G.R. No.
L-64279 April 30, 1984
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting
for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR
ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET
AL., respondents.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of
Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and
forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler
truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with
Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur,
issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial
commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that
the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the
LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of
Sipocot.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud,
Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station
commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the
aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the
Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the
carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be
executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the
case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim
Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2,
1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the
Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in
article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640;
Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110
Phil. 150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed.,
p. 146.)
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank
Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000,
was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months
after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture
provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be
informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order
can be bound thereby.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine
Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the
enforcement of any penal regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability
should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document which shag
prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective
only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly
promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the
head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No.
626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation
was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they
cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order.
Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the
forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos
are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos,
with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with
the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. L-62243 October 12, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales and
Olongapo City, Branch I, and BENITO GO BIO, JR., respondents.
RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in
Criminal Case No. 5396 in the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, presided by respondent judge.
The information reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
That on or about and during the second week of May 1979, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, guaranteeing the authenticity and genuineness of the
same and with intent to defraud one Filipinas Tan by means of false pretenses and
pretending to have sufficient funds deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Island,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Bank of
Philippine Island Check No. D-357726 in the amount of P200,000.00 Philippine
Currency, said accused well knowing that he has no sufficient funds at the Bank of
the Philippine Island and upon presentation of the said check to the bank for
encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the said accused has no
sufficient funds with the said bank and despite repeated demands made by
Filipinas Tan on the accused to redeem the said check or pay the amount of
P200,000.00, said accused failed and continues to fail to redeem the said check or
to pay the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of said Filipinas Tan in the
aforementioned amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency. (pp. 23-24, Rollo)
Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the
ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the alleged commission of the
offense, which was about the second week of May 1979, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has not yet taken
effect.
The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the
check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense; and that
assuming that the effectivity of the law — Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 — is on June 29, 1979,
considering that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979, the said law is applicable.
In his reply, private respondent Go Bio, Jr. submits that what Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 penalizes is
not the fact of the dishonor of the check but the act of making or drawing and issuing a check without
sufficient funds or credit.
Resolving the motion, respondent judge granted the same and cancelled the bail bond of the accused.
In its order of August 23, 1982, respondent judge said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Court finds merit to the contention that the accused cannot be held liable for
bouncing checks prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 although the
check may have matured after the effectivity of the said law. No less than the
Minister of Justice decreed that the date of the drawing or making and issuance of
the bouncing check is the date to reckon with and not on the date of the maturity of
the check. (Resolution No. 67, S. 1981, People's Car vs. Eduardo N. Tan, Feb. 3,
1981; Resolution No. 192, S. 1981, Ricardo de Guia vs. Agapito Miranda, March
20, 1981).
Hence, the Court believes that although the accused can be prosecuted for
swindling (Estafa, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code), the Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the above entitled case.
(pp. 49- 50, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent judge's
dismissal of the criminal action against private respondent Go Bio, Jr. for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of the
Official Gazette. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or several days before
respondent Go Bio, Jr. issued the questioned check around the second week of May 1979; and that
respondent judge should not have taken into account the date of release of the Gazette for circulation
because Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that for the purpose of ascertaining
the date of effectivity of a law that needed publication, "the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be
published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue."
Private respondent Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the
Official Gazette issue of April 9, 1979, nevertheless, the same was released only on June 14, 1979
and, considering that the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he
could not have violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at
the time.
We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the private respondent.
The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. Charito A. Mangubat, Copy Editor of the
Official Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office, stating-têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is to certify that Volume 75, No. 15, of the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official
Gazette was officially released for circulation on June 14, 1979. (p. 138, Rollo)
It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979 and not
on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of publication of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions,
the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties. For, if a
statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to
be violated and, consequently, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that "This Act shall take effect
fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in such clause should be
given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make known to the people in general. If the Batasang
Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in
determining the effectivity of the statute in question, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity
provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as criminal, in
May 1979, there was then no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979. As a matter of fact, in May 1979, there
was no law to be violated and, consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not commit any violation
thereof.
With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979
when the check was presented for encashment and was dishonored by the bank, suffice it to say that
the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact
of its dishonor. The title of the law itself states:
AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
and, Sections 1 and 2 of said Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds ... shall be punished ...
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a
check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing
and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds ... . (Emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent judge dated August 23, 1982 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368,
404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566,
573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923,
935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-
283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349,
357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473,
486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-
1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723,
1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-
1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858,
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-
2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-
507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563,
567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707,
712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
 f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-
81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved,
or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and
as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election
for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court,
Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for
the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule
may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are
different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper
party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate
the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but
not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of
the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually
been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts
of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee
said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements
as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-
with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed
to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state
and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the
same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179579               February 1, 2012
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF
SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003 4 on the
tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs
Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents
The antecedent facts are as follows: Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to
immediately cease and desist from enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the
Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or SO ORDERED.12
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. 5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent
factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food
concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory
grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
relief was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered
that respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to the application of the
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification regulation in future transactions.
Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the
subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential. 6
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the
basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for petitioners had "substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a quasi-legislative
Declaratory Relief7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the predetermination."13 The lower court pointed out that a classification based on importers and ports of
implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from discharge were violative of the due process rights of respondent.
China.8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the
Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same
University of the Philippines Law Center.
allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003. 14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held
that, since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it
would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more
Hence, this Petition.
than was proper.

Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when
the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20)
COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
days from notice.9

The Petition has no merit.

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the
classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were
speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
products. They likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that
they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be
contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision11 without having to resolve the application for preliminary
injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must
be ripe for judicial determination. 15 We find that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court
meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,16 we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts,
including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance
Secretary,17 we said:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat, each and
every importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result into (sic) delays in the delivery,
setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is
easy to see that business uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums
involved are not minimal is shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the
pleadings filed. It may be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed
because the Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO.
Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said agency. We believe and so find that Petitioner has
presented such a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file this
petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is
inevitable19 for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration
of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to
file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of
the case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as
explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of
Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:

xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction
against any party of persons.
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule
is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity
judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial
judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall
correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative
have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the
rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its
first hearing thereon.
judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
(Emphasis supplied)
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily
imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the
2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance
has actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in
to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect
December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The
of law.20
regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein.
Thus, respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat,
instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition, respondent would have to go through the Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:
procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court
correctly pointed out as follows:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of
the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready access to
the legislative records – no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually
been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts
of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code,
the assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances.
Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification.
For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class.22
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of
wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade
wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7%
tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade
wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The
regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and thus
prevent their misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve
this end, but results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that
other corporations that are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates
an assumption that those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case,
importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their wheat imports; while in the
second, the state carries that burden.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the
customs officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The
law provides:
Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported
Articles. – The customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall
determine whether the packages designated for examination and their contents are in accordance with
the declaration in the entry, invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a
manner as to indicate whether the articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard
their quantity, measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall
submit samples to the laboratory for analysis when feasible to do so and when such analysis is
necessary for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission into the Philippines of imported
articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and
sold, and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.
Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties
prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.1âwphi1
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of
the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified
the article even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner
Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard
to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment
of the proper classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new
and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by law.23
In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003
when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners
likewise violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable
classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went
beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer
to examine and assess imported articles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187587               June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of
Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of
land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military
reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort
Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a
national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which
reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation
No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots
1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open
for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General
Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation
and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI)
filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed
as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas
they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable
and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the
Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the
subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a
Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with
regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan. 5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the
portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-
General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could
not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October
16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the
provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 8 Finally, she
maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the
published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the
field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was denied by the COSLAP
in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions
dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting
MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the
petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed
herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review
with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING
THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS
THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS
NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING
THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY
MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT
>INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES. 14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS
NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that
the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims
were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They
allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of
portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed
version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of
law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a
different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in
the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The
issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon.
Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief
Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall
become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter
of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. reclassification.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual
or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
xxxx RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
IMPERIAL, J.:
xxxx
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil case No. 1504 of said court and
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as held: that the contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that
feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied) the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements
thereon and free from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay to the defendant-
petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of the decision; and
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was
absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the cross-complaint relative to the value of the improvements
not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force
claimed by the defendant-petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered the registrar of deeds of
and effect.
Bataan to cancel certificate of title No. 325, in the name of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to
issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal parts, free of all liens and incumbrances except those
law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its expressly provided by law, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid
legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in
civil case to the end that they recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its
the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 18 we ruled that
improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued on
"under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
January 11, 1931, with certificate of title No. 325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27,
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can
1931 in her favor, under section 122 of Act No. 496, which land was surveyed and identified in the
create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be
cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No. 285; that the petitioner pay to them
violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply
the sum of P650 being the approximate value of the fruits which he received from the land; that the
or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but
petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its possession to the respondents;
that he petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying or encumbering the
land and its improvements; that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and
issue in lieu thereof another in favor of the respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by way of special
defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by
virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May
16, 1932, which was duly ratified by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents
pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent interest per annum which the deceased owed him and that,
should the respondents be declared to have a better right to the possession of the land, that they be
sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the improvements which he introduced upon
the land.lawphil.net
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following public deed:
"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between Emiliana
Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L., hereinafter called the party
of the first part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at
312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P.L., hereinafter called party of the second part.
WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with each other as
follows:
ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000)
Philippine currency, paid by the party of second part to the party of the first part, receipt
whereof is hereby acknowledged, the party of the first part hereby encumbers and
hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements described in Articles II and III
hereof, of which improvements the party of the first part is the absolute owner.
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of the first part shall
well and truly pay, or cause to paid to the party of the second part, his heirs, assigns, or
executors, on or before the 16th day of November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years
after date of the execution of this instrument, the aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) with interest at 12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage shall be and become
null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and effect, and
subject to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for the amount due
thereunder, with costs and also attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure.lawphil.net
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and assessments which are or
may become due on the above described land and improvements during the term of this
agreement.
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this agreement, the party
of the first part shall file a motion before the Court of First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I.,
requesting cancellation of Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof
and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of Land
Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.

ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of a parcel of land
ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of time (4½) years
in the barrio of Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, her title thereto being
stipulated in this mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage, she would
evidenced by homestead certificate of title No. 325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June
execute a deed of absolute sale of the property herein described for the same amount as this
11, 1931, said land being lot No. 285 of the Limay Cadastre, General Land Registration
mortgage, including all unpaid interests at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the
Office Cadastral Record No. 1054, bounded and described as follows:
mortgagee.

Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3, thence N.
ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not
66º 35' E. 307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17'
approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall automatically become null and
W. to point "5"; S. 28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to
void, and the mortgage stipulated under Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.
point 1, point of beginning, "Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4
and 5, stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by property claimed
by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on the South, by Alangan River and property claimed by In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first
Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West, by property claimed by Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. herein before written.
Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with
existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927
(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG
and approved on February 25, 1931.

(Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO

ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of the following:

Signed in the presence of:

Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo trees; one (1)
tamarind and six (6) boñga trees.
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed value of the
improvements is P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of (Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
Limay, Bataan.
 PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.
BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula by reason of her
sex, to me known and known to me to be the person who signed the foregoing instrument,
and acknowledged to me that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and
deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this page of the
acknowledgment and that each page thereof is signed by the parties to the instrument and
the witnesses in their presence and in the presence of each other, and that the land treated
in this instrument consists of only one parcel.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, this 16th day of
May, 1932.
(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO
Notary Public
My commission expires December 31, 1933.
Doc. No. 178
Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana
Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she
conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the
interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land,
and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract, the petitioner entered
upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not collect the interest on the loan,
introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on May 22, 1934 the
tax declaration was transferred in his name and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was
increased from P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so
held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one
of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and
void and without legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into
between the parties, ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and severally,
the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the decision. In this first
assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals violated the law in holding that
Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and that it is void and without any
legal effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting
parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 of the
Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed;
and if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention
shall prevail. The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be interpreted in accordance with these rules. As
the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal
meaning of its clauses. The words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they
intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent
per annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead, the parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In
other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired
as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest
thereon. In clause V the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a half
years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in which event the mortgage would
not have any effect; in clause VI the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements,
during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was
covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a
motion in the Court of First Instance of Bataan asking that certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled and
that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 3901; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to
redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four years and a half, she would execute an
absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the
loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be
presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the contract
of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to
the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be
separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are
independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa,
commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives
his views as follows:
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no difficulty is
presented; but should they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the
nullity of the principal obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are
added to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical
relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering
therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest
intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition,
juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion. (Manresa,
Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.)
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following words:
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a
promise to do several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises
which can be separated, or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may
be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely
because an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration,
and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless
the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract void. . . . (13 C.
J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451; U.S.
v. Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law. ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937;
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 Law. ed.,
 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not expressly define what is
284; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.) meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title,
or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good
faith"; and provides further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith".
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we stated that
Article 1950 of the same Code, covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other
the principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the
real rights, provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the
land acquired as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not
person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title
against the law. The second, or the mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section
thereto." We do not have before us a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last article is not
116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he
knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or
legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner should be
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of
the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent
its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the
or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
rule. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be
premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on article 434 in connection with the
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the loan together
with interest, she would execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law.
P1,000, including the interest stipulated and owing. The stipulation was verbally modified by the same
When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been
parties after the expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take possession of the
passed upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final judgments and
land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of interest
administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote
upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax. These pacts made by the parties
under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far
independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter
exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that
into a contract of antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being a real
even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear,
encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and
another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of error is well- from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
founded and that error was committed in holding that the contract entered into between the parties was
one of absolute sale of the land and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of
assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of
a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons,
violating the Public Land Act because he entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is
compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is
vague and not specific. If it attempts to show that the said document is valid in its entirety, it is not well-
possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish
founded because we have already said that certain pacts thereof are illegal because they are prohibited
Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.

In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the verbal agreement
entered into between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been accepted by the Court of Appeals;
and in the fourth and last assignment of error the same petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that he acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of
the fruits thereof, resulting in the denial of his right to be reimbursed for the value of the improvements
introduced by him.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties entered into
another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to receive
the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment
of stipulated interest and he would assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner
and his receipt of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis,
are illegal and void agreements because, as already stated, the contract of antichresis is a lien and
such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The Court of Appeals held
that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract
he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter could not sell
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but
possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with
the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on
the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In
taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and
that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the
conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and
may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do not give much importance to the change of the tax
declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an
act may only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the
petitioner, to about which we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and
excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land
and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and
having introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same
Code are applicable; wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
upon indemnifying the petitioner the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial
court; or the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market value
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the
to be fixed by the court of origin.
Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and
her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to pay them the sum of all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
P650, being the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the land. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved
the same opinion as the trial court that the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the
in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff
land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the respondents have not
claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
established such damages. Under the verbal contract between the petitioner and the deceased
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the former would take possession of the land and would
receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on condition that he would no longer collect the
stipulated interest and that he would attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at bottom, Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her
is tantamount to the stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of the land to the husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as
payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the elements husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
characterizing the contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code. It was not possible for the way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by
parties to stipulate further that the value of the fruits be also applied to the payment of the capital, her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
because the truth was that nothing remained after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest,
at the rate fixed, amounted to P120 per annum, whereas the market value of the fruits obtainable from
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
the land hardly reached said amount in view of the fact that the assessed value of said improvements
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute
was, according to the decision, P860. To this should be added the fact that, under the verbal
without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be taken a certain amount to pay the annual land tax. We
mention these data here to show that the petitioner is also not bound to render an accounting of the
value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements for the reason stated that said value hardly covers There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
the interest earned by the secured indebtednes. owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria
del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino
Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1) that
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background,
the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that the
it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the
contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the
time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil
land and, as such, is a null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that
Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements
before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be filed by the court of origin, upon hearing the
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged
improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying
to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that stipulated is set off The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and in default because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
thereof the petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements for the purpose of applying the leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be
proceeds thereof to the payment of his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs in all entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it
instances. So ordered. be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).

But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
G.R. No. L-4963             January 29, 1953 however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter
(article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave
vs.
rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be
declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said
new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already
stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative
provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right
of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of
pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they
were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage
somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is
disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real
property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be
made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one
(Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that
the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
G.R. No. L-44466 January 30, 1989
MAGDALENA V. ACOSTA, JULIANA V. ACOSTA and ROSITA V. ACOSTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
Branch II, HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, and BERNARDINO MAGDAY, respondents.
Florentino E. Estillore for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
The only issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether the petitioners' appeal from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Isabela in Civil Case No. 1201, may be dismissed for tardiness in
submitting their record on appeal.
On January 8, 1962, the petitioners filed an accion publiciana (Civil Case No. 1201) in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against the private respondent Bernardino Magday. After the defendant had filed his
answer, the complaint was amended on August 25, 1971, to implead the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Bureau of Lands as additional defendants. Magday filed an amended
answer. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands filed separate
answers to the amended complaint.
After the parties had submitted a stipulation of facts, the court, upon plaintiffs' motion for judgment on
the pleadings and/or summary judgment, which the defendant did not oppose, rendered judgment on
October 3, 1975, dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs (Annex F, pp. 35- 46, Rollo).
The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration (Annex G, p. 47, Rollo) of the decision. It was denied by
the respondent Judge on December 12, 1975 (Annex H, p. 50, Rollo).
On December 22, 1975, they filed a motion for leave to appeal as paupers (Annex J, p. 52, Rollo) and
on December 23, 1975, they filed a notice of appeal (Annex I, p. 51, Rollo). The trial court granted on
January 19, 1976 their motion to appeal as paupers (Annex K, p. 55, Rollo).
Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on appeal, they waited for the
trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals as provided in Section 16,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to
file a record on appeal (Annex L, p. 56, Rollo). A motion for reconsideration (Annex M, p. 57, Rollo) of
the dismissal order was filed by the appellants on July 26, 1976. On August 10, 1976, they mailed their
record on appeal to the Court. On August 23, 1976, the lower court denied their motion for
reconsideration (Annex 0, p. 60, Rollo). Hence, this petition for certiorari by the appellants raising the
lone legal question of whether for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant, the timely submission
of a record on appeal is required.
Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was indeed required to be filed by a pauper
appellant although it did not have to be printed. As argued by the Solicitor General in his brief.
Petitioners contend, however, that having been allowed by the lower court to
appeal as paupers, they are not required to file a record on appeal since the entire
record of the case shall be transmitted to the appellate court and the case shall be
heard upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same.
Sec. 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper. — Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to
the satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses
of prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of
the amount involved, or the nature of the questions raised, that it ought to be
reviewed by the appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the
party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the entire
record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal,
and the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon the original record so
transmitted without printing the same.' (Emphasis types supplied.)
'It is clear that even a pauper litigant is required to file a record on appeal. What is
not required of him is the filing of a printed record on appeal, and, of course, an
appeal bond, since the cited Rule is designed to help the pauper litigant who may
not be able to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal. In contrast, Sec. 17 of
the same Rule 41 which refers to appeals in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and employee's liability cases categorically provides that 'the original
record of the case shall be transmitted to the appellate court in lieu of the record on
appeal.' In other words, appeals in special civil actions do not require record on
 appeal; they are perfected by the mere filing of the notice of appeal (Embroidery
and Apparel Control and Inspection Board vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 517 [1967]).
'Indeed, records on appeal have been filed by pauper litigants as a matter of
course (Tiozon vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 284 ,[1976]).' (pp. 7-9, Brief for the
Respondents; p. 109, Rollo.)
However, under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided, a record on
appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an appeal. This new rule was given retroactive effect
in Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 where We Ruled:
The reorganization having been declared to have been completed, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 is now in full force and effect. A record on appeal is no longer
necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being
procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit
of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'
(People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764).' (Cited in Palomo Building Tenants
Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 168; De Guzman vs.
Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 731; and Lagunzad vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA
199.)
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 3, 1975, of the trial court and its orders of June 16, 1976
and August 23, 1976 are hereby set aside. The trial court is hereby ordered to forward the entire
records of Civil Case No. 1201 to the Court of Appeals for the determination and disposition of the
petitioners' appeal on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188056               January 8, 2013
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were
dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated
a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No.
XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753. 1
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO
No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special
Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:2
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of Companies, may be filed
with the docket section of the National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre Faura,
Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and distribution to
panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of Legacy group of Companies
in your respective offices with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City which is covered
by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at
Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper disposition.
For information and guidance.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in
issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the
equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No.
182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive
effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009
exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and
pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum
dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains the
validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be
dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
Issues
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly
to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No.
182?
 3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners’
constitutionally guaranteed rights?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with
their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or
compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 4 An
undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse.
In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to
shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks
that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v.
Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious
and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must
be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the policy of
hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their
applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the Court has cautioned
lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to the highest tribunal, viz:
x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts x x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to
the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after
all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.
Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra—
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently
intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would
have had to be filed with it.1âwphi1
xxxx
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and evidence of all
concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance
thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to
seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a
court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the
observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court
or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall
be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 6
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was permissible, the
petition must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7 "The sole office of the writ of certiorari," according to
Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:8
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to
warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner
as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur,
namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on
petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that
the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show
that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because
his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function
involved was purely executive or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-
judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor
does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on
the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 10 the Supreme Court
has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.11
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor’s power to
conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to
the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly endsthere. For
sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory
functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its
decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect
whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order
to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the
Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not see how that
can be. They have not shown in their petition in what manner and at what point the Secretary of
Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already
indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant
omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings
in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a)
Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when "any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court."12 The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus
does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, 13 which,
it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor.
Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed
issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were
unquestionably entitled.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. In ABAKADA
Guro Party List v. Purisima,14 the Court has extended the presumption of validity to legislative
issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court.15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of Justice had
promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer the criminal justice
system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071
(Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of
Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became incumbent
upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that the
Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by
demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other
pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the performance of the DOJ’s functions
under the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid
down by the assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in
any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them by the Legacy Group.
Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like them expedite the
prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the wrong through the creation of
the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and
comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the Secretary of
Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No. 182 of the cases
filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the exemption
traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law. 17
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated estafa were filed with your
office against officers of the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the distance of the place of
complainants therein to Manila, your Office is hereby exempted from the directive previously issued by
the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the records of all cases involving Legacy
Group of Companies to the Task Force.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases involving
the Legacy Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to file the corresponding
informations if evidence warrants and to prosecute the same in court.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires
is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. 18 Hence, the Court
has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the
classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 19
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the
Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many
complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations
would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been
filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the
considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was
fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The
classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid. Resultantly,
petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground that the non-
application of the exemption to them would cause them some inconvenience.
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy disposition of cases
guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there would be considerable delay in the resolution of
their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to
speedy disposition of their cases."20
We cannot favor their contention.
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the Constitution guarantees the
right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To properly
define that concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken
into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 22 It is cogent to mention that a
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the concept. 23
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to obtain
expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed
involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary
of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the
efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases reaching the DOJ in
addition to those already brought by petitioners and other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases
occasioned by such other and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182.
The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to
render rights nugatory.24 In fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners
to the speedy disposition of their cases.
Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in
violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such
exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute
relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but
only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights. 25 A statute or
rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted obstruction of
justice. This ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to assume
jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is fully
sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all
the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the discharge of the
DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules
and regulations to carry out their objectives, policies and functions.
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his authority, or
arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or
adversely affected should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules and
regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for
lack of merit.
Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ZSHORNACK respondents.
Pacis & Reyes Law Office for petitioner.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack and the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company of the Philippines [hereafter referred to as "COMTRUST."] In 1980, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed COMTRUST through a corporate merger, and was
substituted as party to the case.
Rizaldy Zshornack initiated proceedings on June 28,1976 by filing in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
— Caloocan City a complaint against COMTRUST alleging four causes of action. Except for the third
cause of action, the CFI ruled in favor of Zshornack. The bank appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court which modified the CFI decision absolving the bank from liability on the fourth cause of action.
The pertinent portions of the judgment, as modified, read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant COMTRUST to restore to the dollar savings account of
plaintiff (No. 25-4109) the amount of U.S $1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to earn
interest together with the remaining balance of the said account at the rate fixed by
the bank for dollar deposits under Central Bank Circular 343;
2. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to return to the plaintiff the amount of U.S.
$3,000.00 immediately upon the finality of this decision, without interest for the
reason that the said amount was merely held in custody for safekeeping, but was
not actually deposited with the defendant COMTRUST because being cash
currency, it cannot by law be deposited with plaintiffs dollar account and
defendant's only obligation is to return the same to plaintiff upon demand;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to pay plaintiff in the amount of P8,000.00 as
damages in the concept of litigation expenses and attorney's fees suffered by
plaintiff as a result of the failure of the defendant bank to restore to his (plaintiffs)
account the amount of U.S. $1,000.00 and to return to him (plaintiff) the U.S.
$3,000.00 cash left for safekeeping.
Costs against defendant COMTRUST.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 47-48.]
Undaunted, the bank comes to this Court praying that it be totally absolved from any liability to
Zshornack. The latter not having appealed the Court of Appeals decision, the issues facing this Court
are limited to the bank's liability with regard to the first and second causes of action and its liability for
damages.
1. We first consider the first cause of action, On the dates material to this case, Rizaldy Zshornack and
his wife, Shirley Gorospe, maintained in COMTRUST, Quezon City Branch, a dollar savings account
and a peso current account.
On October 27, 1975, an application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgilio V. Garcia, Assistant
Branch Manager of COMTRUST Quezon City, payable to a certain Leovigilda D. Dizon in the amount of
$1,000.00. In the application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to Dollar Savings
Acct. No. 25-4109, the savings account of the Zshornacks; the charges for commission, documentary
stamp tax and others totalling P17.46 were to be charged to Current Acct. No. 210465-29, again, the
current account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar
draft.
On the same date, October 27,1975, COMTRUST, under the signature of Virgilio V. Garcia, issued a
check payable to the order of Leovigilda D. Dizon in the sum of US $1,000 drawn on the Chase
Manhattan Bank, New York, with an indication that it was to be charged to Dollar Savings Acct. No. 25-
4109.
When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from his account, he demanded an
explanation from the bank. In answer, COMTRUST claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was
given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., brother of Rizaldy, on October 27, 1975 when he (Ernesto)
encashed with COMTRUST a cashier's check for P8,450.00 issued by the Manila Banking Corporation
payable to Ernesto.
Upon consideration of the foregoing facts, this Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of both the
trial court and the Appellate Court on the first cause of action. Petitioner must be held liable for the
unauthorized withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from private respondent's dollar account.
In its desperate attempt to justify its act of withdrawing from its depositor's savings account, the bank
has adopted inconsistent theories. First, it still maintains that the peso value of the amount withdrawn
was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr. when the latter encashed the Manilabank Cashier's Check. At
the same time, the bank claims that the withdrawal was made pursuant to an agreement where
Zshornack allegedly authorized the bank to withdraw from his dollar savings account such amount
which, when converted to pesos, would be needed to fund his peso current account. If indeed the peso
equivalent of the amount withdrawn from the dollar account was credited to the peso current account,
why did the bank still have to pay Ernesto?
At any rate, both explanations are unavailing. With regard to the first explanation, petitioner bank has
not shown how the transaction involving the cashier's check is related to the transaction involving the
dollar draft in favor of Dizon financed by the withdrawal from Rizaldy's dollar account. The two
transactions appear entirely independent of each other. Moreover, Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., possesses a
personality distinct and separate from Rizaldy Zshornack. Payment made to Ernesto cannot be
considered payment to Rizaldy.
As to the second explanation, even if we assume that there was such an agreement, the evidence do
not show that the withdrawal was made pursuant to it. Instead, the record reveals that the amount
withdrawn was used to finance a dollar draft in favor of Leovigilda D. Dizon, and not to fund the current
account of the Zshornacks. There is no proof whatsoever that peso Current Account No. 210-465-29
was ever credited with the peso equivalent of the US$1,000.00 withdrawn on October 27, 1975 from
Dollar Savings Account No. 25-4109.
2. As for the second cause of action, the complaint filed with the trial court alleged that on December 8,
1975, Zshornack entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US $3,000.00 cash (popularly known as
greenbacks) for safekeeping, and that the agreement was embodied in a document, a copy of which
was attached to and made part of the complaint. The document reads:
Makati Cable Address:
Philippines "COMTRUST"
COMMERCIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
of the Philippines
Quezon City Branch
December denying
MR. RIZALDY T. ZSHORNACK
&/OR MRS SHIRLEY E. ZSHORNACK
Sir/Madam:
We acknowledged (sic) having received from you today the
sum of US DOLLARS: THREE THOUSAND ONLY
(US$3,000.00) for safekeeping.
Received by:
(Sgd.) VIR
V. GARCIA
It was also alleged in the complaint that despite demands, the bank refused to return the money.
In its answer, COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was credited to Zshornack's peso current
account at prevailing conversion rates.
It must be emphasized that COMTRUST did not deny specifically under oath the authenticity and due
execution of the above instrument.
During trial, it was established that on December 8, 1975 Zshornack indeed delivered to the bank US
$3,000 for safekeeping. When he requested the return of the money on May 10, 1976, COMTRUST
explained that the sum was disposed of in this manner: US$2,000.00 was sold on December 29, 1975
and the peso proceeds amounting to P14,920.00 were deposited to Zshornack's current account per
deposit slip accomplished by Garcia; the remaining US$1,000.00 was sold on February 3, 1976 and the
peso proceeds amounting to P8,350.00 were deposited to his current account per deposit slip also
accomplished by Garcia.
Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was properly credited to Zshornack's current account at
prevailing conversion rates, BPI now posits another ground to defeat private respondent's claim. It now
argues that the contract embodied in the document is the contract of depositum (as defined in Article
1962, New Civil Code), which banks do not enter into. The bank alleges that Garcia exceeded his
powers when he entered into the transaction. Hence, it is claimed, the bank cannot be liable under the
contract, and the obligation is purely personal to Garcia.
Before we go into the nature of the contract entered into, an important point which arises on the
pleadings, must be considered.
The second cause of action is based on a document purporting to be signed by COMTRUST, a copy of
which document was attached to the complaint. In short, the second cause of action was based on an
actionable document. It was therefore incumbent upon the bank to specifically deny under oath the due
execution of the document, as prescribed under Rule 8, Section 8, if it desired: (1) to question the
authority of Garcia to bind the corporation; and (2) to deny its capacity to enter into such contract. [See,
E.B. Merchant v. International Banking Corporation, 6 Phil. 314 (1906).] No sworn answer denying the
due execution of the document in question, or questioning the authority of Garcia to bind the bank, or
8, 1975 the bank's capacity to enter into the contract, was ever filed. Hence, the bank is deemed to
have admitted not only Garcia's authority, but also the bank's power, to enter into the contract in
question.
In the past, this Court had occasion to explain the reason behind this procedural requirement.
The reason for the rule enunciated in the foregoing authorities will, we think, be
readily appreciated. In dealing with corporations the public at large is bound to rely
to a large extent upon outward appearances. If a man is found acting for a
corporation with the external indicia of authority, any person, not having notice of
want of authority, may usually rely upon those appearances; and if it be found that
the directors had permitted the agent to exercise that authority and thereby held
him out as a person competent to bind the corporation, or had acquiesced in a
contract and retained the benefit supposed to have been conferred by it, the
corporation will be bound, notwithstanding the actual authority may never have
been granted
 ... Whether a particular officer actually possesses the authority which he assumes
to exercise is frequently known to very few, and the proof of it usually is not readily
accessible to the stranger who deals with the corporation on the faith of the
ostensible authority exercised by some of the corporate officers. It is therefore
reasonable, in a case where an officer of a corporation has made a contract in its
name, that the corporation should be required, if it denies his authority, to state
such defense in its answer. By this means the plaintiff is apprised of the fact that
the agent's authority is contested; and he is given an opportunity to adduce
evidence showing either that the authority existed or that the contract was ratified
and approved. [Ramirez v. Orientalist Co. and Fernandez, 38 Phil. 634, 645- 646
(1918).]
Petitioner's argument must also be rejected for another reason. The practical effect of absolving a
corporation from liability every time an officer enters into a contract which is beyond corporate powers,
even without the proper allegation or proof that the corporation has not authorized nor ratified the
officer's act, is to cast corporations in so perfect a mold that transgressions and wrongs by such
artificial beings become impossible [Bissell v. Michigan Southern and N.I.R. Cos 22 N.Y 258 (1860).]
"To say that a corporation has no right to do unauthorized acts is only to put forth a very plain truism but
to say that such bodies have no power or capacity to err is to impute to them an excellence which does
not belong to any created existence with which we are acquainted. The distinction between power and
right is no more to be lost sight of in respect to artificial than in respect to natural persons." [Ibid.]
Having determined that Garcia's act of entering into the contract binds the corporation, we now
determine the correct nature of the contract, and its legal consequences, including its enforceability.
The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for
safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for
the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time, Thus, Zshornack
demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the
same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the
contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
Note that the object of the contract between Zshornack and COMTRUST was foreign exchange.
Hence, the transaction was covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20, Restrictions on Gold and Foreign
Exchange Transactions, promulgated on December 9, 1949, which was in force at the time the parties
entered into the transaction involved in this case. The circular provides:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Transactions in the assets described below and all dealings in them of whatever
nature, including, where applicable their exportation and importation, shall NOT be
effected, except with respect to deposit accounts included in sub-paragraphs (b)
and (c) of this paragraph, when such deposit accounts are owned by and in the
name of, banks.
(a) Any and all assets, provided they are held through, in, or
with banks or banking institutions located in the Philippines,
including money, checks, drafts, bullions bank drafts, deposit
accounts (demand, time and savings), all debts, indebtedness
or obligations, financial brokers and investment houses, notes,
debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, bank acceptances,
mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of
security, expressed in foreign currencies, or if payable abroad,
irrespective of the currency in which they are expressed, and
belonging to any person, firm, partnership, association, branch
office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or
corporation residing or located within the Philippines;
(b) Any and all assets of the kinds included and/or described in
subparagraph (a) above, whether or not held through, in, or
with banks or banking institutions, and existent within the
Philippines, which belong to any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or other
unincorporated body or corporation not residing or located
within the Philippines;
(c) Any and all assets existent within the Philippines including
money, checks, drafts, bullions, bank drafts, all debts,
indebtedness or obligations, financial securities commonly
dealt in by bankers, brokers and investment houses, notes,
debentures, stock, bonds, coupons, bank acceptances,
mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of
security expressed in foreign currencies, or if payable abroad,
irrespective of the currency in which they are expressed, and
belonging to any person, firm, partnership, association, branch
office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or
corporation residing or located within the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
4. (a) All receipts of foreign exchange shall be sold daily to the Central Bank by
those authorized to deal in foreign exchange. All receipts of foreign exchange by
any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or other
unincorporated body or corporation shall be sold to the authorized agents of the
Central Bank by the recipients within one business day following the receipt of
such foreign exchange. Any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office,
agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation, residing or located
within the Philippines, who acquires on and after the date of this Circular foreign
exchange shall not, unless licensed by the Central Bank, dispose of such foreign
exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value, nor delay taking
ownership thereof except as such delay is customary; Provided, further, That within
one day upon taking ownership, or receiving payment, of foreign exchange the
aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such foreign exchange to
designated agents of the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
8. Strict observance of the provisions of this Circular is enjoined; and any person,
firm or corporation, foreign or domestic, who being bound to the observance
thereof, or of such other rules, regulations or directives as may hereafter be issued
 in implementation of this Circular, shall fail or refuse to comply with, or abide by, or
shall violate the same, shall be subject to the penal sanctions provided in the
Central Bank Act.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph 4 (a) above was modified by Section 6 of Central Bank Circular No. 281, Regulations on
Foreign Exchange, promulgated on November 26, 1969 by limiting its coverage to Philippine residents
only. Section 6 provides:
SEC. 6. All receipts of foreign exchange by any resident person, firm, company or
corporation shall be sold to authorized agents of the Central Bank by the recipients
within one business day following the receipt of such foreign exchange.
Any resident person, firm, company or corporation residing or located within the
Philippines, who acquires foreign exchange shall not, unless authorized by the
Central Bank, dispose of such foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor receive
less than its full value, nor delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is
customary; Provided, That, within one business day upon taking ownership or
receiving payment of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities
shall sell such foreign exchange to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.
As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended the
bank to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his complaint
that he is a Philippine resident. The parties did not intended to sell the US dollars to the Central Bank
within one business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of depositum would never have been
entered into at all.
Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within one
business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must be
considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to
Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of a
mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against
the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the
act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action
against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of the State to
prosecute the parties for violating the law.
We thus rule that Zshornack cannot recover under the second cause of action.
3. Lastly, we find the P8,000.00 awarded by the courts a quo as damages in the concept of litigation
expenses and attorney's fees to be reasonable. The award is sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is ordered to restore to the
dollar savings account of private respondent the amount of US$1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to
earn interest at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar savings deposits. Petitioner is further ordered to pay
private respondent the amount of P8,000.00 as damages. The other causes of action of private
respondent are ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE
BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,
special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-
appellant..
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise
agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-7866,
entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion,
which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive
property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife,
Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under
administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940,
filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de
Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-
administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the
testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto
himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special
administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued
with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases
remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been
unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a
compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of
Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr."
The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with
finality, the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc.,
between them in connection with the administration, settlement, partition,
adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without
any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following
terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties
situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la
jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y
con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay;
por el Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el
Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per
square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000)
Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the
payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete
payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco
de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija
and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or
by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and
shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of
Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that
particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines,
amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5
share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer
of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development
Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly
to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name
of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose
de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs,
successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually
renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of
action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money,
accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which
they ever had, or now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp.
Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija,
Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well
as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each other,
their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or
partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution
of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under
paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and
 documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said
heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property
"Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this
instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva
Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while
administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2)
that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and
Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the
Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against
the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a
decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no
debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal
representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and
still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the
validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that
at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of
the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of
Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties
have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless
ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than
useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from
an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary
share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis
Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among
the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in
the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant,
creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4 Of course, the effect of such
alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the
aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the
coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the
Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should
be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of
a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of
suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent
of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all.
Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous
cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the
heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the
perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only
difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court,
is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the
point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no
definite period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory
period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred
that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered
into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit,
Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the
consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040,
pp. 39- 46) and which contained the following clause:
 III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of
the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja,
namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no
sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of
the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days
from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further
effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this
particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no
date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was not
notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification
clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2
heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000
represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which
corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that
the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was
designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the other three Borja
heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in
Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the
stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of
the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and
ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be
paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold
until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in
approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now under
appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of
Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose
estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This
circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in
the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she
owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As
owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose.
Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not
be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it
amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is
without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A")
describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in
the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in
its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-
28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in
its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the
parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed
amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion above-
mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been formally
signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that some time
after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the compromise
agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A"
(Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly
intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by the probate of
Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A"
involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all
of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's attitude,
Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial
sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in
attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of
Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in
G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17
June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the
inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies
the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately
performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order
should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be,
and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the
value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of
the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement
(Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as
to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June
1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every
subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in
the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the
husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it
forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the
presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become
moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R.
No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her
late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-
claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees,
its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly
registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was
partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section
to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja
(V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena
Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of
13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages
7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco
de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose
de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to
have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his
answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his parents
(Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article 160 of
the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as
well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had
adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then
appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question as
owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de
Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his
deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same
date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de
Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7
September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the
Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as
administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed the
Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja
and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal"
(Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against
interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial
proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not
conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the
strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4
parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de
Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had
been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by
Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand from
the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that
Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal,
Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would represent
Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de
Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions in
the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally
determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja
showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private funds, for
which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive
property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de
Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay,
hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja
had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both Marcelo
and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is
improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and
when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is
clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not
clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers
precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two
real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600,
and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion).
To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and
not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are
not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they are
clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-
widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the self-serving
statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of
the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by
proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion)
declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should be
ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased,
the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No.
L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and
set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.
[G.R. No. 186550 : July 05, 2010]
ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.
SPOUSES CESARIO GRAVADOR AND NORMA DE VERA AND SPOUSES EMMA
CONCEPCION G. DUMIGPI AND FEDERICO L. DUMIGPI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the June 10, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
83197, setting aside the April 5, 2004 decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
9, Bulacan, as well as its subsequent Resolution [3] dated February 11, 2009, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On October 22, 1999, petitioner Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation (ACFLC)
extended a loan of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00)[4] to respondent Cesario
Gravador, with respondents Norma de Vera and Emma Concepcion Dumigpi as co-makers.
The loan was payable in sixty (60) monthly installments of P24,400.00 each. To secure
the loan, respondent Cesario executed a real estate mortgage [5] over his property in Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29234. [6]
Respondents paid the initial installment due in November 1999.  However, they were
unable to pay the subsequent ones.  Consequently, on February 1, 2000, respondents
received a letter demanding payment of P1,871,480.00 within five (5) days from receipt
thereof. Respondents requested for an additional period to settle their account, but ACFLC
denied the request. Petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage with
the Office of the Deputy Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan.
On April 7, 2000, respondents filed a suit for annulment of real estate mortgage and
promissory note with damages and prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction.  Respondents claimed that the real estate
mortgage is null and void. They pointed out that the mortgage does not make reference to
the promissory note dated October 22, 1999.  The promissory note does not specify the
maturity date of the loan, the interest rate, and the mode of payment; and it illegally
imposed liquidated damages. The real estate mortgage, on the other hand, contains a
provision on the waiver of the mortgagor's right of redemption, a provision that is
contrary to law and public policy.  Respondents added that ACFLC violated Republic Act
No. 3765, or the Truth in Lending Act, in the disclosure statement that should be issued to
the borrower.  Respondents, thus, claimed that ACFLC's petition for foreclosure lacked
factual and legal basis, and prayed that the promissory note, real estate mortgage, and
any certificate of sale that might be issued in connection with ACFLC's petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure be declared null and void.  In the alternative, respondents prayed
that the court fix their obligation at P800,000.00 if the mortgage could not be annulled,
and declare as null and void the provisions on the waiver of mortgagor's right of
redemption and imposition of the liquidated damages. Respondents further prayed for
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, and for the issuance of a TRO
to enjoin ACFLC from foreclosing their property.
On April 12, 2000, the RTC issued an Order,[7] denying respondents' application for TRO,
as the acts sought to be enjoined were already fait accompli.
On May 12, 2000, ACFLC filed its Answer, denying the material allegations in the
complaint and averring failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action, as
defenses.  ACFLC claimed that it was merely exercising its right as mortgagor; hence, it
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action. Sustaining the validity of the promissory note and the real estate mortgage, the
RTC held that respondents are well-educated individuals who could not feign naiveté in
the execution of the loan documents.  It, therefore, rejected respondents' claim that
ACFLC deceived them into signing the promissory note, disclosure statement, and deed of
real estate mortgage.  The RTC further held that the alleged defects in the promissory
note and in the deed of real estate mortgage are too insubstantial to warrant the
nullification of the mortgage. It added that a promissory note is not one of the essential
elements of a mortgage; thus, reference to a promissory note is neither indispensable nor
imperative for the validity of the mortgage.  The RTC also upheld the interest rate and the
penalty charge imposed by ACFLC, and the waiver of respondents' right of redemption
provided in the deed of real estate mortgage.
The RTC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence on record and the laws/jurisprudence applicable
thereto, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in the above-entitled
case for want of cause of action as well as the counterclaim of [petitioner] Asian Cathay
Finance & Leasing Corporation for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees for
abject lack of proof to justify the same.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. On June 10, 2008, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision, reversing the RTC.  It held that the amount of P1,871,480.00
demanded by ACFLC from respondents is unconscionable and excessive. Thus, it declared
respondents' principal loan to be P800,000.00, and fixed the interest rate at 12% per
annum and reduced the penalty charge to 1% per month.  It explained that ACFLC could
not insist on the interest rate provided on the note because it failed to provide
respondents with the disclosure statement prior to the consummation of the loan
transaction. Finally, the CA invalidated the waiver of respondents' right of redemption for
reasons of public policy. Thus, the CA ordered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Affirming the amount of the principal loan under the REM and  Disclosure Statement
both dated October 22, 1999 to be  P800,000.00, subject to:
a. 1% interest per month (12% per annum) on the principal from November 23, 1999
until the date of the foreclosure sale, less P24,000.00 paid by [respondents]  as first
month amortization[;]
b. 1% penalty charge per month on the principal from December 23, 1999 until the date
of the foreclosure sale.
2) Declaring par. 14 of the REM as null and void by reason of public policy, and granting
mortgagors a period of one year from the finality of this Decision within which to redeem
the subject property by paying the redemption price as computed  under paragraph 1
hereof, plus one percent (1%) interest thereon from the time of foreclosure up to the time
of the actual  redemption pursuant to Section 28, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.
The claim of the [respondents] for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees is
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
ACFLC filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on February 11, 2009.
ACFLC is now before us, faulting the CA for reversing the dismissal of respondents'
complaint. It points out that respondents are well-educated persons who are familiar with
the execution of loan documents. Thus, they cannot be deceived into signing a document
containing provisions that they are not amenable to.  ACFLC ascribes error on the part of
the CA for invalidating the interest rates imposed on respondents' loan, and the waiver of
the right of redemption.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is true that parties to a loan agreement have a wide latitude to stipulate on any interest
rate in view of Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982, which suspended the Usury
Law ceiling on interest rate effective January 1, 1983.  However, interest rates, whenever
unconscionable, may be equitably reduced or even invalidated. In several cases, [10] this
Court had declared as null and void stipulations on interest and charges that were found
excessive, iniquitous and unconscionable.
Records show that the amount of loan obtained by respondents on October 22, 1999 was
P800,000.00.  Respondents paid the installment for November 1999, but failed to pay the
subsequent ones.  On February 1, 2000, ACFLC demanded payment of P1,871,480.00.  In
a span of three months, respondents' obligation ballooned by more than P1,000,000.00. 
ACFLC failed to show any computation on how much interest was imposed and on the
penalties charged.  Thus, we fully agree with the CA that the amount claimed by ACFLC is
unconscionable.
In Spouses Isagani and Diosdada Castro v. Angelina de Leon Tan,  Sps. Concepcion T.
Clemente and Alexander C. Clemente, Sps. Elizabeth T. Carpio and Alvin Carpio, Sps.
Marie Rose T. Soliman and Arvin Soliman and Julius Amiel Tan,[11] this Court held:
The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if knowingly
and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant
spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of
man. It has no support in law, in principles of justice, or in the human conscience nor is
there any reason whatsoever which may justify such imposition as righteous and as one
that may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals.
Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable interest are
contrary to morals, if not against the law.  Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, these
contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the right
to set up their illegality as a defense be waived. The nullity of the stipulation on the
usurious interest does not, however, affect the lender's right to recover the principal of
the loan. Nor would it affect the terms of the real estate mortgage.  The right to foreclose
the mortgage remains with the creditors, and said right can be exercised upon the failure
of the debtors to pay the debt due.  The debt due is to be considered without the
stipulation of the excessive interest.  A legal interest of 12% per annum will be added in
place of the excessive interest formerly imposed. [12] The nullification by the CA of the
interest rate and the penalty charge and the consequent imposition of an interest rate of
12% and penalty charge of 1% per month cannot, therefore, be considered a reversible
error.
ACFLC next faults the CA for invalidating paragraph 14 of the real estate mortgage which
provides for the waiver of the mortgagor's right of redemption.  It argues that the right of
redemption is a privilege; hence, respondents are at liberty to waive their right of
redemption, as they did in this case.
Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it must, in the first place, be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to the intention of a
party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Additionally, the intention
to waive a right or an advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly. [13] 
Unfortunately, ACFLC failed to convince us that respondents waived their right of
redemption voluntarily.
As the CA had taken pains to demonstrate:
The supposed waiver by the mortgagors was contained in a statement made in fine print
in the REM.  It was made in the form and language prepared by [petitioner]ACFLC while
the [respondents] merely affixed their signatures or adhesion thereto. It thus partakes of
the nature of a contract of adhesion.  It is settled that doubts in the interpretation of
stipulations in contracts of adhesion should be resolved against the party that prepared
them. This principle especially holds true with regard to waivers, which are not presumed,
but which must be clearly and convincingly shown.  [Petitioner] ACFLC presented no
evidence hence it failed to show the efficacy of this waiver.
Moreover, to say that the mortgagor's right of redemption may be waived through a fine
print in a mortgage contract is, in the last analysis, tantamount to placing at the
mortgagee's absolute disposal the property foreclosed.  It would render practically
nugatory this right that is provided by law for the mortgagor for reasons of public policy. 
A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for being
subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely deprived of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing.[14]
In fine, when the redemptioner chooses to exercise his right of redemption, it is the policy
of the law to aid rather than to defeat his right. [15] Thus, we affirm the CA in nullifying the
waiver of the right of redemption provided in the real estate mortgage.
Finally, ACFLC claims that respondents' complaint for annulment of mortgage is a
collateral attack on its certificate of title.  The argument is specious.
The instant complaint for annulment of mortgage was filed on April 7, 2000, long before
the consolidation of ACFLC's title over the property.  In fact, when respondents filed this
suit at the first instance, the title to the property was still in the name of respondent
Cesario.  The instant case was pending with the RTC when ACFLC filed a petition for
foreclosure of mortgage and even when a writ of possession was issued.  Clearly, ACFLC's
title is subject to the final outcome of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83197 are AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94571             April 22, 1991
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, HON.
ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as follows:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service)
and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,1 while the appropriations for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00. 2
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines may bring this
suit where a constitutional issue is raised.3 Indeed, even a taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful
expenditure of public funds.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177,
and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and
not this Court.
In Gonzales,5 the main issue was the unconstitutionality of the presidential veto of certain provision
particularly Section 16 of the General Appropriations Act of 1990, R.A. No. 6831. This Court, in
disposing of the issue, stated —
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.
It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision
by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.
Sec. 1. The judicial power shad be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional and that charge
being controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper
House of Congress and the executive department that may be taken cognizance of by this
Court.
The questions raised in the instant petition are —
 I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION 1990 BUDGET
VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION?
II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 29(l), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION? 6
There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which this Court may properly take
cognizance of On the first issue, the petitioners aver —
According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
The reason behind the said provision is stated, thus:
In explaining his proposed amendment, Mr. Ople stated that all the great and
sincere piety professed by every President and every Congress of the Philippines
since the end of World War II for the economic welfare of the public
schoolteachers always ended up in failure and this failure, he stated, had caused
mass defection of the best and brightest teachers to other careers,
including menial jobs in overseas employment and concerted actions by them to
project their grievances, mainly over low pay and abject working conditions.
He pointed to the high expectations generated by the February Revolution,
especially keen among public schoolteachers, which at present exacerbate these
long frustrated hopes.
Mr. Ople stated that despite the sincerity of all administrations that tried vainly to
respond to the needs of the teachers, the central problem that always defeated
their pious intentions was really the one budgetary priority in the sense that any
proposed increase for public schoolteachers had to be multiplied many times by
the number of government employees in general and their equitable claims to any
pay standardization such that the pay rate of teachers is hopelessly pegged to the
rate of government workers in general. This, he stated, foredoomed the prospect of
a significant pay increase for teachers.
Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition by the Constitution of the highest priority
for public schoolteachers, and by implication, for all teachers, would ensure that the
President and Congress would be strongly urged by a constitutional mandate to
grant to them such a level of remuneration and other incentives that would make
teaching competitive again and attractive to the best available talents in the nation.
Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before World War II, teaching competed most
successfully against all other career choices for the best and the brightest of the
younger generation. It is for this reason, he stated, that his proposed amendment if
approved, would ensure that teaching would be restored to its lost glory as the
career of choice for the most talented and most public-spirited of the younger
generation in the sense that it would become the countervailing measure against
the continued decline of teaching and the wholesale desertion of this noble
profession presently taking place. He further stated that this would ensure that the
future and the quality of the population would be asserted as a top priority against
many clamorous and importunate but less important claims of the present. (Journal
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)
However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt service while only
P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the 1990 budget. It plain, therefore, that
the said appropriation for debt services is inconsistent with the Constitution, hence, viod (Art. 7, New
Civil Code).7
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign
the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as
to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and
improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The
amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under
the General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all
department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according
highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the
greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed
as unconstitutional.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following observations:
To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH
FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN
BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR
BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES
INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RELENDING TO THE PRIVATE
SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES, provides:
Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding interests,
which the President of the Philippines is authorized to incur under this Act shall not
exceed one billion United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies
at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the loans, credits and indebtedness are
incurred: Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness
incurred under this Act shall not exceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of
 the approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every fiscal year thereafter, all
in United States dollars or its equivalent in other currencies.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of
every regular session, to report to the Congress the amount of loans, credits and
indebtedness contracted, as well as the guarantees extended, and the purposes
and projects for which the loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the
guarantees extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipino
owned or controlled corporations and similar purposes.
Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to effect payments on
foreign or domestic loans, or foreign or domestic loans whereon creditors make a
call on the direct and indirect guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines, obtained
by:
a. The Republic of the Philippines the proceeds of which were relent to
government-owned or controlled corporations and/or government
financial institutions;

Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount out of any funds in b. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or government
the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the financial institutions the proceeds of which were relent to public or private
principal and interest on such loans, credits or indebtedness as and when they institutions;
shall become due.
c. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or financial
However, after the declaration of martial law, President Marcos issued PD 81 amending Section 6, institutions and guaranteed by the Republic of the Philippines;
thus:
d. other public or private institutions and guaranteed by government-
Sec. 7. Section six of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows: owned or controlled corporations and/or government financial
institutions.
Sec. 6. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and in order to enable
the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal Sec. 2. All repayments made by borrower institutions on the loans for whose
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, account advances were made by the National Treasury will revert to the General
debentures, securities or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international Fund.
markets incurred under the authority of this Act, the proceeds of which are deemed
appropriated for the projects, all the revenue realized from the projects financed by
Sec. 3. In the event that any borrower institution is unable to settle the advances
such loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures, securities or
made out of the appropriation provided therein, the Treasurer of the Philippines
other evidences of indebtedness, shall be turned over in full, after deducting actual
shall make the proper recommendation to the Minister of Finance on whether such
and necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of said projects, to the
advances shall be treated as equity or subsidy of the National Government to the
National Treasury by the government office, agency or instrumentality, or
institution concerned, which shall be considered in the budgetary program of the
government-owned or controlled corporation concerned, which is hereby
Government.
appropriated for the purpose as and when they shall become due. In case the
revenue realized is insufficient to cover the principal, interest and other charges,
such portion of the budgetary savings as may be necessary to cover the balance or In the "Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing Fiscal Year 1990," which
deficiency shall be set aside exclusively for the purpose by the government office, accompanied her budget message to Congress, the President of the Philippines,
agency or instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation Corazon C. Aquino, stated:
concerned: Provided, That, if there still remains a deficiency, such amount
necessary to cover the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credit
Sources Appropriation
or indebtedness as and when they shall become due is hereby appropriated out of
any funds in the national treasury not otherwise appropriated: . . .
The P233.5 billion budget proposed for fiscal year 1990 will require P132.1 billion of new
programmed appropriations out of a total P155.3 billion in new legislative authorization from
President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which provides:
Congress. The rest of the budget, totalling P101.4 billion, will be sourced from existing
appropriations: P98.4 billion from Automatic Appropriations and P3.0 billion from Continuing
Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. –– All expenditures for (a) personnel retirement Appropriations (Fig. 4).
premiums, government service insurance, and other similar fixed expenditures,
(b) principal and interest on public debt, (c) national government guarantees of
And according to Figure 4, . . ., P86.8 billion out of the P98.4 Billion are programmed for debt service.
obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically appropriated; Provided, that
In other words, the President had, on her own, determined and set aside the said amount of P98.4
no obligations shall be incurred or payments made from funds thus automatically
Billion with the rest of the appropriations of P155.3 Billion to be determined and fixed by Congress,
appropriated except as issued in the form of regular budgetary allotments.
which is now Rep. Act 6831. 9

and PD 1967, which provides:

Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President
Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the
one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress
on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new
legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not
approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is
an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No.
1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the
said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides ––
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Emphasis
supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President,10 then a law must be passed by Congress to
authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of
Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows ––
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, 11 otherwise it
is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount
appropriated for the debt service.12
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the
social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to
remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended,
repealed or revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed to
cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the
national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the
necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods
and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management
policies. Its political wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the Solicitor General as he argues —
. . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of
market conditions by redeeming high-interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to
shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten
our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt to asset, debt-to-debt or other such
schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt
servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual
debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a
mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, "basket" of foreign exchange and interest
rate assumptions which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to
changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the
Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the
time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the
meantime may have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments
and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure
ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate payment even before due
dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the
intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person
of Marcos.13
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are
therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among
others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by
Congress and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not
contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating
public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative million The only
reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean
appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were
otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is
the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs. Ericta,14 this Court had
this to say ––
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, the inequity must be directed to the scope and definiteness of
the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what
job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in which legislative process can go forward . . .
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy . . .
 The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as whole . . .
In People vs. Vera,15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except enforce it. If there are
gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have
been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and exercise a discretion essentially
legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid delegation. 16
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the
Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits
or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a
separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable
the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the
credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the
very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the
amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and
other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or
security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law,
as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will
be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four major phases as
aptly discussed by the Solicitor General:
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and
covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and
activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and
the translation of desired priorities and activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and
Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the
requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the Development Budget
Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic projections of
interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and foreign financing,
estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury
computes for the interest and principal payments for the year for all direct national
government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. –– At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates
or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the
Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor
already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967. Precisely in the fight
of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for debt service,
Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely
with annual levels and approval thereof upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation
program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have
delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies the implementation or execution of
the legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers
the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority
ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing
review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of
cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
Release from the debt service fired is triggered by a request of the Bureau of the Treasury for
allotments from the Department of Budget and Management, one quarter in advance of
payment schedule, to ensure prompt payments. The Bureau of Treasury, upon receiving
official billings from the creditors, remits payments to creditors through the Central Bank or to
the Sinking Fund established for government security issues (Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and
initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished
are compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved.
There being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown, petitioners
insist nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue delegation of legislative
power to the executive on the alleged ground that the appropriations therein are not exact,
certain or definite, invoking in support therefor the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution
under which the case of State v. Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike
the Constitution of Nebraska, however, our Constitution does not require a definite, certain,
exact or "specific appropriation made by law." Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution
omits any of these words and simply states:
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization
or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time
horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as
 well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.
The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An
appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears
from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,
or in the present.17 vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon C. Aquino
submitted to Congress the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the Fiscal Year 1990. Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering the estimated obligation that will be incurred by the Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
national government during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the proposed budget, P86.8 is
set aside for debt servicing as follows:

1âwphi1
National Government Debt MORELAND, J.:
Service Expenditures, 1990
(in million pesos)
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —
Domestic Foreign Total
RA 245, as RA 4860
amended as amended, That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
PD 1967 in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of
the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the
Interest purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of
Payments P36,861 P18,570 P55,431 horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was
proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the
Principal delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk
Amortization 16,310 15,077 31,387 on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an
opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran
into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely
Total P53,171 P33,647 P86,818
18 wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the
======== ======== ======== carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.

x x x           x x x          x x x
as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as amended.

The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise
amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this petition.
Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or not
the country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous amount that had been
incurred by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an
issue that is presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political
decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound
discretion.
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the
cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good
servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to
deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of
delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of
the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for
the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in
the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip
and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon
and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the
rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on
which street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de
Martinez, was riding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.

SO ORDERED.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against
him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October,
1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code.
The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed
or on account of their duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damages should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a
trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence
of such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the
ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from that in
Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence
is determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating
the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law
determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme
court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2
March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June,
1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and
tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving
them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away
up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses
and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the
custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by
the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence.
(Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442;
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N.
Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person
who suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ
another to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to
go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the
injury, is that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like
circumstances. It can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself
negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the
disposition of the horse; whether he was under the observation and control of some person
all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury
from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the trial
court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him
unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the
sidewalk loading goods on the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite
and gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of
the alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident.
The refusal of the trial court to charge as requested left the jury free to find was verdict
against the defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts were
proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with
his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad
crossing, left the horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house,
knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for three or four months without ever
hitching it or knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on
his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise
reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or
inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues.
(Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6
Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La.
An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or
imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not
be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been
permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen
and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results.
To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent,
is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a
case, does not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates
a prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act
complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case
showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard
Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was
that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against
a wharf properly built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima
facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's agent in making the landing,
unless upon the whole evidence in the case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such
damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control of her officers and
carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage was done in this case was prima
facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might
properly be so instructed.
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway and
the accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those
conditions showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of
the horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to
deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which
that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been
productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection
or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one
who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest
of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989
RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V, respondents.
David W. Natividad for petitioner.
Calamba, Garcia, Geralde & Calamba Law Offices for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Review on certiorari of the decisio * of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition filed and
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-07192-R, entitled: "Rudy Gleo Armigos, petitioner, versus Judge
L.D. Carpio, respondent," and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of said decision.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein petitioner with the Municipal
Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 971, for the collection of damages and
attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private respondent and against the
herein petitioner. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the
following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June
1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an
appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the case was elevated
to the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur (Branch V) for the consideration of the appeal, the
presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period; consequently,
he dismissed the appeal.
Whereupon, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with the
Court of Appeals, claiming that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the
municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so
that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that
the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the
decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June
1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to
4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.
The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the novel interpretation suggested as it would result in many
confusing situations and many unreliable testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision, order or
pleading is received, and cited the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Encarnacion, 1 where this
Court held that when a law was to be effective upon approval by the President and the President
signed the same on 16 June 1950, the law should be considered to have taken effect not on the exact
hour when the President signed the same on 16 June 1950 but from the very first minute or hour of said
day of 16 June 1950.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, but his motion was
denied in a resolution promulgated on 7 December 1978.
Hence, the present recourse.
We find no merit in the petition. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In
computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not
Identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially
provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the
first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well
as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that "In computing any period of time prescribed
or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the
act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The
last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which
event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In
applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and we find no cogent
reason to adopt a different view.
Besides, human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary one for a
person, there is no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the exact hour when a
pleading, order or decision is received by a party?
Petitioner's suggestion, however, may find application in appeals in habeas corpus cases where the law
requires that such appeals should be made within 48 hours from notice of judgment. 2
While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that the real matter in dispute
may be submitted to the judgment of the court, and that the trial court is vested with discretion to allow
or admit an appeal filed out of time, this discretion is not unconditional. There must be justifiable reason
to warrant such action, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down
by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and in the absence of any justifying circumstance, the
court has no jurisdiction to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. 3 In the instant case, the
petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29131             August 27, 1969
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.
Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes for plaintiff-
appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved
therein.
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No.
20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:
(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25,
1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;
(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this
decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to
plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would
pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson
has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.
Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On
December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets,
rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment
creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof,
against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520.
Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and plaintiff's
opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:
Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than
P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court,
the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the
decision of this Court became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on
December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days
(Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present
case was filed it was filed two days too late.
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having
prescribed.1äwphï1.ñët
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on March
20, 1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question therein raised is one of
law, namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of
limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code,
"commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn, took
place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment — which was received by
the defendants herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken therefrom. 1 The issue is
thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955 expired.
Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains otherwise,
because "when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-
five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the
month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of
3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this
view in its appealed order of dismissal.
Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar year (Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being computed here is the
number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation. There is no question that
when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra
day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it
belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute
one year." 2
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision
of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as the term is
used in our laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme
Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural"
month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such provision was
incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court
declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it shall
be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months,
unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be computed by the actual number of
days they have. This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month."  4 In
the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in
accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or
civil month," with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or
nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days."
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure
to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld
without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised
Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of
Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative
Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-37048             March 7, 1933
MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, defendant-appellant.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.
Quintin Paredes and Barrera and Reyes for appellant.
DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for plaintiff-appellee.
Camus and Delgado for intervenors-appellees.
HULL, J.:
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of
Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and
wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time
have not lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8
and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued
for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of
her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or
necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the
husband left the Islands, betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute
divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the
defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928, where he has since
remained. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms of
marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage.
Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly
for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno
divorce as alimony.
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila requesting that the
courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of the State
of Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree
becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the spouse who,
having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by
the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of what would have been due to them
as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the
community of property.
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the equivalent of what
would have been due to their children as their legal portion from the respective estates had their
parents did intestate on November 28, 1927. It is also prayed that the community existing between
plaintiff and defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered to render an accounting
and to deliver to the plaintiff her share of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to pay
the plaintiff alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month, that the defendant be ordered
to pay the plaintiff, as counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos (P5000), and that the defendant be
ordered to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred in educating the three minor sons.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as intervenors and join their
mother in these proceedings. The Court of First Instance, after hearing, found against the defendant
and granted judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff and intervenors, with the exception of reducing
attorneys fees to three thousand, and also granted costs of the action against the defendant. From this
judgment defendant appeals and makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court erred in not declaring that paragraph 2 of section 9 of the Philippine
Divorce Law, is unconstitutional, null and void.
II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law) applies to the
Nevada decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C. Gonzalez, said decree
being entitled to confirmation and recognition.
III. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in intervention for lack of cause of
action against appellant and appellee.
IV. The lower court erred in not declaring the notice of lis pendens filed by intervenors to be
null and void.
V. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month for the
support not only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein, Manuela Barretto.
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is not
entitled to support from her ex-husband, herein appellant, over and beyond the alimony fixed
by the divorce decree in Exhibit A.
VII. The lower court erred in condemning defendant appellant to pay to plaintiff-appellee
P3,000 attorney's fees.
VIII. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.
While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in trying to secure
the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On the record here
presented this can not be done. The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly
set forth in Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court: Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil.,
252); Garcia Valdez vs. Soteraña Tuason (40 Phil., 943-952); Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil.,
855); Chereau vs. Fuentebella (43 Phil., 216); Fernandez vs. De Castro (48 Phil., 123); Gorayeb vs.
Hashim (50 Phil., 22); Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42); Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian Ng Shun and
Lim Tingco (52 Phil., 571); and the late case of Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, decided March 21, 1931, and
reported in 55 Phil., 851.
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this
court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a
purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves
a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the
matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in
the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence
and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which
he had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity
of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now
in force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended
to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign
laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.
It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which
the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. The lower court in granting relief as prayed for
frankly stated that the securing of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into
the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. The
hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what he personal views of the writer on the subject of
divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the
personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a
manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals. Holding the above
views it becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant in
his first assignment of error.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be reversed and
defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action. This, however, without
prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the intervenors may have against defendant. No
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-
appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age
(scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army
officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain,
Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination
of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in
love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their
marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a
piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned
the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she
pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To
facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St.
Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize
because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the
intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she
admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because
Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the
clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño
spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed
to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the
Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration
did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose
name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students
and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated
the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that
day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with
Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948
the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed
for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign
the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at
the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and
that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United
States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and
absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of
her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto
and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced
their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife
and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and
Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to
the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño
liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain
Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and
State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at
the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not
essential to give the marriage civil effects, 3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act,
which provided the following:
 SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the
solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and
the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was
valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of
the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident
consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of
her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal
Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord
with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered
under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature).
As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act
2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces,
in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings,
therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of
these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that
case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of
Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until
her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in
the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil
Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo
Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the
proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine
law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not
new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as
 written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.
too strict or too liberal. (p. 72) Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the
late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward
her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the
Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by
Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App.,
pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for
the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity"
[sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows
nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her
hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and
despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the
marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the
previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was
not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it.
That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration
but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation
of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not
concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million
pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized
by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c)
that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although
such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is
unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union
that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second
marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way
have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole
deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and
the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected.
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of
malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved. (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right
of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of recover damages;
parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable
for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts
and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of
his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his
conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a
divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his
home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused
them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled Neither party to recover costs.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay
down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella
Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been
living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes,
Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet
arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his
office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary
of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987.
The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William
Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of
the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were
fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private
respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try
and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic),
since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the
aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule
is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of
the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.
The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the
criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and
no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the
People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in
the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present
prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since
the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and
option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of
the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for
this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and
by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case
in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the
action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where
such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not
exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a
party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall
have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer
be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would
there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons
for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the
Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married
woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her
marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still
be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint
for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what
was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation
where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the
termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer
the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein
had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual
situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 88582             March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who
had been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information which
reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
design and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario
Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which
caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie
Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino
Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10)
Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta
(15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom
Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22)
Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1)
Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val
Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are
summarized in its decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich
Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his
hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children
were chosen from among a bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told
them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he
came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was
inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up young boys,
and put them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out and placed on top of a
table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of
these objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of
which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted inside
the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal
inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a
tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so
did the accused. He then started masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's hand
for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they were both naked,
and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom,
she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then
placed himself between the two (2) children and accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He
looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was
trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore
bother to look because he was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid
Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the
American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted
something in her vagina. But they could not do anything anymore, because the American had
already left, and neither did they report the matter to the police. Sometime the following day,
Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already removed from her body
and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same
date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked
her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion
wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when
he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did not
see Rosario anymore because he already went home to his aunt's house who resided at
Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21,
near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake
Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was
unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition
and brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via
jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one who gave the personal
circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower
Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already
in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of
Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the
Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara
who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the
testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the
reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14,
1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he has
seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate
neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of
his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with their mother, brother and sister-in-law
and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony even stays for one
week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely
assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at his
brother's house, he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot
including her age. In his testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie
and softdrinks money which can safely be concluded that he knows her very well. It is against
normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have
found out the real name of the girl he claims to know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was
attending to her since she is a street child, having stowed away from the custody of her
grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in
the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the
hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to her
and after finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short
interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped up about her
residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the medicine she
needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able
to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her
for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because
their program assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and
vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as
symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on
May 17, 1987, after she was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that
there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged
with blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors who attended
to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by
means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said object was deeply
embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged,
tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when
she was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an operation on
May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director
was not obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that
Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order to save her life. Her condition was
guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario's
operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her
abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes
were congested with pus and so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of
pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have septicemia, poisoning
of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been caused through
infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario.
The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a
sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object
was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for
safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object was
shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful and the
patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the
ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it
was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20,
1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was
indicated therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to
septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario
Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar
and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it
was given to her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who
helped financially Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis.
Palencia was in custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the
object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask
him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs.
Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in
state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the
burial expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita
and asked her if she was interested in filing a case against the person who caused the death
of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City)
Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his
messenger came to her house and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case,
but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she
knows that the accused is liable to pay damages anyway. After that, she received a letter
from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who
wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no longer
bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged
and told her that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the
records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant
barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office.
Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After
he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00,
but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money with the understanding that
there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and she was
asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she
and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was
subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not paid,
because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could no longer
attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even apologized to
her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by
Col. Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of
the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign
object inside Rosario's vagina was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also
conducted its investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga.
Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street
child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children and from some of them
they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM
Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they
asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot
sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to the said hotel.
Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement.
Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the
description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof
were distributed to the local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base.
Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the composite drawing were
photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside
from the physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also
described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking
that the so-called American may be European or Australian national, the team composed of
Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the
follows:
Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987.
On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals were said to be
frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while
they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male caucasian
who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez
and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity
with the American suspect, so the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to
strike a conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that
indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM
Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no beard while the one previously
described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he have just
shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes he came out,
and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said
foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police District.
It could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were accompanied by two (2)
policemen from the Western Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that
he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the pension
house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained his personal
belongings, and from there they brought him to the Western Police Department. At the said
police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the foreigner of his clutch bag
and his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form
of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about P100.00, all duly
receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan
Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter, Salonga and his team already
left the headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was
already shaking with fear after he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo
City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal of
Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The
private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla because it was she who had custody of Rosario
Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio
Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts
was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was already
in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the
death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already
gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with
Homicide because the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian.
Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot
was at the time of the commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having
been born on December 26, 1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that
Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on December 26, 1973
as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal
Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but
admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein.
Likewise, the defense's stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a
vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure,
and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the
surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp.
109-116)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution
has established the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape
with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00)
Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's fees to
the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the
court:
I The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22, 1975
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT
UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the
accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort
to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience
that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who
died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not
Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened on
October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape, Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman
under 12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious state do
not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the
accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's grandmother and
father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations were admitted
pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth certificate,
the act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a
member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the admission of
hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because her
brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only one who failed to
attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13,
1988).
(T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she
was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death
certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City General
Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the
hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot
also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as
adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared
that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since
he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by other
independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel and
Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any probative or
evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application of
evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of
Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or
marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam;
and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must as a general rule be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall
within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted by the
trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court. Their
declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The other
witnesses who testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of
Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of what happened and
not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down
in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the mother that
her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age because
the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came
from one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness.
(People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never
established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father's
declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had direct
knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year old at the
time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis
shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar
Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came
to know her only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the
circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based
on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old
at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much less offset
a documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being
hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing
Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of
belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St. James
Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that
he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber
Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book,
there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on
December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales.
Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31,
1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court
held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in
conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it
does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate
that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in
order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by
law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the
course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The
baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties
and recorded in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105
[1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized
on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the
victim's father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the one
presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date different
from that brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was
baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have been born on
December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be proof
only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's
assertion that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more
inclined to agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
x x x           x x x          x x x
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been
registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was sufficient to
establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos.
(At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document as to
Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973.
Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on the
prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in a
charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged sexual
violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was
force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows
that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have
consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez
was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the
testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor
street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to
submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under the purview of force or
intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was
Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the
insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which
led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the
circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina.
Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which the
appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng
kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may
inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang
nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada.
Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang
hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin
mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman
sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng
bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul
gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny
having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6,
1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue
(Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of
the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when he
answered on additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the
same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the prosecution
(T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator
because he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner
inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res gestae.
In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test of
admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old,
the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is
undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show that the
statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the event was so
startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence
is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically
admitted to you that she was already able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside her
vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later
on when you met her when you asked her and when she told you that she was already able
to remove that object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And
she answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain of
her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was
uttering defamatory words against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp.
72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by
the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so
we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the
appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and
discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People vs.
Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?
defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State University
in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal
Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a
usually developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .
graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan
1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until
1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to x x x           x x x          x x x
1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima
College of Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center,
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her
UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended
vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following year,
no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and
so it took more than 7 months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take that
"Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too
long before any adverse infection could set in inside the vagina?
authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:

Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was
described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of object,
would you kindly tell us what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is
inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as
such be considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the body may be:
No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign
body. One of the reactions that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body
is concerned is to cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury
to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and
changes in the area where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all
over the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as
shown to me is already not complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the body to
react. If there is mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of
power from within and that power must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition of the battery
are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any substance that will cause current
flow. All of these substances are irritants including areas of the container and as such, the
primary reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory
changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would be a
supervening infection in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer from
diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and other
systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this lipstick of women
usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that the patient suffer some abnormal
symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you mentioned, this object
has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein infection
sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is not more
than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is facing a
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities which are less
likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the body.
An examination of the object gave the following results:

x x x           x x x          x x x (1) Color: Blue

Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an inches (b) Length—approximately
infection would set in, how many days after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12 2.179 inches.
year old girl? Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.

A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that
vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals would be (2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification dated
enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction. 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics,
Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).
 (3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the object. After which, I made a speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner
catalog because no actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were portion of the vaginal canal, there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the
shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL") vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.

The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end portion x x x           x x x          x x x
which revealed the following:
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to remove the
Result of Examination said foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the
same.
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the
following inscription: Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in the first and
second instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you able to talk to her when you
were examining her?
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")

A Yes, sir.
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis'
testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that the object was
inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
with a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible
to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
A Yes, Sir I asked her.

The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and binding upon
the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469
[1988]). A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY
NITO."
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May
17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and placed the
patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988) foreign object on her vagina?

Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that day? A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the time I
examined her.
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next with your
patient?
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if any?

A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.

A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The patient was
brought to the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the patient was
ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door to the examining table. On examination, Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
the patient is conscious, she was fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was
uncooperative at that time and examination deals more on the abdomen which shows slightly
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?
distended abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum
tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
x x x           x x x          x x x
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled
that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors and would be
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings, if any?
sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to
the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I placed my index
finger and middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and was able to palpate a hard
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because there
were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to her
operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic
Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group she visits indigent children in the hospital
every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario
Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp.
16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope John
23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she encountered
Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario
Baluyot seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it
was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13,
September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she was
conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought
her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer questions
asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention
given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis,
which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual
vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes
and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the
prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no
defense at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of
the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the
bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the
positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until
the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p.
592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and
preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof
that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death
seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the
following requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this
case the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the
liability of the appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death exemplified
starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in order to survive.
At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they experience life in
its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying
their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to
dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street
children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could
be brought to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and
implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as
much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-
abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the
accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
 1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less
than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the prosecution
is to be believed, she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the
prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for
rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual
act for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was
Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the
insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who
informed him that she was able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the
night of that second encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach.
She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also
contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active
properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months inside a
young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled
that the incident happened in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The
evidence, however shows that the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December.
As per the Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived
in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until
September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened only in
October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside
the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that
she told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident.
Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior
to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that
she could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator
or vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime renders
the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with the requisite
moral certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a
foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the
appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon
mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken
against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into
account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the
mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The
strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA
593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in
criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof
"to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes
every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the
proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be
true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those
who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v.
Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of
the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez
and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced
that he comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate
pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked
him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was
shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly
show that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children.
Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have
sexual intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various ages participate in sexual
activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse.
Usually committed by a homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a passive
partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself.
Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article II,
Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles,
especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not only
to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The state has
expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art.
XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a
person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano
v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
(Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
 only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal
of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It
has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of
the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot
be demanded.
Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the
appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we
are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children
from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from
the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never
intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the
forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the
appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to
advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have
to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the
Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them. Something
must be done about it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
into the country.
correction of the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages suffered
by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a SO ORDERED.
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be G.R. No. 161921               July 17, 2013
proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,
vs.
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for disillusionment on the part of the
innumerable persons injured or wronged. DECISION

Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.1âwphi1 Circumstances
forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs
who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous
death as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of
rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there
is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and
that the vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities
but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of
indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy
(see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 28,
2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision affirmed with
modification the August 15, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing
unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153)
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473,
Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00. The
Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and not
hers. She should have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:

"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second Party
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente,
(Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:

vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)

(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and

For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never
questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice,
the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water (c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three
(3) months corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed.
Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000,
The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were
pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line
influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should be liable.
was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).

SO ORDERED.6
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the
same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the
cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160). Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.

On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.,
answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente
that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a] complaint for damages
[against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected when the
[trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p. 237). 4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with justice, gave
plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water supply,
defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as
testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department of defendant COWD.
There was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The
due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither did they
observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have
investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told
them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of
the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the patience
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that
the awarded damages is reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, while
attorney's fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor the possession and use of
water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when
[petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide."8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of disconnection and
derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent
spouses Pastorfide]."9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but these were
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit
any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a Resolution 10 issued by this
Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied with finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following Assignment of Errors: Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this instant petition. 13 This is
especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case. 14
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY
INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant petition lacks merit.
THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH
CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent spouses' water
FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES
supply, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she admitted in the
PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE
present petition that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water
ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD
supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner. While it was
WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER
COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it was
SUPPLY DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was disconnected in the
first place.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND THAT
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED
transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of
TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE.
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm
RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A
another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. 16 In the present case, intention
GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE
to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent
NEW CIVIL CODE.
spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her
request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD
DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she should
LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE have advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for disconnection,
EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their
WITH JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD
FAITH. undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses
Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the
part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN
AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS
AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12 The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-defendants before
the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instant petition. This
cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation 17 is
petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on instructive, to wit:
the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do
so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim against
xxxx
COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up
shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC,
petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition. This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in
the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and
good faith.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed with this
Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA Decision
final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article
already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their previous social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA. either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:

As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues raised by One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles
petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which
merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental
precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as
golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway
and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all
other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in
a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if
the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. x x
x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure
to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it
is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to
reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both the
RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article 2219, 19 in
connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich
one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the award
of exemplary damages, although it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent spouses
were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and such deprivation would have
continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, among others, that
such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
73000 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA,
BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of
the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila
should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The
respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila
acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No.
43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the complaint of
private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627.
Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the
marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that
petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner
Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void
since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to
the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived
together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at
least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which
reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment
of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be
determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in
the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case
can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for
suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980,
for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is
not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was
petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and
void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private
respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the
second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to
the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the
accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In
order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question
to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's
consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The
situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies
had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse,
not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the
civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his
marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats
and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The
lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in
failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage
has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later
case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the
case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was
charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise,
Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as
contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan,
petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that
her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still
subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second
marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such
marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in
the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for
conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the
criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he
had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years
without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private
respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage
is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that
they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and
one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private
respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case
No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the
marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner
also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode
upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err
in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-
02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We
make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22579             February 23, 1968
ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
          In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the
Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the
second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse
for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy
against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the negative. We sustain him.
          The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963, petitioner was
charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge,
with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married
to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an
action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent
Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab
initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and
because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case,
filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse,
praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground
that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage
with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
          Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case
pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil
suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a
motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964.
Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
          In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within
ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the
prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended
petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines
as another respondent. This Court admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
          Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of
facts as above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the
complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses
that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the
assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would
not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ." 2
          This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court.
In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be
determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the
opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage
can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy
can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial
question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action
and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for
petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be
declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a
case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."
          To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the
opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a
case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question — we further said — must be
determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another
court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the
second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue
involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or
innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."
          The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy
on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be
precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first
spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada,
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

          Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the
third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy
was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based
on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude
a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend
the hearing as sought by petitioner.

          WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
dissolved. With costs.1äwphï1.ñët