Hannah Arendt: Democracy and The Political

Author(s): SHELDON S. WOLIN

Source: Salmagundi, No. 60, On Hannah Arendt (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 3-19
Published by: Skidmore College
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40547750 .
Accessed: 05/12/2013 13:44

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Skidmore College is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Salmagundi.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HannahArendt:Democracy
and The Political
BY SHELDON S. WOLIN

The question of democracyis not one that has received much

attentionfromthose who have writtenabout Hannah Arendt.This
omission seems understandable because Arendt herself never
systematically addressedthetopic in any of herwritings.Yet it is not
difficult to showthatmanyof themajor categoriesthatcompose and
distinguish herpoliticaloutlookwereeithercriticalof or incompatible
withdemocraticideas. This I believeto be thecase withthedistinction
on whichher politicalideals weregrounded,the distinctionbetween
"thepolitical"and "the social." Her criticalattitudetowarddemocracy
restedon a correctintuitionthatthe impulseof democracyhas been
to overridethatdistinction.For historically, democracyhas been the
meansbywhichthemanyhave soughtaccess to politicalpowerin the
hopethatitcould be used to redresstheireconomicand social lot. The
"natural" stateof societycontainsimportantdistinctionsof wealth,
birth,and educationthatare typicallyextendedinto politicalpower.
Thus social poweris translatedintopoliticalpowerwhichis thenused
to increasesocial power. Democracyis the attemptof the many to
reversethe naturalcycle of power, to translatesocial weaknessinto
politicalpowerin orderto alleviatethe consequencesof what is not
so muchtheirconditionas theirlot-tery.
Democracywouldalso obliterate theseArendtiandistinctions because
itwantsto extendthebroad egalitarianism of ordinarylivesintopublic
life.It is at odds withtheemphasison authority, ambition,glory,and
superiority thatfiguredso importantly in Hannah Arendt'sconception
of authenticpoliticalaction. It was not accidentalthat she excluded
thesentiments - compassion,pity,and love - from
of fellow-feeling
the political realm, or, more important,that she was silent about

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
4 SHELDON S. WOLIN

"friendship"(so centralto herancientGreeks)and "fellowship"(so

basic to Hebraic and Christianconceptionsof community).These
democraticsentimentsand virtuesdo not accord withthe agonistic
conceptionof action she extolled. Democratic action is, perforce,
collective;itsmodeis cooperation;and itspresupposition is nota small
audienceof heroesbut sharedexperience.
In whatfollowsI proposeto exploretheoriginsof theantidemocratic
strainin Arendt'sthought,tracingit fromitsbeginningsin herclassic
studyof totalitarianism to its apogee in her next major work, The
Human Condition,Then I want to show thatin her laterwritingsa
changeis evident.It appearedfirstin thelastchapterof On Revolution
(1963) and more strikingly in the collectionof essays, Crises of the
Republic(1969). Whileon the way to whatcan fairlybe describedas
a leftwardposition, she modifiedsome of her most characteristic
categories.Withinlimits,and in herown way, she was, in thecourse
of reflecting upon the politicaleventsof the 1960s, radicalized.
Hannah Arendt'sfirstmajor work, The Originsof Totalitarianism
(1951), was completelysilentabout democracy.Althoughprimafacie
thereseemsto be no necessaryreasonwhyan analysisof totalitarianism
should discussdemocracy,the historicaland politicalcontextof the
subject-matter and thebook suggestotherwise.The book was written
in theimmediateaftermath of WorldWar II. Duringthewar yearsin
the UnitedKingdom,the BritishCommonwealth,the UnitedStates,
and in a significantpart of Nazi-occupiedEurope, the single,most
universalthemethatset the interpretation of the war in the mindsof
ordinarypeople everywhere was of a strugglebetween"democracy"
and "dictatorship." The books, newspapers,magazines,radio and
moviesof the timeconveyeda prettyunanimousviewpointthat the
natureof totalitarianism was to be graspedalmost entirelyin terms
of the political antithesesbetweendemocracyand totalitarianism:
betweendemocraticfreedomof speechand educationand totalitarian
thought-control and mass manipulation;betweendemocracy'ssystem
of freepoliticalpartiesand government byconsentand thetotalitarian
one-partystate withits use of terrorand intimidation.
While it would be an exaggerationto argue that the Originsof
Totalitarianism reversedtheacceptedperspective, itis no overstatement
that
to saythattheworkadopteda viewpoint interpreted totalitarianism
bymeansof categories thatwere drawn from intellectualtraditionsthat
were deeply anti-democratic.One tradition was associated with
Nietzsche,theotherwithTocqueville.A fundamental categoryof both

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 5
traditions was the"mass." For Nietzschedemocracywas primarily the
politicalexpressionof theatomistic,unheroic,security-loving culture
whichhad emergedafterthedefeatof theagonistic,aristocratic political
cultureof antiquityby the slave moralityof Christianity."The
democraticmovement,"Nietzschewrote,"is notonlytheformof the
decayof politicalorganization,but a formof the decay, namely,the
diminution,of man, makinghimmediocreand loweringhis value."1
Tocqueville,whosegeneralinfluenceon Arendt,particularly in her
understanding of the founding of the American republicand of the
natureof the FrenchRevolution,has not been fullyappreciated,not
onlyanticipatedNietzsche'snostalgiafora politicson an heroicscale,2
butwas thefirstnineteenth-century theorist to revivetheancientnotion
thatcertainformsof tyranny might have a popularbasis.3Tocqueville
envisioned"an immenseprotectivepower," operatingbenignlyrather
thanbrutally, that"hinders,restrains, enervates,stifles,and stultifies"
by "a network of prettycomplicated rules" that"covers thewholeof
social life." Democratic"equality," Tocquevilleheld, "has prepared
men for all this," encouragingthem to pursue "petty and banal
pleasures," to "exist in and for himself," isolated and politically
passive.4
The echoes of these writerscan be heard in the main themesof
Arendt'sanalysisof totalitarianism. "... totalitarianmovements,"
she wrote,"depended less on the structurelessness of a mass society
than on the specificconditionsof an atomized and individualized
mass. . . ."5 "Mass man" was characterizedby "isolation and lack
of normalsocial relationships"caused in partby "the breakdownof
theclass system."6Totalitarianmovements,she continued,werebuilt
on "sheernumbers"of "indifferent people. . . who neverbeforehad
appeared on the politicalscene."7 Totalitarian leaders,such as Hitler
and Stalin, "had the confidence of the masses" and enjoyed
"indisputablepopularity."8The triumphof totalitarianmovements,
she concluded, shattered the "illusion" that the existence of
1 Cited in Tracy B. Strong,FriedrichNietzscheand the Politics of Transfiguration
(Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1975), p. 201.
2 See, forexample,Democracyin America,tr. George Lawrence(Garden City,New
York. 1969). d. 15.
3 A. Andrewes,The Greek Tyrants(London, 1956).
4 Democracyin America,p. 692.
5 The Originsof Totalitarianism(New York, 1951), p. 312.
6 Ibid., pp. 310, 308.
7 Ibid., p. 305.
8 The Originsof Totalitarianism(New York, 1951), p. 301.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
6 SHELDON S. WOLIN

"democracy"had been made possiblebecause themajorityhad taken

an activepart and had positivelysupporteddemocraticgovernment.
In realitythe majorityhad been indifferent. This proved that "a
democracycould functionaccording to rules which are actively
recognizedby only a minority."Insofaras democracyrestedon the
massesat all, it had rested"on the silentapprobationand tolerance
of theindifferent and inarticulatesectionsof thepeople." The moral
wasthatwhiledemocratic freedoms mightbe definedintermsof formal,
legal equality,theywereviable "only wherethecitizensbelongto or
are represented by groupsor forma social and politicalhierarchy,"
thatis, wheretherewas politicaland social inequality.9
The Originsconcludedwitha warning,that unless human beings
resolvedto undertakea freshpoliticalstart(a "planned beginningof
history")thatwouldincludethecreationof "a newpolity,"thefuture
was bleak. "There are plentyof indicationsthatthemob. . . willtake
over and destroywherewe were unable to produce."10
She undertookthatprojectherselfin TheHuman Condition(1958),
and offeredherconceptionof a newbeginningthatwould furnishthe
groundforwithstanding themasses.Therewas littlein theOriginsthat
wouldhaveprepareda readerforthearchaicvisionof "a newpolity"
thatwas inspiredby the versionof pre-SocraticHellenismassociated
withNietzscheand Heidegger.The Human Conditiondid not present
a sketchof a politicalconstitution as Plato had done, butit did offer,
in the Platonic sense, an "idea" that embodied an ideal. And like
Plato's, herideal owed virtuallynothingto thefactsof history and only
slightlymoreto thehistoryof politicalideas. "The political" was the
ideal. The intentionbehindit was to combata different versionof the
in
massesthantheone whichhad figured heranalysis of totalitarianism.
Although"mass society"remainedthedanger,theanalysiswas focused
on thephenomenonof "work" and on thetransformation of society
and politicseffectedby the modern emphasisupon productivity and
economicgrowth. These and other notions were assembled under the
idea of "the social"; and behindthat idea was hermain opponent, Karl
Marx, who symbolizedthe destructionof the Westerntraditionof
politics.
Arendt'sconceptionof "the political"had severalaspects.It signified
not a stateor a societybut a determinatepublic space, a forum,an
agora, set aside, jealouslydefendedso thatthosemenwho wishedto
9 Ibid., p. 306.
10 Ibid., pp. 438, 439.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 1
testthemselvesby thehigheststandardsof excellencemightcompete,
byspeechand action,inthepresenceof theirpeers.It was to be a politics
of loftyambition,glory,and honor,unsulliedby privateinterestor
thematerialconcernsin thelargersociety"outside": a politicsof actors
ratherthancitizens,agonisticratherthan participatory, encouraging
qualitiesthatwould enable mento standout ratherthanto take part
of, share (participation = pars (part) + capio (seize)). It was a
combinationof Pericleandemocracy,idealized so as to expungethe
democraticelementsof law courtsand assemblies,and an Homeric
assemblyfromwhichthemerestsuggestionthata Thersitesmightarise
to "quarrel withkings" (Iliad 2.211-78) had been removed.
It is difficult
to exaggerateeitherthe severitywithwhichshe drew
boundariesaroundthepoliticalin orderto separateit fromthebanality
and low concernsof ordinarylife,or the historicaldistortionswhich
had to be introducedin orderto claim forherconstructtheauthority
of the Greeks. Among the distortionsshe ignoredthe acute class
conflictsthatwerea familiarfeatureof theGreekcity-states and had
generatedcontinuouspressureforthe broadeningof citizenshipand
fortheenlargement of politicalaccess so thatexcludedsocial elements
mightenjoythebenefitsof politicalmembership.As a resultshe gave
us a politicswithoutthedivisiveconflictsthathave presentedthemain
challengeto politicians,just as she had givenus whatwas said to be
a Greek-inspired conceptionof action but withoutanalyzingthevital
place accordedviolenceand war in Greekconceptionsof thepolis and
of noble action.
In thesame bowdlerizing vein,she made no mentionof theperiodic
efforts,as earlyas the Solonic land reforms,to expand the meaning
of equality(insonomia)so as to includea socio-economiccontentand
notjust an equalityof formallegal rights.11 So insistentwas she that
politicalequalityhad to be confinedamong the fewthatshe triedto
maintainthat the "real" meaningof equalityas understoodby the
Greekshad notto do withfairtreatment or evenwithequal rightsbut
witha conditionin whichtheindividualwas freebecausehe was neither
a ruler(or superior)nor a subject (or inferior).12 In supportof this
interpretation she claimedthat "the whole conceptof rule and being
ruled. . . was feltto be prepoliticaland to belongto theprivaterather
11 See G. Vlastos,"bonomia," ClassicalPhilology,Vol. XLI (1946),65-83;J.W. Jones,
The Law and Legal Theoryof the Greeks(Oxford, 1956), pp. 16-23,84-90; M.M.
Austinand P. Vidal-Naquet,Economic and Social Historyof AncientGreece: An
Introduction(Berkeley,Los Angeles, 1977), pp. 24-26.
12 The Human Condition(Chicago, 1958), pp. 32-33.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8 SHELDON S. WOLIN

thanthe public sphere."13The claim is, however,flatlycontradicted

'
by Aristotle'sfamiliardefinitionthat 'citizens,in thecommonsense
of the term,are all who share in the civic life of rulingand being
ruled."14
The fragility of herideal was underlinedby the conditionwhichit
required.A politicsdevotedto the productionof memorableactions
had to be notonlyexclusivebutsubsidized.The ancientAthenianshad
compromisedtheirdemocracyby excludingslaves, residentaliens,
workers,and women,thatis, practicallytheentireworkforceof the
polis. Arendtaccepted this notion and dressed it out by adopting
Aristotle'sjustificationthatthesehumanactivitieswere "functions"
whichembodiedthemetaphysical principleof "necessity,"thatis, they
werenecessary to sustaininghumanlifeand, byextension, thecollective
life of the polis. But because these formsof "labor" were bound
endlesslyto produceand reproducethemeansof life,and because the
fateof theproductsand serviceswas to be consumedand thusto pass
away withouttrace,and because the laborerdependedon employers
or masters,the activitieswere unfree,withoutchoice or lasting
significance.Parenthetically,one mightnotethatthiscontrastbetween
"freedom" and "necessity"was comparableto theone developedby
Marx, but, unlikeMarx, Arendtwantedto preservenecessityrather
than develop a complex strategy,as Marx did, for exploitingit,
overcomingit, and consortingwithit. For Arendtfreedomresided
essentiallyin the politicalrealmwheremen could exercisechoice. In
hereyes,Marx's exaltationof labor,hisclaimthatitshouldconstitute
theprinciplearoundwhichsocietyshouldbe reorganized,represented
an inversionof the truehierarchyof values. It meantenshriningan
activitythatwas essentiallymindless,routinized and repetitiousin place
of politicalactionwithitsdrivefortheunpredictableand memorable
deed. "The artof politicsteachesmenhow to bringforthwhatis great
and radiant.. . Greatness.. . can onlylie in theperformance itselfand
neitherin its motivationnor its achievement."15 Labor, on the other
hand,entailsa formof sociabilitythatinvolves"the actual loss of all
awarenessof individuality and identity."The "animal laborans" is
markedby "an incapacityfor distinctionand hence for action and
speech."16

13 Ibid., p. 32.
14 Politics Ill.xiii. 1283 b 45.
15 The Human Condition, p. 206.
16 Ibid., pp. 213, 215.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 9
The distinctive natureof thepoliticalor publicrealmwas developed
bythecontrastswhichArendtdrewbetweenitand theconceptof "the
social." The lattersignified all of theactivitiesand relationships
which,
by nature,were"private." They includedworkand labor, love, sex,
family,and household.These, she contended,weremattersthatcould
not withstandthe glare of publicitythat attendsall politicalactions
withoutbeing distortedor perverted.Privatethings,such as labor,
' ' and '' ' ' 17
"materialconcerns, "bodilyfunctions,shouldremain"hidden.
The crisisof modernity is thatthepoliticalrealmhas been invaded
bythesocial realm,especiallybyprivateeconomicinterests and private
values of consumptionand pleasure.The most dangerousinvaderis
the mass whose powerhas increasedwiththe growthof conformity.
The valueof equalityhas beenrealizedin thefactof sameness.Politics
has givenwayto administration as bureaucraciesregulatedailylifeand
renderit moreuniform.The triumphof necessity,and of the labor-
principlethatembodiesit,is realizedin theformof a societydedicated
to theignobleideal of merelife.She describedthatsocietyin a passage
thatis pure Nietzsche:

Societyis the formin whichthe factof mutualdependencefor

and
thesake of lifeand nothingelse assumespublicsignificance
wherethe activitiesconnectedwithsheersurvivalare permitted
to appear in public.18

In retrospectThe Human Conditionseems a work that is highly

suggestiveat themarginsof its chosenproblemsand irrelevant, even
misleading,at itscenter.Thereare marvelouslyperceptivecomments
about thenatureof actionand of work,but themainconstruct,"the
political,"could notcarrytheburdenassignedto it. This was because
two of the most fundamentalpoliticalproblemswere eitherignored
powerand justice.Power,she declared,"exists
or treatedsuperficially:
onlyin its actualization." It "springsup betweenmen whentheyact
togetherand vanishesthe momenttheydisperse. . . Power is to an
astonishingdegreeindependentof materialfactors. . .""
This formulation was fullyconsistentwithherdiscussionof work,
labor, technology,and privatepropertywhich never succeeded in
graspingthebasic lessontaughtnot onlyby Marx but by theclassical
17 The Human Condition,p. 77.
18 Ibid., p. 46.
19 The Human Condition,p. 200.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
10 SHELDON S. WOLIN

economistsas well, that an economyis not merelywork, property,

productivity, and consumption:it is a structure of power,a systemof
ongoing relationshipsin which power and dependence tendto become
cumulative,and inequalitiesare reproducedin formsthat are ever
grosserand evermoresophisticated. It is a systemof powerwhoselogic
containsno inherentprincipleof justice,and it is doubtfulthat,in the
absenceof thedevotedlaborsof philosophers overthepasttwodecades,
itwouldhaveeveracquiredone. Butjusticewas notdiscussedbyArendt
at all; it simplydid not figureforheras it had forPlato and Aristotle,
as the main objectiveof politicalaction.
Arendt'ssilenceabout justicewas relatedto anotherextraordinary
omission:the state. That one could claim to have a politicswithout
discussingthe stateis perhapsthe resultof her Greekstarting-point.
As is well-known, theconceptof thestatedoes notmakean appearance
untiltheearly16thcentury.Its absence,both in theoryand practice,
allowed herattentionto be focusedon the politicalactor and action
itselfto be treatedin dramaturgical terms,withnotmuchattention given
to institutional constraints,to thedifficulties of "action-at-a-distance,"
and to thedependenceof actorsupon theirown instrumentalities. When
the modernstate appears and acquires its centralizedapparatus of
power,theactoranticipatesthe fateof thecontemporary authorin a
structuralist critique:the textno longer needs him. The presenceof the
statehas even moreimportantconsequencesforordinarycitizens.It
representsnot only the greatestconcentrationof coercivepower in
history, and itnotonlydemandsobedience,butitasks forloyalty,even
affection,fromits subjects. The conditionswhichthe modernstate
requires- enormousrevenues,a managedeconomyand labor force,
a hugemilitary establishment, ever-more lethalinstrumentsof violence,
a vast bureaucracy,and a compliant citizenrythat will produce
legitimationupon demand - make it increasinglyplain that the
"democraticstate" has become a contradictionin terms.

* * *

On Revolution(1963) saw Arendtexchanging theparadigmof Athens

forthe earlyAmericanrepublic,the agonal actor of Homer forthe
revolutionary of 1776, and Pericles for JohnAdams. Many of the
categories developed in The Human Condition were retained,
particularlythe dichotomybetweenthe "political" and the "social"
with its anti-democraticand even anti-politicalimplications.Now,

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 11
however,the opposition between the political and the social was
developedby meansof a contrastbetweenthetwo great18thcentury
revolutions,theAmerican,whichwas guidedby an authenticpolitical
impulse,and the French,which catalyzed the "many" who, since
antiquity,had remained outside history,that is, the historyof
memorableactions.The FrenchRevolutionmarkedthemomentwhen
thosewho had been hiddenaway in the lowerdepthsof societyhad
suddenlyerupted.". . . thismultitude,appearingforthefirsttimein
broad daylight,was actually the multitudeof the poor and the
downtrodden, whomeverycenturybeforehad hiddenin darknessand
shame."20It was as though,she continued,"the slaves and resident
aliens[ofantiquity],who formedthemajorityof thepopulationwithout
everbelongingto the people, had risenand demandedan equalityof
rights."21Themselvespreoccupiedwiththeir"needs," theygenerated
a typeof physical"necessity"fromtheirown "misery"and unleashed
revolution
ituponpublicspace. Thus out of a primalnecessity emerged,
notas theinspiredactionof a desperatepeopleunableto secureredress
fortheirgrievances,but as an "irresistibleprocess," a necessityso
overpoweringas to defyhuman control,and hence signifying - as
necessityalways does - the denial of freedom.22
In the AmericanRevolution,she maintained,"the exact opposite
took place."23 The Americans conducted a genuinely political
revolution,one that"concernednot theorderof societybut the form
of government."Amongthereasonsforthedifference, as Tocqueville
had arguedbeforeher,was nature'sbountyratherthancolonialvirtue.
Althoughtherewas "poverty," therewas littleof the "misery" and
"want" thatwould latergoad thesansculottesto revolt.At the same
time therewas just the rightamount of deprivationto discourage
improperpoliticalaspirations.The majorityof colonists,she noted
approvingly,being occupied with "continuous toil," "would [be]
automatically exclude(d) . . . from active participation in
government."24 Acknowledgingthatwhilemiserymay not have been
thelot of the whitemajority,it may have been the experienceof the
black slaves, she insistedthat the main point was that "the social
question" was absent fromrevolutionary America "and withit, the
mostpowerfuland perhapsthe most devastatingpassion motivating
20 On Revolution,p. 41.
21 Ibid., p. 33.
22 Ibid., pp. 33, 41-44.
23 Ibid.. d. 44.
24 On Revolution,p. 63.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
12 SHELDON S. WOLIN

revolutionaries, the passion of compassion."25The demands of the

miserablethatthe politicalorderremedytheirdistresscould fall on
sympatheticears in Europe because moderns had come to feel
compassion,not because therewas any widespreadbeliefthatsocial
and economicopportunitiesoughtto be open to all. "The game of
status-seeking," shewrotein a passagethatis simplyhistorically untrue,
". . . was entirelyabsent from the society of the eighteenthand
nineteenthcenturies.. . ,"26 And witha fineNietzscheanaside she
chided contemporarysocial scientistsfor believingthat "the lower
classes have, as it were,a rightto burstwithresentment, greed,and
envy. . . ,"27
AlthoughArendtwas fullof praisefortheFramersof theAmerican
Constitutionforhavingsucceededin givinglastinginstitutional form
to revolution, something which most modern revolutionists have failed
to do, heraccountof the Constitutiondisplayedagain her antipathy
towardmaterialquestions,in thiscase, the economicmotivesof the
FoundingFathers,eventhoughmanyof thefounderswerenothesitant
to argue themopenlyin public space, as it were. By ignoringthese
mattersheraccountof theConstitution leftuninterpreted thedrivefor
centralization, the determination to curb the power the colonial
of
legislatures, and theHamiltonian vision of a national economypresided
overbya strongstate.Her failureto recognizethattheFounderswere
more concernedto halt the democraticsocial movementthat had
capturedsomeof thestatelegislatures and initiatedeconomiclegislation
favoringsmallfarmers and thattheir own plans includeda capitalist's
versionof the social question returns to undercutthe proposals fora
new conceptionof the political - or rather,a new embodiment-
advanced towardthe end of On Revolution.
She criticizedthe Framers for having introduceda systemof
representative governmentwhich meant that "the people are not
admitted to thepublicrealm." She chargedtheConstitution withhaving
causedthewithering of the"revolutionary spirit"because had failed
it
"to incorporatethetownshipsand thetown-hallmeetings, theoriginal
springsof all politicalactivityin the country"into the new political
order.28 Her charge,however,merelyaccusedtheFramersof whatthey
openly avowed. The new nationalgovernment, as its architectsmade
clear, had to break the monopoly which State and local institutions
25 Ibid., pp. 66, 90.
26 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
27 Ibid.. p. 67.
28 On Revolution,pp. 241-242.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 13
had on theaffectionsof thepeople.29Incorporatinglocal institutions
was not somethingthe Foundersfailedto do; it ran counterto their
politicalvision. They made the Constitutioninto a triumphof state-
sponsoredcapitalism,an eliteversionof the "social question" which
includedthedefenseof property rights,theencouragement of a national
economy throughcurrencyreforms,tariffs,taxation, commercial
policies, state subsidies,a militarypower able to extendAmerican
commerce, and an enlightenedbureaucracy to nurture infantindustries.
The visionof the Founderswas nationalratherthan local, expansive
ratherthanstationary. Consequently, forArendtto praisetheFounders
forhavingkepttherabbleand theirsocialconcernsfrominvadingpublic
space, and thento tax thatsame eliteforbeinginsensitive to thevalue
of local participatoryinstitutionswas to strainat a gnatand swallow
the camel.
Arendt'scriticismof the Framerswas an expressionof her unease
at the spectaclepresentedby modernrepresentative governmentand
itssystemof politicalparties:theyhad made politicsthemonopolyof
a professionaleliteand closed it offto naturaleliteswho are inspired,
not by careers,but by genuinelove of politics.Her solutionwas to
resurrect an obscureproposaladvancedbyJefferson in a privateletter
writtennearly a quarter century after the ratificationof the
Constitution.Jeffersonhad envisaged a system of "elementary
republics"located in the wards, counties,and statesand forminga
"gradationof authorities,"each witha share of power, that would
serveto checkand balanceeach other.30 AlthoughJefferson's proposal
sufferedfrom some of the same shortcomingsas ancient Greek
democracy inmakingno provisionforthepoliticaladmissionof women,
slaves,and aliens,thereweregenuinely democraticfeatures to it. "Every
man in the State" was to be "an acting memberof the Common
government, transactingin person" accordingto "his competence."
Each would thusfeelhimselfto be "a participatorin thegovernment
of affairs,not merelyat an electionone day in the year, but every
"31
day
Arendtthen proceeded to integrateJefferson'sproposal with a
traditionof participationwhich extendedback to the likes of the
Committeesof CorrespondenceduringtheAmericanRevolutionand
forwardto therevolutionary councilsand committees thathad sprung
29 See Hamilton's remarksin Federalist27 ad finem.
30 On Revolution,d. 258.
31 Cited, On Revolution,p. 257.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
14 SHELDON S. WOLIN

up spontaneouslywiththe outbreakof revolutions.She foundthem

in the FrenchRevolution,the Paris Communeof 1871, the Russian
revolutionsof 1905and 1917,and theHungarianRevolutionof 1956.
And doubtlessshe would have includedthe Solidaritymovementin
contemporary Poland.
Most of theseexamplesfulfillherexactingcriteriaof heroicpolitics
and spontaneousappearance. Whethertheywerepurelypoliticaland
unmarredbysocial and economicobjectivesmaybe morecontestable.
But grantingtheirimportance,it maystillbe thecase thatthe factof
theirexistence castsdoubton herentirethesisconcerning thecorrupting
effectsof thesocial question,of materialmiseryupon thecapacityof
ordinarycitizensto act in a genuinelypoliticalway. If modernsocieties
weremass societies,how is it possible forordinarycitizensto escape
the deadening effectsof routinizedlabor and the corruptionsof
consumersocietyand to displayan appetiteforpoliticsand political
action?How is it possible,first,to congratulatetheelitesforkeeping
themassesat bay and, then,to welcomethesecommittees and councils
as "the politicaleliteof thepeople"? Arendtdid notattemptto answer
the question,but it is not difficultto finda plausible explanation,
althoughit involvesgettingbehind the "darkness" which Arendt
repeatedly foundto be surrounding thelivesof laboringpeople.Thanks
to social historiansand culturalanthropologists we learnthatthepoor
are notwithoutrichculturesof theirown. Once thisis appreciatedtheir
capacityto act ceases to be inexplicableand the suspicionarisesthat
theconceptof the "mass" may be of limitedutility.It may even be
primarilyan intellectualconceit,a displacementof the intellectual's
resentment at whatcapitalistculturedoes to thestatusof intellectuals:
It restricts
"highculture"to thefewand thensubsidizestheintellectual
to protectthe few fromthe culturalbanalityof capitalism.
Arendt'sindifference, to put it blandly,to the cultureof ordinary
and poor citizensproduced a severelyimpoverishednotion of the
historicalmeaningof thepolitical.Here I have in mindwhathas been
one of themostimportant, perhapsthemostimportant, sourcesof the
popular understanding of a wide rangeof politicalnotions,such as
equality,justice, community,authority,and power. The historical
contribution of Westernreligionsto thepoliticaleducationof ordinary
and poor people is almostimpossibleto exaggerate.Religionsupplied
a firsthandexperience in whatitmeantto be a memberof a community,
to sacrificeand share, to be an object of power, to make not just
promisesbutcommitments of longduration,to refuseto conformfor
conscience'ssake, and, not least, to foundnew communities.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 15
At the end of On Revolutiontherewas an elementof pathos to
Arendt'sproject. Beyond extollingthe value of these new formsof
elitism,nothingis said about how theymightbe maintainedbecause
institutionalizing themwould destroythe spontaneitywhichwas an
essentialelementof theirpolitical authenticity.Their appearance,
therefore, is acceptedas one would accept the inexplicableworkings
of DivineGrace. These elitesare "chosen by no one," theyconstitute
themselves."Politicallytheyare the best and it is the task of good
government and thesignof a well-ordered republicto assurethemof
theirrightful place in thepublicrealm." "To be sure," she added, the
recognitionof theseelites"would spell the end of generalsuffrage"
forrecognition wouldmeanthattheelitehad won "the rightto be heard
in the conductof the businessof the republic," and thattheycared
"for morethantheirprivatehappiness." As forthosewho would be
excluded,theyhad not only chosen theirfateby remainingpassive,
but theyhad, unconsciously,affirmed"one of the most important
negativelibertieswe have enjoyedsincetheend of theancientworld,
freedomfrompolitics."32
This last remarkillustratesArendt'sprofoundequivocalityabout
politics,an equivocalitythatled herto welcomespontaneouspolitical
action but to distrustaction when the stakes became so large as to
threaten to incorporate theconcernsthatare locatedcloserto or within
"private" life. She wanted a pure formof politics,one that was
consistentwith the claim that "power is to an astonishingdegree
independent she declared
of materialfactors."33Politicalinstitutions,
flatly,should be made independentof economicforces.34It was her
visionof purepoliticsthatled herduringthelate 1960sto oppose the
VietNam War,to defendcivildisobedience,to criticizetheinvolvement
of universitiesin thewarbusiness,and, withinlimits,to welcomesome
aspectsof thestudentprotestmovements.In all of thesecommitments
one can see a commonelement:a supportof actionsthatwereprimarily
political,or at least could be seen that way, and withouteconomic
motivesor broad social aims.

***

In closinglet me offersome remarksintendedas a contributionto

democraticconceptionof thepolitical.Whatwouldsuch
an alternative,
32 On Revolution,p. 284. See also Crises of the Republic, pp. 231-233.
33 The Human Condition,p. 200.
34 Crisesof the Republic,pp. 212-213.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
16 SHELDON S. WOLIN

a conceptionlook like? How can it escape being merelyanother

arbitrary construction? One answeris that,historically,theidea of the
politicaland the idea of democracy have shared so many common
meanings as to seem almost synonymous. This cannot be said of the
relationship between the idea of the politicaland, say, the idea of a
politicalorder that would be controlledby or responsiveprimarily to
the wealthy.Marx expressedthis point in one of his earlywritings:

... it is evidentthatall formsof the statehave democracyfor

theirtruth,and forthatreasonare falseto the extentthatthey
are not democracy.35

Marx's pointcan be renderedlikethis:It is thenatureof thestatethat,

insofaras it claims to be political,it will governforthe good of the
entirecommunity and not serveprimarily theinterestsof a particular
class or group:thisis thedemocratic"truth." But insofaras thestate
in questiontakesa particularform,say, one mainlycontrolledby the
wealthyor by corporations,it will by virtueof its actual naturerule
intheinterests of a partof thesociety,thatis, be falseto thedemocratic
principle of the good of thewhole community.It followsthatonlya
democraticstatehas thepossibility of actingas a genuinepoliticalstate.
It mightbe added thatmostpoliticaltheorists,fromantiquityto the
present,have accepted the premiseof this point and resistedthe
conclusion.Theyhave acceptedtheprinciplethatthepoliticaldefines
a distinctkindof associationthataims at thegood of all, dependson
the contributions, sacrifices,and loyaltiesof all, but theyhave then
benttheiringenuityto devisingstructuresthat would allow the few
(whetherkings,aristocrats,representatives, or bureaucraticofficials)
to use collectivepower for the good of all while exactingfromthe
populationat large the various contributionsneeded forthattask.
These are, however,mainlyformalconsiderations,and whilethey
help to identifycorrectlythe principlethat the political means the
commonwell-beingis theend and the definitionof whatis authentic
politicalaction,it does not specifywhatthepoliticalhas to includeso
thatthecommonwell-beingis furthered. Nor does it tellus whatthe
natureof the commonwell-beingis: is it somethingthat is "made"
or "created" ? and, if so, out of what?Or is it disclosed?Is it a pure
good,or equivocal,evenironic?Whataretheconditionsthatare needed
35 Critiqueof Hegel's 'Philosophyof Right',tr. JosephO'Malley (Cambridge,1970),
p. 31.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 17
for the politicalto come into being so that the common well-being
becomespossible and how do theseconditionsentaildemocracy?
We can beginnot by ignoringthestatebut by avoidingtheerrorof
assumingthatthe stateis identicalor coterminouswiththe political.
The stateis a modernphenomenonand itsraisond'êtrewas to develop,
or better,to capitalizethe power of society- the power residentin
the humanactivities,relationships,and transactionsthatsustainlife
and itschangingneeds. The statebecamea coerciveagency,declaring
and enforcing law, punishing miscreants of all descriptions,
systematizing taxation,encouragingcommerceand manufacture in the
directionof nationaleconomies,conductingdiplomacy,wagingwar,
and seekingempire.Its characteristic formof action is the decision
whichit *'makes" withrelentless regularity;itstypicalexpressionis the
announcement of a "policy," and itsmode of governancerangesfrom
inducementsto force.
The appearanceof thestatesignifiesthatsurpluspoweris available,
thatcollectivelifehas succeededin producingmorepowerthanthedaily
needsof themembersrequire.The existenceof surpluspoweris a sign
thatthe politicalhas come into beingin the commonlifethatmakes
the state possible. Common life resides in the cooperation and
reciprocity thathumanbeingsdevelop in orderto survive,meettheir
needs,and beginto exploretheircapacitiesand theremarkableworld
into whichtheyhave been cast. The politicalemergesas the shared
concernsof humanbeingsto take care of themselvesand the partof
theirworldthattheyclaim as theirlot. The politicalemerges,in the
literalsense,as a "culture," thatis, a cultivating,
a tending,a taking
care of beingsand things.The commonlifeand the politicalculture
emergeto the accompanimentof power. Shared concernsdo not
eliminatethe need for power; theydepend upon it. This was partly
glimpsedin a remarkby the late Roland Barthes:

One mustnaturallyunderstandpolitical in its deepermeaning,

as describingthe whole of human relationsin theirreal social
structure,in theirpower of makingthe world.36

There is, of course, an irony here in that the skills of social

cooperation,which human beings acquire throughexperienceand
apprenticeship,and which enable them to settle their existence,
eventuallyare made to workagainstthem.Theirskillproducesmore
36 Mythologies,tr. AnnetteLavers (New York, 1972), p. 143.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
18 SHELDON S. WOLIN

powerthantheyneed.Surpluspowerenablesthemto project:to control

more of the futureand so to develop plans and expectations,i.e.,
projects.The dynamicsof collectivity thentake hold. The searchfor
surpluspower then getsinstitutionalized, whichis the organizational
for
language talking about the routinized manufacture of surpluspower.
Surplus then becomes the province administration;it is managed
of
and administered in theformof programs,includingprogramsforthe
deploymentof powerconvertedinto weapons and man-power.In all
of this the political, which had emergedas shared concerns and
involvements, has disappeared.
The loss of the political is a clue to its nature: it is a mode of
experienceratherthan a comprehensiveinstitution such as the state.
The thingabout experienceis thatwe can lose it and the thingabout
politicalexperienceis thatwe are alwayslosingitand havingto recover
it. The natureof thepoliticalis thatit requiresrenewal.It is renewed
not by unique deeds whose excellencesets some beings apart from
others,but by rediscovering thecommonbeingof humanbeings.The
political is based on this possibilityof commonality:our common
to
capacity share, to share memories and a commonfate.Our common
being is the natural foundation of democracy.As beingswhosenature
displays common elements, we have an equal claim to participatein
thecooperativeundertakings on whichthecommonlifedepends. We
are not equal in power or ability,and that is preciselywhyequality
is crucial. The developmentof power upon whichthe common life
dependsrequiresdifferent qualitiesand it producesdifferent beings,
differences whichare interpreted as inequalities.At thesame time,and
statedsomewhatdifferently, our humanbeingis not exhaustedby its
common being. It is, as Hannah Arendt so often and eloquently
remindedus, a beingthatis capable of expressingthemostremarkable
and gloriousdiversity. Thatdiversity has importantimplications on how
power is exercised democratically.
Each of us is a contributor to thegenerationof powerwithoutwhich
humanlifecannotendure.The problemof thepoliticalis not to clear
a space fromwhichsocietyis to be keptout but it is ratherto ground
power in commonalitywhile reverencingdiversity- not simply
respecting difference.Diversitycannotbe reverencedby bureaucratic
modesof decision-making. Diversityis thenightmare of bureaucracy.
The bureaucrat'sresponseto itis eitherto inventanotherclassification
or, in thecorporateworld,to manufacture57 varieties.The mode of
action that is consonantwithequalityand diversityis deliberation.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 19
Deliberationmeansto thinkcarefully.We mustthinkcarefullybecause
what is at stake is the exerciseof human power. To exercisepower
democratically,thatis, withthefullestpossibleparticipationbyequals,
farfrombeingan exerciseof crudemass power,is the mostsensitive
wayof handlingpower.Democraticdeliberation ourcommon
implicates
beingin decisions which are bound, in a complexsociety,to threaten
harmto our diversebeings.It requiresnotthatwe come to termswith
power- representatives and bureaucratscan do thatforus - butthat
we face it.

This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Thu, 5 Dec 2013 13:44:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions