Vol. 26, No. 3, March 2017, pp. 491–508 DOI 10.1111/poms.

12648
ISSN 1059-1478|EISSN 1937-5956|17|2603|0491 © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society

On the Same Page? How Asymmetric Buyer–Supplier

Relationships Affect Opportunism and Performance
Ver

onica H. Villena
Department of Supply Chain & Information Systems, Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University,
412 Business Building, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, USA, vhvillena@psu.edu

Christopher W. Craighead
Department of Marketing and Supply Chain Management, Haslam College of Business, University of Tennessee,
311 Stokely Management Center, Knoxville, Tennessee 37996, USA, craighead@utk.edu

esearch on buyer–supplier relationships (BSRs) has often focused on only one side of the relationship and, thus, has
R tended to overlook asymmetries. Yet, a buyer (supplier) may often deal with a bigger supplier (buyer) or one that
has higher levels of trust, respect, and reciprocity. Therefore, we examined how two types of asymmetries—size and rela-
tional capital—affect perceived opportunism and performance. We used dyadic data from 106 buyers and their matched
suppliers gathered from a survey and an archival database. The results demonstrate that the degree and direction of both
asymmetries affect the BSR. Our results also reveal that an imbalance of relational capital in a firm’s favor may have the
opposite effect from that intended. In other words, the firm’s counterpart perceives more, rather than less, firm oppor-
tunism. The results also suggest that a buyer observes lower benefits in the presence of size asymmetry, whereas the sup-
plier’s perception of benefits is unaffected. Thus, our research represents a significant step forward in understanding BSRs
and asymmetries by (i) bringing attention to two key asymmetries inherent in BSRs and (ii) showing that these asymme-
tries are not unidirectional in their influence on perceived opportunism and performance.
Key words: buyer–supplier relationship; perceived opportunism; size asymmetry; relational capital asymmetry;
performance
History: Received: January 2015; Accepted: August 2016 by Vinod Singhal, after 4 revisions.

(Cousins et al. 2006) and how to rebuild it (Wang

1. Introduction
Our greatest strength as a human race is our
ability to acknowledge our differences—our
greatest weakness is our failure to embrace them.
Judith Henderson, composer
Buyer–supplier relationships (BSRs) are comprised
of both economic and social exchanges. Within eco-
nomic exchanges, one of the more salient factors is
the firm’s size (Sheth 1973). Researchers have
unpacked size in BSRs, including how it influences
both the use of information sources within the buy-
ing process (Moriarty and Spekman 1984) and the
adoption of integrating technologies (Hart and Saun-
ders 1997). Relative to social exchanges, relational
capital is a more latent factor referring to trust,
reciprocity, and respect that actors develop with each
other through a history of interactions (Kale et al.
2000). In fact, relational capital is a key factor in fos-
tering buyer–supplier interactions with the goal of
creating relational “rents” (Dyer and Singh 1998).
Scholars have devoted considerable effort in examin-
ing BSRs’ relational capital, including how to build it
491
et al. 2014). Scholars have also examined how RC
positively affects performance (Sarkar et al. 2001),
whereas others are starting to unpack relational capi-
tal’s “dark side” (Villena et al. 2011, Zhou et al.
2014).
While size and relational capital are important fac-
tors in our understanding of BSRs, we are not focus-
ing on them per se. As the opening quote suggests, our
efforts are centered on the relative amount of each. That
is, we are focusing on size and relational capital asym-
metries because an imbalance in size often exists
between buyers and suppliers (Lee and Johnsen 2012,
Thomas and Esper 2010), and because the same level
of trust between buyers and suppliers may actually
be quite uncommon (Brower et al. 2009, Korsgaard
et al. 2015). Also, the two asymmetries complement
each other in that size is structural and salient while
relational capital is behavioral and latent. Thus, juxta-
posing these asymmetries allows us to more fully
examine how they affect economic and social
exchanges.
In a growing body of knowledge, scholars have
started unpacking some asymmetries in BSRs (see
 Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
492 Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society

Table 1 Representative Literature on Asymmetry in Buyer–Supplier Relationship

Asymmetry
Reference dimension(s) Method Major findings
Qualitative
Johnsen and Ford (2008) Size Eight case studies with small textile Proposed various coping mechanisms of smaller suppliers to
suppliers (one side) manage their larger buyers’ size imbalance
Thomas and Esper (2010) Asymmetry Interviews of eight supply chain Proposed that asymmetry’s effects in BSRs were not
in general professionals in three large retailers unidimensional; Proposed several mechanisms to manage
(one side) asymmetry
Lee and Johnsen (2012) Size Five in-depth case studies of large Proposed three stages of relationship development in the
buyers and small/medium-sized presence of size asymmetry: exploratory, developing, and stable
suppliers (both sides)
Quantitative
Kumar et al. (1995) Dependence Survey of automobile dealers (one side) Degree of interdependence asymmetry found negatively related
to commitment and trust, and positively relate to conflict
Anderson and Weitz (1989) Power Survey of distribution representatives Degree of power imbalance found to be negatively related to
(one side) continuation and trust
Gulati and Sytch (2007) Dependence Survey of component buyers (one side) Theorized degree and direction of asymmetry found that buyers
with an advantageous position receive fewer benefits from the
relationship
Nyaga et al. (2013) Power Survey of a single high-tech firm and Degree of mediated power asymmetry was negatively linked to
multiple suppliers (both sides) performance, but inconclusive in its association with adaptation
and collaboration
Brinkhoff et al. (2015) Dependence Survey of buying companies (one side) Degree of dependence asymmetry is negatively related to project
success

Table 1 for a summary). While this asymmetry litera-
ture is informative, several areas warrant attention.
First, only a few studies (e.g., Nyaga et al. 2013) have
captured actual asymmetry via dyadic data because
of methodological challenges (Roh et al. 2013). Yet,
we believe that examining actual asymmetry pro-
vides insights that would otherwise be incomplete.
Second, with few notable exceptions (e.g., Gulati and
Sytch 2007), research has examined the degree of
asymmetry without capturing the direction of asym-
metry, with the latter purportedly being influential
(Ross et al. 1997). Third, although select studies (e.g.,
Villena and Cheng 2016) have started to examine
BSRs in more complex ways, little effort has been
made to examine how various asymmetries affect
behaviors and performance within the dyad. For
example, while case studies have examined size
asymmetry (Lee and Johnsen 2012, Thomas and
Esper 2010), none of them have explicitly linked size
asymmetry to opportunistic behavior. Finally, there is
a notable absence of studies focusing on asymmetries
involving relational capital such as trust. In reviewing
the literature on trust, Korsgaard et al. (2015) noted,
“Of the varying perspectives on dyadic trust, argu-
ably the least attention has been paid to trust asym-
metry” (p. 17). Thus, we examined the following
research questions: Do asymmetries in size and rela-
tional capital increase or decrease perceived oppor-
tunism within a dyad? Do these asymmetries
ultimately impede or enable performance within a
dyad? We sought insight into our research questions
from both sides of the relationship.
Accordingly, we theorized via transaction cost eco-
nomics (Williamson 1973, 1985) and the relational
view (Dyer and Singh 1998) that two key asymme-
tries—size and relational capital—affect perceived
opportunism and performance. We focused on each
asymmetry’s degree (i.e., relative difference) and direc-
tion (i.e., whether the focal firm has a higher level
than its partner or vice versa). To avoid contexts
where “little is at stake,” we theorize within dyads in
which the supplier is perceived to be critical1 to the
buyer. Within this context, we believed asymmetries
would play a prominent role because of inherent
strategic vulnerabilities (Spekman 1988). We used
dyadic data—106 buyers and their matched suppliers
collected from a survey and an archival dataset—and
analyzed our hypotheses with two complementary
analyses.
Our research makes several contributions to the
study of BSRs and asymmetries. First, our research
features an asymmetry (relational capital) that has
been identified as needing exploration (Korsgaard
et al. 2015, Tomlinson et al. 2009). Our results reveal
that a buyer or supplier that perceives a higher level of
relational capital than its counterpart may be per-
ceived as more (rather than less) opportunist, thereby
challenging the traditional view of investing in rela-
tional capital as a key to deterring perceived oppor-
tunism (Dyer and Singh 1998). Second, we extend the
theorizing and analyzing beyond the degree to include
the direction of size and relational capital asymme-
tries; thus, adding to the few studies that do so (Gulati
and Sytch 2007). Third, we show that from the buyer’s
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
perspective, the two asymmetries may be a perfor-
mance liability rather than an asset. A buyer perceives
lower benefits whether the buyer is bigger or smaller
and when the supplier has higher relational capital.
From the supplier’s perspective, these two asymme-
tries’ influence on performance is less clear with only
suppliers with higher levels of relational capital per-
ceiving improvements to performance.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical model containing
both asymmetries and their associations with per-
ceived opportunism and performance.
2.1. Asymmetries and Perceived Opportunism
2.1.1. Perceived opportunism. Opportunism is self-
interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1973). In our
context, we define it as the firm’s perception that its
partner is violating norms affirmed over the course of
the relationship (Jap and Anderson 2003, Macneil
1981). While opportunism may be manifested in
many ways (Wathne and Heide 2000), its negative
effects are well established in the literature (Crosno
and Dahlstrom 2008). We propose that larger firms
and those firms with higher relational capital perceive
less partner opportunism, but are perceived as more
opportunist by their partners.
2.1.2. Size Asymmetry and Perceived Oppor-
tunism. We conjecture that size asymmetry would
likely serve as a catalyst for uncertainty within the
exchange. This uncertainty would ultimately foster a
smaller partner’s perception of the larger partner’s
opportunism in at least three ways (Williamson 1985).
First, size asymmetry may culminate in interpretive
uncertainty stemming from the two partners’ varying
cognitive frames (Weber and Mayer 2014). Even the
very nature in which larger vs. smaller companies
Figure 1 Theoretical Model
Size Asymmetry-Buyer
Size Asymmetry-Supplier
H2
Relational Capital Asymmetry-Buyer
Relational Capital Asymmetry-Supplier
Note: The respondent for our dependent variables is indicated in parenthesis.
493
approach the exchange vary significantly. Larger com-
panies tend to have more formal, bureaucratic commu-
nication channels and specialized personnel in their
business exchange than their smaller counterparts do
(Claycomb and Frankwick 2004). This misalignment of
communication and expertise could be disturbing to
the smaller party, who could thereby interpret the lar-
ger partner’s approach as opportunistic—even if it is
not intended to be (Weber and Mayer 2014). Second,
given that the supplier is critical, there has likely been
investment in non-trivial relationship-specific assets.
Exchange uncertainty becomes paramount in the pres-
ence of these specific assets, which could ultimately
foster more perceived opportunism (Williamson 1996).
The smaller company could suspect the larger com-
pany (whether the buyer or the supplier) of attempting
to extract more value from the relational assets (Wil-
liamson 1996). For example, larger companies may
capitalize on their more expansive resource endow-
ments to gain more (and perhaps better) information
pertinent to the economic exchange (Moriarty and
Spekman 1984). This advantage, in turn, could create a
perception that the larger company is coming to the
exchange “armed” to negotiate for more of the rela-
tional investment’s value (Williamson 1996). Finally,
size asymmetry may create a disproportionate level of
vulnerability whereby the larger company may use its
bargaining power2 in the exchange to gain control over
its smaller partner (Crook and Combs 2007).
In light of the above discussion, if the balance of
size favors the buyer (henceforth referred to as size
asymmetry—buyer or SIZEA-Buyer), the supplier
will perceive more buyer opportunism. Given that the
smaller supplier is critical, the potential for an expro-
priation effect exists (Rokkan et al. 2003), whereby the
bigger buyer seeks to gain more value from the smal-
ler supplier’s critical resources/expertise specific to
the relationship (Williamson 1996). The buyer could
be attempting to gain control over the smaller
H1 Perceived Buyer Opportunism (supplier)
Perceived Supplier Opportunism (buyer)
H3
Buyer Performance (buyer)
Supplier Performance (supplier)
H4

494 Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
supplier’s critical resource endowment (Casciaro and
Piskorski 2005). This attempt would be disturbing
from the supplier’s perspective as the supplier may
have made considerable investments to develop such
specific assets (Thompson 1967). Thus,
H1A. Size asymmetry—buyer is positively related to the
supplier’s perceptions of buyer opportunism.
Conversely, if the size balance favors the sup-
plier (henceforth referred to as size asymmetry—
supplier or SIZEA-Supplier), we now argue that
the supplier would perceive lower buyer opportu-
nism. While the differences in size and exchange
approaches would give rise to interpretive uncer-
tainty (Weber and Mayer 2014), the bigger supplier
would perceive itself to be less vulnerable and thus
be less prone to suspect opportunism. For example,
the bigger supplier would perceive the smaller
buyer’s behavior as more collaborative (i.e., both
parties working for mutual interest) as it has the
capacity of rewarding or punishing the smaller
buyer (French and Raven 1959). The larger supplier
would be cognizant of its resources’ critical nature
(Williamson 1996), yet would also recognize that its
relative size could be a safeguard from the buyer
seeking control of its resource endowment (Casciaro
and Piskorski 2005). In essence, the larger supplier
would perceive a bonding effect (Rokkan et al.
2003), thereby not perceiving the smaller buyer as
behaving opportunistically. In sum, aware of the
disproportionate level of vulnerability in the
exchange (Williamson 1973), the supplier tends to
perceive less buyer opportunism. Thus,
H1B. Size asymmetry—supplier is negatively related to
the supplier’s perceptions of buyer opportunism.
When the role is reversed—the buyer perceives
supplier opportunism; we conjecture the direction of
size asymmetry’s effect on opportunism would be
consistent as above. However, the supplier’s critical-
ity would affect the nuances of our theorizing. For
example, a larger buyer (SIZEA-Buyer) would be cog-
nizant of its supplier’s critical status. Yet, the buyer
would also recognize its size leverage and view it as a
deterrent to the smaller supplier’s taking advantage
of its critical status (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005).
Thus, the buyer would perceive that the supplier
would be less prone to behave opportunistically. Con-
versely, a smaller buyer (inherent in SIZEA-Supplier)
would recognize its larger supplier’s leverage (Crook
and Combs 2007) combined with the larger supplier’s
specific assets (Thompson 1967). This recognition
would culminate in the smaller buyer’s heightened
awareness of its strategic vulnerabilities (Spekman
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
1988). Thus, the buyer would be more prone to sus-
pect supplier opportunism. Hence,
H1C. Size asymmetry—buyer is negatively related to
the buyer’s perceptions of supplier opportunism.
H1D. Size asymmetry—supplier is positively related to
the buyer’s perceptions of supplier opportunism.
2.1.3. Relational Capital Asymmetry and Perceived
Opportunism. Relational capital has consistently
been found to deter opportunistic behavior (Wathne
and Heide 2000). Yet, parties’ perceptions of rela-
tional capital do not always converge (Korsgaard
et al. 2015, Tomlinson et al. 2009). We refer to this
imbalance as relational capital asymmetry and con-
jecture that it may undermine the relational capital’s
benefits, depending on the direction (Ross et al.
1997).
Our overarching conjecture is that a firm with
higher relational capital perceives less partner
opportunism, but is perceived as more opportunist
by its partner. If the focal firm has more relational
capital than the partner, the focal firm perceives less
partner opportunism, partly because of the “halo
effect”—that is, the focal firm views the partner’s
actions through a positive lens (Kim et al. 2010,
Kumar et al. 1995). In essence, the focal firm would
view the partner’s actions as more collaborative
given its higher level of trust, reciprocity, and
respect toward the partner. For example, if the part-
ner tries to persuade the focal firm to accommodate
its needs, the focal firm may perceive the partner as
being forthright (rather than opaque) about expres-
sing its needs, sharing knowledge and working
toward mutual benefit (Dyer and Singh 1998). Con-
versely, if the partner has a higher level of relational
capital than the focal firm, the focal firm would per-
ceive more partner opportunism. Herein, the focal
firm may begin to suspect partner interactions as
having a “hidden agenda” or as attempting to gain
more “leverage” within the relationship. Thus, while
the partner may view engagement as reciprocity
(i.e., a give-and-take to create mutual benefit), the
focal firm with low relational capital may not share
this view (i.e., no give—just take) (Korsgaard et al.
2015).
If the buyer has a higher level of relational capital
than the supplier (henceforth referred to as rela-
tional capital asymmetry—buyer or RCA-Buyer), the
supplier may perceive buyer actions as opportu-
nism. For example, the buyer may offer regular vis-
its to the supplier’s plants and provide training in
quality/process improvement. The buyer may see
this offer as an effort to have a close interaction
with the supplier, while the supplier who does not
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
share the same perception of relational capital may
be suspicious. Ultimately, the supplier may fear that
the buyer would eventually expropriate any result-
ing cost reductions from buyer actions (Rokkan
et al. 2003). The lack of a shared view of relational
capital is particularly troubling in that the supplier
(being critical) may have certain technology, knowl-
edge, and processes that the buyer needs. Thus, the
supplier may view the buyer’s regular visits as a
means to obtain this knowledge as opposed to shar-
ing knowledge in order to create relational rents
(Dyer and Singh 1998). Similarly, the supplier may
perceive other relational approaches (e.g., informa-
tion sharing) in the same manner. In other words,
the supplier may perceive that the buyer is strategi-
cally manipulating the dependence within the rela-
tionship (Bacharach and Lawler 1981). Thus, we
predict the following:
H2A. Relational capital asymmetry—buyer is positively
related to the supplier’s perceptions of buyer opportu-
nism.
Conversely, if the supplier has more relational capi-
tal than the buyer (henceforth referred to as relational
capital asymmetry—supplier or RCA-Supplier), we
argue that the supplier will perceive less buyer oppor-
tunism. The supplier would recognize its non-trivial
relationship investments while simultaneously per-
ceiving the relationship favorably. This combination
would create a sense of comfort with the buyer’s
actions and would perceive them with little suspicion.
Thus,
H2B. Relational capital asymmetry—supplier is nega-
tively related to the supplier’s perceptions of buyer oppor-
tunism.
When the role is reversed—that is, the buyer per-
ceives supplier opportunism; we conjecture the
direction of relational capital asymmetry’s effect on
opportunism would be consistent as above. How-
ever, the supplier’s criticality would affect the nuan-
ces of our theorizing. For example, buying
companies with higher perceptions of relational
capital (RCA-Buyer) may interpret supplier actions
to build non-trivial relationship investments as reci-
procity with a focus on creating relational rents
(Dyer and Singh 1998)—in turn, perceiving lower
levels of supplier opportunism. Conversely, those
buying firms with lower perceptions of relational
capital (RCA-Supplier) may view supplier actions
with suspicion, questioning whether the supplier
seeks to take advantage of its non-trivial invest-
ments. Thus, the supplier would be viewed as more
opportunist. Hence,
495
H2C. Relational capital asymmetry—buyer is negatively
related to the buyer’s perceptions of supplier opportu-
nism.
H2D. Relational capital asymmetry—supplier is posi-
tively related to the buyer’s perceptions of supplier oppor-
tunism.
2.2. Asymmetries and Performance
2.2.1. Firm Performance. We also explore whether
the two types of asymmetries have an impact on the
buyer’s and supplier’s performance. Both parties col-
laborate with their ultimate goal being to learn from
one another in order to improve their capabilities
(Kale et al. 2000). However, an imbalance of either
size or relational capital can affect the gains they aim
to achieve from the relationship. Central to our argu-
ment is that larger firms and firms with higher level
of relational capital will perceive improved benefits
and vice versa.
2.2.2. Size Asymmetry and Firm Performance. We
posit that size asymmetry directly affects perfor-
mance for the same logical and theoretical reasons as
with opportunism. A larger buyer may perceive
greater benefits from the relationship because it
believes it is driving the nuances of how the
exchange occurs and, thus, is better enhancing its
capabilities via the supplier’s critical assets. Conver-
sely, a smaller buyer will take precautions to reduce
its vulnerabilities in dealing with its larger supplier
(Nyaga et al. 2013). The supplier, being critical, may
have key assets and personnel to meet the buyer’s
needs (Thompson 1967). Yet, the larger supplier may
prefer to minimize interactions with its smaller cus-
tomer because it may not count a big portion of its
business. Thus, the smaller buyer may perceive the
relationship with a bigger supplier less favorably.
Hence,
H3A. Size asymmetry—buyer is positively related to the
buyer’s perceptions of performance.
H3B. Size asymmetry—supplier is negatively related to
the buyer’s perceptions of performance.
When the perspective is reversed in terms of the
supplier’s perceptions, we recognize a potential com-
plicating “pressure” relative to the supplier’s percep-
tion of performance. Within the very nature of buyer–
supplier exchanges, the supplier strives to meet the
buyer’s needs and demands by outperforming its riv-
als—other potential suppliers. Also, BSRs’ underlying
structure is often sequential—suppliers try to meet
the customer’s needs rather than the other way
around (Thompson 1967, Crook and Combs 2007).

496 Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
We suspect this situation could alter the supplier’s
perception of the value gained. Yet, notwithstanding
this competing view, we believe our theoretical and
logical arguments discussed above will hold. There-
fore, we predict the following:
H3C. Size asymmetry—buyer is negatively related to
the supplier’s perceptions of performance.
H3D. Size asymmetry—supplier is positively related to
the supplier’s perceptions of performance.
2.2.3. Relational Capital Asymmetry and Firm
Performance. Similarly, asymmetry in relational
capital directly affects performance, but this effect
depends on the direction. For example, if the buyer
has higher relational capital, it will perceive the rela-
tionship as an asset in which both parties have joined
efforts to achieve objectives. More broadly, consider-
ing how relational capital affects the perception of
opportunism, the directional hypotheses related to
relational capital asymmetry and performance are
driven by the same logic. Thus,
H4A. Relational capital asymmetry—buyer is positively
related to the buyer’s perceptions of performance.
H4B. Relational capital asymmetry—supplier is nega-
tively related to the buyer’s perceptions of performance.
When the perspective is reversed in terms of the
supplier’s perceptions, we again recognize that the
potential pressure to satisfy the buyer’s needs may
affect the supplier’s performance. Yet, we believe that
our asymmetry arguments will prevail. Thus, consid-
ering how relational capital affects the supplier’s per-
ception of opportunism, the directional hypotheses
related to relational capital asymmetry and perfor-
mance are driven by the same logic. Hence,
H4C. Relational capital asymmetry—buyer is negatively
related to the supplier’s perceptions of performance.
H4D. Relational capital asymmetry—supplier is posi-
tively related to the supplier’s perceptions of performance.
3. Method
3.1. Research Design
We collected survey and archival data from 106 buy-
ing companies and their matched suppliers operating
in Spain during 2011–2012. We pilot tested the survey
with a group of four academics and five practitioners
in the supply chain area. The archival data were
extracted from the Sistemas de An
alisis de Balances
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Ib
ericos (SABI) database (similar to the COMPUSTAT
database in the United States).
3.1.1. Survey Data. To select our sample firms, we
identified 801 firms in diverse manufacturing sectors
from the SABI database. We deliberately excluded
service firms (e.g., consulting services) and small
firms (<10 employees). Developing a survey instru-
ment with well-established scales, we pilot tested it
making minor modifications where necessary. To
ensure conceptual equivalence, we created the instru-
ment in English, translated it into Spanish, and then
translated it back into English (Hoskisson et al. 2000).
In December 2011, we sent the survey to 801 firms,
along with a cover letter explaining the study’s pur-
pose and the criteria for selecting a supplier (i.e., criti-
cal to each company’s operations). We requested that
respondents have the chosen supplier as a reference
point for completing the survey and named a contact
at the supplier firm. We received 206 usable
responses, for a response rate of 25%. Upon receiving
the buyer survey, we sent a customized survey to the
designated supplier. We received 118 supplier sur-
veys, for a response rate of 57%. Because of missing
data, we ended with 106 dyads.
To ascertain whether buyer and supplier respon-
dents were knowledgeable about the relationship
between their firms, we followed two steps. First, in
our survey instrument, we asked respondents to spe-
cify how long they had been involved in the focal rela-
tionship. Buyer respondents averaged 9.5 years of
experience working with the chosen supplier, while
supplier respondents averaged 10 years of experience
working with the buyer. Second, we requested in the
cover letter that respondents be responsible for sup-
plier relationships in their organizations. The most
common titles for buyer respondents included supply
chain director, purchasing manager, purchasing coor-
dinator, and operations coordinator, while for sup-
plier respondents it included director, sales director,
account manager, and operations coordinator. The
final respondents were diverse in terms of company
size, age, and industry.
3.1.2. Archival Data. We collected archival data
on participating buyers and suppliers from the SABI
database and used the data in three ways. First, we
triangulated survey and archival measures. The test
results showed some consistency between survey-
based and 2011 SABI-based information for buyers
(number of employees: r = 0.42, p < 0.001; years in
business: r = 0.30, p < 0.01) and for suppliers (num-
ber of employees: r = 0.32, p < 0.01; years in business
r = 0.52, p < 0.001). Second, we calculated size asym-
metry and several control variables. To calculate size
asymmetry, we used sales volume registered in the
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
2011 SABI dataset. To calculate the two control vari-
ables (i.e., recent past performance and environmen-
tal uncertainty), we used the 2006 to 2011 SABI
datasets (more details are provided in the measure-
ment subsection). Third, we checked nonresponse
bias (Lambert and Harrington 1990) by examining
mean differences in responding (n = 206) and nonre-
sponding (n = 595) buying firms using the 2011 SABI
data. The t-statistics were not significant for the num-
ber of employees (t = 1.01, p = 0.30), years in business
(t =
0.93, p = 0.35), return on assets (t =
0.74,
p = 0.45), or return on equity (t = 0.68, p = 0.49). To
complement this approach, we used the survey data
to examine the mean difference for responding
(n = 106) and nonresponding (n = 100) supplier
firms. Between these groups, the results showed no
significant difference in relationship length (t = 1.18,
p = 0.23), type of product supplied within the rela-
tionship (t = 0.40, p = 0.68), or equity involvement
(t = 1.60, p = 0.12).
3.1.3. Common Method Bias (CMB). Following
Podsakoff et al. (2012), we implemented several
remedies for CMB. For procedural remedies, we pro-
tected respondent anonymity, reduced item ambigu-
ity during the pretest, separated the measures of the
predictors and criterion variables, and obtained data
from two groups of respondents (buyers and suppli-
ers) and from two sources (survey and the SABI data-
set). For statistical remedies, we triangulated the
survey-based data with SABI-based data and ensured
there was no significant difference in demographic
information. We also measured the dependent vari-
ables from one side of the relationship while indepen-
dent variables were calculated as the difference
between both sides’ scores. These steps reduced, but
did not completely eliminate, the potential for CMB.
3.2. Measurement Development and Assessment
Consistent with previous supply chain and marketing
studies (Gulati and Sytch 2007, Nyaga et al. 2013, Roh
et al. 2013, Ross et al. 1997), we used a spline method.
This method calculates the difference (i.e., degree) of
scores between a buyer and its supplier regarding a
relationship attribute and, subsequently, differenti-
ates which of the two parties has a higher level (i.e.,
direction). This method allowed us to explore possible
variations in the effects of the buyer’s and the suppli-
er’s size and relational capital that would not be
uncovered in focusing only on the degree of asymme-
try by taking the difference of the scores’ absolute
value (Kumar et al. 1998). Also, we theorized that
firm opportunism is heavily influenced by who is big-
ger or has the higher level of relational capital. Thus,
a single-variable approach capturing only degree and
ignoring direction would have been inadequate.
497
To calculate our asymmetry variables, we first mea-
sured relational capital and size for both buyers and
suppliers. Relational capital (RC) was measured using
five items adapted from Kale et al. (2000) that cap-
tured the extent to which the firm perceived that the
relationship with its partner was characterized by
close interactions, trust, friendship, respect, and reci-
procity. Each side reported its own internal percep-
tion of relational capital. Coefficient alpha for RCbuyer
and RCsupplier were 0.83 and 0.76, respectively. Next,
we used the spline method to calculate the value of
RCbuyer
RCsupplier and named it RCA-Buyer. Then
we recoded this variable to equal (RCbuyer

RCsupplier) if RCbuyer > RCsupplier and zero otherwise.
We calculated RCA—Supplier the same way. Our sam-
ple returned 24 dyads in which a buyer held a higher
level of relational capital, 66 dyads in which a sup-
plier did, and 16 with symmetric values. Buyers and
suppliers were not far apart in their RC levels: 68%
were within one scale point of each other, but their
differences ranged up to two scale points. This differ-
ence scale’s reliability was 0.76.3
We followed this same approach for size asym-
metry using firm sales extracted from the 2011 SABI
dataset. This objective measure was right-skewed;
thus, we calculated the sales’ logarithmic value.
Our sample returned 70 dyads in which a buyer
was larger (SIZEA-Buyer) and 36 dyads in which a
supplier was larger (SIZEA-Supplier). Only 27% of
the dyads had buyer and suppliers within one scale
point, while the difference ranged up to seven
points.
We measured opportunism using items adapted
from Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) and from Jap and
Anderson (2003). We created two constructs: buyer
opportunism (assessed by the supplier) and supplier
opportunism (assessed by the buyer) with alpha coef-
ficients of 0.92 and 0.91, respectively. Their correlation
was moderately significant (r = 0.16; p = 0.09). To
measure firm performance, we adapted a scale from
Kale’s et al. (2000). We created two constructs: buyer
performance and supplier performance. Alpha coeffi-
cients were 0.82 and 0.80, respectively, whereas their
correlation was not significant (r = 0.08, ns). See
Table 2 for all constructs’ items.
We also included three types of control variables—
organizational, relationship, and market characteris-
tics. The organizational characteristics included recent
past performance as well as research and develop-
ment (R&D) capabilities of both buyers and suppliers.
The first set came from the 2009–2011 SABI databases,
while the second came from a detailed analysis of the
companies’ annual reports and websites. Recent past
performance was measured using average ROA for
2009–2011. More profitable firms may devote more
resources to improving their capabilities and,
 Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
498 Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society

Table 2 Measurement Items.

Measurement items CR AVE a Coefficient SE p-value

Relationship duration: Please indicate how long (in years) your firm and the chosen supplier have been working together (Kale et al. 2000, Poppo et al.
2008)
Equity involvement: Please indicate whether the structure of the relationship with the chosen supplier is equity (1) or non-equity (0) (Kale et al. 2000)
Customized product: Please indicate if the product transacted within the relationship with the chosen supplier is customized (1) or standard (0) (Modi and
Mabert 2007)
Buyer dependence: How many potential satisfactory suppliers does your company have for the product transacted with the chosen supplier? (Gulati and
Sytch 2007)
Supplier dependence: What percentage of total product the supplier manufactures does your company buy? 0–5%(1), 6–15%(2), 16–30%(3), 31–50%(4),
>50%(5) (Modi and Mabert 2007)
Supplier relational capital(supplier): Please indicate the extent to which the relationship is characterized by 0.84 0.58 0.83
(Kale et al. 2000)
A close personal interaction 0.74 0.04 0.00
Mutual respect 0.69 0.05 0.00
Mutual trust 0.87 0.03 0.00
Friendship† – – –
Reciprocity 0.72 0.05 0.00
Buyer relational capital(buyer): Please indicate the extent to which the relationship is characterized by 0.79 0.49 0.76
(Kale et al. 2000)
A close personal interaction 0.62 0.06 0.00
Mutual respect 0.75 0.05 0.00
Mutual trust 0.81 0.05 0.00
Friendship† – – –
Reciprocity 0.61 0.06 0.00
Buyer opportunism(supplier): Please indicate the extent to which the buying firm would often 0.91 0.59 0.91
(Jap and Anderson 2003)
Take advantage of the relationship†
Hide important information from us 0.77 0.04 0.00
Exaggerate its needs to get what it desires 0.78 0.04 0.00
Use shared norms of reciprocity to further its own interest 0.85 0.02 0.00
Alter facts to get what it wanted 0.84 0.03 0.00
Use know-how existing in the relationship opportunistically 0.83 0.03 0.00
Do anything within its means to get a larger share of the gains from the relationship 0.75 0.04 0.00
Supplier opportunism(buyer): Please indicate the extent to which the supplier would often 0.92 0.68 0.92
(Jap and Anderson 2003)
Take advantage of the relationship†
Hide important information from us 0.72 0.04 0.00
Exaggerate its needs to get what it desires 0.90 0.02 0.00
Use shared norms of reciprocity to further its own interest 0.90 0.02 0.00
Alter facts to get what it wanted 0.84 0.03 0.00
Use know-how existing in the relationship opportunistically 0.83 0.03 0.00
Do anything within its means to get a larger share of the gains from the relationship 0.77 0.04 0.00
Buyer performance(buyer): Please indicate the extent to which (during the last three years) 0.83 0.62 0.82
(Kale et al. 2000)
Your company has acquired, exchanged, and combined key information/knowledge within the 0.75 0.05 0.00
relationship
Your company has acquired some critical capabilities/skills from the relationship 0.73 0.05 0.00
The relationship has enhanced your existing capabilities/skills 0.87 0.04 0.00
Supplier performance(supplier): Please indicate the extent to which (during the last three years) 0.83 0.62 0.80
(Kale et al. 2000)
Your company has acquired, exchanged, and combined key information/knowledge within the 0.68 0.06 0.00
relationship
Your company has acquired some critical capabilities/skills from the relationship 0.71 0.05 0.00
The relationship has enhanced your existing capabilities/skills 0.94 0.04 0.00

(respondent): The respondent is indicated in parentheses. AVE: Average Variance Explained; CR: Composite Reliability; a: Cronbach’s alpha.
*Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results: v2 = 474.83, df = 284, RMSEA = 0.07, SRMR = 0.06, CFI = 0.90, TLI = 0.89.
†
Items dropped after CFA.

therefore, perceive fewer benefits from inter-firm rela- department (value of 1) or not (value of 0). Firms with
tionships (Hill and Rothaermel 2003, Levinthal and strong R&D capabilities may enjoy more power and,
March 1981). R&D was measured with a dummy vari- consequently, perceive more benefits (Johnsen and
able indicating whether the firm had an R&D Ford 2008).
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
The relationship characteristics included relation-
ship length, equity involvement, product type, buyer
dependence, and supplier dependence. Such informa-
tion was gathered only from buyers to maximize the
supplier’s response rate. Relationship length measured
the number of years the two companies had been
working together (Poppo et al. 2008). Long-term part-
ners can cultivate processes and routines that facili-
tate achieving goals set for the relationship. We also
asked the buyer whether it had any equity involvement
with the supplier. Buyers and suppliers that share
some equity (e.g., belonging to the same parent firm)
may have more incentive to achieve established goals
rather than to misbehave (Kale et al. 2000). We cre-
ated a dummy variable coded as 1 if equity was
involved and 0 otherwise. We also controlled for pro-
duct type. If the product exchanged is more custo-
mized, both parties may be more interested in
teamwork to achieve the desired properties and less
interested in misbehaving. We created a dummy vari-
able, customized product, which was assigned the value
of 1 if the product was customized and 0 otherwise.
We also controlled for both buyer and supplier
dependence. If the buyer is highly dependent on the
supplier, it is more willing to invest relational capital
and less interested in misbehaving (Gulati and Sytch
2007, Krajewski et al. 2005). Asking the buyer how
many potential satisfactory suppliers it had for the
product, we named this variable buyer dependence. A
higher number of satisfactory suppliers indicates
lower dependence, and vice versa. For supplier depen-
dence, we asked the buyer what percentage it buys of
total products the supplier manufactures. We created
a variable that received the value of 1 if 0–5%, 2 if
6–15%, 3 if 16–30%, 4 if 31–50%, and 5 if >50%. The
higher percentage of total supplier production the
buyer bought would indicate a higher supplier
dependence (Modi and Mabert 2007).
We controlled for market conditions for both
buyers and suppliers. Market unpredictability estimates
the degree of irregularity in an overall pattern of
environmental change that a firm faces in its industry
(Child 1972). The parties operating in highly uncer-
tain markets may limit benefits or leverage the trust
within their relationship (Villena et al. 2016). Follow-
ing previous studies (Delacroix and Swaminathan
1991, Krishnan et al. 2006), we first identified the
firm’s industry sector (using the classification that
Spain’s National Institute of Statistics created) as
registered in the 2011 SABI database. We then calcu-
lated the industry’s sales value from 2006 to 2010 to
reflect market unpredictability in 2011, using the
2006–2011 SABI databases. Market unpredictability
was the coefficient of alienation (1
R2) of 2011
industry sales’ regression on the five preceding years’
industry sales as expressed in Equation (1):
499
Yt ¼ bo þ b1t þ a; ð1Þ
where y = net industry sales, t = year, and a =
residual.
To assess our variables’ validity and reliability, we
computed composite reliability (CR), average vari-
ance extracted (AVE), and Cronbach’s alpha. The CR
values (in the range of 0.79–0.92), AVE (in the range
of 0.49–0.68), and Cronbach’s alpha (in the range of
0.76–0.92) exceeded the minimum limit indicated in
previous research (Hair et al. 2010). Using confirma-
tory factor analysis (CFA), we also tested the mea-
surement by including all items from both buyer and
supplier data. The model’s estimation indicated an
acceptable fit: v2 = 474.83, df = 284, RMSEA = 0.07,
SRMR = 0.06, CFI = 0.90, TLI = 0.89 (Hu and Bentler
1999). The results show that all items’ standardized
coefficients were highly significant, indicating the
constructs exhibited convergent validity. The mea-
surement items are reported in Table 2.
4. Results
4.1. Hypothesis Testing
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and correla-
tions. We examined the data for violations of assump-
tions of normality and multicollinearity (Cohen et al.
2003). All variables approximated normal distribution
except the relationship length and firm size, which
were transformed by taking their logarithm. To
address multicollinearity, we calculated the variance
inflation factor (VIF) for all regression equations. The
highest VIF was 1.66, well below a common rule-of-
thumb cutoff of 10 (Kutner et al. 2004). To test our
hypotheses, we used hierarchical regression analysis.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of buyer/supplier
perceived opportunism and buyer/supplier perfor-
mance, respectively. These tables report the incre-
ments to adjusted R2 at each step, each regression
equation’s significance, unstandardized beta coeffi-
cients, and robust standard errors.
First, we assessed the four asymmetry variables’
direct effects on buyer/supplier opportunism (see
Table 4). Model 2 shows the results for buyer oppor-
tunism. SIZEA-Buyer was positively and significantly
associated with buyer opportunism (B = 0.10;
p < 0.05), rendering support to H1a. The SIZEA-Sup-
plier’s coefficient was not significant; thus, H1b was
not supported. The results show that RCA-Buyer was
positively associated with buyer opportunism
(B = 0.30; p < 0.05), supporting H2a, and that RCA-
Supplier was negatively associated with it (B =
0.25,
p < 0.001), supporting H2b. As presented in Model 4,
the results for supplier opportunism show that
SIZEA-Buyer was negatively associated with supplier
opportunism (B =
0.08; p < 0.05), providing support
 500

Table 3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Buyer past
performance
2 Supplier past 0.10
performance
3 Buyer R&D
0.02
0.02
4 Supplier R&D
0.01
0.07 0.03
5 Customized product 0.09
0.12
0.16
0.15
6 Relationship length
0.05
0.13
0.11
0.13
0.14
7 Equity involvement 0.07
0.10
0.04
0.01 0.05 0.11
8 Buyer dependence 0.11 0.22* 0.05
0.07 0.02
0.04 0.01
9 Supplier
0.01
0.03
0.12 0.09 0.33**
0.05 0.06
0.22*
dependence
10 Buyer market
0.09 0.06
0.04 0.13
0.04 0.09
0.01
0.06
0.04
unpredictability
11 Supplier market 0.01 0.15†
0.04
0.08 0.13 0.12
0.04
0.06 0.08 0.38**
unpredictability
12 SIZEA-Buyer 0.13
0.04
0.06
0.28* 0.24*
0.11 0.15
0.05 0.10
0.16† 0.10
13 SIZEA-Supplier
0.11 0.04 0.04 0.34*
0.24*
0.01
0.02 0.08
0.04
0.02
0.23*
0.50*
14 RCA-Buyer
0.03
0.01
0.04 0.03
0.03
0.04
0.06 0.15
0.11
0.05
0.05
0.09 0.24*
15 RCA-Supplier
0.02 0.01 0.10
0.05
0.08 0.04
0.19*
0.01
0.09
0.01
0.09
0.09 0.02
0.40*
16 Buyer opportunism 0.09
0.17† 0.03
0.01 0.01 0.04 0.19*
0.03 0.02
0.11
0.22* 0.17
0.11 0.12
0.23*
17 Supplier 0.03
0.07 0.05 0.03
0.15 0.01
0.04
0.11
0.05 0.11
0.10
0.15 0.06
0.05 0.16† 0.16†
opportunism
18 Buyer performance 0.01
0.26*
0.02
0.09 0.11 0.15 0.18*
0.01 0.11 0.02
0.12
0.06
0.12 0.08
0.24*
0.05
0.06
19 Supplier 0.12
0.08 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.03
0.04 0.21* 0.06 0.10 0.07
0.15†
0.21* 0.16†
0.16† 0.01 0.08
performance
Mean 1.30 1.36 0.04 0.43 0.33 2.55 0.05 2.96 2.44 0.48 0.47 1.34 0.75 0.13 0.50 1.63 1.89 3.75 3.87
SD 0.68 0.73 0.10 0.50 0.47 0.72 0.22 1.75 1.55 0.22 0.17 1.50 1.29 0.33 0.53 0.72 0.82 0.73 0.77

It should be noted that both the buyer and supplier past performance is quite low due to the economic downturn (i.e., high unemployment and no growth) that occurred during the 2009–2011 period in
Spain. N = 106. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society 501

Table 4 Results of Regression Models for Opportunism

Buyer opportunism(supplier) Supplier opportunism(buyer)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 1.80*** 0.37 1.78*** 0.37 1.98* 0.50 1.78* 0.71
Firm control variables
Buyer recent past performance 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08
Supplier recent past performance
0.13† 0.07
0.11 0.07
0.04 0.08
0.03 0.08
Buyer R&D 0.17 0.55 0.50 0.39 0.33 0.60 0.17 0.65
Supplier R&D
0.01 0.16 0.09 0.15
0.06 0.16
0.07 0.16
Relationship control variables
Relationship length 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.10
Equity involvement
0.52 0.40 0.33 0.40
0.15 0.24 0.14 0.24
Customized product
0.01 0.18
0.06 0.18
0.16 0.18
0.10 0.17
Buyer dependence 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
0.06 0.05
0.08† 0.05
Supplier dependence 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06
0.02 0.05
0.01 0.05
Market control variables
Buyer market unpredictability 0.01 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.78* 0.34 0.65† 0.37
Supplier market unpredictability
0.72* 0.34
1.12*** 0.32
0.65 0.52
0.36 0.54
Main Effects
SIZEA-Buyer H1a (+) 0.10* 0.05 H1c (
)
0.08* 0.05
SIZEA-Supplier H1b (
)
0.06 0.07 H1d (+)
0.02 0.06
RCA-Buyer H2a (+) 0.30* 0.16 H2c (
) 0.37 0.25
RCA-Supplier H2b (
)
0.25*** 0.09 H2d (+) 0.42** 0.15
R2 10.6% 22.6% 8.40% 16.3%
R adjusted square 3.40% 9.4% 1.60% 3.5%
F change 3.36*** 2.15†

We report one-tailed test for hypothesized variables when the coefficients are in the direction of the hypothesis, two-tailed test otherwise. Also, the
respondent is indicated in parentheses. N = 106. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Values highlighted in bold correspond to hypotheses.

for H1c. RCA-Supplier was positively associated with
supplier opportunism (B = 0.42; p < 0.01), supporting
H2d. No support was found for H1d and H2c.
Next, we assessed the four asymmetry variables’
direct impact on buyer/supplier performance (see
Table 5). For buyer performance (Model 2), the results
show that SIZEA-Supplier (B =
0.10; p < 0.05) and
RCA-Supplier (B =
0.28; p < 0.05) decreased buyer
performance, providing full support for H3b and
H4b. No support was found for H3a and H4a. Inter-
estingly, SIZEA-Buyer was significant (B =
0.14;
p < 0.01), but in the opposite direction we had theo-
rized. For supplier performance, only RCA-Supplier
was moderately significant (B = 0.23; p = 0.06), pro-
viding partial support for H4d.
4.2. Post hoc Analysis
Difference scores are widely used in studies of fit and
agreement in several fields, such as marketing
(Anderson and Weitz 1992, Ross et al. 1997), manage-
ment (Gulati and Sytch 2007) and more recently, sup-
ply chain (Brinkhoff et al. 2015, Roh et al. 2013).
However, scholars have suggested potential method-
ological threats associated with this approach
(Edwards 2002, Edwards and Parry 1993). Thus, to
overcome the spline method’s limitations, we con-
ducted a polynomial regression with response surface
analysis (Edwards 2002; Shanock et al. 2010). We first
ran polynomial regressions4 and assessed the
assumptions, as suggested by Edwards (2002). In six
out of eight regressions, there was a significant
change in R2 between a control-only model and a full
model as reported in Equation (2). When size asym-
metries were independent variables, supplier oppor-
tunism and supplier performance did not meet this
criterion and, thus, were excluded. For the remaining
six equations, we calculated four surface values (a1,
a2, a3, and a4) based on the coefficients of our polyno-
mial regression equation (see footnote 4). a1 repre-
sents the slope of perfect agreement—those situations
in which both the buyer and supplier share the same
level of relational capital (RCbuyer = RCsupplier) or are
similar in size (Sizebuyer = Sizesupplier). If a1 is signifi-
cant and positive (negative), the outcome variable
increases (decreases) as both independent variables
(e.g., RCsupplier and RCbuyer) increase. The line of
agreement’s curvature related to the outcome variable
is represented by a2. A significant and positive (nega-
tive) a2 indicates a convex (concave) surface along the
line of perfect agreement. The line of incongruence’s
slope is represented by a3—those situations in which
RCbuyer =
RCsupplier or Sizebuyer =
Sizesupplier, rep-
resenting the discrepancy’s direction (e.g., RCbuyer is
higher than RCsupplier or vice versa). In our case, a
 Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
502 Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society

Table 5 Results of Regression Models for Performance

Buyer performance(buyer) Supplier performance(supplier)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 3.66** 0.33 4.19** 0.37 3.13 0.34 3.03 0.35
Firm control variables
Buyer recent past performance 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.15† 0.09 0.15 0.09
Supplier recent past performance
0.20 0.13
0.21 0.14
0.06 0.11
0.06 0.11
Buyer R&D 0.05 0.48
0.01 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.28 0.42
Supplier R&D
0.21 0.15
0.26† 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.15
Relationship control variables
Relationship length 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Equity involvement 0.38** 0.13 0.38** 0.15
0.01 0.27 0.10 0.27
Customized product 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.16
Buyer dependence 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03
0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04
Supplier dependence 0.08 0.04 0.08† 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.05
Market control variables
Buyer market unpredictability 0.40 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.24 0.39 0.20 0.38
Supplier market unpredictability
0.49 0.53
0.48 0.51 0.05 0.43 0.07 0.43
Main effects
SIZEA-Buyer H3a (+)
0.14** 0.05 H3c (
) 0.01 0.06
SIZEA-Supplier H3b (
)
0.10* 0.05 H3d (+)
0.05 0.06
RCA-Buyer H4a (+) 0.01 0.17 H4c (
)
0.10 0.17
RCA-Supplier H4b (
)
0.28* 0.13 H4d (+) 0.23† 0.15
R2 15.7% 23.9% 13.4% 16.6%
R adjusted square 5.5% 10.8% 3.0% 3.1%
F change 2.37* 0.82

We report one-tailed test for hypothesized variables when the coefficients are in the direction of the hypothesis, two-tailed test otherwise. Also, the
respondent is indicated in parentheses. N = 106. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Values highlighted in bold correspond to hypotheses.

significant positive (negative) a3 indicates that the out-
come variable is higher when the discrepancy is such
that RCbuyer is higher than RCsupplier (RCsupplier is
higher than RCbuyer) than vice versa. a4 represents the
line of incongruence’s curvature as related to the out-
come variable and indicates the degree of discrepancy
between RCbuyer and RCsupplier or between Sizebuyer
and Sizesupplier. A significant positive (negative) a4
indicates a convex (concave) surface. Table 6 includes
the results and the formulas for a1, a2, a3, and a4.
To assess whether the asymmetry’s direction and de-
gree matter, we created surface plots for those cases in

Table 6 Results of Response Surface Analysis for Relational Capital and Size Asymmetry

Relational capital (RC) asymmetry Size asymmetry

Supplier Supplier
Buyer opportunism opportunism Buyer performance performance Buyer opportunism Buyer performance

Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t

(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
a1
0.75***
3.89
0.73***
3.04 0.45* 2.13 0.81*** 3.47
0.18*
2.05 0.01 0.12
(0.19) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.09) (0.09)
a2 0.00 0.00
0.05
0.14 0.32 1.00 0.36 1.01
0.14*
2.34 0.06 0.94
(0.30) (0.37) (0.32) (0.35) (0.04) (0.06)
a3 0.67*** 3.16
0.17
0.60 0.39† 1.64
0.87***
3.34 0.04 0.45
0.03
0.37
(0.21) (0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.09) (0.08)
a4
0.56†
1.84 0.15 0.40 0.04 0.11 0.28 0.80
0.02
0.26
0.12*
2.05
(0.30) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.07) (0.06)

The polynomial regression is as follow: Y1 = b0 + control variables + b1 9 RCbuyer + b2 9 RCsupplier + b3 9 RC2buyer + b4 9 RCbuyer 9 RCsupplier +
b5 9 RC2supplier.
RC could be replaced with Size. Coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis), and t-statistics are reported. Standard errors (SE) were calculated based on
the guidelines by Shanock et al. (2010). †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
a1 = b1 + b2: The slope of the line of perfect agreement; a2 = b3 + b4 + b5: the curvature along the line of perfect agreement.
a3 = b1
b2: The slope of the line of incongruence; a4 = b3
b4 + b5: the curvature along the line of incongruence.
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society 503

which either a3 or a4 was significant. In all of the fig- higher than RCsupplier (area B) than vice versa (area A).
ures, the line of perfect agreement is represented with Interestingly, the curvature along the line of incongru-
the solid line (CD line) while the line of incongruence ence as related to buyer opportunism increases more
(our focus) is represented with the dotted line (AB sharply as the degree of discrepancy increases. This
line). finding provides further support for H2b and H2a.
For relational capital asymmetry, a3 is significant for Figures 3 and 4 illustrate buyer and supplier per-
buyer opportunism (Figure 2), buyer performance formance, respectively. The figures show that perfor-
(Figure 3), and supplier performance (Figure 4) while mance is highest when both parties share similar high
a4 is significant only for buyer opportunism. Figure 2 levels of relational capital (area C). This result is con-
illustrates that buyer opportunism’s lowest level is sistent with past studies suggesting that relational
achieved when buyers and suppliers share similar capital is beneficial (Dyer and Singh 1998), but note
high values of relational capital (area C). This finding that this case occurs only if both parties have a similar
is consistent with past studies that suggest relational high level of relational capital. Figure 3 shows that
capital is a deterrent to buyer opportunism (Wang buyer performance increases when the discrepancy is
et al. 2013), but only if both parties share symmetric such that RCbuyer is higher than RCsupplier (area B)
levels of high relational capital. Buyer opportunism compared to when RCsupplier is higher than RCbuyer
increases when the discrepancy is such that RCbuyer is (area A), providing support for H4a and H4b. As
shown in Figure 4, supplier performance increases
when the discrepancy is such that RCsupplier is higher
Figure 2 Perceived Buyer Opportunism as Predicted by Perceived
Buyer Relational Capital-Perceived Supplier Relational
than RCbuyer (area A) compared to when RCbuyer is
Capital Discrepancy higher than RCsupplier (area B), providing support for
H4d and H4c.
5
Perceived For size asymmetry, a4 is significant for buyer per-
Buyer formance (Figure 5). Figure 5 shows that size asym-
Opportunism
4 metry’s degree (rather than direction) is more
relevant; that is, buyer performance suffers equally
3 when a size imbalance is in favor of the buyer (area
A) or the supplier (area B). Thus, this result supports
2
H3b but not H3a.
C Overall, the results of the response surface analysis
B are consistent with those of the spline method. For
A
1 2
1 instance, H2a, H2b, H3b, H4b, and H4d are sup-
2 1 D 0
0 -1
-1
-2 -2 Relational CapitalBuyer ported. Also, both methods’ results are consistent for
SIZEA-Buyer’s effect on buyer performance (H3a) in
Relational CapitalSupplier
the opposite direction we had theorized. The major
BO= + 0.004*RCbuyer -0.712*RCsupplier -0.24*RC2buyer+ 0.287*RCbuyer*RCsupplier -0.039 *RC2supplier
differences between the two methods are that with
the response surface analysis; we gained support for
H4a and H4c, but lost support for H1a, H1c, and H2d.
Figure 3 Buyer Performance as Predicted by Perceived Buyer
Relational Capital–Perceived Supplier Relational Capital Table 7 summarizes the results of our 16 hypotheses,
Discrepancy

5
Figure 4 Supplier Performance as Predicted by Perceived Buyer
Relational Capital–Perceived Supplier Relational Capital
Buyer Discrepancy
Performance
4 5

Supplier
Performance
3 4

3
2
C
B 2 2
A 1 C
1 0
2 Relational B 2
1 -1 A 1
0 D CapitalBuyer 1 0
-1 -2 Relational
Relational CapitalSupplier -2 2 1 -1
D CapitalBuyer
Relational CapitalSupplier 0 -1 -2
-2
BP= Constant-0.42*RCbuyer +0.05*RCsupplier +0.23*RC2buyer+ 0.14*RCbuyer*RCsupplier +0.23 *RC2supplier SP= Constant-0.03*RCbuyer +0.80*RCsupplier -0.13*RC2buyer+ 0.04*RCbuyer*RCsupplier -0.44 *RC2supplier
 Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
504 Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society

identifying those that are significant based on one or
two methods and those that are not significant based
on both methods.
5. Discussion
Our study contributes to the nascent, but growing
research on asymmetries in BSRs. As have other
researchers (Gulati and Sytch 2007, Nyaga et al. 2013,
Thomas and Esper 2010), we find that asymmetries
exist in BSRs and that their presence has profound,
complex implications. We focus on two types of
asymmetries—relational capital and size—that are rel-
evant to BSRs. We are unaware of any other study
that has tried to unpack two important, yet distinct,
forms of asymmetry related to perceived opportunism
and performance using dyadic data. Thus, in many
ways, our research is in “unchartered waters” in
terms of our theorizing, research design, and analysis.
5.1. Asymmetries and Perceived Opportunism
Past studies have consistently shown that relational
capital reduces opportunistic behavior (Dyer and Chu
2003, Liu et al. 2009, Tangpong et al. 2010, Wang
et al. 2013). Our results confirm that this is the case
Figure 5 Buyer Performance as Predicted by Buyer Size–Supplier Size
Discrepancy
5
Buyer
Performance
4
3 by altering the underlying cognitive frames and, thus,
2
C and should be unpacked in future research.
B 2
A 1
1 0
2 -1
1 D -2
SizeSupplier
0
-1
-2
BP= Constant -0.01*Sizebuyer +0.02*Sizesupplier -0.004*Size2buyer+0.09*Sizebuyer*Sizesupplier
only when both parties share similar levels of high
relational capital. Our results also reveal that a buyer
or supplier with a higher level of relational capital
than its counterpart may be perceived as more oppor-
tunist. That is, an imbalance of relational capital in the
focal firm’s favor may have the opposite effect from
that intended—its counterpart perceives more, rather
than less, firm opportunism. This is an interesting
dichotomy relative to relational capital and its effects
on perceived opportunism, contributing to our under-
standing that more relational capital is not always
desirable (Villena et al. 2011). In fact, our results sug-
gest that one party’s well-intentioned relational capi-
tal endeavors can actually increase the other party’s
concern regarding opportunism if that party does not
perceive the same level of relational capital.
Regarding size asymmetry, the results show that if
the buyer is bigger, it perceives less supplier oppor-
tunism and the supplier perceives more buyer oppor-
tunism; however, this is not the case if the supplier is
bigger. Our findings show a stronger impact of rela-
tional capital asymmetry on buyer opportunism than
on supplier opportunism. In other words, suppliers
(compared to buyers) are more sensitive to this
impact. One potential reason is that suppliers (despite
being critical) are still sellers and, thus, have more to
lose from further dealings than buyers do. Both
results provide some evidence of how the upstream
(supplier) or downstream (buyer) position within the
relationship influences the relational capital and size
asymmetries’ impact on perceived opportunism.
Could the imbalance position affect the prominence
of interpretive uncertainty (Weber and Mayer 2014)
the perceptions of partner opportunism? Overall, we
believe this finding and conjecture are noteworthy
5.2. Asymmetries and Performance
SizeBuyer
Overall, our results suggest that supplier performance
is largely unaffected by size asymmetries. One poten-
-0.03*Size2supplier tial reason is that suppliers (in an upstream position)

Table 7 Summary of Results

Buyer’s perceptions of Supplier’s Perceptions of

Asymmetry types Supplier opportunism Performance Buyer opportunism Performance

If the buyer is larger (SIZEA-Buyer)
(H1c) +(H3a)* +(H1a)
(H3c)
If the supplier is larger (SIZEA-Supplier) +(H1d)
(H3b)
(H1b) +(H3d)
If the buyer has more relational capital (RCA-Buyer)
(H2c) +(H4a) +(H2a)
(H4c)
If the supplier has more relational capital (RCA-Supplier) +(H2d)
(H4b)
(H2b) +(H4d)
Both methods significant
Both methods not significant
Spline method only significant
Response surface method only significant

*Both methods show that SIZEA-Buyer has a negative (rather than a positive as theorized) association with buyer performance.
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
try to satisfy their customers and meet performance
expectations regardless of customer size. Also, our
theorizing that the buyer would perceive more favor-
able performance when it is bigger was not sup-
ported. In fact, our results are opposite from what we
predicted, revealing that bigger buyers observe fewer
benefits in their dealings with smaller suppliers. Fur-
ther, our results suggest that buyers perceive fewer
benefits if working with bigger suppliers. That is,
buying companies observe reduced performance
when they are larger or smaller, perhaps offering a
boundary to our understanding of asymmetry’s direc-
tion (Gulati and Sytch 2007, Ross et al. 1997).
Also, the results show that if suppliers have higher
levels of relational capital, buyers observe reduced
benefits, whereas suppliers perceive slightly
improved benefits. In short, our study suggests that
asymmetries in size and relational capital are perfor-
mance liabilities for buyers while asymmetry in rela-
tional capital could be an asset for suppliers. We hope
that future research delves more deeply into these
unexpected results. Such research would be particu-
larly enlightening if juxtaposed with our results rela-
tive to perceived opportunism.
When analyzing the results of performance and
opportunism in tandem, we found that RCA-Supplier
catalyzes a positive supplier perception (of lower
buyer opportunism) and a negative buyer perception
(of lower firm performance). Thus, RCA-Supplier can
be viewed as a “double-edged sword.” In essence,
our results suggest that this asymmetry is viewed
both favorably and negatively depending on whether
it involves the upstream or downstream partner. This
finding echoes our earlier thoughts that in addition to
the influence of asymmetries’ degree and direction,
the firm’s position in the dyad could trigger varying
perceptions of the same asymmetry.
5.3. Managerial Implications
Given the frequency of imbalances in size and rela-
tional capital, managers should extend efforts to un-
cover and manage them in key BSRs—especially
relational capital asymmetry, which is more latent
and complex. If not effectively managed, this asset
can become a liability in the form of perceived oppor-
tunism. The two main messages for managers are (i)
not to assume, and act as if, there is a shared level of
relational capital and (ii) to recognize that initiatives
to build relational capital can backfire if the other
partner is not on the same page. Managers should
thus seek more transparency in their actions and
invest company resources wisely. For example, a
sourcing manager should seek to avoid ambiguity in
negotiations, lest the supplier perceives vagueness as
an attempt to hide buyer opportunism. Likewise, an
account manager should be more transparent when
505
establishing a new requirement to avoid its supplier’s
suspicion that this new requirement will unilaterally
favor the account manager’s company.
Bigger buyers should recognize that they may be
viewed as more opportunistic although they view less
opportunism in their smaller (critical) supplier.
Again, transparency in all buyer actions is para-
mount. Furthermore, buyers, whether bigger or smal-
ler than their counterparts, should be aware of
reduced benefits from their supplier relationships.
Conversely, suppliers perceive no influence on per-
formance regardless of whether they are bigger or
smaller than their counterparts. Thus, buyers and
suppliers should be in tune with these differences
and perhaps use a different “lens” through which to
evaluate the benefits of working together. For
instance, a sourcing manager could anticipate bigger
benefits if working with smaller suppliers; however,
that manager would eventually realize that the chal-
lenges (e.g., more uncertainty) of working with smal-
ler suppliers could overcome the anticipated benefits.
In contrast, an account manager will always try to sat-
isfy the customer’s demands regardless of whether
this customer is a smaller or larger player.
5.4. Limitations and Future Research
Opportunities
The results of this research need to be considered in
the context of its limitations. First, we studied two key
complementary types of asymmetry. However, other
asymmetries may be worthy of exploration—for
instance, asymmetry of power with its various
sources (e.g., technical capabilities) (Krajewski et al.
2005). Furthermore, examining the interrelations
among asymmetries could be fruitful. For instance,
could size asymmetry be an antecedent of trust asym-
metry? Second, we invested great effort into collecting
archival and survey data from both parties. However,
we used a cross-sectional design and the dynamics of
BSRs’ change. For instance, perceptions of trust could
change over time (Jap and Anderson 2007); thus,
future studies should examine how symmetries
evolve. Third, our research did not explore specific
mechanisms for managing asymmetric BSRs or for
mitigating their negative consequences. Such infor-
mation would be very informative for managers.
Fourth, our empirical setting included buyers and
their critical suppliers. Thus, our results should be
used with caution when considering other types of
BSRs (e.g., transactional relationships in which rela-
tional capital would be minimal and size differences
might be even greater). Fifth, we examined the effect
of size and relational capital asymmetries on the
firm’s benefits of developing new capabilities and
skills from the relationship. However, asymmetries
may also have an impact on financial performance. Of

506 Production and Operations Management 26(3), pp. 491–508, © 2016 Production and Operations Management Society
course, this impact may require a context in which a
dyad could play a key role in overall firm-level per-
formance (e.g., sole supplier of a critical commodity).
Sixth, we acknowledge that we could not entirely
eliminate endogeneity. Clearly, measuring the related
constructs (relational capital, opportunism, and per-
formance) is fraught with challenges. Most notably,
the measures cannot completely decouple these
related constructs, meaning that some of the relation-
ships found could arguably be tautological. Our
transparent multi-method and dyadic analysis
approach attempted to address this argument; but
future research, perhaps longitudinal or detailed
cases, could further tease out these complex relation-
ships. Seventh, the AVE value of our construct of rela-
tional capital on the buyer’s side reached 0.49 while
the cutoff was 0.50. Also, Figure 4 shows a saddle
region between performance and relational capital for
suppliers, which should be further explored in future
studies. Finally, our analysis was based on a sample
of companies operating in Spain. Future research
could use a more diverse sample and, more interest-
ingly, compare across countries.
6. Concluding Thoughts
The buyer–supplier relationship literature is a rich,
informative body of knowledge. Yet, much of it views
only one side of the relationship and, thus, fails to
capture important differences relative to the degree,
direction, and position of BSR imbalances. While we
have taken a step further in exploring two important
asymmetries—size and relational capital, we believe
additional scholarly efforts are warranted. Thus, we
believe that this study’s epigraph should resonate
with scholars and managers alike—we need to con-
tinue acknowledging and embracing asymmetries as
they very well could be our greatest strength in fully
and truly understanding the dynamics of buyer–sup-
plier relationships.
Acknowledgment
We are grateful to Sandy Jap, Qiong Wang, Lance Ferris,
and Kaitlin Wowak for comments and suggestions on ear-
lier versions of this manuscript. We are grateful to Vinod
Singhal, the senior editor, and two reviewers for their con-
structive comments and guidance that helped us signifi-
cantly improve our manuscript. The first author would like
to thank Elena Revilla for her assistance in data collection.
Notes
1 edn. Erlbaum, Mahwah.
In many situations the supplier may be viewed as critical.
For example, the supplier could be a sole-source provider
of an important commodity or supply a high percentage
of the buyer’s total needs for a component.
Villena and Craighead: Buyer–Supplier Asymmetries
2
We recognize that size is not the only factor that influ-
ences bargaining power (cf. French and Raven 1959), but
it is an important one in an exchange.
3
Some critics of the spline method have noted that one of
the problems with difference scores is that the method
could suffer from reduced reliability (Edwards 2002). Fol-
lowing Peter et al. (1993), we calculated our difference
r21 r11 þr22 r22
2r12 r1 r2
scale’s reliability as follows: rD ¼ r21 þr22
2r12 r1 r2
; were
r11 and r22 are the reliabilities of each of the two compo-
nent scores, and r12 s the correlation of the two scores.
The difference score’s reliability exceeds the threshold of
0.70.
4
Due to space limitations, we do not provide the polyno-
mial regressions’ results. An example of our regression
equation is as follows:
Y1 ¼ b0 þ controlvariables þ b1  RCbuyer þ b2
 RCsupplier þ b3  RC2buyer þ b4  RCbuyer
 RCsupplier þ b5  RC2supplier : ð2Þ
where Y can be supplier opportunism, buyer oppor-
tunism, supplier performance, or buyer performance. The
surface values are then calculated as follows: a1 = b1 + b2:
the slope of the line of perfect agreement;
a2 = b3 + b4 + b5: the curvature along the line of perfect
agreement a3 = b1
b2: the slope of the line of incongru-
ence; a4 = b3
b4 + b5: the curvature along the line of
incongruence.
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