A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RATIO LAID DOWN IN

BONGAIGAON REFINERY & PETROCHEMICALS LTD VS. SAMIJUDDIN AHMED

(2001) 9 SCC 557

WITH THAT LAID DOWN IN

WORKMEN OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE V. THE MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI

TEA ESTATE AIR 1958 SCC 353.

A research paper submitted for the partial fulfilment of the course Labour Laws-II for
obtaining the degree of B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) during the academic session 2020-2021.

SUBMITTED BY:

ANURAG RANJAN (2011)

SUBMITTED TO:

MS. PALLAVI SHANKAR

FACULTY OF LABOUR LAWS-II.

October, 2020

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NYAYA NAGAR,

MITHAPUR, PATNA- 800001.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude and deep regards to my

guide MS. PALLAVI SHANKAR ma‟am for her exemplary guidance, monitoring and
constant encouragement throughout the course of this research. The blessing, help and
guidance given by her time to time shall carry me a long way in the journey of life on which
I am about to embark.

I also take this opportunity to express a deep sense of gratitude to her for providing me this
research topic and for her cordial support, valuable information and guidance, which helped
me in completing this task through various stages.

Lastly, I thank almighty, my parents, brothers and friends for their constant encouragement
during this pandemic, without which this assignment would not be possible.

Thank You!

ANURAG RANJAN

ROLL NO. - 2011

B.B.A., LL.B. (Hons.)

SESSION- 2018-2023.

2
 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work reported in the B.B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) A research
project titled “A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RATIO LAID DOWN IN “BONGAIGAON
REFINERY & PETROCHEMICALS LTD VS. SAMIJUDDIN AHMED (2001) 9 SCC 557 WITH
THAT LAID DOWN IN WORKMEN OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE V. THE MANAGEMENT OF
DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE AIR 1958 SCC 353” submitted at Chanakya National Law
University; Patna is an authentic record of my work carried out under the supervision of
MS. PALLAVI SHANKAR.

I have not submitted this work elsewhere for any other Degree or Diploma. I am fully
responsible for the contents of my research project.

3
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION: CASE BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 6

2. PROVISIONS OF LABOUR LAW INVOLVED IN THE MATTER .................................................. 8

3. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN BONGAIGAON REFINERY CASE .......................................... 10

4. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE CASE .......................................... 12

5. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RATIO IN BOTH THE CASES ............................................. 15

6. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 19

4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

The researcher has done a doctrinal type of research. The researcher has studied both the
case laws in detail and has interpreted judicial perspective.

AIM AND OBJECTIVES:

1. To understand the judicial perspective behind the interpretation of word „any person‟
within the meaning of section 2k of industrial dispute act, 1947.
2. To comprehend the ratio behind the judgements in both the cases.

HYPOTHESIS:

The researcher hypothesizes that a person, in respect of which the relationship of employer-
employee never existed, cannot be the subject matter of dispute between employers and
workmen.

SOURCES OF DATA:

The researcher has relied on both primary and secondary sources to complete the project.

 Primary Sources: Enactments, Cases, Rules, Regulations etc.

 Secondary Sources: Books, websites etc.

LIMITATIONS:
The limitations to the present research are the lack of access to library, short time limit and
also the research work contains only doctrinal work.

MODE OF CITATION:

The researcher has followed a uniform mode of citation. The system followed in this
research project is [The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (2015, 20th Ed.)]

SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH:

This research might be useful for the students, teachers, executives and law-makers alike.

5
1. INTRODUCTION: CASE BACKGROUND
 BONGAIGAON REFINERY CASE
Bongaigaon Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd. is a public company that is engaged in the
industrial activity of refinery and petrochemicals. On 15th January, 1977, the Central
Government took a policy decision according to which lands of the public were acquired
and further in the interest of rehabilitation, employment was to be given to persons who
were displaced from their lands acquired for establishment of the government project.
According to the policy so formulated, at least one person in the displaced family shall be
given employment in any public sector undertaking. Ahmed Ali Sarkar, the father of the
respondent, was one of such a displaced person and had a large family. His two sons,
namely, Kazimuddin Ahmed and Karamat Ali were given employment by the appellant
respectively in the years 1981 and 1982.

In the year 1986, the appellant company were in need of some grade-IV staff for which
purpose a notification was released and sent to the employment exchange. Therein it was
mentioned that on 17 unreserved posts preference will be given to the candidates whose land
was acquired for the appellant company. The name of respondent was also brought at by the
employment exchange.

On 8th September, 1987, the respondent was offered an appointment on the post of Material
Handling Personnel (MHP). Before he could begin the service he was asked to fill in an
attestation form as a part of formal procedure whereof it was specifically asked if there were
any of his family members or relations working with the appellant corporation and also to
state their names and relationship. The respondent replied with NIL. He solemnly declared
at the foot of the form that in the event of any material fact having been found to have been
mis-stated or wilfully concealed he shall be liable to appropriate action by the appellant
company.

On 21.9.1987 the respondent submitted his joining report which was not accepted by the
Manager (Personnel and Administration) for reasons recorded therein. It was found that the
fact of his two brothers were already given employment under the profitable scheme
promulgated by the Central Government and such a vital fact was concealed, which fact if
disclosed, the respondent would not have been offered employment in the preferred
category of displaced persons.

6
On 5.10.1987 the respondent came to know that his joining report was rejected and the letter
of appointment was withdrawn by the authority. It is stated in the communication dated
5.10.1987 that at the time of interview held on 19.1.1987 the respondent was specifically put
the question whether any of his family members like brothers etc. are working in BRPL and
to such question specifically put forward, the respondent replied negatively to the interview
board members. The truth of his assertions has never been disputed by respondent.

This further set the legal process in motion with the respondent appealing
the government to transfer the case to the Industrial Tribunal while the appellant opposing
such a reference.

 DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE CASE

The appellants were the workmen of the Dimakuchi Tea Estate and the respondent were the
management of the Dimakuchi tea estate in Assam. In this case a person named, Dr. K. P.
Banerjee was appointed assistant medical officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate. He was
appointed on probation for three months where his suitability for permanent employment
was to be considered. If he was found suitable he would be confirmed in the garden‟s
services. If he was considered unsuitable for employment, he would receive seven days'
notice in writing terminating his appointment. One day during his tenure, Dr. Banerjee
received a letter from Mr Booth, manager of the tea estate where it was said that his services
were terminated. When enquiry was made about the reasons for Dr. Banerjee's discharge,
the authority replied that the Chief Medical Officer had found that Dr. Banerjee was
incompetent. Dr. Banerjee‟s cause was then espoused by the Mangaldai Circle of the Assam
Chah Karmachari Sangha.

On this matter, conciliation proceedings took place which proved to be unsuccessful and
finally the matter was referred to the tripartite Appellate Board. This Board recommended
reinstation of Dr. Banerjee with effect from the date of his discharge. Further the
government referred for adjudication to a Tribunal & the Tribunal held that Dr. Banerjee
being not a “workman”, his case was not one of an "industrial dispute" and the Tribunal has
therefore no jurisdiction to give any relief to him. An appeal was made to the Labour
Appellate Tribunal at Calcutta which affirmed the decision by the earlier tribunal. Finally
the appellants had moved the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution
for special leave.

7
 2. PROVISIONS OF LABOUR LAW INVOLVED IN THE MATTER

I. Sec. 2 (k), The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

“Industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or
between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected
with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions
of labour, of any person”.1

This case gives the proper interpretation of the word “any person” given
under Sec. 2 (k) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The provision mentioned above
expressly mentions as to who can be the „Parties to the dispute‟. It further clarifies as to who
falls under the ambit of “any person”.

II. Sec. 10, The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. - (1) where the appropriate

government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any
time], by order in writing,--
(a) refer the dispute to a board for promoting a settlement thereof; or
(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a court for
inquiry; or
(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the
dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the second schedule, to a labour court for
adjudication; or
(d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the
dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified, in the second schedule or the third
schedule, to a tribunal for adjudication.

1
Sec. 2 (k), The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

8
 Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third
Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate
Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court.”2

In the present case, the petitioner sought the dispute to be referred for adjudication before
the Labour Court which request was however, not accepted by the Central Government.
Against the said order he preferred a writ petition. Ultimately, the division bench of Gauhati
High Court issued a direction to the Central Government to reconsider the matter.

On reconsideration, the Central Government referred the dispute for adjudication by the
Industrial Tribunal, Gauhati under the provision of Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes
Act. Thus the reference of dispute was made by the central government to the Industrial
Tribunal under the provision laid down in Sec. 10, The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The honourable apex court answered the question whether such a reference was justifiable
or not.

2
Sec. 10, The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
9
3. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN BONGAIGAON REFINERY CASE

After hearing the learned counsel for the both the parties, the division bench of Supreme
Court comprising of Hon'ble Justice K.G. Balakrishnan & Hon'ble Justice R.C. Lahoti,
opined that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the order of the Division Bench of
Gauhati high court deserves to be set aside due to the reasoning mentioned below.

The Documentary evidence that was filed on behalf of the appellant clearly made it evident
that the respondent had never entered into the employment of the appellant. Under a special
scheme of government, He was offered an employment where the respondent made a
material concealment of facts thereby trying to secure an employment to which he was not
entitled under the scheme. This was detected in the meantime and therefore his joining
report was not accepted by the authority of the appellant company. The appellant pointed
out that there was still a long queue of persons waiting for employment in the preferred
category. The respondent by seeking such an appointment by making material concealment
of facts was attempting to deprive someone else of his legitimate claim against limited
number of vacancies available.

This assertion made on affidavit and supported by documentary evidence has not been
rebutted by the respondent. As the respondent had not entered the employment of the
appellant, referring a dispute under Section 10 of the I.D. Act based on assumption that
the respondent had entered the service of the appellant and was then removed from
service, suffered from material infirmity and was therefore vitiated. 3

According to the Supreme Court, The Division Bench of Gauhati high court was not correct
to form an opinion that the controversy raised by the appellant should have been left to be
adjudicated upon by the Industrial Tribunal. It said that The Industrial Tribunal cannot go
behind the order of reference.

According to the apex Court, the Division Bench of Gauhati high Court should not have
extended its helping hand to a non-deserving claimant. Due to the above mentioned reasons
that reference of dispute under Section 10 of I.D. Act at the instance of the respondent was
considered to be wholly unwarranted.

3
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/259678/(Accessed on 25-10-2020 7:30 P:M)
10
Finally it was held that –

“Any person cannot be read without limitation and a person in respect of which the
employer-employee relationship never existed and can never possibly exist cannot be the
subject matter of dispute between employers and workmen.”4

The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is
restored.

4
Supra Note 3.
11
 4. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE CASE

The judges before whom the contentions of the appellants were put forth were Chief
Justice, S.R. Das, Justice S.K. Das and Justice A.K. Sarkar. And the principle issue or
question involved in this case was whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a
workman falls within the scope of the definition of industrial dispute contained in Section
2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The appellants contended that the conditions referred to in the first and second parts of
Section 2(k) were clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there was a dispute over the
termination of service & the dispute or difference is between the employer, namely, the
management of the Dimakuchi tea estate on one side, and its workmen on the other.

The appellants have also submitted that the expression "of any person" occurring in the third
part of the definition clause is expression of very wide meaning and can‟t be restricted to the
sense of workmen only. However the court said that expression “any person” can‟t mean
anybody in this whole wide world because the subject matter of dispute must relate to
employment or non-employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour of any
person and these necessarily signify a limitation on the term “any person”.5 Therefore the
term “any person” can‟t be given its ordinary meaning.

Based on these contentions, the appellants themselves formulated four limitations thereby
putting limitations on the width of the expression "any person". They are as follows:-

i. The dispute must be a real and substantial one in respect of which one of the parties to
the dispute can give relief to the other.
ii. The industrial dispute if raised by workmen must relate to the particular establishment
or party of establishment in which the workmen are employed.
iii. The dispute must relate to the employment, non-employment or the terms of employment
or with the conditions of labour of any person, but such person must be an employee
discharged or in service or a candidate for employment.

5
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/822/Workmen-Of-Dimakuchi-Tea-Estate-V.-The-Management-of-
Dimakuchi-Tea-Estate.html (Accessed on 25-10-2020 9:30 P:M)

12
iv. The workmen raising the dispute must have nexus with the dispute either because they
are personally interested or because they have taken up the cause of another person in the
general interest of labour welfare.

Based on these limitations the appellants again argued that that the dispute in question is an
industrial dispute because the employer could give relief in the matter of the termination of
service of Dr. K. P. Banerjee, whose termination from the service as an assistant medical
officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate gave fume to the matter in dispute.

In the final verdict by the apex court, Justice S.K. Das has
concluded his reasoning by saying that the crucial test is one community of interest and the
person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-
employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the parties to the dispute have a
direct or substantial interest. Whether such direct or substantial interest has been
established in a particular case will depend on its facts and circumstances. Therefore the
expression 'any person' must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as
arise from the context and the two crucial tests6 are:

1. The dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute so as to be
capable of settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief
to the other.
2. The person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment,
non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour the parties to the
dispute have a direct or substantial interest.

Justice S.K. Das reasoned that the words “any person” cannot have its
widest amplitude, as that would create incongruity and repugnancy in the provisions of the
Act. Chief Justice S.R. Das was in concurrence with the reasoning given by Justice S.K.
Das. While Justice A. K. Sarkar gave a minority dissenting judgment and hence there was
a divergence in opinion which was seen in the ratio offered by him.

Finally based on the majority decision it was held -

 That Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a 'workman'. He belonged to the medical or technical
staff which was a different category altogether from workmen.

6
G.B. PAI, “LABOUR LAW IN INDIA”, (2001).
13
 The appellants had no direct or substantial interest in his employment or non-
employment,

And even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, it
cannot be said, on the basis of tests laid down that the dispute regarding his termination of
service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act.

14
5. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RATIO IN BOTH THE CASES

i. INTERPRETATION OF WORD ‘ANY PERSON”

 Dimakuchi Tea Estate Case:

The court held that the expression 'any person' must be read subject to the limitations and
qualifications arising from the context and the two tests laid down by the honourable bench
of Supreme Court. It said that the words “any person” cannot have its widest amplitude, as
that would create incongruity and repugnancy in the provisions of the act.

The three main reasons given for such a restrictive interpretation was -

a) In certain sections of the act the words "any person" have been used but there the
reference is to workmen, and therefore in section 2(k) the words "any person" should
mean persons of the workman class.
b) The scheme and the purpose of the act generally and the object of the act specially
being to benefit workmen, the words "any person" should be confined to people of the
workman class.
c) the word "dispute" in section 2(k) itself indicates that the person raising the dispute
must be interested in the dispute and therefore since the dispute must concern the
employment, non-employment, terms of employment or the conditions of labor of a
person, that person must be of the workman class.

Justice a. K. Sarkar in his dissenting judgment rebutted these reasons.

 The justice referring to the first reason said just because of the fact that in certain
sections use the words “person‟ as meaning “workmen” there is no reason to conclude
that that the same word must be given the same restricted meaning in section 2(k).
 Referring to the last reason he said that the interest of workmen is very vague and
difficult to define.7

7
Supra Note 5.

15
 Bongaigaon Refinery Case:

A question arose whether a person who had been issued an offer of appointment which was
withdrawn before he could join on knowing that he had concealed important material facts
and who later on raised a dispute about his non-employment could fall within the meaning
of “any person” under section 2k of industrial disputes act.

The apex court answered the question in negative and held that the reference of the
dispute under section 10 of act was unjustifiable. R.C. Lahoti, J. in his clarifying
judgement said that in the above case any person was an employee appointed on probation
and it was doubtful whether he was a workman or not. It was held that -

 Any person cannot be read without limitation and,

 A person in respect of which the employer-employee relationship never existed and can
never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of dispute between employers and
workmen.8

8
Supra Note 3.
16
ii. VALIDITY AS TO THE REFERENCE MADE TO THE TRIBUNAL BY THE

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

 Dimakuchi tea estate case

The government referred for adjudication to a Tribunal under Section 10(1) (c) which in
turn gave rise to two main issues:

I. Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P.
Banerjee?
II. If not, is he entitled to re-instatement or any other relief in lieu of that?

The Tribunal held that Dr. Banerjee being not a “workman”, his
case was not one of an "industrial dispute" and the Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to
give any relief to him. An appeal was made to the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Calcutta
which affirmed the decision by the earlier tribunal.

Here the reference made was valid as it was related to the termination of an employee and
not someone who does not come under the ambit of meaning of the word “any person”.
Thus the reference of the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication in this case was
unquestioned and valid.

 Bongaigaon refinery case

The respondent by filed a civil writ petition before the High Court of Assam which was
dismissed by the High Court holding that the respondent was not entitled to be appointed in
the quota and therefore respondent was not entitled to any such relief. The High Court also
held that in invalidating the appointment there was no violation of the principles of natural
justice on the part of the appellant.

The respondent then preferred a writ appeal and this was allowed by the Division Bench
setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and held that the dispute should have
been allowed to be adjudicated upon by the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

17
The apex court held that the Division bench should not have extended its helping hand to a
non-deserving claimant and therefore the reference of dispute under Section 10 of I.D. Act
at the instance of the respondent was wholly unwarranted and invalid.it also held that the
reference of the dispute under Section 10 of the I.D. Act based on assumption that the
respondent had entered the service of the appellant and was then removed from service,
suffered from material infirmity and was therefore stands vitiated.9

9
Supra Note 3.
18
6. CONCLUSION

Here both the cases namely Dimakuchi Tea Estate case and Bongaigaon Refinery case are
very landmark of their own which has laid down certain guiding principles with respect to
the labour and industrial laws in India the tests and ratio laid down by the judges set
remarkable precedents in the sphere of labour laws legislation

In both the cases the interpretation of the word any person enshrined under sec 2k of the act
has given proper understanding as to who are the persons that fall under the ambit of the
term “any person” also the validity as to the reference mad e to the industrial tribunal was
also the matter in question. The comparative study of both the cases has given a clear
picture of the above mentioned questions of law.

Hence after a detailed perusal of the cases, we can say that these cases deal with the one of
the most indispensable and important labor legislations of the day- Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 as well as its scope, interpretation and application at the same time. The Supreme
Court has extensively dealt with the issue raised in both the cases.

Since the concept of labor is one of the most crucial in any society, hence after exhaustive
discussions, deliberations, arguments and consensus, the Court has delivered its judgment in
both the cases which is not only reasonable and fair, but also keeps up with the present labor
requirements and also upholds the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in its
true sense.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

 BOOKS

1. G.B. PAI, “LABOUR LAW IN INDIA”, (2001).

2. H K SAHARAY, “TEXTBOOK ON LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL LAW”, 7TH ED.,
UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING, 2017.

 STATUTES

1. THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947.

2. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIAN, 1950.

 INTERNET SOURCES

1. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/259678/ (Accessed on 25-10-2020 7:30 P:M)

2. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/822/Workmen-Of-Dimakuchi-Tea-Estate-
V.-The-Management-of-Dimakuchi-Tea-Estate.html (Accessed on 25-10-2020 9:30
P: M)

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