ORIGINAL REGISTRATION (Chapter III, Sections 14-38)

d. Forms and Content (Sections 15-19)

i. What to file (Section 15)

- an application for land registration

*in writing

*signed by the applicant or the person duly authorized in his behalf

*and sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths for the province or city where the
application was actually signed.

*signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each if there is more than one applicant

The application shall provide information on the following:

1. Full description of the land as evidenced by a survey plan duly approved by the Director of
Lands, surveyor’s certificate, and technical description;
2. Citizenship and civil status of the applicant, whether single or married, and if married, the
name of wife or husband, and if the marriage has been legally dissolved, when and how the
marriage relation terminated;
3. Full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those adjoining owners, if known,
and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find them
4. Assessed value of the land and the buildings and improvements thereon;
5. WON there are mortgages or encumbrances of any kind whatsoever affecting the land, or any
other person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, or in possession, thereof;
6. The manner by which the applicant has acquired the land (refer to Sec. 14)
7. WON the property is conjugal, paraphernal or exclusive property of the applicant;
8. Names of all occupants of the land, if any;
9. Original muniments of title and other related documents supporting the applicant’s claim of
ownership; and
10. If the land is bounded by a public or private way or road, whether or not the applicant claims
any and what portion of the land within the limits of the way or road, and whether the
applicant desires to have the line of the way or road determined.

MANUAL of INSTRUCTIONS to be OBSERVED by CLERKS of COURT of RTC in Ordinary and Cadastral

Land Registration Cases issued by the Land Registration Authority (see book pp. 136)

(c) the application and its accompanying papers be filed in TRIPLICATE which shall be distributed as
follows:

*original- Clerk of Court

*duplicate- Land Registration Authority

 *triplicate- Solicitor General

(d) prior to the filing of the application has furnished the Regional Executive Director of DENR
(previously Director of Lands) with a copy of the application and its annexes.

The application shall be accompanied by the following documents:

a. The original plan in tracing cloth or Diazo polyester film duly approved by Regional Technical
Director, Land Management Service of the DENR, a certified copy of the same by the Clerk of
Court shall be attached to the duplicate records and forwarded to the Land Registration Office.
When in lieu thereof, a true copy of the original tracing cloth or Diazo polyester film is
submitted, the Clerk of Court shall see to it that the same is properly attested and duly
certified correct by the RTD concerned or the official authorized should sign the plan for the
regional Technical Director. The true copy shall be retained by the court concerned and a copy
thereof duly certified as a faithful reproduction by the Clerk of Court shall be forwarded to the
LRA.
b. The white or blue print copies of the plan.
c. The original and two copies of the technical descriptions certified by the RTD or the official so
authorized and not merely signed by a Geodetic Engineer who prepared the plan
d. The original and two copies of the Geodetic Engineer’s certificate, or in lieu thereof, a
certification from the Regional Technical Director as to its non-availability.
e. A certificate in triplicate of the Provincial, City, or Municipality Assessor of the assessed value
of the land at its last assessment for taxation, or in the absence thereof, that of the next
preceding year. In case the land has not been assessed, an affidavit in triplicate (Judicial Form
no. 81) of the market value of the land signed by three disinterested witnesses.
f. All original monuments of title of the applicant which prove his ownership of the land. This
requirement is not mandatory as long as the documents can be produced before the court
during the hearing whenever required or necessary.

The original tracing cloth plan is now simply attached to the original record and retained by the
court where it may then be marked and formally offered in evidence during the proceedings.

Section 17. What and Where to File

The applicant shall file together with the application all original monuments of titles or copies
thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Lands Management Bureau. (to prove
ownership. No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration without the Director of Lands’
approval. LRA has no authority to approve original survey plan of the land duly approved by the
Director of Lands.)

The clerk of court will not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has
furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes. (This is a
recognition of the concept of jura regalia where all lands and all other natural resources are
owned by the State and a recognition as well of the exclusive authority of the Director of Lands in
the administration, management, survey and disposition of lands of the public domain.)
 ii. Where to file (Section 16-17)

Section 16. Non-resident applicant

Where the applicant is not a resident of the Philippines, his shall file his application through a
duly-authorized representative or attorney-in-fact, whose authority as such shall accompany the
application. Service of all papers and other legal processes shall be made upon said representative
or attorney-in-fact with the same effect as if made upon the applicant himself.

A special power of attorney executed before a notary public or other competent official in a
foreign country cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is duly certified in accordance with
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by the Secretary of embassy or legation, consular,
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Section 17. What and Where to File

The application for land registration shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or
city where the land is situated.

The RTC have now the authority to act upon not only on applications for original registration, but
also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the
power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Especially
where the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the land
registration court has plenary jurisdiction.

TAKE NOTE OF DELEGATED JURISDICTION (RA 7691)

The assignment of cases is governed by SC Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A dated November 15,
1995. Appeals from decisions of inferior courts in land registration cases are taken to the Court of
Appeals.

iii. Requisite Steps in Bringing a land under the Torrens System

In order that the land may be brought under the operation of the Torrens System, the following steps
should be observed:

a. Survey of land by the Lands Management Bureau or a duly licensed private surveyor;
b. Filing application for registration by the applicant;
c. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the court;
d. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the documents
or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Authority;
e. Publication of the notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing in
the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation;
 f. Service by mailing of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have
interests in the property;
g. Posting by the sheriff of the notice in a conspicuous place on the land and in the bulletin board
of the municipal building or city where the land is situated;
h. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not;
i. Hearing of the case by the court;
j. Promulgation of judgment by the court;
k. Issuance of an order for the issuance of a decree declaring the decision final and instructing
the Land Registration Authority to issue decree of confirmation and registration;
l. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Authority;
m. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and
n. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of the
owner’s duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon
payment of prescribed fees.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements will justify the court to deny the application for
registration.

iv. Amendments of area (Section 19)

1. Additional Area

It not permissible to make any amendments or alteration in the description of the land after its
publication in the newspaper and after the registration of the property has been decreed, without the
publication of new notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the said alterations
and amendments.

An order of the court, in a land registration proceeding, amending an official plan so as to include land
not previously included therein, is a nullity as against a person who is not a party and who has no
notice of the proceeding, unless publication is affected anew.

REASON:

Otherwise, the law would be infringed with respect to the publicity which characterizes the
procedure, and third parties who have not had an opportunity to present their claim, might be
seriously affected in their rights, through failure of opportune notice.

Publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration and
cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new
publication.

Benin vs Tuason… (G.R. No. L-26127, June 28, 1974)

2. Diminished Area

Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the
original area that was published, no new publication is required.
 v. Survey of the Land

The application for registration must be accompanied by a survey plan of the land duly approved by
the Director of Land, together with the claimant’s muniments of title to prove ownership.

Carpo vs Ayala Land

The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the CA.

(FROM TRIAL COURTS DECISION WHICH WAS REVERSED BY CA AND SC)

In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a

survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character
of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence.

The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the
plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not
of much value (Republic  vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that
the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director
of  Lands, et al.  vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).

To begin with, a perusal of the defendant's answer or amended answer would show that, contrary to
the trial court's allusions thereto, there is no admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued
without a survey plan that was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. There is likewise
no evidence on record to support the trial court's finding that the survey plan submitted to support
the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950 land registration proceedings was approved only by the Land
Registration Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey plan mentioned in OCT No.
242 was unapproved by the appropriate authority all from the notation "SWO" which appeared
beside the survey plan number on the face of the title or from a failure to allege on the part of ALI
that a duly approved survey plan exists.

SC quoted CA:

Pursuant to the foregoing, the trial court erred when, in ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242
is dubious, it gave emphasis to defendant-appellant's failure to allege that the survey plan of
OCT No. 242 was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. 

It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of
registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be assumed that said
requirement was complied with by ALI's original predecessor-in-interest  at the time the latter
sought original registration of the subject property. Moreover, the land registration court
must be assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in favor of
ALI's predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by public officers. The court upon which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is
deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it
effectively.

This is as it should be, because once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens
system, and the time has passed within which that decree may be questioned  the title is
perfect and cannot later on be questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant
could, by repeated actions, compel a court to review a decree previously issued by another
court forty-five (45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if
the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration, as what
the court a quo did when it faulted ALI's failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest
submitted a survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of  Lands in the
original land registration case.

It should be emphasized that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its
predecessor-in-interest complied with the requirements for the original registration of the
subject property. A party dealing with a registered  land need not go beyond the Certificate of
Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest. Hence,
ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the
name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued for the subject property and  the law will in no way oblige it to go
behind the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property . This is the
fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the public the right to
rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further. 

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: DCAHcT

Section 3.Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(m)That official duty has been regularly performed;

(n)That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere,

was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;

(o)That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a
dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon
by them; . . . .

The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No. 976 and OCT No.
242 includes the presumption that all the requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been complied
with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly approved survey plan accompanied the issuance of OCT
No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who
would have the burden to present adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners
did not even attempt to do.

Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides: ADTCaI

Section 1.Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present

evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.

With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all the bases of their cause of
action, particularly their allegation that ALI's title is null and void and that such title should be
cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that petitioners never alleged the
purported lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of ALI's title.

vi. Presentation of Additional Facts (Section 21)

Section 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection

In assessing the merits of the application for registration, the court is not limited to considering only
the facts stated in the application. It may require the applicant to present additional facts and other
corroborative evidence as maybe relevant in the determination and resolution of the case.

In a number cases, the SC remanded registration cases to the appellate court or court of origin for
additional evidence and the conduct of survey and ocular inspection in order to arrive at a judicious
disposition of the case.

A land registration court has the duty to determine the propriety of the application for registration
and to ensure that the issuance of a new certificate of title will not conflict with a valid and existing
certificate of title.

For this purpose the Court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its determination and
resolution of the case and also order the conduct of an ocular inspection in the presence of the
interested parties if deemed necessary.

It may also require the DENR, the LRA and any other government agency to submit a report on
whether the subject property has already been registered and covered by certificates of title to avoid
overlapping of claims and duplication of titles.

e. Publication, Opposition and Default (Section 23)

i. Notice of Initial Hearing

Section 23 directs that the court, within five days from the filing of the application, shall issue an order
setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than
90 days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing by means of: (a) publication, (b) mailing and (c)
posting. The requirement of giving notice by all three modes is mandatory.
The duty and power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court. After an applicant has
filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date.

The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court
to the LRA.

1. Director of Lands vs CA and Abistado

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory
or directory?

MANDATORY

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word
denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. If mailing of notices is
essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise
imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to
or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or
whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they
had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land
registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but
the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of
realty. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can
best be achieved when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause
why the application should not be granted.

REASON:

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory
when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and
posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of
land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction
of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

ii. Publication
 1. Purpose

The purpose of publication is two-fold:

a. To confer jurisdiction upon the court over the res, and

b. To appraise the whole world of the pending registration case so that they may assert their
rights or interests in the land, if any, and oppose the application, if so minded.

FEW PRINCIPLES TO REMEMBER:

a. Publication in the Official Gazette does not dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing
and posting
b. Lack of personal notice does not vitiate the proceedings
c. Purpose of notice by all three modes: to strengthen the Torrens system through safeguards to
prevent anomalous titling of real property.
d. New publication to include additional area.
e. Effect of non- or defective publication

In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the
manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and
must be strictly complied with, or the PROCEEDING will be utterly VOID.

A mere defect of publication deprives the court of jurisdiction. THUS VOID.

iii. Posting

This requirement is mandatory. WON the requirement of posting, particularly on the land itself, has
been complied with is an important issue which cannot just be lightly disregarded.

iv. Proof Required in Registration Proceedings

Section 24. Proof of publication and notice

Implicit from Section 24 is that the Certification by the LRA Administrator as to the fact of publication
and mailing, and that of the sheriff as to posting, as required by law, are conclusive

1. Republic vs de la Paz

Respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide  claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the respondents must prove by no
less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.

To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable,
respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 &
3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with
the following annotation: “This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.”
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.

In  Republic v. Sarmiento, the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the
blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area,
Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the
land remains part of the inalienable public domain.

Further, in  Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation, the Court held that:

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by
law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at
bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey
plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the
property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government
agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

Furthermore, in  Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, the Court held that the applicant bears the
burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a
certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He
must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as
alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by
the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law to
prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit
a certification from the proper government agency to establish that the subject land is part of the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to
prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the
same as still inalienable public domain.
Anent respondents' possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records failed to
show that the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject
property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the
adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents' predecessors-in-interest'
possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

v. Opposing Application
1. Requisites

For an opposition to be considered the following requisites must concur:

a. The oppositor must have an interest in the land applied for;

b. He should state the grounds for his objection as well as the nature of his claimed interest;
c. He should indicate the desired relief; and
d. The opposition should be signed and sworn to by him or by his duly authorized representative.

It has been held, however, that unverified oppositions in land registration proceedings are
nevertheless sufficient to confer standing in court to oppositors who may be allowed to verify
their oppositions later on, especially where said defect is deemed waived by the applicants’
failure to invoke said requirement seasonably. Also, the written appearance with opposition
present by petitioner in a case was considered valid and sufficient to give him a legal standing in
court and entitle him to notice as a matter of right. It was substantial compliance with the law
that required a formal answer.

Nature of interest to support opposition

To give a person legal standing to object to the application for registration, “he must make some
claim to the property.” The circumstance that an opponent in a land registration proceeding
cannot show title in himself does not discapacitate him from opposing registration of the property
in the name of the applicant. Nor is it even material for the opponent to have the legal character
necessary to enable him to maintain a registration proceeding in his own name and behalf. ALL
THAT IS NECESSARY IS TO ENABLE ONE TO EXERT THE FACULTY OF OPPOSITION IS THAT HE
SHOULD APPEAR TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.

2. Effect of Failure to File Opposition

Where no answer in writing or any opposition is made to an application for registration of property,
all the allegations contained in the application shall be held as confessed by reason of the absence of
denial on the part of the opponent.

A person who has not challenged an application for registration of land even if the appeal afterwards
interposed is based on the right of dominion over the same land, cannot allege damage or error
against the judgment ordering the registration inasmuch as he did not allege or pretend to have any
right to such land.

In the same manner, it has been held that any claimant having failed to present his answer or
objection to the registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens system or to the question of validity
of such registration within a period of one year after the certificate of title has been issued, is deemed
to have forever lost his right in said land even granting that he had any right therein.

3. Failure to appear on the day of initial hearing is not a ground for default where opposition or
answer had been filed
4. Orders of General and Special Default (Section 26)

Section 26. Order of default; effect

When the court issues an order of default, it is presumed to have been regularly preformed in task in
accordance with law especially regard to notice requirements. Compliance with the requirements of
notice and publication has the effect of notifying all persons interested in the proceedings.

BUT A DECLARATION OF DEFAULT IS NOT A GUARANTEE THAT THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
WILL BE GRANTED. IT IS STILL THE BURDEN OF THE APPLICANT TO PROVE THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO
REGISTRATION BY “WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF.”

Where the Director of Lands did not oppose the application consequent to which an order of general
default was issued by the court, it was held that said order should not prejudice the government
under the well-known principle that the Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by the
mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.

Notwithstanding the absence of opposition from the government, the applicant in land registration
cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. He is
not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system, simply because no one
appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land.

Motion to lift order of general default

The interests of substantial justice and the speedy determination of the controversy should be the
guiding principle of the trial court in lifting an order of general default to allow a party to file an
opposition to the application. But the motion to lift the order of the general default should be filed
before entry of final judgment.

(SEARCH SPECIAL DEFAULT)

vi. Persons deemed to have legal standing

1. The following persons are deemed to have that “interest” or “equitable title” necessary to
give them legal standing as oppositors:
 a. A homesteader who has not yet been issued his title but has fulfilled all the conditions
required by law for the issuance of patent;
b. A purchaser of friar land who is deemed to have an equitable title to the land even before the
issuance of the patent;
c. An awardee in a sales application who, by virtue of the award, is authorized to take
possession of the land to enable him to comply with the requirements for the issuance of the
patent;
d. A person claiming to be in possession of the land and has applied with the Lands Management
Bureau for its purchase.

A mere public land applicant under any mode of disposition under the Public Land Act cannot be a
proper party to oppose an application for registration under the Torrens system since by filing his
application with the Lands Management Bureau, he recognizes the character of the land as public land
and not as private property.

In such case, only the government, through the Solicitor General, may properly interpose its
opposition following the principle that all lands and other natural resources are owned by the State.
The burden of overthrowing the presumption of State ownership belongs to the registration
applicant.

2. Private persons may not oppose in behalf of the government

A private person may not oppose an application for registration on behalf of the government on the
ground that the land belongs to the government.

3. Opposition by government

The government, acting through the Office of the Solicitor General, is invariably represented by the
Director of Lands or Director of Forestry as public oppositor in all land registration and related
proceedings.

Pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain and all other natural resources are
owned by the State, hence, it is the burden of the applicant (or private oppositor) to overthrow the
presumption that the land is public land by “well-nigh incontrovertible proof” and that he is entitled
to registration under the law. Corollarily, in controversies involving the disposition of public
agricultural lands, the burden of overthrowing the presumption of State ownership lies upon the
private claimant.

Only the SG, as the lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines and, therefore, actions filed in the name of the Republic, or its government agencies, if
not initiated by the SG, will be summarily dismissed. Conversely, all actions filed against the
government must be defended by the SG.
In practice, because of the numerous activities of government requiring the services of the Office of
the SG, more so in land registration and cadastral cases which is nationwide in scope, it has become
necessary to deputize provincial or city prosecutors and special attorneys from different government
offices to assist said office in the discharge of its important functions. Even so, the Sol Gen has full
control of the conduct of the proceedings. Important pleadings have to be signed by the Sol Gen
himself, or at least by the handling Assistant Sol Gen, usually assisted by a State Solicitor or Associate
Solicitor.

The failure of the government agency concerned to file an opposition to the application for
registration or to appeal from the adverse decision of the registration court is not fatal. The reason for
this is that the government is usually not estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents.

a. Republic vs Tiotioen

ISSUE:

WON appeal beyond the reglementary period by the OSG be allowed considering the OSG received
the notice of the Resolution late?

RULING:

YES.

In deciding this case, this Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the belated filing of an appeal by
the State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land registration case because of the mistake or
error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the government of its right to appeal from a
judgment of the court. In  Director of Lands v. Medina, SC said that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the appeal of the government on the basis of what it perceived as a procedural
lapse. The lower court should be reminded that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount
consideration in any litigation or proceeding. As this Court ruled in  Republic v. Associacion Benevola de
Cebu, "to dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper
considering the merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in
behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted the crux of the government's case "would defeat
the time-honored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land
and charged with the conservation of such patrimony."

In  Heirs of Marina C. Regalado v. Republic, SC ruled that failure of the Republic to file any opposition
or answer to the application for registration, despite receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive its right
to appeal the RTC decision. 'It is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or
its government, is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.'

Moreover, we have advised the lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be "cautious about
not depriving of a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of
technicalities." In  Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, et al., we recognized the importance of the facts and issues
involved and gave due course to an appeal despite that it was the wrong mode of appeal and that it
was even filed beyond the reglementary period to do so.

The vast tracts of land involved in this case are claimed by the petitioner to be a protected watershed
area, which allegedly preserves the main source of water of the Municipality of La Trinidad. Relative
thereto, the petitioner raises substantial factual and legal issues which should be decided on their
merit instead of being summarily disposed of based on a technicality.

vii. Issuance of Decree

1. When judgment becomes final (Section 30)

Sec. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree

The judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes final upon the expiration of the fifteen
(15) days to be counted from the date of the party concerned receives notice thereof.

Period of Appeal: 15 days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from.

Section 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title

After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, the Court shall, within
fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the
corresponding Decree of registration and certificate of title. The Clerk of Court shall send, within
fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the of the court directing
the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a
certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has
become final.

2. Gomez vs CA

Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does
not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the
entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one
(1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering it. 

3. Republic vs Nillas

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the
issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing
applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the
Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to
transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration
Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof
to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their
performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of
registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such
applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is
geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and the
imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.

Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in
land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From
another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within
the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for
Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of
judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the
judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the
LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established
before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court
that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree of
registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant
number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or
order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree
of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the
judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches
that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration.

4. Writ of Possession and Writ of Demolition

A writ of possession is employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It

commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to the person entitled under the
judgment.

If the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of
the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially
considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of
demolition, would be ineffective. But pursuant to Section 10(d), Rule 39, the sheriff is specifically
mandated not to destroy, demolish or remove improvements, except upon special order of the court.

After the registration of a land is decreed in favor of the applicant, the latter, as well as any
subsequent purchaser of the property has the right to the title and possession thereof, and to the end
he may ask the proper court for the issuance of a writ of possession, provided the same has not been
issued before.

Possession is an essential part of ownership.

A writ of possession maybe issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion
thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.

a. Vencislao vs Vano

In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration
in his name necessarily carried with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the
right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in
this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests
(Romasanta, et. al. vs. Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion, et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et al., 100 Phil. 554
[1956]). A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion
thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs.
Ibañez, et al., 97 Phil 2 [1955]).

The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the said land for more than thirty
(30) years which began long before the filing of the application for registration and continued in
possession after the hearing of the registration case, worked against them. It was a virtual admission
of their lack of defense. Thus, the writs of possession were properly issued against them.

5. Possession of 3rd persons after issuance of final decree, remedy

It is settled that when parties against whom a writ of possession is sought entered into possession
apparently after the issuance of final decree, and none of them had been a party in the registration
proceedings, the writ of possession will not issue.

A person who took possession of the land after the final adjudication of the same registration
proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ of possession secured by a mere motion and
that regardless of any title or lack of title of persons to hold possession of the land in question, they
cannot be ousted without giving them their day in court in proper independent proceedings.

The remedy is to resort to the courts of justice and institute a separate action for unlawful entry or
detainer or for reivindicatory action, as the case may be.

Only after the judgment has been rendered can the prevailing party secure a writ of possession to
enforce his right over the disputed lot.

So, the writ of possession will not issue:

 a. When it has already been issued at the instance of the applicant or his successors, who hold
transfer certificates of title; and
b. When the persons against whom it is sought to be used have occupied the premises after the
final decree was issued, and have not taken direct part as opponents in the registration
proceedings where said final decree was issued.

Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true
owner must resort to judicial processes, for the recovery of the property (Article 443, NC), not
summary through a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.

6. Consequence of refusal to vacate; contempt

a. Vencislao vs Vano

SC did not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that petitioners are guilty of contempt.

Under Section 3 (d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of
real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be
directed to deliver the possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This
means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the
possession thereof to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing
party enters or attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged with and punished for contempt
(Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., 85 Phil. 459).

According to this section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry out the
mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by
the trial judge who rendered that judgment, to place the respondents in possession of the land. The
petitioners in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of possession, and consequently, their
refusal to effectuate the writ of possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not
hinder, and much less prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his
duty. It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of the petitioners, that the
judgment was not duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have availed himself of the
public force, had it been necessary to resort thereto.

viii. When OCT takes place

DECREE OF REGISTRATION- is an order issued under the signature of the Administrator, LRA, in the
name of the court, stating that the land described therein is registered in the name of the applicant or
oppositor or claimant as the case may be.

Upon the issuance and entry of the decree of registration, the Administrator, sends a certified copy
thereof, under a seal of his office, to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies,
and the Register of Deeds transcribes the decree in a book, called the “Registration Book,” which a
leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the
Register of Deeds in said book constitutes the original certificate of title and is signed by him and
sealed with the seal of his office.

THE LAND BECOMES REGISTERED LAND ONLY UPON THE TRANSCRIPTION OF THE DECREE IN THE
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION BOOK BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, AND NOT ON THE DATE OF ISSUANCE OF
THE DECREE.

Otherwise stated as soon as the decree has been registered, in the Office of the Register of Deeds, the
property described in said decree shall become registered land, and the certificate shall take effect
upon the date of transcription of the decree. The certificate of title is the true copy of the decree of
registration.

1. Manotok Realty vs CLT Realty

The bone of contention is whether OCT No. 994 should be deemed registered as of the date of the
issuance of the decree of registration on April 19, 1917, instead of the date it was received for the
transcription by the Register of Deeds on May 3, 1917.

The Court made it plain that THE OCT IS ISSUED ON THE DATE THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION IS
TRANSCRIBED since what stands as the certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration
made by the Register of Deeds in the registry. Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the
Register of Deeds is the certificate of title itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the
recipient from the land registration office of the decree for transcription on the certificate.

In this case, OCT No. 994 indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of Deed of Rizal,
May 3, 1917. It is this date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able to transcribe
the decree in the registration book. It is only after the transcription of the decree by the Register of
Deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.

From these premises the Court made the following conclusions:

1. There is only one OCT No.994− that the mother title which was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on May 3, 1917 which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the
title. The issuance of the decree of registration on April 19, 1917 cannot be considered as the
date of the title or the date when the title took effect.
2. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is void, for such mother title
is inexistent.

e. Classification of Public Lands

The 1987 Constitution classification: agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a POSITIVE ACT OF THE
GOVERNMENT, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. There must be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-
public uses. Section 3 of CA 141 limits alienable lands only to those lands which have been “officially
delimited and classified.”

i. Who classifies?

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not of the courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

Under Section of the Public Land Act, the President, through a presidential proclamation or executive
order, can classify or reclassify land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), is the only other public official
empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.

ii. Law Governing Classification

1. CA NO. 141 Public Land Act
iii. Classification of Lands

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of an application is alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive ac of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH CLASSIFICATION

It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that land is alienable and disposable (A and D). The
application for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as A and D land, and that the land falls within
the land classification map as verified through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant must present a certified copy of the DENR Secretary’s declaration or the President’s
proclamation classifying the land as alienable and disposable.

iv. Cases
1. Director of Lands vs CA and Bisnar

As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874,
the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the
courts.

With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral
but the Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was
grave error and/or abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted
facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then
Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.

Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest
land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. 

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded.

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic
Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the
public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his application.

2. Republic vs Court of Appeals

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the filing of the action. Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. From
the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those
comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation
are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public
in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private
or juridical person. Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State
for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest
zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or
thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in
1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The
certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994,
contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.

The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, which provides:

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which
have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.

The finality of the trial court's decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1.All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public
domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant,
lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution". When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution,
spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant
to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

3. Secretary of DENR vs Yap

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall
be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To
this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands, and privately owned
lands which reverted to the State.

Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, which now
provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. ECA

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Private claimants' continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the
land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into
private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.||

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority certify that Boracay
Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not". Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.

g. Non-registrable properties

i. Amunategui vs Directory of Forestry

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is
not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp". Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as
first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot
885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the
property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was
already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and
not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest
and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot
No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public
domain.

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets
the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but
that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect
title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be
classified as forest land of the public domain.

As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest. In the instant petitions, the exception in
the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public
land classified as forest.

The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

ii. Republic vs Court of Appeals and Lastimado

ON FRAUD

The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: a) that the
petitioner has a real and dominical right; b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d) that
the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and e) that the property has not as
yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.

However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered.
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud connotes any fraudulent scheme
executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his
side of the case." But intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such
as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the present action of the
case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.

The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.

Although there was an agreement by the parties to submit for resolution the Opposition to the Petition
for Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial Court, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, should not have dismissed the Petition outright but should have afforded petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to constitute actual and extrinsic fraud
committed by private respondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson, et al., it was held that "the
action of the lower Court in denying the petition for review of a decree of registration filed within one
year from entry of the decree, without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that
actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated, is held to be in error, because the lower
Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it."

RELEVANT RULING

If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reservation at the time
it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral proceeding nor can it be the
object of reopening under Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if the land in question, indeed, forms part
of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as
it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction
of the Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System.

Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (although the
Solicitor General claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the
State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents. Further, we cannot lose
sight of the cardinal consideration that "the State as persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land" under basic Constitutional precepts, and that it is
moreover charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

iii. Laurel vs Garcia

iv. Mineral Resources
1. La Bugal-B’laan Association vs Ramos

All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration, development and utilization (EDU)
must always be subject to the full control and supervision of the State. More specifically, given the
inadequacy of Filipino capital and technology in large-scale EDU activities, the State may secure the
help of foreign companies in all relevant matters ” especially financial and technical assistance ”
provided that, at all times, the State maintains its right of full control. The foreign assistor or
contractor assumes all financial, technical and entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence, it
may be given reasonable management, operational, marketing, audit and other prerogatives to
protect its investments and to enable the business to succeed.

Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State
retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of
the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of
a private corporation: the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other
functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board
retains full residual control of the business.

Who or what organ of government actually exercises this power of control on behalf of the State? The
Constitution is crystal clear: the President. Indeed, the Chief Executive is the official constitutionally
mandated to "enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations." On the other hand, Congress
may review the action of the President once it is notified of "every contract entered into in
accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution." In contrast to
this express mandate of the President and Congress in the EDU of natural resources, Article XII of the
Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress
gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may” in a proper case” exercise their residual
duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of
this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.

The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate
economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the
President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign
investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of
prosperity and peace.

On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining
Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations ” insofar as they relate to financial and technical
agreements ” as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).

2. Republic vs De la Rosa

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
"SEC. 1.  Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit
of the grant."

Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

"Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary

notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set
apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be
valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be
valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their respective locations."

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land
or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they
had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes
of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver,
by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the
case at bar, for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves had
acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the
evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not
convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse
of discretion or without sufficient basis.

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the rights of the mining locators
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact,
Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" but she did not
mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of
the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange doctrine, for it is a
well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application. c

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere
with the mining operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above.
How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights?
Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

THE COURT FEELS THAT THE RIGHTS OVER THE LAND ARE INDIVISIBLE AND THAT THE LAND ITSELF
CANNOT BE HALF AGRICULTURAL AND HALF MINERAL. THE CLASSIFICATION MUST BE CATEGORICAL;
THE LAND MUST BE EITHER COMPLETELY MINERAL OR COMPLETELY AGRICULTURAL. In the instant
case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and
became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. As long as
mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and
become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by
those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of
the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found
in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said
minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise
of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein. For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

h. Remedies

i. Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration (Rule 31, Rules of Court)

Within the period of taking appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trail for one or more of the causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party.

If the motion for new trial is granted, the judgment is set aside; if the motion for reconsideration is
granted, the judgment is merely amended.

The period for filing either motion is within the period for taking, not perfecting, an appeal. An appeal
maybe taken within fifteen (15) days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record of appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record of appeal within 30 days after notice of the judgment or final order.

The grounds are:

a. Fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in
his rights;
b. Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds
that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or
final order or that decision or final order is contrary to law.

ii. Petition for Relief from Judgment (Sec. 38, Rules of Court); relief from denial of appeal

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any proceedings is thereafter taken against a party in
any court through, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and
in the same case praying that the judgment, order, or proceeding be set aside.

When a judgment or final order is rendered by the any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal is given due course.

A final judgment or order (as distinguished from one which has become final and executory) is one
that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court in respect thereto.

Time of Filing Petition: under Sec. 1 and 2, Rule 38, A petition for relief from judgment or from denial
of appeal is filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

1. Petition for relief and motion for new trial/reconsideration are exclusive of each other
A party who has filed a timely motion for new trial cannot file a petition for relief after his motion has
been denied. These two are exclusive of each other. He should appeal from the judgment and
question such denial.

2. APPEAL

An appeal may be taken from a judgment or a final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by the Rules of Court to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

a. An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

b. An order denying a petition for relief or of any similar motion seeking relief from judgment
c. An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal
d. An order denying motion to set aside judgment
e. An order of execution
f. An order dismissing an action without prejudice

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

iii. Remedies under the Property Registration Decree, in cases of fraudulent registration

1. Petition for review of decree (Section 32)

a. Eland Philippines, Inc. vs Garcia

Respondents, in their Complaint, claim that they have become the owners in fee-simple title of the
subject land by occupation and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Law
or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Thus, it appears that the first requisite has been satisfied.
Anent the second requisite, respondents enumerated several facts that would tend to prove the
invalidity of the claim of the petitioner. All of these claims, which would correspond to the two
requisites for the quieting of title, are factual; and, as discussed earlier, the petitioner interposed its
objections and duly disputed the said claims, thus, presenting genuine issues that can only be resolved
through a full-blown trial.

Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title, the indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of the decree of registration come into question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible.

Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

As borne out by the records and undisputed by the parties, OCT No. 0-660 of petitioner was issued on
August 29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued on August 20, 1997, while the complaint for the quieting
of title in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998; hence, applying the above
provisions, it would seem that the period of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of
registration has not elapsed for the review thereof. However, a closer examination of the above
provisions would clearly indicate that the action filed, which was for quieting of title, was not the
proper remedy.

Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an application for
review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual fraud.

The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for
reopening and revising a decree of registration. One of the remedies available to him is a petition for
review.

REQUISITES OF PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECREE

To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:

(a)The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;

(b)He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;

(c)The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Authority; and

(d)The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.

THE PETITION FOR REVIEW MUST BE FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM ENTRY OF THE DECREE OF
REGISTRATION.

As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority and period of one
year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration case continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
registration court. After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer
subject to reopening or review.

THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD STATED IN SEC. 32 WITHIN WHICH A PETITION TO RE-OPEN AND
REVIEW THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION REFERS TO THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION DESCRIBED
IN SECTION 31, WHICH DECREE IS PREPARED AND ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION
ADMINISTRATOR.

The provision of Section 31 that every decree of registration shall bind the land, quiet title
thereto, and be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the national government,
and Sec. 32 that the decree shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority or
other disability or by any proceeding in court, save only in cases of actual fraud and then only
for one year from the entry of the decree, must be understood as referring to final and
unappealable decrees of registration. A decision or, as it is sometimes called after entry, a
decree of a registration court, does not become final and unappealable until fifteen days after
the interested parties have been notified of its entry, and during that period may be set aside
by the trial judge on motion for new trial, upon any of the grounds stated in the Rules of
Court. An appeal from the decision of the trial court prevents the judgment from becoming
final until that decree is affirmed by the judgment of the appellate court.

A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for
new trial and the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of such a motion
irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been presented.

In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible has not yet expired; thus, a review of the decree of registration would have
been the appropriate remedy.

b. Lopez vs Padilla

In ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands, courts may reopen proceedings
already closed by final decision or decree, only when application for review is filed by the
party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. Applied to
homesteads the decree of registration corresponds to the promulgation of the order of the
Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent and not the actual issue of the patent.

the period within which to file the action for review of the title and to annul the sale to
Woolbright has already expired," on the strength of the ruling of Recido, 7 "that the patent is
deemed issued upon promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance
thereof."

As succinctly held by the lower court, the torrens title issued to defendants in pursuance of the
homestead patent is no longer susceptible to collateral attack through the present action filed by
plaintiffs, who as mere applicants of revocable lease permits or miscellaneous applications of what is
now concededly titled property of private ownership, have no personality or legal interest in the first
place to institute the action, nor to question the sale of the homestead allegedly within the five-year
prohibitory period of section 118 of the Public Land Act. Since there is no showing that their
applications have been approved by the Director of Lands, who could not be expected to do so
knowing that he has since 1952 decreed the issuance of a patent therefor and the property has long
ceased to be of the public domain, the lower court correctly ruled itself to be bereft of authority to
grant the relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants on the basis of their lack of a valid cause of action.

c. Ramos vs Rodriguez

Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility(,) until after the
expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in
several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from
the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.

THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD STATED IN SECTION 32 OF P.D. 1529 WITHIN WHICH A PETITION TO RE-OPEN
AND REVIEW THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION CLEARLY REFERS TO THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION
DESCRIBED IN SECTION 31 OF THE SAID P.D., WHICH DECREE IS PREPARED AND ISSUED BY THE
COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is
purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record,
and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation
to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They
act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act
of the court. They are specifically called upon to 'extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings.
d. Walstrom vs Mapa

Petitioner Hilda Walstrom filed a civil complaint against the respondents praying for the nullification
of the Mapas' sales patent and certificates of title issued by the register of deeds of Benguet
Province under Section 38 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act.

It is the teaching of the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration may be reopened or
reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five essential requisites, to wit:

(a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right;

(b) that he has been deprived thereof;

(c) through fraud;

(d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and

(e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.

An examination of the records of the case shows non-concurrence of the essential elements
enumerated above.

The case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The petitioner herself admits that her petition for relief is still pending resolution by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who may reconsider his action on the matter in
dispute. The petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a flaw which to our mind is fatal
to a court review at this time.

Instead of invoking Section 38, the petitioner should have pressed for the speedy resolution of her
petition with the DANR. The petitioner avers that since the one-year prescriptive period for seeking
judicial relief provided for in Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act was about to lapse, she was
compelled to file the action to nullify said patent. The petitioner's submission is not correct. Her fear
of the futility, or even only inefficacy, of exhausting the administrative remedies granted her by law is
clearly unfounded.

In Amerol vs.  Bagumbaran  that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued
in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject
property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real
owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to
shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad
faith.

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is

sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a
better right. This is what reconveyance is all about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it
imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 

e. On Fraud

Only extrinsic fraud or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a
judgment.

i. Palanca vs American Food Manufacturing Co.

Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or order entered against a party
through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence may be set aside upon proper petition to
that effect. Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court
has held that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling
a judgment.

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is committed
outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully, and fairly his side of the case. On the other
hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the Use of forged
instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent
a fair and just determination of the case. 

Where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney
regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side — these, and
similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the
case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former
judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and fair hearing.

On the other hand, the doctrine is equally well settled that the court will not set aside a
judgment because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any
matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed.

The rule is that an action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, will not lie unless the
fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered,
and that false testimony or perjury is not a ground for assailing said judgment, unless the
fraud refers to jurisdiction; that fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, where it has
prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting all of his case to the court.

The acts complained of by petitioner-appellant, even if assumed to be true and fraudulent, were all
committed by her own counsel, and not by the successful party or opponent in the case. Hence,
petitioner-appellant had not shown extrinsic fraud that would warrant the setting aside of the
decision.

Negligence, mistake or fraud of one's own attorney is not ground for granting a new trial. Fraud,
such as would authorize the setting aside of the verdict at the instance of the movant, is fraud of
respondent or his counsel and not of the misconduct of her own counsel, for the purpose of
annulling the verdict obtained by respondent.

ii. Frias vs Esquivel

To justify the setting aside or review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496, the
party seeking relief must allege and prove, inter alia, that the registration was procured through fraud
— actual and extrinsic. It has been held in this connection that if the fraud alleged in the petition to
set aside the decree is involved in the same proceedings in which the party seeking relief had ample
opportunity to assert his right, to attack the document presented by the applicant for registration, and
to cross- examine the witnesses who testified relative thereto, then the fraud relied upon is intrinsic.

The fraud is extrinsic if it was employed to deprive a party of his day in court, thus preventing him
from asserting his right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.

iii. Director of Lands vs CFI of Rizal

The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (a) that the
petitioner has a real and dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d)
that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has
not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. cdll

However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts
upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled was rendered.
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent
scheme executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party,
or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party, is prevented from presenting
fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud taxes the form of "acts of a party in a
litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did
not affect the present action of the case, but did present a fair and just determination of the
case.

In other words, extrinsic fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.
The allegations, even if proved, do not constitute extrinsic fraud as would warrant a reopening of the
decree.

The person(s) contemplated under Section 38 of Act 496, to be entitled to a review of a decree
of registration, are those who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in
the original registration case. Such is not the situation of the petitioner here. It was not denied
a day in court by fraud, which the law provides as the sole ground for reopening of the decree
of registration. In fact, it opposed the application but failed to substantiate its opposition
because it did not appear at the hearing of the registration case despite proper notice. In
Solomon et al., vs. Bocauto et al., 73 Phil. 363, 365, cited in Crisolo vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA
435, 441, a petition for review of a decree of registration was properly denied for "both
petitioners had notice of the original registration proceedings; but failed to put up any claim and
to show title in themselves." Significantly, petitioner failed to explain why it failed to appear at
the hearing. Mere allegation of fraud is not enough. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and
deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure him must be alleged and proved. There
must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud to entitle one to the
reopening of a decree of registration. And it must be extrinsic and not intrinsic fraud (Greg
Alba vs. de la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, 57). This is necessary to maintain the stability of judicial decisions
and save the precious time of the courts from being wasted by unnecessary proceedings.
Moreover, the fact that the District Land Officer of the Bureau of Land conducted the
corresponding inspection and investigation of the land in question with its findings and report
submitted in court, renders the present appeal interposed by the Director of Lands without
valid basis. It cannot just simply deny the report of its own investigator. Besides, there is
always that presumption of regularity in the performance of official function.

f. Purchaser in good faith

i. Rosales vs Burgos

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the
purchase or before receiving any notice of another person's claim. The burden of proving the status of
a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon one who asserts that status. This onus
probandi  cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith.
As a GENERAL RULE, every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.

However, this rule admits of an UNCHALLENGED EXCEPTION:

. . . a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the
purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a
piece of real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property
that someone is claiming an interest on the same or may have a better right than the registered
owner thereof. Despite the notice of adverse claim, the Burgos siblings still purchased the property in
question.

Too, at the time the Burgos siblings bought the subject property on December 4, 1984, an action for
damages, and a Criminal Case for estafa, filed by the Rufloes against Delos Reyes, were both pending
before the RTC of Pasay City. This circumstance should have alerted the Burgos siblings as to the
validity of Delos Reyes' title and her authority and legal right to sell the property.

An ordinarily prudent man would have inquired into the authenticity of the certificate of title, the
property's location and its owners. Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing with
registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly established rule that where
circumstances exist which would put a purchaser on guard and prompt him to investigate further,
such as the presence of occupants/tenants on the property offered for sale, it is expected that the
purchaser would inquire first into the nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the
occupants possess the land in the concept of an owner. Settled is the rule that a buyer of real property
that is in the possession of a person other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a
buyer in good faith. 

ii. Fule vs De Legare

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil., 606). We have measured the conduct of the petitioner
spouses by this yardstick.

These facts were uncontroverted. The negotiation and transaction which eventually caused the
certificate of title to be transferred from the herein respondent to the petitioner spouses were
conducted by a real estate broker licensed since 1938. Nothing in John W. Legare's person or
behaviour suggested anything suspicious.

He was the adopted son of the herein respondent, and, to the time that he was contracting with the
petitioner spouses, he had not been known to commit crime or dishonesty. On the contrary, John has
had previous dealings with the real estate broker during which he exhibited the expected degree of
trustworthiness.

It should be noted that the deed of sale was regular upon its face, and no one would have questioned
its authenticity since it was duly acknowledged before a notary public. Moreover, even if the
petitioners had the opportunity to compare the signature of the respondent on the deed of
conveyance with a specimen of her genuine signature, the effort, nonetheless, would have been in
vain since the respondent's signature on the document was admittedly hers. Lastly, it should not be
overlooked that the respondent, during the whole period of the negotiation, was nowhere available
to confirm or deny the execution of the deed. She was then in hiding, or, hidden, at the Windsor Hotel
in Manila.

The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners themselves could hardly have been wanting.
The records show that they did not rely solely and fully upon the deed of sale in favor of John W.
Legare and the fact that John had then in his possession the corresponding certificate of title of the
registered owner. They demanded more. They insisted that the sale in favor of John W. Legare be first
registered and that the transfer in their favor be thereafter likewise registered. It was only after all
these were complied with that they paid the purchaser price. In other words, the petitioner spouses
relied not really on the documents exhibited to them by John W. Legare, but, on the registerability of
those documents. This in our view, satisfies the measure of good faith contemplated by law.

All these, were adequate safeguards against the objection interposed. A contrary conclusion would
operate to weaken the reliance of the general public on the indefeasibility of titles registered under
the Torrens System.

Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was
able to secure a registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed
to the herein petitioners. A forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of
Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19).

However, there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title.
One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true
owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.
We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system,
"registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land
(Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act). Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of
title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the
purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest
for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule
were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system
seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and
De Guzman vs. Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its foremost
motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act. In the end, the business
community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.

iii. Yu vs Pacleb
iv. Domingo vs Reed

The case law is well settled. The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the
registered owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from
a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered.
While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one
who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of
title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of
the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.

This Court has consistently applied the stricter rule when it comes to deciding the issue of good
faith of one who buys from one who is not the registered owner, but who exhibits a certificate
of title.

v. St. Dominic Corporation vs IAC

Anent the effect of the trial court's judgment on the mortgagee bank's rights and on the foreclosure of
the property in question, this Court has held that where a Torrens title was issued as a result of regular
land registration proceedings and was in the name of the mortgagor when given as a security for a bank
loan, the subsequent declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage
rights of the bank which had acted in good faith (Philippine National Cooperative Bank v. Carandang-
Villalon, 139 SCRA 570). As a matter of fact, there are instances when even a fraudulent and forged
document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate had already been transferred
from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger (Duran v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 138 SCRA 489). Here, there is no forgery or fraud involved.

A mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the certificate of title. In the absence
of anything to excite suspicion, it is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate
the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said certificate. There is no showing in the records
that the mortgagee bank was aware of any shadow affecting the title of the mortgaged property when
it was mortgaged. As will be explained later, the intervenors are only prospective awardees of the
disputed lot. They are not the owners. They have no title to the land.
The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate, and to
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such further inquiry (Pascua v. Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78). Thus, where innocent third
persons relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights (Director of Land v. Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606). The
lien of the petitioner, an innocent mortgagee for value must be respected and protected (Blanco v.
Esquierdo, 110 Phil., 494).

A person who takes a mortgage in good faith and for a valuable consideration, the record showing a
clear title in the mortgagor, will be protected against any equitable titles to the premises or equitable
claims on the title, in favor of third persons, of which he had no notice, actual or constructive. The
protection extends to a purchaser at a Sheriff's sale under proceedings on the mortgage although such
purchaser had notice of the alleged equity (59 CJS, Sec. 233, pp. 303-304).

Any subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificate of title cannot in any
way prejudice the mortgage previously registered and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser
at public auction free from any lien or encumbrance (Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc., v. Philippine
National Bank, 4 SCRA 1257). Otherwise, the value of the mortgage could be easily destroyed by a
subsequent record of an adverse claim, for no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if found by
the posterior claim (Bank of the Philippine Island v. Noblejas, supra).

Upon proper foreclosure of a first mortgage, all liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise
foreclosed. The foreclosure as well as the sale of the property were annotated on the title to the
property, then still in the name of Adalia Francisco and Carlos Robes. Such annotation serves as
constructive notice to the parties having any claim or interest in the property to exercise their right of
redemption or to participate in the foreclosure sale. Certainly, there was an opportunity for the
claimants in Civil Case No. Q-11895 to acquire the property at issue. St. Dominic's rights can no longer
be disturbed.

It should also be noted that the intervenors in Civil Case Q-11895 possess no enforceable lien over the
property in question. They are merely prospective awardees of the realty. The right they assert is
purely speculative. No vested rights exist in their favor.

However, the PHHC is now estopped by circumstances from making any further award. As earlier stated,
the lower court cannot order the execution of the decision as against the petitioner and, thereby, cancel
St. Dominic's title in favor of a future unknown person. It cannot disregard the rights already vested in
petitioner St. Dominic. To do so would impair confidence in certificates of titles and orderly processes of
law. Among the guarantees of the Torrens system is that it renders title indefeasible. Section 31,
Presidential Decree 1529, The Land Registration Act, provides: "The decree of registration shall bind
the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches
thereof whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the
general description 'to all of whom it may concern'." This provision is applicable under the facts of this
case.

2. Actions for Reconveyance

a. Section 53 and 96
b. Cases
i. Heirs of Labanon vs Heirs of Labanon

First Issue
Petitioners argue that respondents can no longer question Maximo Labanon's ownership of the land
after its registration under the principle of indefeasibility of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).

The principle of indefeasibility of a TCT is embodied in Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,
amending the Land Registration Act.

Contrary to petitioners' interpretation, the aforequoted legal provision does not totally deprive a
party of any remedy to recover the property fraudulently registered in the name of another. Section
32 of PD 1529 merely precludes the reopening of the registration proceedings for titles covered by the
Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the reconveyance of the property to its
rightful owner. As elaborated in  Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac:

While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The
acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the
real owners.

The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the
possessor a true owner of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate
alone become the owner of the land illegally included. It is evident from the records that the petitioner
owns the portion in question and therefore the area should be conveyed to her. The remedy of the land
owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one
year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages.

Undeniably, respondents are not precluded from recovering the eastern portion of Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. P-14320, with an area subject of the "Assignment of Rights and Ownership"
previously owned by their father, Constancio Labanon. The action for Recovery of Ownership before
the RTC is indeed the appropriate remedy.

Second Issue
The trust agreement between Maximo Labanon and Constancio Labanon may still be enforced.
Trusts are classified under the Civil Code as either express or implied. Such classification determines
the prescriptive period for enforcing such trust.

Article 1444 of the New Civil Code on express trust provides that "[n]o particular words are required
for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended."

An express trust is created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or
deed or by words evidencing an intention to create a trust; the use of the word trust is not
required or essential to its constitution, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.

In the instant case, such intention to institute an express trust between Maximo Labanon as trustee
and Constancio Labanon as trustor was contained in not just one but two written documents, the
Assignment of Rights and Ownership as well as Maximo Labanon's April 25, 1962 Sworn Statement. In
both documents, Maximo Labanon recognized Constancio Labanon's ownership and possession over
the eastern portion of the property covered by OCT No. P-14320, even as he recognized himself as the
applicant for the Homestead Patent over the land. Thus, Maximo Labanon maintained the title over
the property while acknowledging the true ownership of Constancio Labanon over the eastern portion
of the land. The existence of an express trust cannot be doubted nor disputed.

On the issue of prescription, we had the opportunity to rule in  Bueno v. Reyes  that unrepudiated
written express trusts are imprescriptible.

This principle was amplified in  Escay v. Court of Appeals  this way: "Express trusts prescribe 10 years
from the repudiation of the trust (Manuel Diaz, et al. vs. Carmen Gorricho et al., 54 O.G. p. 8429, Sec.
40, Code of Civil Procedure)."

In the more recent case of  Secuya v. De Selma, we again ruled that the prescriptive period for the
enforcement of an express trust of ten (10) years starts upon the repudiation of the trust by the
trustee.

In the case at bar, Maximo Labanon never repudiated the express trust instituted between him and
Constancio Labanon. And after Maximo Labanon's death, the trust could no longer be renounced;
thus, respondents' right to enforce the trust agreement can no longer be restricted nor prejudiced by
prescription.

ii. Aguile vs CFI of Batangas

As a matter of fact, he was not denied that opportunity, which is precisely — and only — what due
process guarantees. The records show that he did have that opportunity to be heard and to have the
decision reviewed but forfeited the right because of his own counsel.

In the instant case, the petitioner should have noticed the succession of errors committed by his
counsel and taken appropriate steps for his replacement before it was altogether too late. He did not.
On the contrary, he continued to retain his counsel through the series of proceedings that all resulted
in the rejection of his cause, obviously through such counsel's "ineptitude" and, let it be added, the
clients' forbearance. The petitioner's reverses should have cautioned him that his lawyer was
mishandling his case and moved him to seek the help of other counsel, which he did in the end but
rather tardily.

Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and recognize his earlier claims
to the disputed property on the justification that his counsel was grossly inept. Such a reason is hardly
plausible as the petitioner's new counsel should know. Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to
do to salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing
the adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming
of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also
found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad
infinitum. This would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any
time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.

On the effects of counsel's acts upon his client, this Court has categorically declared:

It has been repeatedly enunciated that 'a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the
conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different
had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds
were to be admitted and reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit
so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had
not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. . . . Mistakes of attorneys as to the
competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the
proper defense, or the burden of proof, . . . failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon
witnesses and to argue the case are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the
incompetency of counsel is so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly
presenting his case.

Perhaps it is for this reason that the petitioner does not strongly attack the decision, preferring to
train his sights on his own former counsel. As he says in his petition, he "does not seek the nullity of
the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 1552 which has already become final due to legal
technicality. What he does ask for is a reconveyance of the subject properties which he says were
unjustly taken from him as a result of his lawyer's mistakes. Such blunders, he contends, are
correctible in an action for reconveyance which the Court should allow in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.

The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled. This remedy is available
in cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, property is registered in the name of a person not its
owner. Clerical error in designating the real owner is a valid ground for reconveyance after the decree
shall have become final following the lapse of one year therefrom. Reconveyance may also be sought
where it is established that a person not entitled to the property succeeded in registering it in his
name to the prejudice of the real owner. However, it cannot be employed to negate the effects of a
valid decision of a court of justice determining the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an
appropriate proceeding, as in Civil Case No. 1552. The decision in that case was a valid resolution of
the question of ownership over the disputed properties and cannot be reversed now through the
remedy of reconveyance.
iii. Gasataya vs Mabasa

Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person with a
better right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously registered. While
respondent is not the legal owner of the disputed lots, she has a better right than petitioner to the
contested lots on the following grounds: first, the deed of conditional sale executed by DBP vested on
her the right to repurchase the lots and second, her right to repurchase them would have subsisted
had they (the Gasatayas) not defrauded her.

Petitioner cannot discredit the deed of conditional sale just so he can to keep his titles to the lots.
Petitioner should be reminded that DBP revoked respondent's right to repurchase the lots under said
deed because of the deceitful maneuverings that he and his father employed. If we were to sustain
petitioner's argument, then we would, in effect, reward him for his misdeed.

The registration of the properties in petitioner's name did not obliterate the fact that fraud preceded
and facilitated such registration. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception
practiced by means of misrepresentation of material facts, which in this case was the conscious
representation by petitioner's father (Sabas Gasataya) that respondent's obligation to DBP had
already been settled. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained, to
the prejudice of another. Consequently, fraud is a ground for reconveyance.

Moreover, the law only protects an innocent purchaser for value and not one who has knowledge of
and participation in the employment of fraud. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same
property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice
of another person's claim. Obviously, petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for value.
iv. Benin vs Tuason