G.R. No.

108713 October 28, 1994

ANGELITO OLAYBAR, ANTONIO VILLALUNA, JR., ERIC LUBRICO, JESSIE DE LA VEGA,

CARLOS ROPEROS, LUIS PLOTENA, JESSIE ABALONA, MIGUEL OCTAVIO, SAM GUILLENA,
and RAMON ESTEMBER, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FOURTH DIVISION, CEBU CITY, AND ORIENT
MARINE AND FISHING RESOURCES, INC., ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, respondents.

Natalio V. Sitjar, Pedro E. Jimenea and Beethoven R. Buenaventura for petitioners.

Padlan, Sutton, Mendoza & Associates for private respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The case of Veloso v. Department of Labor and Employment  postulates that the law looks with
1

disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing
them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities.

On the other hand, there are legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary settlement of laborer's
claims that should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. And while in a dispute
between management and labor the latter's rights are always extended protection by the State, the
picture changes completely where labor no longer recognizes honor and a sense of commitment in
solemn agreements. This is a case in point.

Petitioners were regular employees of private respondents Orient Marine and Fishing Resources,
Inc., when they were dismissed on the ground of retrenchment. Contesting the legality of their
retrenchment, petitioners lodged separate complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice
with prayer for reinstatement and back wages before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. 6 in
Bacolod City.

In a decision dated 4 March 1991, Labor Arbiter Buenaventura C. Cordova, Jr., dismissed the
complaints but ordered respondent Orient Marine and Fishing Resources, Inc., to pay petitioners
P4,005.00 each or the total amount of P40,050.00 as separation pay.

Unsatisfied, petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. Pending appeal
(specifically on 7 May 1991, 3 June 1991 and
9 July 1991),  petitioners executed separate affidavits stating, among others, their intention to
2

withdraw their appeal since they had already received

the separation pay decreed in the 4 March 1991 decision of Labor Arbiter Cordova, Jr. Said
affidavits were subscribed and sworn to before Labor Arbiter Cordova, Jr., after the latter had
explained to petitioners the legal consequences of their action. These affidavits were not, however,
submitted to the NLRC. In other words, for some inexplicable reason, neither petitioners nor private
respondent brought to the attention of the Labor Tribunal the crucial fact that they had already
amicably settled their dispute and that petitioners had been given their severance pay.

Unaware of the joint affidavits, the NLRC rendered a decision on 16 July 1991 in favor of
petitioners.  Private respondent Orient Marine and Fishing Resources, Inc., was ordered to reinstate
3

petitioners and to pay their full back wages which should in no case exceed three (3) years. In due
time, an "Entry of Judgment" was issued to the effect that the aforementioned decision "has on
August 12, 1991 (become) final and executory." 4

Petitioners moved for execution which private respondent opposed on the ground that the 16 July
1991 decision " has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the (petitioners) have
already claimed their separation pay in conformity with the decision (dated March 4, 1991) of Labor
Arbiter Cordova." 5

On 7 January 1992, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideno denied petitioners' motion for execution and
considered the cases closed and terminated by reason of the settlement.
Petitioners went up to the NLRC, this time questioning the 7 January 1992 order. In its resolution of
14 July 1992, the NLRC nullified the aforesaid order and directed Labor Arbiter Sideno" to issue a
writ of execution enforcing the decision . . . promulgated on July 16, 1992."  But on motion for
6

reconsideration by private respondent, the NLRC, in its resolution of

28 September 1992, reversed itself and reinstated the 7 January 1992 order of Labor Arbiter
Sideno. 7

The NLRC held that the dismissed employees were deemed to have accepted the 4 March 1991
decision of the Labor Arbiter because they voluntarily received their award as directed therein.
Consequently, its decision and resolution of 16 July 1991 and 14 July 1992 respectively became
moot and academic since the 4 March 1991 decision had been fully satisfied.

Reconsideration having been denied on 19 November 1992,  petitioners sought the instant recourse
8

contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that its decision and
resolution of 16 July 1991
and 14 July 1992 respectively have become moot. Petitioners contend that the 16 July 1991
decision was already final and executory and could no longer be set aside. They also denounced
their "joint affidavits" pending appeal as violative of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
protection to labor.

No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the NLRC. Necessarily, the petition must fail for lack
of merit.

Even as far back as 1923, the Court has acknowledged the binding effect of agreements and
compromises between the parties. Thus we declared in McCarthy v. Barber Steamship Lines  — 9

Hence it is a general rule in this country that compromises are to be favored, without
regard to the nature of the controversy compromised . . . and if a settlement be made
. . . free from fraud or mistake, whereby there is a surrender or satisfaction, in whole
or in part, of a claim upon one side in exchange for or in consideration of a surrender
or satisfaction of a claim in whole or in part, or of something of value, upon the other,
however, baseless may be the claim upon either side or harsh the terms as to either
of the parties, the other cannot successfully impeach the agreement in a court of
justice . . . .

To be sure, the Labor Code recognizes the conclusiveness of compromise settlements as a means
to end labor dispute. Art. 227 provides that "(a)ny compromise settlement, including those involving
labor standards laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the
regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National
Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein
except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was
obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or coercion."

In a suppletory manner, Art. 2037 of the Civil Code states that "(a) compromise has upon the parties
the effect and authority of res judicata . . ." and this is true even if the compromise is not judicially
approved.  10

Consequently, when the NLRC rendered its decision on 16 July 1991 ordering the reinstatement and
back wages for petitioners, it unknowingly adjudicated a case which, for all intents and purposes,
had already been closed and terminated by the parties themselves when they agreed on a
settlement. This is the clear import of the rule that compromises and settlements have the effect and
conclusiveness of res judicata upon the parties.

Thus, we are appalled at the volte-face and flagrant opportunism of petitioners. As adverted to
earlier, the separate affidavits representing the intention of petitioners to withdraw their appeal from
the NLRC since they have been recompensed were voluntarily and knowingly made in the presence
of Labor Arbiter Cordova, Jr., who rendered the award in their favor. The so-called "economic
difficulties and financial crises" allegedly confronting petitioners prior to their separate affidavits is not
an acceptable ground to annul the agreements since it has not been convincingly established that
petitioners were forced to execute them. In fact the alleged violation of their constitutional rights
should not even be dignified at all with a corresponding rebuttal since the present petition is nothing
but an obvious ploy on the part of petitioners to backtrack on their undertaking, especially after the
labor tribunal has unwittingly ruled, although it ultimately reversed itself, that they were entitled to
reinstatement and a higher monetary award.
The case of Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission   capsulizes the current doctrinal
11

policy of the Court and it would be well for the parties contemplating settlements to bear this in mind
—

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the
law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The challenged resolution and order of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated 28 September 1992 and 19 November 1992 respectively are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 G.R. No. 87297, 5 August 1991, 200 SCRA 201, 202.

2 See Annexes "A" to "P" of Comment on the Petition, Rollo, pp. 112-127.

3 Rollo, pp. 48-49.

4 Id., p. 50.

5 Comment, Rollo, p. 87.

6 Rollo, p. 55.

7 Id., p. 33.

8 Id., p. 36.

9 45 Phil. 488, 498 (1923).

10 Cochingyan, Jr. v. Cloribel, Nos. L-27070-71, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 361, 388-
389, citing Vda. de Guilas v. David, 23 SCRA 762, 767, and Meneses v. De la Rosa,
77 Phil. 34; see also Go v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73707, 12 March
1990, 183 SCRA 82.

11 G.R. No. 91298, 22 June 1990, 186 SCRA 724, 730-731.

G.R. No. 206627

VAN CLIFFORD TORRES y SALERA, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
 DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 petitioner Van Clifford Torres y Salera (Torres) challenges the Court of
Appeals Decision2 dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution3 dated February 22, 2013 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 00481. The
assailed judgments affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision dated June 5, 2006, which convicted Torres for violation
of

Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.4

In an Information dated June 9, 2004 filed before Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, Torres
was charged with other acts of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610: 5

That on or about the 11th day of November, 2003, in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to harm and humiliate, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse, slap and whip AAA, a 14 year old minor (born on June 5, 1989)
with a T-shirt hitting his neck and shoulder and causing him to fall down on the stairs of the barangay hall which acts
are humiliating and prejudicial to the development of the victim and are covered by Article 59 of Pres. Decree 603, as
amended; to the damage and prejudice of the said victim in the amount to be proved during trial. 6

Upon arraignment, Torres pleaded not guilty. 7 Trial on the merits ensued.8

The prosecution presented the victim AAA, AAA's aunt and uncle, Dr. Vicente Manalo Jr., and Barangay Captain
Hermilando Miano as witnesses to testify on the alleged incident.9 The prosecution established the following facts
during trial:

CCC, AAA's uncle, previously filed a complaint for malicious mischief against Torres, who allegedly caused damage to
CCC's multicab. 10 AAA witnessed the alleged incident and was brought by CCC to testify during the barangay
conciliation. 11

On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the conciliation proceedings
to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from fishing. 12 CCC's wife, who was also with them at the
barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the conciliation proceedings to answer for his liability. 13 Torres vehemently
denied damaging CCC's multicab. 14 In the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres
damaged CCC's multicab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. 15

Torres told AAA not to pry in the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not stop. 16 However,
AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's multicab. Infuriated with AAA's
meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. 17 Torres continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall
down from the stairs. 18 CCC came to his nephew's defense and punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they
were separated by Barangay Captain Hermilando Miano. 19 Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times.20

Based on the physical examination conducted by Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustained a contusion. 21

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented the following version of the incident:

Torres testified that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC badgered him to answer for the damage he had
allegedly caused to CCC's multicab. AAA abruptly interrupted the heated discussion between the two men. 22 Angered
by what AAA had done, Torres told AAA to stop making unfounded accusations or he would be forced to whip him.
AAA called Torres' bluff, which further provoked Torres. Torres attempted to hit AAA but was thwarted by the timely
intervention of CCC, who suddenly attacked him.23

Torres claimed that CCC filed this case to preempt him from filing a complaint for physical injuries against CCC. 24 He
also claimed that he tried to settle the matter with CCC and CCC's wife.25 However, the parties failed to reach an
agreement due to the unreasonable demands of the spouses. 26

On June 5, 2006, the Regional Trial Court convicted Torres, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds VAN CLIFFORD TORRES y Salera, the accused[,] GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Section 10, paragraph A of Republic Act No. 7610 and applying in
 his favor the beneficial provisions of The Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby imposed the indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS, the maximum period of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum, the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. Van Clifford Torres
y Salera is also imposed a penalty of FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (PS,000) pursuant to Section 31, Letter f, RA
7610. The Court credits Van Clifford Torres y Salera his preventive imprisonment in the service of his penalty pursuant
to Art. 29 [of] the Revised Penal Code as Amended.

SO ORDERED.27

Torres appealed before the Court of Appeals. 28 He argued that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of
child abuse and that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.29 He also questioned the lower court's
jurisdiction over the case.30

In its Decision31 dated August 11, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision, albeit with
modification as to the penalty:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 5 June 2006
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 1 in Tagbilaran City in Crim. Case No. 12338 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is sentenced to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis in the original)

Torres moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals Resolution 33 dated February 22,
2013.1âwphi1

Aggrieved, Torres filed before this Court this Petition for Review on Certiorari.34

On October 7, 2013, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Comment, 35 to which petitioner filed a Reply36 on February 7, 2014.

Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court's resolution: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining
his conviction on a judgment premised on a misapprehension of facts; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming his conviction despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 37

Petitioner invites this Court to review the factual findings on the ground that the judgment was rendered based on a
misapprehension of facts. He argues that both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals disregarded certain
material facts, which, if properly considered, would have justified a different conclusion. 38 In particular, petitioner
challenges the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses.39 He highlights the inconsistencies in their testimonies and
their failure to clearly establish the presence of CCC's wife during the incident. 40

Petitioner also calls attention to the partiality of the prosecution's witnesses, majority of whom are relatives of the
victim.41 He believes that the prosecution's witnesses could not have given a true narrative of the incident because of
their obvious bias.42 Hence, their testimonies were undeserving of any weight and credit.

On the other hand, respondent argues that the questions raised by petitioner were questions of fact, which are
generally proscribed in a petition for review under Rule 45.43

We affirm petitioner's conviction. The act of whipping a child three (3) times in the neck with a wet t-shirt constitutes
child abuse.

It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.44 The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and
conclusive on this Court.45 This Court is not a trier of facts. 46 It is not duty-bound to analyze, review, and weigh the
evidence all over again in the absence of any showing of any arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error. 47 A
departure from the general rule may only be warranted in cases where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to the findings of the trial court or when these are unsupported by the evidence on record. 48

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within the office of the trial courts. 49 It is a question
of fact not reviewable by this Court.50 The trial court's findings on the matter are entitled to great weight and given great
respect and "may only be disregarded ... if there are facts and circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court
 and which would substantially alter the results of the case[.]" 51

This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. The trial court neither disregarded nor
overlooked any material fact or circumstance that would substantially alter the case. The presence or absence of one
person during the incident is not substantial enough to overturn the finding that petitioner whipped AAA three (3) times
with a wet t-shirt.52

Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner did whip AAA, petitioner argues that it should not be considered as child
abuse because the law requires intent to abuse.53 Petitioner maintains that he whipped AAA merely to discipline and
restrain the child "from further intensifying the situation." 54 He also maintains that his act was justified because AAA
harassed and vexed him. 55 Thus, petitioner claims that there could not have been any intent to abuse on his part.

Petitioner contends that the injuries sustained by AAA will not affect the latter's physical growth or development and
mental capacity. 56 He argues that he could not be convicted of child abuse without proof that the victim's development
had been prejudiced. 57 He begs the indulgence of this Court and claims that his conviction would only serve as a
"precedent to all children to act recklessly, errantly[,] and disobediently" 58 and would then create a society ruled by
juvenile delinquency and errant behavior. 59 If at all, petitioner claims that he could only be convicted of slight physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code for the contusion sustained by AAA. 60

Respondent maintains that the act of whipping AAA is an act of child abuse.61 Respondent argues that the act
complained of need not be prejudicial to the development of the child for it to constitute a violation of Republic Act No.
7610.62 Respondent, citing Sanchez v. People,63 argues that Section 10(a)64 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines and
punishes four distinct acts.65

We reject petitioner's contention that his act of whipping AAA is not child abuse but merely slight physical injuries
under the Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident occurred. Therefore, AAA is entitled to
protection under Republic Act No. 7610, the primary purpose of which has been defined in Araneta v. People: 66

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the
survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional
mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development."67 (Emphasis omitted, citation omitted)

Under Section 3(b) of the Republic Act No. 7610, child abuse is defined, thus:

Section 3. Definition of Terms.

….

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death. (Emphasis supplied)

As can be gleaned from this provision, a person who commits an act that debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being, whether habitual or not, can be held liable for violation of Republic Act
No. 7610.

Although it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child abuse, 68 petitioner's intention
to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child can be inferred from the manner in which he
committed the act complained of.

To note, petitioner used a wet t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three (3) times. 69 Common sense and human
experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck, with a wet t-shirt would cause an extreme
amount of pain, especially so if it was done several times. There is also reason to believe that petitioner used excessive
force. Otherwise, AAA would not have fallen down the stairs at the third strike. AAA would likewise not have sustained
a contusion.

Indeed, if the only intention of petitioner were to discipline AAA and f stop him from interfering, he could have resorted
to other less violent means. Instead of reprimanding AAA or walking away, petitioner chose to hit the latter.

We find petitioner liable for other acts of child abuse under Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, which
provides that "a person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development . shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period."70

In Araneta:

[Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610] punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute
distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different
from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. . . . [An] accused can be prosecuted and be
convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the
prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the
act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted ... as a qualifying condition for the
three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such
construal.71 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades, and demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked several times in a public place is a
humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age. Petitioner, as an adult, should have exercised
restraint and self-control rather than retaliate against a 14-year-old child.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated
February 22, 2013 in CA_G.R. CEB-CR No. 00481 affirming the conviction of petitioner Vam Clifford Torres y Salera for
violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
 Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2416-A dated January 4, 2017.

1
 Rollo, pp. 4-18.

2
 Id. at 24-34. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos and concurred in by Associate
Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes of the Twentieth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu.

3
 Id. at 21-22. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos and concurred in by Associate
Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap of the Special Former Twentieth Division, Court of
Appeals, Cebu.

4
 Id. at 33.

5
 Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act (1992).

6
 Rollo, p. 24.

7
 Id. at 25.

8
 Id.

9
 Id.

10
 Id.

11
 Id.

12
 Id.

13
 Id.

14
 Id.

15
 Id. at 25-26.

16
 Id.

17
 Id.
 18
 Id.

19
 Id.

20
 Id. at 31.

21
 Id. at 26.

22
 Id.

23
 Id.

24
 Id.

25
 Id.

26
 Id.

27
 Id. at 27.

28
 Id.

29
 Id.

30
 Id.

31
 Id. at 24-34.

32
 Id. at 33-34.

33
 Id. at 21-22.

34
 Id.at4-18.

35
 Id. at 39-51.

36
 Id. at 53-61.

37
 Id. at 7.

38
 Id. at 10.

39
 Id.

40
 Id. at 7-10.

41
 Id. at 14.

42
 Id.

43
 Id. at 42-44.

44
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.

45
 Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 512 Phil. 679, 706 (2005) [Per J. SandovalGutierrez, Third
Division].

46
 Id.
 47
 Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Bautista v. Puyat, 416
Phil. 305, 308 (2001) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].

48
 Changco v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 336, 342 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

49
 People v. Pajares, 310 Phil. 361, 366 (1995) [Per J. Melo, Third Division].

50
 Addenbrooky Barker v. People, 126 Phil. 854, 855 (1967) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].

51
 People v. Pajares, 310 Phil. 361, 366 (1995) [Per J. Melo, Third Division].

52
 Rollo, pp. 30-31.

53
 Id. at 58-59.

54
 Id. at 59.

55
 Id. at 11.

56
 Id. at 14.

57
 Id. at 14-15.

58
 Id. at 59.

59
 Id. at 58.

60
 Id, at 15.

61
 Id. at 48.

62
 Id.

63
 606 Phil. 762 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

64
 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(a) provides:

Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty of Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. -

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.

65
 Rollo, p. 45.

66
 578 Phil. 876 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

67
 Id. at 883.

68
 Bongalon v. People, 707 Phil. 11, 20-21 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

69
 Rollo, p. 31.

70
 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(a).

71
 Araneta v. People, 578 Phil. 876, 884-886 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

MELVIN ENCINARES Y BALLON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 27, 2019 and the
Resolution3 dated March 10, 2020 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
42150, which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 27, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court
of ██████████ (RTC) in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-17-02854-CR, finding petitioner Melvin
Encinares y Ballon (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610,5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an Information charging petitioner with violation of Section 10 (a)6 of
RA 7610, which reads: 

That on or about the 27th day of December 2011, in ██████████, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of child abuse prejudicial to the
development and welfare of one [AAA], a minor, 16 years old, by then and there placing the latter's
penis in his mouth and played (sic) with it, which acts debases, degrades or demeans (sic) the
intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA], as a human being, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that petitioner was the Vice President of the ██████████ High School
General Parents Teachers Association while AAA,8 then sixteen (16) years old, was the Citizenship
Advancement Training (CAT) Corps Commander. Sometime between October and November 2011,
petitioner approached Perla R. Ragadio (Ragadio), the school's CAT Commandant, to offer help with
the t-shirts and other items that the CAT might need, which the latter accepted. Thereafter, Ragadio
asked AAA to follow-up the items they ordered from petitioner. Because of this, AAA and petitioner
became text mates. Petitioner would send AAA cellphone load and even offered him "ATM, GSIS,
and SSS pensions."9

In the evening of December 27, 2011, petitioner invited AAA to a drinking spree in his house.
Although AAA does not drink alcohol, petitioner offered him one. Later that night, petitioner told him
to sleep in the bedroom since there were no more available means of transportation for AAA to go
home. While AAA was sleeping, petitioner put AAA's penis into his mouth and played with it for ten
(10) minutes. AAA tried to resist but failed since he was too drunk.10 Consequently, an Information
charging petitioner with violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 was filed before the RTC.

In defense, petitioner denied the charges against him and instead, claimed that he was friends with
AAA, who would often ask him for favors such as cellphone load and money. Petitioner averred that
on the date and time of the alleged incident, AAA asked permission to sleep in his (petitioner's)
house, to which he agreed. AAA arrived at 11 o'clock in the evening while petitioner was watching
television with his family. Petitioner then told AAA to sleep in the sofa. He denied that there was a
drinking spree at that time and asserted that it was impossible for him to do anything to AAA as there
were other persons in the house and the lights were switched on so that he could constantly check
on his sick child. He further alleged that AAA was just prodded by his uncle, BBB, to file a case
against him to extort money.11
As additional defense witnesses, Erlinda Galiano testified that she witnessed AAA, who was
unassisted by a guardian, sign a handwritten affidavit of withdrawal, recantation, and desistance.
Likewise, Rizaldy Sidayon, President of Sitio Ruby Neighborhood Association, Inc., issued a
Certification dated June 14, 2012 stating that petitioner was a role model to the youth through his
strong moral values. Punong Barangay Jose Arnel Quebal issued a similar Certification dated July
24, 2012.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated July 27, 2018, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay the costs of suit.14 It found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime
charged and gave weight to the positive, direct, spontaneous, and candid testimony of AAA, who
positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator. On the other hand, the RTC rejected petitioner's
defense that it was impossible for him to commit said crime as other people were present that time,
ratiocinating that lust respects no time and place. As to the letter and affidavit of withdrawal,
recantation, and desistance executed by AAA, the RTC stressed that when the latter executed the
same, he was still a minor and not assisted by a guardian. Moreover, the letter was not presented
before the investigating prosecutor during the preliminary investigation. Finally, the RTC found that
petitioner failed to come up with a plausible explanation as to why AAA would file false charges
against him.15

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision17 dated November 27, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling, concurring with its
finding that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish all the elements of the crime charged. It
refused to give credence to petitioner's unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi, and instead
affirmed the findings of the RTC as regards the credibility of the prosecution witness, there being no
reason to disturb said findings. Finally, it reiterated the doctrine that lust is no respecter of time and
space, since rape can even be committed in places where other family members are sleeping.18

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,19 which was denied in a Resolution20 dated

March 10, 2020; hence, the present petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in convicting petitioner of the
crime of violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610, as charged.

The Court's Ruling

Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review,
and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment, whether assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.21

Guided by this consideration, the Court finds that based on the established facts and evidence
offered in this case, petitioner's conviction should be for a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,
instead of Section 10 (a) of the same Act.

The pertinent provisions of Sections 5 (b) and 10 (a) of RA 7610 respectively state:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.] x x x

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Child's Development.  -ℒαwρhi ৷

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As can be gleaned from the above-mentioned provisions, Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 specifically
applies in cases of sexual abuse committed against children, which includes lascivious conduct;
whereas, Section 10 (a) thereof punishes other forms of child abuse not covered by particular
provisions of RA 7610. Evidently, the offense will not fall within the purview of Section 10 (a) of RA
7610 if the same is specifically penalized by a particular provision, such as Section 5 (b).

The term "lascivious conduct" was given a specific definition in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 7610, viz.: "the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person."22

In light of the clear definition of the term vis-a-vis the evidence presented in this case, the Court finds
that petitioner's acts of putting AAA's penis inside his mouth and playing with it for ten (10) minutes
constitute Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. As such, it was an error for the
courts a quo to have convicted him under Section 10 (a) of the same Act. True, the Information filed
against petitioner charged him under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610. However, it is a well-settled rule
that "the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the specification of the
provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the indictment, that is,
the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information, and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law. The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the
technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the
character of the crime."23 Further, the information must sufficiently allege the acts or omissions
complained of to inform a person of common understanding what offense he is being charged with -
in other words, the elements of the crime must be clearly stated.24

A perusal of the Information filed against petitioner in this case discloses that it is sufficient to charge
him with Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as it reads:

That on or about the 27th day of December 2011, in ██████████, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of child abuse prejudicial to the
development and welfare of one [AAA], a minor, 16 years old, by then and there placing the latter's
penis in his mouth and played (sic) with it, which acts debases, degrades or demeans (sic) the
intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA], as a human being, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.25

Here, as both the recital in the Information and the evidence presented by the prosecution provide
for a case that can be prosecuted and penalized as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA
7610, petitioner should be properly convicted and penalized therefor.
Due to the modification of petitioner's conviction, a change in the imposable penalty, as well as the
awards of damages, is in order. The prescribed penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence shall be taken from the medium
period of the prescribed penalty. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a special law,
petitioner may still enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying its provisions,
the minimum term shall be taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Thus, petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.

Finally, and conformably with the ruling in People v. Tulagan,26 the amount of civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages awarded for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,
where the victim is a child below eighteen (18) years of age and the penalty imposed is within the
range of reclusion temporal medium, is P50,000.00 each.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 27, 2019 and the Resolution
dated March 10, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 42150 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, finding petitioner Melvin Encinares y
Bailon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7610. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until full
payment.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, Lazaro-Javier, Lopez, and Rosario,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2797 dated November 5, 2020.

1 Rollo, pp. 12-26.

2 Id. at 30-39. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justices
Pablito A. Perez and Louis P. Acosta, concurring.

3 Id. at 41-42.

4 Id. at 63-72. Penned by Presiding Judge Roslyn M. Rabara-Tria.

5 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL

PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992.

6 Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. -

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation
or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including
those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.

7 Records, p. 1.
 8 The identity of the minor victim or any information which could establish or compromise his
identity, as well as those or his immediate family or household members, shall be withheld
pursuant to RA 7610; R.A. 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR
VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as
the "RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN" (November 15,
2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano. Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 2014, citing People v.
Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 (2013). See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-
2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION,
PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL
RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017.) See further People v. Ejercito, G.R. No.
229861, July 2, 2018.

9 See rollo, pp. 31-32. See also id. at 65.

10 See id. at 32. See also id. at 65.

11 See rollo, pp. 32-33. See also id. at 67.

12 Id. at 33. See also id. at 68-69.

13 Id. at 63-72.

14 See id. at 71-72.

15 Id. at 70-72.

16 See Notice of Appeal dated July 30, 2018; CA rollo, pp. 10-11.

17 Rollo, pp. 30-39.

18 Id. at 34-38.

19 See motion for reconsideration dated December 20, 2019; CA rollo, pp. 155-160.

20 Rollo, pp. 41-42.

21 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 234190, October 1, 2018; citations omitted.

22 People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019; emphasis supplied.

23 People v. Delector, 819 Phil. 310, 320-321 (2017); citations omitted.

24 See People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil. 630, 649 (2005).

25 Records, p. 1.

26 Supra.

G.R. No. 235071

EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision   dated July 13, 2017 and the Resolution  dated September 25,
1 2

2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 37385 which affirmed with modification the
Decision  dated November 19, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163,
3

Taguig City Station, finding Evangeline Patulot y Galia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
charges of child abuse.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

In two (2) separate Informations, Patulot was charged with child abuse, defined and penalized under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act,  the accusatory portions of which read:
4

(Criminal Case No. 149971)

That on or about the 14th day of November 2012, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously commit acts of child abuse upon one AAA,  a three (3) year old minor, by
5

throwing on him a boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts
are inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth and development.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(Criminal Case No. 149972)

That on or about the 14th day of November 2012, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of child abuse upon one BBB, a two (2) month old baby, by
throwing on her a boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts are
inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth and development. CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

During arraignment, Patulot, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges. Subsequently,
trial on the merits ensued wherein the prosecution presented CCC, mother of minors AAA and BBB,
three (3) years old and two (2) months old, respectively; DDD, father of the minors; and Dr. Francis
Jerome Vitales as its witnesses and offered documentary evidence   to establish the following facts:
7

At around 2:00 p.m. of November 14, 2012, CCC gathered clothes from the clothesline outside her
house. As she was about to enter the house, she was surprised to see Patulot who was holding a
casserole. Without warning, Patulot poured the contents of the casserole - hot cooking oil - on her.
CCC tried to dodge, but to no avail. AAA and BBB, who were nearby, suddenly cried because they
were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil. CCC hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to her three neighbors
who volunteered to bring the children to the Polyclinic at South Signal, Taguig City, for treatment.
She then went to the barangay hall also at South Signal, Taguig City, to report the incident.
Accompanied by barangay personnel, she went to Patulot's house, but Patulot was not there. She
instead returned to her children at the Polyclinic. While there, she learned from a neighbor that
Patulot had been arrested. Consequently, having been assured that her children were all right and
that medication had already been given, they returned to the barangay hall, where DDD met them.
At the barangay hall, CCC noticed that her children were shivering. Thus, she asked her neighbors
to bring them to Pateros-Taguig District Hospital while she stayed behind to give her statement.
Afterwards, she proceeded to the hospital where she was likewise treated for injuries. While she and
BBB were able to go home, AAA needed to be confined but was discharged the next morning.
Before going home, however, CCC proceeded to the Taguig Police Station where she executed
her Sinumpaang Salaysay.  Subsequently, Dr. Vitales of the Pateros-Taguig District Hospital, who
8

examined and treated CCC and her children, testified that the injuries suffered by AAA and BBB
would heal for an average period of thirty (30) days. Next, DDD testified that he incurred ₱7,440.00
in medical expenses for his wife and children. 9

Solely testifying in her defense, Patulot denied the allegations against her. She recounted that prior
to the alleged incident, she was on her way to the market to sell her merchandise when CCC
bumped her on the arm, uttering foul words against her. Due to the impact, Patulot's merchandise
fell. Because of this, she cursed CCC back who, in turn, merely laughed and repeated the invectives
as she moved away. Then, from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on November 14, 2012, she was repacking
black pepper at her house when she heard CCC taunt her in a loud voice, "Bakit hindi ka pa
sumama sa asawa mo? Dapat sumama ka na para pareha kayong paglamayan." Because of this,
Patulot proceeded to Barangay Central Signal, Taguig City, to file a complaint against CCC, but she
was ignored. So she went instead to the Barangay South Signal, Taguig City. But upon reaching
said location, she was apprehended by the Barangay Tanod and brought to the Barangay Hall of
South Signal, Taguig City for questioning.  10

On November 19, 2014, the RTC found Patulot guilty of child abuse and disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 149971, the Court finds accused Evangeline Patulot y Galia GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four
(4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum. Accused is further ordered to pay the offended party the
amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702), as actual damages, and Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱l 0,000) by way of moral damages;

2) In Criminal Case No. 149972, the Court finds accused Evangeline Patulot y Galia GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four
(4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum. Accused is fm1her ordered to pay the offended party the
amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702), as actual damages, and Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱l 0,000) by way of moral damages; and

3) Finally, accused is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000) in each case,
conformably with section 31 (f) of R.A. 7610.

SO ORDERED.   (Italics supplied.)

11

The RTC found that while Patulot may not have intended to cause harm on AAA and BBB, her
negligence nonetheless caused injury on them, which left visible scars that are most likely to stay on
their faces and bodies for the rest of their lives. Besides, the trial court added that R.A. No. 7610 is a
special law such that intent is not necessary for its violator to be liable. 
12

In a Decision dated July 13, 2017, the CA affirmed Patulot's conviction, but modified the penalty
imposed by the RTC in the following wise:

WHEREFORE, the 19 November 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
163 (Taguig City Station) is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:

1) in Criminal Case No. 149971, Evangeline Patulot y Galia is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of  prision
correccional, as minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum;
and

2) in Criminal Case No. 149972, Evangeline Patulot y Galia is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of  prision
correccional, as minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.   (Italics supplied, underscoring in the original.)

13

According to the appellate court, there was no reason to deviate from the trial court's findings of guilt
for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and their deportment on
the witness stand. It, however, ruled that the RTC was amiss in finding it unnecessary to determine
intent merely because the act for which Patulot stood charged is punishable by a special law. The
CA clarified that the index of whether a crime is malum prohibitum is not its form, that is, whether or
not it is found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or in a special penal statute, but the legislative
intent. Nevertheless, this reasoning still cannot help Patulot's case because even if she did not
intend on inflicting harm on the children, there was still intent to harm CCC. Thus, criminal liability is
incurred although the wrongful act done be different from that which Patulot intended. For the same
reason, the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed"
cannot be appreciated in Patulot's favor. Thus, Patulot must still be held guilty of the offense
charged.  14

Aggrieved by the CA's denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Patulot filed the instant petition on
January 4, 2018, invoking the following arguments:

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S

CONVICTION OF VIOLATING SEC. 10(A) R.A. 7610 DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE HAD NO
INTENT TO DEGRADE AND DEMEAN THE INTRINSIC WORTH AND DIGNITY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S CHILDREN.

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY ARTICLE 49

OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WITH REGARD TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY.  15

According to Patulot, she can only be convicted of physical injuries and not child abuse. Citing our
pronouncement in Bongalon v. People,   she submits that not every instance of laying hands on a
16

child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the laying
of hands is shown to be intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the
RPC. Thus, in the absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her true intention being to pour
hot oil only on CCC with AAA and BBB being merely accidentally hit, she cannot be convicted of
child abuse.

Patulot adds that even considering her to have committed child abuse, the CA erred in determining
the imposable penalty for failing to apply Article 49  of the RPC. According to Patulot, there was
17

error in personae as the oil that was intended for CCC accidentally hit the children. She intended to
commit physical injuries, but ended up committing child abuse. Applying Article 49, since the penalty
of the intended crime (physical injuries) is less than the crime committed (child abuse), the
imposable penalty is that which refers to physical injuries, in its maximum period. As to the extent of
the physical injuries intended, based on the finding of Dr. Vitales that the injuries suffered by AAA
and BBB would heal for an average period of thirty (30) days, the offense Patulot intended to commit
is only Less Serious Physical Injuries under the first paragraph of Article 265  of the RPC. Thus, the
18

proper penalty should only be arresto mayor in its maximum or four (4) months and one (1) day to
six (6) months for each count. 19

We deny the petition.

Under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) psychological and physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) unreasonable
deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) failure to immediately give
medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development
or in his permanent incapacity or death.

In conjunction with this, Section 10(a) of the same Act provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development.

----

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.  (Italics supplied.)
1âшphi1
Corollarily, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases defines the term "child abuse" as the infliction of physical or psychological injury,
cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. In turn, the same Section defines
"physical injury" as those that include but are not limited to lacerations, fractured
bones, burns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered by a child.

In view of these provisions, the Court, in Araneta v. People,  discussed the distinct acts punishable
20

under R.A. No. 7610, to wit:

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules
and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act
prejudicial to the child's development. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, an accused can be
prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits
any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty
and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the
development of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic
Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse;
second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial
to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as
a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the
questioned provision does not warrant such construal.  (Italics supplied, citations omitted.)
21

It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a child is subjected to physical abuse or injury, the
person responsible therefor can be held liable under R.A. No. 7610 by establishing the essential
facts above. Here, the prosecution duly proved the following allegations in the Information charging
Patulot of child abuse: (1) the minority of both AAA and BBB; (2) the acts committed by Patulot
constituting physical abuse against AAA and BBB; and (3) the fact that said acts are punishable
under R.A. No. 7610. In particular, it was clearly established that at the time of the incident, AAA and
BBB were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old, respectively; that Patulot consciously
poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC, consequently injuring AAA and BBB; and that said
act constitutes physical abuse specified in Section 3(b)(1) of R.A. No. 7610.

On this score, Patulot contends that on the basis of our pronouncement in Bongalon, she cannot be
convicted of child abuse because it was not proven that she intended to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Her reliance on said
ruling, however, is misplaced. In Bongalon, the Information specifically charged George Bongalon,
petitioner therein, of committing acts which "are prejudicial to the child's development and which
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human being."  Thus, we ruled that he
22

can only be held liable for slight physical injuries instead of child abuse in the absence of proof that
he intended to humiliate or "debase the 'intrinsic worth and dignity"'   of the victim.
23

A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case, however, reveals no similar allegation that
Patulot's acts debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as
human beings. Instead, they charged Patulot for willfully committing acts of child abuse on AAA and
BBB "by throwing on [them] a (sic) boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical
injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth and
development."  Accordingly, the RTC and the CA duly found that this allegation in the Informations
24

was adequately established by the prosecution. It bears stressing that Patulot did not even deny the
fact that she threw boiling oil on CCC which likewise fell on AAA and BBB. Clearly, her actuations
causing physical injuries on babies, who were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old at
the time, are undeniably prejudicial to their development. In the words of the trial court, Patulot's
acts, which practically burned the skin of AAA and BBB, left visible scars that are most likely to stay
on their faces and bodies for the rest of their lives. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to escape
liability arising from her actions.
1âшphi1
Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to harm AAA and BBB, she
cannot be convicted of child abuse because she merely intended on committing physical injuries
against CCC. Our pronouncement in Mabunot v. People  is squarely on point. There, petitioner
25

Jester Mabunot accidentally shoved a female minor child consequently fracturing her rib while he
was engaged in a fistfight with another boy. But he points out that the injury sustained by the minor
victim was unintentional. Thus, according to Mabunot, this single and unintended act of shoving the
child while trading punches with another can hardly be considered as within the definition of child
abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Assuming, therefore, that he was the cause of the
injury, Mabunot insists that he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries under Section 265
of the RPC. The Court, however, rejected Mabunot's contention and held him liable not for slight
physical injuries, but for child abuse. We explained:

The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches then, he could not
have made a deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists
that he deserves an acquittal.

The foregoing argument is untenable.

"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed."

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special law.
However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal
intent on the part of the offender.

In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were to consider for
argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he had no design to harm Shiva, when he swang his
arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He clearly intended to injure another person. However, it
was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib. Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot
escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.  (Citations
26

omitted.)

Similarly, in the instant case, Patulot's criminal intent is not wanting for as she expressly admitted,
she intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As such, even granting that it was not her intention
to harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from her
casserole on CCC. She cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in view of the settled
doctrine mentioned in Mabunot that a person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended. As defined in the law, child abuse charged against Patulot
is physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. To the Court, her act of pouring
hot oil on AAA and BBB falls squarely within this definition. Thus, in view of the fact that her acts
were proven to constitute child abuse under the pertinent provisions of the law, she must be held
liable therefor.

Indeed, it cannot be denied that AAA and BBB are children entitled to protection extended by R.A.
No. 7610. Time and again, the Court has stressed that R.A. No. 7610 is a measure geared towards
the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable
members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under
Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "[t]he State shall defend the right of the children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."  This piece of
27

legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children,
namely, the RPC and Presidential Decree No. 603 or The Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a
statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse
and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which child
traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is expanded
to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but includes also "other
acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development." 28

As regards the penalties imposed by the courts a quo, we find no compelling reason to modify the
same for being within the allowable range. To conform to recent jurisprudence, however, the Court
deems it proper to impose an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the actual damages in the
amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702) and moral damages in the amount
of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000), to be computed from the date of the finality of this Decision until
fully paid. 29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated

July 13, 2017 and Resolution dated September 25, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
37385 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the ₱3,702.00 actual damages and P10,000.00
moral damages awarded in each Criminal Case No. 149971 and Criminal Case No. 149972 shall be
subject to an interest of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of this Decision until
full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, Hernando, and Carandang,  JJ., concur.

*

A. Reyes, Jr., J., on leave.

Footnotes

*
 Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.

 Rollo, pp. 32-41. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with the concurrence of
1

Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Maria Filomena D. Singh.

2
 Id. at 53.

3
 Id. at 73-79. Penned by Judge Leili Cruz Suarez.

 An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse,
4

Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes (approved on June l 7, 1992).

 The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well
5

as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to R.A.
No. 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes"; R.A. No. 9262, "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes"; Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-
10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children," effective
November 5, 2004; People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703, 709 (2006); and Amended
Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, Subject: Protocols and
Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions,
Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.

6
 Rollo, pp. 32-33.

 Id. at 33. Salaysay of CCC; Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-aresto; Certificates of Live Birth
7

of BBB and AAA; Medico-Legal Certificate of CCC, BBB, and AAA; photographs of BBB and
AAA; and medical receipts (cited in the CA Decision).

8
 Id. at 33-34.

9
 Id. at 34.

10
 Id. at 34-35.

11
 Id. at 79.

12
 Id. at 78.
  Id. at 40-41.
13

 Id. at 38-40.
14

 Id. at 19.
15

 707 Phil. 11 (2013).

16

 Article 49 of the RPC provides:

17

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is
different from that intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from
that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that
corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty
corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding
to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be
imposed in its maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the
acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of
another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses,
in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be
imposed in its maximum period.

 Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. - Any person who shall inflict upon another physical
18

injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same period,
shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor. (Italics supplied.)

 Rollo, pp. 19-24.
19

 578 Phil. 876 (2008).

20

 Id. at 333-335.
21

 Bongalon v. People, supra note 16, at 15.

22

 Id at 20.
23

 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
24

 795 Phil. 453 (2016).

25

 Id. at 463-464.
26

 Torres v. People, 803 Phil. 480, 490, citing Araneta v. People, supra note 20.

27

 Araneta v. People, id. at 884.

28

 Mabunot v. People, supra note 25.

29

MELVIN ENCINARES Y BALLON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 27, 2019 and the
Resolution3 dated March 10, 2020 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
42150, which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 27, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court
of ██████████ (RTC) in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-17-02854-CR, finding petitioner Melvin
Encinares y Ballon (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610,5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an Information charging petitioner with violation of Section 10 (a)6 of
RA 7610, which reads: 

That on or about the 27th day of December 2011, in ██████████, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of child abuse prejudicial to the
development and welfare of one [AAA], a minor, 16 years old, by then and there placing the latter's
penis in his mouth and played (sic) with it, which acts debases, degrades or demeans (sic) the
intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA], as a human being, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that petitioner was the Vice President of the ██████████ High School
General Parents Teachers Association while AAA,8 then sixteen (16) years old, was the Citizenship
Advancement Training (CAT) Corps Commander. Sometime between October and November 2011,
petitioner approached Perla R. Ragadio (Ragadio), the school's CAT Commandant, to offer help with
the t-shirts and other items that the CAT might need, which the latter accepted. Thereafter, Ragadio
asked AAA to follow-up the items they ordered from petitioner. Because of this, AAA and petitioner
became text mates. Petitioner would send AAA cellphone load and even offered him "ATM, GSIS,
and SSS pensions."9

In the evening of December 27, 2011, petitioner invited AAA to a drinking spree in his house.
Although AAA does not drink alcohol, petitioner offered him one. Later that night, petitioner told him
to sleep in the bedroom since there were no more available means of transportation for AAA to go
home. While AAA was sleeping, petitioner put AAA's penis into his mouth and played with it for ten
(10) minutes. AAA tried to resist but failed since he was too drunk.10 Consequently, an Information
charging petitioner with violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 was filed before the RTC.

In defense, petitioner denied the charges against him and instead, claimed that he was friends with
AAA, who would often ask him for favors such as cellphone load and money. Petitioner averred that
on the date and time of the alleged incident, AAA asked permission to sleep in his (petitioner's)
house, to which he agreed. AAA arrived at 11 o'clock in the evening while petitioner was watching
television with his family. Petitioner then told AAA to sleep in the sofa. He denied that there was a
drinking spree at that time and asserted that it was impossible for him to do anything to AAA as there
were other persons in the house and the lights were switched on so that he could constantly check
on his sick child. He further alleged that AAA was just prodded by his uncle, BBB, to file a case
against him to extort money.11

As additional defense witnesses, Erlinda Galiano testified that she witnessed AAA, who was
unassisted by a guardian, sign a handwritten affidavit of withdrawal, recantation, and desistance.
Likewise, Rizaldy Sidayon, President of Sitio Ruby Neighborhood Association, Inc., issued a
Certification dated June 14, 2012 stating that petitioner was a role model to the youth through his
strong moral values. Punong Barangay Jose Arnel Quebal issued a similar Certification dated July
24, 2012.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated July 27, 2018, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay the costs of suit.14 It found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime
charged and gave weight to the positive, direct, spontaneous, and candid testimony of AAA, who
positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator. On the other hand, the RTC rejected petitioner's
defense that it was impossible for him to commit said crime as other people were present that time,
ratiocinating that lust respects no time and place. As to the letter and affidavit of withdrawal,
recantation, and desistance executed by AAA, the RTC stressed that when the latter executed the
same, he was still a minor and not assisted by a guardian. Moreover, the letter was not presented
before the investigating prosecutor during the preliminary investigation. Finally, the RTC found that
petitioner failed to come up with a plausible explanation as to why AAA would file false charges
against him.15

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision17 dated November 27, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling, concurring with its
finding that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish all the elements of the crime charged. It
refused to give credence to petitioner's unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi, and instead
affirmed the findings of the RTC as regards the credibility of the prosecution witness, there being no
reason to disturb said findings. Finally, it reiterated the doctrine that lust is no respecter of time and
space, since rape can even be committed in places where other family members are sleeping.18

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,19 which was denied in a Resolution20 dated

March 10, 2020; hence, the present petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in convicting petitioner of the
crime of violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610, as charged.

The Court's Ruling

Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review,
and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment, whether assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.21

Guided by this consideration, the Court finds that based on the established facts and evidence
offered in this case, petitioner's conviction should be for a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,
instead of Section 10 (a) of the same Act.

The pertinent provisions of Sections 5 (b) and 10 (a) of RA 7610 respectively state:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.] x x x

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Child's Development.  -
ℒαwρhi ৷
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As can be gleaned from the above-mentioned provisions, Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 specifically
applies in cases of sexual abuse committed against children, which includes lascivious conduct;
whereas, Section 10 (a) thereof punishes other forms of child abuse not covered by particular
provisions of RA 7610. Evidently, the offense will not fall within the purview of Section 10 (a) of RA
7610 if the same is specifically penalized by a particular provision, such as Section 5 (b).

The term "lascivious conduct" was given a specific definition in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 7610, viz.: "the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person."22

In light of the clear definition of the term vis-a-vis the evidence presented in this case, the Court finds
that petitioner's acts of putting AAA's penis inside his mouth and playing with it for ten (10) minutes
constitute Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. As such, it was an error for the
courts a quo to have convicted him under Section 10 (a) of the same Act. True, the Information filed
against petitioner charged him under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610. However, it is a well-settled rule
that "the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the specification of the
provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the indictment, that is,
the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information, and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law. The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the
technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the
character of the crime."23 Further, the information must sufficiently allege the acts or omissions
complained of to inform a person of common understanding what offense he is being charged with -
in other words, the elements of the crime must be clearly stated.24

A perusal of the Information filed against petitioner in this case discloses that it is sufficient to charge
him with Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as it reads:

That on or about the 27th day of December 2011, in ██████████, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of child abuse prejudicial to the
development and welfare of one [AAA], a minor, 16 years old, by then and there placing the latter's
penis in his mouth and played (sic) with it, which acts debases, degrades or demeans (sic) the
intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA], as a human being, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.25

Here, as both the recital in the Information and the evidence presented by the prosecution provide
for a case that can be prosecuted and penalized as Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA
7610, petitioner should be properly convicted and penalized therefor.

Due to the modification of petitioner's conviction, a change in the imposable penalty, as well as the
awards of damages, is in order. The prescribed penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence shall be taken from the medium
period of the prescribed penalty. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a special law,
petitioner may still enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying its provisions,
the minimum term shall be taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Thus, petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.

Finally, and conformably with the ruling in People v. Tulagan,26 the amount of civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages awarded for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,
where the victim is a child below eighteen (18) years of age and the penalty imposed is within the
range of reclusion temporal medium, is P50,000.00 each.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 27, 2019 and the Resolution
dated March 10, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 42150 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, finding petitioner Melvin Encinares y
Bailon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7610. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until full
payment.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, Lazaro-Javier, Lopez, and Rosario,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2797 dated November 5, 2020.

1 Rollo, pp. 12-26.

2 Id. at 30-39. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justices
Pablito A. Perez and Louis P. Acosta, concurring.

3 Id. at 41-42.

4 Id. at 63-72. Penned by Presiding Judge Roslyn M. Rabara-Tria.

5 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL

PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992.

6 Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. -

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation
or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including
those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.

7 Records, p. 1.

8 The identity of the minor victim or any information which could establish or compromise his
identity, as well as those or his immediate family or household members, shall be withheld
pursuant to RA 7610; R.A. 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR
VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as
the "RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN" (November 15,
2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano. Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 2014, citing People v.
Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 (2013). See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-
2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION,
PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL
RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017.) See further People v. Ejercito, G.R. No.
229861, July 2, 2018.

9 See rollo, pp. 31-32. See also id. at 65.

10 See id. at 32. See also id. at 65.

11 See rollo, pp. 32-33. See also id. at 67.

12 Id. at 33. See also id. at 68-69.

13 Id. at 63-72.

14 See id. at 71-72.

15 Id. at 70-72.

16 See Notice of Appeal dated July 30, 2018; CA rollo, pp. 10-11.

17 Rollo, pp. 30-39.

18 Id. at 34-38.

19 See motion for reconsideration dated December 20, 2019; CA rollo, pp. 155-160.

20 Rollo, pp. 41-42.

21 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 234190, October 1, 2018; citations omitted.

22 People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019; emphasis supplied.

23 People v. Delector, 819 Phil. 310, 320-321 (2017); citations omitted.

24 See People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil. 630, 649 (2005).

25 Records, p. 1.

26 Supra.