Name of Student: Mary Stefany F.

Apaitan
Case Title: Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng) v. People of the Philippines
G.R No. 125865
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Date of Promulgation: January 28, 2000
FACTS: Jeffrey Liang, petitioner, was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against fellow Asian Development Bank (ADB) worker Joyce Cabal. Petitioner was
arrested but was released to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB after his bail was fixed.
After his release, the MeTC judge received an “office protocol” from the DFA stating that the
petitioner is immune from suit under the agreement of the ADB and the Philippine Government.
The judge dismissed the case without notice to the prosecution. The prosecution then filed a
motion for reconsideration but was opposed by the DFA, which resulted to the prosecution filing
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC. The rulings of the MeTC was set aside and
was ordered by the RTC to enforce the warrant of arrest issued earlier. Petitioner elevated the
case to the Supreme Court arguing his immunity from suit.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit?
RULINGS: No. The petitioner is not immune from suit. Under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state EXCEPT in the case of an action relating to any professional/commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his functions. In this case,
slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: People of the Philippines v. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras,
Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma
G.R No. L-32126
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Date of Promulgation: July 6, 1978
FACTS: The relationship of Bernardo Bagabag and appellant Teresa Domogma had been
strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa would desert their family home a couple of times.
Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on between appellant Nemesis
Talingdan and his wife. The couple had a violent quarrel, where he slapped her several times,
making her seek for help from the police. Talingdan, a policeman at that time, came to
Bernardo's house and called him but Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was armed.
Talingdan left the place leaving a warning that he would kill Bernardo someday. Corazon, the
couple’s 12 years old daughter, saw her mother meeting with Talingdan and their co appellants
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, hearing one of them say “Can he elude a
bullet”. On a Saturday after the sunset, Corazon saw her mother met again with the other
appellants, who had long guns, hearing them converse in subdued tones. After Teresa came up,
Bernardo was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then
climbed the stairs, carrying their long guns, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Corazon
couldn’t call for help because Bides threatened to kill her. After the assailants fled from the
scene, Corazon informed Teresa that she recognized the killers of her father, she warned her not
to reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Corazon revealed the
truth to her immediate relatives, which led to the filing of the information for murder against the
five (5) appellants. According to the defense, Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled
and never maltreated her. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a
policeman in Sallapadan; an illicit relationship never existed between them. Talingdan was not in
Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the Mayor in Bangued from June 22
to June 26. Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs Bayongan in
Sallapadan, 250-300 meters from the place of the killing. After weighing the evidences of both
parties, the appellants were charged guilty. The Solicitor General submitted a recommendation of
acquittal for Teresa Domogma claiming that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined
in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no “actual cooperation” and just a “mere
cognizance, acquiescence or approval” on her part, which is less than what is required for her
conviction as a conspirator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teresa was an accessory to the murder of Bernardo?
RULING: Yes. Her subsequent acts constitute “concealing or assisting in the escape of the
principal in the crime” which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under the paragraph
3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. After knowing that her daughter recognized the
assailants, she did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went
to the extent as to threaten her daughter to kill her if she reveal the truth; and when the peace
officers came to investigate, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. She is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accessory to the murder and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: Eduardo P. Manuel v. People of the Philippines
G.R No. 165842
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.
Date of Promulgation: November 29, 2005
FACTS: On July 28, 1985, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña in Makati. He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. Tina was then 21
years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to
Baguio City to visit her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring Tina that he
is single. Even his parents assured the same, making Tina finally agree to their son’s proposal.
After 3 years of happy marriage, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house
only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless and Eduardo would slap her whenever she ask for
money. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo left and never came back. He also stopped giving
financial support. Tina became curious and inquired with the NSO, learning that Eduardo was
previously married. Eduardo testified that he met Tina in a bar where she worked as a GRO. He
claimed that Tina knew he was married but still agreed to marry him. His first wife Rubylus was
imprisoned due to estafa, and visited her only for three months and never saw her again for more
than 20 years, thus believing that his marriage with his first wife was no longer valid when he
married Tina. Eduardo was found guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Eduardo appealed to the CA claiming that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because he
married the complainant in good faith. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with the
modification of the penalty of the accused. Eduardo filed the instant petition for certiorari
insisting that the CA erred in ruling that his first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under
Article 390 of the civil code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as
provided under Article 41 of the family code and, that the CA committed error when it affirmed
the award of moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was guilty of bigamy, a felony by deceit?
RULING: Yes. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is
a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal
intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know
the law. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.
The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: The People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta
G.R No. L-47722
Ponente: Moran, J.
Date of Promulgation: July 27, 1943
FACTS: Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venencio Serna,
and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported to the Provincial Inspector , Captain
Godofredo Monsod where they were shown a copy of a telegram, ordering Balagtas’ capture
dead or alive, and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. Chief of Police Oanis,
who was also called by the Provincial Inspector, said that he knew Irene, a bailarina. Oanis
volunteered to join the manhunt for Balagtas. After arriving at Irene’s house, they went to her
room and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta
simultaneously and successively shot with their revolvers. It turned out that the person shot was
Serapio Tecson, an innocent citizen. The trial court refused to believe the testimonies of the
appellant because they are materially contradictory. The lower court held and so declared them
guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in
the honest performance of their official duties?
RULING: No. According to article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, a person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
(a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and
(b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first
requisite is present. The crime committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance
of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered
by him and they are overpowered. They have exceeded in the fulfilment of such duty by killing
the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without any
previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: Arsenia B. Garcia v. Hon. Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines
G.R No. 157171
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
Date of Promulgation: March 14, 2006
FACTS: During the May 1995 elections in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Election Officer Arsenia B.
Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R.
Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, were
accused of conspiring together. They wilfully and unlawfully decreased the votes received by
senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. Pimentel filed a complaint to the RTC, where all
the accused were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence except for the petitioner, Garcia. The
Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic
Act 6646, Section 27 and in relation to BP Blg. 881. Petitioner appealed before the Court of
Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, a special law,
classified under mala prohibita?
2. Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
RULING: 1.No. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of
election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes, shall be guilty
of an election offense. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise,
even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
2. No. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the
members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their
part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of
canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of
six months is AFFIRMED.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: The People of the Philippines vs. Fernando Pugay y Balcita & Benjamin Samson y
Magdalena
G.R No. L-74324
Ponente: Medialdea, J.
Date of Promulgation: November 17, 1988
FACTS: On May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.
Sometime after midnight, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel while reading a comic
book. Later, appellant Fernando Pugay and Benjamin Samson, with other companions arrived
drunk. They saw Bayani Miranda, a 25 year old retardate, and started making fun of him by
tickling him with a piece of wood. Pugay suddenly took a gasoline can and poured it on Miranda,
with Gabion asking him to stop. Samson then set Miranda on fire which caused his subsequent
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda. Upon being
arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court
rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of
the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed an appeal.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there was conspiracy of criminal purpose between two appellants?
2. Whether or not Pugay is guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence?
RULING: 1. No. There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or
unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before
the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused
Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that
the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the
respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed
against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act
committed by him
2. Yes. As defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, a man must use common
sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent,
if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results
as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through
culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings,
would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: Jason Ivler y Aguilar vs. Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro and Evangeline
Ponce
G.R No. 172716
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Date of Promulgation: November 17, 2010
FACTS: After a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court with two separate offenses: 1). Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries and 2.) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband and damage to spouses’ vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for
his temporary release in both cases. Petitioner pleaded guilty in the first case resulting to the
penalty of public censure. Petitioner moved to quash the second case for placing him in double
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense but the MeTC refused quashal. Petitioner
then elevated the matter to RTC in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A No. 2803). Petitoner sought
from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings and arraignment in the second case, invoking
S.C.A 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying the motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but the motion remained unresolved. Respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion. In an Order, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, due to petitioner’s
forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment. The RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner
argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
ISSUE: 1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
823663?
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366?
RULING: 1. No. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the
accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s
status to that of a fugitive without standing.
2. Yes. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine... the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes... and
prosecution.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: Salud Villanueva VDA. De Bataclan and the minors Norma, Luzviminda, Elenita,
Oscar and Alfredo Bataclan represented by their natural guardian, Salud Villanueva VDA. De
Bataclan, v. Mariano Medina
G.R No. L-10126
Ponente: Montemayor, J.
Date of Promulgation: October 22, 1957
FACTS: The bus no. 30 Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, driven by
Conrado Saylon. Among the passengers was Juan Bataclan. At about 2am, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag and fell into a ditch on the side of the road and turned
turtle. Some of the passengers were able to leave the bus or had to be helped or pulled out, while
Bataclan and 3 others could not get out of the overturned bus. Then about ten men came, one
carrying a lighted bamboo torch, fuelled with petroleum. These men approach the bus
immediately starting a fierce fire, burning the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside
it. As the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak spreading over the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch set it on fire. By Bataclan’s death, his
widow, Salud Villanueva, in behalf of her minor children filed a suit for damages. The CFI of
Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiff, plus P600 as attorney’s fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise carried by Bataclan for sale and which was lost in the fire. Upon appeal by the
plaintiffs and the defendants, the CA endorsed the appeal to the SC because of the value of the
claim in the complaint.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of
the bus?
RULING: 1. Yes. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, for the reason that when the vehicle turned
on its back, the leaking of the gasoline was not unnatural; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help made, and that because it was dark, the rescuers
had to carry a light as they came from a rural area where flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend rescue
requested from them.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: Filomeno Urbano v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines
G.R No. 72964
Ponente: Gutierez, Jr., J.
Date of Promulgation: January 7, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang. His palay was
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. There he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio
Erfe cutting grass. When he asked them who was responsible for the flooding, Javier admitted.
Urbano got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. Urbano unsheathed his
bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital for
the treatment of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and tended to his
tobacco plants. Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital.
Doctors findings showed that he was suffering from tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.
RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised
the case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier?
RULING: 1. NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The petitioner reiterates his
position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence,
that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus
when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands
exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings, however, lead
us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITED of the crime of homicide.
Name of Student: Mary Stefany F. Apaitan
Case Title: Gemma T. Jacinto v. People of the Philippines
G.R No. 162540
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Date of Promulgation: July 13, 2009
FACTS: Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto, a BDO check as payment for purchases
from Mega Foam Int’l Inc., and the petitioner was the collector at that time. The check was
deposited to the account of Generoso Capitle, husband of Jacqueline Capitle, who is the sister of
the petitioner and former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam. Rowena
Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from Land Bank who was
looking for Generoso Capitle to inform him that the BDO check has been dishonoured.
Ricablanca phoned Anita Valencia, who instructed her to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check
with cash. Valencia also told her of the plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for
herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca reported the matter to
the owner of Mega Foam. The owner talked to Baby Aquino and the former filed a complaint
with the NBI and worked out an entrapment operation. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were
arrested. The NBI filed a ccriminal case for QUALIFIED THEFT against the two and
Jacqueline Capitle. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed petitioner’s
conviction and her subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of qualified theft was actually produced?
RULING: No. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is
a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully
taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it
not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which
was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless,
because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace
the value of said dishonored check.
The petition was granted. The decision of the CA was modified. Petitoner Jacinto is found guilty
of an Impossible Crime.