2F Case Digests 2021 - Atty. Anicia Marquez 1

1. Civil Aeronautics Administration v.
Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70120. September 2, 1992
Nocon, J:
FACTS: Private respondent Valentin Abad, a civil service eligible, having passed the Patrolmen's Examination was
appointed as a security guard in the Civil Aeronautics Administration on July 1, 1968. Under the terms of the
appointment, the employment of Abad was only for a period of one month or up to July 31, 1968. However, Abad was
reinstated on November 18, 1968 as a Special Police Officer in the Civil Aeronautics Administration and his
appointment was up to 5months or December 31, 1968. In the year 1969, Abad was extended plantilla appointments
covering the months of January, February and March and July 1 to December 31, 1969. In January 1970, Abad was
again extended another appointment for one (1) month. Continuously from July 1, 1971 to December 31, 1971, Abad's
employment was under authority of a temporary appointment which was extended to him monthly until his services
were terminated on January 1, 1972. A case was then filed in the RTC. Petitioner claims that Valentin Abad was not
dismissed but that his temporary appointment merely lapsed. The RTC, ruled in favor of private respondent Abad,
and ordered the reinstatement of Abad by herein petitioner. Petitioner went to the IAC, but the IAC affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence this appeal. However, in as much as private respondent Valentin Abad has already died,
the decision sought to be reviewed with respect to the latter's reinstatement has become moot and academic. Hence,
the only matter left to be reviewed is the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement of Abad was proper, and therefore, his heirs are entitled to damages?
RULING: Yes, The court ruled that the civil service rules state that “Qualifications in an appropriate examination is
required for appointment to positions in the competitive or classified service, except as otherwise provided by the Civil
Service Law."
“Employees shall be selected on the basis of fitness, determined by the appointing authority, as well as on the basis
of merit as provided in this Act."
"Qualifications in an appropriate examination shall be required for appointment to positions, except as otherwise
provided in this Act; Provided, that all those who successfully pass the examination shall be equally qualified for such
appointment: Provided, further, that whenever there is a Civil service eligible actually available for appointment, no
person who is not such eligible shall be appointed even in a temporary capacity to any vacant position in the
competitive service in the government or in any government-owned or controlled corporation, except when the
immediate filing of the vacancy is urgently required in the public interest, or when the vacancy is not permanent, in
which cases temporary appointments of non-eligibles may be made in the absence of eligibles actually and
immediately available"
Moreover, the court defined the security of tenure of an employee which states that a non-eligible appointee
who has already more than five years of service to his credit, even though his appointment be of temporary
character, acquires a right to continue holding his position upon the fulfillment of the following three
conditions, namely, (1) he must have been given a qualifying examination within one year from said approval
of the law, (2) he either failed in said examination or failed or refused to take it, and (3) he could be replaced
only by one who has the requisite or appropriate civil service eligibility.
In the present case, the dismissal of Abad was undoubtedly malicious and arbitrary, since of the 27 employees in the
security unit of petitioner, only respondent and four others possessed appropriate civil service eligibilities. Yet, his
services were terminated on January 1, 1972, along with two other employees who did not possess appropriate civil
service eligibilities. Worst, the two others whose services were terminated along with respondent's, were reappointed
within the first quarter of 1972, while respondent was not. Therefore, the court maintained the decision of the RTC
and the IAC, and granted the amount of damages to the heirs of Valentin Abad.
2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 1

2. DELFIN N. DIVINAGRACIA, JR., AND ALEXIS D. SAN LUIS, petitioners, vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS,
RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., and PRESCILLA B. NACARIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 110954, May 31, 1995, BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
● In 1980 Filomena R. Mancita was appointed Municipal Development Coordinator (MDC) of Pili, Camarines
Sur, in a permanent capacity.
● In 1983 when the Local Government Code took effect, the office was renamed Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (MPDC). Mancita held over the position until 1985.
● On 1 January 1985 the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration approved the
reorganization plan and staffing pattern of the Municipality of Pili. In a letter, Mayor Anastacio M. Prila notified
Mancita that her services were being terminated effective at the close of office hours on 1 July 1985 on the
ground that the Office of MDC was abolished as a result of the reorganization of the local government of Pili.
● Private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario who was then the Municipal Budget Officer was appointed MPDC on
10 June 1985 to take effect on 1 July 1985.
● Nacario was replaced by Digna Isidro as Municipal Budget Officer. Isidro was succeeded a year later by
Eleanor Villarico who served until 1990.
● In 1988 the Local Government Officers Services, which included the local Budget Office, was nationalized and
placed under the Department of Budget and Management. As a result, the authority to appoint the Budget
Officers of the different local government units devolved upon the Secretary of the Budget.
● When Villarico resigned on 1 March 1990 the Budget Office became vacant until 30 September 1991, or for
more than a year, owing to the lack of a qualified candidate that the Secretary of the Budget could appoint.
● In the meantime, Juan Batan, the former Municipal Budget Officer of Baao, Camarines Sur, was appointed
Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Budget Office of Pili. He was later replaced by Francisco Deocareza, the
former Budget Officer of Naga City, in the same capacity.
● On 1 October 1991, petitioner Alexis D. San Luis, Cashier II of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), was temporarily appointed Municipal Budget Officer of Pili by Secretary Guillermo N.
Carague of the Department of Budget and Management.
● When control over the Local Government Officers Services was returned to the local government units by
virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160 as implemented by E.O. 503), San Luis was
reappointed to the same position on 22 June 1992, this time in a permanent capacity, by petitioner Delfin N.
Divinagracia, Mayor of Pili.
● San Luis started in the career civil service in 1977 as a casual clerk in the DENR, rising from the ranks until
he was appointed Cashier II based in Legaspi City, the position he was holding when appointed Municipal
Budget Officer of Pili.
Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) Decision
● Meanwhile, Mancita appealed her termination to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB). On June
1989 the MSPB declared her separation from the service illegal, holding that the Office of the Municipal

Development Coordinator was abolished by the Local Government Code of 1991 and not by the reorganization
of the Municipality of Pili as claimed by Mayor Prila.
RTC
● On 8 November 1990 private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court against CSC Chairperson Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas, Mayor Delfin N. Divinagracia, Jr., Elium Banda, Regional Director of CSC in Region 5, and Filomena
R. Mancita, praying for the annulment of CSC Resolution.
● Presiding Judge Ceferino P. Barcinas of Br. 31 issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of the questioned CSC resolution and set the date for the hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction.
Supreme Court
● The SC granted the petition and held that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case since all decisions,
orders and resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were subject to review only by this Court on certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner’s Contention
● Petitioners have come to us for relief praying that CSC Resolution be nullified for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Upon motion of petitioners, this Court issued a status quo ante order enjoining the
enforcement of the questioned CSC order.
● Petitioners contend that Sec. 13, Rule VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Revised Administrative
Code (E.O. 292) does not apply to the present case because the rule covers only appointments in a chain of
promotions and not where a public officer was merely transferred to another position of the same rank, grade
and level.
● Petitioners further contend that Nacario was deemed to have vacated her position as Budget Officer when
she accepted her appointment as MPDC considering that there were several appointments made to the
Budget Office in the past eight (8) years since her transfer.
Respondent’s Claim
● Private respondent claims that she did not voluntarily apply for transfer from the Budget Office to the Office of
MPDC but was constrained to "accept" the new position because of Mayor Prila.
● Nacario maintains that her "acceptance" of the position of MPDC which she admits is of the same rank, salary
grade and level was motivated by her respect for Mayor Prila who was then her superior.
● They submit that the term "chain of promotions" must not be interpreted in a literal, rigid and narrow sense but
must be construed liberally in favor of private respondent who merely accepted the position of MPDC to
accommodate her superior unaware that her new appointment thereto would be infirmed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner San Luis can hold on the positions of Municipal Budget Officer. (NO)
2. Whether respondent Nacario should be reinstated. (YES)

HELD:
1. NO.
Sec. 13 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 provides that —
Sec. 13. All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by the
Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion
of those in lower positions and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the affected persons
are entitled to the payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments.
Under the aforecited section, before a public official or employee can be automatically restored to her former position,
there must first be a series of promotions; second, all appointments are simultaneously submitted to the CSC for
approval; and third, the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position.
The essential requisites prescribed under Sec. 13 do not avail in the case at bench. To start with, the movement of
Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC cannot be considered a promotion for the term connotes an
increase in duties and responsibilities as well as a corresponding increase in salary. Conformably therewith, we find
the movement of Nacario one of lateral transfer.
A careful examination of the qualifications, powers and duties of a Budget Officer and an MPDC provided under Secs.
475 and 476 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shows that the latter office is not burdened with more duties and
responsibilities than the former.
Aside from the lack of a series of promotions, the other two (2) requisites are not also present, i.e., the appointments
of the parties concerned were not simultaneously submitted to the CSC for approval — the appointment (permanent)
of Nacario was approved by the CSC on 13 June 1985 while the appointment (permanent) of San Luis was approved
by the CSC on 9 February 1993 — and, the ouster of Nacario from the Office of MPDC was a result of the MSPB
decision directing the reinstatement of Mancita and not because the CSC disapproved her appointment as MPDC.
While the contemporaneous construction of Sec. 13 by the CSC is entitled to great weight and respect, this Court
shall depart from such interpretation when it is clearly erroneous or when there is no ambiguity in the rule, as in the
instant case, and yield to the letter of the law taking its terms in their plain, ordinary and popular meaning.
Transfer and Promotion distinguished
31
In Sta. Maria v. Lopez we distinguished between a transfer and a promotion and laid down the prerequisites of a
valid transfer thus —
A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level and salary,
without break in service." Promotion is the "advancement from one position to another with an increase
in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and is usually accompanied by an increase in
salary" . . . A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer
that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position," cannot be done without the
employees' consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent transfer can
take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed
to another position. (emphasis provided)
Clearly then, the unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was arbitrary
for it amounted to removal without cause hence, invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure.

When Nacario was extended a permanent appointment on 1 August 1980 and she assumed the position, she acquired
a legal, not merely an equitable, right to the position. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by statute,
but also by the Constitution and cannot be taken away from her either by removal, transfer or by revocation of
appointment, except for cause, and after prior notice.
The guarantee of security of tenure is an important object of the civil service system because it affords a faithful
employee permanence of employment, at least for the period prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear
of political and personal prejudicial reprisal.
Consequently, it could not be said that Nacario vacated her former position as Budget Officer or abdicated her right
to hold the office when she accepted the position of MPDC since, in contemplation of law, she could not be deemed
to have been separated from her former position or to have terminated her official relations therewith notwithstanding
that she was actually discharging the functions and exercising the powers of MPDC.
3. JOAQUIN M. TEOTICO vs. DEMOCRITO O. AGDA, SR., and HON. JUDGE IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,
Regional Trial Court, Branch No. 134, Makati, Metro Manila,
G.R. No. 87437, May 29, 1991
Facts: Honorable Cesar Lanuza, Administrator of the Fiber Dev’t Authority (FIDA) appointed Agda as Chief Fiber
Dev’t Officer of the FIDA, however, this appointment does not indicate any specific station or place of assignment.
Under Special Order No. 29, Lanuza designated Agda as "Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and
II." Subsequently, Special Order No. 219, temporarily re-assigned" Agda, at the main office of the Administrator
to perform special functions which may be assigned to him, and Mr. Epitacio Lanuza, Jr., Assistant Fiber Regional
Administrator, was designated Officer in Charge of FIDA Region I. The following month, Agda filed before the Civil
Service Commission, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, and the Commission on Audit an Urgent Petition
To Stop Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219, alleging therein that the Special Order is
(a) devoid of legal basis (b) against the interest of public service (c) improper, inappropriate and devoid of
moral justification, and (d) a violation of Civil Service rules and regulation
After such, another Special Order designated Wilfredo Seguritan, as Officer in Charge of FIDA Region I. On January
1988, Petitioner, Teotico, as Acting Administrator of FIDA issued a Memorandum to Agda directing him to
immediately submit his development programs for Region I and his proposals concerning sericulture and
maguey industry in the Region. However, Agda refused and returned the Memorandum to Teotico since Special
Order No. 219 had re-assigned him to FIDA Central Office where he now presently reports.
Thereafter, Seguritan, requested Teotico to require Agda to turn over to him (Seguritan) the keys of the vault
in FIDA Region I, Teotico referred the request to Agda. Agda then indorsed the routing slip request to the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture wherein he admits that he has the key of the safety vault, but
refused again to follow alleging that his petition to stop the implementation of Special Order No. 219 and to nullify it
is still unresolved and, besides, the intended re-assignment is merely temporary. He also asks that the urgent petition
be resolved.
Because of Agda’s several refusal to perform, Teotico charged Agda for insubordination and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service for his failure to comply with his memorandum and with the routing slip
request. Further, Teotico also placed Agda under preventive suspension in Pursuance to Section (sic) 41 and 42 of
P.D. 807.
Agda asked Teotico for an extension of twenty days to submit his answer to the formal charge; however, Teotico
granted him an extension of only five days from receipt thereof. Subsequently, Agda sent a letter to the Commission
on Elections, inquiring if Special Order No. 219, was referred and submitted to it for approval three days before its

implementation. The Commission informed Agda that Special Order was not yet submitted or referred to the
Commission for approval.
Agda then filed Civil Case No. 88-577, with his Amended Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction and
restraining order against Teotico and the three (3) members of the FIDA-AC alleging that Special Order No. 219 is:
1. null and void for having been issued in violation of Section 48 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree)
and Section 261(h) of BP 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
2. He further alleges therein that he "is filing" with the COMELEC criminal charges against Lanuza and
Teotico.
3. He prays that the court declare null and void and set aside Special Order No. 219, Teotico's Memoranda,
the Formal Charges, the preventive suspension, Special Orders.
JUDGE’S DECISION:
- Respondent Judge favored Agda and issued a restraining order directing respondents to refrain
from enforcing the Special Orders and memorandums of the amended petition.
- Respondent Judge granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction of Agda. According
to Respondent Judge, Agda was denied due process of law that despite the pendency of Special Order
219 before the Secretary of Agriculture, respondents still implemented the same which is tantamount to
denial of due process of law to Agda.
- Respondent Judge also issued the prayed Writ of Preliminary Preventive or Prohibitory Injunction
Teotico and his co-respondents below filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by the judge. Respondent Judge
also directed the respondents reinstate Agda from his previous position. Teotico and his co-respondents filed a motion
to reconsider however once again failed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered petitioners, to
reinstate respondent Agda to his previous position as Fiber Regional Administrator of FIDA Region I and
when he refused to dismiss respondent's petition in Civil Case No. 88-577 despite his finding that
respondent has already availed of an administrative remedy which is pending resolution by the Civil
Service Commission.
2. Whether or not Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of
preliminary injunction
RULING:
1. Yes, the respondent Judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case, in
failing to act on the motion to dismiss, in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, and in ordering the "reinstatement" of
Agda, "
Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator of FIDA Region I but as CHIEF FIBER DEVELOPMENT
OFFICER; he was not appointed to any specific station. He was merely designated as Acting Regional Administrator
For FIDA Regions I and II. Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be transferred or assigned to
any other place by the head of office.
Moreover, Special Order No. 29 which merely designated Agda as Acting Regional Administrator for Regions I and II
applies to the rule enunciated in Cuadra vs. Cordova with regard to temporary appointments or appointments in
an acting capacity. These appointments are terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Such is
applicable to Agda, therefore, he cannot claim a vested right to the station to which he was assigned nor to
security of tenure in such position.
Given such fact, Special Order No. 219 reassigning Agda is valid. Although denominated as "reassignment", it was in
fact a mere detail in that office.
The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and re-assignment. If the employee concerned believes
that there is no justification, he "may appeal his case to" the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by
the Commission, the decision to detail an employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the
Commission when he filed his Urgent Petition To Stay Implementation and Nullify the Special Order. However,

it does not appear that he exerted genuine and sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious resolutions. What appears to
be clear is that he used its pendency as an excuse for his refusal to comply with the memorandums of Teotico and
the routing slip request for the key to the safety vault.
In regard to Agda's claim that the questioned detail was done in violation of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code), the
evidence presented cannot be held as conclusive proof for the violation of the said law. All that Agda showed is his
alleged letter to the COMELEC to inquire if Special Order No. 219 had been referred to it and an alleged answer in
the same. That is not a conclusive proof that no prior authority was in fact obtained by Administrator Lanuza for the
reassignment or detail of Agda. No law requires the submission to the COMELEC of special orders reassigning or
detailing employees within the prohibited period. What is needed is "prior authority," the request for which and its
approval may be in separate documents or papers.
Moreover, Agda alleges in his amended petition that he is filing criminal charges for violations of B.P. 881 against
Lanuza and Teotico in the COMELEC however, none of his pleadings both before the lower court and before the court
disclose that he had filed such charges.
Furthermore, even in the cases of transfer or detail within the prohibited period prior to an election, an aggrieved party
is provided an appropriate administrative remedy under Section 6 of Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel
Actions and Policies which provides that:
Except when the exigencies of the service require, an official or employee of the government may not be ordered
detailed or reassigned during the three-month period before any local or national election, and if he believes that the
order for his detail or reassignment is due to harassment, coercion, intimidation, or other personal reasons, he may
appeal the order to the Commission.
In this case, Agda made no attempt to avail of this remedy. In his Urgent Petition against Special Order No. 219,
nothing is mentioned about a violation of the ban on transfer or detail.
REINSTATEMENT:
The court held respondent Judge clearly breached the limits of his discretion for nowhere in Agda’s amended
petition attacked the validity of the preventive suspension on any other ground than its being issued to
implement Special Order No. 219. Preventive suspension is allowed under Section 41 of P.D. No. 807 which allows
a disciplining authority to preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or
neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
would warrant his removal from the service.
However, per Section 42 of the same decree, if the administrative cases against the suspended officer or employee,
who is not a Presidential appointee, is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within ninety days after date of
suspension, he shall be automatically reinstated in the service provided that when the delay in the disposition of the
case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing
the period of suspension.
In the instant case, by Agda's own act and the cooperation of respondent Judge, the administrative case against Agda
is not yet even ready for hearing. He has not filed his Answer in the given time.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Given that agda has not yet fully exhausted the administrative remedies, Agda cannot be permitted to abandon it at
his chosen time and leisure and invoke the jurisdiction of regular courts.
In the said case, Respondent Judge, as clearly shown that he was fully aware of Agda's urgent petition before the
Civil Service Commission to suspend its implementation of Special Order No. 219 and to nullify the same. He had
should’ve already granted the motion to dismiss; however did not do so. He granted the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and issued the writ on 17 May 1988.

2. WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The writ was improvidently and capriciously issued. The issuance of the writ, although addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right which should be protected.
Considering that the amended petition should have been dismissed outright because Agda prematurely invoked the
jurisdiction of the court in view of his appeal to the Civil Service Commission, it follows that, even if he had a right, no
protection was available from the court below.
4. DR. EMILY M. MAROHOMBSAR, in her Official Capacity as President of the Mindanao State University,
petitioner V. COURT OF APPEALS and BILLANTE G. MARUHOM, respondents, G.R. No. 126481, February
18, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent Billante S. Guinar-Mahurom was appointed as Technical Assistant assigned to the Office of the
Chancellor of the Mindanao State University sometime in 1988. When the Salary Standardization Law (R.A. 6788)
was enacted, private respondent's position was converted into Executive Assistant II. However, since private
respondent at that time was not a Civil Service eligible, she was extended a temporary appointment duly noted by the
Board of Regents.
When private respondent passed the Civil Service career professional examinations, she was immediately extended
a permanent appointment by then MSU President Ahmad Alonto, Jr. on May 3, 1991. Private respondent continued
to hold the position and received the corresponding salary and other benefits from the MSU until she was summarily
terminated on February 28, 1993 when she received the letter of termination from petitioner Marohombsar after the
latter had assumed office as President of the University. The cause of termination was “in view of the urgent need to
establish a new order and maintain the trust and confidence reposed upon the Office of the President as demanded
by the standards of Public Service."
Private respondent thereafter sought a reconsideration of her termination but her request was denied, hence, she filed
a complaint for illegal termination before the Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil Service Commission. The Regional
Director found the complaint meritorious. It was noted that private respondent's position as Executive Assistant II is a
permanent position and is "covered by the Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure." And ordered private
respondent’s reinstatement.
Petitioner did not heed the order, instead wrote a letter of reconsideration, contending that the appointment of private
respondent was not valid for lack of confirmation by the Board of Regents before it was submitted to the Civil Service
Commission for attestation.
The Regional Director referred the case to respondent Commission, and which the latter resolved the case in favor of
the private respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order. Petitioner argued that
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not private respondent is an employee holding ad interim appointment.

2. If so, whether such appointment may be terminated at any time and for any cause.
RULING:
1. The SC ruled in the affirmative.

Petitioner correctly theorizes that private respondent's appointment was merely ad interim considering the
appointment was issued by the University President rather than the MSU Board of Regents prior to submission to the
Civil Service Commission for attestation. Petitioner, however, errs in concluding that an ad interim appointment is
invalid and ineffective, therefore, terminable at any time and for any cause.
The essence of ad interim appointments has been sufficiently discussed in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court: where the university's charter similarly vests the power of appointment in the Board of
Regents and the power to recommend in the President.
“the Court stated in said case that "it is an appointment done by the President of the Pamantasan in
the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University charter with the
power of appointment, is unable to act." In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the
Pamantasan President merely nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board
is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such appointments
are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the
appointee's term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position.
2. The SC ruled in the negative.
As mentioned in the PLM case - Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board
disapproves them. There is absolutely no showing that the Board of Regents disapproved private respondent's
appointment. On the contrary, private respondent assumed the position, discharged her duties and received the
corresponding salary and benefits without objection from the MSU Board of Regents from the date of her appointment
on May 3, 1991 or for a period of almost two (2) years until her dismissal effective February 28, 1993. It is worth
mentioning that the MSU Code of Governance provides that "(n)o payment of salary shall be effected unless approved
by the Board of Regents.
Considering that private respondent was paid her corresponding salary and benefits for almost two (2) years from her
appointment as Executive Assistant II up to her termination, the Board of Regents may be deemed to have tacitly
approved her appointment.
Based on the foregoing, private respondent holds an appointment under permanent status and thus enjoys security
of tenure as guaranteed by law. As an employee in the civil service and as a civil service eligible, private respondent
is entitled to the benefits, rights and privileges extended to those belonging to the service. Private respondent could
not be removed or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due
process as what happened in the present case. nescapable then is the conclusion that private respondent was illegally
dismissed when she was summarily terminated from the service by mere letter on the alleged ground of "urgent need
to establish a new order and maintain the trust and confidence reposed upon the Office of the President . . . ."
However, according to settled jurisprudence, an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries
limited only to a maximum period of five years and not full back salaries from her illegal termination up to her
reinstatement. (Petition Denied)
5. FERNANDEZ v STO. TOMAS, G.R. No. 116418, 7 March 1995

FACTS
● Salvador Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA")
● Anicia de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"),

● both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City
● During their service, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr.,
Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the CSC
● The Resolution was issued on 7 June 1994.
● Resolution No. 94-3710 among others provides that
○ Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides that ". . . as an independent constitutional body,
the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises;"
○ the Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in the organization to streamline its operations
and improve delivery of public service;
○ the Commission finds it necessary to immediately effect changes in the organization of the Central
Offices in view of the need to implement new programs in lieu of those functions which were transferred
to the Regional Offices;
○ the Commission hereby RESOLVES to effect the following changes in its organization, specifically in
the Central Offices:
○ 1. The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit] and OPR [Office of Personnel Relations] are merged to form the Research and
Development Office (RDO).
○ 3. The following functions and the personnel assigned to the unit performing said functions
are hereby transferred to HRDO:
■ a. Administration of the Honor and Awards program under OCSS;
■ b. Registration and Accreditation of Unions under OPR; and
■ c. Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on appointments under OPIA.
● In the general assembly of officers and employees of the Commission, Chairman Sto. Tomas, was apprised
of objections of Fernandez and De Lima. Nevertheless, Sto. Tomas expressed the determination of the
Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority.
● Fernandez and Sto. Tomas then instituted the present Petition
● The Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that they have
received Office Orders from the Commission which assigned Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and de
Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga
● They prayed that the public respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office Orders.
● The Court granted the Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioners.

● The Commission moved to lift the Temporary Restraining Order.
● The Office of the Solicitor General filed a separate Comment defending the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710
and urging dismissal of the Petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent
it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and
Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and
2. Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure.
RULING
1. CSC Had the authority to issue the Resolution
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure and organization of the Commission in the following terms:
xxx
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission — The Commission shall have the following offices:
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and
evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion and employee
incentive benefits and awards.
xxx
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the
effective conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of
delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional Offices and government
agencies in the implementation of their personnel programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and employees in the areas
of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and awards systems, position classification and
compensation, performance appraisal, employee welfare and benefits, discipline and other aspects of personnel
management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
● Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the Commission and their respective functions, the 1987
Revised Administrative Code goes on to provide as follows:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed
by a Director with at least one (1) Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as

are necessary to carry out their respective functions. As an independent constitutional
body, the Commission may effect chances in the organization as the need arises.
● the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well each of the other Offices
listed in Section 16 above, consist of aggregations of Divisions,
● each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections
● Each Section, Division and Office comprises a group of positions within the agency called the Civil Service
Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions.
● These functions are related to one another, each of them being embraced by a common or general subject
matter.
● Clearly, each Office is an internal department or organizational unit within the Commission and that
accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all the other Offices within the Commission constitute
administrative subdivisions of the CSC.
● Put a little differently, these offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.
What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do?
● the Commission re-arranged some of the administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the Commission and, among
other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research
and Development Office (RDO)."
● The same Resolution renamed some of the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for Human Resource
Development (OHRD) was renamed Human Resource Development Office (HRDO); the Office for Central
Personnel Records (OCPR) was renamed Management Information Office (MIO).
● The Commission also re-allocated certain functions moving some functions from one Office to another; e.g.,
the information technology function of OPM (Office of Planning and Management) was transferred to the newly
named Management Information Office (MIO).
● This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it the transfer of the budget earmarked for
such function to the Office where the function was transferred.
● Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to the carrying out of such
functions were moved to the Offices to where the functions were transferred.
● The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in that
Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the Commission's]
operations and improve delivery of service."
● These changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization
and devolution of the Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and

ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and
its staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees that they are mandated to serve.
● In the past, its functions had been centralized in the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila
and Civil Service employees all over the country were compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of
personnel transactions.
● Upon the other hand, the dispersal of the functions of the Commission to the Regional Offices and the Field
Offices attached to various governmental agencies throughout the country makes possible the implementation
of new programs of the Commission at its Central Office in Metropolitan Manila.
Commission's Office Order assigning de Lima to the CSC Regional Office No. 3
● precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing an application for retirement,
● generating a need to find a replacement for him.
● Petitioner de Lima was being assigned to that Regional Office while the incumbent Regional Director was still
there to facilitate her take over of the duties and functions of the incumbent Director.
● de Lima's prior experience as a labor lawyer was also a factor in her assignment to Regional Office No. 3
where public sector unions have been very active.
Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office No. 5
● had been necessitated by the fact that the then incumbent Director in Region V was under investigation and
needed to be transferred immediately to the Central Office.
● Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely designee for Director of Regional Office No. 5 considering
that the functions previously assigned to him had been substantially devolved to the Regional Offices such
that his reassignment to a Regional Office would result in the least disruption of the operations of the Central
Office.
It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite legitimate considerations of
administrative efficiency and convenience in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and
in assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in
Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in Region III in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
● changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-3710 — re-naming of existing Offices; re-
arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and Sections composing particular Offices; re-allocation of existing
functions (and related personnel; budget, etc.) among the re-arranged Offices — are precisely the kind of
internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code), quoted above, as "chances in the organization" of the Commission.
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices, something which may be done
only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first place.

● Court unable to accept the argument
● The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public.
● Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers
● It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried
with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public employment between the
Commission and any of its officers and employees.
● We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14)
different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as
it were, the internal organization of the commission until it might please Congress to change such internal
organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole
● To the contrary, the legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in
the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises."
● Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off
changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is
necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted.
● The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set
out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service
Commission as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a career service, adopt
measures to promote — efficiency — [and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel
functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and
agencies where such functions can be effectively performed.
2. Their right to Security of Tenure was not violated
● Petitioners argued that they were unlawfully removed from their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the
implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without their consent, be moved out to the
Regional Offices of the Commission.
● We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public
office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks.
● Thus, a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV
or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth.
● In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any
particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same position or
rank of Director IV of the Commission.

● the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the
Commission and, for that matter, in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil service:
Sec. 26. Personnel Actions. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known
as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, re-instatement,
re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with
such rules, standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency,
Provided, That such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and salary. (Emphasis supplied)
● It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions in OPIA
and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the
Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent assignment from the RDO to the Commission's
Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute
removals without lawful cause.
● It also follows that such re-assignment did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to
security of tenure considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the
same rank, status and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the
Commission in Metropolitan Manila.
● Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.
● the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively,
to the Research Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions Regional Offices in
Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right
to security of tenure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 27
September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.
6. ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO, 9 SCRA 619 (1963)

G.R. No. L-17169 November 30, 1963
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
● On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from the
customshouse which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange.

● Said commodities consisted of 1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by any
Central Bank release certificate
● On the same date, the company addressed an identical request to the Secretary of Finance who was also
the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank.
● Not content with this step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank,
urging, the same matter.
● When the Import-Export Committee of the Central Bank submitted to the Monetary Board a memorandum
on the joint petition for authority to withdraw the concentrates from the customs-house stating therein that it
sees no objection to the proposal, The Monetary Board failed to take up the matter for the reason that the
transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or foreign exchange.
● Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola Far
East Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to
secure from him the immediate release of the concentrates, but this official seeing perhaps that the
importation did not carry any release certificate from the Central Bank advised the counsel to try to secure
the necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over the case.
● However, the said Office, wrote a letter addressed to the Collector of Customs stating, that it could not take
action on the request as “the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar Import Office within the
contemplation of R.A. No. 1410.”
● Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been contacted by telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco
read to him the letter after which the Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of
said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, while still in doubt as to the propriety of the action suggested, finally
authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges,
fees and taxes.
● When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release of the concentrates in question
he immediately ordered their seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the warehouse.
● Whereupon, he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him with
having committed a grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
customs service.
● On the strength of this complaint President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to
investigate Ang-Angco. As a result, Collector Ang-Angco was suspended from office.
● On April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco was reinstated to his office by Secretary Hernandez, but the decision
on the administrative case against him remained pending until the death of President Magsaysay.
● Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered a decision on the case on
February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco “guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service”, and
considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of
Customs.
● Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action
taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him from office had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to
have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the
Civil Service Board of Appeals
ISSUE:
Whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to the
classified service
RULING:
NO.It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the procedure laid
down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been
deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.

The question then may be asked: Is the President empowered by any other law to remove officers and
employees in the classified civil service?
Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent portion of which we quote: “(b) To remove
officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For
disloyalty to the (United States) Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may
at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands)
Philippines.”
The phrase “conformably to law” is significant. It shows that the President does not have blanket authority to remove
any officer or employee of the government but that his power must still be subject to the law that may be passed by
the legislative body particularly with regard to the procedure, cause and finality of the removal of the persons who
may be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as above stated, we have such law which governs the action to be
taken against officers and employees in the classified civil service. This law is binding upon the President.
Section 79 (D) of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides: “Power to appoint and remove.—The
Department Head, upon the recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or office concerned, shall appoint all
subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly vested by law in the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as especially provided otherwise, in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.”
The phrase “in accordance with the Civil Service Law” is also significant. So we may say that even granting that, for
administrative purposes, the President of the Philippines is considered as the Department Head of the Civil Service
Commission, his power to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959, and we already know that with
regard to officers and employees who belong to the classified service the finality of the action is given either to the
Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
7. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND
ATTY. ELIAS V. PACETE
G.R. NO. 101207. OCTOBER 1, 1993
FACTS:
Atty. Pacete was a permanent appointee to the position of Division Chief of Region IX of the Commission of
Human Rights (CHR) since February 1, 1988.
On June 17, 1989, he filed an application for optional retirement pursuant to Rep. Act. No. 1616 because of his
failing eyesight. However, on July 7, 1989, Atty. Pacete sent his withdrawal of application for retirement. Subsequently,
the Chairman of the CHR accepted and approved his application for optional retirement thus appointing Atty. Roy
Rodrigo as his successor.
On August 25, 1989, the GSIS informed Atty. Pacete that his application for optional retirement cannot be
considered because he failed to meet the condition under Sec. 12 (c) of Rep. Act. No. 1616, requiring 3 years of
continuous service preceding retirement, thus the GSIS advised the CHR to allow Pacete to continue in the service
to complete the said requirement.
Subsequently, Atty. Pacete requested the CHR that he be reinstated to his former position with backwages and
allowances and to recall the appointment of atty. Rodrigo however, his request was denied by the CHR. Atty. Pacete

was also charged with incompetence, gross inefficiency in the performance of his official duty and failure to account
for public funds.
Upon being informed of the charges against him, Atty. Pacete elevated his case to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) and on August 31, 1990, the MSPB ordered the immediate reinstatement of Atty. Pacete to
his former position with payment of back wages and other benefits allowed by law without prejudice to the outcome
of the formal charges against him.
The CHR through its then Chairman Baustista, filed a motion for reconsideration but the board affirmed the
decision of the MSPB. The CHR then appealed the decision to the CSC but the commission affirmed the decision of
the MSPB.
The CHR also referred the matter to the office of the ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal charges
against him since they alleged that Atty. Pacete failed to settle his accountability as regional field officer.
ISSUE/S:
1. (1) WON the Civil Service Commission (CSC) erred in affirming the decision of the MSPB reinstating
Atty. Pacete.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of the civil service commission.
CHR argues that Atty. Pacete cannot be reinstated because under Section 12 (d) of Commonwealth Act No.
186, the employer concerned may request the retirement of an employee who, by reason of a disqualification, is
unable to perform satisfactorily and efficiently the duties of his position or some other position of the same grade or
class as that occupied by the employee and to which he could be assigned, however such request shall be submitted
to the civil service board of appeals only after the said employee had been notified in writing of the proposed
retirement. No employee shall be retired unless the civil service board of appeals has given him a hearing and found
him after examination that he is so disqualified. The decision of the civil service board of appeals as to whether or not
the said employee shall be retired under this sub-section shall be final and conclusive.
The above-mentioned provision allows an employer to request retirement of an employee who is unable to
perform satisfactorily and efficiently his duties, however, such request must be submitted to the civil service board of
appeals only after the employee has been notified of the proposed retirement. It also recognizes that the approval of
an employee’s optional retirement is at the discretion of the head of office.
The court finds that there was a glaring disregard of the procedure laid down in the law. In fact, the resolution
of the CHR denying Atty. Pacete of his reinstatement was reached without notice and hearing. Atty. Pacete was given
a copy of the resolution denying his application for reinstatement with the attendant charges against him, he was not
afforded the opportunity to refute them prior to the promulgation of the said resolution.
From the facts mentioned, the resolution denying the reinstatement was issued without conforming to the
requirements of due notice and hearing, therefore Atty. Pacete’s dismissal from service is illegal since it violated
section 46 of the administrative code of 1987 and section 36 of presidential decree no. 807 which provides that no
officer or employee in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except for causes provided by law and after
due process.
The court explained that such treatment is unfair and totally unexpected from a government agency whose
mission is to protect and promote human rights.

Therefore, the petition is denied. The decision of the Civil Service Commission is affirmed in toto.
8. PALMERA v. CSC, G.R. No. 110168, August 4, 1994, Cruz, J.
FACTS:
● Palmera started working in the government in 1953 and has held various positions in the Ministry of Public
Works.
● Upon the merger of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Public Highways, he was appointed
Assistant Regional Director of the NCR.
● 2 years after, DPWH Minister Mercado directed Palmera to turn over his office to Mendoza (who had been
assigned as OIC) and to report to the MPWH Central Office for his new assignment.
● Later, DPWH Secretary Jayme charged Palmera along with several others, with grave misconduct and
dishonesty in two administrative cases.
○ All respondents were placed under 90-day preventie suspension.
● Palmera was again charged with other respondents with grave misconduct and dishonesty by virtue of another
memorandum issued by then DPWH Secretary Ferrer.
○ He was again placed under preventive suspension.
● All the abovementioned administrative cases were based on results of an investigation of anomalies in the
flood control and related projects in Metro Manila.
○ Several complaints and informations were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and
Sandiganbayan for malversation, estaffa, falsification, and violations of R.A. No. 3019, and P.D. 1759.
● After the second preventive suspension was lifted, Palmera was no longer reinstated. Mendoza was later
appointed to his position.
○ Palmera argued that he was assured that he would be appointed to another position but no such
appointment occurred.
○ Further, DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services recommended that he be hired on contractual
basis for a period of time to provide a legal basis for payment of his salaries.
○ After such period, management would decide on whether or not to renew the contract. Palmera signed
the contract but it was never renewed.
● Palmera filed with CSC a letter-appeal for his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority
rights and also prayed for the nullification of Mendoza’s appointment.
○ DPWH commented that his acceptance of the contractual appointment is equivalent to a

relinquishment of his former position.
CSC:

● Found the contract of employment issued to Palmera to be violative of the Civil Service Law and Rules.
● However, dismissed the appeal on the ground of laches -- Palmera failed to contest the issuance of the
contract and his non-reinstatement within a reasonable period.
○ Palmera presented affidavit of a certain Dungca but such was rejected as hearsay.
ISSUE:
● WON Palmera’s acceptance of the contractual appointment was an indication of his relinquishment of his
position as ARD and foreclosed his right to contest his non-reinstatement.
HELD:
● NO.
● Palmera has the constitutional right of security of tenure. P.D. 807 specifically includes the position of Assistant
Regional Director in the Career Executive Service. Career service is characterized by:
○ 1) entrance based on merit and fitness determined by competitive examination based on highly
technical qualifications; 2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and 3) security of
tenure.
● Security of tenure means that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law and after due process.
● In the case at hand, Palmera had no intention to abandon his permanent position and his security of tenure.
He has been working in the government for 34 years and it cannot be reasonably supposed that by signing
the contract, he was relinquishing his permanent post and all his concomitant rights.
● Further, the memorandum which recommended the contract explains that the rationale behind it was to
provide legal basis for payment of Palmera’s salaries for the services rendered or during the period that he
has been reporting for duty.
● Palmera was made to understand that the contract was merely for formality to give some legal basis for his
compensation for 1987.
● In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to
indicate and absolute relinquishment.
● Further, the CSC held that the contract of service was null and void. Hence, it can have no force and effect
from the very beginning and cannot be validated by time or ratification.
● Laches will also not apply since Palmera’s inaction was due to his reliance on the assurances made to him
that he would be appointed to another position.
○ Laches in not concerned merely with the lapse of time. It deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.
In this case, there was no formal communication to Palmera that he had already been dismissed from
the service.
● Hence, Palmera should be immediately reinstated to this former position or appointed to another position of
equivalent rank and compensation.

● However, in view of the administrative cases pending, back salaries may not be paid at this time and until he
is absolved of all administrative and criminal charges against him.
9. NPC-DAMA v. NPC
NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National Power Corporation (NPC) – G.R. No.
156208, September 26, 2006, C.J. Panganiban
FACTS:
On June 8, 2001 , Republic Act No. 9136 or the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of2001” (EPIRA Law) was
approved and signed by President Macapagal -Arroyo. It provides a framework for the restructuring of the electric
power industry, specifically (1) the privatization of the assets of NPC, (2) the transition to the desired competitive
structure, and (3) the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities. Thus,
under such law, a new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was constituted.
On February 27, 2002, in pursuant of the EPIRA Law, the Energy Restructuring Steering Committee (Restructuring
Committee) was created by the Secretary of the Department of Energy to enact the first and second provisions stated
above.
On November 18, 2002, the Restructuring Committee proposed a guideline to the NPB which was modified and
passed by the latter through Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125. Said Resolutions provide that (1) all NPC
personnel shall be legally terminated on January31, 2003 and (2) the NPC personnel shall be entitled to separation
benefits.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction which assails the validity of the NPB Resolutions by maintaining that no
quorum existed during the NPB Resolutions meeting. Petitioners argue that of the seven persons present in the
meeting, only three are NPB members. The remaining four are merely representatives of other NPB members not
present in the said meeting thus, rendering the said Resolutions void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly enacted.
HELD:
The court held that the Resolutions were invalid because they lacked the necessary number of votes for their adoption.
The legislature is the one who vested the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running the affairs to the NPB.
Discretion means a power or right conferred to them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to
the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
In case at bar, the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the secretaries
themselves who exercised judgement in passing the assailed Resolution.
The court held that the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their
power to vote and approve board resolutions because it is their personal judgment that must be exercised in the
fulfillment of such responsibility.

Hence, the Resolutions declared void.
10. CSC v. PILILLIA, G.R. NO. 190147, MARCH 5, 2013
FACTS:
Paulino J. Rafanan was first appointed General Manager on a coterminous status under Resolution No. 12 issued
on August 7, 1998 by the Pililia WD Board of Directors (BOD). His appointment was signed by the BOD Acting
Chairman and attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal. When GM Rafanan is about to reach 65 years old, , the BOD
passed Resolution No. 19, S. 2004. In the said Resolution, the Board unanimously agreed to retain his services as
General Manager at least up to December 31, 2008 co-terminus with the term of the Director last appointed after
which period he may stay at the pleasure of the other Board.
The CSC denied the extension of service and considered the latter "separated from the service at the close of office
hours on June 25, 2004, his 65th birthday." Petitioner also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Chairman
Paz under its Resolution No. 05-0118 dated February 1, 2005. On April 8, 2005, the BOD issued Resolution No. 09,
Series of 2005 reappointing Rafanan as General Manager on coterminous status. Said reappointment was signed by
Chairman Paz and attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal. A year later, the BOD approved Resolution No. 20 declaring
the appointment of General Manager Rafanan as permanent but this resolution was not implemented.
In a letter dated November 19, 2007, Pililla Mayor Leandro V. Masikip, Sr. questioned Rafanan’s coterminous
appointment as defective and void ab initio considering that he was appointed to a career position despite having
reached the compulsory retirement age. Said letter- complaint was treated as an appeal from the appointment made
by the BOD Chairman of respondent. On May 19, 2008, petitioner issued Resolution No. 080942 invalidating the
coterminous appointment issued to Rafanan as General Manager on April 8, 2005 on the ground that it was made in
violation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9286. Petitioner further observed that the appointment was issued to circumvent the
denial of the several requests for extension of service of Rafanan. Rafanan filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by petitioner under its Resolution No. 081846 dated September 26, 2008.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the position of GM is primarily confidential in nature.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it ruled that the position of general manager of a local water
district is primarily confidential in nature.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it ruled that the April 8, 2005 appointment of Rafanan in a
co-terminous capacity was valid.
RULING:
In holding that the position of General Manager of a water district is primarily confidential in nature, the CA
said:
x x x we rule that the position of general manager remains primarily confidential in nature despite the
amendment of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 by R.A. No. 9286, which gave the occupant of said position
security of tenure, in that said officer could only be removed from office for cause and after due process. The
nature of the duties and functions attached to the position points to its confidential character. First, the
general manager is directly appointed by the board of directors. Second, the general manager directly reports
to the board of directors. Third, the duties and responsibilities of a general manager are determined by the

board of directors, which is a clear indication of a closely intimate relationship that exists between him and
the board. Fourth, the duties and responsibilities of a general manager are not merely clerical and routinary
in nature. His work involves policy and decision making. Fifth, the compensation of the general manager is
fixed by the board of directors. And last, the general manager is directly accountable for his actions and
omissions to the board of directors. Under this situation, the general manager is expected to possess the
highest degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty, which is crucial to maintaining trust and confidence between
him and the board of directors. The loss of such trust or confidence could easily result in the termination of
the general manager’s services by the board of directors. To be sure, regardless of the security of tenure a
general manager may now enjoy, his term may still be ended by the board of directors based on the ground
of "loss of confidence." (Emphasis in the original)
We sustain the ruling of the CA.
We stress that a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of the appointer
and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship. The tenure of a
confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure. However, the
confidential employee may be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65
years.
In the case of the General Manager of a water district, Section 24 in relation to Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as
amended, reveals the close proximity of the positions of the General Manager and BOD.
SEC. 24. Duties.–The duties of the General Manager and other officers shall be determined and specified from time
to time by the Board. The General Manager, who shall not be a director, shall have full supervision and control of the
maintenance and operation of water district facilities, with power and authority to appoint all personnel of the district:
Provided, That the appointment of personnel in the supervisory level shall be subject to approval by the Board. (As
amended by Sec.10, PD 768) (Emphasis supplied)
X x x And while the BOD may not engage in the detailed management of the water district, it is empowered to delegate
to such officers or agents designated by it any executive, administrative or ministerial power, including entering into
contracts under conditions and restrictions it may impose. Moreover, though the General Manager is vested with the
power to appoint all personnel of the water district, the appointment of personnel in the supervisory level shall be
subject to the approval of the BOD. It is likewise evident that the General Manager is directly accountable to the BOD
which has disciplinary jurisdiction over him. The foregoing working relationship of the General Manager and BOD
under the governing law of water districts clearly demands a high degree of trust and confidence between them. The
CA therefore correctly concluded that the position of General Manager is primarily confidential in nature.
On the basis of the foregoing, the logical conclusion is that the General Manager of a water district who is appointed
on coterminous status may serve or hold office for a maximum of six years, which is the tenure of the appointing
authority, subject to reappointment for another six years unless sooner removed by the BOD for loss of trust and
confidence, or for any cause provided by law and with due process.
In fine, since the position of General Manager of a water district remains a primarily confidential position,
Rafanan was validly reappointed to said position by respondent's BOD on April 8, 2005 under coterminous
status despite having reached the compulsory retirement age, which is allowed under Section 12 (b), Rule XIII of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as amended by Resolution No. 011624 dated October 4, 2001.
11. Remolona v. CSC, G.R. No. 137473, Aug 2, 2001

FACTS:

Estelito Remolona (petitioner) is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon, while his wife Nery is a teacher in Kiborosa
Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, District Supervisor of DECS Infanta, Quezon inquired
about Mrs. Remolona’s Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also disclosed that
he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for a fee of P8,000 per examinee for a passing mark
in the board examination for teachers. During the preliminary investigation, only Estelito appeared and signed a written
statement of facts, stating that sometime in September 1990, he met a certain Atty. Salupadin who represented himself
as working at the Batasan and offered to help for a fee of P3,000 regarding acquiring eligibility for his wife; that in the
following days they met at the Batasan in which Remolona gave the amount as well as the requirements, in which
Atty. Salupadin in turn handed to him the Report of Rating with a passing grade; and that Mr. America asked for
money in exchanged for his wife’s appointment and was able to get 6 checks at P2,600 each plus bonus of Nery.
Remolona admitted that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On
recommendation of Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and
imposed a penalty of dismissal. On motion for reconsideration, only Mrs. Remolona was exonerated and reinstated.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.
ISSUE:
whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense which is not work-
related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty
RULING:
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty,
in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged.
The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.
The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well,
because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty
against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed;
and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his
grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and
actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on
the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer
or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the
government. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
12. RTC MAKATI MOVEMENT AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION, vs. ATTY. INOCENCIO E. DUMLAO,
Acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court Valenzuela, Metro Manila
SUSAN QUINTO, vs. ATTY. INOCENCIO E. DUMLAO, Acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila
FACTS:
1. In a letter-complaint, addressed to this Court, Respondent Atty. Inocencio E. Dumlao, then Branch Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, was charged by the RTC Makati Movement against Graft &
Corruption for allegedly engaging in usurious activities, immorality and violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices
Act.

2. The complaint alleged that Respondent withheld the salary checks of all RTC Makati employees to compel them to
borrow money from him at usurious rates, as evidenced by Trust Agreements. The amounts loaned are collected
through his alleged paramour, Ms. Piedad Rufo a clerk employed at the Cash Section of the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC Makati.
3. Respondents was also charged with allegedly demanding money from party litigants and lawyers in exchange for
favorable action on their cases.
4. Respondent denied all the charges and branded the allegations as mere conjectures, hearsay and rumors without
legal or factual basis. He revealed that he has been engaged in a confidential mission to help the Court Administrator
expose the widespread corruption in the Makati RTC and he surmised that this is the reason for the "anonymous
poison letter" against him.
5. In its Reply, complainant challenged Respondent's appointment as a confidential agent in view of the latter's
removal from the Land Transportation Office, prior to his appointment as Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Makati, Branch
34, for being notoriously undesirable.
6. The Office of the Chief Justice received another letter complaint against Respondent signed by Susan B. Quinto
for corruption and dereliction of duty for exacting money from court litigants in the pretext that the amounts exacted
are his commissioner's fees, yet, he does not prepare his reports; For operating a lending agency with the use of the
facilities of the court and for exacting from court employees usurious interest; and for criminal negligence in the
performance of his duties as Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 234, Makati, Metro Manila.
7. The cases were consolidated and referred to Executive Judge Salvador Abad Santos of the RTC, Makati, Metro
Manila, for investigation, report and recommendation.
8. In the course of the investigation conducted by Executive Judge Abad Santos, no one appeared in behalf of the
RTC Movement Against Graft & Corruption. However, complainant Susan Quinto testified and adduced evidence to
substantiate her complaint.
9. Executive Judge Abad Santos recommended the dismissal of Respondent from service on grounds of grave
misconduct and dishonesty prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts unbecoming a court officer.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s dismissal is in order.
RULING: Yes. We find that the dismissal of Respondent is in order and we approve the recommendation of Executive
Judge Abad Santos.
Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task. The conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion. Indeed, every employee of the judiciary should
be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 9 In the case at bench, the particular public officer concerned is a
Branch Clerk of a court of justice who is described as an essential officer in any judicial system, whose office is the
hub of activities, both adjudicative and administrative 10 and who occupy a position of great importance and
responsibility in the framework of judicial administration. 11 Clerks of Court are, thus, required to be individuals of
competence, honesty and probity specifically mandated to safeguard the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to

earn respect therefor, to maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge as the superior officer, to maintain the authenticity
and correctness of court records and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice.
FIRST: On the issue of Respondent's demanding and receiving so called "commissioner's fees," we find the
charges against Respondent meritorious. The Manual for Clerks of Courts, which in essence is the "Bible for Clerks
of Courts" specifically provides that:
No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand and/or receive commissioner's fees for reception of evidence ex-parte.
. . . The court shall allow the commissioner, other than an employee of the court, such reasonable compensation as
the circumstances of the case warrant. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Yet despite the express prohibition, a bill for the payment of P2,000.00 as commissioner's and stenographer's fees
for the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence pending before Branch 134, RTC-Makati was issued and signed
by Respondent. Respondent's admission that he is unfamiliar with the Manual of the Clerks of Courts and is not even
aware of its existence does not help him any. Respondent's ignorance of the existence and contents of the Manual
for Clerks of Court clearly demonstrates how grossly remiss he has been in the performance of his duties as Branch
Clerk of Court of Branch 134 RTC-Makati.
He cannot rely on his thirteen (13) years of experience alone, vast though it may seem, because the law is constantly
evolving. Respondent's failure to explain the purpose for which the money will be used at the time that he solicited the
same reflects poorly on his conduct as Branch Clerk of Court and how he carries out the functions of his office.
SECOND: The accusation that Respondent allegedly operated a lending business at the RTC of Makati using
the facilities and resources of the court and charging the court/government personnel exorbitant or usurious
interest
The documentary exhibits presented by Complainant leave no doubt as to the existence of Respondent's lending
operation, some of which even led to the filing (by Respondent) of criminal charges against borrowers who failed to
pay their loans under the so-called trust agreements. Such despicable acts cannot be tolerated by this Court. Courts
are not lending institutions. By engaging in lending activities, Respondent has caused dishonor to courts of justice.
THIRD: On the final issue of dereliction of duty, we likewise concur with the findings of Executive Judge Abad
Santos.
One of the duties of a Branch Clerk of Court is to attend all court sessions. 30 In the instant case, however, Respondent
has seriously neglected this duty to the prejudice of public interest. In Rañosa v . Garcia we laid down the rule that:
Respondent's duties and responsibilities as branch clerk of court require that his entire time be at the disposal of the
court served by him . . . to assure that full-time officers of the courts render the full-time service required by their office
so that there may be no undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases as required by the
Rules of Court.
We find Respondent's failure to prepare proper or correct monthly reports of cases a serious breach of duty. One of
the basic responsibilities of a Branch Clerk of Court is the preparation of the monthly report of cases to be submitted
to this Court. Respondent in the above-mentioned procedure practically does next to nothing, his only contribution or
input is his signature-- This practice cannot be considered as proper supervision. Branch clerks of court must realize
that their administrative functions are just as vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. They are charged
with the efficient recording, filing and management of court records, besides having administrative supervision over
court personnel. They play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs
under one pretext or another. 36 They must be assiduous in performing their official duties and in supervising and
managing court dockets and records.

We find Respondent guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the duties pertaining to his office and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
13. DEBULGADO v. CSC [G.R. No. 111471. September 26, 1994.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. He
appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria Debulgado, as General Services Officer of the City Government of San Carlos.
Before her promotion, Victoria had been in the service for 32 years as she rose from the ranks by successively
occupying different government offices.
Public respondent CSC, received a letter from Congressman Tranquilino Carmona of the First District of
Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife.
After the investigation, the CSC disapproved the promotion of Victoria to the position based on the ground of
violating the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that:
a. The statutory prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria since the
prohibition applies to original appointments and not to promotional appointments;
b. The CSC had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her appointment.
Petitioners assert that Victoria can no longer be removed from the position without giving her an opportunity
to be heard and to answer the charge of nepotism.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the prohibition against nepotism apply to promotional appointments as well;
2. Whether or not the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the
promotional appointment given to petitioner Victoria.
RULING:
1. NO. Section 59, Book V of the E.O. No. 292 explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any
distinction between different kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, it covers all appointments to the national,
provincial, city and municipal governments, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government
owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there are exceptions provided therein, and these are: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The list has not been changed and does not contain words like "and other similar positions." Thus,
the list appears to be a closed one, at least closed until lengthened or shortened by Congress.
This is also in connection with the Omnibus Implementing Rules. Under the provisions of Section 1, Rule
V and Section 1, Rule II the Implementing Rules, both an original appointment and a promotion are of similar
personal action. The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions
undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, etc.,
must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII. To
the extent that all personnel actions occurring after an original appointment, require the issuance of a new
appointment to another position (or to the original position in case of reinstatement), such appointment must

comply with all applicable rules and prohibitions, including the statutory and regulatory prohibition against
nepotism. To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism to the appointment issued at the time of initial
entry into the government service, and to insulate from that prohibition appointments subsequently issued when
personnel actions are thereafter taken in respect of the same employee, would be basically to render that
prohibition, “meaningless and toothless”, as cited in the case of Laurel V, etc. v. CSC. Thus, the Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually broad and comprehensive.
Section 59 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: it refers to "all appointments"
whether original or promotional in nature. The public policy embodied in it is clearly fundamental in importance,
and the Court has neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification
or a distinction.
2. NO. The action of the Commission was taken in implementation of Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 and the
relevant Implementing Regulations. Because the promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a
violation of Section 59, it was null and void as being contrary to law. Section 9 of Rule V of the Omnibus
Implementing Regulations sets out the principal legal consequence of an appointment issued in disregard of the
statutory prohibition. A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of such
appointment. The Commission is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel
actions, e.g., promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard
of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations. Section 20 of Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing
Rules makes this clear. The recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval which had been issued by
one of its Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, however, it cannot cure the
intrinsic vice of the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria as it is void “from the beginning.”
Under its own rules and regulations, the Commission may review motu proprio personnel actions involving
the position of a Division Chief or above, such as the position of General Services Officer. The court holds that
the respondent Commission had authority, indeed the duty, to recall on its own initiative the erroneous initial
approval of the promotional appointment extended to petitioner Victoria, and to review the same de novo.
14. LOLITA DADUBO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

GR No. 106498, 1993-06-28
Facts:
· Petitioner Lolita A. Dadubo, Senior Accounts Analyst who acted as the teller and Rosario B. Cidro, Cash
Supervisor, of the Development Bank of the Philippines(DBP), Borongan Branch were administratively
charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The charges were based on reports on
the unposted withdrawal of P60,000.00 from Savings Account of Eric Tiu, Edgar Tiu, and/or Pilar Tiu.
DBP DECISION:
· On the basis of these findings, DBP found Dadubo guilty of dishonesty for embezzlement of bank funds.
She was penalized with dismissal from the service. Cidro was adjudged guilty of gross neglect of duty and
fined in an amount equivalent to one month basic salary, payable through salary deductions in not more
than 12 installments.
MSPB DECISION:

· Dadubo appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB),which affirmed the decision of the DBP,
and declared that
· DBP did not commit abuse of discretion in deciding the case against Dadubo or that their decision was
made and attended with arbitrariness or unfairness.
· To all intents and purposes, the ensuing decision was a necessary consequence of the evidence.
CSC DECISION:
· However, DBP was reversed by the Civil Service Commission in its Resolution No. 91-642, dated May
21, 1991, which reduced Dadubo's penalty to suspension for six months on the ground that:
· Although Dadubo made alterations on the dates in the Ledger Card from August 13 to August 14, the
fact remains that the bank was defrauded on account of said ABH withdrawal (for) which Cidro is held
responsible and accordingly found guilty of Gross
· Neglect of Duty and Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duty. It was also
Dadubo who reported on the irreconcilable P60,000.00. The most that Dadubo could be charged with is
willful violation of office regulation when she undertook reconciliation because under the Bank Manual the
tellers are not allowed access to the savings account ledger cards.
· Respondent DBP filed a motion for reconsideration and the Commission in its Resolution No. 92-878 ruled
in favor of DBP affirming its earlier findings with regard to Dadubo's guilt which is based on Dadubo's
admission in her Answer. (They are not authorized to reconcile the subsidiary ledger cards for the period
ending August 20,1987)
· Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
WON Resolution No. 92-878 conflicts with the findings of fact in CSC Resolution No. 91-642; the Commission
manifestly overlooked or disregarded certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties; and it based its conclusions
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures.
WON CSC failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which the decision is based;
Ruling:
· The court ruled in the negative.
1st ISSUE:
· The petitioner's challenges are mainly factual. The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies,
if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority.
· It is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
· Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set
aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown in
this case.
2ND ISSUE:
· The invocation of the petitioner of the due process is without merit.

· Her complaint that she was not sufficiently informed of the charges against her has no basis. While the
rules governing judicial trials should be observed as much as possible, their strict observance is not
indispensable in administrative cases. As this Court has held, “the standard of due process that must be
met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.”
· Not only did she testify at her formal investigation but she also filed a motion for reconsideration with the
DBP, then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board(MSPB) and later elevated the case to the Civil
Service Commission. Having been given all these opportunities to be heard, which she fully availed of,
she cannot now complain that she was denied due process.
· The rejection of the affidavit of Ballicud, for example, was not improper because... there was nothing in
that document showing that the petitioner did not embezzle the P60,000.00.
· It is true that the petitioner was formally charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the bank
and not specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless, the allegations and the evidence presented
sufficiently proved her guilt of embezzlement of bank funds, which is unquestionably prejudicial to the best
interest of the bank.
· The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of
an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge
against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts... complained of, not the designation of the
offense.
· We must also dismiss the petitioner's complaint that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the
constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which a decision is based.
We have held that this provision applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the
Civil Service Commission.
Principle:
The petitioner's challenges are mainly factual. The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on
substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is settled that it is not for... the appellate court to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are.entitled to respect and can only be
set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.None of these vices has been shown in this case.
15. HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD, VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS,
ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and NICANOR MARGALLO G.R. 131012, APRIL 21, 1999
Facts:
Private respondents are public school teachers.
During the teachers' strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1)
grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and
reasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension
investigation was concluded before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty.
Margallo was ordered dismissed from the service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia
Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six months

CSC affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas, and
Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file applications for leave of
absence and, therefore, reduced the penalty imposed on them to reprimand and ordered them reinstated
The Court of Appeals which, on September 3, 1996, rendered a decision affirming the decision of the CSC with respect
to Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang but reversing it insofar as the CSC ordered the
suspension of Nicanor Margallo. The appellate court found him guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations only and imposed on him the penalty of reprimand.
The Court of Appeals, while maintaining its finding that private respondents were guilty of violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations for which they should be reprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled to the
payment of salaries during their suspension "beyond ninety (90) days."
Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, moved for a reconsideration insofar as
the resolution of the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of private respondents' salaries during the period of their
appeal. His motion was, however, denied by the appellate court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the administrative investigation of respondents was concluded within the 90-day period of
preventive suspension, implying that the continued suspension of private respondents is due to their appeal, hence,
the government should not be held answerable for payment of their salaries. Moreover, petitioner lays so much store
by the fact that, under the law, private respondents are considered under preventive suspension during the period of
their appeal and, for this reason, are not entitled to the payment of their salaries
Issue:
Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are subsequently
exonerated
Ruling:
Yes.
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining
authority to investigate charges against respondents by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing
witnesses against him.
Although we hold that employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the
payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not entitled
to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal
Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending
appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed
Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, §47(4) states that respondent
"shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the
other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal

It is precisely because the respondent is penalized before his sentence is confirmed that he should be paid his salaries
in the event he is exonerated. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate execution of
the decision against him and continue to do... so even after it is shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he
was suspended. Indeed, to sustain the government's theory would be to make the administrative decision not only
executory but final and executory.
Sec. 47 of the present law of the Civil Service Commission providing that an administrative decision meting out the
penalty of suspension or dismissal shall be immediately executory and that if the respondent appeals he shall be
considered as being merely under preventive suspension if eventually he prevails
Nothing in what has thus far been said is inconsistent with the reason for denying salaries for the period of preventive
suspension. We have said that an employee who is exonerated is not entitled to the payment of his salaries because
his suspension, being authorized by law, cannot be unjustified. To be entitled to such compensation, the employee
must not only be found innocent of the charges, but his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But though an
employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal in the event he wins, his
suspension is unjustified because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90
days. Beyond that period the suspension is illegal. Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to reinstatement with
full pay. Under existing jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent of five years respondents were
exonerated of all charges against them for acts connected with the teachers' strike
Although they were absent from work, it was not because of the strike. For being absent without leave, they were held
liable for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for which the penalty is a reprimand.
CASE DIGESTS JUNE 15, 2021
1. Risos-Vidal v COMELEC | G.R. No. 206666. January 21, 2015 | Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS:
● In September of 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder.
● However, in October of 2007, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo extended executive clemency, by
way of pardon, to former President Estrada, which the latter received and accepted.
● Moving forward to November of 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President.
● During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC
1. Petition to Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
2. Petition for "Disqualification as Presidential Candidate
3. Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M. from Running as President due to Constitutional
Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada
● All three petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that
i. the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and
ii. the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored the former's right
to vote and be voted for a public office.
● Thus, Estrada was able to run for the May 2010 Presidential election, however, he only managed to garner
the second highest number of votes.

● In October 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, but
this time, for the position of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
● The petitioner in the case at bar, Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, however filed a Petition for Disqualification against
Estrada before the COMELEC. She alleged that Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of
his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan which sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification
● Further, she relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
● Under Sec 40 of the LGC, it was stated that “Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence” shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position
and Sec 12 of the OEC basically stated the same.
● The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition for utter lack of merit.
● A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner, but it was denied. Hence, this instant petition.
● It should be noted that while the case was pending before the Court, the May 2013 Mayoral elections was
conducted as scheduled and Estrada won in the said election. Thereafter, the local board of canvassers
proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
● Thus, following Estrada’s victory, Alfredo Lim, one of Estrada's opponents for the position of Mayor, moved
for leave to intervene in this case.
● He alleged that Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by the Estrada
should be declared stray, and, being the second placer, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful winning
candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified
to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
● In her petition, Risos-Vidal claims that the “acceptance” of Estrada is an indication of the conditional nature of
the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the Whereas Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office."
● She explains that the aforementioned commitment was what impelled former President Arroyo to pardon
former President Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been extended.
● And any breach thereof, that is, when former President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President
and Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted
to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence . . . and disqualifies him as a candidate for the
mayoralty [position] of Manila."
● Nonetheless, petitioner clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which Estrada must be disqualified from
running for and holding public elective office is actually the proscription found in Section 40 of the LGC, in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC
● Further, petitioner invoked Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
● According to Risos-Vidal, by virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights without
categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights are restored "shall not work to restore the
right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of civil interdiction

and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal."
RULING:
● The Court ruled that former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy.
● First of all, the Court mentioned that the 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5
of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons.
● It is apparent from the stated constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in:
1. impeachment cases;
2. cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
3. cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
● Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.
● This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President's power of pardon by acts of Congress,
specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the
1987 Constitution
● Secondly, regarding the proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC, the Court said that they cannot
accept Risos-Vidal's interpretation of the said Articles
● The Court said that a rigid and inflexible reading of those provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is
unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant executive
clemency.
● Now, regarding disqualification of Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC,
as earlier stated, the petitioner maintains that Estrada's conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running
for the elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40 (a) of the LGC.
● However, the Court ruled that the subsequent absolute pardon granted to Estrada effectively restored his right
to seek public elective office. This is made possible by reading Section 40 (a) of the LGC in relation to Section
12 of the OEC.
● The Court said that while it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40 (a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition — a plenary pardon or
amnesty.
● In other words, the OEC provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.
● As for the whereas clause, contrary to the petitioner’s declaration, the Court ruled that the third preambular
clause of the pardon, neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that Estrada's
rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially true as the pardon

itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and
political rights" as being restored.
● The Court ruled that whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not
part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to
make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of
the pardon.
● Hence, the petition of Risos-Vidal and Alfredo Lim was dismissed and the Court reiterated that former
President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE LEONEN:
● The Court also discussed the dissenting opinion of Justice Leonen regarding the matter.
● Justice Leonen agreed with Risos-Vidal that there was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights
of suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as required by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
● Justice Leonen stated in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions must be followed by the
President, as they do not abridge or diminish the President's power to extend clemency.
● He particularly stated that:
● All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in the pardon the
restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission of the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification, he or she should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask
that the President state his or her intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To
belabor the point, the President retains the power to make such restoration or remission, subject to a
prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it.
● The Court, however, disagrees with Justice Leonen. The Court ruled that the form or manner by which the
President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives
cannot be interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle of
separation of powers deeply ingrained in our system of government.
● For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full
effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation
● All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission
of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It
still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon
the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both.
● Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits
no other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained
his FULL civil and political rights — including the right to seek elective office.
● And as to the issue of the case, Justice Leonen emphasizes that the ultimate issue for resolution is not whether
the pardon is contingent on the condition that former President Estrada will not seek another elective public
office, but it actually concerns the coverage of the pardon — whether the pardon granted to former President
Estrada was so expansive as to have restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office.
● Justice Leonen is of the view that the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the
statement that former President Estrada is "hereby restored to his civil and political rights,”

● For Justice Leonen, the foregoing statement restored to Estrada all his civil and political rights except the
rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification made up of, among others,
the rights of suffrage and to hold public office.
● He adds that had the President chosen to be so expansive as to include the rights of suffrage and to hold
public office, she should have been more clear on her intentions.
● However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," to the mind of the Court, is
crystal clear — the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only
unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character
● The Court disagrees with Justice Leonen that the omission of the qualifying word "full" can be construed as
excluding the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. There appears to be no distinction
as to the coverage of the term "full political rights" and the term "political rights" used alone without any
qualification.
● More so, it will be extremely difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored by the pardon, when
the text of the latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of pardon cannot be presumed from the
absence of the qualifying word "full" when the pardon restored the "political rights" of former President Estrada
without any exclusion or reservation.
Maquiling v. COMELEC
GR 195649 | 16 April 2013| Sereno
Facts:
Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen and was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America. He
applied for repatriation under RA No. 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using
his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen. The Court ruled that Arnado’s act
of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest
number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy

and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of
lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
COMELEC EN BANC: not important.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.
2. Whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case. 
RULING:
1. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation
but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying
for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local election.
2. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots." This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x
with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed
in his stead. An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal
mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any
other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently,
he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility
does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The
number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements
of eligibility to run for public office.  
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.  

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is
electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made
to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.  
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.  In addition, a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election.  
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected,
and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of
the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also
be respected.  
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to
the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer
among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The
subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy
voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other
legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he
filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
3. NORMAN CORDERO MARQUEZ, PETITIONER, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 244274, September 03, 2019
FACTS: Here, the Petitioner Norman Cordero Marquez, was a Senatorial candidate, running independently in the
2019 election, and was motu proprio declared by the COMELEC as a nuisance candidate, basing primarily on his
incapability to sustain the financial rigors of a nationwide campaign.
· In its Petition, the COMELEC argued that Marquez, who was "virtually unknown to the entire country except
perhaps in Mountain Province, where he resides, is not financially capable and serious of mounting a national
campaign, citing the principles enunciated in the cases of Pamatong and Martinez III, who were similarly declared
as nuisance candidates.

· Marquez, for his part, claimed that the COMELEC is not correct in saying that he is virtually unknown in the
country, because one, he is the co-founder and sole administrator of Baguio Animal Welfare (BAW), an animal
advocacy group known in various social media and websites. He also claimed that he is a member of relevant
task forces and advisory committees, as well as a participant to regular consultations with government offices to
discuss animal welfare issues and concerns, and that he has been interviewed in television and radio shows. He
also said that he has travelled all over the country, to promote his advocacy and has received donations and
contributions from supporters both locally and internationally.
· He also added that, he has bona fide intention to run for office, and that he can sustain a nationwide campaign
through social media, which he considered to be an emerging platform, that is cost effective and revolutionary. He
also said that the power of social media will not require the "unwarranted exorbitant costs associated with the
traditional cash-dependent campaigns, similar to what other Senatorial candidates have been doing.
· With this, he prayed for a writ of injunction and TRO to prevent the COMELEC from deleting his name in the
final list of senatorial candidates in the printed ballots and to enjoin COMELEC to include his name in all the
certified list of senatorial candidates issued for public information until after the Court shall have resolved the
petition.
ISSUE/s: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Marquez as a nuisance
candidate, for his failure to prove his financial capability to mount a nationwide campaign.
RULING: For the Court’s ruling, it found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Marquez
as a nuisance candidate, and thus declared it violative of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence.
The Court cited the case of Maquera v. Borra, where it declared that the right to vote and to be voted for, shall not be
made to depend upon the wealth of the candidate.
Here, the rationale applies equally in the case of Marquez, which the Court said that, the State cannot condition a
person's privilege to be voted upon as senator, on his or her financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign,
because it clearly becomes a property requirement which is unconstitutional.
By declaring Marquez a Nuisance candidate on the basis of his financial standing, the Court said that the COMELEC
has effectively imposed a "property qualifications, which are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
Republican system ordained in our Constitution, and the principle of social justice underlying the same. It says that
this has already and clearly proscribed under the Court’s ruling in Maquera[1].
Secondly, according to the Court, both Section 69 of BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 1, Rule 24
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523[2], to which the cancellation of Marquez’ candidacy were allegedly based, are
silent as to the requirement of proof of financial capacity before an aspirant may be allowed to run in the national
elections.
Further, Section 13 of RA 7166, which the COMELEC interpreted as imposing a financial capacity requirement, only
speaks of the allowable limit for expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaign.
Finally, the Court said that the reliance on Pamatong and Martinez III cases, which the COMELEC mentioned, also
do not apply, because financial capacity to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign was not the
basis for the cancellation of Pamatong’s CoC. Neither was it the reason for the cancellation of CoC in Martinez III
case, which involved a controversy between two candidates with similar names vying for the same position, causing
confusion among the voters.

So with that, the Petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution was reversed and set aside.
4. MARIO O. SALVADOR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ALEXANDER S. BELENA
G.R. No. 230744
September 26, 2017
FACTS:
Salvador, a member of the political party Bagong Lakas ng Nueva Ecija, was a mayoralty candidate in San
Jose City, Nueva Ecija in 2010. Marivic Violago-Belena, private respondent Alexander Belena's (Belena) wife, won
over the petitioner in said mayoralty election.
Belena filed a Complaint-Affidavit for overspending against Salvador. She alleged that Salvador exceeded the
expenditure limit allowed by law for mayoralty candidate since he spent a total of ₱449,000.00 in the 2010 election,
when the maximum expenditure allowed by law is ₱275,667.00. She averred that under Sec. 13 of R.A. 7166, a
candidate, other than for presidency and vice presidency, is allowed to spend an amount of ₱3.00 for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy. However, if a candidate without any
political party and without support from any political party, he may be allowed to spend ₱5.00 for every such voter.
Salvador maintained that while he is a member of a political party, he argued that he did not receive any
support from any political party. Hence, the exception under Sec. 13 of R.A. 7166 was applicable to him. The
COMELEC En Banc directed its Law Department to file the appropriate information against Salvador for overspending.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction when it recommended the filing of an appropriate information against Salvador.
RULING:
NO.
Sec. 51 of P.D. No. 1296 and Sec. 100 of the OEC made a categorical declaration as to the allowable
expenditure by any kind of candidate, whether a member of a political party or an independent candidate.
With the amendment introduced by R.A. 7166, a distinction was made between a candidate without a political
party and without support from any political party and a candidate with a political party and who receives support from
a political party. The former is allowed to spend the ₱5.00 cap while the latter is allowed to spend the ₱3.00 cap.
The word "support," provided by the law, is not solely limited to financial aid. As mentioned, political parties
are designed to assist a candidate in his desire to win the vote of the populace. Political parties use its machinery and
its resources to achieve such end.
The word "and" between "without political party" and "without support from any political party" is conjunctive.
It means in addition to. The word "and," whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentences, must be
accepted as binding together and as relating to one another.

The candidate must both be without a political party and without support from any political party for the P5.00
cap to apply. In the absence of one, the exception does not apply.
In this case, the current number of registered voters in San Jose City is 91,889. Following the law, Salvador
is only entitled to spend the amount of ₱275,667.00 since he is only allowed to spend ₱3.00 for each registered voter.
Cleary, Salvador exceeded the allowable limit as declared in his SOCE. This constitutes an election offense under
Article 262 in relation to Article 263 of the OEC.
5. FELICIANO P. LEGASPI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDO GERMAR, and ROGELIO P.

SANTOS, JR
G.R. No. 216572; September 1, 2015
FACTS:
Respondents Alfredo Germar and Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. and Roberto C. Esquivel were among the candidates fielded
by the Liberal Party to vie for local elective posts in Norzagaray, Bulacan, during the 13 May 2013 elections. Germar
ran for the position of mayor, Santos ran for the position of councilor, and Esquivel ran for the position of vice-mayor.
Petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, on the other hand, was the National Unity Party’s bet for mayor of Norzagaray during
the 2013 polls.
After the votes cast by the Norzagaray electorate were tallied, Germar emerged as the highest vote getter in the
mayoralty race. Santos also appeared secured enough votes to be the second councilor of the municipality. Esquivel,
though, failed in his bid to become vice-mayor of Norzagaray.
Upon learning about the results of the tally, petitioner immediately filed before the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) of Norzagaray a motion to suspend the proclamation of Germar and Santos as winning candidates. Such
motion, however, proved to be futile.
At exactly 7:45 a.m. on 14 May 2013, despite the petitioner’s motion, the MBC proclaimed Germar and Santos as duly
elected mayor and councilor of the municipality of Norzagaray, respectively.
A few hours after the said proclamation, petitioner filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against
Germar, Santos, and Esquivel. In it, petitioner accused Germar, Santos, and Esquivel of having engaged in rampant
vote buying during the days leading to the elections.
The petition was assigned to the COMELEC first division. The decision of such division was an even 1-1 split. Due to
the impasse created by the absence of one of its members, the COMELEC First Division called for the constitution of
a Special First Division.
On 3 October 2013, the COMELEC Special First Division, by a 2 to 1 vote, rendered a resolution: (1) disqualifying
Germar and Santos for the positions of mayor and councilor, respectively, of Norzagaray; and (2) referring the criminal
aspect of the case to the COMELEC Law Department for preliminary investigation.
Germar, Santos, and Esquivel filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc
On 10 July 2004, the COMELEC en banc took a vote on the motion for reconsideration. However, only five (5)
members actually participated in the deliberations and casted votes.
The following were the results of the voting:

1. As to the electoral aspect of the case, the vote was 3-2. Hence, a majority of at least four (4) votes was not
reached with respect to the electoral aspect of the case.
2. As to the criminal aspect of the case, the vote was 4-1. Hence, a majority was reached with respect to the
criminal aspect of the case.
The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration with respect to the criminal aspect
of the case but ordering the conduct of a rehearing insofar as the electoral aspect of the case was concerned.
After the rehearing, the COMELEC en banc took another vote but it still failed to muster a majority consensus on the
electoral aspect of case. The final vote of the COMELEC en banc on the matter remained at the exact 3-2 split that it
was before the rehearing.
Thus, on 28 January 2015, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order12 directing the dismissal of the electoral aspect
of the case. pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal was occasioned by a "misapplication" by the COMELEC en banc of Section 6, Rule 18
of the COMELEC Rules.
RULING:
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the COMELEC, like the other constitutional commissions, to decide
all cases or matters before it by a "majority vote of all its members." When such majority vote cannot be mustered by
the COMELEC en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules provides the mechanism to avert a non-decision.
Under provision, the COMELEC en banc is first required to rehear the case or matter that it cannot decide or resolve
by the necessary majority. When a majority still cannot be had after the rehearing, however, there results a failure to
decide on the part of the COMELEC en banc.
When that dispute reached this Court in the case of Mendoza vs. COMELEC, the court held that the first effect applied
because the case before the COMELEC en banc was an electoral protest that was "originally commenced" in the
commission. While the electoral protest only reached the COMELEC en banc through the motion for reconsideration
of the decision of a division, the same did not change the nature of the case before it; the motion for reconsideration
not being an appeal. The failure of the COMELEC en banc to decide the motion for reconsideration would result—not
in the denial of the said motion or the affirmance of the division’s decision—but in the dismissal of the electoral protest
itself, pursuant to the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
The COMELEC en banc did not err when it dismissed the electoral aspect of the case when it was unable to reach a
majority vote after the rehearing. Contrary to what petitioner asserts, the case is most definitely an action that was
filed originally before the COMELEC within the contemplation of the said provision. While the case reached the
COMELEC en banc only through a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Special First Division, its character
as an original case filed before the commission remains the same. Hence, the failure of COMELEC en banc to decide
in this case properly results in the application of the first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
In this case, the fact that the case is an action originally commenced in the COMELEC cannot at all be doubted. The
records are crystal clear that the petition was first filed with the COMELEC and was raffled to the First Division for
decision. It is a fresh petition—as it passed upon no other tribunal, body or entity prior to its filing with the COMELEC.
Hence, for all intents and purposes, the case must be considered as an action "originally commenced in the
commission" under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

2F Case Digests 2021 - Atty. Anicia Marquez 1

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1. Civil Aeronautics Administration v.

Intermediate Appellate Court

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 1

G.R. No. 110954, May 31, 1995, BELLOSILLO, J.

Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) Decision

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 2

2. Whether respondent Nacario should be reinstated. (YES)

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 3

Transfer and Promotion distinguished

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 4

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 5

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 6

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 7

1. Whether or not private respondent is an employee holding ad interim appointment.

1. The SC ruled in the affirmative.

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 8

2. The SC ruled in the negative.

5. FERNANDEZ v STO. TOMAS, G.R. No. 116418, 7 March 1995

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 9

● The Resolution was issued on 7 June 1994.

● Resolution No. 94-3710 among others provides that

■ a. Administration of the Honor and Awards program under OCSS;

■ b. Registration and Accreditation of Unions under OPR; and

■ c. Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on appointments under OPIA.

● Fernandez and Sto. Tomas then instituted the present Petition

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 10

1. CSC Had the authority to issue the Resolution

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 11

● each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections

What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do?

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 12

● precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing an application for retirement,

● generating a need to find a replacement for him.

Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office No. 5

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 13

2. Their right to Security of Tenure was not violated

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 14

Sec. 26. Personnel Actions. — . . .

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

6. ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO, 9 SCRA 619 (1963)

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 15

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7. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND

ATTY. ELIAS V. PACETE

G.R. NO. 101207. OCTOBER 1, 1993

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 17

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8. PALMERA v. CSC, G.R. No. 110168, August 4, 1994, Cruz, J.

○ All respondents were placed under 90-day preventie suspension.

○ He was again placed under preventive suspension.

○ DPWH commented that his acceptance of the contractual appointment is equivalent to a

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 19

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 20

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 21

10. CSC v. PILILLIA, G.R. NO. 190147, MARCH 5, 2013

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 22

We sustain the ruling of the CA.

11. Remolona v. CSC, G.R. No. 137473, Aug 2, 2001

2F CASE DIGESTS 2021 | ATTY. ANICIA MARQUEZ 23

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ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s dismissal is in order.