Nama: Dwi Syahrani Taufiq

NIM: 2014091

Tingkat: 1C

The Contribution of Sociology to Psychology and Philosophy (1909)

Some misunderstanding has often arisen regarding the way in which we conceive the
relationship between sociology and psychology on the one hand, and between sociology and
philoso- phy on the other. The explanations given above will perhaps assist in dispelling some of
these misapprehensions.

Because we have been intent on distinguishing the individual from society we have
sometimes been reproached with wanting to set up a sociology which, indifferent to all that
relates to man, would confine itself to being the external history of institutions. The very purpose
we have assigned our work demonstrates how unjustified this reproach is. If we propose to study
religious phenomena, it is in the hope that the study will throw some light on the religious nature
of man, and the science of morals must finally end in explaining the moral conscience.

In a general manner we deem that the sociologist will not have completely accomplished
his mission so long as he has not penetrated the inmost depths of individuals, in order to relate to
their psycholo- gical condition the institutions of which he gives an account. To tell the truth -
and this is doubtless what gave rise to the misunderstanding to which we are referring - man is
less for us the point of departure than the point of arrival. We do not start by postulating a certain
conception of human nature, in order to deduce a sociology from it; it is rather the case that we
demand from sociology an increasing understanding of humanity. as the general traits of our
mentality, in the way they are studied by the psychologist, are by hypothesis common to men of
every age and land, they are likewise too abstract and indeterminate to be capable of explaining
any particular social form.

It is society which imparts to them that varying degree of determinateness that it requires
to sustain itself. It is society which informs our minds and wills, attuning them to the institutions
which express that society. Consequently it is with society that the sociologist must begin. But if
for this reason, as he embarks upon his investigation, he appears to distance himself from man, it
is because he intends to return to him and succeed in understanding him better. For in so far as
man is a product of society, it is through society that man can be explained. Thus far from
sociology, so conceived, being a stranger to psychology, it arrives itself at a psychology, but one
far more concrete and complex than that of the pure psychologists. Finally, history is for us only
a tool for analysing human nature.

Likewise, because for methodological reasons we have tried to remove sociology from
the tutelage of philosophy, which could only hinder it from growing into a positive science, we
have sometimes been suspected of a systematic hostility towards philo- sophy in general or, at
the very least, of having a more or less exclusive sympathy for a narrow empiricism in which -
not moreover unreasonably - was to be seen only a philosophy of minor consequence. This is to
impute to us an attitude that is scarcely sociological. For the sociologist must proceed from the
axiom that the questions which have been raised in the course of history can never cease to exist;
they can indeed be transformed but they cannot die out. Metaphysical problems, even the boldest
ones which have wracked the philosophers, must never be allowed to fall into oblivion, because
this is unacceptable. Yet it is likewise undoubtedly the case that they are called upon to take on
new forms. Precisely because of this we believe that sociology, more than any other science, can
contribute to this renewal.

Nowadays it is universally agreed that philosophy, unless it relies upon the positive
sciences, can only be a form of literature. On the other hand, as scientific studies break up and
become more specialised, it is increasingly evident that the philosopher's task is an impossible
one if he cannot embark upon his task of synthesis until he has mastered the encyclopedia of
human knowledge. Under such conditions, the philosopher has only one resort left.