© Carl P.

Watts (2011)

Carl P. Watts “Is the United States a declining power?” Politics Review Online Vol. 20, No. 4
(Apr. 2011)

Introduction

Students become familiar with the concept of power when they are first introduced to the
discipline of government and politics. The International Relations scholar Joseph Frankel
observed that “All politics, by definition, revolve around the exercise and pursuit of power,
but in international politics power is considerably more in evidence and less circumscribed
than in domestic politics; hence this field is often described as ‘power politics’.” (Frankel,
1988, pp.110-11) The centrality of power to the study of international relations is revealed in
the number of books and articles in which scholars discuss the status of “middle powers”,
“great powers”, “superpowers”, “the balance of power”, “rising powers” and “declining
powers”. The first purpose of this article, then, is to bring some clarity to the concept by
discussing the measurement of power in international relations. Secondly, the article will
consider the position of the United States within the international states system. The
academic and political debate about whether or not the United States is a declining power is
not new, but in recent years it has been brought into sharp relief by the rapid rise of China in
particular. In 2004 the National Intelligence Council predicted gloomily that as a result of the
rising power of China, India, Brazil and Indonesia, by 2020 the "relative power position" of
the United States will have been eroded. (NIC, 2004, p.11) The delicate approach that
President Obama’s administration takes in managing relations with China seems to give
credence to the NIC’s predictions. However, it should be appreciated that the United States
possesses enormous military and economic resources, and it is also capable of exercising
considerable “soft power” around the globe. Further, the rising powers have considerable
problems of their own that they will have to surmount if they are going to achieve the level of
economic and military power evident in the United States, which suggests that the scale of
US decline should not be exaggerated.

Power in international relations

The historian David Reynolds has commented that “For the student of international relations
few concepts are more important than that of ‘power’. Yet its meaning is difficult to pin down.”
(Reynolds, 1991, p.5) Power in international relations, as indeed in the domestic context,
ultimately depends upon the ability to achieve one’s objectives and, if necessary, enforce one’s
will. There are, of course, several modes of power. At the moderate end of the scale it may
take the form of positive inducement, and it extends progressively through manipulation,
coercion or, at the most extreme level, war. The sources of a country’s power are also diverse,
as suggested by the following table. (Morgenthau, 1948; 1985, Waltz, 1979)

Some variables of state power

Tangible Intangible
Numbers and skills of population National unity, morale and attitudes
Extent, resources and strategic location of Coherence of governmental system
territory
Wealth and productive capacity (including Quality of leadership
control of the sources of wealth)
Existing and potential military capacity Reputation for military prowess
Number and quality of allies Diplomatic skill and determination to achieve
objectives

Reynolds has observed that these various tangible and intangible factors are interrelated:

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All these elements come into play in a particular power relationship between two
states. A strong economy may not be decisive if the country’s armed forces are ill-
prepared for war. A large army may be irrelevant if the country has no will to fight, or if
its leaders are distracted by other concerns at home or abroad. A state with limited
economic resources may be able to secure unexpected advantage by diplomatic
dexterity. And the reputation for being powerful may ensure influence long after
economic and military strength has waned, particularly if war can be avoided.
(Reynolds, 1991, pp.5-6)

Most analysts now acknowledge that any assessment of state power must be qualified by
the psychological factors involved in its relationship with other states, which negates the
realist assumption that power is an asset that can be accumulated. (Kim, 2003, pp. 38-41)
In other words, power must be conceived in relative terms. This can be illustrated by the fact
that during the Second World War, the United States played a decisive role in defeating the
advanced industrial societies of Germany, Italy, and Japan, yet in the 1960s and 1970s it was
unable to defeat the peasant state of North Vietnam. (Reynolds, 1991, p.6) Similarly, the United
States and its allies have been fighting in Afghanistan for nearly ten years, but despite their
technical military superiority they have failed to eliminate the threat from Al Qaeda and the
Taliban.

In recent years academics and politicians have been paying more attention to the notion of
“soft power”, which focuses on indirect ways to achieve foreign policy objectives. According to
this perspective, a state may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other
states that admire its values, want to emulate its example, and aspire to its level of prosperity
and openness, are willing to follow it. Joseph Nye Jr., a leading proponent of this concept, has
noted that the soft power of a country rests primarily on three factors: “its culture (in places
where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and
abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral
authority).” (Nye, 2004, p.11) Soft power theorists like Nye suggest that less emphasis should
be placed on attempts to force other states to change their behaviour by threatening military
force or economic sanctions. Rather, it is important to set the agenda and attract other states
to one’s own position, so that they want the same outcomes. In other words, the exercise of
soft power seeks to co-opt other states rather than coerce them.

Debates about US power

The Kennedy thesis

Perceptions of waning US power can be dated back to the ignominious exit from Vietnam in
the 1970s, but the debate about US decline was really energised in 1987 with the publication
of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by Paul Kennedy. Kennedy argued that the
position of the United States at the end of the twentieth century was analogous to the decline
of Spain in the seventeenth century, France in the eighteenth century and Britain by the
middle of the twentieth century. Kennedy suggested that each of these states had faced an
insuperable struggle to reconcile the division of resources between domestic consumption,
investment, and military spending. In particular, excessive military spending had
compromised the economic vitality of these imperial powers, thereby generating the problem
of “overstretch”, which could only be resolved by strategic retrenchment. Although Kennedy
did not explicitly say so, he implied that if the problem was not addressed, then the United
States would also experience this cycle of rise and relative decline. (Kennedy, 1987) The
dramatic disintegration of the Soviet empire between 1989 and 1991 appeared to confirm
Kennedy’s thesis; many political commentators agreed that high levels of military spending
had indeed been responsible for the Soviet collapse. (Kegley, 1994, p.14)

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Yet the anxieties that had been unleashed by the Kennedy thesis receded very quickly into
the background during the 1990s, which can be explained by three main factors. First, the
Gulf War of 1991 was a showcase for the United States’ military prowess and diplomatic
leadership. Second, potential challenges to American power simply disappeared: the
demise of Soviet power removed the alternative to the capitalist system; Japan, which had
enjoyed phenomenal growth in the 1980s, descended into economic crisis; and the power
and prestige of the European Union was eviscerated by its weak response the disintegration
of the former Yugoslavia and the onset of genocide in the Balkans. Third, the US economy
enjoyed a sustained boom during the Clinton years, which seemed to refute the notion that
American economic power was on the wane. (Cox, 2007, p.648) Now politicians and the
academic community spoke not of potential US decline, but of a unipolar international
system in which the United States was an undisputed hegemon. As William Wohlforth put it
in 1999, “The United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most
powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading state in the last
two centuries.” (Wohlforth, 1999, p.5) The American response to the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 appeared to confirm the awesome reach of US
power, as it invaded first Afghanistan, then Iraq, and adopted a belligerent approach in its
relations with Iran and North Korea. The “war on terror” now served as a doctrine for the
projection of US power around the globe. (Cox, 2007, p.649)

Pessimistic assessments of US power

In the last few years, however, the experience of fighting protracted campaigns against
insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq has lead some to question American hubris. In 2009,
Robert Pape returned to the argument that “America is in unprecedented decline.” Pape’s
claim was based on the “self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War”, and the ailing US economy,
which is beset by the increasing indebtedness of the US government, and unfavourable
trade balances. Pape suggested that “If present trends continue, we will look back at the
Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony.” (Pape, 2009, p.21)
Pursuing a similar line of argument to Kennedy in the 1980s, Pape suggests that US power
is fundamentally a product of its economic strength. American wealth, technology, and
population size are essential for building and modernising its military forces. Although the
United States may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to
create military assets, it is economic performance that constrains the choice. The size of the
American economy relative to its potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of US power
in international politics. Although recent American growth compares favourably with
advanced economies, it is being outstripped by China’s developing economy, which is
enjoying consistent double-digit growth. (Pape, 2009, p.24)

Annual GDP Growth Rates (constant prices)

1993-2000 2001-2008
USA 3.7 2.2
China 10.6 10.1
Japan 1.1 1.5
Germany 1.7 1.3
UK 3.2 2.4
France 2.2 1.7
Russia -2.1 6.7

US growth rates have declined by almost 50 percent from the Clinton years and this
trajectory is likely to be revised further downward as a result of the financial crisis of 2008.
As US growth declines, so does its share of world production, which has decreased from 31
per cent in 2000 to 23 per cent in 2008. In the corresponding period China’s share of world
production grew from 2 to 7 per cent. Projections suggest that by 2013 the United States will

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have a 21 per cent share of world production compared to China’s 9 per cent. Analysts like
Pape are alarmed by the scale of America's relative economic decline during the last decade
because it represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any other
example between 1815 and 1945. Only the Soviet Union has declined at a faster rate, and
that resulted in its total collapse. Pape contends that although the United States remains
stronger than any other state individually, its power to stand up to the collective opposition of
other major powers is rapidly eroding. It may be the case that China, and perhaps Russia,
are now pursuing a policy of “economic prebalancing” in which they will avoid the risks of
engaging in a premature arms buildup by concentrating first on closing the economic and
technological gap between themselves and the United States. Successful economic
prebalancing would lay the foundation for hard balancing in the future. (Pape, 2009, pp.30-
31) Pape therefore concludes that “Unipolarity is becoming obsolete, other states are rising
to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom.
Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments.” (Pape, 2009, p.34)

Optimistic assessments of US power

The foregoing discussion indicates that there are sound reasons why the United States
may be considered a declining power, but there is also plenty of counterveiling
evidence to suggest that the notion of American decline is overblown. The economic
output of the United States is currently larger than the combined gross domestic
products of the next three largest economies: Japan, China, and Germany. The United
States enjoys a huge technological lead over other countries, accounting for about 40 per
cent of world spending on research and development. US power is also underpinned by its
growing population, which is expected to rise from 305 million to 439 million by 2050, and by
the highly educated and skilled nature of the US population, particularly in areas such as
science and technology. The United States retains enormous structural power, reflected in
the considerable influence it exerts over institutions such as the World Trade Organisation,
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and in the role of the dollar as the world’s
leading currency. (Heywood, 2011, p.227)

Optimists argue that it is not clear that rapid Chinese growth represents a profound
threat to American interests. If the US economy continues to grow at 2.5 per cent per
year, China would have to grow at 8.2 per cent just to maintain the gap between the
two economies, which suggests that it will take generations for the Chinese to catch up.
China is afflicted by deep poverty: out of a total population of 1.3 billion, 600 million
have an income under $1,000 per year; another 440 million have incomes of between
$1,000 and $2,000 per year; and only 60 million Chinese have incomes of $20,000 a
year or more. The Chinese government faces a range of further problems, as Samuel
Kim has pointed out, “In the coming years, the way Beijing manages its economic reforms,
especially the state-owned enterprises, rising unemployment and social unrest, rampant
corruption, widening inequality, and ethnonational pressures from below and within may be
decisive factors that will shape China’s future as a complete great power.” (Kim, 2003, p.72)

Above all else, those who emphasize the unipolarity of the international states system point
to the fact that the United States enjoys a huge margin of military superiority over its allies
and adversaries alike. According to the Royal United Services Institute, “The US is more
than a superpower, it is more correctly termed a hyperpower.” (RUSI, 2008, p.3) The US
military budget is equal to the combined military spending of the next 14 most powerful
states (most of them are US allies), and the combined military budgets of actual or potential
state adversaries to the United States (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, Syria
and Libya) amounts to less than one-third of the US total. Before the invasion of Iraq in
2003, the United States maintained 752 bases in 130 countries around the globe, and
operated nine supercarrier battle groups at sea, whereas the rest of the world has none.
(Ferguson, 2005, p.16; Johnson, 2004, 151ff.) The Royal United Services Institute points

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out that “American weapons systems are at least a generation of technology ahead of our
allies and around two generations ahead of any likely state adversaries.” (RUSI, 2008, p.4)
This is all highly impressive, but it is of course necessary to bear in mind the point made
earlier in this article that power is a relationship, not a possession.

Conclusion

Power is a vital concept for understanding international relations, and debates about rising
and declining powers will always exercise the attention of governments and academics alike.
Although the United States has enjoyed a preponderance of power since the end of the Cold
War, it cannot expect to determine indefinitely the way in which the international system
operates. According to the Royal United Services Institute, “It is reasonable to foresee the
United States maintaining its dominant position for at least the first quarter of the twenty-first
century.” (RUSI, 2008, p.3) Many Americans would doubtless wish to see US hegemony
continue beyond that. Yet, as Michael Cox has suggested, the real question is not whether
or when the United States is going to experience decline, but rather how successfully it will
adjust to the process, for it has “clearly grown used to being ‘the indispensable nation’ …
and is therefore unlikely to feel anything but deep existential angst about having to play a
lesser role in the world.” (Cox, 2007, p.653)

References and Further Reading

Berridge, G. W. and John W. Young (1988) ‘What is a “Great Power”?’ Political Studies, Vol.
36, No. 2 (June), pp. 224-34.

Bijian, Zheng. (2005) ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.
84, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.), pp. 18-24.

Cox, Michael. (2007) ‘Is the United States in Decline – Again? An Essay’, International
Affairs Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 643–653.

Deng, Yong and Thomas G. Moore (2004), ‘China Views Globalization: Toward a New
Great-Power Politics’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer), pp. 117-136.

Ferguson, Niall. (2005) Colossus: The Price of America's Empire. New York: The Penguin
Press

Frankel, Joseph. (1988) International Relations in a Changing World. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 4th ed.

Heywood, Andrew. (2011) Global Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Johnson, Chalmers (2004) The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the
Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Kegley Jr., Charles W. (1994) ‘How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy’,
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Apr.), pp. 11-41

McCormick, Mark (2011) “China v the US: how do the two the countries compare?”, The
Guardian (19 Jan.) at http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/19/china-social-
media

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948, 1985) Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and
peace. New York: Knopf, 6th ed.

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National Intelligence Council (2004) Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National
Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project. Washington DC: Government Printing Office.

Nye Jr. Joseph S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:
Public Affairs)

Pape, Robert F. (2009) ‘Empire Falls’, The National Interest, Vol. 99 (Jan.-Feb.), pp. 21-34.

Royal United Services Institute (2008) The Future Security Environment. London: RUSI.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. London: Longman.

Wohlforth, William C. (1999) ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’ International Security, Vol.
24, No. 1, (Summer), pp.5-41.