Middle East in The Transition Copernicus

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Middle East in the Transition
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The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2013, No. 1 ( 3) ISSN 2299-4335
Content s
ARTICLES
A New Middle East?

Dave Jer v is
Much Pain, Little Gain: The Consequences of the Iraq War for Iraqis
and Americans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B o g dan Sz ajkow sk i
The Shia Crescent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B ar to s z B ojar c z y k
Iran on the Crossroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
F er i d e A sli Er g ül Jor g e n s e n
Turkey’s “New” Middle East or More of the Same. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Man ue l F ér e z G il
Everything Will Be Decided in Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A r t ur Malan tow ic z
“Crisis, Chaos, Violence – Is that Really what We Want?”
A Stalled Democratization in Jordan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
What’s with Israel?

Ag nie s z k a B r yc
Israel in a New Middle East: How to Respond? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Mar cin Sz ydzis z

The Palestinian International Identity after the UN Resolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Man ue l F ér e z G il
Peace Movements in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4 Contents
REVIEWS
A lf r e d L ut r z y kow sk i
Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Pozycja ustrojowa i funkcje Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
po akcesji do Unii Europejskiej [Constitutional Status and Functions of the Sejm
of the Republic of Poland Following the Accession to the European Union],
Dom ELIPSA Publishing House, Warszawa 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Jar o s ław Jar z ąb e k

Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions
of the New Middle East, Public Affairs, New York 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A r t ur Malan tow ic z
Raphaël Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria,
Hurst & Company, London 2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Nat alia Da ś ko
Nonie Darwish, Okrucieństwo w majestacie prawa. Prześladowanie kobiet
w świecie islamu [Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implications
of Islamic Law, Nashville 2008], KEFAS Publishing House, Warszawa 2011. . . . . . . . 148
Agat a M u s z y ń sk a
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Marcin Wojciechowski, W cieniu. 12 rozmów z Marcinem
Wojciechowskim [In the Shadow. 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski],
Agora SA, Warszawa 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Ro b er t Mań k
Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global
Power, Basic Books, New York 2012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2013, No. 1 ( 3) ISSN 2299-4335
A RTICLES
A New Middle East?
Dave Jer v is
Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland
PAIN, LITTLE GAIN: THE CONSEQUENCES

OF THE IRAQ WAR FOR IRAQIS
AND AMERICANS
Abstract
The aim of this study is to provide details about contemporary reality in Iraq
and the impact of the American invasion on Iraq and American interests in
the ten years since 2003. The analysis of the various source material, including
survey results, policy statements, and statistical data reveals that, while the
invasion brought gains to both the Iraqis and the Americans, it did so at a great
cost. The assessment of the outcome of that invasion is complicated by the fact
that contemporary Iraq was influenced by two decades of the rule of Saddam
Hussein, who dominated the government and repressed his real and imagined
foes. In March 2003 the US hoped for a quick win; however, its troops were to
remain in Iraq until December 2011, giving it significant influence throughout
this period. While ten years have passed since the invasion, only ten years have
passed and that may not be an adequate time frame in which to identify and
evaluate gains and losses.
Key words
Iraq, America, democracy, Islam, Middle East
6 Dave J er v is
Ten years have passed since the American invasion of Iraq and one year has
passed since the withdrawal of the last American troops from that country,
so early 2013 provides a timely opportunity to assess the consequences of that
invasion for the Iraqis, the Americans, and the American strategic interests. This
study examines those questions, the answers to which are much debated. On
the question of whether the invasion advanced America’s interests, for instance,
former President George W. Bush has no doubt, writing in his memoirs that,
“For all the difficulties that followed, America is safer without a homicidal
dictator pursuing WMD and supporting terror at the heart of the Middle East.’
Retired General William Odom, former head of the National Security Agency,
has a very different view, describing the invasion as ‘the greatest strategic
disaster in American history.” 1 As to the question about what the Americans
left in Iraq when they departed, Ned Parker, who reported from that country
prior to the American withdrawal, writes that it “has become something close
to a failed state… The dream of an Iraq governed by elected leaders answerable
to the people is rapidly fading away.” In contrast, Anthony J. Blinken, a Deputy
Assistant to President Obama, argues that Iraq has made “clear, measurable
progress in the few short years since it lurched to the brink of sectarian war.”
While the country has much to do, its progress in the last three years has been
“remarkable”; it is “less violent, more democratic, and more prosperous than at
any time in recent history.” 2
To assess these issues, this study provides details about contemporary reality
in Iraq and what has changed there since 2003 as well as considers the impact of
the war on America’s strategic interests. It will conclude that, while the invasion
brought gains to both Iraqis and Americans, it did so at great cost, probably too
great a cost, for both. This conclusion must be preliminary and tentative, however.
While ten years have passed since the invasion, only ten years have passed and
that may not be an adequate time frame in which to identify and evaluate gains
and losses. Moreover, contemporary Iraq was influenced by two decades of
Saddam Hussein’s rule prior to the American invasion, so assignment of praise
and blame for the contemporary reality is not completely straightforward.
T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, New York 2011, pp. 190, 234.

1
N. Parker, The Iraq We Left Behind, “Foreign Affairs” March/April 2012; A. Blinken,
2
Morning in Mesopotamia, “Foreign Affairs” July/August 2012.

Much Pain, Little Gain: The Consequences of the Iraq War for Iraqis… 7
1. Context
Any understanding of contemporary Iraq must take account of two earlier

periods in the country’s history. It had had a “tumultuous quarter-century under
the leadership of Saddam Hussein,” the dominant figure from 1979 to 2003. 3
Then, Saddam’s regime was overthrown by the American invasion of March
2003, something that “exacted an enormous toll on Iraq’s citizens.” 4 Saddam’s
armies invaded two of the country’s neighbours, Iran and Kuwait, fighting the
first war to an inconclusive outcome and losing the second to an American-led
international coalition. As many as 200,000 Iraqis may have died in the war with
Iran, and perhaps 25,000 more in the occupation and war with Kuwait. When,
following Iraq’s defeat in Kuwait, the country’s Shiite and Kurdish populations
rose up in rebellion, Saddam’s retaliation led to the death of as many as 50,000
Shiites, while perhaps as many as two million Kurds fled the country to Turkey
and Iran.
At home, Saddam dominated the government and repressed his real and
imagined foes. Freedom House’s 2003 report on the human rights situation in
the country noted that Iraq might be “the most oppressive state in the world.” It
had long judged Iraq to be “not free” and consistently assigned the lowest possible
scores on both civil liberties and political rights. There was virtually no freedom
of expression or assembly, the majority Shia population faced severe persecution,
there were arbitrary arrests and torture was common. Socioeconomic conditions
deteriorated, especially in the 1990s. Iraq’s ranking on the Human Development
Index declined from 55 to 126 (of 174) in the 1990s, a result of wars and UN
sanctions imposed after the 1991 war. UNICEF reported that 500,000 Iraqi
children under five died between 1991–1998. 5 It will take years to overcome these
conditions and to overcome the political legacy of the Saddam Hussein years,
“a culture of deep suspicion coupled with a winner-take-all and loser lose-all
form of politics.” 6
3
The Failed States Index: Country Profiles, Iraq, Fund for Peace, p. 3, http://www.
fundforpeace.org/global/?q=states-iraq.
4
At A Crossroads: Human Rights in Iraq Eight Years after the U.S.-Led Invasion,
Human Rights Watch, p. 1, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/02/21/crossroads.
5
Freedom in the World 2003, Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2003/Iraq.
6
Déjà vu All Over Again? Iraq’s Escalating Political Crisis, International Crisis
Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/
iraq/126-deja-vu-all-over-again-iraqs-escalating-political-crisis.aspx>.
8 Dave J er v is
The March 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq also had a great impact.
While the US hoped for a quick win, its troops were to remain in Iraq until
December 2011, giving it significant influence throughout this period. While
total blame for the problems in Iraq in recent years cannot be assigned solely to
the United States, it certainly contributed to them. The US had invaded, after all,
and occupied the country for eight years, and as Secretary of State Colin Powell
noted prior to the invasion, “when you take out a regime and you bring down
a government, you become the government.” 7
The US occupation lasted as long as it did due to significant and continuing
political and military problems in Iraq, an indication of its inability to establish
a secure and stable Iraq, with all the attendant consequences for the Iraqis. Thus,
the initial plan to turn power over to the Iraqis, primarily to the Iraqi exiles, and
to leave the country in six months was abandoned within six weeks. Widespread
violence and widespread Iraqi disapproval of the leaders chosen by the Americans
led the Americans to reverse course completely in May 2003 and to rule the
country directly through the Coalition Provisional Authority, a role planned to
last as long as five years. That plan also met Iraqi resistance and increased the
political and economic costs for the American occupying forces. Consequently,
it was decided in November 2003, merely six months later, to turn power over
to an Iraqi government. The transfer of political authority occurred in June
2004, but thousands of US troops remained in the country, giving it significant
influence, but not enough to halt the continuing and escalating violence, leading
to another change in US military policy in late 2006, to counterinsurgency,
i.e., an effort to protect Iraq citizens rather than fixed points and to engage in
political-military efforts to win their loyalties. This policy worked in the sense
that there was a dramatic decline in violence; however, the Iraqi government
remained indecisive and sectarian tensions remained. 8 Americans’ influence
declined as the date for their final departure approached. Failure to get the Iraqis
to agree to a power-sharing agreement after the 2010 election or to a continued
American troop presence resulted in “an Iraq that is less stable domestically and
less reliable internationally than the United States had envisioned.” 9
7
D. Samuels, A Conversation with Colin Powell, “Atlantic Magazine” April 2007.
8
T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, op.cit.; A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the
War, Losing the Peace, New Haven 2007; C. Tripp, A History of Iraq, New York 2007.
9
M. Gordon, In US Exit from Iraq, Failed Efforts and Challenges, “New York Times”
September 22, 2012.
2. Gains and Pains for Iraqis
How have the lives of the Iraqis changed in the decade since the American
invasion? Are they better off than they were in 2003? Individual Iraqis will have
different answers to these questions. What follows is evidence they might use to
reach those individual assessments.
The greatest single gain for the Iraqis has been the removal of Saddam Hussein
from power. Few lament his passing. There is a new, American-influenced
constitution that was (barely) endorsed in a national referendum in October
2005. Two parliamentary elections, generally regarded as free and fair, were held
in December 2005 and March 2010, and turnout was high, especially in the first
election, when 75% of the public voted. Still, Freedom House argues in its most
recent report that “Iraq is not an electoral democracy”: while it had conducted
“meaningful elections” in March 2010, “political participation and decision-
making in the country remain seriously impaired by sectarian and insurgent
violence, widespread corruption, and the influence of foreign powers.” 10
That same Freedom House report demonstrates that there has been some
improvement in human rights conditions. Most political rights and civil
liberties are guaranteed by the constitution, although their exercise is hindered
by violence and fear. For instance, while freedom of expression is protected by
the constitution, “in practice it has been seriously impeded by sectarian tensions
and fear of violent reprisals.” Iraq’s score on the Press Freedom Index, to cite
one example, decreased from 124 (of 166) in 2003 to 152 (of 178) in 2012, due
to “an increase in intimidation and violence against journalists.” There are no
restrictions on the operation of non-governmental organizations, although
these, too, have seen their operations restricted by safety concerns. This is
a change since 2002, when the exercise of civil liberties was restricted by the
government and not by societal conditions. The Iraqis have far more sources
of information in 2012 than they did in 2002. More than a dozen independent
television stations and hundreds of print publications have been established,
and the number of Internet subscribers increased from a pre-war level of 4,500
to more than 1.5 million by January 2010. Criminal justice practices have not
changed as dramatically. Security services still engage in arbitrary arrests and
the use of torture continues, especially in security-related cases, and the judiciary
is not independent. Given these changes, Freedom House still characterized Iraq
10
Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2012/iraq.
10 Dave J er v is
as “not free” in 2012 and assigned scores of 6 (of 7) for civil liberties and 5 (of 7)
for political rights, better than the consistent ratings of 7 in the Saddam Hussein
years. This is an improvement, but only a modest improvement, especially
compared with the changes elsewhere resulting from the Arab Spring. Tunisia’s
Freedom House rating, for instance, went from “not free” in 2011 to “partly free”
in 2012, with its political rights score improving from 7 to 3 and its civil liberties
score improving from 5 to 4. 11
Whatever the character of its institutional structure, the Iraqi government
does not operate efficiently. A July 2012 report by the International Crisis Group
described it as “weak,” “dysfunctional,” “divided,” and “drifting.” 12 It took nine
months following the 2010 elections to form a government, and since that time
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has increased the power of his office, e.g. by
gaining control over nominally independent bodies and appointing allies to
temporary positions rather than seeking parliamentary approval for permanent
occupants. The divided opposition has protested and threatened a vote of
confidence but has been unable to do so due to internal divisions and the self-
interest of some of its members. Given these internal divisions and resulting
weakness, no Iraqi government has been able to pass laws on oil exploration
or the distribution of oil revenues, the environment, consumer protection,
intellectual property, investment, or permanent rules for de-Baathification. 13
The government has failed in other ways, too, and the quality of life for
ordinary Iraqis remains poor. Broad measures of conditions in the country can
be found in the State Fragility Index published by the Center for Systemic Peace
and the Failed States Index published by the Fund for Peace. Iraq ranked 16th (of
164 countries, with 1 being the most fragile) on the State Fragility Index in 2011,
a ranking that placed it into the “high fragility” category. Security and economic
effectiveness were identified as particular problems. The 2012 Failed States Index
ranked Iraq 9th (of 177 countries, with 1 being the most failed state). Iraq ranked
among the world’s worst ten countries on five of the index’s twelve components:
“group grievance” (ethnic violence, discrimination, powerlessness), “security
11
Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House; At a Crossroads, Human Rights Watch;
Iraq Index (January 31, 2012): Tracking the Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-
Saddam Iraq, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Centers/saban/iraq%20in-
dex/index20120131.PDF.
12
Deja Vu All Over Again?, International Crisis Group, pp. 10,16.
13
Ibidem; K. Katzman, Iraq: Governance, Politics, and Human Rights, “Congressional
Reference Service” December 13, 2012, pp. 13–14, 25, http:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/
RS21968.pdf.
apparatus” (internal conflict, small arms proliferation, political prisoners),

“human flight” (migration per capita, emigration of educated population),
“fractionalized elites” (deadlock and brinkmanship for political gain), and
“uneven development” (large gaps between rich and poor and/or urban and
rural areas). The Failed States Index is also useful because it tracks changes over
time. This longer-term perspective provides evidence that conditions in Iraq
have improved in recent years, although modestly: while still very low, its 2012
scores on eight of the twelve components of the index had improved from 2011
and, over a five-year period, had improved on seven of the 12 components. 14
Terms such as “failed state” or “fragile state” suggest a government that is
unable or unwilling to complete the tasks expected of all governments. The most
fundamental failure of the Iraqi government and the Americans before it has
been the failure to protect the lives of the Iraqis. Iraq Body Count documented
116,497 civilian deaths from the time of the American invasion in 2003 until its
withdrawal in 2011. Using WikiLeaks revelations, Iraq Body Count estimates
that as many as 15,000 more Iraqi civilians may have been killed. The situation
has improved in recent years in the sense that fewer civilians are being killed: the
number of civilian deaths was slightly more than 4,000 in both 2010 and 2011,
declines from the height of the violence in 2006–2008. In fact, 90% of all civilian
deaths occurred by 2009. Not only did the number of deaths decrease, but the
number of the Iraqis killed by the Americans also declined. Approximately 13% of
those killed were killed by American soldiers, especially in the first several weeks
after the invasion; here, too, there has been improvement, with the number killed
by American soldiers declining greatly after 2009, with only 32 Iraqi civilians
killed in 2010 and 19 in 2011. Following the American withdrawal, however, the
level of violence increased. Two attacks by terrorist groups in January 2012 killed
131 people, and overall, 2012 was the most violent year since 2009. 15
Another government failure is the inability to provide public services to all
citizens and regions. The Iraq Knowledge Network, part of the government’s
Planning Ministry, conducted a survey on the availability of public services in
first quarter of 2011. It found that, with respect to electricity, households receive
14
M. Marshall, B. Cole, Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility,
“Center for Systematic Peace”, p. 30, http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf;
The Failed States Index 2012, Fund for Peace, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi;
Country Profile: Iraqi, Fund for Peace.
15
Civilian Deaths from Violence in 2012, Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.
org/analysis/numbers/2012/; K. Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights,
op.cit., pp. 19–20.
12 Dave J er v is
an average of 14.6 hours of electricity per day from public and private sources.
The public water network provides 25% of its users with less than two hours of
water per day. Only thirty percent of households, mostly in urban areas, have
access to the public sanitation system, and only 52% of households have access
to solid waste collection services. 16
Examination of macroeconomic factors provides further evidence that,
despite recent improvements, the situation remains poor. The country’s nominal
GDP increased from $13.6 billion in 2003 to $128.1 billion in 2011 and per capita
GDP increased from $802 to $3808 in the same period. These are dramatic
improvements, although some of the gains have been eaten up by inflation –
which has been kept in check in recent years – and by corruption, which has
gotten worse: Iraq’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Index
declined from 113 (of 133 countries) in 2003 to 175 (of 183 countries) in 2011. The
oil industry remains the economic lifeblood of the country, responsible for 90%
of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings. Unfortunately for
the Iraqis, production has barely increased since before the American invasion,
although revenues have increased as a result of increased oil process. Production
has only increased from a pre-war estimate of 2.5 million barrels per day to 2.89
million barrels per day in April 2012 and exports have increased, maybe, from
pre-war estimates of 1.75–2.5 million barrels per day to 2.4 million in June 2012.
Unemployment remains high, about 20% nationwide, but is as high as 55% in
some rural areas. 17
There are continuing social problems. The UN Development Program’s
Human Development Index, based on life expectancy at birth, access to
knowledge, and standard of living, ranked Iraq 132nd of 187 countries in 2011
and placed it in the “medium development” category. The country made progress
between 2000–2011 on education measures and on standard of living measures,
but life expectancy at birth was lower in 2011 than in 2000 or 1995. Average life
expectancy in 2011 was 69 years and mean years of schooling for those over 25
was 5.6 years. 18 The large number of refugees and internally displaced persons
16
Essential Services Factsheet, Iraq Knowledge Network, http://www.iauiraq.org/doc-
uments/1583/ServicesFactsheet-English.pdf.
17
World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html; Iraq Index (July 2012), Brookings; Freedom in the
World 2012, Freedom House.
18
Human Development Report 2011: Sustainable and Equity: A Better Future for All,
United Nations Development Program, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/
download/>.
create additional social problems. Approximately one million people were

displaced or had fled the country prior to the American invasion and another
2.7 million were displaced by April 2010. More than 400,000 of those who fled
have returned to their homes since 2009. While that is good news, a 2010 survey
of returnees indicated that 87% could not make enough to care for their families
and 61% regretted returning. 19
One gain for the Iraqis since 2003 is that they feel freer to express opinions
about their conditions. Only 7% believed they were “thriving” according
to a September 2011 Gallup poll, while 25% believed they were “suffering.”
Conditions appear to be getting worse: in response to the same question
eighteen months earlier, 16% reported they were thriving and 14% that they were
suffering. Seventy percent of respondents in September 2011 reported feelings
of stress the previous day and 60% reported experiencing anger. One likely
source of anger and stress is the standard of living. In February 2010, 46% were
satisfied with their standard of living and 49% dissatisfied. Here, too, conditions
appear to be worsening: eighteen months later, in August 2011, there was more
dissatisfaction: 32% reported being satisfied and 64% dissatisfied. 20
Many Iraqis held the US responsible for their condition, especially in the years
immediately following the invasion. A September 2003 Gallup poll indicated
that only 5% of Iraqis believed the United States had invaded to “assist the Iraqi
people” and only 1% believed it had done so to bring democracy to the country.
On the other hand, 94% believed Baghdad was “a more dangerous place than
before the invasion.” Opinion improved little over the course of America’s direct
rule: a Coalition Provisional Authority-sponsored poll conducted near the end
of the occupation revealed that 85% of Iraqis lacked confidence in the CPA.
Opinions about the United States did not improve much over the next several
years. Asked “Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the
leadership of the United States?” fewer than 40% of Iraqis approved in any year
after 2008: 35% in 2008, 24% in 2009, 36% in 2010, and 29% in 2011. 21
19
Iraq Index (January 31, 2012), Brookings.
20
‘Suffering’ in Iraq Highest Since 2008, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/151940/
suffering-iraq-highest-2008.aspx; Opinion Briefing: Discontent and Division in Iraq, Gal-
lup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153128/opinion-briefing-discontent-division-iraq.aspx.
21
D. Jervis, Mugged By Reality: The American Experience in Iraq, “South African
Journal of International Affairs” 2009, No. 16; The U.S. Global Leadership Project,
Meridian International Center and Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153959/Global-
Leadership-Project.aspx.
14 Dave J er v is
3. Gains and Pains for Americans
For Americans, too, the Iraq war brought some gains but much pain as well.
The biggest gain was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Yet this
gain must be qualified in two ways. Some argue that Saddam was not all that
threatening. Iraq’s military had been degraded since the first Gulf War, it did
not possess weapons of mass destruction as Americans had believed, and few
of its neighbours, the ones presumably most threatened by it, supported the
invasion. Also, any threat posed by Iraq might have been contained through
a combination of UN sanctions and British and American air power. That is, the
threat that was eliminated by the American invasion might have been dealt with,
or was already being dealt with, by less painful policies.
To achieve Saddam’s removal, America and Americans experienced a lot of
pain. The most obvious are the costs in lives and dollars. The Defense Department
reported that 4,487 American soldiers were killed in Iraq between March 19,
2003 and December 31, 2011 and another 32,223 were wounded. 22 In terms of
expenditures, the Congressional Research Service reported in March 2011 that
Congress had appropriated $806 billion for the war in Iraq. Expenditures have
undoubtedly increased since then, although probably not too dramatically as US
troop numbers have declined. That spending has had an adverse impact on the
American economy, and the United States will be paying an economic price for
years. Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, and Linda J. Bilmes,
a lecturer in public finance at Harvard’s Kennedy School, estimate that the war’s
ultimate cost (including government spending and the adverse impact on the
American economy) will be more than $3 trillion. Why? Because the war added
at least $25 to the cost of a barrel of oil coming to the US, was responsible for at
least 25% of the increase in America’s growing debt burden, and, because low
interest rates and lax regulations – necessary to keep the domestic economy
growing while the war continued – contributed to a worsening of the financial
crisis. 23
One human and economic cost that will last long after the last American
soldier leaves Iraq is the treatment of those who were physically and emotionally
22
Iraq Index (December 31, 2011), Brookings.
23
A. Velasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations
Since 9/11, “Congressional Research Service” March 29, 2011, p. 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf; J. Stiglitz, L. Bilmes, The True Cost of the Iraq War: $3 Trillion and
Beyond, “Washington Post” September 10, 2010.
wounded there. These costs follow all wars, but will likely be higher in the case
of the Iraq (and Afghanistan) war for several reasons. One is that more soldiers
wounded in the current wars are surviving their injuries (90%) than did so in
Vietnam (86%) or earlier wars. In addition, more veterans are reporting injuries:
forty-five percent of returnees from Iraq and Afghanistan are filing claims, a far
higher rate than in the World War II or Vietnam eras, and as many 20% are
reporting symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Finally, more veterans
are seeking help from the Veterans Administration because they do not have
private health insurance. If previous wars, in which the highest costs for treating
veterans occurred thirty to forty years after the conflict ended, are any guide,
disability and treatment expenses for veterans will become a huge item in the
federal budget. The Congressional Budget Office has predicted an increase in
costs from $1.9 billion in 2010 to as much as $8.4 billion in 2020. Looking to the
more distant future, some private groups estimate that treatment and disability
costs will amount to as much as $1 trillion over the next forty years. 24
A further problem is that not all of the money spent in Iraq was spent
wisely or for the purpose it was intended, reducing its impact on Iraq while
increasing costs to Americans. Writing in February 2009, Stuart Bowen Jr., the
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, concluded that expenditures on Iraqi
infrastructure projects between the summer of 2002 and late 2008 generally did
not meet their goals, although expenditures to increase the capabilities of the
Iraqi military did. There was a “significant waste of taxpayer dollars,” however,
contrary to public perceptions, relatively few examples of outright fraud. 25 It
was not just American money that was misspent or spent poorly. The US has
been unable to account for more than $7 billion in Iraqi assets from the UN’s
Development Fund for Iraq. This fund includes assets left over from the UN’s
Oil-for-Food program that were to be distributed by the US to help reconstruct
the country. Poor bookkeeping rather than fraud is perhaps the reason for this
failure, but the Iraqis are likely to insist that some of their money be returned. 26
All wars cost money and lives. The more relevant question is whether the
outcome of a war justified its costs. World War II, for example, was far more
24
J. Dao, Cost of Treating Veterans Will Rise Long Past Wars, “New York Times” July 27,
2011; The Paperwork Mountain at Veterans Affairs, “New York Times” 23 November 2012.
25
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (2009), Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction, http://www.sigir.mil/files/HardLessons/Hard_Lessons_Report.
pdf#view=fit.
26
J. Rogin, U.S. Can’t Produce $1 Billion of Fuel Receipts in Iraq, Foreign Policy, http://
www.foreignpolicy.com.
16 Dave J er v is
costly in terms of both lives and dollars than the war in Iraq, but few would argue
that those sacrifices were not worth making. What distinguishes the war in Iraq
from many previous ones America has fought is the large number of strategic
costs in addition to lives and dollars. The most significant such cost is that “it
dramatically shifted the regional balance of power in Iran’s favour,” according to
Safa al-Sheik, Iraq’s deputy national security adviser. 27 Iraq’s military arsenal was
bigger than Iran’s in 2002, with more tanks, combat aircraft, attack helicopters,
and surface-to-air missile launchers, but by 2010 it was Iran that possessed more
of each. The Iranian military manpower advantage increased from a ratio of 5:4
to 5:2 in those years. 28 Details such as these do not account for the quality of
military equipment or the morale of troops, but they do demonstrate a significant
erosion of any regional counterbalance to Iran.
The US invasion may also have limited America’s ability to confront Iran.
While American strategists might have hoped that the presence of US troops
in Afghanistan as well as Iraq would place great pressure on Iran, the opposite
turned out to be true, i.e., because Americans were tied down in both countries,
America’s ability to pressure Iran was reduced and Iran’s ability to retaliate to
any American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities was increased. Furthermore,
questions about America’s intelligence capabilities and the erosion of its position
in the world, to be discussed below, contributed to less international attention
and pressure on Iran and its nuclear program than would otherwise have been
the case.
The Shia Iran also benefitted because of its increased influence in the Shia Iraq.
The two governments are increasing cooperation, especially on security matters,
and have greatly enhanced trade and tourism ties. Iran played an important
role in mediating Iraq’s political crisis following the 2010 elections and has ties
with important Iraqi political and security forces. 29 This can be illustrated in the
current struggle in Syria, Iran’s most important Arab ally. A September 2012
intelligence report claimed that Iraq has been allowing Iran to funnel “personnel
and tens of tons of weapons” through Iraqi airspace and into Syria “on almost
a daily basis.” There have been reports that buses carrying Iranian pilgrims to
27
S. al-Sheik, E. Sky, Is Iraq an Iranian Proxy?, Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.
com.
28
A. Cordesman, S. Khazi, Iraq After US Withdrawal: US Policy and the Iraqi Search
for Security and Stability, “Center for Strategic and International Studies”, p. 4, http://csis.
org/publication/iraq-after-us-withdrawal.
29
Déjà vu All Over Again?, International Crisis Group, pp. 10–12; A. Cordesman,
S. Khazi, Iraq After U.S. Withdrawal, p. VII.
a Shiite shrine in Syria have also carried weapons, supplies and fighters to aid the
embattled Syrian regime. The US has urged the Iraqi government to slow or halt
the supplies going to Syria, e.g. by inspecting planes on their way to Syria, but it
has rarely done so: only two flights to Syria have been inspected since September
2012, the last on October 27. There is also evidence that Iranians were alerted to
the inspections by Iraqi officials. 30
How about terrorism, the reduction of which was one of the purposes of the
war? The invasion might be deemed a strategic success if looking merely at the
terrorist threat to the US According to the Global Terrorism Index, its ranking on
the list of countries experiencing the “highest impact of terrorism” dropped from
1 to 41 between 2002–11. The terrorist threat to Iraq, in contrast, has increased
dramatically. Fully one-third of victims of terrorism in the decade after 2002
were Iraqi and it had the highest score on the “impact of terrorism” measure.
Overall the global number of terrorist incidents increased 460% between 2002–
–2011, although most of that increase occurred between 2002–2007. Examination
of the number of fatalities and injuries yields similar results. Fatalities increased
195% between 2002–2011 and the number of injuries increased 224%, although
there has been a decline in both since 2009. 31
One strategic consequence of the war in Iraq (and Afghanistan) is likely to
be a reduced public willingness to be active on the world scene. After the wars
in Korea and Vietnam, the US public “developed a strong aversion to embarking
on such ventures again,” according to John Mueller, an expert on public opinion
during conflicts, and he predicts similar consequences following the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. 32 There is already evidence of such views emerging. The 2012
Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that just 61% of the American
public believed it would be best for America to take an active role in the world,
down ten points since 2002, while 38% believed it would be best for the country
to stay out of foreign affairs, up from 25% in 2002 and the highest level recorded
since the question was first asked in 1947. Perhaps most worrisome for the future
is that it is young people, those aged 18–29, who are most likely to support
a reduced American role. Americans want the US to reduce its global presence,
30
N. Younis, Time to Get Tough on Iraq, “New York Times” October 30, 2012;
M. Gordon, E. Schmitt, T. Arango, Flow of Arms to Syria Through Iraq Persists, to U.S.
Dismay, “New York Times” December 1, 2012.
31
2012 Global Terrorism index: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism in the Last Decade,
Institute of Economics and Peace, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads
/2012/12/2012-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report1.pdf.
32
J. Mueller, The Iraq Syndrome, “Foreign Affairs” November/December 2005.
18 Dave J er v is
too: 52% believe the US should have the same number of overseas military bases
as it does today, the lowest percentage since 2002, and 38% believe it should have
fewer, up from just 14% in 2002.
None of this should be taken to mean that the American public is isolationist
or does not want any involvement in the world. Rather, it is calling for a change
in foreign policy methods, emphasizing non-military solutions to problems and
a very selective use of military force. 33 President Obama’s use of military power
reflects these views. He has been willing to use US military power in response to
direct threats, but to do so “in a targeted, get-in-and-get-out fashion that avoids,
at all costs, the kind of messy ground wars and lengthy occupations that have
drained America’s treasury and spirit for the past decades.” Examples of the
Obama approach include the use of drones against al-Qaeda operatives and the
use of computer viruses against Iranian nuclear program computers. 34
Another adverse consequence of the invasion is the deterioration of America’s
global reputation in both the short-term and long-term. This can be illustrated
in Pew Global opinion polls. There was a consistent and often dramatic decline
in America’s “favourability rating” in Europe between 2002 and 2003, i.e., at the
time the US was deciding to invade Iraq: from 62% to 42% in France, 60% to
45% in Germany, and 71% to 45% in the Czech Republic. European support for
the US remained low for the remainder of the Bush presidency and, although
it has increased in the Obama years, it has generally not returned to pre-war
levels. The erosion of support for the US declined even more dramatically in the
Middle East in the short term and remains low. In Turkey, for example, the 30%
favourability rating in 2003 declined to 15% in 2003 and was still at that level in
2012. In Jordan, support deteriorated from 25% in 2002 to just 1% in 2003 and
was just 12% in 2012. While Pakistani support for the US actually increased
between 2002 and 2012, it did so from a very low base, 10% in 2002 to 12% in
2012. 35
33
Foreign Policy in the New Millennium: Results of the 2012 Chicago Council Survey
of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs,
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Task%20Force%20Reports/2012_
CCS_Report.pdf.
34
D. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and the Surprising Use of
American Power, New York 2012, pp. XIV–XV.
35
Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted, Pew Global Attitudes
Project, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-
foreign-policy-4/.
The decline in America’s favourability rating probably resulted as much

from the flawed rationale for the invasion of Iraq as the invasion, itself. The
Center for Public Integrity published a report in January 2008 identifying
“at least” 935 false statements about the threat posed by Iraq in the two years
following September 11, 2001. The President made 232 false statements about
weapons of mass destruction and 28 false statements about Iraqi links to al-
Qaeda. Secretary of State Colin Powell made 254 false claims, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld – 109 false claims, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz – 85, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice – 56, and Vice
President Dick Cheney – 48. This was part of an “orchestrated campaign that
effectively galvanized public opinion and, in the process, led the nation to war
under decidedly false pretences,” that the officials knew or had reason to know
were false. 36 To cite but one piece of evidence that the administration overreached
in its depiction of an Iraq with nuclear weapons, George Tenet, who, himself,
later exaggerated the Iraqi threat, acknowledged in his memoirs that claims of
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction “went far beyond what our analysis could
support. The intelligence community’s belief was that, left unchecked, Iraq
would probably not acquire nuclear weapons until near the end of the decade.” 37
Americans recognize the pain caused by the war and have become very
critical of it. Two-thirds of respondents in a 2012 survey said the war in Iraq had
not been worth it, the highest percentage since the war started, while just 32%
said the war was worth it, the lowest percentage since 2003. Americans recognize
the adverse strategic consequences of invading Iraq: 71% of respondents in the
same poll said the Iraq war demonstrated that caution should be used when
contemplating military force, 70% believed the war had worsened America’s
relations with the Muslim world, while 69% doubted that the war had reduced
the threat of terrorism. Given these conclusions, it is not surprising that 51% of
respondents in a poll taken at the time of the final troop departure from Iraq
believed that the decision to send troops there had been a “dumb” one. Nor is
there much faith that the situation in Iraq will improve: 63% believed it was
unlikely that the Iraqi government would be able to prevent terrorists from
using its territory to plan attacks against the United States, 60% doubted the
36
C. Lewis, M. Reading-Smith, False Pretenses: Following 9/11, President Bush
and seven top officials of his administration waged a carefully orchestrated campaign of
misinformation about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, “Center for Public Integrity” January 23,
2008, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2008/01/23/5641/false-pretenses.
37
Quoted in T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, p. 113.
20 Dave J er v is
country would be able to preserve its own safety without American help, and
54% doubted the country would be able to preserve a democratic government. 38
4. Conclusions
One clear conclusion of this study is that the Americans and the Iraqis have both
experienced significant pain since the American invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Almost all of the pain for Americans – deaths, adverse economic consequences,
and others – can be attributed directly to the decision to go to war and poor
planning for the post-war period. For the Iraqis, the causal relationship between
the invasion and subsequent hardship is not so clear. Nonetheless, one can argue
that the number of deaths, political instability, and socioeconomic hardships
after 2003 were greater than they would have been had the US not invaded.
Were those pains worth it? Americans will likely answer “no,” if only because
there were so few gains from the invasion. Yes, Saddam Hussein was removed
from power, but the costs were great. Consider the standard used by Dick
Cheney, then the Secretary of Defense, at the end of the first Gulf War when the
US did not invade Iraq: noting that only 146 Americans had died in the war, he
asked “how many additional dead Americans is Saddam worth? Our judgment
was, not very many…” 39 More than thirty times as many Americans died in the
second Gulf War, and the results were more ambiguous. These, along with all the
other costs make it hard to conclude that the invasion was worth it.
Unlike the Americans, the Iraqis had more gains from the invasion. Saddam
Hussein was removed from power; the human rights situation improved
somewhat; Iraq is unlikely to threaten its neighbours, although it may face
greater threats from them; the socioeconomic situation has improved; and
elections have been held. Are these gains worth the costs? While individual
Iraqis will have different answers, an outsider might generalize that the Shiites
would be more likely to answer affirmatively and the Sunnis negatively. For the
Shiites, not only did the invasion remove Saddam, whose regime had persecuted
them severely, but was followed by a Shia-dominated government. Reduced
tension with Iran not only reduces the danger of foreign invasion but create
38
Gallup/ORC Opinion Poll (December 16–18, 2011), Polling Report, http://pollingre-
port.com/iraq.htm); Foreign Policy in the New Millennium, Chicago Council on Global
Affairs.
39
Cheney quoted in T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, op.cit., p. 39.
opportunities for the Iraqi Shiites to visit religious centres in Iran. For these
reasons, the Iraq Sunnis, who lost their long-dominant position in society, are
more likely to conclude that the post-invasion gains are not worth the pain they
have experienced. The political position of the Iraqi Kurds is largely unchanged;
they have had de facto autonomy since the first Gulf War, although that status
has now been inserted into the Iraqi constitution. They may have special reason
to be thankful for Saddam’s demise, however, given that he launched a genocide
against the Kurdish population in the late 1980s.
This study has concentrated on the impact of the American invasion on
Iraq and American interests in the ten years since 2003. Are its conclusions
premature? Should Americans and Iraqis take a longer term perspective with
regard to changes in that country? Ryan Crocker, a former American ambassador,
has argued that they should because the “Iraq story post-2003, is still chapter
one. This is a very long book.” 40 Are its conclusions too harsh? Is consideration
of the extent to which the situation in Iraq has improved since 2003 the correct
standard? Should the Americans and the Iraqis focus on what has been prevented
rather than what has been achieved? Bowen, the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction, thinks so, writing in October 2012 that “The encouraging
thing is that Iraq has not fallen apart.” 41 These questions and different alternative
perspectives suggest that scholars will be debating the decision to invade Iraq
and the impact of the invasion for a long time.
Crocker quoted in T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, op.cit., p. 220.

40
Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (October 30, 2012), Special Inspector
41
General for Iraq Reconstruction, http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/

October2012.html.
The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2013, No. 1 ( 3) ISSN 2299–4335
B o g dan Sz ajkowsk i
University of Exeter, United Kingdom
THE SHIA CRESCENT
ABSTRACT
The study focuses on the recent rise in importance of the Shia branch of
Islam. Ever since the success of the Iranian revolution, the Teheran regime has
persistently claimed to be protector and promoter of the Shia interests outside
its borders. Many Sunni rulers in the Middle East fear that the rising position
of the Shia and Iran, in particular through its nuclear programme, will alter
the traditional balance of power not only in the Gulf region but throughout
the Arab world. The study introduces the term “the Shia crescent,” which has
become a commonly used expression in popular, intellectual and political
debates. As a geo-political term, it is used to describe a region of the Middle East
where the majority population is Shia, or where there is a strong Shia minority
in the population. The aim of this article is to examine critically the notion of
the Shia crescent and suggest possible explanations on what is behind the rise of
Shia power, how to account for it, and what are its consequences for the current
system of international relations.
Key words
Shia Crescent, Shiite, Sunni, Iran, the Gulf region
In December 2004 King Abdullah II of Jordan warned publically of the emergence

of a “Shia crescent” in the Gulf and the Middle East regions. He sounded an
alarm that a vast swath of the region, stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to
the Indian Ocean – from Lebanon through the oil rich Caspian Sea to the even
richer Persian Gulf, was coming under the sway of the Shia branch of Islam.
More importantly, he sent a warning that the hegemonic Iran is attempting to
dominate the region through an array of Shiite proxies. He was referring to the
growing influence of Iran in Iraq, Iran’s support of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and
the strong alliance between Tehran and Syria.
If pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government – the King
said – a new ‘crescent’ of dominant Shia movements or governments stretching
The Shia Crescent 23
from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could emerge, alter the traditional
balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and pose new challenges to
US interests and allies. 1
The King’s statements reflected the fear of many Sunni rulers in the Middle
East that the rising position of the Shia and Iran, in particular through its nuclear
programme, will alter the traditional balance of power not only in the Gulf region
but throughout the Arab world. Indeed, in April 2006 in an interview with Al-
Arabiya TV, the then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak deliberately conflated
Arab Shias with Iranians and questioned their fidelity: “There are Shias in all
these countries [of the region], in significant percentages, and Shias are mostly
always loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live… Naturally Iran has
an influence over Shia who make up 65 per cent of Iraq’s population” 2. President
Mubarak reflected a wider views of the royal families from the Gulf countries
to Morocco. In January 2007 an editorial in al-Ahram, a newspaper widely seen
as the voice of the Egyptian state, declared: „Iran is working actively towards
spreading Shia doctrine even in countries which do not have a Shia minority…
paving the way for reviving the dreams of the Safavids.” 3
Subsequently the term “the Shia crescent” became a commonly used
expression in popular, intellectual and political debates. As a geo-political term,
it is used to describe a region of the Middle East where the majority population is
Shia, or where there is a strong Shia minority in the population. The aim of this
article is to examine critically the notion of the Shia crescent and suggest possible
explanations on what is behind the rise of Shia power, how to account for it, and
what its consequences for the current system of international relations are.
King Abdullah’s idea of the Shia crescent met with a great deal of support
among the Sunni Muslim political elite on the one hand and with substantial
1
Quoted by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri in their book,
A. Ehteshami, M. Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran’s
Silent Revolution, London 2007, p. 133.
2
Ibidem, p. 134.
3
R. Hardy, Sunni and Shia: Spectre of Sectarianism, BBC report, 20 February 2007.
The Safavids were the 16th century Persian dynasty that unified much of Persia under
a single political control and, initially, also subjugated large parts of Iraq. They introduced
Shia Islam to that part of the world. The theocratic Safavid Empire lasted from 1501 to
1722 and it covered all of contemporary Iran, parts of Turkey and Georgia. Under Safavid
rule, eastern Persia became a great cultural centre, best represented by Isfahan, the capital
of the Empire for over 120 years.
24 B o g dan S z ajkow sk i
criticisms from Iran and the leaders of Shia communities throughout the Arab
world on the other.
Speaking to the CNN in 2010 king Abdullah was asked whether he regrets
making the comment about the Shia crescent. He replied:
No, well, that’s not what I said. What I said is I was worried about members
– certain members of the Iranian government using an agenda to create the
perception of a Shia crescent, because the last thing that we need in this part of
the world is a conflict between Sunnis and Shias. And so when I raise the alarm
bell, I saw a political strategy that would as an endgame have the Sunnis and
Shias at each other’s throats. If you look back at the Iraq-Iran war, the war first
started as a war of territory. It then became an issue of race – Persians against
Arabs – which I think was wrong. Never did they ever come close to touching
the religious aspect, because the fault line between Shias and Sunnis goes from
Beirut all the way to Bombay and it’s a catastrophic subject to play with. In my
view, I felt that there was an agenda out there that was going to try and push it in
that respect, and also raising the alarm bell that that cannot happen. 4
Interestingly, in this re-visit to his controversial opinion, the king placed the
responsibility for the idea of the Shia crescent on “certain members of the Iranian
government,” ignoring the background to the tensions between the two sects
and the role of the Sunni political elites in curbing the Shia minority aspirations.
Remarkably, this time king Abdullah extended the fault-line between the Shia
and the Sunnis all the way to India.
The Sunni-Shia conflict is centuries old and deeply imbedded into the ideology
and theology of the two main sections of Islam, as well as into various aspects of
relations between them. The claims of the two groups as to who holds the proper
succession from Prophet Mohammad and, therefore, which group represents the
properly constituted assemblage of adherence and should be recognised as such,
presents an insurmountable problem. Throughout the centuries, the claims of
the Sunnis and the Shia to the origins and property of the Prophet’s succession
have been a source of open conflicts and skirmishes, as well as intense communal
animosities. Recently, the Sunni-Shia hostilities reached new dimensions – each
of the two main traditions of Islam is now associated with a powerful state –
Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran on the other – which also represent
groupings of countries linked through their version of Islam with two important
clusters in the system of international relations.
4
CNN Interview with King Abdullah at Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, January 29,
2010.
Shiism arose as a distinct movement within Islam primarily as a political

movement and as a political identity, irrespectfully of the issue of the succession
to the Prophet Mohammed. The difference between the Shia and the majority
Sunni community can be summarised in three different categories: political,
religious and ethnical.
The Shiat Ali (the partisans of Ali), were the partisans of a particular
movement that believed that the succession to the Prophet Mohammed should
rest within the prophet’s immediate family. “So when we talk about that original
split between Shiism and what will eventually become known as Sunni Islam,
we need to recognize that at first there was very little religiously that separated
these two groups. This was surely political separation. However, once the Shia
political aspirations were more or less denied and the Muslim community
transformed into an empire, a distinctly Arab empire, the Shia slowly began to
withdraw from the larger political implications of their movement.” 5 This was
particularly apparent after an epic battle in Karbala in 680 when the grandson of
the Prophet Mohammed, Hussain, and a small group of the Shia, fought against
the tyrannical reign of the Umayyad caliph Yazid ibn Muawiya. Outnumbered
by the tens of thousands, Hussain and his small band of followers fought bravely
but were brutally massacred. The “tragedy of Karbala” as it is known continues
to serve as inspiration to the Shia; endowing them with the belief that standing
up to oppression and injustice, no matter how great or at what odds, is an act
of faith. 6 Resistance against despotic rule and rulers is a deeply-seated notion
among the Shia. The withdrawal of Shia from the society after 680, particularly
in political terms, inescapably led them to become a distinctly religious sect.
It is interesting from the point of view of religious studies that Shiism is one
of very few religions in the world whose origins are in many respects defined
by ritual, and not so much by mythology. It was the lamentation rituals, the
mourning rituals that arose out of the massacre at Karbala that began to
give Shiism its distinct religious definition, and only later on the theological
implications emerged. The theological definition of Shiism was formed as
a result of rituals that had already very organically been going on for quite some
time. From about 680 onwards, Shiism comes to represent essentially the protest
movement within the Islamic world.
5
The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Understanding the Shia, Council on Foreign
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescent-symposium-
understanding-shia-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10864.
6
R. Amiri, The Shia Crescent Revisited, RSD Reports, February 10, 2011.
Shiism is something that is not so much defined just by doctrine, but by

a convergence of a certain type of institutional identity, a very strong, practical
sense of ties with whom one follows his religious leader to talk about personal
issues, family issues, household and community issues and just about everything
else. And then, on the other hand, there is the identity shaped sometimes by
rituals, which allowed many different interpretations. 7
Within Shiism there is a great deal of emphasis on the charismatic leader, the
imam, the true successor to the Prophet Mohammed. The Shia clerics have much
more organization and much more influence over ordinary Shia believers than
most Sunni clerics have over Sunni believers.
The Shia tradition is far from uniformed – there are varieties of schools and
sects within Shiism, including the Ismaili, Zaydi, 8 Nizari, Musta`lis, Druze, and
Muqanna`ah.
There is little difference between the Sunnis and the Shiites when it comes
to basic rituals like prayer and fasting. But fundamentalist Sunnis label Shiite
practices, such as treating dead religious figures like saints, as blasphemous.
The idea of Sunni Islam is very much tied to the development of Islamic
law, which, while it has its primarily foundations within the Koran, the bulk of
Islamic law, particularly in the Sunni world, involves the Sunnah, the traditions
of the Prophet.
The contemporary rise of Shiism and the ascendancy of the Shia can be
associated with three pivotal events. First was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in
Iran and the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Tehran. The revolution
toppled the secular, well-established and particularly well-endowed, Western-
backed administration. The demise of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
regime spread panic among the Western-allied governments in the Arab world.
But even more telling and worrisome was the technique deployed by Khomeini
to secure and further galvanise the revolution. He took the Shia clerics out of the
seminaries and told them to teach what was relevant to actual political action.
The clerics became political actors and the Shia political force. By many, if not
the majority in the Arab world, the Shia in their own countries were now seen as
an extension of Iran – a non-Arab Shia country. However, in retrospect, it can be
argued that the local Shia communities in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq,
7
The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Understanding the Shia, Council on Foreign
Relations, op.cit.
8
Zaydis (also: Zaidi, Zaiddiyah, or in the West Fivers) are the most moderate of the
Shi’a groups and the nearest to the Sunnis in their theology.
Kuwait, Lebanon and elsewhere, by supporting Iran and indirectly the Iranian
threat, have primarily tried to renegotiate their position in their individual
countries. Thus, it can be contended that they have been using the spectre of
Iran in order to establish a different relationship with the Sunni regimes they
were ruled by.
The second important event that brought the emergence of the Shia, as
a new major political force, under intense scrutiny was the result of the first
post-Saddam Hussein elections in Iraq. In the poll held on January 30, 2005,
the United Iraqi Alliance, tacitly backed by Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
won about 48% of the votes. The Sunnis, which for decades dominated the ruling
Ba’ath Party and the administration of the Iraqi regime, lost control of the state.
The persecuted and brutally suppressed Shia majority population seized the helm
of Iraq’s politics. 9 The subsequent emergence of a Shia-dominated government in
Iraq 10 and the perceived growth of Iranian influence in the region inevitably
generated Sunni backlash.
The third set of events that focused the attention of analysts and politicians
on the upsurge of the Shia was the integration of Hezbollah, the Shia political
party and militia, into Lebanon’s political structure. In 2000 Hezbollah
succeeded in forcing the Israelis to withdraw from the south of Lebanon,
which they occupied for 18 years. In the 2005 parliamentary election it won
14 seats 11 and two government posts and its leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah,
clearly enjoyed widespread popularity not only in Lebanon but also on the Arab
streets outside the country. During the years 2000–2006 Hezbollah managed to
construct dynamic and well organized system of Shia community associations
and institutions, including hospitals, orphanages, schools and social centres,
which formed an essential part of the construction of a modern confident notion
9
For the history of political and socio-economic marginalization of the Shia see for
example: G. Fuller, R. Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims, London 2000.
10
In the 37-member post-election cabinet, 19 members were Shiites, nine were
Sunnis, eight were Kurds and one was Christian.
11
With political endorsement from Iran, Hezbollah first participated in national
elections in 1992. Its decision to present parliamentary candidates marked the beginning
of the group’s active involvement in Lebanese participatory politics. In 1992 Hezbollah
won eight seats in the Lebanese parliament. Subsequently, the group continues to field
candidates in national and municipal elections, achieving a modest, variable, yet generally
steady degree of electoral success. In the 2009 national election, Hezbollah won 10 seats
in parliament and was awarded two cabinet posts for the Ministries of Agriculture and
Administrative Reform.
of identity. 12 The Hezbollah-Israeli war in the summer of 2006, which lasted

thirty four days and ended without an unequivocal winner, further increased
the reputation and popular standing of the group. The war made Nasrallah one
of the most admired leaders in the Middle East.
The group’s political strength had grown further after May 2008, when in
an armed conflict with the Western-backed Lebanese government, it took
over western areas of Beirut, in response to a government-ordered shutdown
of Hezbollah’s communications network. Subsequently Hezbollah worked out
a deal that paved the way for peaceful elections in 2009. These elections gave the
militia 13 seats in the 128-member parliament 13 and two government posts. In
fact, however, together with its allies Hezbollah controlled 11 out of the 30 seats
in the Cabinet – enabling them to have veto power over major decisions, keep
their weapons and prevent the government from moving too close to the United
States. 14
In August 2010, the Obama Administration reported that Hezbollah is “the
most technically capable terrorist group in the world” and stated that the group
has “thousands of supporters, several thousand members, and a few hundred
terrorist operatives.” 15 According to the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis
C. Blair, Hezbollah receives financial support from Lebanese Shiite expatriates
around the world and “profits from legal and illegal businesses,” including some
illegal drug activity. 16 The US Administration also reported that Hezbollah
receives “training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and
organizational aid from Iran, and diplomatic, political, and logistical support
from Syria.” 17
Since its birth in 1982 as an Islamic militia fighting Israel’s invasion of the
country, Hezbollah has transformed itself into a powerful military, political and
social organization. It controls a large swath of southern Lebanon, much of the
Bekaa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut. 18
12
A. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, Princeton 2007, p. 108.
13
Hezbollah has maintained its electoral standing routinely winning 10 per cent of
all parliamentary seats.
14
Associated Press, August 13, 2009.
15
Country Reports on Terrorism – 2009, U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010.
16
D. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
17
Country Reports on Terrorism – 2009, U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010.
18
D. Duncan, Jihadi Tourism Hits Lebanon, “The Wall Street Journal”, June 17, 2010.
It is important to remember that Hussein’s desperate struggle in 680 in

Karbala serves as a point of reference for the pivotal events mentioned earlier.
They were recalled by Khomeini in the 1979 Revolution deposing the Shah.
Although it would be incorrect to conclude that the Shias are in a continuous
state of revolt against the established order of the state, their 1991 uprising
against Saddam in aftermath of the first Gulf War, Hezbollah’s battles against
the militarily superior Israeli Army in the 1990s and in 2006, and the continuing
clashes between the Zaidi Shia rebels and the governments of Yemen and Saudi
Arabia, are all viewed with a great deal of mistrust and misgivings by the Sunni
political class in the Middle East. 19
The Arab world is run by a set of Sunni elites for whom Shia power is
an unwelcome novelty. The Sunni Arab governments are understandably
apprehensive about the rising profile of the Shia power in Iran, the emergence
of the Shia dominated government in Iraq and the influence of Hezbollah in
Lebanon. 20 The fear has been that all these forces might well inspire domestic
opposition forces in their own countries, especially as Hezbollah gained
enthusiastic support even among the vast Sunni population of the Arab world.
The idea of the Shia crescent reflects a geopolitical struggle between Iran
and the Sunni Arab regimes over who is the regional superpower – Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Egypt or the United Arab Emirates? However, there is also
another factor which is particularly important in the context of the Arab revolts
of 2011. The discontented and, thus far, ignored mass of downtrodden population
of the Middle East has turned to Iranian-style Shia radicalism to express their
discontent with the status quo.
The notion of an Iranian-dominated “Shia crescent” stretching from Lebanon
to Saudi Arabia may be exaggerated, but it is proving hard to shake off.
Although it is difficult to find accurate data on the Sunni and the Shia
populations throughout the world, it is estimated that in the years 2009–2010,
among the 1.6 billion Muslims (23.4 per cent of the population of the world), the
Sunnis comprise 87–90 per cent and the Shia 10–13 per cent. 21
Between 12–15 per cent of the Muslim population in the Asia Pacific region
is Shia, as is 11–14 per cent of the Muslim population in the Middle East and
19
R. Amiri, The Shia Crescent Revisited, RSD Reports, February 10, 2011.
20
A. Norton, op.cit., p. 137.
21
Mapping the Global Muslim Population. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the
World’s Muslim Population, The Pew Forum on Religious and Public Life, Washington
DC 2009.
North Africa. Most Shiites (from 68 to 80 per cent) live in four countries: Iran,
Pakistan, India and Iraq. Iran has 66–70 million Shiites, or 37–40 per cent of the
global population of this faction. Iraq, India and Pakistan are home to at least
16 million of the faithful of the sect. The following table gives the appropriate
number of Shiites in the countries where they count more than one hundred
thousand.
Estimated population Estimated percentage

of the Shia – 2009 of the Shia Muslim population
Iran 66–70 million 90–95%
Pakistan 17–26 million 10–15
India 16–24 million 1–15
Iraq 19–22 million 65–70
Turkey 7–11 million 10–15
Yemen 8–10 million 35–40
Azerbaijan 5–7 million 65–75
Afghanistan 3–4 million 10–15
Syria 3–4 million 15–20
Saudi Arabia 2–4 million 10–15
Nigeria <4 million <5
Lebanon 1–2 million 45–55
Tanzania <2 million <10
Kuwait 500,000–700,00 20–25
Germany 400,000–600,000 10–15
Bahrain 400,000–500,000 65–75
Tajikistan ~400,000 ~7
United Arab Emirates 300,000–400,000 ~10
United States 200,000–400,000 10–15
Oman 100,000–300,000 5–10
United Kingdom 100,000–300,000 10–15
Bulgaria ~100,000 10–15
Qatar ~100,000 ~10
Total in the world 154–200 million 10–13
Source: Mapping the Global Muslim Population. A Report on the Size and Distribution of
the World’s Muslim Population, The Pew Forum on Religious and Public Life, Washington
DC 2009, p. 8.
The arrival on March 14, 2011 in Bahrain of about 1,500 soldiers from the
Gulf Cooperation Council countries, led by Saudi Arabia, under the umbrella of
the Peninsula Shield Force, 22, 23 is the latest manifestation of the on-going Sunni-
Shiite conflict that has endured at many levels in the Islamic world. Sunni Saudi
Arabia and Shia Iran appear to be engaged in a struggle for supremacy among
the Muslim faithful.
The expanse of the conflict between two major sections of Islam, represented
by the two powerful states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, extends through Africa, the
22
The Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), officially created in 1982 at the third summit of
the GCC’s Supreme Council, comprised of the rulers of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
Oman, Kuwait and Qatar. It took part in the liberation of Kuwait during the First Gulf
War in the early 1990s, and was again sent to Kuwait in 2003 ahead of the US-led invasion
that toppled Saddam Hussein. Initially the PSF was based in north-eastern Saudi Arabia,
in the city of Hafr al Batin, close to both the Kuwaiti and Iraqi borders. The size of the
force was estimated at a modest 5,000 soldiers at its inception, but according The National
(March 16, 2011) it has since grown six-fold. At the 21st GCC summit in Manama on
December 31, 2000 the member states signed a mutual defence pact, which also created
a joint GCC defence council, and a high military committee – codified what is now the
pillar of the GCC’s military doctrine: that the security of all the members of the council
is an “indivisible whole”. According to the communiqué issued at that time “…any
aggression on a member state is aggression against the other states, and facing aggression
is considered a joint responsibility whose burden is on all the member states… Interference
from any entity in the internal affairs of one of the member states is interference in the
internal affairs of all the nations of the council.” The communiqué thus made attacks by
a foreign force, foreign interference and destabilisation of a GCC state all contingencies
that demand unified action by the council. A proposal by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah,
adopted in 2006 by the Gulf Supreme Council, transformed the PSF. It was agreed that
soldiers would be stationed in their home countries but come under joint command.
23
In addition to Saudi forces the UAE sent about 500 police officers to Bahrain.
Qatari troops were also deployed to Bahrain as part of the PSF. According to the Qatar
News Agency: “The duty of the Qatari force participating in the Peninsula Shield Force
is to contribute in restoring order and security in Bahrain” (QNA, March 18, 2011).
Subsequently, on March 21, 2011 Kuwait navy vessel with a number of ground forces on
board docked off the Bahraini coasts, as part of the Peninsula Shield Force troops deployed
by the GCC in the kingdom. In February 2013, the Commander of the GCC peninsula
Shield Forces, Joint Staff Major General Motlq Alozima was reported as saying that they
will stay in Bahrain “to perform tasks for which they have been provided”. (Shafaqna,
February 13, 2013). On April 14, 2013 Gulf News reported that “An additional permanent
headquarters for the Peninsula Shield… is set to be inaugurated in Bahrain soon… The
headquarters will be named The Advanced Command of the Peninsula Shield Forces…”
The report did not specify the size of the Gulf force to be stationed in Bahrain.
Middle and Far East to Asia – from Nigeria to Malaysia. Although, generally the
relationship between these two major factions of Islam, in most Islamic countries
are fairly satisfactory, Saudi Arabia’s Wahabi doctrine contains “virulent hatred”
for the Shiites, which is semi-publicly and privately often expressed with great
intensity. 24 Conservative Sunni clerics in Saudi Arabia routinely denounced the
Shia as heretics. For great many, the Shia are simply an inferior community and
have been regarded as such for a very long time.
This confrontation is founded on the belief that each of these two factions
sees itself as the true representative of Islam, and the other is contemptuously
considered as heresy. The confrontations often turn violent, even during the
pilgrimage in Mecca and Medina, where riots caused by Shiite pilgrims, whom
the Saudi suspect of acting with Iranian encouragement, have caused hundreds
of casualties. 25
Saudi Arabia has decided to intervene in Bahrain after a month of social
unrest that has left the tiny Gulf nation sharply divided between the minority
24
This antagonism towards the Shi’a is much less pronounced in North Africa, for
example. In Iraq, Jordan Egypt and Maghreb countries the Shia and the Sunni inter-
marry.
25
There is a long history of clashes between the Iranian pilgrims and the Saudi police
in Mecca and Medina. The most notorious one took place during the pilgrimage in July
1987, when the Iranian pilgrims’ demonstrations against the “enemies of Islam” (including
the U.S. and Israel), turned into a battle between the protesters and the Saudi security
forces. The police opened fire on demonstrators, which led to panic among the pilgrims.
In this skirmish 402 people died (275 Iranians, 85 Saudis, including many police officers,
and 42 pilgrims from other countries), and 649 people were wounded (303 Iranians, 145
Saudis, and 201 citizens of other countries). Much smaller riots took place in subsequent
years. In early 2009, the Shiite pilgrims were attacked in Medina after performing rituals
that are prohibited by Wahhabi Islam. As a result, the Minister of Interior of Saudi Arabia,
Prince Nayef Ibn Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, said that the Shiites should not show publicly
their faith with respect to the majority Sunni. According to the Human Rights Watch,
a pilgrimage of the Saudi Shia to Medina in February 2009 to observe the anniversary
of the Prophet Muhammad’s death led to clashes between the pilgrims and the Saudi
security forces, who objected to what they consider the idolatrous innovations of Shia
rituals of commemorating special holidays and making visits to graves. The immediate
cause of the Medina clashes was the filming on February 20 of female Shia pilgrims by
a man believed to belong to the Saudi religious police. The clashes continued over a period
of five days in the area of the Baqi’ cemetery in Medina, which is believed to contain
the graves of several of the Prophet’s wives, many of his companions, and four of his
successors whom the Shia recognize as rightful leaders of the Muslim community. They
resulted in the arrest of 49 Shias.
Sunni Muslims backing the ruling system and the Shiite majority demanding
sweeping changes. The ruler of the kingdom, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa,
is a Sunni Muslim like the entire ruling elite of Bahrain. Although, technically,
Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy, the country’s parliament’s prerogatives are
limited in favour of the king, who is the real power broker.
By the middle of March Bahrain’s Sunni ruling elite had discovered that
the country’s security forces are unable to cope with the on-going protests
of the majority Shiites, who constitute around 70 per cent of the population
of 1,214,705. 26 Ostensibly a parliamentary group asked King Hamad bin Isa
al-Khalifa for a three-month declaration of martial law and claimed that
“extremist movements” were trying to disrupt the country and push it toward
sectarian conflict. 27 The king declared a state of emergency and invited the
GCC to help to establish “security and domestic stability”. The deployment of
the Peninsula Shield Force has been explained as a show of solidarity among
the Gulf Council states – “safeguarding security and stability in one country is
a collective responsibility”. 28
Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, the Qatari Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, stated: “There are common responsibilities and obligations
within the GCC countries… The arrival of Saudi and UAE troops in Bahrain is
in line with a GCC defence agreement that calls for all members to oblige when
needed and to fully co-operate.” 29
Quite clearly Bahrain’s leadership found itself under intense pressure from
its Gulf neighbours, particularly from the powerful Saudi Arabia, not to give
ground to the demands of the protesting majority of the country’s population.
Iran has been accused of being behind the demonstrations in Bahrain. King
Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa went as far as to blame a foreign plot for the nation’s
unrest, using veiled language to accuse Iran of fomenting an uprising of the Shia
majority. 30 His view was not shared by the US administration which declared that
26
The figure includes 235,108 non-nationals (July 2011 est.) CIA World Factbook:
Bahrain, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.
27
The 40-seat chamber was left with only pro-government politicians after 18
opposition members resigned to protest violence against demonstrators.
28
GCC secretary general, Abdulrahman al Attiya, quoted by Frank Kane and
Jonathan Lessware, UAE and Saudi Arabia Send Forces to Bahrain, “The National”, March
15, 2011.
29
Saudi Soldiers Sent into Bahrain, “Al Jazeera”, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
middleeast/2011/03/2011314124928850647.html.
30
Associated Press, March 21, 2011.
it “have not seen any indications that Iran is playing an ‘active role’ in helping
the mainly-Shiite Bahrain protest movement”. 31 US diplomatic cables released
by WikiLeaks show that the Americans were rather dismissive of Bahraini
allegation, or at least that the accusation made by the Manama government was
not backed by hard evidence.
Bahraini government officials sometimes privately tell U.S. official visitors that
some Shia oppositionists are backed by Iran. Each time this claim is raised, we
ask the GOB [government of Bahrain] to share its evidence. To date, we have seen
no convincing evidence of Iranian weapons or government money here since at
least the mid-1990s, when followers of Ayatollah Shirazi were rounded up and
convicted of sedition. 32
The British Ambassador to Manama, Jamie Bowden, spoke of evidence of
Iran seeking to exploit the situation once demonstrations were underway, but
he did not think Tehran was involved in starting the protests. “In the case of
Bahrain, we did not see any suggestion that the Iranians were responsible for
triggering what happened here, but what we do have concerns about is having
started, we saw in a number of ways evidence the Iranians were seeking to exploit
the situation.” 33
There can be little doubt that Iran had certainly tried to gain leverage from the
Bahraini unrest, insofar as any kind of instability there is to its own advantage.
Bahrain hosts the US Navy Fifth Fleet and a major British naval force in the
Gulf, and is thus of crucial strategic importance to Washington and London, for
instance in monitoring Iran over its nuclear programme.
Bahraini and Saudi anxieties over the role of Iran in the region are shared
by the United Arab Emirates. The recent uncovering of an Emirati ‘spy ring’ in
Oman, allegedly there to investigate Oman’s Iranian links, further propagates
the notion of the Emirates as highly concerned with Iran’s activities. 34
A secret diplomatic cable from the US Ambassador in Bahrain, Adam Ereli,
dated April 17, 2008, published by WikiLeaks illustrates the US diplomat’s
awareness of the simmering unrest between the Shia majority underclass and
the Sunni minority rulers in Bahrain.
31
Voice of America, April 14, 2011.
32
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/164906.
33
R. Smith, UK Raps Iran Role in Bahrain, “The Gulf Daily News”, July 7, 2011.
34
D. Roberts, The Endgame in Bahrain: Saudi and UAE Troops Enter Manama, http://
www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4D80925B1234B/.
Small but violent bands of Shia underclass youth, frustrated with persistent
discrimination and what they perceive as too gradual a pace of reform, clash
with police nearly every week. The Sunni minority, which rules the country and
controls all security forces, has generally acted with restraint, but it takes only
one mistake to provoke a potentially disastrous escalation. 35
Another cable from the US Charge d’Affaires, Christopher Henzel, dated July
25, 2008, published by WikiLeaks, again warned of the impending disturbances.
Regional tensions may be adding to long-standing domestic tensions as well,
contributing to the stridency of sectarian voices in Bahrain. The majority of
Bahraini citizens are part of the Shia underclass, and their grievances, expressed
both in legal political activity and in street skirmishes between youths and police,
are at the center of all domestic politics here. 36
There is every evidence that the demonstrations in Bahrain, which began on
February 14, 2011 and turned into a revolt had largely an economic base which
gave rise to direct political demands for democracy, rule of law and human rights.
Primarily, the demonstrators sought the end to what they called the “apartheid-
like policies” of the ruling Sunni minority over the Shia majority. In particular,
they called for constitutional monarchy and full democratic citizen rights to
choose their representatives, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
The Shiites in Bahrain make the poorest and least educated section of the
society. According to a secret US Embassy in Manama dispatch published by
WikiLeaks: “With the exception of a few merchant families, Shia Bahrainis are
poorer than Sunni Bahrainis. Most Bahraini Shia are Arabs, but about 10–15
per cent of Bahrainis are ethnically Persian, and speak Persian at home. Many of
these descend from families who came here to work in the British administration
or, starting in the 1930s, in the oil industry. Persian-speakers (mostly Shia, a few
Sunni) now tend to belong to the professional classes”. 37
The Shia complain about discrimination on religious grounds in search for
jobs and public services and that they are regularly pushed to lower levels, even
in comparison with the naturalized Sunni immigrants from other countries,
including those from Asia. The majority of Shiite feel shut out of the best jobs
and other employment opportunities. Their position is becoming increasingly
difficult in a situation when the government of Bahrain naturalizes tens of
35
36
37
thousands of the Sunnis, whose presence in the security forces, is one of the
main factors for harsh police responses to protests. The allocation of housing,
health care and other benefits for the Sunnis from outside Bahrain also causes
resentment among the Shiites who increasingly feel like second-class citizens
in their own country. Despite the wealth of the country, they believe that they
never received a fair share in economic benefits. As a result, Bahrain Shiites
rallied during the Spring of 2011 in expectation of true democracy, pointing to
the example of the Shiites in Iraq, where the Shia took over the control of the
government after the first post-Saddam elections in January 2005.
This, however, is a nightmare scenario for Saudi Arabia and other Sunni
oil principalities in the Persian Gulf – the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait –
whose troops are involved in the Peninsula Shield Force. Each of these countries
struggle with their own restless Shia minority. Moreover, each of these states is
also an object of Iranian ambitions. Their concern is that Shia control of Bahrain
will be the final result in the implementation of age-old Iranian desire to take
over this strategically located island.
Bahrain is just off the east coast of Saudi Arabia and the two countries are
connected by 25 km long causeway. 38 The world’s longest causeway links Bahrain
with Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province – the largest province of the country,
comprising 31.28 per cent of the kingdom’s total size. This province is not only
inhabited by large number of the Shiite population, but it is an area that contains
most of the country’s 14 oil fields, all the most important sources of natural gas,
crude oil and refineries on which, not only the United States but also the majority
of western countries rely. Saudi Arabia in 90% is dependent on oil exports. Also,
75% of the state budget comes from the export. Crude oil accounts for 45% of
GDP. The Eastern Province is of paramount strategic importance not only to the
Saudi government but also to the global energy supply chain.
There are no accurate figures on the number of the Shia in the Eastern Province.
The 1992 Library of Congress study estimates that “in the Eastern Province…
they constituted perhaps 33 per cent of the population, being concentrated in the
38
The King Fahd Causeway was opened in 1986. The idea of building the causeway is
based on the notion of improving relations and ties between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
The project cost a total of $ 1.2 billion. One of the main contractor of the Ballast Nedam
project was based in the Netherlands. This four-lane road is 25 km long and about 23 m
wide and was built with 350,000 m² of concrete and 47,000 tons of reinforced steel. It is
estimated that the number of vehicles using this road is around 45.000 on weekdays and
60,000 during weekends.
oases of Qatif and Al Ahsa”. 39 The 2005 International Crisis Group report states
that “Saudi Arabia’s roughly two million Shiites represent between 10 and 15 per
cent of the total population. Most live and work in the Eastern Province, which
they dominate demographically… While a small number reside in Dammam,
the Eastern Province’s capital and largest city, the overwhelming majority live
in the towns and villages of the two large oases, Qatif and Al Ahsa. Small Shiite
communities also exist in Mecca and Medina…” 40
Their demands for greater freedom of worship to take account of their
religious traditions and freedom from Sunni practices based on the dominant
in Saudi Arabia Wahhabi school of Islam, are interpreted as an affront to Sunni
Wahhabism which is the basis of the kingdom’s legal system. The Shiites are
prohibited to gather in community centres, they do not receive funding from
the state budget for the construction of their mosques, and do not have access
to certain jobs, such as the teaching of history. Deep tensions exist since 1913,
when King Abdul-Aziz, who later created the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, secured
control of this region. In recent decades, inner-religious, sectarian issues have
become even more accentuated as a result of momentous developments in the
region, such as the Iranian revolution, unrest in the neighbouring Bahrain,
and the Shiite-Sunni tensions in Iraq following the American invasion in 2003,
which has completely changed the power dynamics of the area. The latter in
particular “strengthened Shiite aspirations and Sunni suspicions and generally
deepened confessional divisions throughout the region.” 41 For the Saudi Shia the
failure of their engagement with the Saudi ruling circles dating back to the early
1990s and the successes of their co-religionists in Iraq suggested that they must
demand political reforms in the kingdom.
The report published in September 2009 by the New York-based Human
Rights Watch gives examples of discrimination against the Shiites 42 that include
other aspects than just religious freedom. The Human Rights Watch cites
discrimination in the education system, where the Shiites cannot teach religion in
39
Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, H. Metz (ed.), Washington 1992. The same study
suggests that in the whole of the kingdom “Shia… probably constitute about 5 percent of
the total population, their number being estimated from a low of 200,000 to as many as
400,000”, in a population of 12.3 million in 1992.
40
International Crisis Group, The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia, “Middle East
Report” 2005, No. 45.
41
Ibidem.
42
Denied Dignity: Systematic Discrimination and Hostility toward Saudi Shia Citizens,
Human Rights Watch, New York, September 3, 2009.
schools and Shia students learn from Sunni teachers that the Shiites are infidels. 43
The Shiites are not well represented in school faculties and administration in
the Eastern Province. This report also cites discrimination in the judiciary,
ranging from denial of access to justice to arbitrary arrests and discriminatory
verdicts. 44 Sunni judges sometimes disqualify Shiite witnesses because of their
religion and only apply the assumptions of the Sunni religious law. The Shia
cannot be judges in ordinary courts. There are no Shia judges except for seven
judges serving three Shia courts – two first instance courts in Qatif and Al Ahsa’,
and an appeals court, also in Qatif. However, their jurisdiction is limited to
personal status, inheritance, and endowments cases. In August 2005 a new royal
decree significantly curtailed the already limited jurisdiction of the two Shia first
instance courts, giving Sunni courts the authority to supervise the Shia courts
and take up cases pending there. 45 Discrimination also includes employment.
There were no Shia ministers in the successive Saudi governments, high-ranking
diplomats, 46 or high-ranking officers. Shiite candidates generally cannot get
access to military school. AShia woman from Ahsa’ was detained as she was
returning from Syria for having a Shia prayer book in her possession. A court
later sentenced her to six months for witchcraft and sorcery. 47 The report also lists
instances of closure of Shia mosques and private communal prayer buildings.
Damman, the largest city in the area, has no Shia cemetery. According to the 2012
Human Rights Watch Report, Saudi “Authorities continue to suppress or fail to
protect the rights… of some 2 million Shia citizens.” 48 The same body in its 2013
report said that Saudi Arabia “…systematically discriminates against its Muslim
religious minorities, in particular Shia and Ismailis… Official discrimination
against Shia encompasses religious practices, education, and the justice system…
Security forces have killed at least 11 Shia in protests since 2011.” 49
The most serious problems occurred in late November 1979 and were
associated with the revolution in Iran. The Shiites in Qatif region organized
43
In its 2005 report International Crisis Groups quotes an example of a middle school
history class exam paper it obtained, which asked students to discuss why “the ahl al-
Sunna [Sunnis] prefer to characterise Shiites as al-rafida” [rejectionists].
44
Human Rights Watch, op.cit., p. 11.
45
Human Rights Watch, op.cit., p. 12.
46
The exception of Shiite ambassador was Jamil al-Jishi, envoy to Iran from 1999 to
2003.
47
Human Rights Watch, op.cit., p. 11
48
World Report 2012, Human Rights Watch, New York 2012, p. 621.
49
World Report 2013, Human Rights Watch, New York 2013, p. 607.
an Ashura procession without the permission of local authorities. This led to

bloody street violence between state security forces and thousands of frustrated
Shiites that lasted seven days, and rocked the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. 50
Women, as well as men, marched in anger. Several building were destroyed,
including the offices of the Saudia National Airline and the British bank in the
town. Protesters seized weapons from soldiers, destroyed state-owned vehicles
and even occupied the old city in downtown Qatif, from which they held off the
Saudi military for days. The security forces, which included 20,000 officers of
the Saudi National Guard, cordoned off the major roadways, particularly those
in Qatif, Sayhat, and Safwa to localize the protest. The National Guard relied on
the heavy firepower of helicopter gun ships for crowd control, turning the area
into a deadly conflict zone characterized by terror, hostility, and fear. The protest
were eventually crushed by the National Guard. About 20 people were killed and
an unknown number wounded. 51
Similar clashes took place in Qatif in February 1980. Such events only
emphasize the long-held concerns of the Saudi government about Iran’s
machinations and attempts to interfere. In 1993 Riyadh announced a general
amnesty, and many Shiites living in exile returned to the Eastern Province.
In exchange for the release of political prisoners and easing travel bans, Shiite
activists agreed to stop publishing books and magazines criticizing government
policies. However, the gains arising from the arrangements and the attempts
at reconciliation proved to be uncertain, when the government began to arrest
the Shiites in 1995 after the unrest in Bahrain, and again in June 1996 after the
Khobar Towers bombing in the Eastern Province, which killed 19 American
50
The protests coincided with the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a group
of about 200 Sunni extremists on November 20, 1979. The heavily armed group of
fundamentalists, men and women, consisting of peninsular Arabs and Egyptians enrolled
in Islamic studies at the Islamic University of Medina took over and besieged the Grand
Mosque in Mecca. The seizure was led by Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaibi
who belonged to a powerful Sunni family of Najd. He justified the action claiming that
the ruling Al Saud dynasty had lost its legitimacy, because it was corrupt, ostentatious and
had destroyed the Saudi culture by an aggressive policy of Westernization. The events in
the Eastern Province added to an already worrying and insecure situation faced by the
Saudi authorities.
51
T. Jones, Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Marginalization and the Shia
Uprising of 1979, “International Journal of Middle East Studies” 2006, No. 38, pp. 213–233.
soldiers. Hezbollah al-Hijaz, a radical Shiite group operating in Arabia and

linked to Iran was suspected of involvement in this attack. 52
During the spring of 2011, several demonstrations in the Eastern Province
took place with the protesters demanding the release of prisoners. 53 The most
recent unrest in the province took place in October 2011, when, according to the
BBC, quoting Saudi state media, fourteen people were injured in clashes.
It should be stressed that the Shiites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia
and their coreligionist neighbours in Bahrain are among the oldest Muslim
communities and are linked by blood ties. The mutual relationship between
these two communities is extremely important for the constantly changing links
and relationships between the various actors in the Persian Gulf and for the
future stability of the region.
The threat to the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and also indirectly to the interests of
the United States and other Western countries, is also the most likely reason that
the administration of President Obama refused to condemn the Saudi military
ventures in Bahrain. “The New York Times” quoted White House spokesman Jay
52
It should be pointed out that the involvement of Shia in this attack has been
questioned. See G. Porter, Investigating Khobar Towers: How a Saudi Deception Protected
bin Laden, Inter Press Service, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47312.
53
On February 16, 2011 the Shiites staged a small protest in the town of al-Awamiyah.
On February 25, 2011 residents of al-’Awamiyah held a silent vigil the same day calling
for the release of the so-called “Forgotten Prisoners,” nine Shia Saudis detained without
charge or trial for over 12 years. On March 3, 2011 about 100 people, mostly men and one
group of women, staged small protests in two towns of the Eastern Province. On March 4,
2011 more than 100 protesters march through the city of al-Hofuf to demanding the
release of Shiite cleric Tawfiq al-Amir. On March 9, 2011 at least three people are injured
after police fired in the air to disperse protesters in Qatif. Around 600–800 protesters, all
Shia and including women, took to the streets of the city to demand the release of nine
Shia prisoners. On March 11, 2011 around 500 protesters demonstrated in the cities of al-
Hofuf, al-Ahsa and al-Awamiyah. Hundreds of protesters rallied on March 17, 2011 to
show solidarity with their fellow Shiites in Bahrain. On April 8, 2011 hundreds of Saudi
Shiites protested in the city of Qatif demanding the withdrawal of the Saudi troops from
neighbouring Bahrain and political rights and freedoms at home. Sporadic protests by
Saudi Shiite took place throughout 2011 and 2012 – see for example reports by Amnesty
International and from the United Nations Human Rights Council. According to Arab
Times, hundreds of Saudi Shiites staged peaceful protests on April 1, 2013 in support of
Shiites in Bahrain and political freedoms at home. When protests began, demonstrators
called for reforms. But now, younger militants demand elimination of the monarchy and
an end to the US policy of supporting the Saudi ruling family.
Carney saying “this is not the invasion of the country.” 54 This official position of
the U.S. administration, however, is open to charges of hypocrisy, because the
United States supported the demands of unarmed demonstrators in Egypt and
Tunisia, and supported the rebels in Libya.
The Saudis believe the Iranians plan a long-planned game to use Bahrain as
a springboard to destabilize this very sensitive area. Already at the beginning
of the riots in March 2011, following the revolutions in Egypt, Saudi activists
proclaimed the Day of Rage in the Eastern Province during which, hundreds
of Shiites demonstrated against the Saudi authorities. Just as in Bahrain, there
is deep dissatisfaction among more than two million Shiites in Saudi Arabia,
who are on the margins of economic and socio-political life. Their demands and
expectations are of course open to exploitation. Saudi Arabia is deeply afraid of
possible “fragmentation” – the parcelling of its territory and also its oil and gas
wealth without which the kingdom loses its significance.
Iranian politicians are far from shy and openly expressed their desire to
conquer Bahrain. Several times in recent years they have called Bahrain the
14th province of Iran. In July 2007, the semi-official “Kayhan” newspaper ran an
editorial that asserted the Iranian claim to Bahrain. It called Bahrain, “a province
of Iran”, ready for reunification with the “native land”. 55
In February 2009, this claim was repeated by Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, a close
advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei Hosseini. Iran bases its claim
on the period in the nineteenth century when in 1830, Sheikh Abdul Al Khalifeh
declared his submission to the Shah Fath Ali Shah. Over the next 30 years
Iran has controlled the island. And although the government of Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, renounced these claims in 1970, it would
appear that today the mullah in Iran are clearly nostalgic for the demands of the
nineteenth century.
For the Sunni rulers of Bahrain and its neighbours, it is difficult to forget
that with the onsets of the Iranian revolution in 1979, Bahrain witnessed mass
demonstrations in support of the Islamic revolution, and that the leaders of the
54
D. Sanger, E. Schmitt, U.S.-Saudi Tensions Intensify With Mideast Turmoil, “The
New York Times”, March 14, 2011.
55
K. Sanati, US Presence Fuels Iran-Bahrain Tension, “Asia Times”, July 19, 2007. The
claim was made in an editorial written by Hossein Shariatmadari, who is close to Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Shariatmadari has reiterated that Bahrain is an integral
part of Iran that was taken from it in a Western plot on September 4, 2007.
Shiites in Bahrain, demanded that their state, like Iran, be proclaimed an Islamic
Republic.
Iran supports its claims to Bahrain through actions. In the 1970s Tehran
bolstered the establishment of a radical Shiite Islamist organization – the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB). It is alleged that the IFLB
was involved in a coup attempt in December 1981. According to Bahraini
sources, “An Iranian-trained team of Shiite Bahrainis were to simultaneously
attack telecommunications services and Bahrain’s airport and assassinate key
members of the Al Khalifa regime. In the ensuing chaos, Iran would send in its
military and establish a new theocratic regime similar to its own.” 56 Indeed, in
1981 the government of Bahrain announced the discovery of a conspiracy led
by the IFLB, which aimed at the overthrow of the government in Manama and
the establishment of the “Islamic Republic”. A group of the Shia from Bahrain
and other parts of the Gulf, reportedly trained in Iran, was supported during the
overthrow attempt by an Iranian hovercraft. 57 A number of persons were arrested
in 1987 in another plot linked to Iran. In June 1996, fifty one Bahrainis were
arrested and charged with plotting against the government. They were accused
of being members of “Hizballah” trained and armed in an Iranian-backed plot. 58
The importance of the “Hizballah plot” as an attempt to overthrow the Bahraini
regime has been largely dismissed by the Shiite observers and the Sunni liberals.
Apparently, the number and type of weapons found by the security forces was
“hopelessly inadequate to start a revolution or even to stand up to Bahrain
security forces.” 59 In December 2008, fourteen people were arrested on suspicion
of planning a series of terror attacks against commercial centres, diplomatic
missions and nightclubs in Bahrain.
Again in 2010 Bahraini authorities arrested hundreds of Shiites, some local
and some foreign, and accused them of taking part in a conspiracy of preparing
attacks in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The purpose of this conspiracy
56
http://manamapress.net/?p=4148.
57
IFLB infrastructure was badly damaged during the government’s crackdown in
1981 and 1982. Several of its members were imprisoned. The groups influence on political
developments in Bahrain has diminished substantially over time. At present the IFLB has
little support among the senior Bahraini clergy and only some measure of street support.
Its leadership remains based in Iran.
58
The Bahraini Hizballah were established in 1985 with the help of Iranian cleric
Hojjat ol-Eslam Hadi al-Madrasi and are reputed to have operated in coordination with
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force.
59
G. Fuller, R. Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims, New York 1999, p. 135.
was the “planning and execution of a campaign of violence, intimidation

and subversion”. In February 2011, Bahrain put on trial 23 people accused of
belonging to a “terror network” aimed at overthrowing the government. Iran
was accused of participating in preparing the actions of this network.
Conclusions
Iran has for a very long time cultivated a covert strategy in the Persian Gulf
states, particularly in Bahrain, but also elsewhere in the Arab world, that has
helped to advance the Shia unrest, including the revolt in the Spring of 2011. The
Iranian strategy is primarily based on the special relationship between the most
powerful Shia country and the Shia co-religionists in the Middle East, the Gulf
region and the Arabian Peninsula. Iran has sought to harness the support of large
sections of the Shia community in certain Gulf Arab states, as a means to back
Iranian political and strategic objectives. 60 “Iran’s role as a source of weapons,
training and ideological support had thus become central to the most radical
Shiite groups in a struggle in which it was difficult for the Shia to avoid being
dragged into the vortex of broader… struggle whether they liked it or not”. 61
The action of the GCC states led by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Al Khalifa
ruling family in Bahrain has substantially limited the options available to Iran
in terms of being able to sustain the momentum of Shia unrest in eastern Arabia.
While it appears that Saudi Arabia, at least for now, won the battle for Bahrain,
its success in other areas of the proxy conflict with Iran are much smaller. Iranian-
backed Hezbollah in the past three years, has become a political force in Lebanon
intended role of power broker in the country. Lebanese government, backed by
Saudi Arabia, was paralyzed for many months. Long Saudi Arabia mediation
attempt failed and in January 2011, Hezbollah has withdrawn participation in
the government forcing him to resign. Resignation of the government in Beirut,
not only emphasized the importance of Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors, but
also undermined the importance of efforts and the efforts of Saudi Arabia in the
region.
As a result of sectarian violence in Iraq, thousands of the Sunnis were killed
and tens of thousands of refugees were forced to emigrate to neighbouring
countries, Europe and Canada. President Obama’s intention to withdraw U.S.
60
M. Alani, GCC-Iran Relations: The Encounter in Bahrain and Beyond, GRC
Analysis, October 24, 2011.
61
G. Fuller, R. Rahim Francke, op.cit., p. 126.
troops from Iraq before the end of 2011 also lies the danger of invasion of Iran,
which is likely to lead to direct conflict between the two countries.
The basis of King Abdullah II assumption of the “Shia crescent” are divided
loyalties of the Arab Shia and the utility of these to Iran. There is little evidence
of the these divided loyalties. The great majority of the Shia communities in the
Arab states have not deviated from loyalty to their own country and to their Arab
identity. “Indeed, they have never suffered from a conflict of loyalties because, in
short, they have no other loyalty superseding that to their country and to their
Arab national belonging.” 62
The case of the Shia in the so called Shia crescent is primarily one of a group of
people claiming the civil and human rights that are available to their co-citizens.
Ever since the success of the Iranian revolution, the Teheran regime has
persistently claimed to be protector and promoter of the Shia interests outside
its borders. Unfortunately, the Sunni majority states allowed these claims to
go unchallenged. As long as the Shia are marginalised, treated as second class
citizens and vilified as infidels in their own countries, the Tehran regime would
have call on its claims of protection of their co-religionists.
“Over time and particularly today, this self-proclaimed status of Iran as
the leader and protector of the Arab Shia has turned into the main instrument
of Iranian interventionist policy in internal Arab affairs.” 63 To eradicate this
claim and to undermine the international threat of Iran it is best to change the
dynamics of internal Sunni politics.
The rise of the Shia power in Bahrain where the US Fifth Fleet is based, in the
strategically important south Lebanon, and the oil producing power house of the
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is primarily reflection of domestic policies of
those countries. These policies that contained the potential for the Shia to think
as a community and allowed them to see themselves as a community not only
for historical but most importantly for political reasons. It is safe to assume that
in the future within each country the Shia will ultimately demand larger access
to power and the Sunnis will ultimately resist it.
62
M. Alani, op.cit.
63
Ibidem.
Bar tos z B ojar c z yk

University of Maria Curie-Sklodowska in Lublin, Poland
IRAN ON THE CROSSROADS
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been facing several important
challenges to its security. Advanced nuclear programme, which is a source of
conflict with Western powers, and rapid regional developments (Iraq, Egypt,
Afghanistan and mainly Syria) have put that state into a very fragile or even
dangerous position. International economic isolation (US, European and
the United Nations’ sanctions lately) brought Iran to the edge of economic
surveillance. Deep, structural economic crisis that was worsened by international
sanctions is devastating the daily life of the Iranians and may serve as a good
pretext for social unrests. Tehran has limited its room for manoeuvre with
regard to the sanctions and it urgently needs to implement radical changes
into its economy. On the political level, the election of new president – Hassan
Rouhani ended the conflict between the main political figures and groups in
Iran, but the status quo is still very fragile and in the near future we may expect
new developments inside the Iranian decision-making centre.
Key words
Iran, crisis, security, Middle East, conflict
1. Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran is on the crossroads, both internally and externally.
In domestic arena, Iran faces few very serious challenges that may undermine
the security of the fragile socio-political and economic systems, or even may
result in deep and fundamental changes of its primary outlook. The most crucial
issues are related to the economic situation of Iran. The oil sanctions that were
imposed by the Western countries (mainly the USA, the EU, and their allies)
have already took effect and caused considerable problems for Iran. Its economy
was already in difficult position and the latest sanctions have hit it quite badly.
The combination of oil, financial, and banking sanctions drove Iran into terrible
46 B ar to s z B ojar c z y k
condition and there is no noticeable hope for the economic resurrection.

However, the economic challenge is now directly related to the international
position of Iran, but there is an urgent need for fundamental and long term, as
well as very costly and painful (for the society) reforms. Economic situation,
or rather the further economic decline, may result in social unrests that would
easily turn into state-wide turbulence. Breaking out of economic isolation or the
economic containment imposed by the Western powers may be only achieved
through political dialogue, mainly on the nuclear programme.
On the international level, Iran is under direct threat of military intervention
aimed at stopping or slowing down its nuclear programme. It looks like the near
future may bring final developments in the ongoing conflict with the Western
powers, mainly the USA and their regional ally – Israel. Washington has to deal
with the Iranian issue quickly and military action is promoted not only by Israel,
but also by influential parts of the American establishment. Therefore, the top
figures of the Iranian regime need to decide how they want to resolve that conflict
and what conditions need to be fulfilled in order to bring it to the negotiation
table. The Western powers are quite tired of the Iranian ducking game and will
push into final solution whatever it may be. Regional developments, like the two
regime changes in Egypt, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, the very fragile Iraqi
securitization processes, revolts in Arab states, and, most importantly, the civil
war in Syria, make Iran more powerful in the short-time perspective, but each of
them may easily become very dangerous for Iran’s security. The conflict with the
USA and their allies plays an important role in shaping and cementing Iranian
domestic system, it but can not be used forever to that purpose. Moreover, it
looks like the limit has been already reached, and new developments will follow
with all the consequences. The main question for today is what will be the future
of Iran if Syria fell apart under foreign intervention combined with internal
struggle (the Libya scenario).
2. Internal Dimensions
The Iranian political system, described by its founding fathers as an Islamic

Republic, is very awkward and complicated in its unique nature. Iran is the only
state where the clergymen (in this case the Shia ones) has so much impact, or
rather play a crucial role within it. Political Shiism, the doctrine of which was
shaped by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, became a base for Iranian socio-political
system and until now that state is the only theocratic republic in the world. In
Iran on the Crossroads 47
practice, the constitution adopted in 1980 legitimised centralisation of most

religious, political, and economical powers in the hands of the Supreme Leader 1.
However, the newly established republican system divided the powers among
three fundamental branches and found political bodies like the parliament, the
government, the president, the guardian council, and others, but, in practice, it
was Khomeini, who, with his inner circle, was responsible for the structure and
policies of the state. The situation changed in late 1989, when the constitution
was revised and later developments resulting from Khomeini’s death. His close
associates had to reorganize the system and divide the powers among themselves
to keep the achievements of revolution and sustain the stability and security
of the system. Thus, this very fragile and interdependent system (among key
regime figures) came into being in late 1980-s and continues to exist. According
to K. M. Polack, the Iranian regime is one of the most fragmented governments
in the world 2. The existence of overlapping institutions and the informal system,
parallel to the constitutional one and based on key personalities, bring a lot of
misunderstandings and uncommonness to the analysis of the Iranian decision-
making processes. “The system is a composite of key personalities, their informal
networks and relationship with other individuals and power centers, and the
institutions with which these personalities are associated.” 3 Iran’s political system
is a mixture of republicanism and theocracy, where institutions, personalities,
and family connections alternate on political and economical levels.
During the 1980s, under the supervision of Ayatollah Khomeini two factions
were shaping Iranian system – the traditional conservatives and the Islamic
leftists. After his death, the revolutionary figures like Khamanei, Rafsanjani,
Mahdavi-Kani, Karrubi, Yazdi, Jannati, and many others constructed the
system where none of the factions was able to obtain a dominant position. Such
an informal system of checks and balances worked pretty well, where formal
and informal relations were aimed to secure the system and conduct day-to-day
politics. The end of a longstanding war with Iraq brought an urgent need for
economical reconstruction and stabilization of its international position. The
revolutionary approach to the external environment has mostly failed and Iran
1
L. Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs 1982, p. 99.
2
K.M. Polack, Iran: Three Alternative Futures, “Middle East Review of International
Affairs” 2006, No. 2, p. 75.
3
Mullahs, Guards, and Bonayads. An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics,
D.E. Thaler, A. Nader, S. Chubin, J.D. Green, Ch. Lynch, F. Wehrey (eds.), RAND-National
Defense Research Institute 2010, p. XIII.
needed to reorient its strategy and put emphasis on more moderate policies. In
1989, Khamanei became the Supreme Leader and Rafsanjani took the president’s
office. That brought balance to the system and was advantageous for the stability
of the state. During the period of normalisation (of external relations) and
reconstruction (of economy) in the years 1989–1997, the old revolutionary guards
served as a main faction and shared the responsibility to maintain the system in
an acceptable shape. Pragmatism and national interests have overwhelmed the
revolutionary rhetoric and the current fragmented system has been established
at that time 4.
The election of President Mohammad Khatami in 1997 was widely perceived
as a signal of opening and democratization of Iran. New strategy of détente in
international relations and more moderate domestic policies have raised a lot
of hopes for the possible evolution of the system. New parties like the Islamic
Participation Party of Iran, the Servants of Reconstruction, and the 2nd Khordad
Movement were the main bases for ongoing reforms. Leftist orientation aimed
for gradual evolution of closed system was slowly changing the Iranian realities.
A limited liberalism was applied at the social, political, and economic levels
and full reconciliation with the regional and international players was taking
place. During the first term of office of President Khatami, Iran shifted to a very
moderate stance and it looked like the final rapprochement would be possible.
Unfortunately, regional and global developments, especially related to the war
on terror (after 9/11), active penetration of the Middle East system by the USA,
collapse of peace process, war in Afghanistan, and occupation of Iraq have
resulted in a dramatic shift in the Iranian internal affairs. New challenges to the
security of Iran caused radicalisation on the domestic level. The ongoing changes
have been aborted and the so called hardliners once again came to power.
External developments, once again, have brought the conservative (radical)
faction into power. They were able to win the parliamentary election in 2004 and
their candidate Mahmood Ahmadinejad has won the presidential election in
2005. That radicalisation of the Iranian political scene was a direct answer for the
growing external insecurity, mainly connected with the US military offensive in
the surrounding regions. The US confrontational attitude towards Iran under
the administration of President G. Bush completely ruined the possibility of
normalization in the bilateral relations. Iran has stiffened its position and moved
into very harsh regional activities. Of course, both states resolved some issues
4
H. Hassan-Yari, Iranian Foreign Policy in the Postwar Era [in:] Iranian Perspectives
on the Iran – Iraq War, F. Rajaee (ed.), Gainesville 1997.
thanks to informal cooperation (Afghanistan and Iraq), but the conflict raised
even more, and the case of Iran’s nuclear programme as well as its support for
the radical Islamic organizations (Hezbollah and Hamas) became primary
sources of conflict. Between 2004 and 2009, the co called opposition movement
was cracked down in Iran and the final battle took place after the controversial
presidential election in 2009. The “Green movement” led by Mir Hossein
Mousavi, Mahdi Karroubi, and the Khatami brothers was not able to extort fair
results from the regime, which led to street violence and civil unrest. The hopes
for peaceful evolution were lost and the regime emphasised its own surveillance
rather than acceptance of the people’s will.
There were no dramatic changes within the system and the surveillance of
it was not shaken. We have to understand that “opposition” leaders are the long
time servants of revolution and they were not proposing serious changes in
the Iran’s socio-political system. The developments of 2009 resulted from the
regime’s internal struggle between the opposing factions. It was the struggle
between the leftists and conservatives; the latter were directly supported by the
Supreme Leader, which was crucial for their victory. It seems that the opposition
movement, connected with liberalization of internal and foreign policies, was
decisively crushed down and their leaders were put into house arrest. The shift
on the domestic scene, from rivalry between the leftist and conservatives into
internal struggle on the right side of Iranian political scene, drove into very
dangerous situation. During the 1980s and 1990s the factional balance system
was composed of the Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution
and the Militant Clergy Association (and the earlier mentioned supporters
of Khatami) on the one hand, and the Militant Clergy Association and the
Coalition of Islamic Associations on the other 5. In the 21st century, the leftists
lost their power and the system was overwhelmed by the conservative or radical
right factions. It has shaken the equilibrium of the Iranian “republican” system
and new conflicts grew up in connection to the domination of the conservatives.
The main shift in the top political circle began between 2004 and 2005,
when conservatives took Majlis (2004) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became
President. Neoconservatives, or principalists, as they were later called, came to
the top structures as a result of the declining position of reformists. They are
a new generation politicians, fairly religious, supported by the Supreme Leader,
W. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic,
5
Washington 2000, Chapter 1 and 2.

and often with background in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 6. They
were perceived by the Khamanei as the answer to the international challenges
and they served as great supporters of Iran’s confrontational position. They were
able to unite and organise themselves in the begging of the century and for ten
years they have played a dominant role in the formal/constitutional institutions.
That faction, with the praise from the Supreme Leader, practically disabled
the reformist movement and only the former president Hashami Rafsanjani
defended some of his power. Lately, his three children were arrested, which may
be understood as a harsh attack not only on him, but also on his supporters 7.
Other leaders of the leftist/reformist factions are under house arrest, like Karrubi
and Mousavi, or kept away from governmental or influential positions. However,
the principalists did not remain cohesive, and soon after monopolisation of the
power, there was a split between them. Ahmadinejad, with the support of top
military and intelligence commanders, started to implement a modified vision
of the state. The fact that he sought independency and his international activity
were seen as very dangerous and brought Khamanai’s disappointment. The
great economic crisis that hit Iran (sanctions) complicated his position even
more. Since early 2010 (when his close associates were accused of corruption),
Ahmadinejad’s powers were declining up to the election in 2013, which he lost
in a rather humiliating manner. Different approach to Iranian polity, seeking an
independent role, and economic difficulties broke his power and he was left out.
The other group of neoconservatives are the circle of the chosen “youngsters”
close to the Supreme Leader. The most prominent is the Larijani family, of
which one of two brothers is the Chief Justice and the second is the Speaker of
Parliament. But, also Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel (Khamanei’s son in law), Saeed
Jalili, and many others form that “power keeping” party are directly chosen and
secured by the Supreme Leader. Together with the old revolutionary guards
they keep the Islamic Republic in traditional ways, shaping state’s policies, and
managing the economy. Khamanei controls the Parliament, the judiciary, the
Guardian Council, and most of the military and paramilitary forces (existing
independently to the IRGC) what makes his associates very strong, not only
politically. Huge wealth located in religious foundations (bonayads) and family
connected businesses gives them power over the existing and possible opposition.
6
Mullahs…, op.cit., pp. 40–46.
7
N. Bozorgmehr, Rafsanjani’s Son Released on Bail in Iran, “Financial Times”
December 17, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a44a440-484e-11e2-8aae-00144feab49a.
html.
The presidential election of 2013, won by Hassan Rouhani might be seen by

the international community as a sign of Iran’s moderation, but not much has
happened in the internal affairs as yet. New president is a longstanding associate
of Ayatollah Khamanei, he even served as chief negotiator with the Western
powers. In his inauguration speech, he called for moderation and wisdom, he
promised economic reparation program and called for transparency in nuclear
negotiations 8. It looks like the Supreme Leader has chosen Rouhani to manage
economic crisis and to negotiate with international community because of his
clean history of public service. The need for internal changes, mainly on the
economic level, and promises of political reconciliation gave Rouhani victory. He
was also supported by the old reformists and his cabinet is fairly multi-factional.
He appointed Eshaq Jahangiri as First Vice-President, and Bijan Zanganeh as
the Minister if Petroleum (both were close allies of Mohammad Khatami), but
mainly invited conservatives and technocrats to form the government 9. The new
president meets difficult challenges at the beginning of his term, with the Syrian
civil war, the upcoming US-led military conflict, the economic crisis, and the
international nuclear conflict on top of them.
The political situation in Iran is in gridlock, and the conservative faction
mostly related to the Supreme Leader is the most powerful one. On the political
level, it looks like the need of counterbalancing the leftist/reformist faction was
again realized by Khamanei and his supporters; perhaps a new wave of moderate
politicians will approach top institutions in the near future. The other power is
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps which grew in military and economic
importance in the last decade. They would like to enter the decision-making
process, not only in advisory and limited character, and they have been securing
their growing interests through legal institutions not related to military issues 10.
So, for today we may recognise at least four main factions within the Iranian
politics, but the whole system is controlled by the office of the Supreme Leader.
We may see some fundamental changes only when Khamanei leaves politics,
8
Rouhani Calls for Moderation in First Speech as President-Elect, BBC, August 4,
2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23565996.
9
S.K. Dehghan, Iran’s Parliament Approves 15 of Hassan Rouhani’s 18 Cabinet
Ministers, “The Guardian” August 15, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
aug/15/iran-middleeast; Iran’s Rouhani Appoints Reformist as Top Deputy, “The Big
Story” August 5, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/irans-rouhani-appoints-reformist-
top-deputy.
10
B. Hourcade, The Rise to Power of Iran’s ‘Guardians of the Revolution’, “Middle East
Policy” 2009, No. 3, pp. 61–63.
but it would mean his death. On the other hand, the internal situation of Iran
is influenced by external developments, mainly arising from conflicts with the
Western powers over its nuclear programme (up to the level of open military
confrontation) and from insecurity or conflicts of regional neighbours. Further
isolation or active containment of Iran may only worsen its internal situation,
which most probably will lead to radicalization of the Iranian politics.
3. External Variables
Like it was already stated, right now Iran is in a very difficult international position.
The long term (political, ideological, religious, and strategic in its essence) conflict
with the United States reached the level of a possible military intervention in Iran.
Washington accuses Tehran of supporting terrorist organizations and, what is
the most important, of working on nuclear weapons development. There are also
other concerns, like violation of human and citizen rights, spreading the radical
Shia ideology and the anti-American propaganda, and more, but the first two are
the most prominent accusations. External Iranian difficulties became even more
complicated when the Arab Spring shaken the Middle East. The regime changes
in Egypt, the evolution of Israeli position, the revolt in Bahrain, the civil conflict
in Syria, the permanent Iraqi insecurity, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and
the Yemeni conflict are just a few major concerns that the Iranian regime must
react to. The regional position of Iran is contained and actively opposed by the
US (and its allies), which hold a dominant position in regional security system.
As A. Ehteshami said, the 9/11 attacks gave the USA a perfect pretext to extend
its influence over the Middle East to a dominant or even hegemonic position 11.
Such an active US involvement naturally hurts Iranian interests and serves as
a source of constant conflict for the Ayatollahs.
The main reason of Iran’s international problems is its nuclear programme.
Because of advanced uranium enrichment capabilities and accusation of building
a nuclear bomb, Iran became the target of the US, its allies’ and international
sanctions. They are not only political, but lately a set of economic sanctions hurt
Iran a lot. The embargo on oil and shipment, isolating its financial, insurance,
and energy sectors, as well as basically banning transfer of new technologies were
the main ones imposed on Iran in the 21st century. The most serious sanctions
11
A. Ehteshami, Globalization and Geopolitics In the Middle East. Old Games, New
Rules, London–New York 2009, pp. 69–70.
were adopted together with the US allies after 2010, when the Western powers
finally decided to support US policy of active containment toward Iran 12. Tehran
probably works on building a nuclear bomb, which is quite rational for many
analysts, considering the dominant and aggressive US attitude towards Iran
over the last three decades. Obtaining a nuclear weapon fits into the resistance
doctrine adopted in the 21st century, shaped under the rule of neoconservatives as
an answer to a growing isolation and insecurity of Iran, mainly related to the US
regional activity 13. Moreover, Despite the fact that Iran denies these accusations
and the Supreme Leader stated many times that Iran would not build and use
nuclear weapons, the international community is quite aware of Iran’s growing
nuclear capabilities. It is the reason why the USA and its coalitionist try to stop
Iran from breaking the NPT regime, which would jeopardize Western interests
in the region and naturally increase Tehran’s power and security. The set of the
latest economic sanctions deeply damages Iranian economy and jeopardize its
daily life. As it was stated in August 2013 by the Iranian Expediency Council
Chairman (and former president) Hashemi Rafsanjani: “We are besieged, under
sanctions and boycott. We cannot use our resources, we cannot sell our oil, and
if we do sell it, we cannot get the money transferred to us. If we buy anything,
we must pay extra. We must pay extra in order to have the money transferred
to us” 14. There is still a chance that Iran’s new president would reach the USA
12
New Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Department of State, November 21, 2011, http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177609.htm; United States Welcomes European Union
Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Department of State, January 23, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2012/01/182350.htm; Increasing Sanctions Against Iran, U.S. Department of
State, July 12, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194924.htm; Deal Struck to
Tighten Sanctions against Iran, “The New York Times” July 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.
com, [access: 31.07.2012]. For deep analysis of sanctions that were imposed on Iran see:
K. Katzman, Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress July 16,
2012, Congressional Research Service, http://www.crs.gov.
13
M. Eisenstadt, Religious Ideologies, Political Doctrines, and Iran’s Nuclear
Decisionmaking [in:] Nuclear Fatwa. Religion and Politics in Iran’s Proliferation Strategy,
M. Eisenstadt, M. Khalaji (eds.), “Policy Focus” 2011, No. 115, pp. 5–8, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/
pubs/PolicyFocus115.pdf [access: 14.05.2013].
14
Y. Mansharof, E. Kharrazi, The Struggle Between Khamanei and Rafsanjani Over
the Iraniab Leadership – Part III, “Inquiry & Analysis Series Report” 2013, No. 1014, p. 1,
The Middle East Media Research Institute, http://www.memri.org/report/en/print7389.
htm [access: 03.09.2013].
and open new chapter in negotiations, but the situation would be clearer after
Washington decides on actions against Syria.
Iran’s international stance is greatly affected by unstable situation in
neighbour and regional states and is mainly shaped in opposition to the US
dominance in the Middle East. Tehran is surrounded by a circle of instability
just outside its borders. Close attention is paid to the situation in Iraq, where,
after the withdrawal of US forces, situation is still very tense and a full-scale civil
conflict may occur anytime. Right now, Iran is probably the most influential
external power in Iraq 15. During long stabilisation process in Iraq, Tehran was
able to build its influences not only on the political level, but also on the social
and economic ones. Security, territorial integrity, and material development
of Iraq are supported by the Iranian leaders, but they would like to maintain
their significant influence over the Iraqi polity and daily life. With the ongoing
nation-building process in Iraq, the position of Iran is somewhat declining, but
it still has the power to destabilise it by activating the Shia militias 16. The best
example of Iranian power and influence was shown lately, when Tehran sent
arms to Syria using Iraqi airspace and no one could do anything about it 17. To
maintain a stable, but a pro-Iran oriented Iraq is in the interest of Ayatollahs,
but if under attack or under harmful international pressure, they may use their
influence to jeopardize the security of that state.
The longstanding conflict in Afghanistan, additionally decreased the level of
Iranian external security. On one hand, Iran supports NATO military struggle
because the Taliban are the bitter enemy of Tehran, but on the other hand, it
would like to see the USA to be humiliated in that conflict, like it was the case
with the USSR. The position of Iran in Afghanistan is growing, especially in
the central and western provinces, where Iran trough huge money transfers is
15
E. Sky, Iran Has Strong Influence in Iraq, “The New York Times” March 20, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/19/the-iraq-war-was-it-worth-it/ten-
years-after-the-iraq-war-irans-influence-is-strong [access: 17.07.2013].
16
M.R. Gordon, A.W. Lehren, Leaked Reports Detail Iran’s Aid for Iraqi Militias,
“The New York Times” October 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/
middleeast/23iran.html [access: 23.10.2012]; K. Katzman, Iran’s Activities and Influence
in Iraq. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress June 4, 2009, Congressional
Research Service, http://www.crs.gov, pp. 6–8.
17
M.R. Gordon, Iran Supplying Syria Military via Iraqi Airspace, The New York
Times September 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/world/middleeast/iran-
supplying-syrian-military-via-iraq-airspace.html [access: 05.09.2012].
trying to buy influence over the Afghani polity and decrease the position of the
USA and its allies 18. However, if NATO would withdraw from Afghanistan, most
probably that state will fell down once again to the Taliban and that would end
the current Iranian influences.
The most important factor for the international position of Iran, right now,
is the evolution of the Syrian civil conflict. The possible military intervention,
which has been lately promoted by the USA after chemical weapons were used
on August 21, 2013 in the Syrian war, will directly endanger Iran’s position and
destroy its only ally state in the Middle East. The close cooperation between
Iran and Syria has been gradually built since 1979, but after the fall of Saddam
Hussein regime the cooperation speed up to the level of a strategic alliance 19.
The main common interests of those two states are: cooperation in Lebanon
(support for Hezbollah), containment of Israel and constant support for
Palestinians, restraining American and Western influences within the Middle
East (e.g. in Iraq), and developing close economic and financial relations 20.
Syrian civil conflict has surprised the Iranian leaders, but they decided to fully
back Assad’s regime, by providing military, economic, and political support. But
the long term and very bloody war in Syria creates real dilemmas for Tehran.
It is rather unlikely that Iran will be able to take a decisive and military action
if Syria becomes a victim to the Western (US) military intervention. Iran has
no military means to support Syria, and deep economic crisis does not allow
Tehran to send sufficient help to the Syrian government. Only the option of
activating Hezbollah and Shia militants across the region remain, but Tehran
needs to be very careful about inflaming the Middle East territories, because, in
the strategic sense, it may decrease its regional position and bring actions from
regional powers, as well as from the Western ones. Therefore, Iranian leaders are
pushing for a diplomatic solution, opposing any military intervention in Syria,
18
D. Filkins, Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful, “The New York
Times” October 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/asia/24afghan.
html [access: 24.10.2010].
19
J.M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional
Environment, “Ortadoğu Etütleri” 2013, No. 2, pp. 46–49, http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/
enUploads/Article/Files/201331_makale2.pdf.
20
Syria i Iran zacieśniają stosunki [Syria and Iran Strengthen Relations], Onet,
October 2, 2010, http://biznes.onet.pl/syria-i-iran-zaciesniaja-stosunki,0,3709760,onet-
wiadomosci-detal [access: 02.10.2010].
and calling for international negotiations. Iran supports Assad’s regime and is
backing Russian activities aimed at preventing any attack on Syria 21.
The Iranian Supreme Leader, as well other politicians and top military
commanders, predict that the possible Western intervention in Syria would
damage the USA forces, destabilize Israel’s security, and may spill over into
other hotspots of the Middle East region 22.
If the USA and some European states decide to strike Syria, Iran’s position
would be jeopardized even more. Attack on Syria may be understood as a prelude
to a bigger action directed to break Iranian policy and end nuclear conflict.
Iranian leaders are in difficult position, because is Syria falls, Iran would be
a new possible target of military intervention aimed at democratising Iran, or
rather at breaking its confrontational posture.
4. Conclusions
Iran is not cohesive politically and we may observe a gradual decline of the
Ayatollah’s power over the state. New factions are competing with the old ones
for power within the systemic boundaries, but soon those centralised fluctuations
may slip out of the old guards’ hands. It looks like the political stability of Iran
is mainly related to the position of Ali Khamanei as the Supreme Leader and
his unilateral decisions of the divine rulership. Taking under consideration
the age and rumours about Khamanei’s bad health, we may expect harsh and
unpredictable struggle for total power after his death. Iran’s stability and security
is also questioned by the developments on international level. Long term conflict
over the nuclear programme, together with rapid changes in the regional security
system (Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan) may result in international intervention.
It looks like the USA is eager to reorganize the Middle East according to its
own vision and Iran is one of the main obstacles on the way. There are just
two options for Iran. Either it will find a way to negotiate a “big deal” with
international community and moderate its policies, or it will become the place
21
E. Benari, Putin and Rouhani: Intervention in Syria is Unacceptable, “Israel
National News” August 29, 2013, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.
aspx/171388 [access: 03.09.2013].
22
Iran: If Syria Is Attacked, It Will Strike U.S., Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Israel,
As Well As E.U. Interests, Israel Will Be Destroyed. Special Dispatch No. 5429, The Middle
East Media Research Institute, August 30, 2013, http://www.memri.org/report/en/7386.
htm [access: 05.09.2013].
of a next military intervention. The longstanding status quo of Iran is reaching

its limits and Tehran is already badly damaged by international sanctions what
makes it already rather worn out. It looks like the confrontational posture has
brought great dangers for Iran, but the Iranian leaders may still opt for a peaceful
solution by changing their policies and aggressive orientation. The ball is on
their side, but the tension is growing and it may result in a great disaster for the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
F eride A sli Er gül Jor g en s en

Ege University, Turkey
TURKEY’S “NEW” MIDDLE EAST

OR MORE OF THE SAME
ABSTRACT
Turkey’s Middle East policy has been changed a lot in time but the most
dramatic one has happened during the reign of the AKP government. As the
political Islam tendency in Turkey has evolved, the economic, political and
cultural relations with the Middle East have developed in parallel. Besides, the
Turkish democracy, which seems to solve its problems with Islam, is shown
by some people as a “model” for the Middle Eastern countries. It is a fact that
the recent Gezi protests in Turkey constitute some doubts about the success of
this model but the impact of AKP’s new foreign policy on the Middle Eastern
politics is clear. With the “zero problems policy” and the “new activism” era in
Turkish foreign policy, Turkey has focused on the Middle East more than ever.
However, to evaluate this change as a complete turn from Turkey’s century-
old westernization and a shift in its identity would be a misreading of the
developments. In fact, this change could be interpreted as another phase in its
strategic foreign policy enriched with an opening to the East. In this context,
this article tries to discuss the new orientation of Turkey upon old grounds in
the Middle East according to its new focus between the regional dynamics and
global actors.
Key words
Turkey, Middle East, regional actor, role model, AKP’s foreign policy, the USA
1. Introduction
The Middle East constitutes a vital region in world politics. Not only the enormous
resources of oil and gas, but also the social, political and religious composition
of the region has been of great importance. The balance in the Middle East is so
fragile that any local or national tension between the Shiite and the Sunni people,
between Israel and Palestine, or between the Kurds and the Turks has a tendency
Turkey’s “New” Middle East or More of the Same 59
to turn into a regional problem. As a matter of fact, the Arab uprisings, which had
started as a local protest in a small village in Tunisia, spread into Egypt, Libya
and the rest of the region in just a few days. Yet, the events were not limited to the
region and the protests spread into many European and American metropolises,
i.e. London, Madrid, and New York. It is noteworthy to mention that the direction
of influence was not from the West to the East, as usual, but from the East to the
West. The events that cascaded through many countries all around the world had
originally started in the Middle East and then became worldwide. Apparently,
the role of the Middle East has slowly shifted from being just a receiver into being
the inspiration for change. In fact, the fire that had been ignited is still burning
in many parts of the world. Moreover, the recent mass movements in Turkey,
Brazil or Bulgaria, which are still going on as this article is being written, look
like extended outcomes of this fire kindled in the Middle East.
Within this context of change, the relations of Turkey with the Middle East
can be best understood according to its transformation from the Ottoman times
to the Republican era, from dismemberment to cooperation, or from being the
role model to something that we do not know yet how to describe. The debate
on the role of Turkey in global affairs has always been deeply connected with
its role in the Middle East. Its relations with individual states in the region and
with the USA, in terms of the American policy towards that region have been
shaping the Turkish foreign policy. The new active strategy of the Turkish foreign
affairs, which had been started by the AKP (the Justice and Development Party)
government, has opened a new path of advanced relations with the Muslim
countries in the Middle East. As Turkey’s social, economic and political relations
with the Arab countries and Iran have developed, new horizons of activity have
opened for the Turkish foreign policy.
The aim of this paper is to analyze this change in Turkey’s Middle East politics
that brings a “new” dimension to enhance a strategic turn into a regional actor.
The new foreign policy of the AKP cannot be solely explained by some identity
issues or a shift of axis; due consideration must be paid to its aim to becoming
a regional actor in the Middle East. The rank of the region has immensely risen
in Turkey’s scope, but it is still far from a break from its western-oriented foreign
policy strategy that focuses on cooperation with the USA in the Middle East
region. Yet, instead of a total change, a more widened and sophisticated regional
foreign policy within the same caliber would be more logical to define this new
circumstances of Turkey.
Instead of reactionary, the new policy of Turkey has locked on being active
and present everywhere in the region. The decades-long dismemberment form
60 F er id e A sli Er g ül J or g en s en
the Arab world seems to be abandoned, but it is still early to declare the success
of Turkey as a role model for democratization and liberalization of the Middle
Eastern states, especially after the Gezi Park protests which brought a bitter
test for the democratic sensitivity of the Turkish government. These events can
be evaluated as the end of dreams about being the “role model” and would be
interpreted as the “Middle Easternization” of Turkey instead, but it can also be
seen as a step required for developing the Turkish political system. If truth be told,
the rhetoric of the AKP about being the apostle of democracy needs to be backed
by active politics in order to be an appreciated example of stability of a state that
is Muslim-oriented, secular and democratic. The way that the AKP deals with
these protests is a new challenge to the Turkish democracy that can elevate it to
the western standards of democracy and unlock the gate towards being a regional
actor which “deserves” to be the “role model” for the Middle East.
To this extent, Turkey’s new foreign policy in the Middle East will be evaluated
and the reasons for this change will be discussed in this article. The intriguing
balance between its approach towards the East and West will be analysed within
the context of Turkey’s new strategic target to become a regional actor. In order
to grasp the picture as a whole, it would be better to start with identifying the
Middle East as a region and then to have look at the history of the relations
between the Middle East and Turkey.
2. The Middle East as a Region: Where to Begin?

In order to analyze these transformations, we first need to place the Middle East
as a region in world politics. As many experts on the Middle East underline,
the region is not easy to define and generalise. Neither its boundaries nor its
actors are clear. The Middle East, although it sounds like that, is much more
than a geographical term. It can also be political, social, religious, or mythical.
Being the Middle, and East of the West, itself is problematic in the first place. The
identity of the region has been carved according to its role in relation to the West.
The boundaries of the region are highly open to discussion and various
definitions are visible in the literature. While Carl Brown 1 (1984) includes the
states which were once under the rule of the Ottoman Empire within the limits
of the Middle East, thus including Israel and Turkey, but excluding Iran and
1
C. Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game,
Princeton 1984.
Morocco, Stephen Walt’s 2 (1987) Middle East excludes Iran, Turkey and the
North African states. Albert Hourani 3 (1991), on the other hand, suggests the
term “Arab world” instead of the Middle East. Michael Barnett 4 (1998) also
believes in the defining feature of Arabism and takes the founding members of
the Arab League: Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, plus
Palestine as the Middle East countries.
It is possible to give many more definitions of the Middle East. Yet, for the
discipline of International Relations to define what really constitutes a region is
a difficult task on its own. To split global affairs into regional zones is severely
complex for the scholars. The difficulty is not limited by the borders, but by
the criteria of being a region. In some regions, historical commonalities can
give that area a regional identity, such as it is in the case of the Balkans. Some
regions can be highly uni-polar and everything in that region can be directly or
indirectly connected to a dominant power. America can be given as an example
of this type of regionalism. In Europe, on the other hand, the balance of power is
highly calibrated to the multi-polarity in many ways, which puts many different
countries forward.
The Middle East is highly contradictory to define as a region, and the same
could be said about the commonalities of the members of that region. Instead of
commonalities, literature on the Middle East mostly highlights antagonism as
the canon. The endless conflicts within the region have been commonly referred
to as a feature of the Middle East. Moreover, unlike many other regions, the
Middle East is open to penetration. The USA, Russia, the EU, and China have
more impact on this region than the countries of the Middle East themselves.
To this extent, regional developments are outcomes of the influences of both the
regional and the global powers.
3. Transformation of Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East

Turkey is a country that is located both in the Middle East and in Europe in terms
of its geography, history, politics and culture. This Eastern-Western duality has
been one of Turkey’s sui generis characteristic. Westernization has been the main
2
S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, New York 1987.
3
A. Hourani, How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?, “International
Journal of Middle East Studies” 1991, No. 2, pp. 125–136.
4
M. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, New York
1998.
drive for the country since the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, whereas
the Islamic and the Middle Eastern dimensions have had a deep impact on
its social and cultural background. While the Western type of modernization
of the country has been introduced as the ultimate goal, social, religious and
psychological landmarks have shown great attachment to the Eastern civilization
and societies. Turkish history is full of this contradiction between becoming
a Western-style nation-state and following its Muslim social instincts. Yet, until
the 1990s the official state policy had insisted upon a total Westernization which
had been the continuation of the modernization project of the last decades in the
Middle East. This trend goes back to the 18th century when the Ottoman Empire
started to lose the battle against the Europeans on the battlefields, but also in
the fields of technology, economy and science. As military defeats, economic
problems and social restlessness were taking the place of the old glorious days of
the Ottoman Empire, the necessity for a change and modernization was widely
accepted among the statesmen and the intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire. As
a matter of fact, modernization and Westernization were used interchangeable,
both of which were referring to catching up with the European powers.
However, the technological and the intellectual gap between the Ottomans and
the modern world was huge. Besides, the already tried and wasted Ottoman
identity was not appealing to the non-Muslim citizens when they compared it
with the independent state promises of the nationalist movement. Hence, the
dissolution of the Empire could not be stopped with these late reform attempts.
On the contrary, the limited freedom of speech and press indirectly accelerated
the collapse 5.
The disengagement between the Turks and the Arabs goes back to the years
of modernization during the Ottoman Empire. As the multi-nationality of the
Empire as a political system did not manage to satisfy the nationalist movements of
the international system, some alternative strategies were introduced by the state
elites to keep the Empire together. Pan-Islamist strategy of Sultan Abdul Hamid
II and the Ottoman nationalism of the Young Turks could not stall the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the Ottoman Turks also failed to introduce an “exit
strategy” from the Middle East. The centralization policies of the Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP, Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) government dramatically
augmented nationalist uprisings in the Empire and also in the Arabic region.
5
M. Belge, Türkiyede Zenofobi ve Milliyetçilik [in:] Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce:
Milliyetçilik, T. Bora (ed.), Istanbul 2003, p. 183.
Under the leadership of Sharif Hussein, the Great Arab Revolt had launched the
disintegration process between the Arabs and the Turks. This process continued
during the rule of Mustafa Kemal, who began pushing modernization towards the
establishment of a nation-state. Meanwhile, the Ottoman dynasty, the Caliphate,
and other institutions were all stripped of power to enforce a secular nation state
regime. Generally speaking, the abolishment of these institutions, especially the
Caliphate, not only did cut ties but also breached the “social contract” between
the Turks and the Muslim territories 6.
During the first years of the Republic (1923–38) under the rule of Mustafa
Kemal, Turkey focused on modernization and Westernization even stronger
than the last epoch of the Ottoman Empire. However, the interest in the Arab
region was highly limited, as the relations with the Middle East began to be
more than just border settlements. Hence, Turkey managed to achieve border
settlement with Iraq over the oil-rich Mosul area in 1926, with Iran in 1932
and with Syria in 1939. There were also some cooperation attempts with Iran,
Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937 (the Sadabat Pact), and with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan
and the United Kingdom in 1955. The relations and agreements, however, were
parts of the Western security system and did not offer Turkey a viable security
assurance. The Cold War years pushed Turkey entirely into the arms of the
West and the security priorities concentrated on the two internal threats: the
Kurdish nationalism and the political Islam 7. The governments generally had
been controlled by the military; secularism and Westernization were the two
important pillars of the state, which should be protected against the threat of the
political Islam and the Kurdish nationalism.
These early years of the Republican Turkey passed mostly under the impact
of the Western type “Orientalism” toward the Middle East that perceived this
region with by a stereotype of inefficiency, superstition, and dubious morals.
It was seen as a backward, conflicted region and considered it as an area to be
cautious of. The imperial memories of betrayal were combined with cautious,
non-interventionist, low-profile approach towards the Arabs. It was only dealt
with in cases when Turkey’s national security was threatened by some forces
connected to this region. Therefore, the early Republican Turkey has kept its
distance and limited its involvement in the Middle East. The mistrust towards
6
A. Ehteshami, S. Elik, Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East,
“Turkish Studies” 2011, No. 4, pp. 643–644.
7
Ibidem, p. 644.
the Arabs was also a part of the state ideology within this security perception 8.
The Cold War strategy of Turkey would bring little change to the Middle East
strategy. Its limited involvement in the region had lacked substance, a consistent
regional scope, and, most importantly, a well-defined discourse. Nevertheless,
the strict Western-oriented foreign policy prevented Turkish foreign policy
makers from adopting an independent neighbourhood policy toward the
Middle East.
Yet, the image of Turkey among the Arabs was far from positive. There
were psychological and political barriers in the Middle Eastern peoples’ views
regarding Turkey which had long been considered the Trojan Horse of American
imperialism in the region. The end of Cold War was far from changing the Arab
public’s “terrible Turk” perception. Let alone diminishing, the negative perception
was strengthened for several reasons: the rise of pan-Turkism in the Turkish
foreign policy and, therefore, activism in Central Asia, military operations in the
Northern Iraq against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), water problems with
the Syrian state, and the growing strategic cooperation with Israel 9.
The loose connections of the Turkish state with the Middle East have been
largely shaken by the 1995 election. The National View has achieved a remarkable
victory together with the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) under the leadership of
Nemettin Erbakan. The earlier mentality of loose connections with the Middle
Eastern states was largely turned upside down by Erbakan’s new government.
As an expected step, Erbakan’s government turned its face mostly to the Middle
Eastern countries and started a new era for the Turkish foreign policy. The
cold relations with the Muslim states were improved and cultivated through
mutual agreements, cultural connections and trade. What is striking, as a Prime
Minister, Erbakan in 1996 made his first official visits to Iran and then to Egypt,
Libya, and Nigeria. Instead of the EU countries or the USA, his priority was set
on the Middle Eastern counties.
When Erbakan’s government remained in power, the discourse of the state
became a critical stand on the Westernization of Turkey. The actors, institutions,
process and objective of westernization were questioned in the name of
authenticity. The impact of Westernization on the character of the state and
society, which were traditionally and culturally under the influence of Islam, was
8
E. Dal, The Transformation of Turkey‘s Relations with the Middle East: Illusion or
Awakening?, “Turkish Studies” 2012, No. 2, p. 247.
9
Ibidem, p. 248.
regarded as a serious problem of Turkey rather than of the West. The National
View Movement believed that historically, culturally and geographically Turkey
did not belong to the West but to the Islamic world 10. Erbakan argued that
“Turkey should cooperate with the Muslim countries through which it can
realize the goal of being a leader, instead of being a servant in the European
Union (EU)” 11.
This change in the attitude has altered the image of Turkey in the eyes of the
Middle Eastern societies. Yet, Erbakan’s harsh criticism of the West and accusing
them as the “mother of all evils” 12 was accepted as a sign for many Arabs that
Turkey had abandoned its distanced foreign policy towards the Islamic countries.
The transformation of Turkey’s Middle East policy has reached its peak with the
government of AKP (Justice and Development Party) after the 2002 elections.
AKP was formed as a more moderate and neo-liberal form of National View
Movement, and inherited its Islamic tendency. The change in the rhetoric was
reinforced by the new government and evolved into a new form of policy, which
is a combination of Islamic tendency, neo-liberal economy and Westernization.
4. New Activism of Turkey and New Presence in the Middle East
The new approach to foreign policy of the AKP government is not a total turnabout
for Turkey. There is continuity between the previous governments and the AKP
in the policy towards the Middle East, however, Erdoğan’s government foreign
policy changes in response to changes in the internal and external dynamics.
The Cold War parameters are no longer defining the geopolitics of Turkey in the
Middle East. Instead of a cautious approach to this region, as during the Interwar
or the Cold War years, Turkey developed a new strategy to be a central country in
the midst of the Afro-Eurasia. The Middle East is seen as a key strategic region in
world politics, in addition to concerns about access to the region’s wide resources
of gas and oil 13. Domestic politics, security and social systems were redefined, as
the new foreign policy discourse of Turkey evolved into a new state policy.
10
I. Dağı, Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West
and Westernization, “Turkish Studies” 2005, No. 6, pp. 24–25.
11
E. Dal, op.cit., p. 249.
12
I. Dağı, op.cit., p. 24.
13
“Turkish Studies” 2011, No. 4, p. 646.
AKP has developed an Islamic language in its dialogue with the Middle
Eastern countries, while it keeps good relations with the USA and Israel in the
region. This pragmatic foreign policy was mostly grounded on the idea of being
a great regional power which has more space in its political, economic and social
environments. In this regard, in addition to being a cultural or a regional partner,
the Middle East has become a new ground for new markets and opportunities
for the AKP government.
The real breakthrough came with the arrival of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the
current minister of foreign affairs, who introduced the “zero problems policy”.
This policy aims to improve and expand Turkey’s relations with its neighbours
by a growing interest to seek solutions to the problems of the country from the
Balkans to the Middle East. It has engendered considerable Turkish involvement
in regional issues, ranging from efforts to mediate between the clashing peoples
and countries in the neighbouring territories. Even if these mediation efforts
have not always ended with success, there is no doubt that it has helped to change
Turkey’s image in the eyes of the Arab world. Turkey has come to be known as
a country that uses a much more soft, multilateral, and cooperative language
than ever 14.
Davutoğlu mentions Turkey as a “central country”, and that its geographic
location cannot permit it to pursue merely reactive policies. Since its security
is closely interconnected with the regional developments that Turkey is a part
of, a proactive policy has to be implemented in order to advance the national
interests and to ensure the state’s survival 15. In his recent article, Davutoğlu
highlights similar points and says “In rejecting a reactionary foreign policy
approach, Turkey develops its positions on regional and international issues
with careful consideration of its own conditions” 16. In fact, when Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave his famous balcony speech after his electoral victory
on June 12, 2011, he declared the continuation of Turkey’s increased engagement
in the Middle East, when he said: “All friendly and brotherly nations from
Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku and Nicosia… the hopes of
the victims and the oppressed have won”, and “Beirut has won as much as İzmir.
14
K. Kirişçi, Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle
East, “Insight Turkey” 2011, No. 2, p. 43.
15
Ş. Kardaş, Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles, “Middle
East Policy” 2010, No. 1, p. 124.
16
A. Davutoğlu, Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring,
Ankara 2012, p. 1.
West Bank, Gaza, Ramallah, Jerusalem have won as much as Diyarbakır. The
Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans have won, just as Turkey has won” 17.
5. “Role Model” for the Middle East?
According to Larry Diamond, a well-known American scholar on democracy

and democratization, a “model” would be an inspiration for reform and
transformation among the Arab countries. In fact, he thinks that there is an
absence of such a model in the Middle East, which complicates the prospects
of democratization in the region 18. Samuel Huntington also mentions the
importance of the demonstrative effect as a model for the democratic change.
He describes this process as a snowballing effect of earlier transitions that allow
“stimulating and providing models of subsequent efforts of democratization” 19.
In other words, earlier experiences of democratic transitions can constitute
examples for the latecomers.
Yet, recently, Turkey has been referred to by some prominent personalities
as a model or an example for the transformation of the Arab world, which has
shaken with the uprisings in 2011. The Tunisian opposition leader Rashid al-
Ganouchi and Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of Hasan al-Banna, the founder
of the Muslim Brotherhood, have underlined Turkey’s importance as a model.
As a matter of fact, it is not a new development for Turkey. After the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the journal “Economist” announced Turkey as the “star of
Islam” and a model for the Central Asian republics when the issue of reform and
democratization emerged in the former Soviet republics. About a decade later,
American President George Bush pointed to Turkey as a model once again when
he launched the BMENA initiative. In general terms, both of these cases are
taking Turkey as an appropriate “model” because of its credentials as a secular
Muslim country and a democracy with a liberal market economy.
As Turkey has risen as a successful example of a combination of Islamic
tendency and democratic system, it won over some liberal Arabs as well. Hence,
when Turkey was accepted as a candidate to open accession negotiations with the
EU in December 2004, some Arab journalists presented it as a model of reform
17
B. Yinanç, PM poses as a Middle Eastern rather than a European leader, “Hürriyet
Daily News” June 13, 2011.
18
K. Kirişçi, op.cit., p. 34.
19
Ibidem.
for the Arab world 20. Being a candidate for the EU as an Islamic country was
something that was attractive for the people who are looking for the expected
compromise between Islam and democracy. This highlighted aspect of Turkey, to
a large extent, seemed to be appealing to the Arabs, because according to a survey
conducted by Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) in 2010
in seven Arab countries, 61% of the respondents considered Turkey as a model
for the Arab world. 63% agreed that Turkey constitutes a successful example of
coexistence of Islam and democracy 21.
Unquestionably, economic development is important for this positive image
of Turkey. The growth of the economic capacity of Turkey, the rise of income per
capita, the animated trading relations, and the increasing number of internal and
external investments of Turkish enterprises contribute to this positive perception.
In fact, the AKP government is very sensitive about the growing economy of
Turkey up to a point of largely implementing a liberal visa policy to open the
doors of Turkey to any foreign trader or investors. Kemal Kirişçi, a respected
scholar on Turkey’s foreign policy, explains this attitude of Turkey with the
term “trading state”, that is to say a state whose “foreign policy is increasingly
shaped by economic consideration and a country whose foreign trade acquires
an important place in the GNP” 22. The middle class and liberal capitalism have
also grown during this economic prosperity, which makes Turkey one of those
centres of attraction for a new opening for the economies of the Middle East
trapped between oil revenues and the rentier state model.
In addition to the economic statistics, Turkish media, and especially the
Turkish TV series, are also influential on the societies of the Middle East. The
way of living depicted on TV looks like a Western style grounded in Muslim
culture, which is attractive for the Arabs, especially for women, youngsters or
marginalised groups, who are look for more liberalism in their countries. Hence,
beyond the economic or the political instruments, Turkey’s image has been
constructed sociologically by the media and filming industry. Turkish series and
popular artists seem to be representing the image of Turkey on the “Arab street”.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan’s popularity had mounted among the Arab
people especially after his rise against the Israeli president Simon Peres in 2009
at the Davos World Economy Forum. His emotional reaction supporting the
20
Ibidem.
21
M. Akgün et al., The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East, Istanbul 2009, pp. 21–
–22.
22
K. Kirişçi, op.cit., p. 37.
Palestinians against the “cruelty” of the Israeli military operations has been
known as “one minute”. This reaction was seen as a change in the Turkish foreign
policy, which used to be a supporter of American interests in the region and
a collaborator of Israel. However, it should be mentioned that Turkey’s popularity
as a model was not always welcomed by the elite groups, who were toppled by
the recent protests. There are some doubts about the sincerity of Turkey in its
Middle East policies. The state might look like more American than Islamic in
many dimensions to these people. In this sense, the new activism of the Turkish
foreign policy has been interpreted as an extension of new imperialism. Yet,
the discourse on Turkey’s role as a model for the Middle Eastern states can
be considered in a broader scope of analysis. To evaluate the new activism of
the Turkish foreign policy within its global and regional politics would not be
a conspiracy theory. In fact, to be a model for the Middle Eastern states would be
in favour of Turkey in its quest towards being a regional power than of the Arabs
who are “seeking” for a model. To be followed by others would perhaps serve
Turkish political interests more than the needs of Arab populations. For some
people, “The use of the Turkish Model is perhaps largely a Turkish or a Western
tool used to enhance Turkey’s discursive power or to contribute to the western
hope that the Arab Spring states could become as amenable to Western interests
as Turkey has been in the past” 23.
Thus, to discuss further the subject of being a “model”, it is necessary to
indentify the reasons behind this “demand”. To bring stability and a more
Western-type modernity to the region would also bring easy access to the region
not only for Turkey but also for the Western countries. Stable political systems
and liberal economies are more open to dialogue and to develop connection
with these powers, especially with the USA, which probably has held the position
of the “most unfavoured nation” in the minds of the Middle Eastern people. To
have an ally like Turkey in the Middle East would be very welcome by the USA as
it also brings a more peaceful and controllable access to the people of the region.
For Turkey, being a model country for the region would provide the expected
position of being a regional power and also a candidate to a global actor. Yet, the
card of the Middle East is the strongest one that Turkey has in its hands in world
politics and it would not want to lose it as it did before.
The AKP government has come a long way in its Middle Eastern policy and
strengthened its position as a regional power. The rhetoric of “zero problems”
A. Stevens, The ‘Turkish Model’ in the Arab Spring: Discourse and Foreign Policy
23
Metaphors, “The Journal of Turkish Weekly” July 2, 2012.

would be reasonable and attractive, but it has required more than just good
intentions. In fact, the tense reaction of Turkey towards the civil war in
Syria constitutes a challenge for the peaceful philosophy of “zero problems”
neighbourhood policy. The profile of “always with the peace” has been distorted
by the “anytime can get into war” image of Turkish foreign policy during the
recent crisis between Syria and Turkey. The financial and military support for
the “aggressive” opposition group in Syria, the Syrian Liberation Army, has
been questioned by many groups in Turkey because of its risks and irrationality.
Despite the visibility of risks, the AKP government has been probably calibrating
its foreign policy according to the vision of Turkey as a regional power in the
Middle East. As the global dynamics have been changing in the region, Turkey
seems to use its initiative as a “reactionary state” more than being an “apostle
of peace”.
Moreover, the success of Turkey’s role as a regional actor and a soft power
depends largely on the stability of its domestic politics, the peaceful resolution
of the Kurdish question and the place of political Islam in the secular state. 24
As the hope for the Kurdish rapprochement has been diminished by mutual
reluctance of the PKK and the Turkish government, domestic politics have also
been shaken by the recent turmoil. The Gezi Park protest in Turkey, which had
started as a small protest, has been challenging for the AKP government both
from the inside, as a source of instability, and from the outside, as a stain on the
state’s image. The outcome of these events is still away from certainty, since they
are still going on during as article is being written. However, it is a fact that they
would be an important experience for the improvement of democracy in Turkey.
The rhetoric of democracy, which has been used as a “model” for the developing
democracies of the Middle East, have finally found an opportunity to be
practiced. There would be ups and downs in every democracy, but what matters
is the way how that government deals with these problems. The emergence of
pluralism and a comprehensive form of democracy in Turkey would bring hope
not solely to Turkey, but also to the Middle East.
6. Conclusion
Turkey and the Middle East have had a history of a very changing relationship.
The close cultural and religious relations have been damaged during the last
decades of the Ottoman Empire and did not improve with the establishment
24
A. Ehteshami, op.cit., p. 658.
of the Republican Turkey. The late Ottoman and early Republican Western-
oriented and secularist policy orientation drove Turkey even further away from
the Middle East. With the rise of the political Islam in Turkey, the tendency of
the governments to move closer to the Middle East started to be more evident in
the foreign policy. The Arabs’ perception of Turkey has also been transformed
during these developments, especially during the AKP government. With the
new policy of the AKP government, relations between Turkey and the Middle
East have been closer than ever. The cold relations had warmed up within
this new environment. Numerous publications were released on Turkey’s new
foreign policy in the Middle East. The change in Turkish foreign policy in the
Middle East has been named the “Shift of Axis” by some scholars, pointing
out its new identity orientation towards the East instead of the West. However,
instead of evaluating this process as an identity transformation, evaluating the
developments from the perspective of strategic reformation in its foreign affairs
would be a better way to understand the new AKP policy in the region.
In this regard, “Turkey’s new activism has aimed at keeping its old alliances
in balance while establishing relations with a new power centre in the Middle
East” 25. Within this context, the new strategy of Turkey is mainly to maintain
the status quo in the region and to avoid regional conflict. Creating relations
of interdependence by using political, social and economic channels is a useful
way of realising this new strategy. In contrast to the Interwar or the Cold War
politics, Turkey’s new strategy and entrance into the Middle East has not been
perceived by the Arab Middle East as a hegemonic threat or a Western influence,
but rather as a balancing power 26.
In fact, what makes Turkey closer to becoming a regional actor within the
Middle East is the AKP’s new foreign policy strategy of focusing on the Arab
states more than any other Turkish government. This new strategy of getting
closer to the Middle East is sometimes misinterpreted as a detachment of Turkey
from the West. However, the new activism of Turkey on the Muslim lands is
a part of its general international relations strategy. To be an active player within
the region, which had been neglected for a long time, could certainly give Turkey
a broader perspective on the world politics. In this sense, Turkey needs to play its
cards on two tables. On the one hand, it needs to consider the regional dynamics
and act as a regional actor. On the other hand, it has to keep the balance between
25
“Turkish Studies” 2011, No. 4, p. 658.
26
the global actors. This bilateral task can be confusing in evaluating Turkey’s new
policy, but treating the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the
Middle East as a disconnection from the West would be an oversimplification.
This new era is an extended version of its Westernization. An increased
effectiveness of Turkey in the region, an improved image among the Arabs and
more effective economic relations with the Middle Eastern economies would
raise the importance of Turkey for the global actors, as this is the aim of the
AKP government. Within this context, the role model talk would do nothing but
support the position of Turkey in the Middle East.
Apparently, the Middle East has never been an isolated region as the great
powers’ interests have been clashing on it. Any slight shift of balance within
the region could mean a change on the global arena. Therefore, Britain, France,
Germany, Russia and the USA have always given great importance to the Middle
East in their foreign affairs. Among these powers, Turkey has had a special
political, strategic and military link with the USA. Actually, as the leading global
power in the world, the USA has paved the way of Turkey for importance as
a both democratic and Islamic country in the region. Yet, for the USA, Turkey’s
significance has always been connected with the Middle East, which was not
always welcomed by the Turkish authorities during the Cold War years. In the
aftermath of the Cold War, the Middle East became one of the most crucial
elements of the Turkish-American alliance, a development that was largely
accepted by both sides 27. Turkey’s close relation with the Middle East would be
helpful for Turkey to strengthen itself and for the USA to have access to the Arab
societies.
The USA may be an important power, but the Middle East has been changing
as a region and the balance of power in the region has been changing. It is
moving from being a multipolar system to bipolarity between the poles around
Iran and the USA. Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shiite government in
Iraq, with support from Russia and China forms the group which supports Iran.
Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with the support
from the European allies, stand against that group as the opposing pole in the
region 28. Multipolarity in the region used to give Turkey an opportunity to play
a balancing role in the region and to increase its influence by using a soft power
27
M. Altunışık, The Middle East in Turkey-USA Relations: Managing the Alliance,
“Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies” 2013, No. 2, p. 157.
28
L. Martin, Turkey and the USA in a Bipolarizing Middle East, “Journal of Balkan
and Near East Studies” 2013, No. 2, p. 175.
paradigm grounded on expanding trade networks, diplomatic mediation and

enhancing cultural ties with the Arab world and Iran 29. However, a bipolarizing
region will likely increase threats to Turkey’s national interests in the Middle
East. The future threat of Iran armed with nuclear weapons, the need for securing
energy sources, while reducing reliance on Iranian supplies, and expanding the
capacity of trade and investment would be among the upcoming challenges for
Turkey’s foreign policy 30.
Apart from the tension between Iran and he USA, the civil wars in the
region have been challenging for Turkey’s stable foreign policy. Turkey needs
great dexterity to handle these challenges all alone 31. An active foreign policy, in
this sense, necessitates a strategic turn strengthened by the regional and global
dynamics. Cultural bonds, religious similarities and growing economic ties
would bring more and more substance for Turkey in the Middle East, as it is
developing both its regional activism and, at the same time, its stability in the
world politics. The Middle East gives the right strategic horizon for Turkey to
expand its vision.
29
Ibidem, p. 176.
30
Ibidem, p. 181.
31
Manuel F ér ez G il
Milddle East Universidad Iberoamericana and Universidad Anahuac
in Mexico City, Mexico
EVERYTHING WILL BE DECIDED IN SYRIA
ABSTRACT
It is difficult to understand the current situation in Syria without making an
analysis of the historical reasons that have led to the country on the brink of
collapse. This brief article intends to expose the lines of rupture of the Syrian
regime as well as the regional and international importance of this conflict.
Key words
Bashar Al Assad, sunni/chii division, civil war
Syria is, at the same time, a symbol and a symptom of a regional war that recast
the composition of what will be the Middle East: it is this too much to fight and
it is resolved in this nation state.
Hans Kung remembers that the city of Damascus has an ancient history of
more than four thousand years. Mentioned first in 1470 BC to be conquered by
the Pharaoh Tutmés II, this beautiful city bears the marks left by King David, the
Persians, the Seleucid Empire, the Romans, and the Byzantines. However, from
the year 634, Damascus, is primarily (though not only) Arabic and for almost
a century (661–750) the Umayyad Caliphs ruled from there a huge Islamic
Empire. That glorious history is behind us, and today we are distant witnesses of
a civil war that has led to the country to the verge of a total collapse and human
tragedy that is far from being over.
In my classes about the Middle East I put emphasis on the huge tensions
experienced by entire countries and other international actors (United States,
Russia, Britain, China, and France, among others) that converge in Syria
Professor Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow at the International Institute for
strategic studies, in his book Syria´s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant
lists five reasons behind the tensions:
Everything Will Be Decided in Syria 75
1. The discrepancy between the Government and their society (delegitimiza-

tion);
2. The confrontation for regional leadership between Iran, some Arab
countries of the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia), and Turkey;
3. The deepening of the Sunni/Chii division;
4. The role of political Islam in the identity of the Arab and Muslim and non-
Muslim groups;
5. Breaking the balance of different ethnic groups in traditionally multi-
ethnic societies (in Syria the Kurdish case is most obvious).
The regional impact of this conflict is already unquestionable; for example,
the flight of the Kurds to the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq will have
demographic, political and economic implications. The large number of refugees
in Jordan is threatening the precarious stability of a regime that historically
barely survives in a ruthless region. Turkey, which for too long has called on
the international community to intervene in its neighbour, receives the impact
of refugees seeking asylum in the South of the country. Lebanon is absorbed
by the violent dynamics. Israel distributed gas masks among its population and
prepares militarily for conflict on their northern border and finally, Iran becomes
witness of how its main ally in the Middle East pound an existential battle, while
the Gulf countries are committed to which groups Sunni fundamentalists are
the final winners.
Internationally, the picture is more complex with the Security Council
paralyzed by the fundamental disagreement between Russia and the United
States on the construction of the law (ius ad bellum, and ius in bello) and
legitimacy of operations. Similarly, little is debated on the consequences of the
post-conflict period in the short and medium timeframe (reconstruction of the
state, social cohesion, and the Syrian identity preservation), central questions
that have inhibited rapid participation in the conflict by actors such as the US
and Britain due to the previous conflicts in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).
President Putin has made it clear that his country will only validate only
the decisions agreed upon in the Security Council and interventions supported
by international law, while President Obama is in a dilemma whether to act
unilaterally or to negotiate a plausible solution with Russia on terms of equality.
The use of chemical weapons by the government forces is, at least, difficult to
prove clearly and forcefully, which inhibits Russia and China from proclaiming
their support for an intervention, which, moreover, would cause harm to their
area of influence, as well as their military and commercial presence in the
Middle East. Likewise, the Kremlin puts on the table the analysis of the Syrian
76 Manuel F ér e z G il
case, where it was not only the Government of Assad who has committed crimes
of war and against humanity, but also the opposition has not hesitated to use
inhuman methods during the fight.
The viewpoint of President obama is different because the refusal of
the British Parliamentąs support to Prime Minister David Cameron in his
intervention proposal, joined with the uncertainty of the French, Washington
sees itself deprived of two fundamental props that placed it in a dilemma: how
to act in the Syria case without compromising the credibility of a President who
wanted to mark out the legacy of the Bush doctrine?
The columnist of Haaretz, Anshel Pfeffer poses varying degrees of
involvement: the first involves an attack limited to strategic objectives (bases,
and military stores of chemical weapons) without removing Bashar Al-Assad’s
power, which would result in a scenario similar to the iraq post Hussein. The
alternative would involve ground presence; however, realising it is practically
impossible at the moment, because of the great military and economic costs that
this would entail added to the unpopularity among the American population of
this intervention.
The scenario may not seem more difficult and daunting: already more than one
hundred thousand dead, two million refugees, millions of internally displaced
persons, destruction of infrastructure, cultural and historical sites, fracture of the
fabric of Syrian society are the result of the civil war. When i was finishing writing
these words, i heard that the United States Senate Foreign relations Committee
approved the use of military force in Syria. Will the decision of the Washington
be beneficial to the future of Syria or will it further exacerbate the war?
Source: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/news/middle-east/2013/09/03/obama-confident-
of-getting-Congressional-support-for-Syria-strike.html.
A r tur Malantowic z
University of Warsaw, Poland
“CRISIS, CHAOS, VIOLENCE –

IS THAT REALLY WHAT WE WANT?”
A STALLED DEMOCRATISATION IN JORDAN
ABSTRACT
Amidst the regional turmoil in the Middle East, the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan prevails its relative stability despite undergoing only limited democratic
reforms. The article aims to present and analyze the Jordanian regime’s reaction
to the Arab Spring in light of the international historical sociology, which
depicts multidimensional and interlinked relations between the state, society
and international environment, all immersed in historical context. The analysis
finds that Jordan is a case proving that some nations praise stability over rushed
political reform and, what is a key to understand the phenomenon, this is the
view shared not only among the ruling elite but also by a vast part of the society.
The somewhat stalled democratisation works in favour of the autocratic regime
of King Abdullah II who retains power, of the Jordanian society, which does not
have to fear internal disorder, and of the international community for whom
Jordan is a long-standing and reliable partner.
Key words
Arab Spring, Jordan, democratisation, stability, International Historical
Sociology
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was closely observed by the international

community since the very onset of the Arab Spring. By many it was doomed as
an another Middle Eastern autocratic regime endangered by massive protests
and socio-political mobilisation, capable of overthrowing the monarchy. Rightly,
demonstrations in Jordan started earlier than those in Egypt or Syria, yet they
have neither gained critical mass nor did they really seek a change in the regime.
Up to this point, Jordan prevails in its relative stability, despite undergoing only
limited democratic reforms and facing regional turmoil. The article aims to
present and analyze the Jordanian regime’s reaction to the Arab Spring in the light
78 A r t ur Malan tow ic z
of the international historical sociology, which depicts the multidimensional and

interlinked relations between the state, society and international environment, all
immersed in historical context. Therefore, the paper aspires to depict how these
three elements of the system interconnect in the case of Jordanian monarchy
and, concurrently, how do they influence the democratisation process. The thesis
of the article is the notion that the stalled reform process in Jordan is working in
favour of almost all parties concerned: the autocratic regime of King Abdullah II,
the Jordanian society and the international community.
1. International Historical Sociology & Democratisation

Historical sociology that emerged in the late 1970s and matured in the 1990s
can be described as studying the past in order to explain how societies function
and encounter changes; studying mutual connections between the past and the
present, and between events and processes 1. Despite a variety of works published
within the stream of historical sociology, all of them are “perceiving the social
reality as a process and underlining the role of historical momentum, pace and
rhythm of changes” 2.
Initially reserved only for analyzing societies, historical sociology very
quickly became ‘internationalized’, particularly by including into analysis
the international system and the relations between the state and security.
A prominent work by Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions introduced
the concept of a state as an open system, arguing that social changes can be
stimulated not only by internal factors (eg. class rivalry, economic pressure) but
also by political, economic and military pressures coming from the international
environment 3.
Fred Halliday explains that the term ‘historical sociology’ implies both
historicisation of the state and locating that history within an international
context 4. What is important, international historical sociology “refuses to treat
1
D. Smith, The Rise of Historical Sociology, Cambridge 1991, p. 3.
2
A. Kolasa-Nowak, Socjolog w badaniu przeszłości. Koncepcja socjologii historycznej
Charlesa Tilly’ego [A Sociologist Studying the Past. Charles Tilly’s Concept of Historical
Sociology], Lublin 2011, p. 14.
3
T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge 1979, passim; J. Czaputowicz,
Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja [Theories of International
Relations. Critique and Systematisation], Warszawa 2008, pp. 389–390.
4
F. Halliday, For an International Sociology [in:] Historical Sociology of International
Relations, S. Hobden, J. Hobson (eds.), Cambridge 2002, p. 245.
“Crisis, Chaos, Violence – Is that Really what We Want?”… 79
the present as an autonomous entity outside of history, but insists on embedding

it within a specific socio-temporal place” 5. Hence it is necessary to place the
studied reality in a broader context of historical structure, within which it is
rooted. “We can never understand the detail if we do not understand the pertinent
whole, since we can never otherwise appreciate exactly what is changing, how
it is changing, and why it is changing” 6. Nonetheless, history, which offers an
analytical framework for events, contingencies and local specifics, is only one
element of the theory; sociology brings into study the understanding of how
relatively constant configurations of social relations influence these processes,
whereas international relations underline the central role played by the
international dimension in shaping their dynamics 7.
Consequently, historical sociology proposes epistemological changes which
are meant to address the reductionism of neorealism and Marxism. As such, an
adequate theory of the state, society and international relations should include:
1) A study of history and change,
2) Multicausality (many independent power sources),
3) Multidimensionality (space without clear borders between dimensions),
4) Partial autonomy of power sources and actors,
5) Historicism – complexity of history and change,
6) (Nonrealist) theory of state autonomy and power 8.
Full understanding of the contemporary social relations thereby requires
knowledge about short-term and long-term events, as well as the processes
which preceded them. Such assumption stems from acknowledging the path
dependency with all its consequences. Importantly, historical sociology is
far from claiming that such path is linear or structurally determined. On the
5
J. Hobson, What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International
Relations’? Transcending ‘Chronofetishisim’ and ‘Tempocentrism’ in International Relations
[in:] Historical Sociology…, S. Hobden, J. Hobson (eds.), op.cit., p. 13.
6
I. Wallerstein, European Universalism. The Rhetoric of Power, New York–London
2006, pp. 82–83.
7
J. Hobson, G. Lawson, J. Rosenberg, Historical Sociology, LSE Research Online,
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28016 [access: July 2013], p. 13. Originally published in: R. Dene-
mark (ed.), ISA Compendium, New York 2010.
8
T. Lapointe, F. Dufour, Assessing the Historical Turn in IR: An Anatomy of Second
Wave Historical Sociology, “Cambridge Review of International Affairs” 2011, p. 11;
J. Hobson, The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in
International Relations, “Review of International Political Economy” 1998, No. 2,
pp. 294–295.
contrary, “it has been a story of conflict and struggle as individuals, groups,
political communities, religions, firms, nations, and empires have interacted
within rapidly shifting contexts in the construction of contemporary world
politics” 9. Simultaneously, as Andrzej Gałganek argues, social development is
not only a multilinear but also an interactive and interdependent process and, as
such, it might be determined or transformed by external pressures 10.
Multidimensionality offered by historical sociology suggests coexistence
of different spatial levels – subnational, national, international and global –
mutually interlinked and influencing each other. In other words, every single of
these levels cannot exist separately: society, state and international community
are interdependent 11. Therefore, it is impossible to explain politics of an individual
actor (state) without taking into consideration numerous factors, both internal
and external, historical and contemporary. It is essential to link sociological
explanation focused on the nature of societies with geopolitical explanation
based on conditions generated by their coexistence 12. Needless to say, the
international dimension is not merely a background for the state activities – it
rather has a dominant character and decides about state formation. However, it
does not remain autonomous as to some extent it is shaped by other elements of
the system which in general can be seen as presented in Figure 1.
As Fred Halliday indicates, historical sociology could be of a real value
when applied to analyze the themes important for the Middle East studies,
such as conflicts and their determinants, the role of ideology and religion in
international relations, transnational movements, domestic changes witnessed
by the countries of the region and their foreign policy 13. Likewise, historical
sociology recognizes the trend of world homogenisation – convergence of
9
G. Lawson, The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations, “Interna-
tional Studies Review” 2006, Vol. 8, pp. 403–404.
10
A. Gałganek, Abstrakcja nierównego i połączonego rozwoju w wyjaśnianiu historii
stosunków międzynarodowych [The Abstract Theory of the Uneven and Combined
Development in Explaining the History of International Relations], “Prawo i Polityka”
[Law and Politics] 2009, No. 1, p. 80.
11
J. Hobson, State and International Relations, Cambridge 2000, p. 195.
12
A. Gałganek, Czy istnieje teoria społeczna »międzynarodowości« i »wewnętrzności«?
[Is There a Social Theory of ‘Internationality’ and ‘Intranationality’?], “Przegląd Politolo-
giczny” [Political Science Review] 2007, No. 2, pp. 22, 32.
13
F. Halliday, Bliski Wschód w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Władza, polityka i ide-
ologia [The Middle East in International Relations. Power, Politics and Ideology], Kraków
2009, pp. 42–43.
Figure 1. international relations according to historical sociology

Source: Artur Malantowicz
political institutions in effect of modernity and the regional context, which

aims at strengthening international legitimacy and stability14. in such form, the
theory can also contribute to our understanding of the democratic process, since
it acknowledges the shifting functions of the state and changeable definitions
of the civil society. it also considers international dimension as a source of
the role models, inspiration for the domestic political scene. Consequently,
historical sociology claims that in order to make it work, democratisation needs
a “democratic coalition” historically consisting of the bourgeoisie, the middle
class and the working class. Likewise, democracy requires a balance between the
ruler (state) and the independent social groups (society), “in which the state is
neither wholly autonomous of dominant classes nor captured by them, allowing
a space within which civil society can flourish”15.
When applied to the case of Jordan, international historical sociology
aims to underline the interconnectedness between the state, the society and
14
ibidem, p. 45. For a broader account see: F. Halliday, Rethinking International
Relations, London 1994, pp. 90, 94–123.
15
r. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle
East: An Overview and Critique, “Democratization” 2006, no. 3, pp. 378–379.
the international environment and to show that the democratisation process

mirrors the shifting interests of all three elements of the system. While it proves
that, very often, the external dimension has a decisive impact on the pace and
direction of socio-political reforms in the kingdom, it nonetheless admits the role
society plays in voicing its approval or discontent towards the state apparatus.
Subsequently, in order to fully understand the links between the state, the society
and the international community, and their joint influence over the shape of
political system of Jordan, it is essential to explore the historical context.
2. Jordan & Democracy prior to the Arab Spring
Unlike most of the countries in the Middle East, Jordan has a long tradition as
the constitutional monarchy with a parliament that, in theory, limits the king’s
executive power. Nevertheless, the political history of Jordan experienced only
two episodes of democratisation, first of which took place in the mid-1950s.
The 1952 constitution, at the time perceived as liberal, guaranteed various
personal freedoms (e.g. freedom of opinion and the right of free association,
political parties included), direct elections to the Chamber of Deputies, and
a system of checks and balances between the legislative and the royal court. The
king’s position was nevertheless relatively strong – he was entitled to appoint
the Senate, to appoint and dismiss government officials, to dissolve the lower
house of parliament and to call for new elections 16. Soon after the constitution
emerged, however, the regime started to restrict the public sphere, fearing the
increasing support for Arab nationalism. The ruling elite was also aware that
political freedom worked against its interests, such as maintaining the alliance
with the United Kingdom or close ties with Israel 17. In 1957, martial law was
declared in response to the coup attempt and, after it was lifted in late 1958, it
was subsequently reintroduced in effect of the June 1967 War and lasted until
early 1990s.
The second wave of democratisation reached Jordan in 1989, when its
economic situation severely deteriorated due to the structural decrease in oil
prices worldwide, and, accordingly, a serious decline in private remittances by
16
R. Brynen, Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World:
The Case of Jordan, “Canadian Journal of Political Science” 1992, No. 1, pp. 76–77.
17
M. Oren, A Winter of Discontent: Britain’s Crisis in Jordan, December 1955–March
1956, “International Journal of Middle East Studies” 1990, No. 2, p. 173.
expatriate workers and official assistance from the Gulf states. Hence, facing
budgetary deficits, weakening terms of trade and falling rates of growth, Jordan
turned to international financial institutions to renegotiate its debt. In return
for help, Jordan was forced to cut governmental expenditures and subsidies,
impose a new sale tax, improve and expand the tax base in addition to public
administrative reform, financial deregulation, trade liberalisation and significant
privatisation 18. All of the reforms sharply increased prices of fuel and food which,
unsurprisingly, triggered anti-government riots across the kingdom. Confronted
with the legitimacy crisis, King Hussein used the democracy agenda as a tool to
re-establish the monarchy’s authority and bring back its stability.
The first full parliamentary elections in more than twenty years were held in
November 1989. Consequently, the National Charter was drafted and endorsed
by the king in June 1991, a month later the martial law was lifted and in 1992
political parties were ultimately legalized. The following twenty years brought
ups and downs in the democratisation process, depending on the international
context of Jordanian politics, with a visible influence of phenomena like the
Middle East peace process or the war with terrorism on Jordan’s domestic
political scene. The facade aspect of democracy – parliamentary elections – was
nevertheless maintained 19.
By the end of 2009, the level of dissatisfaction with the parliament’s work
arose so high that King Abdullah decided to dissolve – not for the first time
in Jordanian history – the Chamber of Deputies. A day later he instructed the
government to amend the electoral law so that the new elections were “a model
of transparency, fairness and integrity, and a promising step in our process of
reform and modernisation, the aims of which are to achieve the best for our
18
H. El-Said, The Political Economy of Reform in Jordan: Breaking Resistance to
Reform? [in:] Jordan in Transition 1990–2000, G. Joffé (ed.), London 2002, pp. 261–262;
C. Ryan, Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund, “Middle
East Policy” 1998, No. 2, p. 56.
19
For a detailed account of the democratisation process in the 1990s and 2000s
see, for instance: B. Milton-Edwards, Façade Democracy and Jordan, “British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies” 1993, No. 2, pp. 191–203; K. Rath, The Process of Democratization
in Jordan, “Middle Eastern Studies” 1994, No. 3, pp. 530–557; L. Brand, The Effects of the
Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan, “Journal of Palestine Studies” 1998,
No. 2, pp. 52–67; J. Choucair-Vizoso, Illusive Reform: Jordan’s Stubborn Stability [in:]
Beyond the Façade. Political Reform in the Arab World, M. Ottaway, J. Choucair-Vizoso
(eds.), Washington 2008, pp. 45–70.
nation and to expand the horizon of progress and prosperity for Jordanians” 20.
However, the new Elections Law of May 2010 contained only some of the popular
demands: total number of the parliamentary seats increased from 110 to 120
with the women quota rising from six (introduced already in 2003) to twelve;
extra four seats were granted to underrepresented urban areas of Amman, Irbid
and Zarqa; the previous multi-seats districts were re-designed into 108 smaller
single-seat sub-districts; strict punishments for votes-buying were introduced
along the expansion of the role of the political observers to assure fairness and
transparency 21.
Even though in the weeks leading up to the election there were several incidents
noted, mostly concerning arrests of the young people who were protesting
against government and calling for an electoral boycott as well as instances
of press censorship, the election day itself – November 9 – was an example of
transparent, free and fair voting. It has also set a precedent in Jordanian history
– for the first time the king invited international observers who joined national
monitoring groups. Some of them indicated a paradox of the voting process
being credible even if “the elections unfolded within a broader political system
that lacked credibility” 22. Barely two months later the Arab Spring brought a new
momentum to the Middle East.
3. Arab Spring in Jordan: 2011–2013
Similarly to other countries of the region, Jordan became a scene of the Arab
Spring as early as in January 2011, when the Jordanians went out on the streets
of major cities to protest against the worsening socio-economic conditions 23.
20
K. Malkawi, King Directs Government to Amend Elections Law, “Jordan Times”,
November 25, 2009, jordantimes.com/king-directs-government-to-amend-elections-law
[access: July 2013].
21
M. Beck, L. Collet, Jordan’s 2010 Election Law: Democratization or Stagnation,
2010, pp. 1, 3–5.
22
M. Dunne, Jordan’s Elections: An Observer’s View, “Carnegie Commentary”,
November 17, 2010, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view
&id=41954 [access: July 2013].
23
First protests took place as early as on January 7, 2011 in the city of Theiban in
the south of Jordan and soon spread across whole country. See: A. Vogt, Jordan’s Eternal
Promise of Reform, “Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft” [International Politics and
Society] 2011, No. 4, p. 65; C. Ryan, Identity Politics, Reform, and Protests in Jordan,
“Studies in Ethinicity and Nationalism” 2011, No. 3, p. 565.
Initially, the demonstrations mostly gathered educated and unemployed youth

along with leftist activists, although soon later they were joined by many
representatives of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and ex-
regime officials. They raised demands for improving living conditions, efficient
fight with unemployment and corruption, prime minister Rifai’s dismissal and
the political system reform 24. Luckily for the Hashemite monarchy, however, the
popular protests, even if run on a regular basis, have never assembled more than
8,000–10,000 people.
Contrary to the other regional leaders, king Abdullah II was prompt to address
the popular demands and replaced Samir Rifai with Marouf Bakhit as the new
prime minister at the end of January 2011. Nonetheless, it did not calm the public
tension, since merely two weeks later the 36 traditional Bedouin leaders from the
south of Jordan, commonly perceived as the monarchy’s backbone, sent to the
royal court an open letter, in which they overtly criticized the royal family. They
mostly condemned Queen Rania’s political involvement which they perceived
as going “against what Jordanians and Hashemites have agreed on in governing
and [being] a danger to the nation and the structure of the state (…) and the
institution of the throne” 25.
The continued protests convinced the regime of a need to undertake
several political reforms. For this aim, in mid-March 2011 the king established
the National Dialogue Committee consisting of leaders of political parties,
lawmakers, journalists, and activists, and assigned it with the task of reviewing
the Elections Law and Political Parties Law to make the political system more
democratic and more pluralistic. After the heavy clashes occurred in Amman on
March 24–25 (with dozens of civilians and policemen injured) and again in mid-
April, King Abdullah eventually ordered the formation of the Royal Committee
on Constitutional Review on April 27. The results of its work were published
on August 14 26 and instantly became the framework of the discussions about
strengthening the rule of law, ensuring balance between powers and wider public
participation.
24
A. Jebrin, What Did the Arab Spring Bring to Jordan?, “Middle East Flashpoint”
2012, p. 2.
25
Jordan Tribes Criticize Queen Rania’s ‘Political Role’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12400274 [access: July 2013].
26
Recommendations Made by the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review, “Jordan
Times”, August 15, 2011, http://jordantimes.com/recommendations-made-by-the-royal-
committee-on-constitutional-review [access: July 2013].
Throughout September 2011 the Committee’s recommendations were

consequently discussed and endorsed by the parliament with only minor
alterations. By the end of the month, the amendments were signed by King
Abdullah, who called them a “turning point in the history of the Kingdom”.
Indeed, the Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was amended for
the first time since 1984 and, what is even more important, for the first time on
such a large scale. The new provisions not only made any infringement on the
rights and public freedom a crime punishable by law (Art. 7), officially forbade
torture (Art. 8), guaranteed freedom of scientific research and artistic activity
(Art. 15), introduced independence of the judiciary (Art. 27) and the rule of
“innocent until proven guilty” (Art. 101), but, above all, they established an
independent commission to oversee the elections (Art. 67) and the Constitutional
Court as an independent judicial body (Art. 58–61), a novum in the Jordanian
legal system. Even though almost one third of the constitutional provisions were
changed, the reform almost entirely omitted royal prerogatives – the king has
lost only the right to indefinitely postpone elections to the parliament in case
of force majeure (Art. 73), which was severely abused by successive monarchs 27.
Soon after the constitution was amended, Jordan has witnessed yet another
government reshuffle, when the Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit was replaced
by Awn Khasawneh, a widely respected lawyer and a former judge at the
International Court of Justice. His primary assignment was to conduct reform
of the electoral law and political parties law 28. As soon as in December 2011, the
new government established the Independent Elections Commission tasked with
administration and supervision over all stages of parliamentary elections. Barely
three months later, in February 2012, the Political Parties Law was amended,
slightly reducing the requirements for establishing a new political party. The
reform of electoral law came only in June 2012, already under the new prime
minister – a conservative politician Fayez Tarawneh, since Khasawneh resigned
from his post at the end of April 2012. Despite changes, the commonly criticized
“one man, one vote” system remained a significant part of the new regulations,
thereby constantly discriminating political parties and favouring minorities.
To mitigate such effect the national list based on proportional representation
27
For a full list of constitutional amendments see Constitutional Reform in Arab
Countries. Jordan, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law, http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/overview_amendments.pdf [access: July 2013].
28
A. Mahafzah, Jordan: The Difficult Path Towards Reform, Al Jazeera Centre for
Studies, 2012, p. 6.
system with 27 seats (out of 150) was introduced and, in consequence, voters were
granted an additional ballot. Also in June 2013 the Constitutional Court was
established to “interpret the Constitution and to examine the constitutionality
of laws and regulations” 29.
The path of reform was not entirely progressive as one might have expected
– in fact, it arrived nowhere close to a substantive change that would shift the
status quo. In some areas it was even retreating from previous advancements,
eg. the September 2012 Press and Publications Law was commonly perceived
as cracking down on freedom of expression and an effort to shut down websites
critical of government. As Asher Susser argues, even though king Abdullah
called for the protection of responsible press freedoms, in reality it was “nothing
more than code words for state supervision of the media” 30.
Furthermore, in mid-2012 Jordan became a scene of growing problems of
both internal and external character. A direct military threat and the refugee
exodus caused by the war in Syria, the energy crisis caused by the destabilisation
of the Sinai Peninsula, the increasing pressure from the Gulf States, Egypt, the
United States and the International Monetary Fund, the deterioration of the
economic situation and the increase in development disparities – they all were
matters of serious concern for the decision makers.
Since the very beginning of the Syrian crisis, Jordanian authorities remained
cautious in framing its response to the challenges coming from its northern
neighbourhood. Above all, Jordan was afraid of a spill over of the conflict,
and of possible retaliatory actions on behalf of the Assad’s regime and further
destabilisation of the region, which would directly hit its relatively weak
economy. It constantly called for a political solution of the crisis, maintained
good relations with both the Friends of Syria and the supporters of Assad (Iran,
Russia) and tried to manoeuvre between Syrian government and opposition 31.
Nevertheless, when faced with a massive influx of Syrian refugees, Jordan turned
into a more decisive stance and overtly criticized Syrian authorities for its bloody
29
A detailed overview of the reforms see: Key facts on Elections and Jordan’s
Political Reform. January 2013, Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the
European Union, http://winweb10.ovh.net/specicom.net/www/jordan/election_new.asp
30
A. Susser, Is the Jordanian Monarchy in Danger?, “Middle East Brief” 2013, No. 72,
p. 5.
31
E. Gnehm, Jordan and the Current Unrest in Syria, “USIP Peace Brief 2011”, No. 114,
pp. 1–2.
response to popular demonstrations. Such a position was understandable, since

dozens of thousands of refugees have already started to be a burden for Jordan’s
scarce water and energy resources, its economy and job market.
Further deterioration of the economic situation was caused by the instability
in the Sinai Peninsula and the consecutive disruptions of the gas supplies from
Egypt. By mid-2012, they fell as low as to 16% of the agreed level and in October
2012 they were completely halted 32. The lack of Egyptian gas forced Jordan to
seek alternative and more costly sources of energy, which in effect contributed
to an enormous budget deficit, which grew by $2 billion during one year only.
For a country whose GDP in 2011 amounted to roughly $30 billion, it was a huge
sum, which in fact pushed Jordan into financial crisis. Combined with pressure
exerted by the International Monetary Fund, it forced the new government (in
power since October 2012) to implement severe cuts in the public expenditure.
Along with other austerity measures, on November 13, 2012 Prime Minister
Abdullah Ensour announced his decision to lift state subsidies on fuel which
consequently led to a drastic increase in the price of gasoline, diesel and cooking
gas by 15%, 33% and 54% respectively 33. Quite predictably, such move triggered
popular unrest with many demonstrations all over the country, during which
some protesters called for the downfall of the regime 34. Initially supported by
opposition, soon the manifestations lost their momentum, due to many incidents
of vandalism and clashes between the rioters and police that took place. Even
while opposing the government’s decision, all political forces criticized violence
and called for peaceful protests, expressing opinions in a civilized and democratic
manner, and respect for national unity 35. Such stance of the opposition, an
intensified public presence of the security apparatus, and the arrest of several
32
Egyptian Gas Supply to Jordan Stabilizes at below Contract Rate, Ahram Online,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/72994.aspx [access: July 2013].
33
O. Obeidat, Fuel Prices Up After Subsidies Removed, Decision Triggers Protests, “Jor-
dan Times”, November 13, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/fuel-prices-up-after-subsidies-
removed [access: July 2013].
34
S. Al-Khalidi, Jordan Protesters Call For ‘Downfall Of The Regime’, Reuters,
November 16, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/16/us-jordan-protest-idUSB
RE8AF0LK20121116 [access: July 2013].
35
See: T. Luck, Vandalism, Arrests as Fuel Riots Continue, “Jordan Times”, November
14, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/vandalism-arrests-as-fuel-riots-continue [access: July
2013] and T. Luck, Calm Returns to Streets After Fuel Price Riots, “Jordan Times”, Novem-
ber 15, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/calm-returns-to-streets-after-fuel-price-riots [ac-
cess: July 2013].
hundred rioters, ultimately resulted in the termination of the unrest after six
days. Soon after the government captured the public attention by launching the
electoral campaign.
At the end of 2012, the monarch had already become actively involved in
promoting the royal vision of the reform, initially presenting it in an interview
with two major newspapers 36 and then in the form of royal discussion papers 37.
King Abdullah outlined his roadmap, in which the elections scheduled for
January 23, 2013 were meant to become a crucial milestone initiating the
majority-based parliamentary governments in Jordan, therefore setting the basis
for a real constitutional monarchy. The elections’ aftermath was to introduce
stable governance with the four-year terms of office 38, based on a parliamentary
majority rather than the monarch’s autonomous decision. In consecutive
discussion papers, the king underlined the need to strengthen the political
parties system and the civil society.
Nonetheless, the pre-elections period proved that both society and the political
system are far from maturity. Missing from the campaign was a serious debate
on Jordan’s needs and on ways to tackle the problems of its growing economic
concerns, energy dependency, young generation’s frustration or poverty. What
dominated the posters and fliers all around the cities were simply slogans of
fighting corruption and unemployment. Even though for the first time the entire
electoral process – voters and candidates’ registration, campaign and the poll
itself – was prepared and supervised by the Independent Election Commission,
during both the campaign and the election day many law violations were
observed. They included clashes between voters, campaigning, vote buying and
single cases of vote forging. In comparison with previous years, however, the
scale of infringements was a minor one, hence the elections were commonly
described as free and fair by international and local monitoring groups 39.
36
King Outlines Vision for Reform Roadmap for New Jordan, “Jordan Times”,
December 5, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/king-outlines-vision-for-reform-roadmap-
for-new-jordan [access: July 2013].
37
See: Discussion Papers, King Abullah II Official Website, http://kingabdullah.jo/
index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/244.html [access: July 2013].
38
In Jordanian reality it is phenomenon almost like a political fiction since during
14 years of king Abdullah’s term eleven different prime ministers governed the country.
39
K. Neimat, Majority Says Elections Were Free and Fair, “Jordan Times”, February
20, 2013, http://jordantimes.com/majority-says-elections-were-free-and-fair----survey
[access: July 2013]. An observatory mission was also dispatched by the EU whose report
described the elections as transparent and credible with minor shortcomings. See:
Despite the main opposition party – the Islamic Action Front – boycotting
the elections on the charge of electoral law discriminating political parties, the
society has legitimatized the path chosen by the monarchy. Almost 57% of the
registered voters casted their ballots by choosing to the 150-seat lower chamber
of parliament 37 representatives identified with the opposition (independent
Islamists, pan-Arabists and leftists) and 18 women (of out which 15 got their
seats within the quota system) 40.
Unfortunately, serious fragmentation of the parliament and the lack of
political affiliation of the majority of the deputies have caused that the long-
awaited political consultations with parliamentary blocs in the process of
nominating the prime minister turned into a political show. After six weeks, the
king nominated for this position an old-new Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour.
Further three weeks were devoted to consultations over the government’s
composition which at the end of the day was nominated with disregard for any
of the parliament’s demands 41. In other words, it turned out that, in reality, both
the new parliament and the new government do not differ significantly from
hitherto existing institutions. Both are largely occupied by loyal and conservative
monarchists who care more about the status quo and the regime’s stability than
any sincere reform.
4. Why the Democratisation Remains Stalled?
An analysis of why the democratisation process remains somewhat limited in the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should be conducted at this point. To that end,
the international historical sociology shall be applied in order to present how
state, society and international community are interrelated, all being immersed
in historical context which constitutes an explanatory key to the problem. In
this light, democratisation should be seen as a reflection of shifting interests of
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Parliamentary Elections, 23 January 2013. European

Union Election Observation Mission Final Report, European Union External Action,
http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/final-report_en.pdf [access: July 2013].
40
2013 Elections – Final Results, “Jordan Times”, January 28, 2013, http://jordantimes.
com/2013-elections----final-results [access: July 2013].
41
O. Al Sharif, Jordan’s New Government: Same Old Politics, “Al Monitor”, March
31, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/jordanian-government-
formation.html [access: July 2013].
the three elements of the political system in that particular historical moment
(2011–2013), largely overlapping in fact. Even though Jordan experiences similar
socio-economic and political situation as most of the countries in the Middle
East, the Jordanian Arab Spring was approached significantly different. Factors
standing behind it can be divided into two groups: one connected with the events
unfolding in Jordan in 2011–2013 and the second stemming from the society’s
permanent attitudes and perception of the monarchy and the foreign actors.
First of all, contrary to other countries that witnessed revolutions,
demonstrations in Jordan, with a very few exceptions, have never been of
a spontaneous character. Generally, they were planned and organized by
certain political movements, and even if they gathered participants with a very
diversified background and broad agenda – from leftists to Islamist groups, both
Jordanians of Palestinian and East Bank origins, youth and elders, traditional
opponents of the regime and its former officials 42 – they never reached a critical
mass capable of seriously influencing the decision makers.
Furthermore, the anti-governmental protests were nothing new for the
Jordanian society and Jordanian political culture – organized massive and
nation-wide demonstrations have taken place many times in the history of the
Hashemite monarchy. It is sufficient to mention the protests of 1989, which
initiated the opening of the political system of Jordan, or those of 1996, when
people showed their discontent due to drastically increasing prices as a result
of cancelling subsidies on food and fuel 43. Jordan has also an endless history of
demonstrations targeting the pro-Israeli policy of the government in the form of
the so-called anti-normalisation movement 44. Consequently, immediately before
the Arab Spring, five months prior to the Tunisian spark, Jordanian teachers
went on strike and organized several manifestations in Amman and other
cities, demanding their long-denied right to establish a professional association.
It clearly evidenced an increasing pressure between the state and the society,
42
The most prominent ex-regime official taking part in the demonstrations was
Ahmad Obeidat, a former intelligence chief (1974–1982) and a former prime minister
(1984 –1985) who in 2011 established the National Front for Reform, a coalition of Islamist,
nationalist and leftist parties. See: A. Mahafzah, op.cit., p. 3.
43
About the protests in 1989 and 1996 see, for instance: C. Ryan, Peace, Bread and
Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund, “Middle East Policy” 1998, No. 2,
pp. 54 – 66.
44
See, for instance: P. Scham, R. Lucas, ‘Normalization’ and ‘Anti-Normalization’ in
Jordan: The Public Debate, “Israel Affairs” 2003, No. 3, pp. 141–164.
nevertheless it has never led to a massive insurgence of the people against the
government 45.
Equally important was the regime’s reaction to the demonstrations and the
behaviour of the protesters themselves. Despite an increase in the number and
scale of the manifestations, they have almost never escalated into violent clashes –
an exception to this tendency were the fuel riots of November 2012. The peaceful
character of those demonstrations was on one hand related to the moderation of
Jordanian political elites, who decided not to use excessive force – even though
security forces were present during protests, they were unarmed in order not
to provoke the crowds. Moreover, following the king’s orders, they were very
often distributing water to the demonstrators. On the other hand, the protesters
believed that by avoiding violence they would achieve better negotiating position
in their dialogue with the regime 46.
Jordan’s domestic political scene is inseparable from the international and
regional affairs. Firstly, the monarchy’s stability lies at the core interest of the
United States, probably more than ever before in its history – the fact that Jordan
is a reliable partner and a buffer zone between Israel and the hostile and full of
turmoil Arab world, makes it a strategic and not-to-lose asset for the Americans.
The monarchy is also actively engaged in the recent American attempt to revive
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, Amman is the channel
through which Washington reaches into the regional terrorist networks – the
Jordanian Mukhabarat (General Intelligence Directorate) is commonly seen as
one of the CIA’s key collaborators 47. One should not expect the US to let this
particular status quo element change. That is why the Americans support the
monarchy even in the moments of its biggest crisis, above all by praising its
stability: “We call on protestors to do so peacefully. We support King Abdullah
II’s roadmap for reform and the aspirations of the Jordanian people to foster
a more inclusive political process that will promote security, stability as well as
economic development” 48. Likewise, the EU has its interest in a stable Jordan
45
H. Barari, C. Satkowski, The Arab Spring: The Case of Jordan, “Ortadoğu Etütleri”
[Middle Eastern Studies] 2012, No. 2, pp. 49–50.
46
Ibidem, p. 50.
47
A. Malantowicz, Stosunki jordańsko-amerykańskie. Prawdziwy sojusz czy przejaw
neokolonializmu? [The Jordanian-American Relations. A True Alliance or a Manifestation
of Neocolonialism?], Centre for International Initiatives Analysis 2012, No. 20, http://
centruminicjatyw.org/?q=pl/node/190 [access: July 2013].
48
U.S. State Department Spokesman Mark Toner. Quoted in: Scott Stearns, US
Supports Jordan’s King Abdullah Over Fuel Protests, “Voice of America”, November 15, 2012,
and that is the reason why it is engaged in supporting the king’s vision of reform
and cautioning against any moves which could hinder Amman’s security. As
Julien Barnes-Dacey puts it, “Jordan is a key strategic ally and, at a moment
of significant regional volatility, the preservation of a calm in the kingdom is
clearly an important aim” 49.
Events taking place in Egypt and Syria have also left their trace on Jordanian
land – both in the streets and inside the royal palace. Even though the Islamic
Action Front boycotted the January 2013 election and continually contests the
regime, now it would possibly count on much less popular support than even
a year ago. The fear that the Islamists in Jordan would not be willing to share
power, once taking a grip on it, mounted significantly after the December
2012 constitutional struggle under Morsi. Recent events in Egypt – massive
demonstrations and coup d’état – further increase the concerns about the
possible polarization of the Jordanian society, which is quite significant already.
The Syrian Civil War, on the other hand, constitutes the biggest security threat
for Jordanian regime – a possible spill over of the conflict, the continuing
massive influx of the refugees (estimated at more than 600,000 up to date) along
with the terrorist activity made Jordanian elites very cautious about further
developments in Damascus. Both crises also have a moderating impact on the
public opinion in Jordan – you can hardly meet a Jordanian citizen who would
like to see the violence escalate in the streets and for that particular reason a lot
of them are willing to maintain the status quo. Not without importance is the
huge financial assistance from the Gulf countries ($5 billion to be provided over
a period of five years), which helps Jordan mitigate its serious economic burden
– for them Jordan’s stability is also in the centre of attention.
That smoothly brings into consideration the issue of the durable attitudes
in the Jordanian society. One should remember that the Jordanians are largely
supportive of the monarchy, while the royal family is commonly perceived as
a symbol of national unity and an element of national identity. It stems from
a social contract agreed between the Hashemites and the Transjordanian tribes,
which dates back to the 1920s. Similarly, the majority of Jordanian citizens
are satisfied with the direction their country is heading. When asked about
http://www.voanews.com/content/us-support-jordan-abdullah/1547111.html [access: July

2013].
49
J. Barnes-Dacey, Jordanian Tremors: Elusive Consensus, Deepening Discontent,
“ECFR Policy Memo” 2012, p. 2, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR68_JORDAN_MEMO_AW.pdf
reasons that lead them to believe so, they indicate above all the security and
stability provided by the current regime (46%), the Hashemite leadership (6%)
and a situation relatively better than in other countries of the region (7%).
Simultaneously, citizens who are discontent about the developments in their
country argue that it is mostly caused by increasing socio-economic problems
(corruption, poverty, unemployment, high cost of living etc.), rather than, as
an outside observer could think, the lack of democratic reforms. Consequently,
barely 12% of the Jordanians believe that political reform should be the state’s
priority 50.
A proof for the lack of critical mass needed to implement bottom-up changes
in Jordan and for the high support for the monarchy is the unwillingness of
majority of the citizens to participate in anti-government demonstrations. 70%
of the Jordanians see no reason for which they should take part in the protests,
whereas only a small percentage has in fact participated or intends to participate
in the manifestations in the future 51.
In order to fully understand the society’s stance in the democratisation
discourse one has to draw attention to the advancing growth of the middle class
in Jordan, particularly within the capital area of Amman. It is a group of educated
and cosmopolitan people, who are acquainted with the Western cultural trends.
As Sarah Tobin illustratively describes, they are “a population who ‘want peace’
and are relieved not to discuss the Civil War of the 1970s and to retreat to their
apartments and villas in sympathetic disdain for Israeli raids of the homes of
Palestinian family members and friends just 60 miles away. They are consumers
of political information put forth on blogs, news and Internet sites, but are not
otherwise politically engaged. Instead, they organize around certain places
and times for consumption and around economic points for solidarity” 52. They
are the Jordanians who consciously observe the situation in the neighbouring
countries and see only “civil wars, death, chaos, poverty, refugees, extremism,
and the collapse of governmental systems” 53. It is not a perspective favourable
50
National Priorities, Governance and Political Reform in Jordan. National Public
Opinion Poll #9. July 17–20, 2012, The International Republican Institute, http://www.
iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-poll-jordanians-split-over-direction-country-
economy-and-corruptio [access: July 2013].
51
Ibidem.
52
S. Tobin, Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution, “Middle East
Policy” 2012, No. 1, p. 100.
53
U. Dekel, O. Perlov, The Elecions in Jordan: People Want Evolution, Not Revolution,
“INSS Insight” 2013, No. 402, p. 2.
to revolutionary attitudes, hence the Jordanians are more often keen to opt for
consumption, to phrase slogans calling for “evolution, not revolution”, to label
the Arab Spring more as a threat than an opportunity and to switch the centre
of gravity of the public discourse to social and cultural issues, such as an active
civil society 54.
Consequently, it strengthens the feeling that Jordan “cannot afford to have
the Arab Spring the way the others did (…), cannot afford to have any kind of
instability” 55. These words fall in line with Sarah Tobin’s opinion that “unitary
construction of social life in Amman as middle class and anti-revolution is further
reinforced by an outward-looking disposition” 56. The Jordanians are not willing
to replace the current regime with the situation in Syria, Egypt or Iraq; they
cannot demand overthrowing the monarchy since “part of the socio-economic
system [in Jordan] is how monarchy makes stability, not just for Jordan” 57. In
that option “people prefer to enjoy this medium level of freedom rather than
lose security and stability” 58 and precisely such a standpoint has a predominant
impact on what the democratisation of the socio-political system in Jordan looks
like. It is hindered, cautious, limited, very often retracing and illusory.
5. Conclusions
The analysis clearly indicates that Jordan is a case proving that some nations
praise stability and security over a rushed political reform and the full opening
of the political system. What is crucial to understand the phenomenon, this is the
view shared not only among the ruling elite, but also by a vast part of the society
and foreign actors, since the current democratisation discourse largely reflects
their overlapping interests. Additionally, a historical perspective is needed in
order to fully explain interlinks and interdependency between the elements of
the political system.
The somewhat stalled democratisation works in favour of the autocratic
regime of King Abdullah II, who retains power and broad prerogatives. Likewise,
54
Ibidem. It was also the topic of King Abdullah’s last discussion paper. See: Towards
Democratic Empowerment and ‘Active Citizenship’, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_
US/pages/view/id/253.html [access: July 2013].
55
H. Esmeiran, author’s interview, Amman, February 14, 2013.
56
S. Tobin, op.cit., p. 106.
57
A. Dahmash, author’s interview, Amman, February 12, 2013.
58
T. al-Masri, author’s interview, Amman, March 2, 2013.
maintaining the status quo is a vital interest for the political elites, whose influence
over the shape of socio-political scene in Jordan may be extensively limited due
to full democratisation. Equally important is the stance of the Jordanian society,
which does not have to fear internal disorder and, consequently, may run their
ordinary life without any disruption. Finally, stability of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan is also profitable for the international community to whom Jordan is
a long-standing and reliable partner.
What’s with Israel?

Agnies zka Br yc
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland
ISRAEL IN A NEW MIDDLE EAST:

HOW TO RESPOND?
ABSTRACT
Israeli foreign policy, its mechanisms, conditions, as well as driving forces is a
complex phenomenon composed of intersecting elements of security, defense,
and foreign interests that are inseparably braided. Generally speaking, there
are at least four main interests which determine states’ foreign activity, firstly
security of the state and its territory, secondly economy and development, thirdly
international position, prestige among other states, and lastly international
society common benefits. The only way to understand Israel’s international
conduct is to look deeper into its national identity, political tradition, and
historical burden as well.
So the goal of this paper is to study the priorities of the Israeli foreign policy,
particularly while the so called Arab Spring, crisis over Iranian nuclear program,
and the changes in the Middle East.
Key words
Israel, foreign policy, the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, Syria,
Russia, U.S., the Arab Spring, Arab revolts, the Iranian nuclear program
1. The main drivers of Israeli foreign policy
In the case of Israel, security is a predominant and key driver influencing

each sphere of its foreign policy. In this way the need to survive in a hostile
neighborhood has ever been the essence of Israel’s policy, so the idea of an
98 A g nie s z k a B r yc
existential threat has formed Israeli way of thinking and its perception of
international politics. Perceiving Arabs as a threat to Israel’s very existence has
been the core of its international strategy, an instrument of maintaining the
image of an endangered state in the Middle East, as well as an explanation for
defense itself by preemptive and retaliatory use of force.
The decades of Israeli independence have been marked by dramatic changes
in regional conditions, and also by a significant alternation in the international
environment. The inception, evolution, then end of the Cold War, and later
the establishment of an American hegemony have led to changes in Israeli
approaches and policies. Living under the threat of being wiped out by hostile
Muslim neighbors derives from the Jewish identity of Israeli state, and to make
the story more complex – the state being established on the mostly former
Palestine (under the British Mandate). This brings both Jewish history and
contemporary Jewish concerns to the forefront of politics and policy. What is
more Israel’s policy is conditioned by its view of Jewish history as a history of
negatives. The great turning points in Jewish history are negative events – the
destruction of the Temple, the exile of the Jews from the Holy Land, the creation
of the concept of the diaspora, anti-Semitism (the Jewish Question), persecution
and discrimination, and the Holocaust. Among the symbolic locations of
modern Israel are Masada, Yad Vashem, and the Western (Wailing) Wall –
each a symbol of and memorial to a great negative event in Jewish history. The
creation of the state was something of an aberration, because it was a positive
event, but even that was short-lived, as the Arab states were designed to restore
Palestine to the Palestinians and eliminate the newly born Jewish state. Israeli
thinking is reflected in such phrases as “never again”, in which it is suggested that
the horrors of the past (mostly the Holocaust) cannot be allowed to be repeated
in the modern world. So Israeli history, based on Jewish history, provides the
basis for attitudes that condition thinking about foreign and security policy.
Its way of explaining history and modern politics is recognized as the “ghetto
mentality” with its unique interpretation of history, isolation, and victimization.
Jewish history, which derives from the Biblical period and perceives the Bible as
a recording of history, provides a basis for foreign policy, and strengthens the
sense of isolation and insecurity 1.
Israel is the creation of political Zionism described and defined by Theodor
Herzl. It also resolved the Jewish Question by creating a sovereign Jewish state that
would serve as a haven for imperiled and persecuted Jews through widespread
1
Israel’s Strategic Agenda, E. Inbar (ed.), London 2007.
Israel in a New Middle East: How to Respond? 99
anti-Semitism, pogroms in Eastern Europe, and finally the Holocaust. Israel’s

declaration of independence formally declared “the establishment of a Jewish
state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel”. The Law of Return, passed
by the Knesset on July 5, 1950, established this principle as a legal requirement
of the state. By granting virtually any Jew the right to immigrate to and become
a citizen of the Jewish state it formalized a connection between the state and
the people, and created a foreign-policy requirement for the state. Thus Israel’s
history is marked by the immigration waves of European Holocaust survivors,
Jews of the Arab world, and, later, the Jews of Ethiopia, and the former Soviet
Union. Each affected the nature of the state and its politics in its own way.
Isolation in the Middle East and the feeling of a direct threat for the state
existence results in the image of a “besieged fortress”. So, the fact is that Israel is
a small state located in an Arab world much larger in both size and population.
Israel’s territory is comparable to the area of a small province of France, and the
population exceeded seven million in 2012. Israeli society is in fact a mosaic
of Jews, Israeli Arabs (Palestinian), immigrants from post-Soviet republics, and
Ethiopia. The acute social and political division is an important feature of Israeli
political scene and way of thinking, as well. There is the old saying, that if there
are two Israelis there are three political parties to reflect their viewpoints. That
manifests itself in the fact that all Israeli governments since the set up of the state
have been coalitions, as no single party has ever achieved an absolute majority
in the Knesset, so the fractionalization of the political scene is a feature of Israeli
way of making decisions. In this case, the intersection of domestic and foreign
politics has become even more obvious than usual 2.
The image of “besieged fortress” has eroded, and today Israel is perceived
as a regional power with a vibrant economy, a dynamic high-tech sector, and
a powerful military. In the eyes of the world, Israel has lost its image of a small
state struggling against impossible odds. Israel now has “security needs” and
“requirements” rather than existential fears. Its power obligates it to be more
magnanimous and forthcoming on peace issues, and its strength should
produce restraint, not excess. Indeed much of the erosion of Israel’s image is
driven by the realities and perceptions of an asymmetry. Israel with its GDP per
capita of 31,000 USD and 100 companies on the New York Stock Exchange is no
more a weak country. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness
Index ranks Israel sixth in innovation capacity, just after the United States. It is
2
B. Reich, Israeli Foreign Policy [in:] Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International
Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, L. Brown (ed.), London 2006, pp. 121–139.
only behind the United States and China in the number of companies listed on
Nasdaq. Militarily, Israel is the region’s superpower, with an armed force that
could easily defeat any of its neighbors. U.S. aid 3 enhances its military edge.
It also has one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, estimated at more than
200 missiles. At home the wall along the West Bank has essentially solved the
problem of Palestinian suicide bombing, rendering Israel safer than at any point
in its history 4.
There is much truth in this image of Israeli might, and those who deny that
capacity trivialize Israel’s most powerful moment in its history. But there is also
truth in Israel’s vulnerabilities, and the asymmetry of power does not work in
Israel’s favor here, either 5. Israel’s eroding image flows from its own actions
and conduct towards the neighbors. Many international actions, mainly by
using force but labeled as preemptive attacks are widely criticized in the world
such as the 1981 attack on the Iraqi reactor; the 2007 preemptive strike on the
fledging Syrian one, illegal settlements in the occupied territories, or building
the separation wall. But as the Israeli founding father David Ben Gurion used to
say is: It doesn’t matter what the goyim say; what matters is what the Jews do 6.
Israel’s security as well as foreign policy are integrated. Without understanding
the idea of deterrence no analysis of Israel’s international moves makes sense. The
concept was formed in early 1950s by its political and military leadership: Moshe
Dayan, David Ben Gurion, Shimon Peres, and Yigal Allon. The roots of the idea
lay literally in the problems of infiltrating the Israeli territory by Egyptians in the
1950s. Moshe Dayan explained the idea based on these problems that Israel did
not have the capability to defend itself from every possible infiltration and thus
could not address the challenges from Egypt. retaliation was used as a strategy of
punishment that forced Arab army commanders to evaluate whether penetrating
the border was worth the humiliation they suffered at the hands of Israelis.
So in Israeli deterrence strategy a few factors are of fundamental importance.
The first is the immediate, asymmetric retaliation, what is the proof of capability
to deter, the second is the reputation of being capable, the third the Israel’s
enemies’ calculations of the costs of the attack. As a result of Israel’s capability
3
Congress recently moved to add 1 billion USD for Israel’s missile defense program
to the president’s budget.
4
F. Zakaria, U. Netanyahu, Israel Is Stronger than Ever, “Washington Post” May 10,
2012.
5
A. Miller, Israel’s Image Revisited. What’s Driving Israel’s Very Bad PR?, “Foreign
Policy” May 16, 2012.
6
Ibidem.
demonstrated in many retaliatory acts, the Arab governments would be forced

to first ask themselves whether their military could compete with Israeli military
and, in the long run, whether the destruction of the state of Israel was a realistic
goal. In the long term deterrence stabilizes the political situation around Israel.
It also explains the need to dominate in every military aspects over Arab states,
and determination to keep such a status quo, because this is the only way to keep
Israelis foes at bay.
While Israel has had more or less impact on creating balance of power the
Middle East for 40 years, the recent Arab revolts, known as the Arab Spring
has generated an earth quake in the Middle Eastern status quo, reshaping it
from grass-roots. Ongoing political change in the Arab Middle East could have
a lasting impact on Israeli perceptions of security. Following Israel’s peace treaty
with Egypt in 1979, the priority that Israel had placed since its founding in 1948
on defending against a concentration of Arab conventional armies at its borders
gave way to concerns about generally asymmetric threats posed by terrorism and
rocket arsenals. Near-complete success in stopping Palestinian terrorist attacks
inside Israel after 2006 led to greater Israeli focus on perceived threats from Iran
– including a possibility of existential nuclear threat – and non-state actors allied
to it in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. What is more the closest neighborhood
of Israel has been changing, because of taking power in Egypt by Muslim
Brotherhood, civil war in Syria, which might destabilize Lebanon and Jordan, as
well as fuel Palestinian resistance. So once again Israel is uncertain about what
to expect from Egypt and Syria, and is also concerned about the future stability
of Jordan’s monarchy.
The newly emerged unstable environment makes up serious security problems
for Israel. Firstly, Jerusalem authorities are afraid of increasing Islamist influence
in post-Spring Arab states, which may create not only anti-Jewish regimes
of revolutionary zealots, but also repeat the scenario of making the states –
failed, like in Libya and Yemen. In this perspective Israelis look carefully at the
developments in Iraq and Syria. Secondly, the rising non-Arab powers in the
Middle East, Iran and Turkey, are unfriendly toward Israel. Domestic changes,
beyond Israel’s control, have led to the foreign policy reorientation of these
regional powers that were once Israel’s allies. In Turkey, the entrenchment of the
Islamist AKP 7 moved this pivotal state into the anti-Israel camp. Both instances
indicate further regional isolation for Israel. Thirdly, the Arab Spring underlines
the further erosion of the US position in the region, and consequently weakens
7
After successive electoral victories 2002, 2007 and 2011.
Israel’s deterrence capability. The strategic alliance, and American guarantees

for Israel’s security have always been a crucial component of deterrence.
Furthermore, Israeli use of force as preventive or preemptive move could worsen
American-Israeli ties – a pillar of its national security. Such considerations are
however not new, but nowadays they are more relevant than in the past when
Israel considered military action against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.
2. Israel strategy in the post-Arab Spring neighborhood
Arab hostility forced Israel to secure its existence, and to look for opportunities
to break the isolation. Its first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion developed the
concept of “the peripheral states”, known also as “strategic depth” according
to which if Israel had no relations with its immediate neighbors it should seek
the friendship of “the neighbors of the neighbor”. At the early stages Israel was
looking at regional non-Arab states, much of the focus was Turkey and Iran.
They gained attention because of their geographical and religious position, as
well as historical relations with the Arab states. Tensions over borders, colonial
past, and religious-ideological differences between these two Muslim but non-
Arab states and the Arab world suggested opportunities for Israel to develop ties
that would enhance its regional position and, perhaps, contribute to its security
and assist in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although both (Iran and Turkey)
voted against U.N. partition plan that created Israel, they soon established
diplomatic relations, albeit limited in scope. Over time these improved and
became increasingly complex.
Iran, on its part, was viewed by Israel as an especially important country
in the region due to its strategic location, its size and economic potential, and
it seemed to have no reason for conflict with Israel. After the fall of the Shah
and creating the Islamic Republic of Iran its role in Israeli foreign policy has
reversed, and Teheran became a number one enemy, “pushing Israel to the sea”,
and looking for wiping out “the Zionist state” 8. The loss of Iran was very sore for
Israel, because their enduring community of interest was shaping the Middle
Eastern geopolitics for 40 years. What is more, Israel was supplied in oil by Iran
in return for military equipment and intelligence.
After the 1991 Gulf War, Israel urged the world to keep the “Iran issue”
high on its agenda. The Shia Iran, which started rebuilding its nuclear program
8
B. Downing, The Israeli Endgame in Iran, “Asia Times”, June 27, 2012.
became a state, which was able to undermine Israeli strategic superiority in the
region 9. Teheran gained growing influence in Lebanon and Syria along Israel’s
northern and eastern boundaries. That is how Iran became Israel’s primary
strategic threat. Israel was also concerned about Iran’s nuclear and long-range
missile program, which was perceived as a major strategic challenge. Since that
moment by and large, all subsequent Israeli prime ministers and ministers of
defense never miss an opportunity to stress the “Iranian danger”, censuring
Iran’s “dark regime” blaming Iran for acts of terrorism and presenting it as
a major threat to the free world.
What makes the Iranian nuclear program an issue is not the possibility of
acquiring a nuclear warhead to allegedly wipe out the state of Israel from the
face of earth, but fundamentally the balance of power, and an excessive growth
of Teheran’s influence in the region, violating the Israeli strategic nuclear
monopoly in the Middle East. Hence keeping this narrative is in Israel’s interest,
what the Benjamin Netanyahu government and his hawkish allies in the West
have been doing. It allows to intensify international pressure on the Islamic
regime, and to restrain ayatollahs from concentrating their influence in the
region 10. A deterring function of nuclear arsenal is worth remembering, because
if Iran decided to target Israel with nuclear missiles using such weapon would
bring to self-elimination, which is guaranteed by so called MAD doctrine 11. New
waves of hysteria over an imminent Israeli attack on Iran are used to keep the
international attention at Iran’s threat, as it provides arguments for tougher Iran
sanctions 12.
Thus, it is crucial for Israel to prevent any Iran-West diplomatic compromise,
which will give Tehran a free hand to enhance its regional influence and
maintain a modern nuclear infrastructure. Simultaneously Israel has repeatedly
warned of “preemptive strike” if diplomatic efforts of stopping Iranian nuclear
program fail. A unilateral attack on Iran would bring negative consequences also
for Israel. Firstly, radicalization of the Muslim world, however Iran is its Shia
branch, secondly, reaction of terrorist groups supported by Iran – Hezbollah
on the Lebanese border and Hamas inside the Palestinian Autonomy, thirdly,
triggering a huge regional war, because Iran would respond to any aggression,
and lastly, it may at best set back Iran’s nuclear ambitions a couple of years.
9
Ibidem.
10
R. Heydarian, Israel Hampers Diplomacy on Iran, “Asia Times” August 10, 2012.
11
B. Downing, The Israeli Endgame in Iran, “Asia Times” June 27, 2012.
12
Israel and Iran, “The New York Times” August 13, 2012.
It is rather of low possibility for Israel to start a direct military strike on Iran
without American backing, however toppling Iran’s closest regional ally – Syria
is believed to bring to undermining the Islamic Republic’s regional influence
by striking a blow to the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Hezbollah axis of power,
which Jordan’s King Abdullah nervously identified as the “Shia crescent”. The
problem for Israel is the politics of Syria after the ouster of Assad’s regime and
coming into power Sunni Islamists 13. It is stressed that if the Assad regime stays
in power it will not attempt to repossess the Golan Heights by military force
and will meet with Israeli leaders to negotiate for peace, whereas the an open
question is how a post-Assad Syria would handle the problem of Golan Heights
occupied by Israel since 1967.
Another problem for Israel would be the rule of radical Muslims instead of
the Alavit regime. Even if the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would not take power
in post-Assad Syria, or even if it does not change Syrian foreign policy vis-a-vis
Israel-Palestine, Israelis worry about the consequences of the change of rulers
in Damascus. Assad’s regime is however for Israel an enemy, but a predictable
one and ousting the president from the post could lead to a disintegration of the
Syrian state, what constitutes a security threat for Israel 14. Efraim Inbar, director
of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, believes that “in the event
that the Syrian regime collapses, Syria’s advanced arsenal, including chemical
weapons, shore-to-ship missiles, air defense systems, and ballistic missiles of all
types could end up in the hands of… radical elements”. The growing presence
of Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia in Syria has been evident since the turmoil began
in 2011, and the potential for AQI, or other militant groups like Hezbollah, to
acquire such weapons could create new dilemmas for Israel 15. Although the
Muslim Brotherhood has become increasingly moderate in the last 30 years, the
other radical Islamist elements in the region, such as the Salafists or even al-
Qaeda, could gain influence in Syria.
On the other hand the collapse of the Syrian regime would isolate Iran in
the Middle East, however potentially provide it with an additional rationale
to develop nuclear weapons. As Syria has provided Iran with the capacity to
transform Hezbollah into a force that the Israeli military cannot defeat, the loss
of Syria may likely mean a weaker Hezbollah, thus decreasing Iran’s ability to
13
G. Cafiero, Syria: America versus Israel, “Asia times” June 6, 2012.
14
Ibidem.
15
E. Inbar, The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel’s National Security, “Mideast Security
and Policy Studies”, No. 95, p. 16.
deter Israel from attacking its nuclear facilities. Defense Minister Ehud Barak,
arguably the most important Israeli decision-maker on this question, told that
the Assad regime’s fall “will be a major blow to the radical axis, major blow to
Iran… It’s the only kind of outpost of the Iranian influence in the Arab world…
and it will weaken dramatically both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Islamic Jihad
in Gaza Strip” 16.
Lebanon, a northern neighbor of Israel influences its security for a few reasons,
firstly, via connections with Syria. Lebanon is affected by what is happening in
Syria due to their long-lasting historical, political, social, and economic ties.
Lebanon’s security and stability have been negatively affected by the Syrian
violence, not just because of the steady influx of refugees seeking shelter within
Lebanese borders, but also the rise in cross-border smuggling of weapons.
Secondly, the Syrian crisis has created rifts within the Lebanese government,
which consists of the Shia parties, Hizbollah and Amal, standing steadfastly
behind President Assad. So in this perspective although there are no diplomatic
relations between Israel and Lebanon, destabilization of Beirut challenges the
security of the Jewish state, surprisingly not due to Hezbollah’s control of the
southern part of Lebanon, but the possibility of the final destabilization of
Lebanon which may end up with an another domestic war. According to Israeli
analysts what is happening in Syria negatively affects Hezbollah. A weakening
Assad regime may disrupt Hezbollah’s vital long term support from Damascus
and Teheran, because the emergence of openly hostile radical Sunni groups on
its doorstep in Syria challenges Hezbollah’s previously unrivaled dominance 17.
The region’s revolutionary tremors have shaken the cornerstones of Israel’s
national security, even raising doubts about the future of its peace agreement
with Egypt under Muslim Brotherhood in power. When Egypt’s longtime leader,
Hosni Mubarak, was toppled in 2011 Israel worried about the loss of a dependable
strongman who had helped preserve a reliable if chilly peace. The concerns have
grown as Egyptians from across the political spectrum have demanded a review
of the treaty, and in particular, its restrictions on Egypt’s military presence in The
Sinai Peninsula. It has once become a subject of serious potential problems that
could lead to strategic damage to Israel-Egypt relations. Even before Mubarak’s
ouster it was not fully under Egypt’s control, demonstrated by massive smuggling
16
J. Rubin, The Real Reason to Intervene in Syria Cutting Iran’s Link to the
Mediterranean Sea Is a Strategic Prize Worth the Risk, “Foreign Policy” June 4, 2012.
17
T. First, E. Yogev, Jihad in Syria: The Penetration of Radical Islam in the Syrian
Conflict, “INSS Insight” 2012, No. 355.
into Gaza, but the situation has deteriorated since the revolution in Egypt. Israeli
military is worried about the spread of crime in Sinai and smuggling weapon
from Libya to Gaza, as well as Islamic jihadist terrorist groups like apocalyptic
Salafists, and al-Qaeda elements consolidating terror cells in the Sinai area 18. It
also has an impact on Israeli-Egyptian economic relations, due to the fact that
Egypt is one of the gas suppliers for Israel. Gas began to flow in February 2008,
but repeated attacks by militants or tribal groups in the Sinai have disabled
the pipeline carrying gas to Israel and Jordan multiple times since Mubarak’s
departure. Although the pipeline supplies over 40% of Israel’s natural gas, its
energy resources dependence is minimal, so supply disruption actually has
a greater effect on Jordan’s energy security 19.
Civil war in Syria may also have a destabilizing impact on the domestic
situation in Jordan, which is a unique neighbor for Israel due to the fact, that as
the only one the Hashemite Kingdom has been maintaining good and predictable
relations with the Jewish state. While the peace treaty signed by Israel and Egypt
has already been endangered by new Muslim elites, a Israeli-Jordan peace accords
of 1994 have still been valid. Normalization of ties is however not popular with
the Jordanian people, over half of whom are of Palestinian origin either from the
West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel. There are an estimated
1.9 million United Nations-registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while
many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained
their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living
under Israeli occupation and in hope of being included in any future settlement.
Thus in such refugee perspective the Hashemite royal family has concerned
about another refugee problem, but this time from Syrian direction. According
to recent UN figures, more than 142,000 refugees have fled to Jordan since the
conflict broke out in Syria, but only 37,000 have registered as asylum seekers.
What is more, the problem is not in numbers, but in the possibility that the
Syrian fraction of the Muslim Brotherhood will look for its momentum in
Jordan, and what is worse such enormous wave of refugees may bring with it the
seeds of trouble, planted in the form of terror cells of organizations like al-Qaeda
smuggled into Jordan in the guise of refugees 20.
18
U. Dekel, O. Perlov, President Morsi and Israel-Egypt Relations: Egyptian Discourse
on the Social Networks, “INSS Insight” 2012, No. 357.
19
S. Brom, The Crisis in Israeli-Egyptian Relations, “INSS Insight” 2011, No. 278.
20
O. Eran, Jordan’s Internal and External Pressure Cooker, “INSS Insight” 2012,
No. 358.
Before the Arab Spring started there have been some worrying changes for
Israeli policy in the region. Apart from Iran, which since 1979 seems to have been
a challenge for Israel, Turkey started deteriorating its relations with Israel. Such
a change is crucial for Israel because since the very beginning close relations
with Ankara were pretty beneficial for Israel at least due to a few reasons: firstly,
a unique chance to break free from regional isolation, secondly, Ankara’s role as
a Muslim country, thirdly, Turkey’s anchorage to the West. Not to overestimate
for Israel is the symbolic fact, that Turkey was the first, and for decades, the
only Islamic country that recognized the Jewish state, setting up diplomatic
relations with Israel in 1949. During the cold war both countries played a similar
role in the Middle East as Western allies to counter the Soviet alliances in the
Arab world. With the end of the cold war, their pro-Western orientation, self-
perception as bastions of democracy, and free-market values put them again in
the same strategic boat. So in the 1990s bilateral relations bloomed economically,
diplomatically, and militarily 21. For political support Israel was in return the
only Western state providing military technology to allow Ankara suppress the
Kurdish insurgency. Generally speaking Turkey became second closest after U.S.
ally for Israeli leaders in Jerusalem.
Their relations started deteriorating after the electoral victory of the Islamic
rooted AK Party (AKP) in October 2002, however initially cooperation even in the
strategic field was continued. Despite this worrying change in Ankara authorities
in Jerusalem believed that their strategic cooperation will successfully face the
upcoming crises, such as on one hand Israeli support for the establishment
of a Kurdish state in fractured Iraq 22, and on the another hosting of Hamas
delegation in Ankara (January 2006). Then Israel disappointed Turkey with not
informing about its attack on Gaza and with not making enough concessions
to Syria in the Turkish mediation effort. Moreover, in September 2009, Israel
turned down a request from Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to enter
21
Defense trade during that time was worth several million dollars. Major programs
included a $700 million deal to modernize Turkey’s aging fleet of F-4 Phantoms and
a $688 million deal to upgrade its M-60 tanks and an array of other sophisticated weapons
systems. In return the Israeli Air Force was allowed to use Turkish air space to practice
complex operations and the countries collaborated on issues of counter terrorism and
intelligence.
22
Also in 2010 Turkish military and government officials have also accused Israel of
providing support to militants from Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Workers’
Party – PKK), including during a May 31 attack against a naval base in Iskandirun that
left seven servicemen dead and six more wounded.
Gaza Strip from Israel, where he planned to meet Hamas officials before crossing
back into the Jewish state 23. In return the Turks cancelled the participation of the
Israeli Air Force in the international “Anatolian Eagle” exercise in October 2009.
In August 2010, Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak expressed apprehensions
about the appointment of a pro-Iranian candidate to head the MIT (Turkey’s
intelligence agency) commenting it as the continuing of the process of leaving the
Western block. Turkish-Israeli relations reached their lowest point as a result of
Israel’s May 2010 seizure of a Turkish ship – the Mavi Marmara in international
waters that was part of a flotilla intending to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza
Strip in order to deliver humanitarian aid 24. Turkey accused Israel of “state
terror”, recalled its ambassador from Israel, cancelled joint military exercises,
and banned Israeli military planes from its airspace. It demanded an apology,
compensation for victims, and an international investigation. Israel withdrew
its military advisers from Turkey, warned Israeli tourists against traveling there,
and refused to apologize after maintaining that it had acted lawfully in self-
defense and alleging that the flotilla’s planners had terrorist links.
Although Israel and Turkey take more or less a similar position towards the
civil war in Syria, looking at details shows that their interests are not composed.
The Kurdish issue makes Ankara vulnerable to the international pressure and
may weaken Erdogan politically. Kurdish problem exists also in Syria and Iran,
what makes Israel naturally involved in it at least to deter and weaken Syria,
Iran, and recently Turkey. To make it more interesting a sovereign Kurdistan
would not only be one of the most populous states in the region, but also one of
the biggest territory, and naturally bound to the Jewish state. That is why Israeli
intelligence and businessmen have longstanding contacts with the Kurdish
Peshmerga in northern Iraq.
Apart from the Kurdish issue another weak point of Turkey is Cyprus. From
Israel’s perspective, Cyprus is attractive not only as an EU member, and a stable
democracy, but also has highly developed infrastructure and untapped natural
resources. The crucial factor is however the need to look for new friends in the
region, as Israel’s relationships with former allies Turkey and Egypt are strained.
23
This decision was part of Israel’s policy of not meeting with foreign statesmen who,
on the same trip, met with Hamas officials.
24
Turkey expelled Israel’s ambassador when Tel Aviv refused to meet its demands,
which included an official apology for the incident, compensation for the families of the
victims and an end to the Gaza blockade. Ankara also froze all military and security
cooperation with Israel and filed criminal charges against the chiefs of the Israeli armed
forces.
What is more discovery of huge natural gas reserves off the coast of the Greek-
dominated Republic of Cyprus attracts the interest of nearby Israel, which itself
made two stunning gas discoveries of its own – Tamar and Leviathan – in recent
years. The two countries began to discuss how they could help each other take
advantage of their new finds, which could make both states energy-independent,
if not exporters of natural gas.
The fact is that all cooling incidents of the Israeli-Turkish relations have their
political reasons, namely the so called “neo-Ottoman” orientation in Turkish
foreign policy, and new diplomatic priorities “zero problems with the neighbors”.
An important factor became the Palestinian issue, which helps Turkey to lead in
the Middle East, but to achieve that partnership with the Jewish state had to
deteriorate 25.
3. Israel and the United States: change or continuation
Political isolation as well as existing in constantly insecure environment made

Israel look for the support of at least one major power. Special relationship 26 that
exists between Washington and authorities in Jerusalem have developed over the
years and are now a central focus of Israeli foreign policy, however this was not
always so to the same extent. At Israel’s birth the U.S. seemed to be a dispassionate,
almost an uninterested, midwife – its role was essential and unconventional,
but also unpredictable and hotly debated in U.S. policy circles. Also today it is
believed that Israeli-American relations have deteriorated after Barack Obama
coming to power. Some specialist point that the reasons of mistrust and chilly
relations are new, comparing to previous American presidents, attitude towards
25
M. Herzog, S. Cagaptay, How America Can Help Its Friends Make Nice, “The New
York Times” June 20, 2012.
26
America’s attitude to Israel rests on three major pillars. The first is the idealistic
dimension in United States foreign policy: America’s commitment to fight for and defend
democracies abroad. Since Israel is a democracy, supporting Israel is an American interest.
The second is the American Jewish community, which serves as a bridge between Israel
and the American people. The third pillar is shared security and foreign affairs interests.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the common enemy in every way. Since the
end of the Cold War, a shared interest has been the war on terrorism, as terrorism is
viewed as a common threat and as such is supposed to ally the two nations (although
unlike Israel, America has made no official declarations linking al-Qaeda terrorism
to Palestinian terrorism aimed at Israel). In Israel’s view, the Iranian threat, first and
foremost the nuclear challenge, is another threat linking the two nations.
the Middle East, and dislike between the hawkish leaders of Israel – Netanyahu
and Barak on one hand, and dove – the President of U.S. Barack Obama on the
other.
The first discrepancy in Israeli – American agendas is about Iranian nuclear
program. Israel is fairly disappointed by the conduct of President Obama’s
administration in the talks with Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that
the threshold of demands presented to Iran is far from satisfactory to Israel 27.
On the other hand American administration is more distanced from Israeli
conduct in the Middle East, because as they predict the United States will hold
responsibility to a greater degree for Israel’s actions. In other words the White
House does not enthusiastically perceive the Israeli traditional prerogative of
“defending itself, by itself”. At the same time American analysts assume that
in spite of decline of the U.S. activity in the Middle East the recent Arab revolts
in the Israeli neighborhood make Israel much more dependent on U.S. security
guarantees, strategic cooperation, and regional influence.
Thus nowadays the discussion is about, whether to launch a “surgeon attack”
on Iranian nuclear facilities with the American “green light” or without it.
Simultaneously statements made by administration officials are clear evidence
of the administration’s unwillingness to be viewed as the one giving Israel
even a tacit “green light” to attack Iran. Pentagon analysts estimate that even
a sustained Israeli air campaign would set back the program by only a few
years, drive it further underground and possibly unleash a wider war 28. On the
other hand Israelis stress that they may take such sole military action without
American acceptance, because similar were taken previously, like those of Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion on the eve of the Sinai Campaign, when it was clear
that a military operation against Egypt would meet with a negative American
response, or even more similar to Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s position on
the eve of the bombing of the atomic reactor Osirak in Iraq.
The second Israeli-American discrepancy is about civil war in Syria.
Washington’s two primary interests in Syria are to strengthen the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) vis-a-vis Iran and to undermine Russia’s influence
in the Middle East. The collapse of the Assad regime would almost inevitably
decrease Russian power in the Middle East, as Syria has hosted Russia’s naval
27
Z. Shalom, Israel and the United States in Disagreement over Iran, “INSS Insight”
2012, No. 340.
28
Z. Shalom, The US on an Israeli Military Strike against Iran: A Change in Position?,
“INSS Insight” 2012, No. 317.
base in Tartus for several decades and, since 1971 has been Moscow’s closest
Arab ally. Furthermore Syria is the largest Arab purchaser of Russian weapons
and is seen by Moscow as Russia’s doorstep into the Middle East. So if the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood removed Syria from Moscow’s and Tehran’s spheres
of influence, the regional balance of power would be shifted fundamentally.
Washington is assuming that the Muslim Brotherhood, the most influential
party within the Istanbul-based Syrian National Council, would end the Iran-
Syria alliance if it came to power 29. Israel shares American interests in cutting off
Iran and Russia’s growth in the region, however there are some diverse interests.
While Washington used in the past the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as a proxy
to topple the Ba’athist regime 30, which has governed for almost half a century,
Israel is primarily concerned about the future security consequences of Assad’s
ouster.
To sum up, although recent relations between Israel and the United States have
been called as pretty chilly, the truth is that such ups and downs have occurred
in the past. The United States is an indispensable ally of Israel. It provides the
Jewish state with economic, technical, military, political, diplomatic, and moral
support. It is seen as the ultimate resource against potential enemies, the source of
Israel sophisticated military hardware, and its interest in lasting peace is central
to the Arab-Israel peace process. Although there is this positive relationship,
there is also Israeli reluctance to abdicate security to another party’s judgment
and action. Israel will continue to consider its perceptions of threat and security
as decisive. It has been a vital foundation of Israel’s security and foreign policy
for years.
29
G. Cafiero, Syria: America versus Israel, “The Asia Time” June 6, 2012.
30
Beginning in 1956, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, the Dwight D Eisenhower
administration sought covertly to overthrow Syria’s left-wing nationalist government.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, through Jordan and Israel, Washington backed the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s armed uprising against the regime of Hafez Assad. Syria
is only one country where Washington supported Islamists to undermine nationalist
and leftist forces. This alliance between the United States and Islamist organizations was
widespread throughout the Muslim world during the Cold War, as Washington deemed
such forces – Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan, the Mujahideen of Afghanistan, Abu Qurah in
Jordan, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – to be reliable partners in the effort to
undermine Communism and Arab nationalism. After the Soviet Union imploded in
1991, the United States continued to foster alliances with Islamist groups to undermine
governments that did not cooperate with the “New World Order”.
4. Conclusions
Israel’s foreign policy shaped by historic burden and security concerns has
been very dynamic due to the ongoing Arab revolts and the changing regional
balance of power in favor of Turkey and Iran, who both encourage radical
elements in the region. What is more, American decline in the Middle East has
been weakening Israel’s position in the Middle East, and reducing its deterrence.
Israel in Arab eyes is no longer an “exceptional” partner of the most influential
state in the world. By and large Israel feels much more isolated and endangered
by the changing neighborhood, rising Islamist radicalization of Arab states, and
grooving anti-Israeli postures of the Middle Eastern societies.
Not to exaggerate the international troubles of Israel, the fact is that it remains
the strongest in every aspect of military affairs in the region. Israeli military
analysts are however worried about the ongoing “arms race”, because it results
in shortening the asymmetrical domination of Israel over Muslim states, and
consequently may deteriorate Israeli deterrence strategy.
It may be predicted, that political and military crisis in the Middle East will
change the environment for Israel, but the basic pillars seem to persist, such as
special, however quite unspontaneous partnership with U.S., cooperation with
Jordan, “chilly” friendship with new Muslim governors in Cairo, who cannot
deny the financial weight of American support, weakening of the danger of
Hezbollah in the southern Lebanon, which suffers from declining support from
Syria and Iran, what results in making it more vulnerable to the deterrence
strategy of IDF.
Mar cin Sz ydzis z

University of Wrocław, Poland
THE PALESTINIAN INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY

AFTER THE UN RESOLUTION
ABSTRACT
Hundreds of press articles on the issue of Palestinian identity have been written
in the last two years. It happened due to granting Palestine on November 29,
2012 a non-member observer state status by the General Assembly of the United
Nations.
Resolution 67/19 of the UN assembly, contrary to appearances, does not answer
explicitly the question concerning the Palestinian identity. In my paper I will
try to display the whole spectrum of legal nuances referring to this issue.
Key words
Palestine, United Nations, identity, General Assembly of the UN
1. The history of Palestinian identity
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British started to carry out their
mandate in the territory of Palestine. Their task was to lead to its formal and real
independence. This aim was not attained. After the war, the United Nations (UN)
tackled the problem of Palestine on November 29, 1947. General Assembly of the
United Nations decided that two states should come into being in the territory of
the Mandatory Palestine: the Jewish and the Palestinian states. Indeed, in 1948
the history of the Jewish statehood started, however, the Palestinian state did not
come into being. As a result of the Arab-Israeli war, some of the terrains which
belonged to Palestine were taken over by Israel, the West Bank became a part
of Transjordan, and Egyptian administration appeared in the Gaza Strip. The
conflict also resulted in many Palestinians seeking refuge (ca. 750 000 people).
In 1967, a subsequent war broke out. Consequently, Israel took over all of the
remaining Palestinian terrain: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the
Gaza Strip.
114 Mar cin S z yd z is z
Arab citizens of the Mandatory Palestine had issues with Jewish settlements
from the very beginning. During the British mandate, there were many clashes
between the feuding sides. An open conflict broke out in 1947. However, we
cannot speak about the Palestinian side at the time. Arab people in Palestine were
at the stage of shaping their identity, in principle, their interests were represented
by the neighbouring Arab states. However, at the time we could speak of the
beginnings of the Arab people’s right to terrains they inhabited. In advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the Western Wall (2004)
it was written, that “The Mandate was created. in the interest of the inhabitants
of the territory, and of humanity in general, as an international institution with
an international object – a sacred trust of civilization” 1. According to Daniel
Benoliel and Ronen Perry, all the facts “stating that Palestinians are entitled
to self determination because self determination has been a central part of
aspirations within international law since the demise of the Ottoman Empire in
the wake of World War I. As the Ottoman Empire lost sovereignty, a Palestinian
state presumably emerged” 2.
However, the period of intensified endeavours of Palestinians themselves
to become an independent power on the international arena did not start until
the sixties. In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 3 was created,
which has become notably independent from the Egyptian auspices since 1968.
The next decade brings a change in the attitude towards the Palestinians. It
can be seen especially on the UN forum. Before, the UN, when referring to the
problems of that region, concentrated on reacting to armed conflicts, promoting
peace solutions, or asserted Palestinian refugees’ rights. In the seventies, however,
the question of Palestine began to be understood in a broader political context.
At the time, we can speak about Palestinian identity being acknowledged
internationally. In 1974, on the forum of the General Assembly of the UN, Jaser
Arafat, the PLO leader, gave a speech. The result of this speech was a confirmation
by the General Assembly of the right to exercise by the Palestinian people their
1
It was a quote from the Advisory Opinion on the International Status of the South
West Africa (1950). Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in The Occupied
Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004, p. 165; The International Court of
Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf [access: 17.07.2013].
2
D. Benoliel, R. Perry, Israel, Palestine and the ICC, “Journal of International Law”
2010, Vol. 32, p. 73.
3
Palestinian national-liberation organizations had come into existence before (e.g.
Fatah).
The Palestinian International Identity after the UN Resolution 115
inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without

external interference, the right to national independence and sovereignty, and
the right to return to their homes and property 4. At the time, the PLO was
granted the right “to participate in the sessions and the work of the General
Assembly in the capacity of observer” and “to participate in the sessions and the
work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General
Assembly” 5.
One year later, the General Assembly established the Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, whose main task
was to indicate recommendation allowing to accomplish Palestinians’ rights. 6
Establishing the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People
in December 1977, which is celebrated annually on November 29 7 was the last –
important and mostly symbolic – move of the General Assembly.
The PLO conducted diplomatic offensive as well as classical diplomacy
on forum of the UN. Jaser Arafat strove to promote Palestinian issue during
numerous meetings with representatives of different states. However, it is
obvious that due to certain respects, the PLO could count on the support of the
states belonging to the Eastern Bloc, of uninvolved states, and of Arab states.
Positive approach of the UN to the Palestinian issue was also connected with
the domination of the Soviet Union and its allies in the General Assembly.
Basically, the status of Palestine did not change until the eighties. In 1982,
Israeli intervention in Lebanon took place. As a result, military and political
forces had to flee from Lebanon. During this conflict, a massacre in camps
for Palestinians – Sabra and Shatila 8 – took place. All of these events arose
global interest in the Palestinian problem. In September 1983 the International
Conference on the Question of Palestine convened. As a result, the Geneva
Declaration was accepted, which included i.a.: the postulate: “the attainment
4
Information Centre of the UN in Warsaw, http://www.unic.un.org.pl/palestyna/tlo.
php [access: 16.07.2013].
5
Resolution GA 3237, UNISPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/
UNISPAL.NSF/0/512BAA69B5A32794852560DE0054B9B2 [access: 16.07.2013].
6
Resolution GA 3376, UNISPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/
UNISPAL.NSF/0/B5B4720B8192FDE3852560DE004F3C47 [access: 16.07.2013].
7
Resolution GA 32/40(A+B), UNISPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/
UNISPAL.NSF/0/2DA3D547118BFD25852560DD006BF4BB [access: 16.07.2013].
8
Christian Phalang were perpetrators. However Israeli army was able to stop bloody
massacre.
by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right
to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own
independent state in Palestine” 9.
At the end of the eighties, Palestinians one more became interesting to the
world. In December 1987, the Intifada broke out. It was a spontaneous revolt
of the Palestinian people against the Israeli presence in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. The authorities of the PLO, residing at the time in Tunis, tried to use
natural compassion of the global public opinion to the Palestinian question and
took up diplomatic action. In November 1988, the Declaration of Independence
was proclaimed. It included the following statement: “The Palestine National
Council hereby declares, in the Name of God and on behalf of the Palestinian
Arab people, the establishment of the State of Palestine in the land of Palestine
with its capital at Jerusalem” 10.
Some states decided to answer this declaration, thereby recognising the state
that was created. In May 1989, there were more than ninety states that had done
so 11. The General Assembly of the UN also formed an opinion on these actions. In
December 1988, Resolution No. 43/177 was adopted. It said that it “acknowledges
the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on
15 November 1988” and “affirms the need to enable the Palestinian people to
exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967”. A regulation
saying that within the scope of the UN system, the name Palestine Liberation
9
Apart from this demand, anther one also appeared: to counter the establishment
of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, as well as the actions taken up by
Israel to alter the character and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem. They also
demanded to guarantee “the right of all States in the region to existence within secure
and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people”.
Report of The International Conference on the Question of Palestine, UNISPAL Documents
Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6F71BD16D6273ABC052565C900573
0E6#sthash.ITXaIw0U.dpuf [access: 16.07.2013].
10
Letter dated 18 November 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UNISPAL Documents Collection,
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6EB54A389E2DA6C6852560DE0070E392
[access: 17.07. 2013].
11
In the request for acceptance of as its member, addressed to the UNESCO we can
find information about 98 states, although in the Appendix there is a list of 92 states.
Request For The Admission of the State of Palestine to Unesco as a Member State, UNISPAL
Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/94D9C3C3DC87698D85
257919005223A3#sthash.6amyZR68.dpuf [access: 17.07.2013].
Organization is replaced with Palestine 12 was of practical value. At the time, the
Palestinians took up decisive action, the goal of which was the membership in
the UNESCO and the WHO. Both of those initiatives failed 13.
The next decade again aroused hopes of the Palestinian nation. The collapse
of the bipolar world was connected with the loss of a powerful ally – the Soviet
Union. On the other hand, however, a chance to peacefully solve the Arab-Israeli
conflict arose. The peace process, initiated in Madrid in 1991, did not result
in expected decisions, but it nevertheless it induced the peacefully-disposed
Israeli and Palestinian leaders to conduct bilateral talks. It resulted in signing
the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in
Washington in September 1993. Due to subsequent agreements, the Palestinian
National Authority was created. It played a role of an autonomous body in the
areas inhabited by Palestinians. A part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were
transferred to the Palestinian administration. In the light of the settlements with
Israel, in the so called A-Zone (the Gaza Strip and eight big cities in the area of
the West Bank) the Palestinians took full civil and security control, and in the
B-Zone, the Palestinians held civil control and security was jointly controlled
with the Israeli services. Palestinian National Authority (most often called the
Palestinian Autonomy) was thus established; however, it did not formally change
anything in the legal position of the Palestinians. They were still represented on
international arena by the PLO.
The next change took place in 1998, when the General Assembly in Resolution
52/250 decided to confer “additional rights and privileges of participation in the
sessions and work of the General Assembly and the international conferences
convened under the auspices of the Assembly or other organs of the United
Nations, as well as in United Nations conferences” 14.
Privileges given to Palestine were limited to i.a:. “the right to participate in the
general debate of the General Assembly or the right of reply, and also the right to
raise points of order related to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East
12
Resolution GA 43/177, UNISPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/
UNISPAL.NSF/0/146E6838D505833F852560D600471E25 [access: 17.07.2013].
13
J. Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, “European
Journal of Internal Law” 1990, No. 1, p. 311, http://ejil.org/pdfs/1/1/1137.pdf [access:
17.07.2013].
14
Resolution of General Assembly 52/250, UNISPAL Documents Collection, http://uni-
spal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/162094FCBE8245D30525665E00536281 [access: 17.07.2013].
issues and the right to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions on Palestinian
and Middle East issues” 15.
These decisions brought about an increase of importance of Palestine on
international arena and, as commentators report, “In 1998, the General Assembly
extended Palestine privileges that had previously been exclusive to member
states, including the right to participate in the general debate at the beginning
of each General Assembly, and the right to cosponsor resolutions. According to
the UN, the decision »upgraded Palestine’s representation at the UN to a unique
and unprecedented level, somewhere in between the other observers, on the one
hand, and Member States on the other«” 16.
In 2000 the final Israeli-Palestinian agreement was to take place. However,
this did not occur as the talks in Camp David failed 17. Moreover, in this period
a subsequent Intifada broke out, which additionally complicated the difficult
situation in the region.
The 21st century marks an extremely hot period, full of various initiatives and
actions taken up by both sides of the conflict. For the needs of our analysis, we
will take into consideration only those, which have a direct or indirect impact
on the legal situation of Palestine. Parliamentary election in Palestine (January
2006) belongs to such events. Hamas 18, regarded by the majority of the world as
a terrorist organization, won the democratic elections. In no time clashes started,
and later on – fights between the supporters of Fattah and president Abbas on
one side, and Hamas on the other. They resulted in the division of the Palestinian
territory. Hamas took control over the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank remained
under control of the Fatah and president Abbas, whom the majority of the states
regarded as the representative of the Palestinians. Since 2007, there have been
two administrations on the Palestinian territory, and both have functioned to
some extent also in the international dimension. Although there were some
attempts to start talks between them (and even some agreements were signed),
a government of national unity was not eventually created.
15
Ibidem.
16
R. McMahon, Palestinian Statehood at the UN, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/palestine/palestinian-statehood-un/p25954#p8 [access: 17.07.2013].
17
Palestinians emphasized that lack of the possibility of the final agreement with
Israel was decided i.a. by the actions in the UN.
18
The truth is that the difference between Fatah and Hamas result was equal to
3 percentage points. The elections statue adopted by the PA (half of mandates were filled
by a simple majority vote) caused that Hamas gained 74 seats in 132-seat parliament.
The next important event was the elevation of the Palestinian status on the
forum of the UN. The initiative was personally endorsed by the President of the
Palestinian National Authority Mahmud Abbas. In this way, he tried to bring
the global interest back to the Palestinian issue, since the focus of the world had
changed due to events related to the so called Arab Spring. A rise of the public
opinion interest, caused by the aforementioned initiative, also led to diminishing
the importance of the Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip.
Maximalist version of the project assumed acceptance of Palestine as a rightful
member of the UN. However, as the Americans had announced their veto in
the Security Council, it was clear, that it will not be accepted. This is why the
Palestinians decided to demand granting Palestine a non-member observer state
status. This procedure assumed the consent of the General Assembly expressed
by a simple majority vote. The initiative of the Palestinian Autonomy authorities
succeeded. The resolution on the status of Palestine in the UN was adopted by
a vote: 138 were in favour and 9 against with 41 abstentions in the 193-member
Assembly. The states which voted against the resolution were i.a. the United
States, Canada, Israel and the Czech Republic. The most significant achievement
of the Palestinian diplomacy was convincing the democratic European states,
which either abstained from voting (Poland, Great Britain, Germany) or which
supported their demand (Spain, France).
This resolution “reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination and to independence in their State of Palestine on the Palestinian
territory occupied since 1967” and “decides to accord to Palestine non-member
observer State status in the United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired
rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United
Nations as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the
relevant resolutions and practice” 19.
2. Is Palestine a State?
At the beginning, we should take into consideration a definition of a state in the

light of the international law. In the doctrine there are two categories of essential
elements. The first one belongs to objective group, the other one is a part of
Resolution GA 67/L.28, UNISPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/

19
UNISPAL.nsf/47D4E277B48D9D3685256DDC00612265/181C72112F4D0E0685257AC5
00515C6C [access: 24.07.2013].
the subjective category. Objective criteria, were laid down in article 1 of the
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933).
“The state as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications:
a) a permanent population;
b) a defined territory;
c) government; and
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states” 20
Subjective category is connected with international recognition (constitutive
theory). Some lawyers claim that an entity is a state (in addition to the objective
conditions), when it is recognized as such by the international community.
Population is the first element which allows us to talk about a state. Of
course, in the area recognized by the General Assembly as Palestine, we have
a permanent population, but also in this context there are some problems.
We have to ask a question, whether all Palestinians should be recognized as
population of Palestine. Ca. 5 million of Palestinians are refugees, who inhabit
neighbouring states. The PLO have always emphasized that they also represent
Palestinian refugees. However, formally today they are by no means subject to
the Palestinian administration, and some of them will never come back to the
land inhabited by their ancestors.
The other, more problematic issue, is the territory of Palestine. Crawford
lists two criteria, which should be fulfilled simultaneously: “the existence of
an organized community on a particular territory, exclusively or substantially
exercising self-governing power, and secondly, the absence of the exercise
of another state, and of the right of another state to exercise, self-governing
powers over the whole of that territory” 21. International society acknowledged
Palestine within the borders dated as of 1967, including East Jerusalem. It does
not mean, however, that the real power of the Palestinian administration is
exerted over the entire area indicated. In the light of agreements with Israel,
Palestinian Autonomy has administration over a part of the West Bank and
in the Gaza Strip. The Israelis rule in ca. 40% of the West Bank. In this area
Jewish settlements were established. Some inhabitants of this area claim that
these terrains should be joined to the Jewish state. Some people justify this move
20
Convention on Rights and Duties of States (26 December 1933), The Avalon Project,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp [access: 24.07.2013].
21
J. Crawfort, op.cit., s. 309.
with religious arguments. They believe that in controlling the whole biblical land
occupied by the Israelis, they make the coming of the Messiah nearer.
Irrespective of the sources that justify the Jewish settlers’ presence in the land
of biblical Judea and Samaria (these are the official names of these terrains in
Israel), this is a group of more than 300,000 people. By no means can the Israeli
government disregard the opinion of such a considerable group of voters.
The situation connected with Jerusalem is even more complex. The East part
of this city was officially joined to Israel in 1980. Palestinian authorities did not
have any control over this city. What is more, districts inhabited by the Jewish
people are being established around the Arab part of the city. Today, a number
of the Israelis in the East Jerusalem is estimated at more than 190,000 people.
Some commentators also emphasize that there are people, who claim that
Israel is not a legitimate state, and that the entire territory should belong to
Palestine 22.
Summing up, the land which is controlled by the Palestinian authorities, does
not coincide with the land in which Palestinian state would come into existence
or, as some people claim, in which Palestinian state already exists.
The third criterion connected with authority that really controls the territory,
which is going to be acknowledged as a state, is much more controversial in this
case. This is because we cannot speak about one Palestinian administration.
When the Palestinian National Authority came into existence, its
competences defined by the agreements with Israel were limited to administering
the governed land. The National Authority could neither conduct foreign
policy nor represent the country abroad. Theoretically, such actions could be
conducted exclusively by the PLO. However, actual changes did take place. It
is a common belief that the President and the government of the Palestinian
Autonomy became representatives of the Palestinian nation. This conviction is
legitimate, since the President, as well as the Parliament, were democratically
elected by the Palestinians themselves 23. Besides, authorities of the Autonomy
essentially started to conduct foreign policy. First, as it is set out in the Permanent
22
Stadnik, Palestinian Statehood under International Law, http://www.lexisnexis.
com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-law-blog/archive/2013/01/03/
palestinian-statehood-under-international-law.aspx [access: 24.07.2013].
23
Palestinian democracy is still faulty. Presidential term of office expired in 2010,
and as a result of Hamas election victory, democratically elected parliament basically has
never exerted a real impact.
Constitution Draft (a quasi constitution of Palestine), the President “shall

appoint the ambassadors of the state and representatives of the state of Palestine
to states and international and regional organizations and relieve them of their
duties” and “shall accept the credentials of representatives of foreign states and
international and regional organizations” 24. Second, in 2003 the office of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs was established in the government of the Autonomy.
The actions taken up by the Palestinian authorities were very practical. They,
for example, made negotiating the rules of international aid easier. In addition,
they gained international acceptance. The President and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs paid international visits, they were received by heads of states and by
prime ministers. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the Presidents of
Autonomy (Jasir Arafat and Mahmud Abbas) were (and Abbas still is) at the
same time leaders of the PLO. Thereby, President Abbas performs a double role.
If the government of Autonomy residing in the West Bank does not arouse
controversy, the same cannot be said about the authorities in the Gaza Strip.
Hamas have ruled there since 2007. Election victory of Hamas confused the
international society. The organization questions all agreements concluded with
Israel, it claims that the peace process should not be conducted any longer, and its
members deny the Israeli state the right to exist and they want to destroy it. The
majority of states, in turn, conduct a policy of isolation towards Hamas, which
is commonly considered to be a terrorist organization, and do not recognize its
authorities. However, in practice Hamas conducts foreign policy. They accept
international aid, and Hamas activists meet the representatives of various
friendly regimes (e.g: Iran or even Russia). We can even observe an increase of
international recognition of the Hamas authorities. During the Israeli Operation
Pillar of Defense conducted in November 2012, representatives of authorities of
various states were in contact with Palestinians inhabiting the Gaza Strip. At
the time, a delegation of ministers of foreign affairs of five Arab states (Egypt,
Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and Iraq) took place. Prime Minister of Egypt also
visited the Gaza Strip, and even Qatar Emir met with the Hamas leaders 25. All
24
Art. 125 of the Permanent Constitution draft (May 4, 2003), Palestitian Center for
Policy and Survey Research, http://www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2003/nbrowne.pdf [access:
24.07.2013].
25
Qatar was regarded as one of Fatah’s declared allies, N. Al-Mughrabi, Qatar’s
Emir Embraces Hamas Leadership in Gaza Visit, The Globe and Mail, http://www.
theglobeandmail.com/news/world/qatars-emir-embraces-hamas-leadership-in-gaza-
visit/article4630750/ [access: 25.07.2013].
these events definitely indicate that Hamas isolation policy has not been so
consistent.
Of course, from the point of view of the majority of entities that create
the international society, the only representative of Palestine is the Abbas
administration, but it must be emphasized that Hamas is not absolutely isolated
any more.
If a government of national unity came into being, it would be just a superficial
solution. Furthermore, such attempts have already been made. Egyptian
diplomacy was actively involved in these actions. In May 2011, an appropriate
agreement was signed in Cairo. It assumed, apart from creating a common
government, conducting presidential and parliamentary election.
Such initiatives, however, are criticized by Israel, and the rest of the
international community may call into question such a new government, as they
refuse to acknowledge the Hamas authorities.
In this context, doubts, which result from the Weberian definition of the state
adopted by some people, are justified. This definition explains the notion of the
state in the following way: this is institution, which has an exclusive right to use
force within its territory. Apart from the fact, that authorities of Autonomy do
not have such rights in B and C Zones, they cannot do it either in the Gaza Strip.
Some lawyers emphasize, that the state should be characterized by the
following features: “protection from the use of force by other states, the right of
self-defense and collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack against it,
plenary jurisdiction over its territory, the prohibition of intervention in matters
essentially within its domestic jurisdiction” 26. According to the aforementioned
definition, it is justifiable to question whether Palestine possesses these attributes
of a typical state.
The last element, which is mentioned in the Montevideo Convention, refers to
the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Some people question even
this element. David Rivkin jr and Lee Casey wrote “This pivotal requirement
involves the ability to enter and keep international accords, which in turn posits
that the ‘government’ actually controls – exclusive of other sovereigns – at least
some part of its population and territory. The PA does not control any part of the
26
J. Cerone, Legal Implications of the UN General Assembly Vote to Accord Palestine
the Status of Observer State, “The American Society of International Law Insights” 2012,
No. 37, http://www.asil.org/insights121208.cfm [acess: 25.07.2013].
West Bank to the exclusion of Israeli authority, and it exercises no control at all
in the Gaza Strip” 27.
Constitutive theory assumes that an entity is a state when it is recognized
as such by the international community. Voting in the General Assembly
showed that 138 states perceived it in such a way. However, even in this case
there are people who dispute with this argument. Thomas Stadnik writes: “the
theory is weakened by the problem that may arise when some but not all States
recognize an entity as a State. What is to come of the nine nations that voted
against Palestinian statehood and the forty one abstentions, constituting a total
of twenty seven percent of the General Assembly members that were present
during the vote?” 28
The last question which raises lawyers’ doubts refers to the entity that decides
whether to acknowledge a state or not. In the light of Charter of the UN, the
General Assembly is not entitled to decide about the membership of a state.
Such a decision is made by the General Assembly upon the recommendation
of the Security Council 29. In 2011, Palestinians tried to gain full membership
in the UN. The USA, who were a decisive opponent, declared readiness to veto
such a resolution in the Security Council. It resulted in Palestinian authorities’
withdrawal from this project.
They managed to obtain a status of non-member state one year later; however,
it did not significantly change their legal situation in the UN. Non-member
States are entitled to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the
General Assembly and maintain permanent observer missions at Headquarters.
Palestine had obtained these rights before.
It can be assumed that this voting was an attempt to confirm the
acknowledgment of the Palestinian statehood. It was perceived in this way
by President Mahmud Abbas, who just before the voting said: “The General
27
D. Rivkin jr, L. Casey, The Legal Case Against Palestinian Statehood, “The Wall
Street Journal” September 20, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119041
06704576578423114178378.html [access: 25.07.2013].
28
T. Stadnik, op.cit.
29
Art. 4 sec. 2 of the Charter of United Nations: “The admission of any such state to
membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council”, United Nations Treaty Collection,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf [access: 28.07.2013].
Assembly is called upon today to issue a birth certificate of the reality of the
State of Palestine” 30.
However, even in this case some doubts emerge. The following information
can be found in the website of the UN: “The recognition of a new State or
Government is an act that only other States and Governments may grant
or withhold (…). The United Nations is neither a State nor a Government,
and therefore does not possess any authority to recognize either a State or
a Government. As an organization of independent States, it may admit a new
State to its membership or accept the credentials of the representatives of a new
Government”. This opinion is also confirmed by lawyers. David Rivkin Junior
and Lee Casey claimed that “The U.N. – General Assembly or Security Council
– has no power to create states or to grant all-important formal ‘recognition’ to
state aspirants. The right to recognize statehood is a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty and the United Nations is not a sovereign” 31.
The other aspect of the resolution of the General Assembly raised John
Cerone’s doubts: “Weighing against these considerations is the significant
number of abstentions, constituting just over 20% of the membership. In
addition, several of the states that voted in favor of the resolution underscored
that statehood could only be achieved through dialogue between the parties,
implying that Palestine had not yet achieved statehood” 32.
Some commentators emphasized the significance of the decision of the
General Assembly indicating that exactly 65 years before, the same assembly
decided to accept a resolution dividing the area of Mandatory Palestine into
two states: the Arab and the Jewish. The Arab state did not come into being.
Resolution to grant Palestine a non-member observer state status was going to
be a symbolic finish of this process.
30
Abbas’ Speech to the UN General Assembly (November 2012), Council on For-
eign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/palestine/abbas-speech-un-general-assembly-novem-
ber-2012/p29579 [access: 28.07.2013].
31
D. Rivkin jr, L. Casey, op.cit.
32
J. Cerone, op.cit. Such reservations were submitted by e.g. New Zealand. Its
representative said: “Noting that the resolution just adopted conferred non-Member
Observer State status, he said that the question of recognition of a Palestinian State was
a separate issue”. General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine’ Non-
Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations, United Nations Meeting Coverage
& Press Releases, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [access:
28.07.2013].
However, the conviction that both actions of the General Assembly have the
same legal character, is wrong. In the first case, the General Assembly acted as an
organ which was tasked with issuing a final decision on the status of mandatory
areas; in the second case, it just regulated legal position of an entity within the
scope of its own structures.
3. Conclusion
It is hard to escape the impression that the legal consequences of granting

Palestine a non-member observer state status are evaluated differently by various
parties, which are interested in this issue. This is why the author claims that the
resolution adopted on November 29, 2012 was much more a political act than
a confirmation of the existing present situation.
It seems that the majority of the international community supported the
Palestinian proposal, because it claimed that the Jewish settlements in occupied
territories and practical freezing of negotiations is not acceptable, and not
because they believe that the Palestinian state really exists.
It seems that gaining a full Palestinian statehood is possible through bilateral
(Israeli-Palestinian) talks. Only the United States (apart from the interested
parties) have a real impact on their success. Israeli and American diplomats
emphasize that declarations of international organizations are not able to change
anything.
Regardless of what we think about the adopted resolution, we hope that peace
in the Middle East and the establishment of Palestinian state is only a matter of
time.
Manuel F ér ez G il
Milddle East Universidad Iberoamericana and Universidad Anahuac
in Mexico City, Mexico
PEACE MOVEMENTS
IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT
ABSTRACT
The peace movements, both Palestinians and Israelis, have been little discussed
academically, however, its importance in the development of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is crucial. This article intends to expose the dynamics that
the Israeli and Palestinian peace organizations have had over the years.
Key words
Israel, Palestine, NGO’s, conflict resolution, peace
“The great figures of the previous generations warned us that the guaranteeing
of international peace was a sine qua non. Furthermore, the technical progress
achieved in our times has made this a crucial issue for civilized humanity, and
each and every one of us, without exception, has a moral duty to play an active
role in solving the problem of how to achieve peace.”
Albert Einstein
The sun rises over Israel and Palestine, and, at the Israeli-army control points
that connect Israel with – and sometimes disconnect it from – the Left Bank,
the women of Machsom Watch, a non-governmental organization that has
been monitoring the behaviour of Israeli soldiers and policemen since 2001
in response to the press reports about human-rights abuses committed on the
Palestinians who enter and leave Israel every day, are monitoring the behaviour
of the Israeli police and soldiers.
At 9:00 a.m., Jeff Halper, the Director of the Israeli Committee against
the Demolition of Houses, will arrive at his office in Jerusalem. The aforesaid
Israeli NGO, founded in 1996, is an organization that uses non-violent means
to prevent the Israeli armed forces from demolishing Palestinian homes, as well
as rebuilding Palestinian houses that have already been demolished, sometimes
with the support of Rabbis for Human Rights, a group founded in 1988 during
the Palestinian intifada, which, from its headquarters in Jerusalem, strives to give
voice to the Jewish religious tradition regarding human rights. As its Executive
Director, Rabbi Ascherman, says: “The aim of we rabbis who are members of
our organization, and variously belong to orthodox, conservative or reform
Judaism, is to take part in non-violent action, show solidarity with the victims of
abuse, and carry on an inter-faith dialogue, in addition to keeping alive, in the
yeshivas (Jewish religious schools), the Jewish tradition of defending victims and
rebuilding demolished houses.”
Sami Awad will soon arrive – albeit 10 minutes late, having lingered over a cup
of coffee with his friends as always – at the offices of the Holy Land Foundation
in Bethlehem, where he works hand-in-hand with Jeff Halper. Since 1998, the
aforementioned Palestinian organization has worked to promote non-violent
resistance and put an end to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, while at
the same time advocating a democratic Palestine and condemning Palestinian
terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians.
The Foundation attempts to improve the lives of Palestinian children and
youths via programs such as Peace and Reconciliation (which operates in
association with the Israeli NGO, Journey and Encounter, and Palestinian
News Network, whose aims are to teach Palestinian youths to respect others, to
eschew hatred and to assume individual responsibility in the search for peaceful
coexistence with Israel.
At four p.m. on the same day, in Hayasmin de Ramat Efal street in Israel,
some Palestinian and Israeli families from Families Forum, an association that
includes hundreds of Israeli and Palestinian families that have lost close relatives
in the conflict, gather together. The aim of the Forum, officially founded in 1998,
is to end the Israeli occupation and establishment of settlements in the West
Bank, stop the terrorism that kills innocent people like their own relatives and
achieve a lasting political settlement, for which purpose, via messages published
on the Internet and conferences in schools and universities, it strives to have an
impact on public opinion and convince politicians to seek reconciliation and
understanding.
Though my favourite byword, during my university years, was “let’s be
realistic and seek the impossible”, I have learned that this is a selfish, simplistic
and irresponsible slogan, since it places us in the very advantageous position of
asking the impossible from others while comfortably ensconced in our favourite
Peace Movements in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 129
armchair, seated in a university classroom or study cubicle, taking part in some

conference, or marching in a demonstration; indeed, there are those who, more
cynical, repeat it while lying in bed watching a movie.
This is why these lines set out to be a reflection on – and homage to – those
Palestinians and Israelis who, in uncommon – and very sad – circumstances,
have every reason to hate each other, choose to go out into the streets each day,
not to ask the impossible, but to do it.
Since I feel that the words of Julio Cortazar aptly describe what has happened
to the words, peace/shalom/salaam – words of consolation and hope; what a pity
that they have a certain air of being overused, oft-repeated, worn out by constant
repetition – I would like to use a definition formulated by Julien Brenda, who
eschews sentimentalism and goes to the heart of the concept of peace: “If it ever
comes, peace will be based not on fear of war, but on love of peace. It will not
consist in refraining from doing something, but in a new mental attitude.”
Though the word “politics” suffers from the same problem, here I will cite
what Manuel Azaña once said: “If politics is the art of governing countries, let
us all engage in it, and the more the better, because it is only thus that we will be
able to govern ourselves and avoid being badly governed by others.”
Since the State of Israel was founded, civil society has played a very active,
decisive role in its formation, as witnessed by the many Israeli citizens who are
members of social movements, non-governmental organizations, cultural and
recreational associations, and political parties.
Relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians have changed across the
years, and one might say that most of the Palestinian population lived under
Arab leadership (above all Jordanian and Egyptian) from 1948 to 1967, thus
rarely coming into direct contact with Israeli civilians.
Such interaction between the two societies intensified after the 1967 war,
especially along the so-called Green Line, when Israel occupied most of the West
Bank and all of Gaza.
Alongside this increase in contact between the Palestinians and the Israelis,
the occupation of the Sinai desert, the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights,
stemming from the military victory in the 1967 war, polarized the Jewish
population into two factions that can be seen today in Israeli society:
− The Eretz Israel Hashlema (Greater Israel) movement, which resulted from
the coming together of nationalist Jewish religious groups and secular
organizations that advocated the annexation of the conquered territory –
i.e. the right-wing and religious sectors of Israeli society.
− The Movement for Peace and Security, which is mainly secular and saw
the 1967 war as an opportunity to settle Arab-Israeli differences, being
made up of groups that identify with the left wing.
As the academics Walid Salem and Edy Kaufman have mentioned, between
these two factions there is the silent majority, which is politically indecisive
and, in the right circumstances, will support any leadership, which explains the
abrupt changes that occur from one election to the next.
Academics such as Yakov Talmor and the religious philosopher Yeshayahu
Leibowitz spoke out against the occupation just after the 1967 war. Leibowitz
was deemed to be “the conscience of Israel” during the 1970s and 1980s, and his
positions regarding the conquering of territory, the role of the Jewish religion in
the State of Israel, and the position occupied –and role played- by Israel in the
world, provoked both admiration and repudiation in Israel society. In his most
widely recognized works, which include Judaism, the Jewish People and the State
of Israel and Israel and Judaism, he very polemically asserted that “no people has
any right over any land. Land is an objective entity, while “right” and “people”
are constructs of the human mind… a land belongs to a given people only in the
mind of that people”. 1
Such statements garnered Leibowitz the hatred and contempt of the Zionist
religious groups. In an article entitled Right, Justice and Reality, published in
the Haaretz newspaper, he wrote: “There is only one way out of the predicament
stemming from the complicated past between the Palestinians and the Israelis,
though neither side considers the said solution to be fair or fully agrees with it;
that way out consists in splitting the land between the two peoples.” 2
Groups such as the Siach (Dialogue) aligned themselves with well-known
peace advocates such as Shulamit Alón, Uri Avneri, Ran Cohen and Matti Peled,
to form Yaad, the left-wing Zionist party that opposed the colonization and
annexation of territory.
While social activism has existed in Israel since the early days and has
permeated Israeli society, it would appear that civilian pacifist activism did not
become part and parcel of Israeli political life until the late 1970s, when the
governing establishment became more sensitive to – and favourable towards –
1
Y. Leibowitz, La crisis como esencia de la experiencia religiosa [Crisis as the Essence
of Religious Experience], Mexico 2000, p. 142.
2
Ibidem, p. 1432.
extra-parliamentary political activism than it had been in the preceding years,

when the founding and survival of the State of Israel were absolute priorities.
After the 1973 war, also known as the Yom Kippur war, a wave of protests by
Israeli soldiers about government actions and policies during the armed conflict
began, giving rise to an intense debate among Israelis about whether those
governing them were competent and helping a lot to legitimize political action
outside the Knesset – i.e. the Israeli Parliament.
In March of 1978, in response to the decision of the then Prime Minister,
Menahem Begin, to defend – and even support – the creation of a host of new
settlements inside the occupied territories, around 350 Israeli-army reservists
sent a letter to him, accusing the government of encouraging the building of
settlements in order to create “Greater Israel”, and of not seeking peace with the
Arab world.
This letter marked the creation of the Shalom Ajshav (Peace Now)
movement, which, in September of the same year, organized the biggest political
demonstration in Israel’s history in Tel Aviv.
On September 25, 1982, as a result of the murders of Palestinians in the Sabra
and Chatila refugee camps committed by the forces of the Lebanese Christian
Phalange with the blessing of the Israeli army, 400,000 Israelis took to the streets
of Tel Aviv in a demonstration convened by Shalom Ajshav, once again showing
the government that a large portion of Israeli society opposed the measures
taken during the occupation of southern Lebanon.
The active role played by women in the Israeli pacifist groups and organizations
merits special mention. In the words of Salid Salem and Edy Kaufman: “The
gender factor should be acknowledged, since a majority of the members of the
peace groups in Israel are women, who have not only set up groups such as Four
Mothers Lebanon and Parents Against Silence, but also participate in human-
rights organizations such as Machsom Watch, and in political coalitions such
as the one between the Israeli Bat Shalom group and the Palestinian Jerusalem
Center for Women.” 3
The history of the Palestinian peace movement is very different, since there
is no record of any non-violent demonstrations by Palestinian civilians seeking
that their national and human rights be respected until the start of the first
Intifada in 1987, and it should be stressed that, during its short history, the
3
Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, E. Kaufman,
W. Salem, J. Verhoeven (eds.), London 2006, p. 27.
Palestinian peace movement has been mainly influenced by two parties – the
European Union and, paradoxically, Israel.
The 1987 Intifada exposed not only the Israeli government and its policies in
the occupied territories and towards the Arab population, but also the corrupt,
non-functional leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Academic
studies of the Palestinian NGOs all concur that the two Intifadas and the 1993
Oslo Accords laid the foundations for the development of these movements
within Palestinian society, with the number of such organizations increasing in
the mid 1990s.
While there are records of the existence of Palestinian civil organizations in
the 1930s and 1940s, most researchers, and academics such as Juliette Verhoeven,
Manuel Hassassian, and Walid Salem and Edy Kaufman in their book Bridging
the Divide agree that the 1987 Intifada might be seen as the event that gave rise
to civil organizations in Palestine (with differences between Gaza and the West
Bank) and also to the Palestinian peace movements.
In broad terms, these were the beginnings of the peace movements in both
Israel and Palestine, the history of which is marked by a series of successes, but
also by dark, difficult periods when citizens’ participation has diminished due to
violence, economic instability and radical extremist political leaders.
The activities of the peace movements in Israel and Palestine can be divided
into three categories, depending on the population at which they are aimed:
the Israeli peace movement which is active inside Israel; the Palestinian peace
movement that targets Palestinian civilians; and the overall Palestinian peace
movement – i.e. those joint Israeli-Palestinian actions that are aimed at promoting
peace, good will and understanding between the ordinary Palestinians and
Israelis.
Since the very beginning of the 1987 Intifada, informal contacts began to be
established and joint activities were undertaken between Palestinian and Israeli
associations, with the 1990s being the most fruitful decade, in terms not only of
the number of organizations founded, but also of the intensity of the contacts
between the said organizations and the amount of pressure that they managed
to exert on the political establishment.
At times, the ability of those non-governmental organizations that seek
and promote peace to apply upward pressure increases – i.e. they manage to
influence the politicians who make the big decisions; at the same time, they
also apply downward pressure on public opinion, giving rise to organized mass
demonstrations that also influence the politicians and affect parliamentary
decisions, not to mention their horizontal effect – i.e. the influence of Israeli
organizations and vice versa.
The main areas in which these groups have managed to achieve success are
bicultural and interfaith education, legal counselling, academic research in
general, human rights and democracy, economic development via cooperatives,
and alternative proposals to settle territorial conflicts.
Some examples of the successes achieved by the Field of Peace are: the upward
pressure that the latter organization succeeded in applying both in Israel and
in other countries, leading to the Israeli government’s decision to withdraw
from southern Lebanon in the year 2000; the aforementioned 1987 Intifada; the
pressure brought to bear on both Arafat and the Nineteenth National Palestinian
Congress by the Palestinian peace organizations, leading the former to approve
the two-state solution and the proposal to recognize Israel; the 1993 Oslo Accords,
which reaped unprecedented popular support, though they later fell through;
and even Ariel Sharon’s plan for the splitting off of the Gaza Strip in 2005, all of
which can, to some extent, be attributed to the said civilian organizations.
“You say that working with children is exhausting. You’re right, because you have
to get on the same level as them, stoop, bend down, crouch, make yourself small.
You’re wrong on that score: that’s not what tires you out, but rather having to
rise to the level of their feelings, stretch, make yourself longer, stand on tiptoe in
order not to hurt them.”
Janusz Korczak 1942
Also one should not neglect to mention other initiatives of the so-called “Field of
Peace”, such as the Neve Shalom-Wahat al Salam (In English: “Oasis of Peace”)
school community founded in 1970 on the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
By 2006, around 50 families had settled in the aforesaid community, which is
self- governing and not affiliated to any political party. In the words of one of its
founders, “Neve Shalom is not something inside a bubble, removed from reality.
This community confronts the conflict between Palestine and Israel, which is
reflected inside it.”
With very little initial support from the Israeli Ministry of Education, the
community in question opened a school that mainly covers the pre-school and
primary levels, as well as the lower senior-high-school grades, and currently has
between 250 and 300 children enrolled, both Palestinian and Jewish.
The said school, which is bilingual and bi-national, takes in children from
both the Neve Shalom community and also the environs of the village where it is
located, who presently make up 90% of all the pupils, as well as day-pupils from
the more distant communities of Nachshon, Harel and Gezer.
Its alternative curriculum is based on several basic tenets, the most
outstanding of which are:
− Jews and Palestinians participate equally in both management and
teaching.
− The establishment of a natural framework that allows Jewish and
Palestinian children to come together every day in a safe environment.
− Teaching in both Hebrew and Arabic for all pupils.
− Strengthening of the children’s individual identity, via teaching about
their own culture and traditions, along with the inculcation of respect for
the other culture based on teaching about its values and traditions.
It should be stressed that, both in the classroom and during recesses and
extracurricular activities, the issue of identity is constantly brought up at Neve
Shalom, where the classes are given in Hebrew and Arabic, the children learn
about each other’s traditions, and both the Jewish and the Moslem children
celebrate each other’s feast days together.
Outstanding among the programs that the school offers is the one called
“Home Hospitality”, which consists in pupils visiting their classmates’ homes
in other villages. In this way, the children develop strong inter-community
links, with stress being placed on mutual understanding of the different family
environments that exist side by side in the same area. To quote one of the
members of Neve Shalom: “Since the school operates based on a democratic,
egalitarian model, the children learn that it’s possible for Arabs and Jews to work
together.”
This ongoing cultural exchange leads the children of Neve Shalom to develop
alternative viewpoints and hence to understand, accept and respect each other.
In recent years, other schools have been set up based on the Neve Shalom
model. While these schools adhere to the state curriculum, they make their own
educational and administrative decisions, as exemplified by their opting to use
Israeli books that include texts aimed at Arabs (one should not forget that both
Hebrew and Arabic are Israel’s official languages).
At present, the primary school is state-recognized, but operates independently,
and there are plans to extend the Neve Shalom model to communities in other
parts of Israel, as well as to set up cooperative projects with Palestinian schools,
though it must be acknowledged that the said educational model has still not
been put into practice within the Palestinian educational system.
Outstanding in the Neve Shalom model is the approach proposed by the
Israeli teacher, Dan Bar-On, and his Palestinian colleague, Sami Adwan, who
both published a text book for Israeli and Palestinian secondary schools that
presents two versions of history, since, in the words of Bar-On, “A common
history was not possible. Given the existence of two states, one must accept two
narratives. We have to learn to live with each other.” 4
Bar-On’s and Adwan’s book was published in Catalan and Spanish by
the Intermón publishing company and caused a great deal of controversy
among Israeli educators, since various teachers, including the Israeli Minister
of Education himself, have consistently refused to implement the book’s
methodology, which involves the analysis of three historic events – the 1917
Balfour Declaration, the 1948 War, and the First Intifada in 1987 – based on
“an asymmetrical narrative”, since, in the words of Adwan, “It is not a matter of
denying one own version in order to accept that of the other. One must accept
the other’s version without denying one’s own.” 5
The very title of the book, Histories of the Other. Israel and Palestine, One
Conflict, Two Viewpoints, reveals its aims. In it, the authors enter what they
describe as a “minefield” full of dangers, though they assert that, if one accepts
that history is interpretation – the formation of perceptions and interpretations
that make it possible to bring about a change that has been awaited for years –
then “in the XXI century, there are no excuses for continuing to deny the other.” 6
In this regard, one must acknowledge that violence and terrorism have
damaged the legitimacy and credibility of the arguments about reconciliation
and dignity that these groups put forward.
The lack of effective dialogue among institutional leaders, which, in recent
years, has led to unilateral policies, should not polarize those people who are
committed to building peace, but it cannot be denied that, in such a violent
political climate, initiatives for peaceful coexistence do not receive much support
from the bulk of the civilian populations of either Israel or Palestine.
Non-violent strategies are needed in both the Palestinian and the Israeli
societies. In this respect, the joint development by the various peace movements
4
“El Periódico”, February 15, 2006.
5
Ibidem.
6
Ibidem.
of an interdependent economic and social program could lead to contact at the

most immediate level – that of everyday life. Indeed, improved living conditions
enable the peace movements themselves to grow.
Also, it must be admitted that the participation of both Palestinian and
Israeli intellectuals in the aforesaid civilian demonstrations and organizations
has decreased over the last few years, due to the polarization that one sees at all
levels of both societies.
The terror that the people of Palestine and Israel have been subjected to has
had an enormous impact on civilian participation in the peace process, and,
indeed, the extremist forces and the violent factions in both communities have
indirectly cooperated in continuing the violence, the hate and the demonization
of the other.
Therefore, it is necessary to create minimum levels of stability, economic
development and security, so that most Israelis and Palestinians will not only
support efforts to bring about peace, but also believe that such efforts can
succeed, and it is here that the international community – if such a thing really
exists – could be of help.
However, I am bound to remark that the difficult situation that has prevailed
for so many years in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel has revealed the profound
ignorance about the conflict that prevails in the media, politicians, academics
and most specialists.
The war in Gaza and Israel has led to the polarization and radicalization of
the supporters of both Israel and Palestine, leaving very little leeway for those
of us who like to define ourselves as both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli, with
the result that dialogue between those holding different positions has become
equally impossible not only in the universities and the media, but also in daily
life. And without serious dialogue and analysis, no sincere agreement can be
reached.
In my opinion, this situation is due to various factors, among which I would
like to highlight: the simplistic and superficial sensationalist communications
media, which prefer quick sound bites over rigorous analysis; the lack of an
academic community with social clout that explains and analyzes the causes of
the conflict; the scant objectivity and professionalism of most opinion columns
and specialists speaking on the radio or appearing on television; a civil society
that is keen to support either Israel or Palestine, but from a distance, without
running any risks, and without the curiosity and humility that stem from an
awareness that the aforesaid superficial and tendentious communications media
have misled people into erroneously believing that they are well informed about
the topic in question.
Thus, based on superficial news reports or sensationalist photos or scenes
shown on TV, everywhere there emerge specialists who demand that their voices
be heard and respected by the rest of us. However, in reality nobody listens to, or
reads, the words of those who think differently, nobody doubts his own opinions
and convictions, clashing discourses are created, and everybody, from his own
entrenched position, condemns those with views that differ from his own.
And these people who are incapable of listening to, or reading, a different
opinion are the same ones who demand peace in Palestine and Israel. What
cynics!
In the words of Amos Oz, we become fanatical adherents of the cause that we
defend, and unfortunately fanaticism is very contagious.
It is essential and urgent that we create spaces for analysis, study, research and
discussion in those universities that have enough impact on society to generate
the minimum amount of factual knowledge required in order for people to take
the most objective position – and reach the most informed opinion – that is
possible about this, or any other, conflict in which people are dying.
Continuous proximity with these real, encouraging expressions of solidarity
between Israelis and Palestinians will enable people to become more productively
involved and, in the words of Hannah Arendt, to eschew lazy ways of thinking
that shun complexity and depth, splitting the world into good and bad, black
and white – mental routines that are blind to the complexity and depth of social
problems and turn us into implacable judges of distant conflicts that are alien to
us. As Ray Loriga has written, “Nobody wants to pay the price of struggle, and
so, day after day, words such as ‘repudiation’, ‘condemnation’ or ‘solidarity’ gain
ground over effective action”.
And it is precisely effective action that the NGOs we have mentioned propose,
encourage and take action that will enable us to develop the mental attitude that
constitutes the true peace that Julián Brenda speaks about and the self-governing
environment that Azaña seeks.
These civilian demonstrations and organizations may be the key to a future
which, while not perfect, is the best one possible in the Middle East. However,
like all good things, this will take time, patience, respect for those who refuse to
accept their cruel fate, humility, and a lot of hard work.
I can think of no better way to end this paper than by transcribing the
following extract from the book, The Same Sea, by Amos Oz:
“And you?
Shattered, desperate, one hears from a distance the cries, in Yiddish, of a woman
whose stomach has been slashed open before her very eyes.
And one hears, moaning in Arabic, yet another woman whose house or child…
Her voice is piercing, terrifying.
And you sharpen a pencil or glue together the ripped cover of a book.
At the very least, shudder!”
Note:
Some of the quotations ate taken from interviews carried out in Israel and
Palestine by the author of this article in the period 2007–2008. The author wishes
to thank all who so kindly and warmly gave their time and shared their thoughts
and feelings.
R EVIEWS
A lf r e d L ut r z y kow sk i (r ev.)
Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Pozycja ustrojowa i funkcje Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej po akcesji do Unii Europejskiej [Constitutional Status and Functions of the
Sejm of the Republic of Poland Following the Accession to the European Union],
Dom ELIPSA Publishing House, Warsaw 2012, pp. 713
Mrs. Dr. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, the author of numerous multidisciplinary publications

balances mainly between legal and political science. Undoubtedly, her latest book is
a real masterpiece of writing not only because of its volume. The problems she describes
cover fundamental topics of the constitution of contemporary Poland. By leading her
reader through a huge number of events to the end of the first decade of the XXI century,
the author assumed the accession of our state to the European Union (1st May 2004) as
a caesura defining the time horizon of her considerations. The book is also abundant in
time references to the period before 2004 and in issues that appeared, literally, in the last
months before the book was published. This proves that the Author manages to conduct
the most current analysis, which obviously enhances its attractiveness and the relevance
of the book.
All the considerations included both in this part of the writing which is
a constitutional analysis of normative considerations shaping the position and functions
of the Sejm of the RP and in the European “plot” are subject to a few introductory
assumptions. Their purpose is to present the constitutional transformations of the
Polish Sejm and its functions in the context of the ongoing processes in the European
Union. Already in the Introduction the Author states that the transformation of the
Union and its entities by “building a thick network of trans-national dependencies
must (…) lead to serious changes concerning the position of national authorities”; she
also adds that “Their full exclusivity of decisions/competences (…) in the advanced
integration/unity would be non-functional in the need of transnational unity” (p. 8).
As it is generally known, not only did these changes concern national parliaments
but also brought crucial transformations of other public authorities mainly of
governments of EU Member States as well. These processes led to the shaping of new
relations between parliaments and governments on the national forum, new forms
and methods to perform their functions within the EU and new connections and
140 REVIEWS
references between authority bodies on the European scene. According to the Author,
a significant and more visible phenomenon is a “specific remodeling of relations
between legislative and executive powers” (Ibidem). As a result, the supremacy of
governments and ministers in building and integrating the European structure
appeared. The parliaments of EU Member States became authorities that had to accept
the information to set representatives of national executives constituted in accordance
with original Treaties of Communities (later the European Union) as bodies with the
highest decision-making power.
One must agree with further assumptions that the Author made by conducting
a detailed multi-layered analysis of current processes in our country. In fact, Polish
practice and experience in this field are a textbook illustration of the phenomenon in
which the existing paradigm of functions, tasks and decision-making order are skipped
within the frames of the public authorities system. It was directly connected with an
active presence of Poland in Union bodies and institutions. Becoming a Member State
of the European Union and following ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon (10 th October
2009) obliged Poland not only to a new theoretical outlook on the question of its role
in the constitutional rank of the Sejm, government and other bodies. The need to build
a coherent set of relations between them both from the point of view of the Constitution
of the RP and the EU model appeared as well. This also raised the question about the
necessity of constitutional revision and a range of constitutional laws.
The hypothesis of the writing is very interesting although a bit questionable. The
author assumes in it that as a result of the accession of Poland to the European Union,
serious changes in a constitutional position and function of the Sejm occurred. Part
of the competences of the Sejm was shifted towards the government, which resulted
in dominance over the legislative. And that is the sentence that exactly describes the
situation and is an introductory assessment verified during the analysis of the process!
However, does the partial acquiring of European Union competences of the Sejm by the
Council of Ministers mean that “the prerogatives of the Sejm were significantly reduced
in favour of the government” and that “The fall of the legislative sovereignty took place
(…)” (p. 11). This statement, bearing the phrase which alleviates the categoricalness of
the assessment (“as the changes were becoming more and more often assessed”, Ibidem),
may raise concerns due to its “radicalism” and categoricalness. The processes described
and analysed by the Author derive from a wish to participate in European integration,
which implies the need to recourse to new tools and methods in decision-making bodies
of the European Union. In the post-accession reality, one needs to once again read and
redefine the traditional functions of particular national authorities system as well. This
system resembles an institutional construction “written” in the constitution, so it must
be functional for the interests of the state and for challenges resulting from the current
internal and international situation. Being part of the European Union, which is a result
of adhesive accession, inevitably involves the necessity of a series of changes in the
mechanisms and functioning rules of authorities in Member States, and the necessity of
modification of “competency fields” and their interrelationships.
REVIEWS 141
The first two chapters of the book convince us that the dramatising statements
about reducing the prerogatives of the Sejm and the fall of its legislative sovereignty
should be treated as a hypothesis verified only as a whole. While discussing the change
of the position and the function of the Sejm after 2004 the Author states: “We face (…)
a completely new situation which resulted mainly from shifting the traditional role of
parliament to EU institutions” (p. 231). So these are not only the prerogatives of the
Sejm that were reduced. These were the European Union bodies that acquired part of
the legislative competences of national parliaments. That is where the source of the so
called “fall of the legislative sovereignty” of the Sejm is to be found, because “also in
the EU, an organisation of inter-governmental character, there is a necessity to shift
some of the roles concerning legislative function of the Council of Ministers” (p. 238).
It also has to be pointed out that this part of the book contains comparative fragments
which show transformations and solutions applied in other Member States as well. This
significantly enhances the cognitive qualities of the writing.
Did the described phenomena mean degradation of the constitutional status of the
Sejm of the RP, which would be equal to undermining constitutional regulations? Was
the range of supervision over government carried out by the Sejm limited to a national
level only, while in front of the EU the Council of Ministers could be an autonomous
participant of the decision-making process and Union legislative? The range of the
real power of the Polish parliament would be diminished in this way. The Author is
critical of the fact that the Polish parliament did not make any effort in order to
establish a new model of Sejm and Senat relations on EU matters with the Council of
Ministers (Ibidem). Later events and decisions made by the Polish parliament and EU
bodies, especially the Treaty of Lisbon, had new contributions while defining the roles
of national parliaments and their constitutional status in the country both in front of
the European Union and its authorities. The importance of advisory, supervisory and
control competences of parliament was increased. The Sejm obtained new entitlements
in the decisive mechanism of the EU. These are mostly: participating of the procedure of
modifying EU treaties, acceptance of international agreements, the right to participate
in EU legislative activity, giving opinions on EU laws or co-deciding on the EU budget
(p. 585 and 629). The role of parliament to implement the norms of Union law into the
Polish system is of vital importance. The Author sees this role as a way to compensate
a prejudice of the legislative bodies which parliaments of EU Member States had to face
(p. 629).
This comprehensive and richly documented study of constitutional, legislative,
supervisory and creative functions of the Sejm of the RP (Chapters III-VI) after the
accession of Poland to the European Union is a “masterpiece itself”. A reader will find
here an expertly analysed, complex compendium of knowledge on the contemporary
Polish Sejm: its organisation, principles for action, achievements and issues requiring
deeper attention, so that this authority could fully perform its functions assigned by
the Constitution of 2nd April 1997. In accordance with the title of the book, the Author
reports on further issues presenting changes that follow our accession to the European
142 REVIEWS
Union. The book also presents solutions included in the Treaty of Lisbon which
significantly modify the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process
so that their roles could be valued.
Chapter VII (“New roles of the Sejm of RP after the accession to the European Union”)
and Ending Chapter (which synthesises different aspects of assessments, conclusions
and requests) create a homogenous sequence of analysis with numerous, sometimes
brilliant, aspects that are a punch line of all the discussed matters. Special attention
should be given to: the catalogue to the “new roles of the Sejm after the accession to
the European Union” (pp. 594–602, 622) and remarks and recommendations about the
methods and means to fulfil the new tasks (pp. 602–622).
The Annexe and list of data sources and literature increase the value of the whole
book showing the abundance of sources that the Author used while preparing her
work. The way those sources are discounted in the text proves the Author’s excellent
writing skills. Certainly the book will be read by political scientists, lawyers, historians
and everyone interested in the way the system of public authority was remodelled in
connection with Polish membership in the European Union. A communicative title
precisely describes the content of the book.
This work certainly deserves to be recommended to students of various faculties
and specialities. Accessible language, clarity, consistency of conclusions and the
Author’s easy narration to formulate even the most difficult issues – are also important
advantages of the reviewed book. Such advantages are quite uncommon with scientific
research. The Aesthetical way of editing fully corresponds with the serious content of
this work, which encourages to careful study.
Jar o s ław Jar z ąb e k (r ev.)

Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East,
Public Affairs, New York 2012, pp. 304
The latest book by Marc Lynch is one of the many works published after the events of the
Arab Spring in 2011 that aspire to describe this phenomenon and to explain its roots and
origins. What distinguishes The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New
Middle East are a few facts. First, Marc Lynch writes the book not only from the position
of a scholar, a professor at George Washington University, but also as an active blogger.
He utilized his blog on foreignpolicy.com and his Twitter channel to observe and cover
up to date the subsequent stages of the Arab uprisings. Frequent travels to the Middle
East on the other hand, gave him an invaluable insider view on the course of events.
Second, being an advisor to the members of the administration of the President Barak
Obama during the time of the Arab revolts, he is able to approach the events from the
point of view of a policy maker and a security advisor.
The Arab Uprising… is a well written book, with a lot of information about both the
historical background as well as the most present events of the Arab Spring. In the first
REVIEWS 143
chapter the author considers the nature and the main features of the Arab uprisings,
correctly concluding that they do not meet the conditions of any specific definition of
a “revolution”. However, his explanations showing the uniqueness of this phenomenon
and the role of a “new Arab public sphere” are not very convincing 1. Also the use of
the term „counterrevolution” to describe the reactions of the Arab governments to the
waves of protests and their attempts to crush the uprising is questionable 2.
The author analyses the previous waves of mass protests, revolts and regime changes
of the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1980s in chapters two and three, concluding that
popular uprisings were quite common for the Arab societies in the past 3. The results
of those revolts and revolutions of the past were radical and lasting changes of the
political systems and structures in many Arab states. This usually meant a collapse of
conservative monarchies and the rise of a new type of Arab authoritarianism, strongly
influenced by elements of nationalist and socialist ideology. Over the next decades the
authoritarian regimes were able to strengthen their position and solidify the political
systems with the use of various tricks and sham operations. Despite of this political
shift, the social structures remained mostly untouched or underwent only superficial
changes 4. This experience of the past should make the reader cautious about the author’s
assumption that “what we have seen in the first year of the uprisings (…) are only the
very earliest manifestations of a deeper transformation” 5.
What has surely changed over the years is that, thanks to the development of new
types of social media, the Arab societies are now more closely connected with one
another and to the world than before. As a matter of fact, the role of media and new
technologies in the Arab Spring are very well described and analyzed in Marc Lynch’s
1
The term “revolution” in political and social sciences refers to “a major, sudden, and hence
typically violent alteration in government and in related associations and structures”. See entry
“revolution”, Encyclopedia Britanica Online, www.britanica.com. This definition clearly links
revolution with an alteration of power and its structures. Thus we will be able to use this term only
to those of the events which will result in an essential, long term change of the political systems
and political structures. So far, except the still uncertain case of Tunisia, the Arab uprisings did
not change the political systems and structures of the states; thus, the use of the term “revolution”
is unfounded.
2
In fact, many of the so called “revolutions” were in fact counterrevolution themselves,
of course in a more common then a scientific sense, as they meant the return to power of the
traditional and conservative groups and return the of the old, conservative social order.
3
M. Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, New York
2012, p. 65.
4
Instead of creating new political, social and economic elites of the countries, the Arab
authoritarian regimes preferred to rely on the old ones, traditionally including members of some
specific clans and tribes, major landowners, local notables, members of religious groups and
minorities, the army officers or just friends, comrades and members of family of the political
leaders. R. Owen, State, Power and Politics In the Making of the Modern Middle East, London
2008, pp. 34–35.
5
M. Lynch, op.cit., p. 5.
144 REVIEWS
book. It is easy to see that all the issues related to the social media, such as Twitter
and Facebook, as well as to satellite television and news programs (Al-Jazeera) are the
author’s particular object of interest. The deeply analyzed role of the media, together
with a well depicted atmosphere of the events of the Arab Spring of 2011, are the biggest
advantages of Marc Lynch’s newest book. The author describes the cases of Tunisia and
Egypt in chapter 4, while in chapter 5 he focuses on what he calls “hashtag protests”
in other Middle Eastern states 6. Though not all the protests and uprisings were so
successful in toppling the governments as those in Tunisia and Egypt, all of them had
numerous common features and the later ones repeated the patterns designated by the
previous ones.
Concentrating on the influences of the new Arab public sphere, the hashtag protest
and the role of mass media in spreading the patterns of the uprising all over the
region, author almost completely ignores the core and most important factors lying
behind the desperate protests and furious antigovernment demonstrations. People in
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and other Arab countries, went out to the streets
not because they heard about the meeting on al-Jazeera or read about it on Facebook,
but because of poverty, unemployment, critical economic situation and lack of hope for
a better future. Other factors, like authoritarian political system, religious disputes, lack
of civil liberties, ubiquitous corruption, or ethnic conflicts also stayed behind many
antigovernment actions, but usually they either were rather short or could mobilize only
relatively small parts of the society. Additionally, the governments had quite a few tools
to deal with the problems of political, ethnic, or religious nature. Much more dangerous
were the economic difficulties, as most of the authoritarian regimes did not have any
ideas or solutions for them. They were also operating in a much longer period of time
and the gap between the rich and the poor parts of society was widening constantly. The
economic factor did mobilize the Arab societies and did force people to stand against
the authoritarian regimes more effectively than any other 7, but reading Marc Lynch’s
book one could have an impression that revolts and uprisings are just in the Arabs’
nature and they were waiting ready for a tweet or an announcement in al-Jazeera to
start one in 2011.
6
The name related to the hashtag dates of the mass protests which occurred in a different
states and are a result of the development of the new Arab public sphere. As noted by the
author “The hashtags that began as a casual coordination device quickly became a symbol of
the unification of diverse national struggles into a single campaign. The hashtags very explicitly
defined each uprising as one chapter in a single unfolding story”. M. Lynch, op.cit., p. 104.
7
The role of the collapsing economy as a major threat for the stability of the authoritarian
Arab regimes has been widely analyzed for example in C.M. Henry, R. Springborg, Globalization
and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, New York 2011; S.J. King, The New
Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa, Bloomington 2009; D. Long, B. Reich,
M. Gasiorowski, The Government and the Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder
2011; B. Milton-Edwards, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, Cambridge 2008.
REVIEWS 145
In chapters 6 and 7 the author describes the responses of the Arab regimes of the
respective states to the protests. Lynch starts with Bahrain, where the demonstrations
of the Shia opposition were brutally crushed by the local police supported by the
Saudi Arabian forces 8. The other Arab monarchs, King Abdullah II of Jordan or King
Muhammad VI of Morocco, whose budgets lack billions due to some moves on the
political scene (like the dismissals of the most unpopular officials), promises of reforms,
and some concessions to the opposition; however, they were able to appease the critics
and retain power. Some revolts (or revolutions, as Marc Lynch calls them) lasted so long
that they finally stalled. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt stalled after overthrowing
the old regime, when the transition to the political reality already started. In Yemen
the protestors split into many different groups and the revolt lost its initial dynamic,
leaving the country with a new president, Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi, who substituted Ali
Abdullah Salih, but with the same old regime.
The bloody civil wars that broke out in Libya and Syria are the subject of the author’s
considerations in chapter 7, where he tries to explain the reasons of the Western states’
intervention in Libya and a lack of such thus far in the case of Syria. The explanation
of the complexity of geopolitics in the Middle East and the interrelations between the
Arab Spring and the politics of the region’s states are strong points of this chapter of the
Arab Uprising… The reasons provided by the author for the restraint of the US and the
European states in sending their warplanes and soldiers to Syria, as they did to Libya,
are convincing, but lack at least a few points. First of all, the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt
and the civil war in Libya brought to power and significantly strengthened different
groups of Muslim radicals and fundamentalists. Potential fall of the Assad regime in
Syria would most probably result in the same, but instead of the moderate Islamists of
the Muslim Brothers or Ennahda Movement, one could expect far more radical groups
to play the major role. The other point missed by Lynch is that, paradoxically, the change
of the Syrian regime does not lie in the interest of the most powerful player in the region
– Israel. For the Israelis, Syria controlled by the Assad regime, their well-known enemy,
but far too weak to pose any serious threat for their security, and aware of its weakness,
is much better solution than Syria plunged into chaos, destabilized or controlled by
various groups of Sunni radicals and fanatics.
In the final chapter Marc Lynch recapitulates the changes the Arab Spring brought
to the Middle East and tries to present his own view of the American policy towards
the region in these new circumstances. Once again addressing the policy of president
Obama and his administration, Lynch strives to present their efforts as genuine,
honest and selfless. The approach, he argues, which tried to combine liberal ideals
8
In his chapter Lynch tries hard to defend the position taken president Obama during the
events in Bahrain, suggesting that the lack of any reaction by the US government was a result
of Saudis pressure and Obama “had little choice but to defer to the Saudis and accept the fait
accompli”. It would be really naive to believe it. US government was rather fully informed and
fully supportive of the Bahraini brutal crackdown and Saudi Arabian intervention.
146 REVIEWS
with pragmatic interest became an object of unfair criticism from all the sides, from
American neocons to the Arab activists. Unfortunately, his close ties with Obama’s
administration visibly influence Lynch’s attitude towards the current US government
policies and deprive him of the capability of critical appraisal. Subsequently, the author
concludes that the old status quo in the Middle East has been shattered for good and
that the new realities will demand new methods.
I cannot restrain myself from taking advantage of my privileged position and using
the most recent events in Egypt, to show how groundless were Lynch’s hopes for the
definitive change of the old status quo and his belief in the radical change of the US
policy toward the Middle East. The removal of president Mohamed Morsi from power
by the army in a regular coup d’état and the establishment of an interim government,
met with applause from a large part of Egyptian society and rage of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which proves that neither the society nor its political culture changed
after the Arab uprisings. And clearly they did not become more democratic. Instead,
President Obama’s restrained reaction to this coup shows that the principles of the US
policy towards the Middle East are still subordinated to their interests in that region.
The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East by Marc
Lynch has two different faces. The good and very interesting descriptive part contrasts
with a rather shallow analysis and sometimes with simply naive conclusions. At certain
points the book also seems to be an uncritical attempt to defend the dull policy of
president Obama and his administration towards the Middle East.
A r t ur Malan tow ic z (r ev.)

Raphaël Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria,
Hurst & Company, London 2013, pp. 288
“Hafiz died and Hama didn’t. Bashar will die and Hama won’t”. This quote from a Syrian
rebel chanting anti-Assad slogans could as well sum up the masterpiece written by a young
scholar Raphaël Lefèvre, thanks to whom the significance of Hama is yet once again
brought to light. Inquisitively researched, thoroughly analyzed and timely published,
Ashes of Hama is not only a critical guidebook to the history of the Syrian Muslim
Brothers – long missing from the academic literature – but also a great explanatory key
to events currently unfolding in Syria. Lefèvre provides readers with a unique account
of the development of the Islamist movement in Syria with the landmark of the Hama
massacre still present in the public consciousness. All of this is backed by endless hours
of interviews with the Muslim Brotherhood activists, independent Islamists, members
of the Ba’ath regime, experts, and analysts.
Throughout his book Lefèvre methodically explores the history and legacy of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, starting from its intellectual roots in the Ottoman and
colonial times and finishing with the recent events of the civil war. As such, it is a valuable
REVIEWS 147
contribution to the debate on the Syrian political scene, both for the Academia and
the general public, since many commentators agree that very little is known about the
contemporary Syrian Ikhwan and its internal politics.
Ashes of Hama proves wrong all those claiming that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
is merely a branch of its bigger and better known sister from Cairo. Early leaders of
the Syrian Ikhwan, such as Mustapha al-Sibai and Mohammed al-Hamid, were in fact
influenced intellectually by Hassan al-Banna as a result of their studies in Al-Azhar
University in Cairo, but, as Lefèvre puts it, “the birth of Syria’s Ikhwan in 1946 was very
much the product of the country’s particular socio-religious and political landscape”.
Based on the network of Islamic societies created throughout 1930s and 1940s and
inspired by the moderate Salafiyya movement, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was
from the very onset an administratively and financially independent organisation.
Lefèvre presents the record of the Ikhwan’s early moderation and attempt to combine
political Islam with democracy, which was the first experiment of this kind in the
Middle East. He also presents the process of radicalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood
in Syria in effect of its socioeconomic, political and ideological opposition to the Ba’ath
party which took over and eventually monopolized Syrian political scene after 1963.
Mutual distrust and rivalry between the two main political forces have also become the
background for a rising wave of sectarianism which altered the social fabric of Syria in
the 1970s and 1980s, and maintains its significance up to this day.
The progressing radicalisation of the Ikhwan, the leadership crisis and the struggle
between different wings of the organisation (Damascus, Aleppo, Hama) eventually
gave way to the rise of violent and radical jihadist movement within the ranks of the
Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in the form of its offshoot – the Fighting Vanguard.
As Lefèvre further explains, it ultimately led to a military confrontation between the
Islamists and the Ba’ath party, which came at the end of the 1970s. Its culmination in
February 1982, when pro-regime forces killed 25,000 to 40,000 civilians in the city of
Hama, has thereafter become a symbol of the regime’s bloody crackdown on opposition
and a factor successfully limiting any discontent among Syrian society. It also forced
into exile the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, which, after years of internal crisis,
has eventually restructured and recovered its coherence and now is about to return to
the political scene in Syria.
Several notions raised by Lefèvre deserve special attention. One of them is the birth
of jihadist movement in Syria, formed in opposition to the Ba’athist regime. Created
by Marwan Hadid in the early 1970s, the Fighting Vanguard soon turned into a well
functioning terrorist organisation targeting Ba’ath state officials. When faced with
severe regime oppression, militant Islamists would eventually leave abroad, principally
to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet presence, but also to Iraq. In consequence, jihad
became globalized and many members of the Fighting Vanguard rose to prominence in
other terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda, eg. Abu Musa’ab al-Suri, who was the main
ideologist of al-Qaeda in the early 2000s. In the midst of the current civil war, some of
them are now coming back to Syria to fight the Assad regime once again.
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Consequently, by exploring the relatively unknown history of the Ikhwan and its
uneasy relations with the Ba’ath party, full of rivalry and mutual animosities, Ashes
of Hama contributes to our understanding of the contemporary Syria. After reading
it, the Ba’athist claims of the current war being the “final act of Syria’s long struggle
between Islamism and secular pan-Arabism” receive essential context and are more
comprehensible. Likewise, the book’s narrative helps to recognize the internal
complexity and diversity of the Ikhwan with its radical and moderate factions.
Simultaneously, the author shows in a clear manner that the Muslim Brotherhood is
in fact only a part of a broader Islamist movement among the Syrian opposition, yet it
attracts most of the Western attention. Furthermore, Lefèvre raises important questions
which should be of concern for the leadership of the contemporary Ikhwan in Syria,
particularly how can they re-establish their support networks after a long time in exile,
especially in the rural areas, and what role could they possibly play in post-Assad Syria?
One might wish to see a few aspects of the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood more
deeply explored in Raphaël Lefèvre’s work, principally its socio-economic and political
agenda, which remains vague, as well as its relations and attitude towards the jihadist
groups currently fighting in Syria. It would surely help in building a coherent and
complex image of the Syrian Ikhwan among the Western audience. Despite these few
minor oversights, Ashes of Hama is a valuable, well researched and very timely volume
which enhances our knowledge about the issues essential for understanding the past,
the present and the future of Syria.
Nat alia Da ś ko (r ev.)

Nonie Darwish, Okrucieństwo w majestacie prawa. Prześladowanie kobiet w świecie
islamu [Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic
Law, Nashville 2008], KEFAS Publishing House, Warszawa 2011, pp. 352
In the democratic countries of the West, one of the fundamental principles of the state
political model is the separation of the activity of religious organizations from the state
bodies. However, the principle of the separation of the church and the state is alien to
the states from the circle of Islamic culture, where all law derives from the teachings of
the prophet Muhammad.
Sharia, that is the essence of the Muslim law, encompasses all the aspects of human
life, such as politics, economy, banking, trade, concluding contracts, marriages, divorces,
children upbringing and taking care of them, sexuality, sin, crimes and various social
issues 1.
1
N. Darwish, Okrucieństwo w majestacie prawa. Prześladowanie kobiet w świecie islamu
[Cruel and Usual Punishment: the Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic Law, Nashville 2008],
Warszawa 2011, p. 36.
REVIEWS 149
Darwish tries to show Western communities how big a threat is the spreading of the
law of Islam to the Western civilizations. At the same time, she emphasizes that she is
not against emigration of people from the Muslim countries to the Western states – after
all, she is such an emigrant herself, but she warns the West against excessive tolerance
to attempts (partly successful already) to use sharia by immigrants instead of the laws of
the place of their permanent residence.
Nonie Darwish was born in Egypt. In 1978, when she was 30, she moved to the
United States – as she mentions “leaving to America set me free from life under the
burden of the most cruel law system in the world. This was the best gift I received,
when deciding to leave Egypt”. Darwish is an activist for the human rights, she gives
lectures throughout America and she also appears in radio and television broadcasting
stations, such as CNN, Fox, Al-Arabiya, Israeli TV etc. She also visits many American
universities, such as Harvard, Brown, Stanford etc. She has established the organization
Arabs for Israel, and performs the function of the director at the Former Muslims United.
Both organizations oppose jihad and opt for reforms in the world of Islam.
In her first book: Now They Call me Infidel: Why I renounced Jihad for America,
Israel and the War on Terror, Darwish shares her private experiences that made her
give up Islam and then convert to Christianity. The author’s latest book, The Devil We
Don’t Know: The Dark Side of Revolutions in the Middle East, published in 2012, has not
appeared in Poland yet.
Cruel and Usual Punishment is divided into two parts: Sharia: the Family and
Sharia: the State, and within these parts, into eight chapters. Darwish shows how
sharia regulates all the aspects of private and public life. With the help of sharia, the
dominating culture of Islam regulates the personal life (on a micro-scale) and state
life (on a macro-scale). Giving examples, the author shows that absolutely every aspect
of life is determined by sharia – marriage, inheritance, sexual intercourses, family
relationships, trade, economy, law etc. Additionally, the most severe punishments are
provided for the conduct against the rules – the death penalty included.
The first part, entitled Sharia: the Family concerns two issues – the history, or the
roots of sharia, as well as the situation of women in the world of Islam.
Firstly, Darwish explains the historical and environmental determinants of the
tribal culture of Bedouins inhabiting the Arabian Peninsula, describes their culture and
the way of life, and shows in what way Mahomet used all those specific features to create
a new religion that would allow him to unite the tribes and enable their expansion.
Darwish shows how the customs of the Arabian Peninsula, dating from the 7 th century
AD, were codified as the law which applies to all Muslims to this day.
Next, Darwish presents the situation of women in the world of Islam. Her descriptions
and observations are the more precious, because Darwish was born and brought up as
a Muslim – therefore it may be stated that this is a “first hand” account so to speak, but
given from the perspective of a “woman of the West”, whom she became in the United
States.
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The situation of women is accurately rendered by the first sentence of the book by
Darwish, who writes: “for the first thirty years of my life I was a real slave”. Darwish
reveals the cruel rules women are subject to in the world of Islam. She supports it both
with theoretical examples – by quoting particular verses of the Quran or sunnah and
their interpretations, and describing the events from everyday life, which ended up in
the international media many times (e.g. the case of the raped Saudi girl 2).
The women of Islam have no chance to shape their lives, they are controlled by men
all the time – by their fathers and, later, by their husbands. Every aspect of their lives is
limited to a minimum – they have no right to take free decisions about marriage, sexual
intercourse, work, travelling, or even to have their own views. Darwish as an ex-Muslim
testifies that women subject to sharia are second class citizens, for whom death is the
penalty for committing a “sin”, both from the authorities and the society.
In the second part of the book Sharia: the State, the author shows what does the life
of non-Muslims look like under sharia law. She describes in particular the position of
Christians and Jews, who are discriminated and persecuted, as well as deprived of the
fundamental rights.
The author dedicated much attention to jihad and acts of terrorism performed by
Muslims. She warns that Muslims use lie and deception in relations with infidels, which
is a great threat not only in personal, but also political relations, which the Western
leaders seem not to notice.
According to Darwish, “the idea of the human rights is alien to nations in which
sharia law is in effect, thus they have developed only the idea of oppression, shame,
as well as alienation and sex segregation, which is propagated by sharia”. The author
points out that the lack of awareness and respect for the fundamental human rights
and a consistent ban and suppression of freedom of thinking breeds terrible social
consequences. The draconian law of sharia is an ideal tool in the hands of rulers, because
it allows the absolute subordination of the society to the state.
After the thorough analysis of Quran and the rules resulting from it, as well as
quoting other studies, Darwish presents the position that Islam should not be called
religion but a political and legal system. Many times the author compares Islam to
communism, as a system that also in principle aspired to a total enslavement of the
society, or to fascism, indicating that racism and class discrimination are an inherent
part of the Muslim society.
The main objective of the author is to make the Western societies aware of the global
threat connected with the expansion of Islam, and together with it – of sharia. The book
reflects Darwish’s personal involvement in struggle for discovering the truth about
sharia and keeping freedom and democracy in the Western countries, which, in her
opinion, are unaware of the threat connected with Islam and consequently, they are too
tolerant towards the Muslim immigrants.
2
Ibidem, p. 106.
REVIEWS 151
Darwish persuades the readers that the West must finally realize what the true
nature of sharia is, which is nothing more than the law of tyranny, “a fatal disease
which destroys well functioning societies”. Darwish emphasizes that the aim of Islamic
fundamentalists is introducing sharia in all countries of the world. In her opinion, such
a scenario may materialize if the West does not change its current policy towards Islam,
based on tolerance and openness.
Darwish does not make do with showing that threat in her book, but she goes one
step further and she formulates a nine-point plan for the Western states that should
be followed in order to oppose the expansion of Islam. The original plan by Darwish
assumes the redefinition of the concept of religion, regarding sharia as an illegal law,
increasing the control of immigrants from Muslim countries, stopping granting visas
to Islamic imams coming from the Muslim countries, closing mosques and seats of
Muslim organizations that use religion to encourage Muslims to murder and hurt people
of other faiths or atheists, elaborating of immigration forms, demanding mutuality,
stopping the inflow of petrodollars to the Arab countries, and strengthening the Jewish
and the Christian fundaments of the Western civilization.
Darwish’s remark, which seems to be worthy of interest, is that the secularization of
Western communities makes in a way “free room” for Islam, which takes advantage of
it and spreads with lightning speed. Moreover, the aim of Islamists – the total control
– is totally counter to the objectives of advocates of freedom and democracy. Darwish
sheds light on the consequences of life under sharia and leaves it to the readers to decide
how to react to this.
Presenting robust views and actively opposing the expansion of Islam, Darwish
comes in for harsh criticism from the representatives of this religion. Nevertheless,
typical charges against people criticising Islam, that is the ignorance of the Arabian
language and consequently, the impossibility of understanding the Quran, sunnah
and other sources of law, as well as unfamiliarity with Muslim communities, cannot
be directed at the ex-Muslim Darwish, born and brought up in Egypt. It is curious
that the author, who is an advocate for reforms concerning particularly the women’s
rights, many times experiences criticism also from Muslim women, who accuse her
of distorting the picture of women’s life under sharia. The author repeatedly stresses
that she meets with the indifference of young Muslim women to death and corporal
punishments used towards Islamic women for even minor departures from the rules
of sharia. Darwish is often criticizes for her support for Israel. Paradoxically, her father
Colonel Mustafa Hafez, an officer of the Egyptian army, stayed in Gaza in the years
1951–1956 and was responsible for air raids on the south border of Israel, where many
civilians were killed. When Darwish was 8, her father died as a result of a bomb attack,
which was the Israeli response to attacks launched by him. The author remembers the
impression made on her by the visit of President Nasser, who asked her and her siblings:
“which of you is going to avenge your father’s death by killing Jews?”
In spite of subjectivity – which is, however, difficult to avoid in her case – the book
by Darwish makes a good study of Islam and sharia and fills the gap in the information
152 REVIEWS
about the everyday functioning of this system from the inside. Some shortcomings are
of editorial nature – the same thoughts, and even expressions, are repeated in almost
identical form in different parts of the book. Sometimes one may have reservations about
the language the author uses, as colloquial phrases appear in many places. However,
one cannot resist the impression that such a form of message is determined by deep
emotions Darwish feels, after all describing also her own experiences. What’s more, the
book reflects Darwish’s great involvement in protection of democratic values and her
genuine fear of the expansion of Islam. The active attitude of the author certainly has an
effect on the language of the book, which renders a great deal of emotions.
The great value of the book is Darwish’s personal experiences from the period when
she lived in Egypt as a Muslim, as well as an extensive knowledge of the Arabian law
sources in their original versions, thanks to which the book has both practical and
theoretical value.
One of the drawbacks of this book are the incomplete footnotes (numbers of pages
are missing) and a lack of index. Incidentally, one may notice the inaccurate Polish
translation of the title, which suggests that the book applies solely the prosecutions of
women in the world of Islam. Such a title detracts the value of complexity from the book
which after all describes Islam and sharia both in the private and state aspects.
Darwish emphasizes that her aim is not to propagate hatred towards the particular
group of people but “show the truth about the baseness of the Muslim sharia law”.
In 2008 Darwish was honoured with the Clare Boothe Luce Award “Woman of
Exceptional Courage” for her attitude. There is no doubt that is a justified choice, and
Nonie Darwish is indeed a woman of incredible courage.
Agat a M u s z y ń sk a (r ev.)
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Marcin Wojciechowski, W cieniu. 12 rozmów z Marcinem
Wojciechowskim [In the Shadow. 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski],
Agora SA, Warszawa 2012, pp. 288
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, b. March 4, 1938 in Przemyślany near Lviv. Polish Foreign Minister
in 2005, a distinguished scholar, one of the best in the history of polish diplomats. Man
for difficult issues, an expert on international security, indisputable authority in the
international arena.
The most important moments in his academic career include: completing studies at
the Diplomatic-Consular School of Foreign Service in Warsaw, where he defended his
master’s degree in public international law, obtaining the title of Doctor of Law at the
Law Faculty of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, receiving the title of Professor of
the Humanities in 2001 1.
1
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, The Internet Archive, http://web.archive.org/web/20080612182359/
http://msz.gov.pl/auths/91/files/min_cv_de.html [access: 30.07.2013].
REVIEWS 153
For many years, he has been working with the Polish Institute of International Affairs,
was a member of the polish delegation during the creation of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, was the head of a research project at the International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) in Stockholm from 1989 to 2002, since January 2008 the
Polish-Russian co-chair Group for Difficult Matters. In August 2009, a member of the
“Group of Wise Men” of NATO 2, author of numerous scientific papers dealing with
international security, disarmament issues, public international law and international
relations, including Poland in an Uncertain World (2006), Whither the World (2008),
Thinking about Russia… and beyond (2012) and In the Shadow, 12 conversations with
Marcin Wojciechowski (2012).
The structure of the reviewed book, enriched with the introduction written by Teresa
Torańska, contains 12 chapters – 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski, each
presenting the memories of the people who rendered outstanding services to the history
of international relations, with whom Adam Daniel Rotfeld met, befriended, argued,
worked and talked. The professor says that he remains “in the shadow” of the following
personalities: Ryszard Kapusciński, Czesław Miłosz, Zygmunt Bauman, Leszek
Kołakowski, Henry Kissinger, Helmut Kohl, Charles de Gaulle, Mikhail Gorbachev,
Pope John Paul II and Jerzy Giedroyc.
The first chapter (Organizing Chaos) and the last (The Art of Diplomacy) tie up the
recent history of international relations, organize reality – the mentioned chaos, and
illustrate the role of diplomacy in the current world.
Adam Daniel Rotfeld offers a collection of reflections as a witness of the age, he shows
the connection between events of the last century and the current reality, shows their
influence on today’s international order, examines contemporary issues that diplomats,
politicians and leaders of all countries must face today. Everything is described from
the perspective of the leading representatives of the intellectual and political life, “in the
shadow” of ideas and concepts that accompanied the years of their lives.
The professor answers many important questions posed at the beginning of each
chapter. He is of the opinion that we cannot predict the direction in which the world
is changing and we cannot clearly define what is best for it. Moreover, author states
that the further changes do not necessarily have to be connected with development and
progress 3.
In the matter of the Polish culture, he believes that Polish literature lacks what is
most important in the lives of Poles. There are no lofty, epic books which would allow
the reader to move to the old days and to experience former realities. Writers create
shallow, mass and chaotic books – it is highly probable that the former level of literature
will never return 4.
2
Archives of the Polish Institute of International Affairs [access: 30.07.2013].
3
A. Rotfeld, M. Wojciechowski, W cieniu. 12 rozmów z Marcinem Wojciechowskim [In the
Shadow. 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski], Warszawa 2012, p. 37.
4
Ibidem, p. 61.
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The author says that there is no nation predestined to crime, or ethnic communities
completely impregnated and incapable of crime. The source of evil which prevails in
different countries is an ideologized political system based on terror and manipulation
of human masses on a large scale 5.
Rotfeld also describes the evolution of Marxism from Marx’s philosophical
thought with the task of healing the economy, to transformation into a “new religion”,
an instrument to eliminate political opponents. Marxism as an ideology remains an
important point of reference for other ideologies of the XIX century, however, being
implemented it leads to distortions, contradicts the very idea of the original concept,
breeds the formation of sects and propagandists 6.
He also gives attention to the radicalism with which the world has changed.
Democracy has become the norm, the population of the countries are not subject, but
political society. Therefore, the actions that were taken in the XIX century would not
yield the same results today. In an increasingly demanding world, we need to use more
complex methods. Decisions are made by continuously growing groups of decision-
makers, while the number of matters hidden from the wide population is decreasing due
to the level of technological development. According to the professor, current politicians
lack the courage to make significant reforms in the country, to actually change the
situation for the better. What matters is the support of voters to maximise the chance for
re-election. It leads to a kind of populism, where the government will promise anything,
as long as the society is happy. According to the author, there was no lack of moral
courage in Mazowiecki, Balcerowicz, or Kuroń. They paid a heavy price for it – have
been hated by the society and thus lost a chance to be re-elected. However, for the good
of the state and its citizens they did what was necessary. In today’s world politicians lack
the courage to tell the truth 7.
Rotfeld believes that empty statements are not enough in order to strengthen the
spirit of Europe. They have to be followed by specific actions that will reinforce the
presented position. Decisions must be made rationally, there is no place for favouring
the members, belittling the problems, and creating inequality. In the EU, everyone
should play by the same book 8.
The professor points out that the contemporary world is a great challenge caused
by the existence of countries that are not able to control the situation within their own
borders. These are weak, failing and failed states. In the interest of all, Russia, Europe,
and our neighbours should show no acceptance to an increase in number of those states.
5
Ibidem, p. 80.
6
Ibidem, pp. 101–102.
7
8
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We should take such measures that would facilitate the process of their development
and growth 9.
Author notes that the secularization of society does not lead to the collapse of ethical
and moral principles. He concludes that they are respected there even more than in
countries where religion is demonstrated in a very ostentatious way 10.
In today’s world these are valuable ideas for policy makers. According to Rotfeld,
no old idea can meet new challenges and threats. There is a need for the EU and other
countries to learn new ways of overcoming the global crisis. They should create new
ideas that will inspire leaders to take action and strive to achieve a consensus 11.
In my opinion, this book is one of the best positions regarding foreign affairs released
in 2012. The original intention of the author – to create a volume of reflection – is fully
achieved. The book touches, intrigues, forces to confront our own perceptions with the
memories of a witness of the age. It describes the main problems of the modern world
and shows possible solutions. The chapters contain similar number of pages, together
form a coherent, logical and harmonious whole.
Author brilliantly analyzes and interprets the facts, as well as explains their
connections to the events of the last century. Dialogue is not conducted in a haughty or
arrogant manner. Rotfeld allows readers to get to know his history and become familiar
with the presented ideas, regardless of level of their knowledge.
Reading this book not only allows to learn about Adam Rotfeld, but also to learn
about people in whose shadows he claims to remain. However, delving deeper and
deeper into the reading, we come to the conclusion that Rotfeld does not deserve the
title of being in someone’s shadow. His contribution to the development of international
relations is so immense that the reason the world has the highest respect for him is
highly understandable.
From my perspective, the reviewed book should be on the shelf of anyone who is
looking for reliable information, wants to understand the complexities of the modern
world, and wishes to consciously participate in the political life, to know the history of
his own country, but also its relationship with the rest of the international community
over the last century.
9
10
Ibidem, p. 215.
11
Ibidem, p. 240.
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Ro b er t Mań k (r ev.)
Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global
Power, Basic Books, New York 2012, pp. 224
Zbigniew Brzezinski – born in Warsaw (March 28, 1928), an eminent geostrategist and
political scientist. Since 1958, a US citizen, formerly President Jimmy Carter’s National
Security Advisor between 1977 and 1981 1. Politically engaged not only in supporting
the anti-Soviet guerrilla in Afghanistan but also in taking advantage of human rights
as an instrument of ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, and in helping Polish
“Solidarity”.
Laureate of numerous decorations – Order of the White Eagle, the Presidential
Medal of Freedom and the First Class Ukrainian Order of Merit, to name just a few.
Author of countless works, monographs, essays and reports in the field of international
relations, of which the following are considered as the most popular and acclaimed:
Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1990),
The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997), or
Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower (2007). Long-
term American universities lecturer – in the years 1953–1960 he worked at Harvard
University, then from 1960 to 1989 – at University of Columbia. Currently a counselor
and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor
of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies at John
Hopkins University.
Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power is the latest book by Zbigniew
Brzezinski. The work is written from a perspective of a geostrategist concerned about
the fate of his homeland. Author sees the forthcoming changes in the foreign affairs
and outlines an ambitious, long-term plan of action for the United States by 2025. The
strategy is not looking further ahead because of the large number of variables occurring
in the interstate relations, thus the accurate predictions made on a scale greater than two
decades are, to a large extent, doomed to failure.
In the book composed of an introduction, four chapters (The Receding West,
The Waning of the American Dream, The World After America: By 2025, not Chinese
but Chaotic and Beyond 2025: A new Geopolitical Balance) and a conclusion titled
America’s Dual Role, Zbigniew Brzezinski touches on numerous vital issues in the field
of international relations. His primary goal is to predict the most likely scenario of
progress of the foreign affairs and to determine the role of the United States in such
setting. Hence, author shows the reasons of decline of the United States on the world
stage, both domestic (such as causing the economic crisis in 2007 and unilateral policy
of the George W. Bush administration) and external (shift in the center of gravity of
foreign affairs from the West to the East resulting from rapid economic development of
1
http://csis.org/expert/zbigniew-brzezinski.
REVIEWS 157
Asia or dispersion of global power). What is more, Brzezinski thoroughly explains the
origin and effects of the phenomenon known as the mass political awakening.
The next part of the book is focused on the constructive criticism of the United
States. Brzezinski bluntly lists the largest and most serious weaknesses of the former
global hegemon. He says that if the US do not take decisive steps – do not “rebirth” by at
least achieving a political consensus on the matter of national debt or developing their
infrastructure – they will deny themselves the chance to play a key role at the global
level in the coming years. At the same time Brzezinski argues that American leadership
will not be followed by the emergence of Chinese primacy, because the world is now
in a situation in which no single state will be able to seize the role of a global leader 2.
Author claims that the potential failure of the US in restoring its position will make the
world more chaotic – whether in the case of neighborhood with Mexico 3, environmental
problems, or states whose national security is largely guaranteed by the United States
(South Korea and Japan to name just a few).
To prevent such an outcome, a former Jimmy Carter’s Advisor defines a dual role
which, if performed correctly, will allow the United States not only to remain a key
worldwide power, but also to act with their allies as a guarantor of the world’s stability
and be a counterbalance to the growing Asia. According to Brzezinski, the role of the
US would involve acting towards the enlargement and revitalization of the West – seen
not only as the EU, but also as a Turkey, Ukraine and Russia – as well as mediating and
conciliation among the Asian countries 4.
While assessing the merit of the presented work, one has to keep in mind that it
belongs to the branch of futurology. Author interprets current events and trends, and on
such basis attempts to predict the most likely course of action. Therefore it is impossible
to fully evaluate the accuracy of the forecasts themselves (since they will be reviewed
in the future). They are not however totally improbable. Even more, many of them
have a strong legitimacy in the contemporary geopolitical environment and with the
occurrence of certain circumstances, these projections would likely become reality. In
addition, Brzezinski demonstrates a comprehensive acquaintance with history, while
the usage of historical references (such as noticing the similarities between the fate of
the Europe of the twentieth century and the emerging competition in contemporary
Asia 5) often reinforces the author’s thesis and allows the reader to better understand the
complexity of described issues.
Furthermore, an experienced political analyst formulates his thoughts in
a transparent way (four questions implemented in the introduction are an example, as
they precisely define the subject of the whole work 6), and the utilization of additional
2
Z. Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, New York 2012,
p. 75.
3
Ibidem, p. 103.
4
Ibidem, p. 192.
5
Ibidem, p. 155.
6
Ibidem, p. 2.
158 REVIEWS
graphs, maps and tables helps to justify them in a thorough and consistent manner.
What is noteworthy is that individual chapters are logically interrelated – for example,
the question ending one chapter is simultaneously an opening to the reflections picked
up in the next section 7. The only inadvertence which can be pointed out in the structure
of the Strategic Vision is the irregular fullness of chapter four (over 60 pages) compared
to the previous sections (about 30 pages each).
Finally, Brzezinski not only foresees the future global order, but, even more
importantly, provides ready solutions that could and should be implemented under these
circumstances. Hence, author is not a doomsayer, but an active creator of a potential
strategy – be it rebuilding the international status of America described in the second
chapter, or proper functioning on the East, which would avoid major clashes in that part
of the world in the chapter four.
In conclusion, the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski is a book that broadens
horizons, provokes and gives plausible vision of what might happen in the global
balance of power in the forthcoming decades. At the same time I want to point out that
the complexity of used vocabulary, as well as complex historical metaphors, could cause
less knowledgeable receivers to find this book too difficult. However, it is a must-read
for all concerned – in an amateur or professional way – with the contemporary foreign
affairs. Students of politically-related courses, scientists and politicians will therefore be
excellent recipients of this work.
7
Ibidem, p. 74.

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ISSN 2299-4335 ISSUE

Middle East in the Transition

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A New Middle East?

What’s with Israel?

Mar cin Sz ydzis z

Jar o s ław Jar z ąb e k

PAIN, LITTLE GAIN: THE CONSEQUENCES

T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, New York 2011, pp. 190, 234.

Morning in Mesopotamia, “Foreign Affairs” July/August 2012.

Any understanding of contemporary Iraq must take account of two earlier

2. Gains and Pains for Iraqis

apparatus” (internal conflict, small arms proliferation, political prisoners),

create additional social problems. Approximately one million people were

3. Gains and Pains for Americans

The decline in America’s favourability rating probably resulted as much

Crocker quoted in T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, op.cit., p. 220.

General for Iraq Reconstruction, http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/

THE SHIA CRESCENT

In December 2004 King Abdullah II of Jordan warned publically of the emergence

Shiism arose as a distinct movement within Islam primarily as a political

Shiism is something that is not so much defined just by doctrine, but by

of identity. 12 The Hezbollah-Israeli war in the summer of 2006, which lasted

It is important to remember that Hussein’s desperate struggle in 680 in

Estimated population Estimated percentage

an Ashura procession without the permission of local authorities. This led to

soldiers. Hezbollah al-Hijaz, a radical Shiite group operating in Arabia and

was the “planning and execution of a campaign of violence, intimidation

Bar tos z B ojar c z yk

IRAN ON THE CROSSROADS

condition and there is no noticeable hope for the economic resurrection.

The Iranian political system, described by its founding fathers as an Islamic

practice, the constitution adopted in 1980 legitimised centralisation of most

Washington 2000, Chapter 1 and 2.

The presidential election of 2013, won by Hassan Rouhani might be seen by

of a next military intervention. The longstanding status quo of Iran is reaching

F eride A sli Er gül Jor g en s en

TURKEY’S “NEW” MIDDLE EAST

2. The Middle East as a Region: Where to Begin?

3. Transformation of Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East

5. “Role Model” for the Middle East?

According to Larry Diamond, a well-known American scholar on democracy

Metaphors, “The Journal of Turkish Weekly” July 2, 2012.

paradigm grounded on expanding trade networks, diplomatic mediation and

EVERYTHING WILL BE DECIDED IN SYRIA

1. The discrepancy between the Government and their society (delegitimiza-

“CRISIS, CHAOS, VIOLENCE –

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was closely observed by the international

of the international historical sociology, which depicts the multidimensional and

1. International Historical Sociology & Democratisation

the present as an autonomous entity outside of history, but insists on embedding

Figure 1. international relations according to historical sociology

political institutions in effect of modernity and the regional context, which

the international environment and to show that the democratisation process

2. Jordan & Democracy prior to the Arab Spring

3. Arab Spring in Jordan: 2011–2013

Initially, the demonstrations mostly gathered educated and unemployed youth

Throughout September 2011 the Committee’s recommendations were

response to popular demonstrations. Such a position was understandable, since

4. Why the Democratisation Remains Stalled?