Professional Documents
Culture Documents
an uncertain
futureThe impacts of climate change on
food security and nutrition in the
Middle East and North Africa
48 Conclusions
50 References
Suggested citation: Jobbins, G., & Henley, G., 2015. Food in an uncertain future: the impacts of climate change on food security and
nutrition in the Middle East and North Africa. Overseas Development Institute, London / World Food Programme, Rome
This report sets out the risks to food security in the whole. This makes it considerably more difficult are likely to contribute to concerns over food safety, to climate shocks and stresses on food security
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) from climate to understand climate change from a regional particularly in conjunction with increased competition will require investment, mainstreaming climate
change, and how these vulnerabilities interact with perspective. over water. risk management and strengthening resilience
other key trends and sources of risk, including throughout the food system. This will include
population growth, urbanisation, and conflict. Climate extremes and climate change will act as a Poor consumers in rapidly growing urban areas are adaptation of food production, improving water
Focused on the year 2030, this report contributes risk multiplier for food insecurity in MENA. However, likely to be most vulnerable due to income insecurity and energy security, macroeconomic management
to a better understanding of how these trends and the main drivers of food insecurity to 2030 will be and poor access to safety nets and basic services. and reform of food subsidy systems, and reducing
risks may affect achievement of the Sustainable population growth, urbanisation, and economic Ensuring their food security will require broad pro- risks in food processing, storage, distribution, retail
Development Goals (SDGs) and Zero Hunger in changes. Economic change will drive employment poor development efforts including management of and consumption. Food security of households is
the MENA region. It highlights some particularly and income and people’s ability to purchase food. climate risk in the economy and employment, the interdependent with many other domains, ranging
vulnerable groups, and also options for reducing This resonates with the SDG’s and the post-2015 design of social safety nets, the maintenance of from income and employment to access to basic
climate risks to food security. Most studies in development agenda which recognizes that ending strategic food reserves, and improvements in food services and markets. Strengthening food security
the region have focused on climate risks to food hunger and achieving food security is dependent storage and supply systems. and reducing climate risks therefore requires
production. By contrast, this report emphasises the on a range of factors that often lay outside of integration and coordination across sectors and
importance of climate risks to other aspects of food traditional food security concerns. Rapid urbanisation Increasingly integrated systems of food storage, across stakeholders.
security, particularly people’s ability to purchase the will change patterns of what food people eat, and distribution and retail in the region are likely to
food that leads to a safe and healthy diet. how and where they get it. Population growth will offer significant opportunities for managing climate Investments in resilience and managing climate
increase demands on supply chains, infrastructure, risk. Adequate cold storage and refrigeration of risks to food security can also address existing and
MENA is highly vulnerable to climate change. By and public services. Understanding how climate food during heat extremes and managing risks underlying vulnerabilities and weaknesses in food
2030, people’s food security will be affected by more change and extremes intersect with these drivers at bottlenecks in exposed storage and transport systems and governance. By seizing the imperative
frequent, longer, and more intense heat extremes of vulnerability and food insecurity will be crucial infrastructure could all reduce vulnerabilities to the to adapt, the problem of climate change can be
and droughts. Beyond 2030, food security will be for making food systems more climate resilient and food security of large numbers of people. turned into an opportunity to reform and strengthen
increasingly affected by changes in long term climate better able to meet changing needs. food systems and food security. The findings and
change trends: higher temperatures, precipitation Climate change will likely have discernable impact timeline of this report, focused on the year 2030,
changes, and sea level rise. Climate variability is already a critical factor in on food security by 2030. However, this should not reinforces the need for urgent action and the
determining the livelihoods of many poor and divert attention from fundamental food security and importance of achieving the SDGs.
Climate change is certainly happening, yet vulnerable people in MENA. By 2030, the farming development objectives. Instead, mainstreaming
uncertainties remain over the direction and activities of food producers, particularly in remote climate risk management into food systems can help
magnitude of some changes. Some trends are clear. and marginal environments dependent on rain-fed address underlying vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and
Higher frequencies of more intense heat waves and agriculture, will be impacted by climate change risks from other sources. More attention is needed
higher average temperatures will be felt across the and extremes. Measures to help them cope with on how climate change and variability will affect the
region. More frequent and more intense droughts drought, to increase farming productivity, and to access, stability and utilisation dimensions of food
are expected to become the “new normal” in diversify away from farming will be key to improving security. These are less well understood than climate
parts of the region, notably the Maghreb. Other their resilience and food security. risks to food availability, but likely to be at least as
trends are less clear. Although higher temperatures important to ensure food security in the region.
imply greater aridity, precipitation may increase For non-producers, food security is more closely
or decrease in different parts of the region. Few linked to employment, developments in global Climate change presents risks to the whole food
assessments of climate change – such as those of markets, the national economy, and how well system, from production, through distribution
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change governments and food systems respond to shocks to consumption. These risks also need to be
– consider the Middle East and North Africa as a such as global food price volatility. Heat extremes understood in the broader regional context of
human and economic development. Adapting
4 Food in an uncertain future Food in an uncertain future 5
1
1. Introduction
Introduction
some of the most challenging settings in the world
Key points for policy makers for addressing food insecurity. MENA is the only
• Food security is an essential component of region outside of Sub-Saharan Africa where the
human development, and is interconnected number of undernourished people has increased
with all other human securities. People in the since the early 1990s, and is the only region where
Middle East and North Africa face shortfalls in the proportion of undernourished people has
water security, high rates of urban expansion increased (FAO 2015). The region1 includes some of
and population growth, varying success the world’s wealthiest countries and also some of
in economic growth and job creation, and the most fragile and least developed. This disparity
sustained pressures to food security at both creates sharp contrasts. 33 million people lack
household and national levels. Conflicts and access to adequate nutrition and 18% of children
refugee crises currently exacerbate these under the age of 5 are developmentally stunted, yet
challenges in several countries. obesity is also a growing public health problem
(FAO 2014; UNICEF 2013, quoted in Schellnhuber et
• Climate change will affect all aspects of food
al., 2014).
security. Despite this, research and policy
dialogue in the Middle East and North Africa
This picture of varied food security and wealth is set
has mostly focused on the impacts of climate
against a backdrop of other development challenges.
change on food production. This is a critical
There are high rates of urban and population growth
issue, but so are potential climate impacts on
in many countries, increasing demands for scarce
food prices, on non-agricultural livelihoods and
water, changing patterns of markets and provision
income, and on food safety. It is these risks
of government services, pressures to sustain
that will most directly affect the majority of
economic growth and create jobs, and political and
citizens by 2030, particularly the poorest and
security challenges. These - and other factors – all
most vulnerable inhabitants of towns
affect food security. Collectively they also pose both
and cities.
risks and opportunities for sustainable development
• By 2030, extreme heat events and droughts in MENA countries.
- already important drivers of food insecurity
and instability - will be more frequent and Climate change will make these challenges
intense across the region. Long term trends even harder to address. Climate risks expose
in temperature increases and precipitation existing weaknesses in food systems, and add
changes will be becoming noticeable, and will further complexity and uncertainty to decision-
intensify into the future. making. Departing from a broad food security and
development perspective, this paper therefore
• Climate change presents risks to the whole
summarises available evidence and knowledge
food system. However, climate change is just
about how a changing climate will affect food
one source of risk and stress to food security
security in MENA. Although most studies consider
and human development. Responding to
climate change in terms of the year 2100, this paper
climate risks is an opportunity to reform and
focuses on more policy relevant medium-term
strengthen food systems and food security,
time horizons of 2030 and 2050. This paper also
and contribute to human security, stability,
focuses less on food production and availability,
and longer term sustainable development in
and emphasises understudied climate risks to food
the Middle East and North Africa.
access, stability, and utilisation.
1
or the purpose of this report, MENA is defined as Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
F
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
MENA is exceptionally vulnerable to the impacts of The effects of climate change could lead to both
climate change (Schellnhuber et al., 2014). Warmer lower incomes and higher food prices: in turn these
temperatures, more frequent and more intense heat affect the economic access of people, particularly
extremes and droughts, and additional stresses poor people, to food. Risks to nutrition and the
on already scarce water resources will compound utilisation of food include infectious diseases and
existing human development challenges. Climate poor water quality. For example, diarrhoeal disease
change and extremes will also worsen existing is correlated with increased temperatures, and poor
natural (e.g. drought, land degradation, and crop water quality can result from droughts and floods.
disease) and human (e.g. conflict, socioeconomic Increased drought risk will also affect the stability
inequality, competition for water, inflation and food and prices of food supplies. Evidence shows that
price spikes) risks to food security (MET Office & safety nets and social protection systems in MENA
WFP, 2013). are challenged by food price shocks (Marcus et al.,
2011; Wheeler & von Braun, 2013 ).
Climate change will affect all four dimensions of
food security – the availability of food, and access With continued economic growth and development,
to, stability, and use of food supplies. Despite this MENA can make further progress against poverty
complexity, political dialogue and research in MENA and food insecurity. However, climate change is
has focused almost entirely on just one aspect of likely to mean that progress is more difficult to
the problem: climate impacts on agriculture and achieve. For example, the number of malnourished
food production. This is a serious issue, particularly children under five years of age in MENA was
for poor and small-scale food producers, but expected to fall from 3 million to 1 million between
the potential impacts of climate change on food 2000 and 2050. Instead, due to climate change, 2
Table 1: Climate change will affect different aspects of food security
prices, non-agricultural livelihoods and income, million malnourished children could remain by 2050
and food safety are also critical. Indeed, it is these (G. C. Nelson et al., 2009). Managing climate risk
impacts - not impacts on food production – that throughout the food system will be therefore an Food Security Dimension Potential Impacts
will most directly affect the majority of citizens by increasingly critical element for policy makers to • Reduced rainfall and increased evapotranspiration reducing yields from
Availability
2030, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable address if food security is to be achieved for all. rainfed agriculture and pastoralism
inhabitants in urban areas. • Reduced soil fertility and increased land degradation from increased
temperatures, evaporation, and drought
Climate change and climate extremes will affect • Climate change induced crop and livestock pests and diseases
directly food production and availability in the region Figure 1: Climate change will delay progress • Higher post-harvest losses as a result of climate change
(Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012; Abou-Hadid, 2014). in reducing the number of malnourished
Impacts will vary considerably across the region, children in MENA Access • Loss of agricultural income due to reduced yields and higher costs of
for different crops and production systems, and 3 production inputs such as water
with different scenarios of climate change. Recent • Climate change impacts on food production could lead to higher global
climate studies have projected that with temperature and local food prices
millions of children
increases of 3C by mid-century, yields of key cereals 2 • Difficulties in accessing food due to displacement driven by climate
could decline 20 to 55% in some parts of MENA extremes and disasters
unless agriculture is adapted to new conditions
(Schellnhuber et al., 2014; Selvaraju, 2013). The region 1 Stability • Greater instability of supply due to increased frequency and severity of
is increasingly dependent on food imports, and extreme events, including droughts
climate impacts on yields in source markets could • Instability of incomes from agriculture
0
also affect food availability in MENA. 2000 2050 2050 Utilisation • Impact on food safety due to increased temperatures
(baseline) without with climate
climate change change
• Impacts on nutrition resulting from reduced water quality and quantity
• Climate induced morbidity
in the Middle East and continue to rise this reliance will increase,
especially for the staple cereals that feature
prominently in the diets of the poor. While
utilisation and stability components (FAO 1996)
North Africa
domestic agriculture remains a vital part of determined by the level of production, stock
rural peoples’ livelihoods and food security, its levels and exchange. Availability of foraged
contribution to meeting national demand for foods may also be important in certain
food staples is shrinking. contexts. Weather, yields, soil conditions,
planting decisions, transport and storage
• Ensuring citizens› access to affordable and
infrastructure and a change in the trade regime
nutritious food on markets should be the
can all affect availability;
central focus of efforts to improve food
security, rather than solely stimulating
Access: Economic and physical access to
domestic agriculture for higher cereal
available food, mainly from the household
production. Within agriculture, the recent
perspective, is determined by overall
growth in vegetable and fruit production
household income, disposable income
offers promise for future diets, and deserves
for food, food prices, as well as gifts and
sustained support.
transfers. Within households culture can
• Malnutrition remains a major concern across determine preferences for certain foods
MENA. Poverty prevents many from affording
nutritious food and leads to under-nutrition. Utilisation: The way individuals are able to
But in addition, poor diets and changing consume food, which has a direct impact
lifestyles mean micro-nutrient deficiencies on nutritional status and is closely linked to
remain high and obesity is a growing problem. feeding practices, preparation and distribution
Improving the quality of diets is an important of food between household members. Health
challenge for all countries. factors also critically determine individual’s
• Food insecurity is worst in poor rural areas. ability to digest food.
However, because many people remain
poor when they move to urban areas, urban Stability: The maintenance of food security
food insecurity is an increasing problem. In through time – while an individual or
particular, attention is needed to make that household may temporarily be food-secure,
sure safety nets target the urban poor. outside shocks such as food price volatility,
unemployment or harvest failures may push
them into food insecurity. The birth or death
of a child or another family member may
also affect the stability of a household’s food
security.
The status of household food The drivers of malnutrition are complex. Levels
Table 3: Levels of stunting and underweight of stunting in under five-year olds - a key indicator
security and nutrition in under five-year olds in MENA countries (% for chronic malnutrition - show that malnourishment
of under five-year olds). is a concern across the region (Table 3). The
The nutritional challenges that households face
underlying factors driving patterns of malnutrition
differ starkly in different types of countries but Country Year of Stunting Underweight
sample (%) (%) are complex, and include poverty, weak access to
malnutrition remains a major challenge in much and areas
markets and services, detrimental nutrition practices
of the region.
Yemen 2011 46.6 35.5 and behaviours, and exposure to drought, conflict,
MENA faces five major nutrition challenges:
and political and economic instability. Malnutrition
undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, obesity, Sudan 2010 35.0 32.2
tends to be more prevalent where these factors
noncommunicable diseases, and foodborne diseases.
Egypt 2008 30.7 6.8 are present. However, even wealthy countries have
The mix of specific nutritional challenges varies
persistent nutritional challenges among vulnerable
between and within countries (Table 2). However,
Syrian Arab 2009 27.5 10.1 groups, which aggregate national statistics do not
across the region as a whole undernutrition, which
Republic fully capture.
results from inadequate calorie or protein intake,
remains the most important challenge. 33 million Iraq 2011 22.6 8.5
Micronutrient deficiencies are widespread. Across
people in the region suffer from undernutrition, and
Libya 2007 21.0 5.6 MENA, many household diets lack the essential
moderate undernutrition contributes to half the
micronutrients (iron, iodine, zinc, calcium, folic acid
region’s deaths of children under five (FAO 2015,
Lebanon 2004 16.5 4.2 and Vitamins A and D). This is worst in countries in
WHO 2011).
complex emergencies and for vulnerable groups
Algeria 2005 15.9 3.7
including women of childbearing age, pregnant and
Morocco 2011 14.9 3.1 breastfeeding mothers and children under the age
Table 2: Nutritional challenges across MENA of two. Micronutrient deficiencies are also high
West Bank 2010 10.9 3.7 in countries where food markets are more stable
Category and countries or region Description and Gaza and people are wealthier, because of the types of
Areas in long term complex emergencies. Severe child and maternal undernutrition and Saudi 2005 9.3 5.3 food households typically eat. A large share of the
widespread micronutrient deficiencies. Arabia dietary energy in many households comes from
unfortified wheat flour, refined sugar, milled rice
Areas with significant undernutrition e.g. Iraq, Particularly high levels of acute and chronic Jordan 2012 7.8 3.0 and soya bean oil which have a low micronutrient
Yemen, and some population subgroups in the child malnutrition, widespread micronutrient content (FAO, 2014). As a result, in many MENA
GCC, Iran, Palestine and Tunisia. deficiencies and emerging overweight obesity Iran 2011 6.8 4.1
countries micronutrient-related health problems such
and malnutrition of affluence in certain as anaemia are high, have not improved over recent
Kuwait 2012 4.3 2.2
socieoeconomic groups. decades (WHO, 2011) and are considered important
Areas in early nutrition transition (traditional diets Moderate levels of overweight and obesity, public health problems. These micronutrient
Source: UNICEF, WHO, World Bank. Joint Child Malnutrition deficiencies have economic consequences— vitamin
high in cereals and fibre) e.g. Egypt, Jordan, moderate levels of undernutrition in specific Dataset, 2014 revision.
Lebanon, Morocco and Palestine. populations and age groups and widespread and mineral deficiencies cost Morocco over US$173
micronutrient deficiency. million in GDP potential (World Bank, 2011).
Countries in advanced nutrition transition (diets High levels of overweight and obesity and Obesity is on the rise in many countries. Countries
with high sugar and fat content) e.g. Iran, Tunisia, moderate levels of under nutrition and where fat and sugar play a larger role in diets have
most GCC countries. micronutrient deficiencies in some population rising rates of overweight and obesity. This often
subgroups. takes place in countries that continue to have
moderate rates of undernutrition—creating a double
burden of malnutrition. Several countries already face
Source: WHO (2011). Note: Categories provide a guide and some countries fit into several because of different nutritional profiles among
this situation and the region has become a global
different groups in society.
obesity hotspot (IFPRI, World Food Programme, &
Photo, above: WFP/Diego Fernandez CAPMAS, 2013; Keats & Wiggins, 2014). A challenge
for MENA countries will be to shift diets of the
existing and growing middle class while subsidised
calorie-rich staples and other processed foods remain The geography of food insecurity
considerably cheaper than more healthy alternatives.
An important reason for optimism on nutrition is Poverty prevents many households from improving
that MENA countries produce a large and growing their nutrition and food security. Across countries,
quantity of fruit and vegetables, which are essential poor people are the most food insecure as they
to overcome the region’s nutritional challenges and have limited resources to buy available food and
improving diets (FAO 2015). At present, much of this face challenges accessing safety nets. Poor people
produce is destined for overseas markets and efforts are also most affected by food price spikes, and in
are needed to raise domestic consumption of fruit response often reduce overall food consumption, or
and vegetables through interventions across the food consume less nutritious foods (Compton et al. 2010).
system, including shifting subsidies towards nutrient- The 2007-08 food price spike had a major impact on
dense foods and public education campaigns poverty and food insecurity in the region: estimates
(FAO 2015). suggest around 2.6 more million people entered
into poverty and 4 million extra people became
undernourished following the crisis (FAO 2008 and
World Bank 2010, cited in Harrigan 2014). Households
Yemen’s protracted struggling to afford food also often cut back on other
essentials. For example, analysis by WFP suggested
nutritional crisis that between 2006-2008 almost half of poor Yemenis
cut back on healthcare spending (WFP 2008 cited in
The state of political instability and
World Bank, FAO and IFAD 2009).
economic downturn in Yemen since 2011 has
worsened its protracted food crisis. Although
Much of this poverty and food insecurity is
Yemen made some progress in reducing
concentrated in rural areas, although this may be Table 4: The poor are concentrated in rural areas (source: World Bank, 2009)
undernourishment in the early 2000s, the
changing. Most of the 33 million undernourished
2007-2008 food price crisis marked a turning
people across MENA live in rural areas, where Country Percent of urban Percent of rural Percent of poor in
point, and challenging conditions since have people who are poor people who are poor rural areas
poverty is also concentrated (FAO, 2014).2 Table 4
had impacts on food security. The number of
below shows this is the case for almost all countries. Yemen 21% 40% 84%
people with diets classified as ‘inadequate’
However, recent crises have underlined the large and
rose 41% from 2011-2013.Under-five stunting
growing numbers of food insecure people in urban Eygpt 10% 27% 78%
is highly prevalent— 47% of children are
areas, including newly-arrived displaced people and
stunted or chronically malnourished. Although Sudan 27% 85% 81%
refugee camps (IFPRI et al., 2013). As Table 4 shows,
the main social safety net, the Social Welfare
Jordan now has more poor people living in urban West Bank and Gaza 21% 55% 67%
Fund, has been expanded in recent years to
than in rural areas and this trend is likely to be seen
cover half of poor Yemenis, the political crisis Jordan 12% 19% 29%
elsewhere in the context of high out-migration from
has meant funds have only been disbursed to
rural areas.
beneficiaries intermittently in recent years. The Algeria 10% 15% 52%
continuation of the conflict raises concerns
Morocco 5% 15% 68%
over possible higher food prices and lower
household food stocks. Tunisia 2% 8% 75%
Sources: WFP (2008) cited in World Bank, FAO and IFAD (2009); Source: World Bank, FAO and IFAD (2009). Data for Iraq, Lebanon and Syria are not available
FEWS NET (2015)
Photo, above: WFP/Marco Frattini
1
Across MENA, around 75% of poor people live in rural areas (World Bank, FAO and IFAD 2009)
North Africa
in MENA will be emerging from this background
changes in precipitation and temperature may variation, with trends becoming stronger and clearer
lead to large changes in water evaporation, by 2050 and beyond. While temperature trends
runoff, and recharge in arid areas. across the region are clearer, there are considerable
• By 2030, climate extremes will be more uncertainties in projections over precipitation and
common and more intense. Heat extremes will drought patterns.
be significantly more frequent across the region,
with risks to human health and food safety. Average temperatures will increase steadily,
particularly during summer months.
• Widespread and severe droughts will be more
Results from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
common in the Mediterranean area by 2030,
Change’s (IPCC) 5th Assessment Report (AR5)
with impacts on food production and rural
suggest that by 2035 temperatures across the region
livelihoods, and the potential to exacerbate
will be higher than the period 1986-2005. Summer
other social, economic and political problems.
temperatures are likely to increase by 1C to 1.5C
By 2100 MENA is likely to be a global hotspot
across MENA, and may increase by up to 2C in parts
for drought.
of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Algeria. These trends
intensify into the future, with potential increases
of up to 3C across the region by 2065. Winter
MENA’s aridity and complicated geography makes temperatures are likely to warm less quickly, but
projecting the region’s future climate very difficult. 1C increases across the region can be expected by
Hyper-arid areas of the Sahara and Arabian Peninsula, 2030, possibly as high as 1.5C, with winter warming
and cooler, wetter mountainous areas of the Levant, more likely in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. By 2065
Iraq, North Africa and Yemen, lie next to semi-arid increases of 2C are likely across much of the region,
coastal plains. Rainfall is highly seasonal and falls potentially increasing to 3C away from the coasts,
mostly in the winter. Rain also varies from year to including inland areas of the Arabian Peninsula,
year and from place to place - higher in coastal and Iraq, Morocco, and Algeria (Van Oldenborgh et al.,
mountainous areas, much lower in the interiors 2013). These results correspond with findings of
(Eshel et al., 2000;(Cullen et al., 2002). These factors Turn Down the Heat 3 (TDTH3), which suggest that
make future changes in precipitation highly uncertain. temperatures across MENA are likely to increase by
There is much less uncertainty over average 2.2C by 2030, rising to 2.5C by 2040 (Schellnhuber et
temperatures, which will rise over coming decades. al., 2014).
In addition to long term changes in average Changes in precipitation are less clear, but some
conditions, extreme heat events will be more areas will probably become drier.
common and more intense by 2030. Some parts of The IPCC AR5 and TDTH3 both found little agreement
MENA will become more prone to drought, which is between models on the direction or magnitude
already the region’s most significant natural disaster of precipitation changes in MENA by 2035. Some
(Erian, 2011). models showed drying trends over Morocco and
parts of the Levant of up to 20%, and others showed
Figure 6: MENA in 2030, showing some likely consequences of climate change and population growth Droughts have become more dry days and soil moisture anomalies (Dai, 2011;
frequent and more intense. Seneviratne et al., 2012). However, the IPCC Fifth
Recent decades have seen increases in drought Assessment Report concluded that while the
Less snow each year means MENA’s fish catches at sea Baghdad now has more than frequency and severity in the region (Chbouki, Mediterranean area is likely to be become drier and
less water for farmers in have declined up to 9% 40 days of extreme heat each Stockton, & Myers, 1995; Donat et al., 2014; Touchan, experience more drought, the signals for West Asia
Morocco’s highlands, limiting since 20103. year6, with higher risks to
their ability to irrigate and human health, food safety,
Akkemik, Hughes, & Erkan, 2007; Touchan et al., and the Arabian Peninsula were inconclusive (Field et
adapt to new conditions. and energy supplies. 2008). Inland countries such as Jordan and Syria have al, 2014).
experienced warming and precipitation decline, with
droughts increasing in severity, extent and duration
(Al-Qinna, Hammouri, Obeidat, & Ahmad, 2011).
Tunisia Iraq
Lebanon Syria
Jordan Iran Between 2000 and 2010, 75% of the land area in
Arab countries was affected by drought for 2 years
Algeria Libya or more: 38% of the area was affected for three or
Morocco Egypt
more consecutive years (Erian, 2011). These events
Average summer
Saudi Arabia temperatures are up to 2C exposed 156 million people to moderate or high
warmer in parts of Iraq, Saudi levels of drought stress, most seriously in northeast
Sudan Arabia and Iran. Average
Yemen winter temperatures are up
Syria, southern Sudan, the northern areas of Tunisia,
to 1.5C warmer, increasing Algeria, Morocco, northeast Somalia, northeast Iraq,
agricultural water demand7. and the northeast of Saudi Arabia (Erian, 2011).
Drought is the ‘new normal’,
and Morocco, Algeria and The livelihoods of more than 80% of MENA’s rural
Tunisia are becoming global
drought hotspots2. population depend on drought sensitive pastoralism
Yemen has water supplies and rainfed agriculture, which also contribute half
of just 60m3 per person per
An additional 4 million people year8. Medium sized cities the region’s food production (Dixon, 2001). The
living in Khartoum9 demand like Ibb and Mukkalah have economic and food security impacts of drought
more food, place more stress doubled in size since 2010,
Wheat yields in Tunisia on infrastructure creating new demand for can be extremely serious, particularly for the poor,
are lower because higher and services, and create urban services. and exacerbate other social, economic and political
temperatures mean the new opportunities for
growing seasons is 10 markets and entrepreneurs. problems. Persistent drought in Morocco during the
days shorter1. early 1980s resulted in food riots and contributed to
a macroeconomic collapse (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014).
Low lying areas such as Drought in Syria between 2006 and 2010 affected 1.3
Alexandria and the Nile Delta The Levant and the North million people, accelerating rural migration to cities,
are beginning to witness sea African coast could be up to
level rise affect soil drainage 20% drier5. Water resources
and compounded other stresses and sources of
and salt water intrusion planning is more difficult tension (Schellnhuber et al., 2014).
of aquifers4. because of greater
variability and uncertainty
in predicting rainfall. By 2030 drought is likely to be more common and
more intense in parts of MENA, particularly the
Mediterranean area.
Climate change is likely to exacerbate aridity in the
region as temperatures increase. MENA countries,
particularly Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, are
1
ource: Mougou et al., 2011
S
expected to become global hotspots for drought over
2
Source: Schellnhuber et al., 2014 the next century (Schellnhuber et al., 2014). Several
3
Source: Schellnhuber et al., 2014 studies suggest that severe drought is expected to
4
Source: Hassaan & Abdrabo, 2013
5
Sources: Van Oldenborgh et al., 2013; Schellnhuber et al., 2014 be the “new normal” across the region as soon as
6
Source: Lelieveld 2013 2030, with droughts becoming more severe and
7
Sources: Van Oldenborgh et al., 2013; Schellnhuber et al., 2014
8
Calculated with data from Aquastat and from UN 2014. prolonged by 2065 with both more consecutive
9
Data from UN 2014, World Urbanization Prospects. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup2014/CD-ROM/Default.aspx.
The impacts of
for MENA. By 2030 increasingly frequent and
Key points for policy makers intense droughts and heat waves will affect food
• By 2030, higher temperatures will affect food production and food availability in the region. Climate
crop production, reducing yields of some change and extremes will also affect other aspects
climate change on
crops, increasing spoilage, and driving up of food security – access to, and the stability and
production costs. Droughts will have more safe utilisation of food supplies. The food security
widespread impacts on yields in affected of different social groups will be affected in different
years, and will exacerbate processes of ways, depending on their livelihood strategies
500
millions of people
400
300
200
100
0
1990 2010 2030 2050
Rural Urban
Data from UN 2014, World Urbanization Prospects. http://esa.
un.org/unpd/wup2014/CD-ROM/Default.aspx. Countries are
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, & Yemen.
Small-scale pastoralists are highly vulnerable to Gulliver, & Gibbon, 2001). These areas will be Rainfed agriculture is vulnerable to drought and term temperature increases on crop yields and
the impacts of drought, and have low capacity to exposed to higher temperatures by 2030, and land degradation, and water stress and drought water demand. Like farmers in rainfed areas who
adapt to climate change. some studies suggest they will also be exposed sensitivity is likely to increase over time. have adopted irrigation, these farmers have reduced
Around 9% of MENA’s agricultural population is to greater aridity and drought risk as early as the Farmers in mixed rainfed agriculture in the semi-arid sensitivity to the impacts of increased crop water
engaged in pastoralism in inland areas of Morocco, 2030s, with drought risk increasing into the future and sub-humid areas of Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, demand and short term drought. The adaptive
Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Syria. A further 14% (Dai, 2011). Pastoralists and dryland farmers are Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria, and northern Iraq make capacity of people in these systems is also generally
are engaged in mixed dryland farming, combining particularly sensitive to drought risk, and the health up 18% of MENA’s agricultural population in areas high as poverty is less extensive, and high population
livestock with barley, rainfed wheat, and fodder, and productivity of pastoralist herds may be more with high population densities. Most of these densities and high agricultural production have led to
in North Africa, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Dixon, affected by pests and disease (Selvaraju, 2013). Long areas are exposed to the same impacts as dryland good access to markets and services. Many farmers
term increases in temperature, aridity and water farmers, with temperature increases, increased in these systems cultivate cash crops, and their
demand are likely to further reduce crop yields and drought risk and aridity all challenging production. In incomes are largely determined by market conditions
Fisheries livestock production, and further degrade natural coastal areas, farmers are also exposed to risks of and significant contributions from off-farm income
resource bases. Poverty is extensive among small saltwater intrusion into aquifers, particularly in areas (Dixon et al., 2001).
Fisheries play an important role in the diets scale producers, and weak capital and assets and of high groundwater pumping such as Morocco
and livelihoods of some of the poorest difficulty in accessing services reduces the adaptive and Lebanon. Some studies have suggested that Individual farmers in these systems therefore have
members of society in certain MENA capacity of these livelihood groups. The vulnerability by 2050, large areas of these lands are likely to be relatively low sensitivity and high adaptive capacity.
countries. Production from marine capture of these systems is demonstrated by the 2006-10 unviable for rainfed agriculture (Evans, 2009). However, these traits depend on the continued
fisheries has increased significantly since drought in Syria’s Badia that saw livestock losses of performance of the irrigation network, over which
the 1960s, and in the last twenty years over 80% in some districts and millions of people In some areas traditionally dominated by rainfed individual farmers have little or no control. Over the
international trade and aquaculture have been migrating to urban areas (Erian, 2011). Due to their agriculture, state irrigation schemes and adoption medium- to long-term, large irrigation systems may
also made fish protein more widely available remoteness, yield losses in these areas can have of small-scale private irrigation have reduced the be vulnerable to hydrological and other impacts of
(Golzarand et al., 2012). dramatic impacts on local food availability and prices. sensitivity of some farmers to short-term drought climate change. Farmers in the Tigris-Euphrates, for
and allowed cultivation of higher water intensity example, may experience changes in seasonal water
Around 2% of MENA’s rural population are Farmers in remote highland systems are highly crops. However, in countries such as Morocco this availability due to changing patterns of snow melt in
artisanal fishers living in small communities, vulnerable to climate impacts because of extensive has contributed to declines in groundwater and river catchment areas and evaporation from water
mainly along the coasts of Yemen, Syria, poverty, remoteness, and marginal resources. increased water stress (Kuper et al., 2012). By 2030 reservoirs (Özdogan, 2011). Major adaptations and
Lebanon, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Highland communities in Yemen, northern Iraq, increased competition from other water uses may alterations to the extensive physical and institutional
Morocco. In general members of these Morocco, Algeria and Iran make up around 30% of restrict farmers’ access to irrigation water, particularly infrastructure for irrigation in the Nile and Euphrates
communities receive very limited social MENA’s agricultural population. This includes both during periods of intense drought. Sensitivity to would have very large transaction costs. If those
services, live in poverty, and are largely rainfed farming of cereals, legumes, and trees on drought and water stress could therefore increase costs were to deter policy makers from necessary
dependent on fisheries for their income and terraces, and sheep husbandry on communally despite adoption of irrigation, particularly for farmers adaptation investments, the risks to large numbers of
food security (IFAD, 2003; 2007). managed lands. Farmers in Morocco are most with insecure water rights. Yet, these farmers farmers would be very high.
likely to be exposed to drought and rapid rises in are likely to have higher adaptive capacity than
Effects of climate change, such as temperature by 2030. Reduced water from snow pastoralists and dryland and highland farmers. Climate risks compound the challenges and risks
temperature changes and ocean acidification, melt will also impact farmers in Morocco and Iraq. Poverty is more moderate and confined mainly to of food producing livelihoods, and can exacerbate
are likely to reduce marine capture fisheries Like dryland farmers and pastoralists, highland small-holder households, farmers have better access poverty.
production and slow the growth of aquaculture farmers are highly sensitive to drought and long to markets and services, and also benefit from more All these food producing livelihoods are vulnerable to
production. Marine capture production in term stresses on natural resources, particularly diverse off-farm incomes (Dixon et al., 2001). climate impacts, although some are more vulnerable
MENA is projected to decline up to 9% water in communities making use of snowmelt. Due than others. The poor are particularly at risk. For
by 2030, and total consumption of fish to temperature changes some crops may become Farmers in irrigated systems are less vulnerable, these groups climate impacts on yields and food
is projected to fall 2% despite increased viable at higher altitudes in the future, while other but over time they are likely to be affected by production directly translates into lost incomes,
trade and aquaculture production (World crops may pass out of production. Adaptive capacity hydrological changes and increased competition less ability to purchase and access food, and debt
Bank, 2013). These figures imply impacts in these areas is low due to extensive poverty, for water. accumulation and/or liquidation of assets to meet
on the incomes and livelihoods of rural degraded natural resources, weak infrastructure, and Large scale irrigated systems dominate only along short term needs. In turn, asset liquidation and
artisanal fishers, and reduced availability and poor access to government services and markets large river systems like the Nile and Euphrates debt accumulation means that producers have less
higher prices of fish protein for poor urban (Dixon et al., 2001). valleys, but they support a relatively large proportion to invest in adaptation and resilience, potentially
consumers. (17%) of MENA’s agricultural population. Farmers increasing their vulnerability to future climate impacts
in these areas are exposed to the impacts of long and other shocks and risks (Heltberg, Siegal &
Jorgensen, 2008). Conversely, management of climate agricultural adaptation or entirely new economic How will food
risks by farmers can include strategies that minimise strategies (such as migration), they are the most
variability but also keep average productivity – and likely to be caught in poverty traps (Dorward et al., consumers be affected?
therefore incomes - low (Lybbert et al., 2009). Climate 2009). The people in MENA most sensitive and fend off higher and more volatile food prices. This
With urban areas in MENA set to grow by 130
risks, and attempts to manage them, can therefore vulnerable to climate change may therefore be poor would result in food becoming more expensive for
million people between 2010 and 2030, food
both exacerbate rural poverty traps. people living in drought-exposed, remote marginal poor households.
security in towns and cities will become even more
areas with endemic poverty - especially highland
important. Although wealth tends to rise with greater
Poor people, living in areas remote from public systems, but also dryland and pastoral systems. At the same time, climate change impacts on the
urbanisation, economic growth often bypasses large
services and markets, and dependent on marginal economy and natural resource-based activities may
sections of urban populations. When coupled with
natural resource bases will be most vulnerable. threaten some livelihood activities underpinning food
poor infrastructure and limited access to services,
Lacking the assets or opportunities to invest in security. By 2030, climate sensitive sectors such as
malnutrition and food insecurity can be as intense,
if not worse, in cities than in rural areas (Tacoli et al., tourism, which generates significant employment
2013). in MENA countries such as Egypt and Morocco,
Table 5: Typical climate vulnerabilities of rural livelihood groups could start to experience significant challenges
Slow onset impacts of climate change could and disruption. This will affect those who directly
Exposure Sensitivity Adaptive capacity have a pronounced effect on incomes and urban or indirectly depend on these sectors for income
Pastoralists & - Heat extremes and - Highly sensitive to -P overty extensive among consumers’ access to food. (Lanquar, 2011). In the medium to long-term sea level
Dryland farmers temperature increases drought small producers Long-term climate changes and trends may act rise places low-lying coastal cities at risk. These areas
- Aridity and drought - Sensitive to land -P oor access to markets as a drag on economic growth and job creation have high concentrations of people and economic
degradation and services through mechanisms including higher mortality, activities.. By 2030, assuming a 30 centimetres sea
- Livestock pests and - Little off-farm income lower performance, and social unrest (Dell, Jones level rise, Alexandria Governorate could experience
disease and Olken 2009), limiting households’ ability to losses of 70,000 jobs if adaptation is inadequate (see
earn incomes and improve their purchasing power. Table 6).
Highland farmers - Heat extremes and - Highly sensitive to - Poverty extensive Reduced economic growth could make it more
temperature increases drought - Poor access to difficult for governments to manage food prices and
- Aridity and drought - Sensitive to degradation infrastructure, markets
- Changes in water of natural resources and services
availability due to snow - Changes in viable crops - Little off-farm income
melt Table 6: Sea level rise is projected to displace people and damage the economy in
Alexandria Governorate
Semi-arid farmers - Heat extremes and - Highly sensitive to -M
oderate poverty
temperature increases drought and aridity among small producers
Year 2000 (SLR=5cm) 2030 (SLR=30cm) 2050 (SLR=50cm)
- Aridity and drought - Lower drought -B
etter connections to
- Salt water intrusion sensitivity amongst markets and services - Area at risk (km2) 32 190 317
- Changes in patterns of irrigation adopters, but -O
ff-farm income more
- Population to be displaced 57 545 1,512
precipitation and water increasing in future significant
(Thousands of people)
availability
Heat extremes could impact incomes and food The incidence of diarrhoeal disease, a leading cause
access through reducing labour productivity and of death among children, is high in parts of MENA
affecting sensitive sectors. where warm weather, inadequate access to drinking
Temperature spikes will take an especially heavy toll water, poor sanitation, and poverty collide (Kolahi
on manual workers. The proportion of the workforce et al., 2010). A study in Beirut has projected climate
expected to be particularly affected between 2010 change driven increases of 16-28% in food- and
and 2030 by reduced productivity ranges between water-borne related morbidity by 2050 (El Fadel
10-20% in most MENA countries. For the countries et al., 2012). Across the region, diarrhoeal disease
of the Arabian Peninsula, the proportion is projected could increase between 6-15% by 2040 if health
to be higher—ranging from 15-40% (DARA 2012). infrastructure does not improve from its current
Tourism is likely to shift in seasonality, as visitors status (Kolstad & Johansson, 2010; (Schellnhuber et
avoid hot months, and is projected to decline around al., 2014).
8% across MENA by 2050 (Bigano et al., 2008).
Impacts of climate variability and extremes on
Heat extremes could have significant impacts on harvests and global food prices could make the
human health. food security of urban populations less stable.
By the 2030s, urban areas will face disruptive With food accounting for 60% of household spending
extreme events that threaten incomes, health and in the poorest countries (e.g. Yemen) and 35-45% of
food security. Heatwaves in particular are expected spending in middle-income countries (e.g. Algeria,
to become more common and more intense across Iraq), food price volatility has a large impact on the Food losses during transport and storage will Climate is not the only change:
the region. Heat extremes threaten health in several welfare of MENA’s population (Ianchovichina 2014). remain high and vulnerable to climatic events unless
ways. Most relevant to food security are the impacts infrastructure is well designed and maintained. intersections with other trends
of heat stress on human physiology. Exposure Global agricultural production is expected to continue Poorly constructed warehouses mean supplies
Climate change will be not the only – or even the most
to heat stress increases the risk of dehydration, rising, yet all regions can expect increasing risk of are at risk from flooding and disease. For food that
apparent - driver of food security in the Middle East
strokes and heart disease as the human body harvest failure due to climate shocks (Abou-Hadid, requires cooling, electricity systems are at risk
and North Africa in coming decades. Rapid population
has to work harder to maintain an average body 2014). Expected increases in population and incomes from load-shedding as well as storms, and water-
growth, urbanisation, economic, political and social
temperature (Parsons, 2009), and dehydration can combined with climate change mean prices for most cooled systems are vulnerable to drought. With food
transitions will all affect how and where people buy
affect metabolisation of food. Preventing heat stress food commodities are expected to rise by 2050 (G. storage and transportation systems already saddled
which food at what price. Climate change will interact
requires avoiding strenuous activity and drinking Nelson et al., 2010). This contrasts with the second with problems in many countries, climate change is
with these other drivers to affect food security.
enough water, but this is a challenge for people in half of the 20th Century, when food prices fell. While expected to present more challenges. Temperature
certain occupations and living conditions. Access to an increase in food prices is enough to threaten rises and more extreme weather events may lead
Conflicts and instability have recently become
household water and electrical power are particularly the food security for those struggling with current to more post-harvest losses, for example if higher
key drivers of food insecurity and vulnerability
important for staying cool (Parsons, 2009). Many costs, many more will feel the impact if food markets humidity of stored foods rises above safe levels
across the region.
households will struggle to afford these privately, become more volatile and countries are unable to and increases fungal or pest infection (Kitinoja,
In Yemen, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Sudan armed
and so access is unlikely without specific targeted increase trade to offset unpredictable price spikes 2011). Losses of perishable foods including fruit
conflict and physical insecurity are key factors
provision. brought on by climate shocks. and vegetables are already high, and more extreme
affecting the food security and climate vulnerability
temperatures could obstruct efforts to bring these
of affected populations. Along with drought, conflict
Heat extremes could also affect food safety and Imports critical to stability of local food markets down. This could limit potential export revenues
is a key driver of forced migration in the region: the
utilisation. may be further affected by climate change. but also impede strategies to raise domestic
Syrian conflict has resulted in more than 3.7 million
Extreme climate events may also present shocks to While it is not possible to forecast developments on consumption of fruit and vegetables needed to
refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt,
food safety, affecting utilisation. Under scenarios of international grain supply chains, rising sea levels improve diets. Countries that rely heavily on open
and more than 6 million internally displaced people.
prolonged heat extremes, unchilled foods will spoil and increasing extreme events including storms storage to store grain such as Egypt (USDA, 2014)
Many refugees have been absorbed by cities such as
more quickly; if electricity grids are strained, breaks and wave surges could potentially disrupt deliveries could experience higher losses of cereals.
Tripoli and Amman that already struggle to provide
in the cold chain may raise spoilage in chilled foods of supplies, for example if port infrastructure is basic services such as sufficient potable water.
too. Periods of high temperature also result in higher damaged (Tacoli et al., 2013). Such events would Refugee camps, in some cases are large enough
incidences of common forms of food poisoning, likely push up prices, and possibly make food to be considered new urban areas, can be highly
such as salmonellosis (Confalonieri et al., 2007) . temporarily more scarce. vulnerable to impacts from flash flooding and heat
waves.
Photo, top: WFP/Abeer Etefa
Population growth and urbanisation will be key million urban inhabitants – almost double the number Rapid urban growth across MENA will stress around 65% of Greater Cairo’s population lives in
forces acting on food security to 2030. in 2010 (all figures from UN, 2014). These people existing urban food systems, expose gaps in informal housing areas (World Bank, 2008). Many
MENA’s population is projected to grow by around will create huge additional demand for jobs, water, services and infrastructure, yet also provide new are classified as rural areas and have relatively poor
155 million people between 2010 and 2030. Almost food, and basic services. Their concentration in cities opportunities. penetration of social protection and food systems,
130 million additional people will be in the region’s implies urban centres become increasingly important The biggest cities, such as Cairo, Khartoum and such as state-subsidised bakeries, and low sanitation
towns and cities. Numbers of rural people will remain political priorities. Sana’a, will absorb the most people. Most of these coverage (see Box).
stable after 2030, but by 2050 there will be 500 cities have aged infrastructure, services that already
struggle to meet demand, and will require continued
investment in social protection and food systems Sanitation, informal
to meet rising needs. However, some of the fastest
Figure 8a: The fastest growing urban areas in MENA, 2010-2030, will be medium sized cities... growth will be in smaller cities and towns such as urban areas, and nutrition
Ibb and Nyala (Figure 8). Smaller towns have less Although officially reported rates of urban
1500 capacity in their administration, services, and markets, sanitation coverage are above 90% for all
Population in thousands of people
require different interventions than larger cities, and MENA countries other than Iraq, Morocco, and
can struggle to attract investment. However, rapid Palestine, there are differences between rural
1000 urbanisation and growth in population density may and urban supply in many countries (World Bank
also lead to improved market coordination, retail, and 2007, cited in Zawahri, Sowers, & Weinthal,
distribution of food that could reduce food prices for 2011). Rapid urbanisation means that some
500 the urban poor. areas classified as rural in official statistics are
actually new urban areas – either new rural
Changes in markets will drive changes in towns or informal areas in large cities. In Egypt,
0 food production and distribution which could for example, ‘villages’ of 10,000 people are
2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 marginalise the rural poor. considered rural, and around 65% of Greater
Ibb Al-Mukalla Ar-Rayyan Nyala As urban markets drive changes in coordination, retail
(Yemen) (Yemen) (Qatar) (Sudan) Cairo’s population live in informal areas (World
and the distribution of food, these could increase Bank 2008, cited in Zawahri et al., 2011). Studies
pressures on rural food producers. Lower prices in several countries indicate that actual rates of
and changed opportunities for direct retail might all coverage in informal urban areas are below those
contribute to pushing small-scale producers out of reported (Zawahri, Sowers, & Weinthal, 2011).
Figure 8b: ...but the large cities will absorb the most people. business or into further marginalisation.
The importance of water supply, sanitation
25000 Similarly, investments in commercial agriculture can and hygiene to nutritional security is widely
also marginalise the rural poor. Land tenure is insecure recognised in efforts to tackle child malnutrition.
Population in thousands of people
20000 in many areas of MENA, making rural populations In areas with poor WASH services, children
vulnerable to ‘land grabs’. There are similar issues with under the age of 5 are more likely to be
15000 customary water rights in many areas, particularly developmentally stunted. Episodic bouts of
where the rights of traditional water resource users diarrhoea and immune responses reducing
10000 are not recognised by state authorities mobilising the metabolisation of food in the gut due to
and allocating water for irrigation or other uses high environmental loads of faecal bacteria are
5000
(e.g.(Houdret, 2012). thought to be the key causes (Humphrey, 2009).
These conditions are more common in informal
Expanding informal areas may prove a specific urban areas due to poor penetration of WASH
0
2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 challenge to food security and social protection services and high population densities.
Cairo Baghdad Khartoum Sana’a systems. Much of the recent growth in MENA cities
(Egypt) (Iraq) (Sudan) (Yemen) has been in informal urban areas and settlements, As informal urban areas in MENA continue to
a trend that looks set to continue. Partly due to the grow the delivery of WASH services will be an
Data from UN 2014 unplanned nature of these areas, but also due to their important component of strengthening food
classification and zoning, these areas often have poor security.
access to services and infrastructure. For example,
Water security will become an even more critical Increasing agricultural water use efficiency will Urban populations will also be affected by water
issue affecting people in MENA in coming become even more important. security issues.
decades. Rapidly growing urban populations will place
Summary
MENA countries have some of the highest rates
The region is already the most water precarious of agricultural water use in the world: Egypt uses more demands on water supplies, and also on MENA is a rapidly changing region. Growing
region in the world, and more people means more 86% of its water in agriculture, Morocco, Sudan infrastructure for water treatment and distribution. populations and cities are driving changes in
demand and competition for water. Figure 9 shows and Yemen use more than 90%, and in many Shocks and stresses from climate change will food markets, the provision of basic services,
how population growth will reduce the average cases the demand for agricultural water is met by expose vulnerabilities in water management. Some demand and competition for water and land
amount of water per person in in some countries by unsustainable extraction (Rached & Brooks, 2010; economic activities may be impacted by reduced occupation, employment and economies.
2030 and 2050. Many of these figures are worryingly FAO 2014b). Increasing temperatures and drought water availability, with consequent impacts on These large-scale transitions raise questions
low. And yet as averages they disguise large risks due to climate change will increase agriculture’s productivity, income, and therefore food access. about the resilience and performance of food
variations in access to sufficient quantities of safe need for water. Additionally, unless farmers can meet Perhaps more significantly, physical water scarcity markets, the adequacy of social protection,
water by different groups in society. As competition higher crop water demands, any short- to medium- leads to use of lower quality water, which has the political imperative of urban food supply,
for water increases, the water security of poor and term benefits of CO2 fertilisation for food production consequences for hygiene and food safety (FAO and the ability of people and systems to adapt
marginalised people will be most at risk - a challenge will be lost (Elliott et al., 2014). Yet higher demand 2008b). to change. In this context climate risks are
of equity and politics rather than physical scarcity and competition for water will put more pressure on potentially serious, but are largely uncharted.
(Mason & Calow 2014). Water security will become the agricultural sector to reduce consumption. Agricultural land is under increasing pressure.
even more critical not just for food production, but As in other regions, average farm size in MENA
also for food utilisation. has declined since the 1960s due to population
growth and fragmentation resulting from inheritance
practices. Limited availability of water and fertile land
constrains opportunities for small rural producers to
Figure 9: Growing populations mean growing demand and competition for water
develop new cultivated areas. Rather than expanding,
agricultural lands are likely to come under increasing
1200
pressure from urbanisation. As an extreme example,
Annual renewable one study for Gharbaia Governorate in Egypt has
1000 water resources per projected that 29% of agricultural lands will be
capita, in cubic metres
lost due to urban sprawl between 2012 and 2030
800 (Hassanein et al., 2014). Increasing land productivity
could compensate for reduced plot sizes, and small
farms can be intensely productive and profitable,
600
particularly for horticulture. However, the obstacles
can be insurmountable for small farmers without
400 technical expertise and access to the necessary
finance.
200
0
Lebanon Morocco Sudan Egypt Syrian Tunisia Algeria Occupied Jordan Yemen
Arab Palestinian
Republic Territory
resilience and
and vulnerabilities from a wide ranges of of the food system – makes them a useful lens
sources, including global market risks, to explore weaknesses and blind spots in current
supply and distribution risks, and economic evidence and decision-making. As an example, this
and financial risks. Addressing risks in food paper contrasts the attention on climate risks to food
Strengthen food systems and Government policies can reduce the sensitivity
of food prices in local markets to volatility in
economic development for all international markets.
Maintaining food reserves and managing exchange
Climate change most threatens those who are
rates, tariffs and subsidies can all reduce the volatility
already food insecure.
of prices in food importing countries. In the past,
Rural and urban poor people unable to find, afford,
efforts by MENA countries to dampen transmission
or safely consume food predictably are already
of global food prices onto domestic markets have
living in risk, and are vulnerable to climate impacts
had mixed success (Ianchovichina, 2014). Between
on food systems. Those living in remote rural or
2006 and 2010, food prices in Egypt, Iraq, West Bank
informal urban areas under-serviced by markets and
and Gaza, and UAE responded quickly and strongly to
public services are particularly at risk. Reducing their
changes in global food markets, squeezing the urban
sensitivity to climate shocks on food systems is a
poor. Good macroeconomic management, providing
combination of:
government with enough resources to buy food on
international markets when prices are rising, may
- climate-proofing food logistics and supply chains;
become even more important in a context of climate
- reducing food prices volatility for consumers;
change and increased climate extremes.
- strengthening safety nets and access to basic
services; and
Social safety nets and the provision of basic
- building climate resilient economies that offer jobs
services should target the poorest, most food
and economic opportunities to the poor.
insecure and vulnerable people.
Managing climate risk requires a broader view of
People in remote rural areas and rapidly growing and Investments in the wider economy should Improve the yields, income, and
informal urban areas have the greatest challenges in consider climate risk and climate impacts on
risks to the food system, rather than a piecemeal
accessing safety nets and basic services. Addressing employment and income. choices of poor food producers
approach based on subsectors or supply chain Economic growth which provides a large number of
the needs of these communities is likely to require Adaptations in agriculture will be important for
links. unskilled and semi-skilled jobs is key to improving
both more resources and reforms in policies and maintaining productivity. While projected yield
Many risks can be managed by improving general the incomes and food security of poor people.
systems but are likely to provide benefits towards losses appear large, modern history suggests that
efficiency in supply chains. As food systems and Climate adaptation in the broader economy that
increased social stability. Food subsidy programmes countering these impacts is at least technically
supply chains in MENA countries develop, there protects jobs is therefore important to ensuring
in most MENA countries could be further enhanced possible – after all, the global production of grains
will be opportunities to improve efficiency, reducing the food security of employees and their families.
to better meet the needs and targeting of the poor. such as wheat, maize and rice almost tripled
both financial costs and post-harvest losses. There Managing the economy’s sectoral composition,
Options such as cash transfers and smart cards can between 1960 and 2010 (Godfray et al., 2010).
are different challenges to maintaining the food discouraging investments that lock-in increasing
strengthen access to food, help with targeting, both Adoption of new agricultural techniques, selecting
supply chains of different MENA countries – some vulnerability, and incentivising investments in
for expanding and contracting support, and smooth crop varieties for drought and heat tolerance,
countries have bottlenecks in ports, while others climate adaptation can all help manage climate risks
the impact of price shocks (Holmes & Bhuvanendra, and improving the management of agricultural
have inefficient inland transportation systems to the economy and employment. However, climate
2013). Here in particular, monitoring trends and water use are likely to benefit yields. Technologies
(Ianchovichina, 2014). Embedding climate risk risk management needs to be pro-poor, as some
using early warning or alert systems to allow promoting water efficiency, such as drip irrigation,
management throughout the food supply system climate adaptation options could have distributional
timely, effective and transparent decision making will be important but must be tailored to specific
could help reduce long term costs and increase impacts on poverty and food security. Adaptation
represents important elements of a strengthened hydrological and institutional contexts (see e.g.
efficiency, for example by minimising the impact that reduces or changes patterns of labour, either by
risk management system. Ensuring access to Jobbins et al., 2015).
of heat extremes on post-harvest losses in food replacing labour with capital assets or by changing
clean water and sanitation will be a key factor in
storage and distribution. Climate risk management the seasonality or timing of labour inputs, can all
the utilisation and safety of food as temperature Focus on comparative advantage in agriculture.
should also mitigate the potential for cascading reduce climate risk of a business or sector but
extremes and competition over water both increase, Maintaining and increasing yields in the face of
impacts, where risks to key bottlenecks in the food increase poverty and food insecurity.
particularly in urban areas. climate change will be technically possible. The real
supply system result in widespread consequences
– e.g. the impact of a flash flood on a major port or question is the extent to which modes of production
storage facility. will be financially feasible. By 2030 agriculture in
MENA will not meet all internal demands for food.
Nor should it aim to. Importing cereals, oilseeds, and
animal feed will be cheaper than local production. Improving access to markets, finance, goods,
Instead, farming can focus on high value perishable services, and technical knowledge will help small
produce for the rapidly growing cities and export to producers step up.
Europe during the winter. Pastoralism – a system Producers able to access credit, new crops and
traditionally adapted to drought – will remain an technologies, information, and markets are better
important source of animal products, but will able to invest and adapt to changing conditions.
increasingly rely on purchased animal feed and In many countries, long-term under-investment in
proactive drought management to manage climate agricultural extension means that the state may not
risks. be prepared to lead implementation in these areas.
Alternatives include non-governmental organisations
Small, poor producers in remote, marginal that work with farmers to test new technologies,
environments will be particularly vulnerable to establish reliable climate services for farmers and
climate change and extremes. other end-users, provide health care to livestock,
Food producing households have three broad types and offer credit, and commercial farms and private
of responses to climate risk and new economic sector organisations that support small producers in
opportunities (Dorward et al., 2009): accessing markets.
- Hang-in: maintaining existing activities to survive in Helping small producers step out requires
the face of difficult circumstances; measures to protect their rights and enable them
- Step up: investing in existing activities to increase to make the best decisions for their families.
returns, such as adopting new technologies and Policies and supporting measures should be in place
crop varieties, acquiring new land, and other to assist small producers who wish to step out of
adaptations; and agriculture. These measures should protect the
- Step out: where existing activities are used rights of small producers, and ensure that they are
to accumulate assets as a basis for investing able to maximise their assets in searching for new
in alternative, often non-agricultural or urban opportunities and transitioning to new livelihoods.
livelihoods. Ensuring rural populations have access to education
programmes, recognised and protected land rights,
The ability of producers to choose between these and to credit, services and markets will all assist with
three strategies depends on their assets, supportive stepping out.
policies, and access to markets, appropriate services,
and information. Improving women’s rights, land tenure and water
governance will strengthen resilience.
Reducing drought risk will be critical in assisting In many rural communities men have migrated to
small producers to hang in. Historically, drought find off-farm work. This has contributed to significant
management in MENA has been responsive, feminisation of agriculture in countries such as
focused on emergency measures. These crisis-driven Jordan, Libya, and Syria, but without necessarily
approaches have been criticised for being slow to changing the political or institutional power of
mobilise and for underwriting unsustainable practices women (Abdelali-Martini & Dey de Pryck, 2014).
(Karrou & El Mourid, 2008). Reducing drought risk Women farmers in MENA find it more difficult to
requires anticipatory approaches that protect critical access credit, state services, and land and water
productive assets and reduce the drought sensitivity management institutions, hindering the ability of
of livelihoods. Social protection mechanisms can female-headed households to hang-in, step up, or
support such anticipatory measures and limit asset step out. Improvements in gender inclusion, and
liquidation and debt accumulation during crises, improved recognition of land and water rights, are
particularly when combined with risk transfer likely to be key to strengthening the resilience and
programmes, such as crop insurance. adaptive capacity of rural communities in MENA.
5 8
Climate change presents risks to the whole food system, from production through distribution and to limate risks to the food security of poor rural
C Looking at food security through a
consumption. However, climate change should not divert attention from fundamental food security and producers can be reduced by helping them: climate change lens adds to the calls for
development objectives, and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Instead, mainstreaming a. cope with droughts through improved governments to improve risk management
climate risk management into food systems can help address underlying vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and programmes that anticipate and reduce in general. In particular risks related to food
risks from other sources. By seizing the imperative to adapt, the challenge of climate change can be an the impact of shocks and help affected import dependencies can be reduced to
opportunity to reform and strengthen food systems and food security, and also the human security, stability, people recover quickly; ensure food is accessible to poor people.
and longer term sustainable development of the region as a whole. b. increase farm productivity and income Enhancing social safety net infrastructure
despite increasing temperatures and must remain a priority to address the needs
water stress, by improving access to of the most food insecure people.
1 3
By 2030 climate change in MENA will be More attention is needed on climate risks to appropriate techniques and technology,
noticeable. Summer temperatures will be access, stability and utilisation dimensions and to markets, services, and financing;
9
1-2C warmer on average, and heat waves of food security. These are complex and less and Strengthening supply chains, including
will be more common and more intense. 156 well understood than risks to food production c. diversify away from agricultural supporting integrated systems of food
million people were affected by drought in and availability, but in MENA, are at least as production and adopt new livelihood storage, distribution and retail in MENA will
MENA between 2000 and 2010, and by 2030 important. Ensuring access to affordable and activities. offer significant opportunities for managing
severe droughts are likely to be more common nutritious food for all people should be at the climate risk and reducing post-harvest losses.
in the Mediterranean area, particularly in the centre of efforts to improve food security. Poor Ensuring cold storage and refrigeration of
6
Maghreb. farmers have a specific set of risks, as their ost people will not be directly affected by
M food during heat extremes and reducing
ability to purchase food depends on income climate risks to domestic agriculture. Their risks at bottlenecks in exposed storage and
from crop yields that may be affected by food security is much more closely linked transport infrastructure could all reduce
2
Already vulnerable and food insecure climate impacts. However, the food security of to systemic risks such as changes in global vulnerabilities to the food security of large
populations are a particular group of concern, an increasing majority of people is conditioned markets, and how well their governments numbers of people.
as they are likely to be more susceptible to by factors such as food prices, not the respond to shocks such as global food price
climate impacts. However, climate change is availability of food. volatility due to widespread harvest failure.
10
just one dimension of change that will affect Poor consumers in remote rural areas and Support is needed for action by a
people’s food security by 2030. Economic rapidly growing informal urban areas are broad range of stakeholders, including
4
change will drive employment, income, y 2030 farmers of some crops in certain
B likely to be most vulnerable, due to low governments, international organisations,
and people’s ability to purchase food. Rapid regions will see changes in temperatures and incomes and access to markets, and weak academia, civil society, and the private
urbanisation will change patterns of what precipitation affect crop yields. Droughts will provision of basic services. sector. Finance and political leadership is
food people eat, and how and where they have more frequent and widespread impacts. required for making specific investments
get it. Protracted crises, conflict, and the Those with fragile farming systems unable to and reforms, and also for long term
7
fragility of states may also drive migration cope with higher levels of risk will be most limate risks to the food security of poor
C strategic planning and ensuring cross-
and patterns of food insecurity. By 2030, affected. Small producers in remote areas food consumers, particularly those in informal sectoral coordination. Different sources
without reform of water management, higher of marginal lands – particularly uplands and urban areas and remote rural areas, can be of finance will be needed, including from
competition for water is likely to severely drylands – are most vulnerable to climate reduced by: the private sector and mechanisms for
affect poor people, with implications for their risks due to fragile natural resources, low a. addressing climate vulnerabilities in international climate adaptation finance.
food production and food safety. Climate incomes, limited access to markets and employment and income, such as The Sustainable Development Goals
change will interact with other these other government services, and the risk of being impacts on infrastructure and labour provide an important framework for these
transitions, resulting in changing patterns of caught in poverty traps. productivity; streams to come together and strengthen
vulnerability and food insecurity. b. increasing access of the poor to social the food security of the most vulnerable
protection systems resilient to food price and at risk populations in the MENA region.
volatility; and
c. improving food safety, including food
storage and provision of improved water
and sanitation.
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