European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.

15, 315-332 ( I 985)

Thinking about thinking: Causal, evaluative and

finalistic cognitions about social situations

ANDREA ABELE
lnstitut fur Psychologie, Universitat
Erlangen-Nurnberg, Bismarckstr. 1, D-8520
Erlangen, W. Germany

Abstract
The present article is concerned with first considerations and data for a theory of
social cognitions. A taxonomy of social cognitions is suggested comprising three
classes: causal, evaluative and finalistic thinking. These classes are subdivided
according to the social perspective taken, i.e. self-directed versus other-directed
thinking. The situational preconditions of these social cognition classes are studied in
different social episodes each comprising either positive or negative, expected or
unexpected events. The results show that the most reasoning about a situation occurs
when it is an important private episode with an unexpected and affectively negatively
experienced event. The data concerning the natural occurrence of the three cognition
classes is interpreted as providing suggestions of their functional meaning: The
functions of the three classes of social cognitions are labelled ‘information
integration’ (self-directed evaluative thinking), ‘action planning’ (self-directed
finalistic thinking and other-directed causal thinking), ‘control of negative feelings’
(selfdirected causal, and finalistic thinking) and ‘understanding’ (other-directed
finalistic and evaluative thinking and self-directed causal thinking).

INTRODUCTION

Present-day research in social cognitions has developed two main trends which can
both be criticized: (1) Firstly, the information processing paradigm is concerned
with how information is transformed into judgements and recalled from memory.
This trend is not interested in the social nature of information processing, i.e. when
information search is instigated and under which conditions reasoning about social
stimuli is maintained. (2) Secondly, attribution theory is concerned with the
informational, and more recently also with the situational, antecedents of causal
attributions. This approach is not interested in what else people think, i.e. what
further kinds of social cognitions emerge in a situation, and the relative weight
causal attributions have within it.
The present article offers considerations and data for a broader theory of social

0046-2772/85/030315-18$01.80 Received 20 June 1984

0 1985 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Revised 3 August 1984
316 A . Abele

cognitions. The central question is: ‘When do people think what?’ This approach is
concerned with the phenomenal representation of different kinds of reasoning in
differently valenced and expected situations.
(1) What kinds of social cognitions can be distinguished? How can a
phenomenally valid taxonomy of the many different forms of reasoning be
established?
A taxonomy of social cognitions should partition the continuous flow of thinking
into a limited number of mutually exclusive, exhaustive and meaningful classes.
They must have face validity in a lay psychological sense. Having answered this
‘what’ question it is then possible to study a person’s cognitive reality in a broader
sense. The interrelationship between the cognitive and the affective experiencing of
situations can be analysed as well.
(2) When d o the different classes of social cognitions occur? What are their
major preconditions?
Interest in the preconditions of information search and social reasoning has
emerged only recently. We know little about the preconditions of different forms
and intensities of social cognitions. By expanding this knowledge it is possible to
gain a deeper understanding of the functional meaning of different forms of
reasoning within the flow of consciousness and action.

A taxonomy of social cognitions

Considering the ‘what’ question, we can start with a definition of social cognitions:
Social cognitions are always inferences from a stimulus (a person, an event, a
behaviour etc.) directed towards a defined ‘goal’ or objective (an explanation, an
evaluation, a prediction etc.). ‘Stimulus’ and ‘objective’ are integrated within a
temporal perspective: Explanations are concerned with objectives preceding the
stimulus. The perspective is from past to present. Evaluations are concerned with
objectives present simultaneously with the stimulus. The perspective is within the
present. Predictions are concerned with objectives which might follow the stimulus.
The perspective is from present to future. This inference process, i.e. integrating
stimulus and objective in a temporal perspective, allows for the distinction of three
different content classes of social cognitions:
Causal thinking (‘why’ considerations) refers to past-present inferences. One is
looking for an explanation, which was prior to the stimulus to be explained, and
which forms a ‘phenomenal causality’ (Heider, 1944) with it. The search for both
causes and reasons (Buss, 1978) belongs in this category. Examples of causal
thinking are: ‘Why did this happen to me? or ‘I wonder, why she is so friendly’.
Certain aspects of causal thinking have been studied in attribution research.
Evaluative thinking (‘how’ considerations) refers to present-present inferences,
i.e. the interpretation and evaluation of reality. Examples of evaluative thinking
are: ‘What does this mean?’ or ‘Is she really friendly or just polite?’ Evaluative
thinking is the prerequisite for the ‘social construction of reality’, as analysed in
phenomenology (Schutz, 1970), in symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934), in
sociology (Berger and Luckmann, 1969) and in communication research
 Thinking about thinking 317

(Watzlawick, 1983). Within social psychology, theories of classificatory judgements

(Eiser and Stroebe, 1974; Tajfel, 1982) also pertain to this subject matter.
Finalistic thinking (‘what follows’ considerations) refers to present-future
inferences. In the philosophical tradition of Aristoteles, a finalistic conception
considers the pulling forces of the goal, which in turn determine movement. It
considers the aim inherent in any change. Adler (1918) contrasted a finalistic with a
causalistic view: In order to understand neurotic symptoms, he not only tried to
find out their causes, but also their purposes, The idea of finality in a functional,
goal-directed sense, is an important aspect in the concept of ‘life space’ as well
(Lewin, 1969). In the present conceptualization, finalistic thinking is similar to the
Lewinian approach. Cognitions, which are concerned with ‘what follows from this
experience’ are functional for further action planning, because they help to learn
from past experiences. Examples of finalistic thinking are: ‘How could I evade such
experiences in the future?’ or ‘What is she going to do now?’ Such a
conceptualization of finalistic thinking, is rarely expressed in contemporary
theories of social cognition.
Thinking about a situation usually implies all three classes: Having just had a talk
with a friend, one might think about how nice it was (evaluative thinking,
self-directed), whether the other also liked it (evaluative thinking, other-directed),
why the other doesn’t phone more often (causal thinking, other-directed) or how
one could arrange to meet him more often (finalistic thinking, self-directed).
However, it is argued here, that the flow of thought about a situation can be
classified into the above defined three classes, and that these classes are exhaustive,
mutually exclusive and subjectively meaningful.
As shown by the example above, this taxonomy can be subdivided according to
the kind of stimulus one is thinking about: Reasoning can be about persons, things
or immaterial objects. In the present study we will focus on reasoning about
persons’: Causal, evaluative and finalistic thinking can be self-directed (for
example: ‘What follows for me from this experience?’) or it can be directed at
another person, present or imagined (for example: ‘Why did she do this?’). This
perspective taking is a process within the individual and must not be confused with
the research tradition of actor-observer differences (Jones and Nisbett, 1971).
When applying the classification it is important to keep in mind that the present
approach is concerned with social cognitions from a phenomenal, and not from an
analytical, point of view. From an analytical point of view, for example, evaluative
thinking might sometimes rely on causal attributions: To describe another person
by a certain trait might be an implicit derivation from an observed behaviour. In the
person’s experience, however, it is an inference t o something inherent in the
present situation and not a causal attribution’.

‘Depending on the research interest, other subdivisions are possible. They are not considered here
because the focus of the present study is on thinking about interpersonal events.
*There is a certain similarity between the present taxonomy and the classificatory system introduced by
Wong and Weiner (1981). These authors categorized their subjects’ responses as attributions, action
oriented considerations or reassessments. Action oriented considerations are comparable to finalistic
thinking. With regard to the ‘attribution’ category the authors are more in favour of an analytical
approach. It is therefore partially causal, partially evaluative thinking according to the present approach.
Their ‘reassessment’ category is more limited in scope than the present ‘evaluative thinking’, because
reassessment is only one outcome of evaluation and interpretation.
318 A . Abele

Preconditions of social cognitions

It is further argued here that both the general amount of thinking about a situation
and the respective share of the different cognition classes varies from situation to
situation. Some situations instigate only little social reasoning while others instigate
quite a lot. Some situations may lead predominantly to evaluative thinking, others
t o more causal thinking etc. In order to analyse this ‘when’ question, we need
parameters for describing and differentiating situations.
Situations have to be analysed both from their outside characteristics and their
internal representation. Outside characteristics are descriptive aspects of a situation
(for example the social episode domain, Forgas, 1982) the frequency of a
situation’s natural occurrence) and also prescriptive aspects (for example the role
expectations or norms attached to the situation). Internal representation pertains to
subjective assessments of the situation (for example emotional meaning, rated
importance, novelty, expectancy confirmation etc.).
As yet no studies have been undertaken to systematically analyse the influence a
situation’s outside characteristics have on social cognitions3. Nor has any research
studied the relationship between a situation’s internal representation and the
amount, and kind, of thinking about it. In attribution literature, however, we find
some data on the different amounts of causal attributions dependent upon certain
situational characteristics. This data can give first suggestions as to the natural
occurrence of one type of social cognition, i.e. causal attributions.
It has been demonstrated that negatively valenced events lead to more causal
attributions than positively valenced events: An election’s losers give more reasons
for their failure than the winners give for their success (Forsterling and Groeneveld,
1983). A negative result in an achievement task leads to more causal attributions
than a positive result (Wong and Weiner, 1981). Data from other studies show that
unexpected events lead to more causal attributions than expected ones (Hastie,
1984; Lalljee, Watson and White, 1982; Lau and Russell, 1980; Nesdale, 1983;
Prysczynski and Greenberg, 1981; Wong and Weiner, 1981). It has been further
suggested that there is more causal reasoning in ambiguous, novel, and subjectively
important situations (Hastie, 1984; Krahe, 1984; Semin, 1980).

Causal, evaluative and finalistic reasoning about social situations

In the present experiment both one outside characteristic of a situation (the social
episode domain) and certain. aspects of its internal representation (expectedness
and valence) were varied in order to study the amount and kind of social cognitions
elicited. Social episodes from three major areas of life (work and achievement
related situations; leisure time and recreation oriented situations; private and
intimate relationship oriented situations) were chosen. Each episode consisted in a
two-person interaction, comprising a positive or negative, expected or unexpected
event. The subjects’ personal experience of these episodes, both in terms of their
thinking about them (amount of reasoning, called cognition quantity; reasoning
classes, called cognition quality) and their feelings within them (well-being and

3Upon completion of this study I read a paper by Mikula and Schlamberger (1984), who carried out an
analysis on the cognitive experiencing of social episodes which contain an unjust event. This kind of
study is similar to the one presented here.
 Thinking about thinking 3 19

relaxation) were studied. Additionally, a situation’s relevance as perceived by the

subjects (called subjective importance) was measured.
The results give some evidence as to the natural occurrence and functional
meaning of the three cognition classes; as to the relationship between
cognition-quantity and -quality; the relationship between thinking and feeling and
thinking and the subjective importance of a situation; the significance of social
episodes; and the influence on thinking and feeling of an event’s valence compared
to it’s expectedness.
The study was conducted as an introspective analysis: The subjects were asked to
think abut their thinking. Thus, their ‘cognitive reality’, their phenomenal
representation of various kinds of cognitive and affective experiences, was
analysed. Though introspective techniques have been criticized for several reasons
(Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), it is argued that it is the appropriate approach here
because the study deals with a person’s subjective experience and not with the
relationship between cognitions and actions. Situations were sampled within
subjects in order to establish sampling across time (Hogarth, 1981). Contrary to the
self probe methodology (Wong and Weiner, 1981), subjects did not give open
answers, but were trained to use the above defined categories to describe and
quantify their cognitions.

METHOD

Subjects
80 students (40 females and 40 males) from various faculties of the University of
Bielefeld (FRG) participated in the study voluntarily and without payment (age
range between 18 and 31 years).

Frocedure
At the beginning of each session the subject was carefully introduced to the
purpose of the study and his/her task of ‘thinking about thinking’. The
experimenter and the subject then went through an exercise example together. A
short description of a social episode was read. The subject was asked to illustrate it
by his/her own experience of a similar situation and to tell, what he/she had been
thinking about such a situation. There followed a free discussion in which subject
and experimenter tried to discover all the thoughts and considerations the subject
had experienced about this kind of episode.. The three categories of social
cognitions-together with the subdivision of self-directed versus other-directed
thinking-were then introduced and the previously recorded cognitions were
classified. Any difficulties in classification were discussed.
The subject then received a booklet containing the description of 12 situations
along with related questions. He/she was asked to imagine the situations as vividly
as possible from hisher own experience and to answer the questions which
followed.
Example: ‘In the university cafeteria you met a student whom you like quite well.
320 A . Abele

As several times before, you had a nice talk while drinking your coffee’
(leisure time, positive and expected event).
‘Please imagine such a situation. After having had the talk with your
fellow student, how much do you think about this situation and what do
you think about it?’
The experimenter stayed with the subject in order to assist with classificatory
problems. Each session lasted between 40 and 60 minutes. All subjects showed
great interest in their task.
The 12 situations contained dyadic interaction episodes of students’ everyday life
(talk with one’s boyfriend or girlfriend; discussion with one’s supervisor, etc.).

Design and measures

The design of the study consisted of two grouping and three trial factors:
The first trial factor was the social episode domain (work, leisure time, private
situations). Every episode domain was operationalized by 4 items.
The second trial factor was the event’s valence (positive or negative): The dyadic
interaction either had a positive course and outcome or a negative one (for example
interesting versus boring talk; mutual understanding versus misunderstanding; goal
attainment versus non-attainment).
The third trial factor was the event’s expectedness (expected or unexpected): It
pertained to the confirmation or disconfirmation of a preexisting expectation about
the interaction (for example expectation of an interesting or boring talk).
Every episode was systematically varied according to the postivenessl
negativeness and expectedness/unexpectedness of the event. There were thus 48
different descriptions.
The first grouping factor was the version of an episode item a subject received
(i.e. group A got item 1 of the work episodes as expected/positive, group B got it as
expected/negative, group C as unexpected/positive etc.). Each group had a
different random order of episode items.
The second grouping factor was the subject’s sex. The situational descriptions
were such, that in work- and leisure-time situations the interactants were of the
same sex, whereas in private situations, the interactants were of opposite sex.
There were 12 questions per situation (7-point rating scales each; 1 = very little,
7 = very much). ‘How much d o you think about this situation?’ was the social
cognitions quantity rating. Causal thinking was operationalized by: ‘I am reasoning
about why I behaved as I did’ (self-directed): or by ‘I am reasoning, why he (she)
behaved as he/she did’ (other-directed). Evaluative thinking was measured by ‘I am
reasoning about how I (-he or she-) experienced this situation’. The questions
on finalistic thinking were: ‘I am reasoning about what follows for me (-for him or
her-) from this situation’. Two questions pertained to the emotions experienced
within the situation (‘How did you feel in such a situation?’ good versus bad,
relaxed versus tense; this rating is also the manipulation check for the
positiveness/negativeness of the event). One rating concerned the subjective
importance of the situation (‘how important is such a situation for you’). The last
two ratings were the manipulation check for the event’s expectedness
 Thinking about thinking 321

(expectedness rating and rating of a respective situation’s frequency from the

subject’s own experience).

RESULTS

A MANOVA with the complete design and all measures revealed significant
effects for the trial factors, i.e. social episode, valence and expectedness of the
event, but not for the grouping factors, i.e. version and subject’s sex4.

Manipulation check
The manipulation check showed that subjects rated their feelings as much better in
positive ( M = 6.04) than in negative (M = 2.57) situations (F(1/79) = 1515.92;
p < 0.01). They also rated the event’s expectedness and frequency as higher when
the situation actually described an expected event (expectedness: M = 4.64,
frequency: M = 3.93) than when it described an unexpected one (expectedness:
M = 3.99, frequency: M = 3.44; F(1/79) = 42.09, p < 0.01; F(1/79) = 26.06,
p < 0.01).
There was a significant correlation of r = 0.62 between the expectedness and
the frequency ratings, i.e. expected events were rated as more frequent than
unexpected ones. Positive events were also rated as more frequent (M = 4.16) and
expected ( M = 4.59) than negative events (expectedness: M = 4.05,
F(1/79) = 18.26, p < 0.01; frequency: M = 3.20, F(1/79) = 49.40, p < 0.01).

Thinking and feeling about different social episodes

The social episode factor had, with one exception (feeling good), highly significant
effects at the univariate level, too (Table 1).
As the multiple comparisons of the row means in Table 1 show, private episodes
are characterized by the highest cognition quantity and also the highest amounts in
all cognition quality classes. They are rated as subjectively more important than the
other two types of episodes, Feelings within them are on average, however, not
better nor more relaxed in leisure time and work episodes. It seems, that private
episodes are not per se experienced as emotionally better. But they have a very high
subjective importance and instigate quite a lot of reasoning about them. As the
comparisons of the column means show, social cognitions about private episodes
are characterized by their other-directedness, i.e. higher amounts of other-directed
causal and evaluative thinking, and the same amount of other directed finalistic
thinking, when compared to self-directed cognitions (mean amount of cognitions
cbout the other person: M = 5.56, about oneself: M = 4 . 8 7 , < ~ 0.01).
Leisure time episodes are experienced as more relaxed than both work and
private episodes. Their rated cognition quantity, and rated importance, is similar to
work episodes (see multiple comparisons of the row means). With respect to the
cognition classes, leisure time episodes are characterized by high amounts of both

41n order to avoid alpha errors in a within-subjects design, the significance level was adjusted to 1
per cent for main effects and to 0.1 per cent for interactions.
 w
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b
a-
Table 1. Quantity and quality of cognitions, emotions and subjective importance depending on the social episode $!
Work Leisure time Private F-value
situations situations situations (2/158)
~~ ~~

Quantity of
cognitions 4.57”* 4.59a 5.60h 48.78, y<O.O1

Causal Self-directed 4.31ft 4.34; 4.797 9.62, p<O.01

Thin king Other-directed 4.732 4.95j 5.772 39.12, p<O.Ol
Quality of Evaluative Self-directed 4.573 4.922 5.34: 27.69, p<O.Ol
cognitions thinking Other-directed 3.42; 4.882 5.63:,, 125.86,p<0.01
Finalistic Self-directed 4.973 4.24p 5.465,, 42.09, p<O.Ol
thinking Other-directed 4.05; 4.017 5.308 43.71, p<O.Ol

Emotions Feeling good 4.27 4.34 4.31 <1

Feeling relaxed 3.94” 4.30h 3.96a 8.76, p<O.Ol

Subjective importance 5.00” 4.72= 5.83b 49.40, p<O.Ol

*Row means with different superscripts differ from each other at the 0.01 level (Tukey test),
?Column means with different subscripts differ from each other at the 0.01 level (r-test, pairs), (only cognition quality data).
 Thinking about thinking 323

self-, and other-directed evaluative thinking, along with high amounts of

other-directed causal thinking. There is an overall equal amount of self- and
other-directed cognitions (M = 4.53 versus M = 4.61, n.s.).
Work episodes are characterized by self-directed finalistic thinking. They
generally elicit more self- than other-directed cognitions (M = 4.61 versus
M = 4.06,< ~ 0.01).
The effect size’ of the episode factor is very high for all thinking ratings
(other-directed evaluative thinking: 51 per cent; cognition quantity: 28 per cent;
self- and other-directed finalistic thinking: 26 per cent; other-directed causal
thinking: 24 per cent; self-directed evaluative thinking: 18 per cent; self-directed
causal thinking: 6 per cent). As the multiple comparisons showed, these large
numbers are especially due to the difference between private episodes and the
other two.

Thinking and feeling about positive and negative events

As there were-with one exception (see below)-no interactions between the
social episode factor, the events’ valence and their expectedness factors, Table 2
shows the cell means for the valence factor averaged over the others.
The affective valence of the event did not influence evaluative thinking and
other-directed finalistic thinking about it. All the other ratings, however, were
influenced by this factor (see F-values in Table 2). There was generally more
thinking about negative than about positive events (omega’ = 21 per cent), more
causal thinking (0mega‘:self-directed = 45 per cent, other-directed = 29 per cent)
and slightly more self-directed finalistic thinking (omega2 = 4 per cent). The
subjects felt worse and less relaxed during negative than during positive events, and
they rated negative events as less important than positive ones. However, as a
significant interaction with the expectedness factor shows, this is only true for
expected events (F(1/79) = 16.42, p < 0.01); expected events: M = 5.72 versus
M = 4 . 2 7 , ~< 0.01; unexpected events: M = 5.25 versus M = 5.04, n.s.).
The columnwise comparison shows that thinking about positive events is
characterized by self-directed evaluative and finalistic thinking, and other-directed
causal thinking. Thinking about negative events is additionally characterized by
self-directed causal thinking.

Thinking and feeling about expected and unexpected events

Table 3 shows the results on the events’ expectedness factor. Expected events led to
generally less thinking about them (omega’ = 9 per cent) and to less causal
(omega2: self-directed = 8 per cent, other-directed = 11 per cent) and to less
evaluative thinking (omega’: self-directed = 13 per cent, other-directed = 4
per cent). The subjects reported better and more relaxed feelings during expected
than during unexpected events. The importance rating was not influenced by the
expectedness factor.
The columnwise comparison of expected and unexpected events shows that both
are characterized by the same cognition classes, i.e. self-directed evaluative and
’The effect sizes, omega square, were computed using formulas developed by Vaughan and Corballis
(1969).
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Table 2. Quantity and quality of cognitions, emotions and subjective importance depending on the event’s valence
Positive events Negative events F-value (1/79)

Quantity of
cognitions 4.62 5.22 23.60, pC0.01

Causal Self-directed 4.00,. 4.96, 66.28, pcO.01

thinking Other-directed 4.843.4 5.46, 33.70, p<O.Ol
Quality of Evaluative Self-directed 4.95, 4.9323 <1
cognitions thinking Other-directed 4.612, 4.68,,, <1
Finalistic Self-directed 4.773,4 5.013 4.48, pcO.05
thinking Other-directed 4.36, 4.55, 2.50, n.s.

Emotions Feeling good 6.05 2.57 15 15.92,p<0.01

Feeling relaxed 5.41 2.73 544.46,p<0.01

Subjective importance 5.48 4.88 29.21, p<O.O1

*Column means with different subscripts differ from each other at the 0.01 level (r-tests, pairs) (only cognition quality data).
Table 3. Quantity and quality of cognitions, emotions and subjective importance depending o n the event's expectedness

Expected events Unexpected events F-value (1/79)

Quantity of
cognitions 4.78 5.06 9.39, p<o.o1

Causal Self-directed 4.321, 4.63 1.2 8.34,p<0.01

thinking Other-directed 4.99, 5.32, 11.22,p<O.Ol
Quality of Evaluative Self-directed 4.762<3 5.123.4 13.49,p<0.01
cognitions thinking Other-directed 4.53 I ,Z 4-76I ,z 4.81,p<0.01
Finalistic Self-directed 4.85, 4.922.3 <1
thinking Other-directed 4.40, 4.501 <1

Emotions Feeling good 4.45 4.17 17.02,p<0.01

Feeling relaxed 4.23 3.91 12.52,p<0.01

Subjective importance 5.22 5.15 <1

*Column means with different subscripts differ from each other at the 0.01 level (I-test, pairs) (only cognition quality data).
326 A . Abele
Table 4. Cellwise correlations between the ratings divided by positive versus

Causal thinking Evaluative thinking

self-directed other-directed self-directed other-directed
+ - + - + - + -

Quantity of
cognitions 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.39

Causal thinking
self-directed 0.36 (0.23) 0.44 0.37 (0.26) (0.19)
Causal thinking
other-directed 0.36 0.34 0.51 0.43
Evaluative thinking
self-directed 0.44 0.39
Evaluative thinking
other-directed
Finalistic thinking
self-directed
Finalistic thinking
other-directed

Feeling good
Feeling relaxed

+ Positive envents; - Negative events.

‘Correlations in parentheses are not significant at the 0.01 level.
a,b correlations of the same variables for positive versus negative events having different
subscripts are significantly different from each other at the 0.01 Ievel.

finalistic thinking, and other-directed causal thinking. These classes are just more
intense when reasoning about unexpected events.

Correlations between the ratings

Table 4 gives the cellwise correlations between the ratings broken down by the
events’ valence factor6.
The amount of reasoning (cognition quality) is similarly related to all classes of
thinking. The correlations to self-directed thinking are slightly higher than the
correlations to other-directed thinking. There is a high correlation between the
amount of thinking about a situation and it’s subjective importance.
The correlations between the cognition classes are all positive, and again, are
higher for self-directed than for pther-directed thinking. The correlations between
self-directed and other-directed reasoning are always highest within the same
cognition class (causal thinking r = 0.33; evaluative thinking r = 0.41; finalistic
thinking r = 0.47). There are positive correlations between all cognition classes
and the situation’s rated importance. Contrary to the assumption that subjective
importance is especially related to causal thinking (cg Wong and Weiner, 1981),
it’s correlation to finalistic reasoning is substantially higher (situation’s importance

6There were n o substantial differences between the correlation matrices of the three social episode
domains, nor of expected versus unexpected events.
 Thinking about rhinking 327
negative events

Finalistic thinking Emotions Subjective

self-directed other-directed feeling good feeling relaxed importance
+ - + - + - + - + -

0.50 0.51 0.47 0.37 (0.23); -0.45, ( ~ 0 . 0 1 ) ~ -0.50, 0.42 0.59

0.35 0.38 (0.25) (0.21) (0.05), -0.34, (-0.06), -0.36, (0.22) 0.34

0.39 0.35 0.50 0.43 (0.21) (-0.23) (0.09),- -0.28, 0.29 0.38

0.41 0.32 (0.27) (0.21) 0.30 -0.28 (0.08), -0.31, 0.33 0.35

0.32 (0.19) 0.47 0.52 (0.21) (-0.17) (0.05), (-0.26)h 0.32 0.34

0.54 0.40 (0.26), -0.37, (-O.Ol), -0.39, 0.37 0.47

(0.17) (-0.22) (O.OO), -0.31, 0.37 0.42

0.5 1 0.55 0.41 -0.39

(0.26), -0.48,

with causal reasoning: self-directed r = 0.22, other-directed r = 0.29; with

finalistic reasoning r = 0.41, r = 0.38, respectively).
All the correlations mentioned until now d o not differ between positive and
negative events. However, the correlations of thinking and feeling in some cases
differ substantially between positive and negative events (see Table 4). With one
exception (self-directed evaluative thinking with feeling good r = 0.30), there is
no significant relationship between thinking and feeling with regard to positive
events. With regard to negative events, however, thinking and feeling are
negatively correlated. The more negative and tense one feels in a situation, the
more one is reasoning about it. Evaluative thinking is slightly less influenced by this
relationship than the other two cognition classes.

Subjective importance as a covariate

In order to test whether all these results remain constant when the subjective
importance rating of the situation is controlled as a covariate, the above data was
reanalysed in a multivariate analysis of covariance. Apart from minor adaptations
in cell means, the results remain constant.

DISCUSSION

Methodological considerations
The present study gives some evidence on the subjects’ cognitive reality in-more
or less-familiar everyday life situations. Some objections might, however, be
328 A . Abele

raised. First, one might object that a person’s ‘cognitive reality’ is not identical with
his/her actually emerging cognitions and feelings. Even if this were correct, a
person’s cognitive reality is interesting in it’s own right. Recently it has been shown
that people often regard reported cognitions and emotions as more diagnostic both
of themselves and of other people than their actual behaviour (Anderson and Ross,
1984). A second objection might concern the use of predefined cognition
categories. This type of approach is very much dependent on the careful instruction
of subjects. Once the subjects have understood the meaning of the categories, then,
phenomenally, it may be even more valid to let them classify their thoughts
themselves than t o have an outside observer do it afterwards. Further studies will,
however, try to replicate these findings with another method of investigation’.

Preconditions of reasoning about situations

The results concerned with reasoning about interpersonal situations, and the natural
occurrence of the above defined cognition classes can be summarized as follows.
Private episodes instigate more reasoning about them than work and leisure time
episodes, which do not differ from each other in this respect. All cognition classes
are rather high for private episodes, and there is a strong other-directedness in
thinking about them. Leisure time episodes are characterized by a high proportion
of evaluative thinking and an equal amount of self- and other-directedness in
reasoning. Work episodes elicit a relatively high amount of self-directed finalistic
thinking as well as generally more self- than other-directedness.
There is a high amount of reasoning about situations with negative and/or
unexpected events, and a relatively low amount of reasoning about situations with
positive and/or expected events. Reasoning about situations with positive events 1s
characterized by self-directed evaluative, self-directed finalistic, and other-directed
causal thinking. Reasoning about situations with negative events is additionally
characterized by self-directed causal cognitions.
The effects of the social episode-, the valence- and the expectedness factors on
reasoning about situations, are additive.
The correlational data shows that the subjective importance of a situation, and
the negative feelings elicited by it, are related to more thinking about this situation.
Whereas studies on the preconditions of causal attributions have shown that
negative valence and unexpectedness of an event instigate causal search, the
present data leads to the conclusion that the subjective importance of a situation,
negative valence and negative affective experience as well as expectancy
disconfirmation, are general instigators of reasoning processes, of which causal
reasoning is only one part.

Valence vesus expectedness as instigators of reasoning

It has been suggested that expectancy disconfirmation is the most powerful
instigator of causal attributions (Hastie, 1984). The present data leads to a different
conclusion: The valence effect sizes are on the average-and especially with

7Presently, a study is being carried out where subjects report their cognitive and affective experiences
immediately after having been in a subjectively very important situation.
 Thinking about thinking 329

respect to causal cognitions-larger than the expectedness effect sizes. Above that
thinking and feeling are substantially correlated if pertaining to negative events but
not if pertaining to positive events. This data demonstrates a directive function of
negative experiences. It seems to be necessary to spend some time reasoning about
negatively experienced events, whereas this need is weaker in the case of
unexpected events. However, negative events are rated as less expected (see
manipulation check), i.e. expectedness and valence are ecologically correlated and
cannot be varied independently.

The functional meaning of causal, evaluative and finalistic cognitions

This data can be interpreted as providing some clues as to the different functions
served by the three cognition classes. These functions are labelled ‘information
integration’, ‘action planning’, ‘controlling for negative feelings’ and
‘understanding’.
Self-directed evaluative thinking is interpreted as having an information
integration function: It serves as the basis for the application of existing schemata
(Wyer and Srull, 1980) and scripts (Abelson, 1981). In this way it aids the
integration of stored knowledge with new information. The results which reveal it’s
generally high amount, it’s variation with the event’s expectedness, it’s
independence from the event’s valence and from the subjects’ emotional state
support this interpretation. Other studies have shown that reassesments, which are
in a sense comparable to evaluative thinking, usually occur prior to causal
attributions (Mikula and Schlamberger, 1984; Wong and Weiner, 1981) and that
evaluations are carried out with higher speed than causal attributions (Smith,
1984). These results can be interpreted as meaning that the basic function of
evaluative thinking is it’s being a prerequisite for further reasoning about an event.
Other-directed evaluative thinking is interpreted as having an understanding
function. It is only intense when the other person is significant to one’s own
emotional needs and it is not related to the event’s affective meaning.
Self-directed finalistic thinking has the double function of action planning and
controlling negative feelings. It is strongly related to an event’s subjective
importance, as both the social episode and the correlational data show. It is
enhanced by the directive function of negative experiences (see valence effects and
correlational data). The generally higher amount of self-directed finalistic thinking,
reflects this double function. The lower amount of other-directed finalistic thinking,
on the other hand, reflects it’s hypothetical character with regard to the other
person.
Other-directed finalistic thinking is interpreted as having the function of
understanding. It is only intense when the other person is emotionally important for
oneself. It is not related to the event’s valence nor to one’s feelings within it.
Self-directed causal thinking has the double function of understanding and of
controlling negative feelings. It is ‘added’ to ‘ordinary’ reasoning when something
unexpected and especially something unpleasant has happened. The generally low
amount of self-directed causal thinking reflects the existence of well defined causal
schemata. It’s instigation by expectancy disconfirmation is an indication of it’s
understanding function when appropriate schemata are not availabie. Self-directed
causal thinking is strongly triggered by negative experiences and it correlated only
330 A. Abele

with the subjective importance of negative events. This data support the control
function for negative feelings (cf: Schwartz, 1984; Schwarz and Clore, 1983).
Other-directed causal thinking serves the function of action planning. It has the
highest intensity of all cognition classes and is significantly related to an event’s
subjective importance. It is the more pronounced, the more important the other’s
behaviour is for one’s own purposes and wellbeing.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by a grant from the University of Bielefeid

(OZ 84/2784) and from the DFG (A-B 45/1-1). P. Kolip, W. Thiel and G. Walter
helped in conducting the study. HeIpful comments on an earlier version of this
paper were given by W. Brehm.

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Cet article fournit des considCrations et des donnees preliminaires pour une thtorie des
cognitions sociales. On suggtre une taxonomie des cognitions sociales en trois classes de
raisonnement causal, evaluatif et finaliste. Celles-ci sont subdivisees selon la perspective
sociale adoptCe: le raisonnement est dirigt vers soi ou vers autrui. Les prtconditions
situationnelles de ces trois classes de cognitions sociales sont CtudiCes dans diffkrents
episodes sociaux avec des CvCnements positifs ou ntgatifs, attendus ou inattendus. Les
resultats montrent que le raisonnement concernant une situation est le plus abondant
lorsqu’il s’agit d’un Cpisode privC important avec un Cvtnement inattendu B valence
nkgative. Les donnees sur I’occurrence naturelle de ces trois classes de cognition sont
interpr6tCes comme donnant idte d e leur significantion fonctionnelle. Le raisonnement
causal, Cvaluatif et finaliste, dirigC vers soi et autrui sert, de faqon differente, les fonctions
d’intkgration de I’information, de planification de I’action, de contrble des sentiments
nCgatifs et de comprthension.
332 A . Abele

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Beitrag beschaftigt sich mit Uberlegungen und Daten zu einer Theorie sozialer
Kognitionen. Hierfur wird eine Taxonomie sozialer Kognitionen in drei Klassen,
evaluatives, kausales und finales Denken, vorgeschlagen. Diese Taxonomie kann
hinsichtlich der eingenommenen Perspektive, d.h. Denken in Bezug auf die eigene Person
bzw. Denken in Bezug auf den Interaktionspartner, weiter unterteilt werden. Die situativen
Auslosebedingungen dieser Kognitionsklassen werden in unterschiedlichen sozialen
Episoden, die jeweils ein positives oder negatives, ein erwartetes oder unerwartetes Ereignis
beinhalten, untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daB am meisten iiber eine Situation
nachgedacht wird, wenn es sich um ein subjektiv bedeutsames, unerwartetes und negativ
erlebtes privates Ereignis handelt. Die Ergebnisse zum Auftreten der drei Kognitionsklassen
lassen sich in Hinblick auf deren funktionale Bedeutung interpretieren: Diese Funktionen
werden als ‘Informations-Integration’ (evaluatives Denken in Bezug auf die eigene Person),
‘Handlungsplanung’ (finales Denken in Bezug auf die eigene und kausales Denken in Bezug
auf die andere Person), ‘Kontrolle negativer Gefiihle’ (kausales und finales Denken in
Bezug auf die eigene Person) und ‘Verstehen’ (finales und evaluatives Denken in Bezug auf
die andere Person, kausales Denken in Bezug auf die eigene Person) bezeichnet.