Chapter 3: The role of theory

lan H. Thompson

Academics often exhort their students to declare their theoretical perspectives, so it is right that
I should declare mine before plunging into the difficult topic of 'theory'. Prior to becoming a
landscape architect, I studied philosophy as an undergraduate. I was taught by Wittgensteinians
and took an optional course in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. As a result I carry around
with me certain ways of thinking, particularly about words and meanings, which are, so to speak,
tools in my theoretical toolbox. The most useful of these is the idea that the meaning of a word is
to be found by considering its use. If we encounter a word which puzzles us, the way to understand
it is to look at the man and various ways that the term is used .

A TROUBLESOME WORD

'Theory' can be just such a troublesome word. When we think we have got a handle on it, we
discover that someone else is using it in a completely different way. If someone asks us 'do you
have a theory about this7' they are probably asking for an explanation. On another occasion,
someone might remark 'oh, but that's only a theory' suggesting that something proposed is merely
a supposition, and doesn't have the sort of authority that might come, for example, from rigorous
observation or scientific testing. People also talk about 'making contributions to theory', 'adding to
theory', 'developing theory' and so on, all of which suggest that theory can be accumulated. Similar
phrases are used about 'knowledge' and indeed people do sometimes talk about 'theory' as if it is
a synonym for 'knowledge'. On the other hand, people say things like 'what theoretical perspective
are you taking?' (see my first sentence!) or 'try looking at this through the lens of (this or that)
theory'. In landsca pe architecture (and I'm sure in many other fields) one often hears the complaint
that we don't have enough theory (as if it is a kind of stuff that we can pile up like gold) or that we
don't have sufficient theory that is truly our own (we have only borrowed it from other disciplines
and thi s is somehow shameful). There is a commercial aspect to this latter grumble. If a profession
can claim to have a body of knowledge to which it has an exclusive entitlement, and if this is the
basis for its expertise, then its practitioners have a form of monopoly in the marketplace, but this is
a matter of business or sociology rather than epistemology.
Attempting to corral all the theory that pertains to landscape architecture is probably impossible,
although a decade ago Michael D. Murphy had a good stab at it with his Landscape Architecture
Theory: An Evolving Body of Thought (2005). He had the good sense to set some limits, focussing
specifically upon 'the body of knowledge required to inform design thinking and on ways to apply

37 D
 lan H. Thompson •

that knowledge to improve the human/landscape condition and enhance quality of life through
design performance' (Murphy 2005, p.vi). Notice, incidentally, that 'theory', 'knowled e' and
'thought' are used virtually as synonyms here, and this is not unusual. However, when consid_gting
the place of theory in~search design, rather more precision is required.
Another troublesome word: 'landscape' .
To make matters even more difficult, the word 'landscape', which we might expect to denote the
object of our enquiries, is pretty slippery too. Murphy deals with it rather too briskly by opting for
what he calls the 'traditional definition', that is 'an area of the earth's surface that has been modified
by human activity', which he takes from J.B. Jackson's Discovering the Vernacular Landscape (1984),
but in the light of more recent scholarship, we cannot make do w ith this anymore. We cannot even
say that a landscape is a complicated object because, as many theorists have pointed out, landscape
is something mental as well as something physical. Cu ltural geographers, such as Denis Cosgrove
and Stephen Daniels (1988; see also Cosgrove 1984), pointed out that 'landscape' is not a neutral
term, but an ideologically charged 'way of seeing' . Kenneth Olwig, on the other hand, responded to
the 'scenic' understanding of landscape by focussing upon landscape as a set of customary practices
bound by precedent and law (Oiwig 2002). Don Mitchell has delivered a bracing materialist critique
of the notion of landscape by revealing the unjust social and economic relations involved in the
production of agricultural landscapes (such as the strawberry fields of California) (Mitchell 1996,
2003, 2007). To shake things up further, a raft of influential work has come out of phenomenology,
non-representational theory and performance studies, wh ich John Wylie has admirably summarised
in his short book Landscape (2007). Perhaps the most challenging idea to emerge from this recent
work, for landscape architects at least, is the notion that the landscape, far from being designed, is
performed, that is made and remade by a succession of repetitive actions, often guided by custom
and precedence. How these customary actions relate to designed interventions by landscape
architects, planners and managers has yet to be fully explored.
Although I am reluctant to draw a distinction between researchers in landscape architecture and
researchers who approach landscape from some other perspective, that of an archaeologist, say, or a
geologist, ecologist, environmental psychologist or cultural geographer, the fact is that landscape is
a transdisciplinary concept. This book may be written primarily for landscape architects who want to
do research, but such readers need to be aware of where their own research might fit into the much
broader field of landscape studies. lt is worth asking 'What particular topics might a researcher who
is a landscape architect be better placed to tackle than someone from a different dis_Q[2)j_ne?' Perhaps
these topics include such things as: the landscape design process in general, the design practices
of particular landscape designers or offices, the history of designed landscapes, the education of
landscape architects, the aesthetic, social and ecological values underlying landscape interventions,
evaluations of the effectiveness of design interventions and so on. Murphy (following Ndubisi 1997)
draws a distinction between 'substantive theories', which 'promote a better understanding of the
landscape as the interface between human and natural process and are descriptive and predictive',
and 'procedural theories' which 'originate from design practice and the academic development
and technical application of knowledge in a social setting' (Murphy 2005, p.27). However, many
aspects of natural science, which one might have expected to be included under substantive theory,
including geology, ecology, climatology, soil science, hydrology and so on, are left to a later chapter
which deals with 'the biophysical environment', wh ile his chapter on substantive theory bundles
together sustainable development, environmenta l psychology and systems theory. I confess that

38 D
 H. Thompson • The role of theory •

· of life through 1 don't know what was in his mind here. Knowledge in all of these fields is certainly relevant to
~owledge' and landscape architecture, but his criteria for identifying theory, let alone landscape architecture theory
~ng per se, are not very clear. Murphy's chapter on procedural theory is much more straightforward.
-Under this rubric come such matters as the design process, design programming, data gathering
and analysis, landscape planning and landscape suitability analysis. He might also have included
~et to denote the the material concerning design practice and design collaboration which appears towards the end
dy by opting for of the book. All of these topics are closely re@ted "Lo the profession of landscape architecture an_Q
lS been modified if one were looking solely for theory that has developed out of the ractice of landscaQe architects
1ndscape (1984), themselves, these would probably be the best places to look.
We cannot even
d out, landscape
DISCIPLINE AND PROFESSION
Denis Cosgrove
' is not a neutral There isn't space to fully examine the complex relationship between the academic discipline 7 _si_
ld, responded to landscape architecture and the profession that goes by the sam t::_n ~e. Landscape professionals
;tomary practices have to compete for business with other professionals, such as engineers and architects, and the
1aterialist critique institutional apparatus of accredited training, examinations, continuing professional development
; involved in the and so on was created as much to secure territory as to guarantee expertise. lt isn't quite the same
) (Mitchell 1996, for academics, who may be more open to overlaps and transdisciplinary ways of thinking, but there _
phenomenology, would be no disciQiiog_(fl.Q2_C_ho.Qis'-no_te(l_cbers and no researchers without th.e_mofession. Theory
ably summarised is often invoked in relation to practice, where it means something like 'a statement of method' or
· from this recent 'knowledge of general principles'. A couple of examples spring to mind. One is the Survey-Analysis-
eing designed, is Design (S-A-D) methodology which was a staple of landscape architecture, in Britain anyway, in the
1uided by custom 1970s and '80s and was based upon the idea of Survey-Analysis-Plan model originally developed
ns by landscape by the Scottish town planner Patrick Geddes (1854-1932). S-A-D was later criticised for being too
deterministic and inimical to imaginative design, but it held sway for a long time and, to the extent
· architecture and that tutors still ask students to undertake surveys and analyses, it is still with us. Interestingly this is
eologist, say, or a not mentioned in Murphy's book- perhaps it was not taught in the US- although similar models,
that landscape is such as the 'six-step design process', do appear (Murphy 2005, pp.63-64) .
ects who want to The second example, also from landscape planning, is Carl Steiniz's Landscape Change Model
fit into the much (1994), which he developed further under the label Geodesign (2013). Steinitz, who is now emeritus
a researcher who professor of landscape architecture at the Graduate School of Design, Harvard University, was a
;_QQ!j_ne ?' Perhaps pioneer in the use of computer technology in landscape planning. He was particularly concerned
~ design practices with the methods landscape professionals use to analyse large areas of land and make important
the education of design decisions (see also Lenzholzer et al. in this book - Chapter 4). He produced a flowchart
lpe interventions, which organised the landscape planning process around a series of models, each associated with
1ng Ndubisi 1997) a question. For example, 'representational models' of the landscape were associated with the
erstanding of the question 'How should the landscape be described?', 'process models' with the question 'How does
·e and predictive', the landscape operate?' and so on, through six stages. In the full version of the process, each
mic development of these steps must be gone through three times, first to establish the context and scope of the
1. However, many enquiry, second (in reverse order) to specify the project methodology and a third time to actually
ubstantive theory, perform the study.
to a later chapter Steinitz's research amounts to a formulation or codification of data gathering, analysis, testing
re theory bundles and decision procedures which might otherwise be undertaken in a haphazard or unsystematic
>ry. I confess that manner. As such, it appeals to those who wish to bring rigour to their practice, though it probably
 lan H. Thompson •

has little appea l to intuitive designers and those w ho place themselves at the more artistic pole of
the landscape profession .
Another important f igure is lan McHarg, author of the semina l book Design with Nature (1969),
who developed the technique of suitabi lity ana lysis while Professor of Landscape Architecture
and Regional Planning at the University of Pennsylvan ia. In terms of Murphy's distinction between
substantive and procedural theory, both Steinitz and McHarg can be seen to have made major
contributions to procedural theory. lt is worth noting that both of these thin kers have been borrowed
or even claimed by other disciplines, largely on the basis of their contributions to the development
and use of geograph ical information systems. Here, at least, are inst ances of landscape arch itecture
exporting theory, rather th an importing it.

BETWEEN THREE EMPIRES

~f _!_an_::Jscape architecture's difficulties with theory arise as a consequence of its relationship

to the three grea~ ~m ~es of _9cademia: the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the arts and
humanities. My use of the word 'science', it is worth mentioning before going any furth er, follows
the ang lophone conventions in which its extension does not include the arts and humanities.
Anglophone readers are sometimes startled to f ind that their conference papers on garden history
or modernist design principles are being considered by a 'scientific committee' wh ich conjures up a
vision of investigators in w hite lab coats. In much of Europe, 'science ' can mean any sort of scholarly
activity. I use the metaphor of 'empire' to hint at the rivalry and territorial friction between these
blocs, but Jerome Kagan, emeritus professor of psychology at Harva rd University, chose the title The
Three Cultures for his revea lin g discussion of the differences between three ways of investigating
and understand ing the world (Kagan 2009). In this he was following the usage coined by C.P.
Snow (20 12) w hose provocative book Th e Two Cultures and the Scien tific Revolution, was first
published in 1959. Snow, both a physical chem ist and a novelist, had been concerned to reveal the
extent to which scientists were ignorant of the arts, but- more seriously for Snow- the extent to
which hi ghly ed ucated British el ites, educated in the human ities, were illiterate in science. The social
sciences, howeve r, he entirely ignored, despite their growing influence after the Second World War,
w hen, for a few decades at least, it seemed that they might hold the answers to problems as w ide-
ranging as alcoholism, school failure and mental illness. Kagan's book gives them their place, but as
a psychologist he is aware of the borderline position of his own discipline. Some psychologists, he
notes, gravitated towards the study of brain activity and were embraced by biology. Others, more
humanistic in their approach, stayed w ith social scien ce. lt is also worth noting that id eas born of
humanistic psychology, such as the theories of Freud, Jung, Klein and later lri ga ray, Kristeva and
Lacan, have been hugely influential in the humanities.
Landscape arch itectu re occupies a similar position in the borderlands and researchers have a
si mil ar choice of paradigms. Murphy contrasts two positions w ithin landscape architecture, one
exemplified by the American landscape arch itect Garrett Eckbo (19 10-2000), who took a creative
stance and argued that it was the profession's role to create fresh and innovative ways for people to
relate to their physical environment, the other epitomised by McHarg 's approach, which emphasised
the scientific approach to ecologica lly sound landscape planning. Murphy, optimistical ly perh aps,
thinks that th e discipline has transcended this apparent battle between the emp ires of art and science
(he does not suggest a champion for socia l science) and says that all landscape arch itects are holists

40 D
-1. Thompson • The role of theory •

artistic pole of now (Murphy 2005, pp.26-27). Nevertheless, it is clearly important, when setting out on a Qiece
of research, to know which of the three cultures it most closely relates to, because, as I will show,
Nature (1969), there are different norms, values and even_lan ua e in each. At present, within the academic world
)e Architecture as a whole, there is much emphasis on collaborative and cross-disciplinary working, which suggests
Ktion between that methods from the three cultures might be creatively brought together. Landscape architects
1e made major ought to be well placed to facilitate or participate in such collaborations. Landscape architects are
been borrowed sometimes inter-disciplinarians par excellence, able to bring together and synthesise very different
1e development perspectives and forms of knowledge, and equally capable of talking the language of aesthetes,
1pe architecture agronomists or archaeologists. At other times this in-between position can be a headache. Certainly
when considering theory it can be a problem, since 'theory' tends to mean different things within
these three domains.

THEORY IN NATURAL SCIENCE

its relationship
1d the arts and In the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology etc.) a_theory is an ex la nation which is
further, follows generally accepted to be true. A hypothesis, on the other hand, is an informed guess, based
nd humanities. upon observation. The philosopher of science Karl Popper suggested that hypotheses can never
garden history be proved, only disproved, arguing that if a hypothesis, or a group of linked hypotheses, survives
h conjures up a repeated experimental testing, it may come to be accepted as a theory (Popper 2002 [1934]). A
;ort of scholarly theory offers an explanation of how nature works. Important theories are named and often come
between these to be well-known outside the confines of their disciplines. Some have great predictive power and
Jse the title The offer abundant benefits to humanity. A good example is the Germ Theory of Disease which replaced
)f investigating the earlier idea that diseases were spontaneously generated, thus opening up the way to life-
coined by C.P. saving medical procedures such as sterilisation. In some scientific disciplines, particularly physics and
;tion, was first chemistry, one also finds 'laws' and it is reasonable to ask what is the difference between a theory
:d to reveal the and a law. The term 'law' tends to be used to redict what nature will do in certain conditions ~
- the extent to this is often expressed mathematical! . An example from chemistry would be Boyle's Law which
'nee. The social states that the pressure exerted by a gas held at a constant temperature varies inversely with the
md World War, volume of the gas. ~oJQ.g_y, perhaps the scientific field with the most bearing upon landscape
blems as wide- architecture, has produced many theories but few laws and this is probably an indication of the
'ir place, but as complexity of the living world, which is not easily reduced to simple mathematical formulae. Natural
ychologists, he science, which for our purposes can also be taken to include applied science, medical research and
r. Others, more all varieties of engineering, is so useful and has such commercial potential that it is generally very
t ideas born of well-funded and institutionally secure. Part of the appeal of McHargian landscape theory was that
y, Kristeva and it sought to place landscape archi!ecture on a scientific bflsis._ which, it was felt, would improve the.
discipline's standing in the academy and the profession's offer to potential clients.
archers have a Landsca e architecture has, therefore, often ali ned with natural science. This accounts for the
:hitecture, one interest in environmental psychology which came to the fore in the 1980s through the work of
took a creative researchers like Rachel and Stephen Kaplan at the University of Michigan (Kaplan and Kaplan 1989;
rs for people to Kaplan 1995b). As Kagan notes, psychology, because of its central interest in human behaviour,
eh emphasised is often classified among the social sciences, but Kagan considers 'investigators who study the
tically perhaps, biological bases for, or evolutionary contributions to, animal or human behaviour as natural
art and science scientists' (Kagan 2009, p.4). The Kaplans' Information Processing Theory offered an experimentally
:ects are holists based explanation of landscape preference, which builds upon evolutionary theory. The researchers

40 D 41 D
 lan H. Thompson •

were psychologists working within the School of Natural Resources and Environment, which is
also the home of a long-standing landscape arch itecture programme . Later work looked at the
restorative potential of natural environments (Kaplan 1995a), a topic also exp lored by Terry Hartig of
the Department of Psychology at Uppsa la University and his col laborators (Hartig et al. 1991, 2003) .
Catharine Ward Thompson and her multidisciplinary research team at Edinburgh University ca lled
OPENSpace, which included the psychologist Peter Aspinall, looked at the influence of outdoor
environments on people's physica l activity, particularly wa lkin g (Ward Thompson and Aspina ll,
20 11; see also Ward Thompson in this book- Chapter 14). One might say that all of these examp~~s
rightly belong to the discip line of psychology, but landsca pe architects have been int gra l t o many_
<:.. -
of these research projects and the resea rch findings are directly relevant to the activities of landscape
CfeSign and plann ing . This work can therefore also be considered as part of the body of theory w hich
pertains to the discipline.
Anoth er example is landscape ecology, w hich can be considered a sub-discipline of ecology,
although, once aga in, the-fuzziness orporosity of boundaries allows us to say that it also belongs
withi n the disciplinary field of landscape architectu re. lt took off with the publication of landma rk
books by Naveh and Lieberman (1984), and Forman and Godron (1986) . Arthur Lieberman is an
emeritus professor of lan dscape architectu re who collaborated w ith the agronom ist Nev Naveh to
write Landscape Ecology: Theory and Application which was the first English language monograph
on the transdisciplinary scien ce of landscape ecology. Richard TT. Forman is an ecolog ist working
within the Graduate School of Design at Harvard University, which also hosts one of the world's pre-
em inent master's programmes in landscape architecture. Landscape ecology held the promise that
lan dscapes cou ld be designed and planned to achieve 'an optimal spatia l arrangement of ecosystems
and land uses to maximize ecological integrity' (Forman 1995, p.522):_.Rob~rt Ri ley, who edited
Landscape Journal from 1987 to 1995, argued fo~owc science-based definition of 'theo .:__ that
wou ld li mit its use to 'knowledge that explains some rea l-world phenomenon' (Swaffield 2002 , p.2).
'Anything concerned with what to do or why to do it, instead of how to do it, is proudly proclaimed
as theory This is not theory; this is pseudotheory' (emphasis in the origina l) Ri ley proclaimed, in an
argum ent wh ich is reminiscent of the logical positivists' strictures aga inst discussions of aesthetics and
ethics (Riley 1990, p.48) ~gis:a l positivism was a mid-twentieth-century school of philosophy wh ich
argued that the only propositions w hich had meaning were either analytic (i.e. statements in log ic
and mathematics that were tautologically true by the meaning of their terms) or those that cou ld be
empirica lly verifi ed, such as those of natural science . Everythin g else was, quite litera lly, meaningless,
including for instance statements about landscapes being beautiful or democratic decision-makin g
being a good thing . Riley did not go quite so far, but he thought that discussions about the place of
landscape architecture in society, for example, shou ld be labelled 'frameworks', not dignified by the
term 'theory' .~ ica l positivism's influence has waned and attempts t~ ulate lao.g.uag_~

I
~ Riley_[lroQosed are genera lly doomed to failur:.e. If landscape arch~ture were simply a nat~
~ i ence. Rile:{s directive ight have ba_c:l_j_ome chance of sticking, but as the di s..cip.line...o.v.edaQ2_~
the arts and sociill sc i enceS-~t..simp.IY. cou ld not hold .
In large swathes of the academy, positivism is now out of favour, indeed we are in the midst of
a kind of intellectual war between two camps, characterised by the philosopher Simon Blackburn
as 'Objectivists' versus 'Subjectivists' (Biackburn 2005). Among the objectivists are traditiona lists,
modernists, rationa lists, universalists and natural scientists. In the ranks of the subjectivists are
relativists, postmodernists, social construction ists and contextualists, including many in the socia l

42 0
lan H. Thompson • The role of theory •

ronment, which is sciences and humanities. Riley and those who think along similar lines clearly belong with the
vork looked at the objectivists, but it is not clear that they remain in the ascendant. Deming and Swaffield (20 11, p.3)
d by Terry Hartig of suggest that there are three epistemological positions:3 ality_ may be independent of its relationship
et al. 1991, 2003). to the investigator, it may be deQendent UQo n that relation2._hip or it might be interdependent
Jh University called with it. Only the first of these follows the positivist model of (most) natural science (when we get
'luence of outdoor to relativity and quantum physics, things get more complicated). The second concerns the sort of
Json and Aspinall, insight that might be delivered by an artist or by a social scientist using subjectivist methods (see
I of these examp~~s the section below 'Theory in the arts and humanities' on phenomenology). The third involves what
~n integral to many_ Deming and Swaffield, following Crotty (1998), call 'constructionist' methods. These presume 'that
:ivities of landscape knowledge is generated through the interaction between the investigators (and their society) and
1dy of theory which a reality (or realities) that exists but can never be known independently of the presumptions of the

:cipline of ecology,
hat it also belongs
:ation of landmark
-----
investigators' (2011, pp.8-9). Students and early career researchers nee_9_to be clear about whish

--
these models th_e_y: are employing when designing_tbeiuesearcb...
0.

I
SCIENTISM
ur Lieberman is an
mist Nev Naveh to In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) Wittgenstein, wrote 'even if all possible scientific
guage monograph questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all' (6.52). A healthy
ecologist working respect for natural science and the benefits it can bring should be distinguished fro~i~m. wh.LCh
of the world's pre- is the bel1ef that emp1ncal sc1ence alone can answer every quest1on ~hat has ever troubled human1ty,
d the promise that including matters of morality, aesthetics, conscious ne~_ and religion, .'::Yhich have historically been
nent of ecosystems seentoTie beyond itsreach--:c:ritic~f scientism of -;:-educti ~ ism, which
often accuse its proponents
_Riley, who edited can involve the translation of complex phenomena, such as the appreciation of art, the appeal of
ion of 'theory~ that music or ideas of justice, into simple physical processes like the firing of neurons, or may offer socio-
vaffield 2002, p.2). biological explanations which interpret the development of these human capacities in terms of
Jroudly proclaimed evolutionary biology. Some biological explanations of landscape preference, such as the Savannah
r proclaimed, in an Theory advanced by Gordon Orions, do indeed belong in sociobiology. The theory is mentioned in
1s of aesthetics and E.O . Wilson's The Diversity of Life (2001 [1992]) Wilson, now an emeritus professor of biology at
f philosophy which Harvard, contributed to the development of the theory of island biogeography which was one of
;tatements in logic the launch points for landscape ecology. He has also been a prominent advocate for biodiversity
hose that could be and conservation. However, he is also regarded as the father of sociobiology on the strength of
~rally, meaningless, his controversial book Sociobiology The New Synthesis (1975). Critics have accused sociobiology
ic decision-making of being biologically deterministic, and an instance of th~ naturalistic fa~y whereby something
about the place of l sc onsidered good or right because it is natural. Theories of this stamp continue to appear in the
ot dignified by the landscape literature. For example, Barrett et al. (2009) argue for the conceptualisation of landscape
ruao_gu~ aesthetics as an 'economy essential to survival'. Even today it remains controversial whether
re simply a nat~ humans have any behavioural traits which are near universa l biological adaptationsc.Opponents of
:llio~o.veda.~ sociobiology would argue for the significance of learning and culture .

3re in the midst of

THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
· Simon Blackburn
are traditionalists, Across the border in the social sciences, the word 'theory' has different connotations. Landscape
e subjectivists are architects probably do not regard themselves as social scientists, but town planners (or 'urban
nany in the social planners' or 'spatial planners'- or whatever they currently prefer to be called) customarily do. Gert

42 0 43 0
 lan H. Thompson •

de Roo, an eminent Dutch planner, recently addressed a workshop of PhD students at Newcastle

I ------
University and remarked 'of course, you are social scientists, so you don't prove anything'. His point
was that social science offered frameworks of understanding and ways of interpreting evidence, but
'-------- -~
it cannot provide certainty. Indeed much of De Roo's own work has been concerned with the ways
planners can operate in conditions of complexity, fuzziness and unpredictability (e .g . de Roo and
Silva 20 10; de Roo 20 11 ); these are just the same conditions faced by landscape architects.
'Certainty' and 'truth' have almost become dirty words in some parts of the academy, but
nevertheless some social scientists stil l seek to emulate natural scientists, developing quantitative
methods for use in disciplines such as sociology, political science, economics and psychology to
produce knowledge that could be considered on a par with the findings of physics or chemistry.
Even in postmodern times, some social scientists retain a positivist stance, investigating observable
social phenomena and employing measurement, statistical techniques and mathematical modelling
to test hypotheses. Social psychologists, for instance, run experiments and produce theories. Among
the research that bears upon landscape architecture there are, for example, theories of personal
space (or proxemics) and of territoriality (for example: Hal l 1966; Sommer 1969; Becker and Mayo
1971 ). Other researchers work with large data sets, such as the information gathered for national
census. lt is fair to say that landscape is seldom foregrounded in such work, although the economic
geographer Danny Dorling's work on the UK housing market has profound implications for the
future of the countryside (he dissents from the popular view that there is a shortage of houses in
Britain, arguing that there is no need to rip up the green belt) (Dorling 2014).
'Big data', as it is often called, may turn out to be very important for landscape architecture, not
just census data, but also the data produced by socia l media. This ties in with initiatives under the
rubric of 'smart cities' to provide urban planners and managers real time information on a whole
range o~which could include traffic and pollution levels through to data on park usage
or refuse collection. Such work is sti ll relatively new and its implications for landscape research have
yet to be fully explored. An example is a Wageningen University MSc thesis on running routes in
Amsterdam, for which the students used the data from two apps, representing in total some 11,000
runs. They could ana lyse this data to show how the city was used from a runner's perspective, and
then propose design interventions to improve running possibilities (Reil ing and Dolders 2015; for
other examples, see van Lammeren et al.- Chapter 9). Their analysis relied on numbers and, h~.
~nsJdered quanh@ti~resea~ch. Alternatives to quantitative rese [(b._gre_q.ual@tive research and
mixed methods research (see also Tobi and van den Brink - Chapter 2) . In qualitative ana lysis the
data are analysed by means of words without using numbers or statistics. Ana logously to statistical
analyses there is a range of qualitative data ana lyses,~ ends o~l:!_e re~ch
question and the paradi~er. Data gathered using such methods as unstructured or
semi-structured interviews, focus groups and participant observation are often suited for qualitative
analysis. The sample size is typically small, but researchers are often able to access deeper attitudes,
opinions and motivations than would be possible using a purely quantitative approach. Qualitative
and quantitative methods may be combined in mixed methods research, and it is not uncommon for
exploratory qualitative work to prepare the way for quantitative work~ly
involves interpret9Qon and intuition and~ laces it at some distance from the I]Jeth_£~tu(a l
science and much closer to the sorts of activities which take place in the arts and humanities. Closely
- -- - - - - - - - ---- ~
reading the transcript of a focus group is not so different from trying to elucidate the text of a novel
or the script of a play. Indeed, we might be tempted to redraw our territorial map of the academic

440
n H. Thompson • The role of theory •

~nts at Newcastle empires, following David Macey, the author of The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory, and talk

--
1ything'. His point
:ing evidence,_~
ed with the ways
instead of~· an area which covers 'the domains of literature, philosophy,
psychoanalysis, film and the visual arts, historiography and sexual politics' (Macey 2000) lt may be
the case that there is more flexibility than there used to be in the choice of methods available, but
(e.g. de Roo and researchers still need to be clear about the paradigm within which they are working.
3rchitects. The term 'critical theory' means something very different from the sort of theory produced by
he academy, but natural science. lt is a confusing term because it has two distinct origins, one in social science
ping quantitative and one in the arts and humanities. Max Horkheimer, a founding member of the neo-Marxist
~-
1d psychology to ~furL~ of social scientists in the 1930s, saw~~theory as t be_kLnd. o.Lso.c@!__!beory_
•sics or chemistry. that was~ imed at critiquing and changing society, rath;;r.-tl:taoj!Jst understanding it. In the arts and
~ating observable ~ies,-;;s-~e ~ill see latetn1e same- termmean~ something closer to 'the~-~ i'
matical modelling ~m~_is~~- a_~ de riilng~~d_p_ers.pectives fo7exaJ2lj_n.in_g';;<;ultu_r~l -p.ro9u~ts~\Jch i~!iJm_?_
! theories. Among

~ories of personal
-- ------- - ------
and plays (and indeed landscapes).
------..:---
Marxism provided the basis for the Frankfurt School and can thus be considered the original
Becker and Mayo 'critical theory' and it illustrates the way in which theory can be used as the basis for social critique
1ered for national (Macey 2000, p.139) In its original form it was both an explanatory theory which offered a--naccount
Jgh the economic of why certain conditions and injustices existed and an ethical theory which suggested what should
plications for the be done about them. The theory predicted that certain contradictions within capitalism would bring
tage of houses in the system down; the ethical injunction was to bring this about more swiftly through revolution.
Many cultural geographers, including Cosgrove, Daniels and Mitchell, all mentioned earlier, have
~architecture, not employed Marxian understandings of social and economic relations.
tiatives under the In his seminal book The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984) the French
1ation on a whole philosopher Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard labelled Marxism a ' rand narrative', a universal and totalising
~
Jta on park usage ~Laspe.cJ:s_o.Uill;iet~_? ~~~~l ~o~eties, throug_
h out the ~ ~ -history. Religious
ape research have worldviews also purport to offer complete accounts, as do the narratives of Enlightenment reason,
running routes in scientific progress and the spread of liberal democracy. In many instances, grand narratives serve
:otal some 11 ,000 to legitimate and reinforce existing social norms and power relations, but the Marxist story seemed
; perspective, and to be different, in that it offered emancipation and issued a call to arms. Taking a Marxist position
Dolders 2015; for
------ ------ ---
allows one to consider any activity or aspect o life and e aluate it in terms of theextentt o V:flich
--- --- ____ --------....
nbers and, h ~,
-----------
~

_
/

---- - - - -----
it helps or hinders the projeg of remal<ing soci~tu long f!lOre just lines. A complication is that

_________________
...- _.,~_..::-..- .......... .:.--- -"
ative research and most versions of the Marxist mission involve revolutionary upheaval, and anything which delays
tative analysis the - ----
the revolution or makes
_.., it less likely to happen must be condemned. The nineteenth-century urban
~~-

ously to statistical parks movement, which was in many ways the foundation upon which landscape architecture

---
Is on the research
3S
----
unstructured or
developed, could be a target for this sort of criticism, since parks were provided paternalistically
to improve conditions for working people and to lessen tensions between different social classes.
ted for qualitative ~~em like good things to _9o, u~l~~ ~e t~ 1Qg ideologic9_l_po~ti ~e3t th~y
, deeper attitudes, delayed the revolution and thu~Jocked in s'ill_emic inju~ ce.
wach. Qualitative In its baldest form, the Marxist narrative can seem a crude one about the clashing interests of
10t uncommon for two blocks in society: workers and bourgeoisie. At the heart of the theory was the difference in the
~ly relationship of each group to the means of production, but it was an oversimplification or reduction,
~h~al since it overlooked the myriad differences that characterise pluralistic society and the many and
umanities. Closely varied ways in which particular groups - women, ethnic groups, homosexuals, the disabled, the
~fa novel elderly and so on - come to be excluded, marginalised or disadvantaged. Lyotard sug_gested that
p of the academic the postmodern world had becom ~ i ~cred~~us about g_r:_Cl_QQ nf) rratiyes, so he did not propose

440 45 0
 lan H. Thompson •

one of his own, arguing instead for 'little narratives' (or 'language_g~ ~·, a term he borrowed
from Wittgenstein). Typically postmodern theorists see 'truth' as something limited, situated and
contingent. When words like 'truth' and 'knowledge' are used in postmodern discourse, they are
often given quotation marks ('scare quotes') to indicate that no claim is being made to universality, or
they are discussed in the plural- truths, knowledges- to show that the author knows that no group
or individual has a monopoly on truth. Elizabeth Meyer, who describes herself as a feminist landscape
architect, has stated that 'theoretical work shou ld be contingent, particular, and situated. Groundin
in the immediate, the parti cular, and the circumstantia l-the attributes of situatio~al criticism-is an
essential characteristic of landscape arc~i!~ctural design and theory. Landscape theory must rely on
t e specific, not the general' (2002 [1997]). Meyer then says that design and theory must be based
on observation and experience, the immediate and sensory (all of the senses, not just vision) and that
landscape architectural theory is situational, 'it is explicitly historical, contingent, pragmatic, and ad
hoc'. Meyer clearly belongs to the camp which Blackburn ca lls the subjectivists.
Balance is nee_d.e.d he(e. Postmodernism has been a fecund source of new perspectives and critical
tools andi t ha~- provided a counter-weight to the cool, distanced, objectifying gaze of science.
Recognising the m riad differences between hu_man bein~2Jl een~ much-need~ d correc~ve
to the homogenising tendencies of modernism. However, when Meyer says that grounding in
the immediate is an essential characteristic of landscape architectural theory, she stumbles upon
'I
V
------------
a difficulty. How can an -~comr:nitted to the contingent and situational say anything about
_an 'essence' (i.e . something_ ir12._mutable)? She wants to say that all knowledge is situated and
relativistic, but wishes to exempt her own statements about the character of landscape architecture
theory which she thinks are essentially (i .e. universally and fundamentally) true.
The postmodern (or post-structural) turn has sensitised researchers and landscape practitioners
to the differences between people and this has undoubtedly had important benefits such as the
development of new techniques for community consu ltation and participatory design. If modernism
led to the cu lt of the 'expert', who was genera lly a 'landscape outsider' in the sense suggested by
the geographer Edward Relph (1976), postmodernism has favoured the local knowledge which can
be provided by 'landscape insiders', that is people who live and work in a particular place..........--
However, --._..,

if all knowledge is local knowledge, as some would ass~rt, how are we to identify mumbo-ju_mbo
and irrational ideas! Ho.;,; arewe to apply knowledge gained in one geographical or historical
-------- - - --
_______.-- ------
-orarea.a- hydrologist,
-
- -~-

- - --·
- -

context in any other? Moreover, there wil l be instances when an outside expert, an ecologist say,
-
-------
actua lly does know more about a particular topic than anyone who lives in the
~

-
~
The imperative is to reconcile these viewpoints, but it can be a difficult work of mediation. The
integration of local and scientific knowledge has become a research topic in its own right: see for
example Failing et al. (2007); Raymond et al. (201 0).

THEORY IN THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES

~he easiest way to distinguish bet~he social sciences and theory in the ~
humanities is to consider their objects. If a theory offers an explanation or critique of J.be way
society functions, then it belongs in s~theory. If it offers an explanation or critique of cu ltural
----
~-- ~
production or cultural products, then it belongs to cultural theory. That said, it is by no means a
~
clear or simple distinction. How cou ld it be? Consideration of cu ltural products, whether they are
symphonies, detective novels, plays, video insta ll ations or gardens and designed landscapes, involves

46 D
I. Thompson • The role of theory •

1 he borrow ed consideration of the societies in wh ich they were produced. In deed,_ criticism of such artefacts or
J, situated and cultura l practices can provide a way into critique of the societies which produced them.
::>urse, they are The Marxist critic, Raymond WiTilaiTl5"(1921=1988),- un derstood the ~ti~~ between the
1 universality, or econom ic organisation of a society and its cultura l production as the relationship between a
; that no group ~~ecfsuperstruc~ts
~--,---=c---.:-~~-~----- __ ___,_..____
of production - and we can in clude
1inist landscape t e production of designed landscapes - are genera lly an articu lation of the dominant cu lture, and
ted~ rounding embody meanings and values (Williams 1959). But, as the Ita lian Marxist Antonio Gramsci asserted,
criticism-is an this :determination' cannot operate in a stra ightforward way. Gramsci disputed Marxism's claim
ry must rely on to be 'scientific' and objectively, ahistorica lly true, arguing instead that the dominant class in any
must be based society rul es not just through physica l coercion, but by persuading everyone in that society (or at
vision) and that least the vast majority) that the preva ilin g arrangements are natural, normal and valid. The word
gmatic, and ad Gramsci used to refer to this form of control was'hegemoni._(Gramsci 20 11 ).
For the Marxist cultu ral geog raphers~ rove and Daniels, 'a landscape park is more pa lpab le
tives and critical but no more real, no less imaginary, than a landscape painting or a poem .. . ' (1988, p. 1). In other
aze of science.

----
eded corrective
- -------- --------··---
words, a landscape, whatever else it may be, is always a symbolic representation, a cultura l product.
--- ----.-
Th eir argument depends upon a conception of landscape as visual, a view over land, rather than as
,t grounding in a tract of land . Raymond W illiams, they observe, suggested that 'a working landscape is hardly ever
stumbles upon a landscape', because ~e i s ~ way of se~ng_ (ibid .). The ploughmen and harvesters are too
anything about busy with their labours to look at the land in an objective and aestheticising way.
~d Picturesque aesthetics have had a particularly hard time at the hands of cu ltural critics. They have
- - - - - - - -- - -- - - -- ·---- ..
Jpe architecture been accused of aestheticising and therefore leg itimising poverty (and it is true that picturesque
paintings sometimes feature hovels, beggars and poor barefoot children). Picturesque aesthetics
pe practitioners are said to be distancing: they set up a picture plane between the landscape and the observer: they
fits such as the are thus the antithesis of an immersed or engaged aesthetic. They represent the commodification
n. If modernism of land and the unjust distribution of wealth; Mr and Mrs Andrews, in Gainsborough's portra it of
;e suggested by 1750, look out smugly over their well-tended fields (though there is not a labourer in sight). The
edge wh ich can critic John Berger thought that 'their proprietary attitude towards what surrounds them is visible in
place~ev~ their stance and expressions' (Berger 1972, pp .106-1 07).

___..
m umbo-jumbo I have dwelt upon theory derived from Marx at length because of its prominence in critiques
of landscape produced by cu ltural geographers, but the realm of critica l theory has expanded

---
cal or historical
........__

n ecojogi~t~ y, vastly beyond its orig ins to include a plethora of -isms, many of w his:h also have a bearing U[Jon
------· -- -~
N~ .the landscape architecture. Freudian psychoanalytic theory and its derivatives, such as Kleinian and
f mediation The Lacanian psychoanalysis, are often said to be the other major source of critical theory, but they have
vn right: see for not featured prominently in landscape theory, though the British landscape architect, Sir Geoffrey
Jellicoe (1900-1996) elaborated a theory which attempted to exp lain the design process and the
apparent power of some designed landscapes by an appea l to the Jungian notion of the co llective
unconscious. Feminism, however, has employed psychoanalytic concepts to criti que the mascu line
gaze upon landscape. The geographer Gi llian Rose, for example, has considered the way that

~ particu lar sets of power relations, in particu lar those between men and women, have structured the
gue of the way meanings of images of landscape (Rose 1993, 1996) Rose identifies a dualism between masculine
tique of cultural forms of geographica l knowledge, which she identifies with rational approaches in the socia l
. by~ sciences, and the aesthetic approach to landscape associated w ith the arts, which feminises places .
vhether they are Within this dualism it has traditionally been the masculine form of knowledge wh ich has
jscapes, involves occupied the dominant position . In a similar vein the philosopher Caroline Merchant has combined

46 D 47 D
 lan H. Thompson •

feminist and ecological critique to examine the culture-nature binary. The earth, according to
Merchant, was seen as a wild but beneficent mother until the emergence of modern science.
Merchant expressly links the exploitation of nature to the oppression of women (Merchant 1980,
2005). A feminist ethics of care has emerged from environmental ethics which has a direct bearing
upon notions of stewardship in landscape architecture (see also Plumwood 1993). Literary studies
was the seedbed for postcolonial theory, another productive strand within critical theory; it seeks
to understand the impacts of European colonialism upon the rest of the world (NB it is a slightly
misleading title, because it studies the colonial period, not just what happened after countries
acquired their independence). In terms of landscape theory, research has often been focussed upon
the imposition of European ways of seeing and controlling landscape at the expense of indigenous
understandings. For example, Paul Carter in The Road to Botany Bay (1987), examines the way in
which picturesque tropes were employed to entice settlers into making the land their own, while
Allaine Cerwonka has studied the impacts of importing European garden plants into the Australian
landscape (Cerwonka 2004). Jacky Bowring (1997) has shown how the language of the picturesque
permeated the development of the landscape architecture profession in New Zealand, through a
close reading of the published discourse of the New Zealand Institute of Landscape Architects.
The smorgasbord of cultural theory is laden with - ologi ~~~nd -isms so man in fact that a
complete review is not possible within the confines of this chapter; I will have to leave it to readers
to decide whether queer theory, semi olOgy, biopo litics.-co~ unicative action, deconstruction,
hermeneutics, existentialism, structuralism, post-structuralism, speciesism, surrealism and the rest
have a bearing upon landscape architecture. However, there is o~~_::!? m which stands out as being
particularly pertinent to research in landscape research. lt approaches investigation from an angle
- - ~

which is so radically different from positivist science that it can seem antithetical to it. This, of

-------
course, is phenomenology and the emphasis it f21Jces l!J20n subj~c1i1,J_eJ:.uo.\L\@d.g.e and the knowing
---
subject. When writing conventional scientific papers it is usual for authors to efface themselves in
c;;:ae-rto achieve a properly objective tone. If they have to mention that the research was carried out
by living human beings, they adopt some distancing epithet like 'the researchers' or 'the author'.
In phenomenological writing, whether in the humanities or the social sciences, there is no such
imperative and first-person accounts are quite normal. On the battlefield of Blackburn's truth wars,
phenomenologists would be found in the subjectivist camp. Indeed, the adjective phenomenologica/
is sometimes used rather lazily as a synonym for subjective.
However, if we consider the origins of phenomenology in the writings of the philosopher
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), we find that his approach was rooted in the rational scepticism of
Rene Descartes. Like Descartes, Husserl wanted to build our knowledge on rock-solid foundations.
Sceptics, such as Descartes, have wondered whether there is an external world and whether it
matches up with our experiences of it. Husserl deliberately side-stepped this problem. The things
we can be absolutely certain about, he argued, are the contents of our conscious awareness, which
include perceptions, thoughts, bodily awareness, memories, emotions and volitions. We have direct
access to these and can study them ~_this _r:e~e~t the_ ~henomenological enterprise is empirical,
something it shares with science. However, Husserl's version of phenomenology features less in
landscape theory than that of his successor, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961 ). Whereas Husserl,
~

true to his Cartesian inclinations, regarded the conscious sub·ect as transcendental and dis-embodied,
,Merleau-Pont}' took _aiLaJ.!Qgether different line, regarding the body as the seat of ~Q!ion}or
Merleau-Ponty our knowledge comes through our bodies (Merleau-Ponty 2012 [1945)). We could

48 0
H. Thompson • The role of theory •

h, according to not have a world, if we did not have a body. This is much closer to common-sense ideas of our
nodern science. relationship to our environment, and for those, li ke landscape architects, who are interested in
Vlerchant 1980, human-environment interactions, this notion of embod ied consciousness has much to recommend
a direct bearing it. The contrast between positivist and phenomenologica l methods of investigation can be illustrated
Literary stud ies by the work of one of my PhD students who has been investigating the microclimate of public parks
theory; it seeks in Ca iro, Egypt, her home city. Her initial inclination was to use the measuring instruments of the
JB it is a slightly climate scientist, but she ultimately rejected this in favour of a phenomenological approach wh ich
after countries focussed upon subjective accounts of climate as experienced by a number of subjects in the park
1 focussed upon (including herself). Her respondents provided rich data about how they experienced sun and shade
;e of indigenous with in the park and how the microclimate influenced their behaviour there. Arguab ly this sort of
1ines the way in data is more useful to would-be park designers than the objective charts and tables of scientific
:heir own, while investigation, or if not more useful then at least as useful, but in a different way (see also Schu ltz
:o the Australian and van Etteger- Chapter 11 ).
• the picturesque The shift from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty has focussed attention upon the materiality of landscape.
!land, through a Th~iSt11m lngold publisned an essay-entitled 'Thet"E;~poralitY of landscape' (lng;ld
~ Architects. 1993) wh ich stressed that a landscape was a lived-in world, rather than just a way of viewing
1 in fact that a land. There are strong resonances here with the work of another philosopher, Martin Heidegger
~ave it to readers (1889-1976), who asked what it meant to 'dwel l' upon the earth (as opposed to merely existing
deconstruction, or surviving) (Heidegger 1971 ). Many writers, including the American geographer J.B. Jackson,
ism and the rest have laid emphasis upon the often repetitive landscape practices (ploughing a field, trimming a
nds out as being hedgerow, tending an allotment, wa lking a footpath etc.) which create everyday landscapes, and
n from an angle interest in these practices now extends to artists and specialists in performance stud ies.
al to it. This, of
md t~e ~ nowing
THE RIGHT SORT OF THEORY FOR THE JOB
ce themselves in
1 was carried out One of the most interesting things about Wittgenstein's later philosophy was that it was supposed
or 'the author'. to be therapeutic. By showing philosophers how their misuse of everyday language led them into
there is no such perplexity, Wittgenstein hoped that he could dissolve, rather than solve, the prob lems that had
'urn's truth wars, perplexed them for centuries. This was hugely radical, in its way, but at the same time it was
?enomenological conservative. lt left everything alone and didn't ca ll for any drastic revision of everyday languageJf__
we didn't puShwords into uses for which they were not suited , everyth ing wa2 fine- we all knew
the philosopher our way about. I f eel the need to say something simi lar here. The word 'theory', as we have seen, is
nal scepticism of used in a great variety of contexts. We sometimes muddle ourselves when we think we are dealing
Jlid foundations. with one sense of 'theory' and it turns out that our interlocutors are using another. We have seen
I and whether it that attempts to police the use of 'theory' with in the dis_s iQiine of landscape arch itectur~ (by Riley
blem . The things and others) ~ I suggest that we do no tinkering at all and that we leave things pretty much
1wareness, which as they are. Landscape architecture is never going to move wholesa le into the natural sciences,
~ ----
s. We have direct ~'Lib_e_?..Q C i ijJ _?ciences_..QUwallowed_gy the arts. Its position, uncomfortabl
)rise is emQirica l, perhaps, wi ll always be at the borders, and as long as that remain~ so, competing _~otio ~ of_theory
1 features less in are likely to persist. We might as we ll get used to~s~-~ c~ti '@t~ our awa_~n ~~ of..!'2_e ~y~w<?_rd_?_
Whereas Husserl, are used within our neighbourinq_e,mplre~.
--------------
ld dis-embod ied, However, knowing our way about b~ <;_~ mes_ even more important. One thing I have not tried to
,f_~QJ:ion . !or do in this chapter is to tabulate the various types ~ory en countered along the way. In part this is
1945]) We cou ld because it wou ld replicate efforts already undertaken by Elen Deming and Simon Swaffield in their

48 D 49 D
 lan H. Thompson •

book Landscape Architecture Research: Inquiry, Strategy and Design (2011 ), where they categorise
research strategies against two axes, one labelled Inductive-Deductive (with 'Abduction' forming
a third possibility between) and the other labelled 'Objectivist-Subjectivist' and then come up with
nine 'strategies of inquiry'. For the most part, their categorisation is useful, though phenomenology
is oddly absent. Rather than spending this entire chapter critiquing or elaborating their framework, I
wanted to show, in a more discursive way, how the puzzlement about the role of theory_J n landscape
ta rchitecture might have come about.
James Corner has suggested that a theory can be both a 'stabilizer' and a 'disruptive
~m~_(-1.990) In the sciences, a good theory can provide an explanation for a diverse range
of data or phenomena, gathering them together, so to speak, and making them intelligible.
However, even a well-established theory can be overturned, if it is found wanting in explanatory
power. In what Thomas Kuhn has called a 'paradigm shift', the old explanatory model can be
rapidly superseded by a new one. The example always mentioned here is the way that the Theory
of Relativity displaced Newtonian mechanics. So, even within objective science, a new theory
can be radically disruptive. However, there are species of critical theory, both social and cultural,
rwhich find their raison d' Wel n dJsruR"tlrl9tfle5tatus _g~o. A fashionable though ugly word for
this is 'problematising', which we seem to owe to Michel Foucault. Problematising occurs when
a critical thinker calls into question a piece of common knowledge or a commonplace practice.
This problematisation generally involves the revelation of some hidden operation of power in the
everyday routines. Thinkers who would reg_~rd !i:Jemselv.es__as~p_CQ.gres_~ive are often enthusiastic
~~~t_!!ed ! orms of knowl..e.d.g_e._Q_~c_®se i! s~ _s:> ffer opportunities for _
new consciousness, hope or action to emerge.
More pragmatically the budding researcher needs to understand how theor)_l (and what sort
of~ evant to her research design-. lt has--;-direct and immediateb earing upon the
framing of research questions and the selection of methods. To return to the example of my
Egyptian research student, her reading of phenomenological theory, particularly Gernot Bbhme's
work on atmospheres and aesthetics (Bbhme 1993, 2005), led her to reject her original ideas
about gathering climatic data with scientific instruments, in favour of 'walk-along' interviews with
subjects in a Cairo park, recording and later analysing their perceptions of microclimate and place.
Bbhme is a philosopher with interests in anthropology, another borderland discipline sometimes
classified among the social sciences, but sometimes considered a humanity. The methods this
student selected came from social science, but they were qualitative rather than quantitative.
Another student (from Thailand) wished to undertake largely historical research into open space
in Bangkok. From the outset, this suggested archival research, but the investigation was shaped
by an understanding of both Henri Lefebvre's theories concerning the production of social space
and also postcolonial theory. Thailand was never colonised, so the interesting question was 'why
not?'; the answer, as this researcher was able to demonstrate, was that the Thai monarchy was
able to present the country as a modern European-style state. The design and use of public spaces
contributed to the projection of this image.
These two, very different, examples show that the researcher needs to engage with existing
theory from the outset and to be prepared to find it anywhere. As it happens, neither of these
theses drew upon theory produced from within the discipline of landscape architecture, though
both students were landscape architecture graduates. If theory is imr9rtant from the outset, as a
kind of framing input into the research process, does research also produce theory? The answer must
~--~

50 D
10mpson • The role of theory •

, categorise be sometimes, but not necessarily. All PhD level work ought to make a contribution to knowledge,
m' forming although it does not need to be an earth-shattering one to earn the degree. The research might
ne up with test a theory in new circumstances. For example, another of my students took well-tried European
omenology methods of collaborative design and sought to discover whether they could be applied in Malaysia.
amework, I His thesis added to the evidence which showed that these methods worked, while identifying a
1 landscape number of particular difficulties which needed to be addressed when they were used in Malaysian
society. Sometimes PhDs do add to theory (as opposed to knowledge) because they offer a~w

-
'disruptive
terse range
intelligible.
theoretical framework for looking at a particular topic or issue. My own thesis was of this kind. I
was interested in the values and motivations of landscape architects, so I went and interviewed a
number of them in-depth . On the basis of these interviews and a wide-ranging literature review, I
~xplanatory suggested that their values fell into three areas: ecology and environment, social and political, and
·del can be creative and aesthetic. I also suggested that there were inevitable clashes between these values,
the Theory which each practitioner had to resolve in their own way. I was able to develop this framework
1ew theory further in the book Ecology, Community and Delight (Thompson 2000) One might say, I suppose,
1d cultural, that the empirical research (i.e. the interviews) provided a snapshot of the way British landscape
ly word for architects considered their vocation at the end of the twentieth century, but I think that it was the
:curs when framework, the theoretical innovation, that readers found more interesting.
:e practice. Theory does, of course, move on, and this is true whichever of the thre~ c~tu~es it_bel~~gs !o.
)Wer in the We have noted how paradigms in natural science can be overthrown by new evidence. The social
~nthusiastic sciences and the humanities are more prone to enthusiasms, as particular critical thinkers become
tunities for fashionable, then fall from favour. We saw this with Derrida and Deconstruction, for example, with
---_,
the Pare de la Villette as an unusually concrete monument to an academic craze. Then the mantle
I what sort passed to Deleuze and Guittari, who provided the intellectual underpinning (or maybe just the gloss)
1 upon the for Landscape Urban ism. This is JUSt the academic weather, but scholars and researchers to be able
1ple of my to read it. The newest idea is not necessarily the best and seemingly dead theory can sometimes be
ot Bi:ihme's reanimat~e.
ginal ideas I was originally approached to write a chapter with the title 'Theory: Chicken or Egg?' I think
rviews with the thought was 'what comes first, the theory or the method'? For the most part, I believe it is
· and place. the theory, though theory may be stretched or otherwise modified by the outcome of the research.
sometimes In the humanities and the social sciences, theory provides frameworks or lenses through which
2thods this to consider phenomena, and sometimes to define and evaluate them. lt is different when we are
uantitative. thinking about procedural research. As we saw, when thinking about Steinitz and McHarg, in
)pen space these instances the research starts from consideration of existing practices and results in some
vas shaped recommended codification of these procedures. Perhaps the question w~~ l~_0eol)'__9.!:!_ input or an
ocial space ~~at ~v~sh o_vyl} _that Lt_can be either (or both).
1 was 'why
1archy was
NOTE
1blic spaces
I note that elsewhere in this volume my colleague Maggie Roe argues that landscape architecture is not a
ith existing 'discipline' but a 'disciplinary field'. I think she does this in order to acknowledge the breadth of research
which informs landscape architectural practice and the degree to which that knowledge is shared with
er of these
others. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as one of its definitions 'discipline: a branch of learning or
1re, though
scholarly instruction'. I don't have much difficulty with this. There are things which need to be passed on to
>utset, as a future generations of landscape architects, but I agree with Roe that there need not be anything exclusive
1swer must about this.

50 D 51 D
 lan H. Thompson •

REFERENCES

Barrett, T.L., Farina, A. and Barrett, G.W. (2009) 'Aesthetic landscapes: An emergent component in sustaining
societies', Landscape Ecology, 24(8), 1029-1035.
Becker, F. D. and Mayo, C. (1971) 'Delineating personal distance and territoriality', Environment and Behavior, 3,
375-381.
Berger, J. (1972) Ways of Seeing, London: British Broadcasting Association and Penguin .
Blackburn, S. (2005) Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed, London: Al ien Lan e.
Bohme, G. (1993) 'Atmosphere as the fundamenta l concept of a new aesthetics', Thesis Eleven, 36(1 }, 113-126.
Bohme, G. (2005) 'Atmosphere as the subject matter of architecture', in Ursprung, P., ed. Herzog & DeMeuron:
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