PEOPLE v.

FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. 62116 MARCH 22,1990
PONENTE: PADILL, J.
FACTS:
This is Federico Conrado's appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Pangasinan, Branch I, in Criminal Case No. L-2593 entitled, "The People of the
Philippines vs. Melquiades Fernandez, alias 'Moding' and Federico Conrado" convicting him and the
other accused of the crime of rape and sentencing them each to suffer inter alia two (2) death penalties.
Teofilo Malong employed Rebecca Soriano as a house-helper since September 1981.
On 13 January 1982 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, after taking a bath and still naked in
the bathroom, the two (2) accused, both in short pants, surreptitiously entered the bathroom. To prevent
her from making an outcry, a piece of cloth was tightly tied around her neck, after which she was forcibly
laid down. Conrado held her hands behind her while Fernandez sexually abused her. Immediately after
Fernandez had raped her, Conrado in turn went on top of her and likewise succeeded in having sexual
congress with her against her will. She added that, thereafter, Fernandez got a handful of mud near the
bathroom and placed it on her vagina. Immediately, she ran to the upper floor of the house to report the
tragic incident to Amelita Malong, daughter of Teofilo.
They then filed their complaint. In defense, the two (2) accused denied any involvement in the
offense, both claiming they were nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
In the trial court's decision holding that the guilt of both accused had been established beyond
shadow of any doubt, both accused used alibi, which is not even corroborated by a single defense witness.
The trial court found each of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape,
aggravated by cruelty or ignominy, and sentenced each of them to suffer two (2) penalties of death, to
indemnify the aggrieved party.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS FOR TWO CRIMES OF RAPE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION OF THE RAPE WAS ATTENDED BY
CRUELTY AND IGNIMINY.
RULING:
1. The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to two (2) crimes of rape is
proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. As clearly found by the trial court: "Both accused
have, obviously, conspired and confederated to commit the crime, considering that they entered
the bathroom where Rebecca was, together and at the same time.
Accused Fernandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly around her neck, while
accused Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body, to prevent her from struggling or
resisting. Then after accused Fernandez had raped Rebecca, accused Conrado raped her. Both
accused, thereafter, fled from the scene of the crime together and at the same time.
All these circumstances show beyond shadow of any doubt conspiracy on the part of both
accused, which renders each of them liable for two (2) crimes of rape, x x x."
It has been held by the Court that in multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only
for the rape personally committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because
each of them (accused) cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by
acts without which it would not have been accomplished.
2. YES. The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy because
of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The testimony of the examining physician
that he did not find mud on the victim's private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter's claim
that the accused "plastered" (in the words of the lower court) mud on her private part. Besides,
Rebecca's testimony was corroborated by that of Amelita Malong who swore that she saw mud
smeared on Rebecca's private part when Rebecca went to her right after the incident. It is also
difficult to conceive why the offended party, young as she was, and with a chaste reputation,
 would go to the extent of fabricating this portion of her testimony notwithstanding the consequent
humiliation on her person and disgrace on her womanhood.
The Court cannot but agree with the trial court's finding that the offense was aggravated
by ignominy. However, the word "cruelty" used in the dispositive portion of the judgment, to
describe an alternative aggravating circumstance, is unnecessary. The act of "plastering" mud on
the victim's vagina right after she was raped, is adequately and properly described as "ignominy",
rather than "cruelty or ignominy."

PEOPLE v. BANTAGAN
54 PHIL 841 AUGUST 15, 1930
PONENTE: STREET, J.
FACTS:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Camarines Sur, finding the appellants, Martin Bantagan (alias Martes), Luis Bantagan, Marcos de la
Cruz, and Francisco Fermino, guilty of the offense of murder, committed upon the person of one
Raymundo de los Santos, and sentencing Martin Bantaga n, as principal to undergo imprisonment for life
(cadena perpetua), with the accessory penalties prescribed in Article 54 of the Penal Code, and sentencing
Luis Bantangan, Marcos de la Cruz, and Francisco Fermino, as accomplices, to undergo imprisonment for
twelve years and one day, cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties prescribed in Article 56 of the
same Code. The accused were furthermore ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P500, and to pay each his proportional part of the costs of prosecution.
Martin Bantagan confessed that he and his son, Luis Bantagan, conceived the idea of killing
Raymundo de los Santos, because the latter had, several months previously, taken away Martin’s
daughter, Angela Bantagan, in order to make her his mistress (querida) only. Luis, who was carrying a
stick, approached to Raymundo hit him once in the neck. Martin Bantagan also had a stick and, when he
saw that Raymundo was not yet dead, he hit him also in the back of the shoulder. When Raymundo was
dead they immediately wrapped his body in a mat. They found a purse in Raymundo's pocket, and Martin
took ninety centavos (P0.90), showing a cause of resentment.
Luis Bantagan differently confessed that Francisco Fermino inflict fatal blow on the deceased and
also took a roll of paper money from the deceased. Luis Bantagan admitted that he assisted in taking the
body of the deceased.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MARTIN BANTAGAN BE HELD PRINCIPAL OF THE
CRIME.
RULING:
The rule to the effect that an accused person cannot be convicted upon his confession alone,
without some independent proof of what is called the "corpus delicti" does not mean that every element of
the crime must be clearly established by independent evidence, apart from the confession. It means
merely that, in a jurisdiction where the question of guilt is determined by a jury, there should be some
evidence tending to show the commission of a crime apart from the confession. As suggested in
Wigmore's treatise on Evidence, the rule requiring independent proof of the corpus delicti was merely
intended to guard against convictions upon false confessions of guilt (Wigmore, Evid., sec. 2070). The
utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the
confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such confession.
The provision made by the trial court with respect to indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the
deceased does not accord altogether with Article 125 of the Penal Code; and this part of the judgment will
be amended by providing that Martin Bantagan, as principal, shall be required to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P500 and that, in case of his insolvency, his three coaccused shall be jointly
and severally liable, secondarily, for said amount; and furthermore that the three accomplices, Luis
Bantagan, Marcos de la Cruz, and Francisco Fermino, shall be jointly and severally liable for another
P500, in the character of accomplices, and that Martin Bantagan shall, in case of the insolvency of said
three accomplices, be secondarily liable for such amount.
It being understood therefore that the appealed judgment is modified with respect to the provision
for indemnity in the manner above stated, the judgment, as thus modified, is affirmed. So ordered, with
proportional costs against the respective appellants.

PEOPLE v. MAGALLANO
266 SCRA 305
PONENTE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

PEOPLE v. BLANCO
86 PHIL 296 JANUARY 13, 1950
PONENTE: BENGZON, J.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

PEOPLE v. BAYOTAS
G.R. NO. 102207 SEPTEMBER 2, 1994
PONENTE: ROMERO, J.
FACTS:
In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid
Hospital due to cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal.
However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General
expressed his view that the death of accused appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of
his commission of the offense charged.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should
still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability
is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both
his criminal and civil penalties.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People
v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF HIS
CONVICTION EXTINGUISHES HIS CIVIL LIABILITY.
RULING:
YES.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of the convict personal liabilities are
extinguished, as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollarily, the claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on
a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: Law, Contracts,
Quasi-contracts, Delict, and Quasi-delicts.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by
way of separate civil action and may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation aside from delicts.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely
on the act of rape. Hence, his civil liability also extinguished together with his criminal liability upon his
death.

PEOPLE v. GUIDO
57 PHIL 52 AUGUST 15, 1932
PONENTE: VILLAMOR, J.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

BACHRACH MOTORS, INC. v. GAMBOA

101 PHIL 1219
PONENTE: MAKALINTAL, J.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS

129 SCRA 558 MAY 31, 1984
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte rendered a decision which finds the accused,
herein petitioners, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Bedena guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion. The petitioners appealed the judgement of conviction the
Court of Appeals.
They contended that the trial court’s finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence.
The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall
was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy-two (72)
hours to vacate the market premises.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgement of conviction and acquitted the
petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but in spite of the acquittal
ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000 to the complainant as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-
appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals
denied the motion.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN REQUIRING THE PETITIONERS TO PAY CIVIL INDEMNITY TO THE
COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING THEM FROM THE CRIMINAL CHARGE.
RULING:
NO. In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts
stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its
demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners
were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other
offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives
the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to
civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil
liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act
as a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not
arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not
constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal
prosecution. There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal
proceedings where the accused was acquitted.
Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged.
The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting
attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury,
and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean
needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil
Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable
doubt.
What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant
has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for
the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed
of only in a separate civil action.
A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only
and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code
provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same
criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the
criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the
act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
 A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint
would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may,
of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the
delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
VIRATA v. OCHOA
G.R. L-46179 JANUARY 31, 1978
PONENTE: FERNANDEZ, J.
FACTS:
Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay
City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name of Victoria Ochoa. An
action for homicide through reckless imprudence was hen instituted against Borilla.
The heirs of Arsenio also commenced a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict against
Borilla and Ochoa, resondents herein. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is
criminal action pending between the same parties for the same cause.
The trial court acquitted the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by
name accident; and it granted respondent’s motion.
Hence this petition
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HEIRS OF VIRATA CAN FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT AGAINST BORILLA AND
OCHOA.
RULING:
YES. Based on Article 2177 of the New Civil Code, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action for
damages due to a quasi-delict. But said article forestalls a DOUBLE RECOVERY.
The preliminary chapter on human relations of the NCC definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (Articles 29 to 32 of the NCC)
from the civil responsibility arising from crimes fixed by Article 100 of the RPC.
Rule 111 also contemplates the same separability. It is jurisprudential that the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the RPC, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
In addition, in the case of Rakes v Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co the Supreme Court held that to
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to ‘fault or negligence’ covers not only acts ‘not punishable by
law’ but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent”.
To sum it up, the petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before
the criminal case was decided, they already manifested that they were filing a separate civil action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver Borilla of the crime charged in the criminal
case is not a bar to the prosecution of the civil case for damages based on quasi-delict. Under Article 1157
of the NCC, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.