spartans and Pellenians took up positions on Mount Oneum, stretching east of
the city as far as the Saronic Gulf. Epaminondas chose to attack these positions
on Mount Oneum. Taking advantage of the incompetence of the Spartan general,
he surprised the enemy with an unexpected attack at dawn and, following a short
fight, he forced the opponents to sign a truce and retreat from their positions.
Epaminondas easily joined his allies from Arcadia, Elis, and Argos at Nemea.
He then captured Sicyon and marched to Pellene in Achaea, which had joined
his side. His next targets were Epidaurus and Troizen in the east, whose territories
he plundered. Finally, he attacked Corinth, which was still defended by Chabrias’
Athenians. During the fighting for this city, reinforcements sent by the Spartans’
ally, tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse, reached Corinth by sea. Unable to achieve any-
thing more, Epaminondas now sent his allies home and retreated to Boeotia
himself.

Failure of Theban leadership in the Peloponnese

Having broken the Spartan alliance and terminated Spartan hegemony over the
Peloponnese, the Thebans did not replace it with any permanent organization; fur-
ther, they were unwilling to intervene in disputes among their allies. As a result,
the coalition of 370 collapsed due to a disagreement between Elis and the Arcadian
League about the territory of Triphylia as well as Arcadian ambitions to dominate
the Peloponnese.
Meanwhile, Sparta received support from the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes as
well as troops sent by Dionysius of Syracuse under the command of Cissidas. Rein-
forced by these troops and taking advantage of Theban involvement in Thessaly, in
368 Archidamus moved with Sparta’s remaining Peloponnesian allies to reassert
their authority in southern Arcadia, where the foundation by Epaminondas of
the “great city” of the Arcadians at Megalopolis was a major irritant (Diod. Sic.
15.72.4). The Spartans took Caryae and then set about investing Parrhasia, while
in response the Arcadians and their Argive allies hastened to lift the siege. Although
the Spartans had to withdraw, Archidamus was able to defeat the Arcadians and
14 The Classical Greek World

Argives at the so-called “Tearless” battle (see Chapter 15: Fourth-Century BC Greek
Wars), a victory that restored Spartan confidence considerably.

Epaminondas’ third invasion of the Peloponnese (366)

In 366, the Thebans made an unsuccessful attempt to bring the Achaeans over to
their side and to strengthen their influence in the Peloponnese. Despite their dip-
lomatic efforts, the Thebans failed to secure the signing of a new common peace in
366; this showed that their military advantage was not enough for them to succeed
the Spartans in the role of hegemon (leader) of Greece. Their leadership in the
Peloponnese was challenged by the Arcadians, who were in disagreement with
the Eleans; both were Theban allies. In order to strengthen their position and
force their allies to cooperate, the Thebans organized an expedition against those
Achaeans who had persisted in their alliance with Sparta. With the help of the
Argives, who took control of the route over Mount Oneum near Corinth,
Epaminondas reached Nemea, where the Arcadians and Eleans had also gathered.
The combined forces reached the promontory of Rhium in Achaea. From there,
some of the troops were transported to the north side of the Gulf of Corinth, where
they captured the cities of Naupactus and Calydon, which were then handed over
to the Aetolians. Epaminondas’ main forces seized Dyme, which undermined fur-
ther resistance by the Achaeans. In exchange for a promise to maintain oligarchic
rule, the Achaeans agreed to become the Boeotians’ allies. However, the agree-
ment soon broke down and the Achaeans rejoined Sparta’s side.

Theban campaigns in the north and the Battle

of Cynoscephalae (364)4
After the successful attack against Sparta in 369, the Thebans decided to intervene
in Thessaly. This marked the beginning of a few years of involvement in a military
conflict between Alexander of Pherae, Jason’s successor, and the Thessalian cities
that opposed his ambitions to rule the whole region. The main force behind this
involvement was under Pelopidas.
In 369, Alexander of Pherae, Jason’s nephew, took over power in Thessaly, hav-
ing murdered his predecessor, Polyphron. The aristocratic Aleuadae family of
Larissa, who were opposed to Pherae’s domination in Thessaly, called for help
from Alexander II of Macedon, who removed Larissa and Crannon from Alexander
of Pherae’s control but, against the Thessalians’ will, installed his own garrisons
there. At the same time, certain Thessalians supposedly called for the Thebans
to intervene against Alexander of Pherae. The Thebans ordered Pelopidas, who
was thought to have influence with Jason’s family, to arrange Thessalian affairs
4
Sources: Diod. Sic. 15.67.3–4, 71, 80, 81.3; Plut. Pel. 26–29, 32–35. Modern discussions: Pritchett
(1969) 112–119; Buckler (2003) 319–327, 340–342.
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 15

in the interests of the Boeotians. Having entered Thessaly, Pelopidas came to an

agreement with the Macedonians and took over Larissa and the other Thessalian
cities they were holding. However, Pelopidas failed to bring about a permanent
agreement with Alexander of Pherae, who refused to promise he would abandon
his efforts to rule the whole of Thessaly.
The next year (368), Alexander reportedly stirred up unrest in some Thessalian
cities, probably trying to win control over them. The Thebans were not convinced
that the situation in Thessaly required military intervention and they sent Pelopidas
and Ismenias as ambassadors to restore peace by diplomatic means. In Thessaly,
Pelopidas first won the support of some Thessalians, recruited mercenaries, and
then used these to intervene successfully in Macedon to support King Alexander.
However, his Thessalian mercenaries betrayed him and when he returned to
Thessaly he was imprisoned by Alexander of Pherae. Afterward, Thessalian sup-
port for the Thebans quickly decreased. When the Thebans sent an army to free
the prisoners, it was soon abandoned by its Thessalian allies, who did not even
provide food supplies. Alexander of Pherae received support from the Athenians,
who sent 30 ships and 1,000 men. The Theban expedition was badly commanded
and only managed to escape from Thessaly with extreme difficulty, chased by Alex-
ander’s cavalry. It was the first serious Theban military defeat since the Battle of
Leuctra. The next expedition in 367 was led by Epaminondas himself. This time
Alexander, abandoned by the Athenians, was unable to oppose the Thebans.
The prisoners were freed in return for a 30-day truce and, although the Thebans
refused to establish a friendship with Alexander and recognize his position in Thes-
saly, the truce was a real victory for him. The Thebans left his power intact and
abandoned their Thessalian allies for the next three years.
In 364, the Thessalian opposition managed to persuade the Thebans to intervene
once more against Alexander of Pherae. Although the main Theban army was
stopped when ready to set off by a bad omen (the solar eclipse of July 13, 364),
Pelopidas himself still departed with 300 mercenary cavalry and some Boeotian
volunteers. At Pharsalus he joined the forces supplied by his Thessalian allies; these
must have included cavalry, especially horsemen from Pharsalus, who were
regarded as the best in Thessaly, and infantry. He hastily led this army east, toward
Pherae, in the hope of catching the enemy unprepared. However, Alexander was
not to be caught off guard and he had already set off with his men to meet the
opponent. His army, reportedly 20,000 strong, outnumbered the enemy; it also
consisted of cavalry and infantry, but its most valuable element was the mercenary
hoplites.
The battle was fought about a dozen kilometers east of Pharsalus, not far from a
temple called the Thetideion, which was located on the hills of Cynoscephalae,
which bound the Enipeus valley on the north. Pelopidas’ army, marching through
the valley, encountered the enemy proceeding in the opposite direction. When
both generals realized what was happening, they immediately sent their troops
to take up position on the hills rising above the valley. In the fight for these
16 The Classical Greek World

positions, first the cavalry forces clashed, with Pelopidas’ men coming off victori-
ous and pushing the opponents back into the valley. By chasing after the enemy,
however, the horsemen failed to stop Alexander’s infantry from securing an advan-
tageous position on the hills. Pelopidas, seeing that his infantry was unsuccessfully
attacking the opponents, decided to lead the charge in person, first ordering his
cavalry to regain its formation and also join the attack. After two failed attempts,
Pelopidas finally managed to force the enemy to leave their positions and descend
from the hills. Then, seeing that Alexander was rearranging his troops, he decided
to attack him directly and to settle the battle in this way. Under attack, Alexander
took shelter among his mercenaries. The battle was decided by the next cavalry
charge of Pelopidas’ Thessalian allies, who attacked the troops on the hills and
forced Alexander’s troops to retreat, causing severe losses. The fighting was very
fierce and a display of personal bravado cost Pelopidas his life when he tried to
settle the outcome in an attack on Alexander’s mercenaries. Although tradition hos-
tile to Alexander portrays the battle as his failure, in reality it could not have wea-
kened him very seriously, since it was necessary for the Thebans to dispatch
another substantial army against him. On hearing of Pelopidas’ death, the Thebans
sent 7,000 hoplites and 700 cavalry under Malecidas and Diogetion, who defeated
Alexander in battle and forced him to sign a peace treaty; this limited his power to
the territory of Pherae and forced him to become a Theban ally.
After several years of fighting, the Thebans had managed to break the power of
Alexander of Pherae and to thwart his plans to transform Thessaly into a centra-
lized state headed by a strong monarch, one capable of competing for hegemony in
central Greece. The Thebans, however, paid for this effort with the death of their
most outstanding general and leader after Epaminondas, the co-author of their pre-
vious successes.

Mantinea (362)5
Despite their military advantage, the Thebans failed to sponsor a common peace or
to prevent the outbreak of military conflicts among their allies in the Peloponnese.
Their policy was limited to emergency military interventions that were designed
to prevent Sparta from rebuilding its power. One of these interventions ended in
the Battle of Mantinea in 362, which effectively terminated the period of Theban
domination in Greece.
In 365, a dispute between Elis and the Arcadian League over Triphylia had led
to the outbreak of war. The Arcadians, along with the Messenians and Syceon,
supported the Pisatans in their efforts to break away from Elis and take over control
of Olympia. The isolated Eleans made an alliance with the Spartans, who confronted
5
Sources: Xen. Hell. 7.4.39–5.27; Diod. Sic. 15.84–87 (a longer and at times different account);
Polyaen. Strat. 2.3.4, 14; Polyb. 9.8–9 (the unsuccessful attack on Sparta); Plut. Ages. 35; Plut. Mor.
194c (circumstances of Epaminondas’ death). Modern discussion: Buckler (2003) 342–350.
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 17

the Arcadians, capturing the strategically located town of Cromnus. The Spartan
attack strengthened the coalition of the Arcadians, Argos, and Messene,
which jointly appealed for Theban help. The Thebans invaded and again showed
their superiority, easily recapturing Cromnus from the Spartans and causing consid-
erable losses. Emboldened by this success, the Arcadians again attacked the Elean
territory. The attacks were not overly successful but during one of them they plun-
dered the sanctuary at Olympia. The sacrilegious act and the issue of using the
resources obtained in this manner led to internal tensions in the Arcadian League
and, in 363, conflict between the Mantineans and the other members, led by the
Tegeans.
In 362, the Thebans decided to send an army under Epaminondas to support
their allies in the Arcadian League and to save their influence in the Peloponnese.
They summoned their allies from central and northern Greece to participate:
the Phocians refused, but contingents from Euboea, both parts of Locris, the
Thessalian League, and Alexander of Pherae joined the campaign. The
Mantineans also summoned their allies: the Achaeans, Athenians, Eleans, and
Spartans. Epaminondas arrived in the Peloponnese and stopped at Nemea, expect-
ing to surprise the Athenian contingent on its way to Mantinea, where the forces
of the anti-Theban coalition were gathering. When they did not appear, however,
he set off south, to Tegea. From there, he launched a bold attack on Sparta. He
had found out that Agesilaus, on being summoned by his allies, had left the city
for Mantinea, leading out 9 of 12 morai; marching upriver along the Eurotas, he
had reached Pellene, located about 11 kilometers from Sparta. Since the whole of
the Spartan cavalry, the mercenaries, and the remaining three morai had also been
sent off, the city was virtually defenseless. Epaminondas, deciding to exploit this
opportunity, ordered an overnight march past Pellene and reached Sparta in the
morning, expecting to surprise the city into surrender. The deceit did not work,
however, because Agesilaus, alerted by a deserter, had managed to turn his army
back and prepare a defense. Sparta had no walls, so its citizens prepared for street-
fighting by barricading the streets. Old men and youths were placed on rooftops
so they could throw missiles at the enemy from above. Epaminondas approached
the city and took up positions on the east bank, where he had an excellent view of
the situation. He then launched an attack in several places, easily crossing the
Eurotas. Despite some successes, his men failed to capture the city. During
the fighting, Archidamus counterattacked, recording a small but uplifting victory
and causing the Thebans some losses. Epaminondas, discouraged by the pro-
longed fighting and learning about reinforcements for the Spartans approaching
from Mantinea, decided to make a quick retreat to Tegea.
He had no intention of handing the initiative to his opponents, however, and,
expecting the majority of the coalition troops to have marched off toward Sparta,
he decided to attack the territory of Mantinea immediately, hoping that he would
be able to capture harvesters and animals. He left his infantry at Tegea to rest but
sent his cavalry, which set off despite fatigue. The next day, the Theban and
18 The Classical Greek World

Thessalian cavalry reached Mantinea, but the attack failed because a 6,000-strong
Athenian contingent under Hegesileos, which included cavalry, had just arrived in
the city. At the Mantineans’ request, the Athenian cavalry attacked the enemy, forc-
ing them to retreat. Following this second failure, the campaign started to take a
negative turn for Epaminondas; what is more, the end of his appointed time as
commanding officer of the Boeotian League was soon coming to an end, which
meant he would have to return to Boeotia with his army, leaving the allies behind.
In these circumstances, he made the decision to march to Mantinea and quickly
give battle.
The battle was fought approximately half way between Tegea and Mantinea, on
a tableland bordered by hills on both the east and the west. With no major natural
obstacles, it was a good place for fighting a battle. Epaminondas had about 30,000
infantry and at least 3,000 cavalry at his disposal. The units of Theban hoplites must
have been some of his most valuable troops; he also had excellent cavalry provided
by the Boeotians and the Thessalians. Furthermore, he could deploy numerous
lightly armed men, including slingers and javelin throwers, very accomplished
in using these types of weapons, from regions around Thessaly. Finally there were
also the lightly armed hamippoi, trained to fight in a mixed formation with the cav-
alry. The anti-Theban coalition assembled 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. The
infantry included hoplites and lightly armed men, including javelin throwers, but
they were fewer than their Theban counterparts. The Athenians and Eleans pro-
vided the cavalry. The command of the coalition forces must have been collective,
but the Athenian Hegesileos is the only name we know, though the Spartans were
presumably led by either Agesilaus or Archidamus. The Mantineans, the other
Arcadians fighting on their side, and the Spartans took up positions on the
right wing; the Eleans and Achaeans stood by their side, while the left wing fell
to the Athenians, with the remaining contingents stationed in the middle.
Epaminondas, together with the Thebans and Arcadians, took up the left wing,
entrusting the right wing to the Argives. The remaining troops, namely the
Aenianes, Euboeans, Locrians, Malians, Sicyonians, Thessalians, and others, were
placed in the center. The coalition forces were less numerous, so all the cavalry and
infantry were arranged in a formation only six rows deep. Both armies divided their
cavalry forces and positioned them on the wings.
Having lined up his troops, Epaminondas unexpectedly formed them into a col-
umn and marched off toward the hills bordering the tableland on the west, to
secure a better position. When his troops had reached the chosen spot, he ordered
them to take off their armor to simulate setting up camp and so convey the impres-
sion that he did not intend to give battle that day. Seeing this, his opponents started
to break formation. Meanwhile, the rest of his army arrived, blocked from view by
the dust raised by the cavalry. At that moment, Epaminondas ordered his men to
line up in battle array and put their armor back on. As at Leuctra, he marshaled the
Boeotians in a deep and close formation, wanting to settle the battle quickly by
using his best troops. Seeing this, the enemy started to pick up their weapons,
 Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC 19

prepare their horses, and take up battle positions. Even so, Epaminondas managed
to surprise them and cause chaos in their ranks. The fighting was started on the left
wing by the Boeotian cavalry units supported by the hamippoi, which together man-
aged to push the enemy cavalry back. Then Epaminondas and his infantry attacked
the Spartan positions. As at Leuctra, he managed to force his opponents to retreat.
There was fierce fighting on the other flank as well, where Epaminondas’ cavalry,
backed by slingers and javelin throwers, clashed with the Athenian cavalry. The
Athenians started to flee but they were saved from complete disaster by the help
of the Elean cavalry; the cavalry had not previously been involved in the fighting,
and its counterattack forced the Boeotian cavalry to retreat. Among the casualties
at this point was the son of the historian Xenophon, who was serving in the
Athenian cavalry. Epaminondas, winning on both wings, was very close to success.
However, even after their formation had been broken, one of the Spartans dealt
him a fatal blow. Epaminondas was carried off behind the lines, but he soon died,
allegedly after being reassured that the Thebans were victorious. Affected by this
loss, his hoplites stopped their pursuit of the enemy. Meanwhile, on the other flank,
the Athenian infantry managed to defeat the Euboeans and kill many peltasts and
hamippoi, who had reached their positions in pursuit of the defeated enemy cavalry.
As a result, when the fighting subsided, Epaminondas’ forces were unquestionably
victorious on the left wing, but the Athenians had triumphed on the right one
through holding their ground. Both sides put up trophies to mark these victories
and waited for negotiations regarding the return of the bodies of the dead.
During the whole expedition, Epaminondas again proved his outstanding mil-
itary talents. He was able to recognize and use every available opportunity to gain
an advantage over his enemies. He surprised them with quick maneuvers, limiting
their initiative and forcing them to respond to his moves. He also had an unusual
knack for winning the trust and devotion of his men, which enabled him to main-
tain discipline and motivate them to make the greatest efforts. His death deprived
the Thebans not only of the ultimate success in the Battle of Mantinea, which had
been so close, but also, most importantly, of a charismatic general.
The battle did not result in major political decisions. The resulting peace treaty
was rejected by the Spartans, who refused to accept the independence of Messene.
The Thebans maintained their reputation as the greatest individual military power,
but, having lost their two greatest generals and political leaders and with only lim-
ited resources at their disposal, they were unable to play the role of hegemon effec-
tively. In the end, their weaknesses were exposed by the Sacred War of 356–346.

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