1.
BOME vs ALFONSO, 1989 Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial
NMAT
The Board of Medical Education, the government agency which supervises and regulates the
country’s medical colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to
nullify and set aside the order issued by Judge Daniel P. Alfonso restraining the
enforcement of Quisumbing’s order of closure of the respondent Philippine Muslim-
Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the College).
The College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed
purpose of producing physicians who will “emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes
on health.” The unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of
the College in Antipolo, Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the
municipality, instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was first proposed to be
located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its name to the Rizal
College of Medicine.
In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of
Medical Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a
study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The report of the Commission showed that the
College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. 1 The team of
inspectors
recommended the closure of the school 2 upon the following findings, to wit:
1. (a)the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created because of
its inappropriate location and the absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to
Muslim culture and welfare;
2. (b)its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from obtaining a “balanced
humanistic and scientific” education;
3. (c)it did not have its own base hospital for the training of its students in the major
clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS;
4. (d)more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the College full-time, resulting
in shortened and irregular class hours, subject overloading, and in general, poor quality
teaching.
The school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its request, the Board of
Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors 3= for a re-evaluation of the
College. After inspection, the team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the
phase-out of the school.
The first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of inspectors. 5 A
year thereafter, the College failed another test—what was in effect the fourth evaluation of
its fitness to continue as a medical school—conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team
from the Board of Medical Education determining the eligibility of medical schools for
government recognition. The College was adjudged “inadequate” in all aspects of the survey,
to wit, college, curriculum, facilities, teaching hospital, and studentry. 6 The inspectors,
of government recognition.
Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the closure of
the College, effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The College however succeeded
in having the Board form yet another team to review the previous findings. Doctors Elena
Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto Romualdez, Artemio Ordinario, Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas
conducted their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there had been a
“major effort to improve the physical plant for classroom instructions and the library, serious
deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and library operations;” “faculty
continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no prospects for satisfactory growth and
development;” “student profile x x (was) below par from the point of view of credentials
(NMAT and transfer records) as well as level knowledge and preparedness at various stages
of medical education,” and “the most serious deficiency x x (was) the almost total lack of
serious development efforts in academic medicine—i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of
teaching, no serious effort to study curricula, almost non-existent innovative approaches.”
Again, the recommendation was to close the College with provisions for the dispersal of its
students to other medical schools.
Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman of the College’s Board of Trusteesof the
decision of the Board of Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong instead
proposed a gradual phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in order not to dislocate
the students and staff and to minimize financial loss. The Board subsequently allowed the
College to continue its operations but only until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed,
this decision being “final and unappealable.” The College was, however, assured of assistance
in the relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for health-related
and paramedical courses.
The College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the Secretary. On February 16, 1989, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
finding “no reason to disturb” the contested decision, affirmed it.
The College went to court questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and
discriminatory and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.
RTC:
The Judge ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the principal basis of the
closure order, and on such basis sustained the claim of the College that the inspection was
done in an “arbitrary and haphazard manner” by a team of inspectors who had already
prejudged the school. Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence supporting the findings
in the report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his own ocular inspection of the College
disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report were non-existent, and that on the
contrary, the laboratory and library areas were “big enough,” and the operations of the
proposed base hospital were “going on smoothly at the time of the ocular inspection.”
The school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for enrollees in all
levels of the medical college and in its pre-board review classes.
ISSUE:
W/N the Courts has the power to reverse the determination by the DECS on the fitness of a
school to continue its operations.
 exercise of judgment and findings of facts, because by reason of their special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to
HELD: pass judgment on such matters and their findings of facts in that regard are generally
NONE. accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. There are, to be sure, exceptions to this
general rule but none of them obtains in this case.
Remedial Law; Administrative Agency; Appeal; There is no law authorizing an appeal from
decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any
other Court.—Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this
case clearly unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or
orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is
not the function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and orders of the
Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and
standards required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this
question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the
Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the competence
to do so.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The only authority reposed in the Courts is the
determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted
within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution.—The only authority
reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and
the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him
should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent
judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby thwart official action.—Given these
facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical
schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have been
committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the
questioned injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken,
allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A single ocular
inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in the
circumstances, warrant overturning the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true
state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The members of the evaluating
team came from the different sectors in the fields of education
and medicine, and their judgment in this particular area is certainly better than that of the
respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to the school could hardly have given him much
more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and facilities and into the conduct of the
classes and other school activities.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice
should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions.—
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is
well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely
administrative and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government involving the
2. Tablarin vs. Gutierrez
FACTS:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and
administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled
on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted
NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986
and in April 1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical
colleges during the school year 1987-1988.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
HELD:
NO.
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements—i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in
a recognized medical school—for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our
social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given
the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]) and quite probably in
other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into
account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

Political Law; Legislative and administrative provisions of the statute that is impugned
constitute valid exercise of police power of the state.— The legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and
non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs—in a word, the public order—of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental
effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there
is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition
for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety
of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has
long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
3. Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego
FACTS:
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor
of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it
as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on
the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC to compel his admission to the test.
He first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By
agreement of the parties, he was allowed to take the NMAT subject to the outcome of his
petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
The judge declared the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita
Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
HELD:
No.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  While every person is entitled to aspire to be a
doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.—While every person is
entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is
true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the
longer the bridge to one’s ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also
giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  The contention that the challenged rule violates
the equal protection clause is not well-taken; Reasons.—The contention that the challenged
rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate
with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical
students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule.
The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers
which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example,
while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated. There would be
unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others
who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection
requires is equality among equals.

Constitutional Law; Police Power; Defined;  Proper Exercise of; Case at bar.—We see no

reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised
in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least
initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The
latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to
repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Same;  Same; Same;  It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health; Three flunk rule, intention of—In other words, the proper exercise of the
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject
of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right
and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the
law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors.
4. BOARD OF MEDICINE VS. OTA
FACTS:
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously
resided in the Philippines for more than 10 years. He graduated from Bicol Christian College
of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doctor of Medicine. After successfully
completing a one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Center, he filed an application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain a
medical license. He was required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit
an affidavit of undertaking, stating among others that should he successfully pass the same,
he would not practice medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan
and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine.
Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical Practitioners Law
of Japan duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus
I. Yabes; thus, he was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which
he subsequently passed.
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC denied respondent’s request
for a license to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board “believes
that no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or
foreigner who can possibly practice there.”
Respondent then filed a Petition before the RTC alledging that the Board and the PRC, in
refusing to issue in his favor a Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine,
had acted arbitrarily, in clear contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his
profession in the Philippines to his great damage and prejudice.
The RTC held that respondent had adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan allow
foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted into the practice of medicine
under the principle of reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the
Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had
substantially complied with the requirements under the law. The RTC then ordered the Board
to issue in favor of respondent the corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to
practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while
respondent submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine
in Japan, it was not shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical
and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power
of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and
not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to practice medicine in the Philippines.
HELD:
YES.
Professions; Medical Profession; Physicians; There is no question that a license to practice
medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government, a right that is earned
through years of education and training, and which requires that one must first secure a
license from the state through professional board examinations.—There is no question that
a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. It is a
right that is earned through years of education and training, and which requires that one
must first secure a license from the state through professional board examinations. Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and
control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and
pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements—i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school—for
admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
regulatory authority of the state.”
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The power to regulate the exercise of a profession or
pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary,
despotic, or oppressive manner; Courts will generally strike down license legislation that
vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily
lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for
the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.—It must be stressed however
that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political
body which regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid
and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. As the legislature cannot
validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer,
courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to
grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity
without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the
exercise of their power.
Same; Same; Same; Medical Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2382); Presidential Decree No. 223 (P.D.
No. 223); Professional Regulation Commission; Nowhere in R.A. No. 2382 or in P.D. No. 223
is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of
medicine in said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos, and neither is it stated
that
it must first be proven that a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to practice his
profession in said country before a foreign applicant may be given license to practice in
the Philippines.—R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical
board examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that
his country’s existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the
same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines
the extent of PRC’s power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon recommendation of the board,
approve the registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or
without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country, provided
the following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the registration or licensing in
said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated
by the laws of the Philippines; (2) that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same
privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that the applicant
shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA,
showing that his country’s existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the
profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. The said provision
further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain
privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are
granted to or some additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in
acquiring the same certificates in his country. Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the
foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said country
are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven that
a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said country
before a foreign applicant may be given license to practice in the Philippines.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a
Filipino to get license and practice therein.—It is enough that the laws in the foreign country
permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiring respondent to prove first that
a Filipino has already been granted license and is actually practicing therein unduly expands
the requirements provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.237

Same; Same; Same; Actions; Mandamus; Where there is no definite showing that the
requirements and conditions to be granted license to practice medicine had been
satisfactorily met, the writ of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will—to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the
applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications, and he must also appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions
and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority.—The Court finds that the
factual circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of the case at bar; hence, the
principle applied therein should be viewed differently in this case. In De Guzman, there were
doubts about the integrity and validity of the test results of the examinees from a particular
school which garnered unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects. Said doubts
called for serious inquiry concerning the applicants’ satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements. And as there was no definite showing that the requirements and conditions to
be granted license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court held that the
writ of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege without thwarting the
legislative will. Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must
show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also
appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the
law and the licensing authority.
5. FELIX MARQUEZ vs. BOME G.R. No. L-24119 August 8, 1925
FACTS:
Felix Marquez, seeks to obtain a writ of mandamus against the Board of Medical Examiners,
requiring them to admit the petitioner to the physicians' examinations conducted, or to be
conducted by the respondents in the City of Manila
institution has any inchoate right on account of that fact. If the law were otherwise upon this
point, it would be impossible for the Board of Medical Examiners to give effect to the
knowledge which they from time to time acquire as to the standing of medical schools; and
an intending physician, upon matriculating in a particular college, takes upon himself the risk
of changes that may be made in the standing of the institution by the board.

It appears that petitioner is a graduate of the Chicago Medical College, having received the
degree of M.D. from said institution on June 8, of the year 1922. No question appears to have
been made by the respondents with respect to the petitioner's qualifications of the
physician's examinations in other respects, but they have denied him admission to the
examinations on the grounds that the Chicago Medical College, where the petitioner was
graduated, has been classified as a Class C medical college by the National Medical State
Board of the United States. For this reason the respondents, in accordance with the
regulations of the board now in effect, have denied the requisite standing to said institution
and excluded petitioner.

Prior to the adoption of the present regulations, and prior to the date when the Chicago
Medical School was classified as a Class C medical college, the Board of Medical Examiners
for the Philippine Islands had accepted diplomas of graduation from said medical college as
sufficient proof of proficiency in medical knowledge to admit a graduate to the examinations
held in these Islands; and as late as October 29, 1923, said board accepted favorably upon
the application of one Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, who was graduated from said school in the
year 1921. At the time said candidate was admitted, however, the regulations denying the
requisite status to the Chicago Medical College had not been made effective, and they had
been made effective by proper authority before the present petitioner had submitted his
application.

In the argument for the petitioner it is admitted that under Act No. 3111, and the regulations
now in force, the petitioner is disqualified to take the examinations; but it is pointed out that
at the time he began and even when he conducted his course in the Chicago Medical School,
said institution was still recognized as a reputable medical institution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner's case should be governed by the law and regulations in force
at the time of his enrollment in and graduation from the Chicago Medical School, or by those
in force at the time he filed his application for admission.

HELD:
NO.

The question whether a medical institution is "a reputable medical school," in the sense
intended by the law, is vested in the Board of Medical Examiners, and although the action
taken by them may conceivably, in isolated cases, result in hardship, nevertheless the
interests of the public require that the board should be free to exercise its judgment and
discretion without reference to the effect of the determination of the question in particular
instances. There can in the nature of things be no vested right in an existing law, which would
preclude its change or repeal. No one who has commenced preparation in a particular
6. PRC vs. DE GUZMAN G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004
FACTS:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the
Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner PRC then released their names as successful examinees
in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure
exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually
and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100%
in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or
better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the
performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that
strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a
record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as
physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity
marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert
mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila
University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said
examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the
scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees
from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of
Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each
other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of
scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause “strong enough to eliminate the normal
variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent,
effort, energy, etc.”
For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the
[1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early
access to the test questions.”
On July 5, 1993, respondents filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as
intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents
with “immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit” in connection with the Bio-Chem and
Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be
nullified.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE MAY NOT BE
AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES, IF EVER THERE IS SOME
DOUBT AS TO THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES.
HELD:
YES.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The surrounding circumstances in the instant case call for
serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by the
respondents-examinees.—The surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry
concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by the respondents. The
unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr.
Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if
not validity, of the tests. These doubts have to be appropriately resolved. Under the second
paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative
investigations and “disapprove applications for examination or registration,” pursuant to
the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 1 thereof. In this case, after the
investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents to
ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 9 of
Rep. Act No. 2382.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The operative word in Section 8 of R.A. No. 2382 is
“satisfactorily”, defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or “capable of
dispelling doubt or ignorance.”—Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others,
that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have “satisfactorily
passed the corresponding Board Examination.” Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath
may only be administered “to physicians who qualified in the examinations.” The operative
word here is “satisfactorily,” defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or
“capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance.” Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the
licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents “satisfactorily passed” the
licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained
by the respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to
enforce one that has been established by law.—The function of mandamus is not to
establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has
been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a
legal remedy for a legal right. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to
the thing demanded. It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a
privilege or franchise granted by the government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of
an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner.—It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the
exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its
agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the
exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up
one’s constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the
legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public
agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public
officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business,
profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of
said officials in the exercise of their power.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the
applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications—without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and
conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to
secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.—In the present case, the
aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which
prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of
candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the
grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been
issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that
he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must
appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the
law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a
matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the
aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant
the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.
7. GOMEZ VS. VENTURA, G. R. No. 32441, March 29, 1930
FACTS:
In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows:
1.1. Annulling and setting aside the aforementioned investigation proceedings, and
particularly the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands dated
March 30, 1926, forever revoking the plaintiff's license to practice medicine and surgery.
2.2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status before the investigation and
the decision of March 30, 1926, that is, as if there had never been an investigation and an
adverse decision.
3.3.Ordering said defendants to issue in favor of the plaintiff a license for the practice of
medicine and surgery in the Philippine Islands, such as he had prior to the investigation and
adverse decision.
1.4. Granting the plaintiff any other proper legal remedy."
provision of said section it cannot be maintained that Act No. 2381 includes more than one
subject. The provisions contained in that section are simply details and means conducive to
the ultimate purpose of said Act, which details and means need not be stated in the title of
the Act for the very reason that, properly speaking, they are not' foreign matter.
1.3.BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS ; POWERS.—The powers vested in the Board of Medical
Examiners to suspend or revoke a physician's certificate of registration and the authority
granted the Secretary of the Interior to confirm or reverse the decision of said board of
examiners, partake of a quasi-judicial character, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this
reason, the exercise thereof cannot be reviewed by mandamus, which is the nature of this
cause on its merits.

The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with costs against the
plaintiff. Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred:
Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
2.2. In not holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix, of the City of Manila, had no personality
nor power to institute administrative proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the
Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
3.3. In admitting in its decision that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is
valid.
4.4. In not holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is
unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.
5. 5. In holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is in force.
6. 6. In not holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381 has been repealed, even on the supposition
that it was valid.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CHARGES AGAINST DR. GOMEZ MAY BE VALIDLY FILED BY A PUB;LIC
OFFICER BEFORE THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS.

HELD:
Yes.

1.1. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS; CHARGES AGAINST PRACTICING PHYSICIANS.—The law

(sec. 12, Act No. 3111) does not require that the charges against practicing physicians be
preferred by a public officer or by any specified person; it even permits the Board of Medical
Examiners itself to require its executive officer to prefer said charges. From the wording of
the law we infer that any person, including a public officer, may prefer the charges referred
to. The fact that the charges were filed by the assistant fiscal of the City of Manila does not
deprive the Board of Medical Examiners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the
proper action according to law.

1. 2. OPIUM ; OPIUM LAW.—The matter contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 (Opium Law)
as to prescriptions of opium is not foreign to the end pursued in said Act, and in view of the