Cainzos, Miguel - Class Inequalities in Political Participation

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Class Inequalities in Political Participation and the ‘Death of Class’ Debate
Article in International Sociology · May 2010

DOI: 10.1177/0268580909360298
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Class Inequalities in Political Participation and the “Death of
Class” Debate
Miguel Caínzos*
Carmen Voces**
Published in: International Sociology, 25 (3): 383-418, 2010
* University of Santiago de Compostela and “Escola Galega de

Administración Pública”, Santiago de Compostela, Spain. (E-mail:
miguel.cainzos@usc.es)
** “Escola Galega de Administración Pública”, Santiago de

Compostela, Spain. (E-mail: investigacion08.egap@xunta.es)
1
ABSTRACT:
The aim of this article is to offer an empirical contribution to the debate on the political
significance of class, and especially the relationship between class position and
political participation. The “death of class” debate has primarily addressed only one
aspect of politics – voting. The perspective offered here widens the scope of analysis to
include the main forms of political action available to citizens in modern democracies.
In this paper a comparative cross-national approach is adopted, using data on twenty
European countries that are included in the first wave of the “European Social Survey”.
Using log-linear models as a descriptive device, we identify a basic pattern of
association between class and participation, point out the main national deviations from
that pattern, and make a comparative assessment of the relative magnitude of overall
levels of class inequalities in participation in different forms of political activity. The
results bear out the continuing relevance of class as a source of differentiation of
political behaviour and tend to confirm previous research regarding the validity of
empirical generalizations on class patterns of political participation.
Key words
Political participation; “death of class” debate; class politics; risk society; post-
modernization.
2
Are class divisions politically relevant nowadays? Most sociologists and political
scientists have traditionally agreed that the answer to this question should be
affirmative. However, since the 1980’s this classical orthodoxy has been under fire from
new theories and research, which argue from different viewpoints that class structures
have been eroded by a long-term process of social change or have simply lost most of
their power to shape social and political behaviour. The most radical statements along
these lines have gone as far as to announce “the death of class”. Of course, this sort of
revisionist thinking has not gone unchallenged, and the social and political relevance of
class continues to be a highly controversial question.
This article offers an empirical examination of the relationship between class position
and political participation. Previous discussions of the political dimension of the alleged
“death of class” have focused primarily on changes in levels of class voting, while
neglecting to study the impact of class on other dimensions of political activity. This is
somewhat surprising, given the long tradition of research on factors affecting political
participation, in which class, occupation and economic status are generally among the
most salient issues. The approach taken here goes beyond the narrow focal point of
voting and widens the scope of the analysis to include the main forms of political action
available to citizens in modern democracies. Furthermore, our work adopts a
comparative cross-national perspective, using data on twenty European countries
covered by the first wave of the “European Social Survey”. At the same time, we build a
bridge between two lines of research that have developed in mutual isolation, bringing
into the analysis of political participation a modelling strategy that has been extensively
used in research on class voting.
The first section of the paper presents a short overview of research on class and
political participation, emphasizing its potential significance in the debate on the “death
of class”. Data and methods are presented in the second section, and the third section
offers the results of our analyses. Finally, we summarize our main findings and discuss
their implications.
1. Political participation and the controversy regarding the political

(in)significance of class.
Once upon a time, the notion of class was a core element of the conceptual framework
of sociology. Modern societies were seen as essentially “class societies”. One of the
cornerstones of classical political sociology was the idea that there is a significant
relationship between class and politics. It was generally assumed that political
behaviour was structured along class lines. Research on political participation regularly
found that the likelihood of an individual to be involved in political activity was
contingent on his or her class or occupational location (Lane, 1959; Milbrath, 1965;
Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978). Electoral studies
underscored the existence of robust patterns of class voting in most modern
democracies – even to the point of considering that elections could be depicted as the
institutionalization of “democratic class struggle” (Lipset, 1960; Alford, 1963; Lipset and
Rokkan, 1967; Rose, 1974). Of course, there were dissenting voices; but disagreement
was mainly about how class should be understood rather than its causal relevance 1.
This situation has changed in the last decades. New developments in sociology and
political science have challenged the formerly undisputed significance of class.
1
A conspicuous but quite atypical exception was Nisbet’s early necrology of class (Nisbet, 1959). The
limited influence of this paper at the time of its publication is worth noting.
3
It has been argued that advanced societies have experienced structural
transformations leading to the breakdown of class structures or, at least, to a radical
decrease in their impact on all spheres of social life. It is not possible to offer here even
a cursory review of all the multiple forms in which this idea has been stated. However,
two of them deserve particular mention because of their boldness and theoretical
ambition.
In a series of works culminating in a book eloquently titled The Death of Class, Jan
Pakulski and Malcolm Waters articulated a theory of postmodern society in which class
inequalities are replaced by a conventional and status stratification system that
emerges from the cultural sphere. In this system, “strata are lifestyle- and/or value-
based status configurations” that can be formed “around differentiated patterns of value
commitment, identity, belief, symbolic meaning, taste, opinion or consumption”
(Pakulski and Waters, 1996a, 25; see also Crook et al., 1992; Waters, 1994; Pakulski
and Waters, 1996b; Pakulski, 2001, 2005). This change would be the result of the
combined effects of several mutually reinforcing processes: an increase in the
significance of inequality related to the distribution of professional skills and scientific
knowledge; growth in the complexity and internal differentiation of occupational
structures; a growing relevance of the differentiation of lifestyles, consumption and
taste patterns in the production of meaningful social divisions; the segmentation and
globalization of markets; the expansion of indirect forms of ownership… According to
the theory, these transformations have led to such a profound decomposition of class
structures that advanced societies can no longer be seen as “class societies” but as
societies experiencing a process of de-stratification and characterized by new
configurations of “complex (classless) inequalities” – i.e., inequalities emerging from
“multiple and hybridized generative structures” and implying low level of formation of
crystallized hierarchical groups (Pakulski, 2005, 171 ff.). As a consequence, class
communities, class cultures and class identities have supposedly eroded, bringing
about the dissolution of the class basis of politics. This is evident in many ways: a
decline in corporatist politics, class dealignment in the electoral arena, a weakening of
class appeals in political discourse, a loss of consistency in left-right polarity due to the
emergence of unaligned issues and new dimensions of politics, and decomposition of
traditional political identities. All of this amounts to a “new politics”, with new actors,
new demands and new languages.
Although it was explicitly presented as an alternative to post-modern theory, the “risk

society” theory advocated by Ulrich Beck (1986) reaches a similar conclusion. Beck
argues that today’s advanced societies are “post-traditional” societies that have
experienced a radical process of individualization and the break-up of “traditional”
social bonds, mainly due to the inner logic of the labour market. The outcome of this
process is ambivalent. On the one hand, it has promoted a revaluation of “the demand
for control of one’s own money, time, living space, and body…, people demand the
right to develop their own perspective on life and to be able to act upon it” (Beck, 1986,
92). On the other hand, individuals are separated from traditional support networks
(family, neighbourhood, community…) and lose non-market sources of income, which
increases dependency on the market both for income and for consumption; the market
invades more and more spheres of life, creating new areas of uncertainty. Among other
things, this involves an “individualization of social inequalities”. In these new conditions
of existence, individuals are forced to carry out a reflexive process of planning and
organizing their own lives and so become “the reproduction unit of the social in the
lifeworld”, since personal situations are increasingly contingent on people’s own
choices. Hence, inequalities come to be understood in terms of an “individualization of
social risks”, and “social problems are increasingly perceived in terms of psychological
dispositions” (Beck, 1986, 100). Class-based cultures, identities and communities fade
away in this “individualized society of employees” – a sort of “capitalism without
4
classes”. Individuals are compelled to choose the groups, lifestyles and sub-cultures
with which to identify. This leads to a fragmentation and multiplication of transient
identities and social links. Ultimately, the final result of this transformation will be the
decline of class-based politics and its replacement with “temporary coalitions between
different groups and different camps” that “represent pragmatic alliances in the
individual struggle for existence and occur on the various battlefields of society” (Beck,
1986, 100-101). Given this tendency, ascribed characteristics such as race, sex,
ethnicity and age would be the only basis for the rise of permanent conflicts and
identities.
This picture of the declining significance of class has received further support from
approaches that have addressed its political dimension more directly, focusing on the
links between socioeconomic transformation and the emergence of a new political
landscape. Descriptions of this new political order differ in their emphasis, but most of
them share a common core that involves the unfreezing of long-established socio-
political cleavages, a decline in class voting, the breakdown of traditional political
loyalties and party identification, a rise in single-issue politics and choice politics, the
expansion of new social movements, and value changes resulting in a new political
culture (see, e.g., Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Rabier, 1986; Dalton et al.
1984; Dalton, 1988, 2000, 2005; Clark, 1998; Clark and Lipset, 1991, 2001; Clark et al,
1993; Clark and Rempel, 1997). Above all, it is important to highlight the fact that these
portrayals of the new political landscape tend to emphasize novel trends in political
participation. On the one hand, they point towards an expansion or makeover of the
“political repertoire” available to citizens, including less involvement in “elite-oriented
action” and more participation in “elite-challenging action”. On the other hand, they tend
to imply that involvement in the emerging forms of action is increasingly heterogeneous
– and specifically, unaffected by class divisions – and could provide new opportunities
of participation for groups that are more reluctant to conventional politics (Van Aelst
and Walgrave, 2001; Norris et al., 2005; but cfr. Stolle and Hooghe, 2005).
In spite of their very wide scope, these theories do not usually make explicit statements
regarding the expected overall relationship between class and political participation.
Yet they logically entail the prediction that the patterning of political participation along
class lines will become progressively blurred as societies move into post-
industrialization, post-modernization or reflexive modernization. Moreover, although
these theories do not specify the threshold of structural change beyond which it could
be thought that class should be entirely irrelevant in political terms, it seems clear that
European societies should be on the cutting edge of the process of class
decomposition. If these general theories of social change are accurate, class
differentials in political action should be virtually negligible in Europe – or, at the very
least, they should not exhibit a particularly robust cross-national pattern. A good way to
test the validity of general arguments about the declining social and political relevance
of class is to check whether these predictions about the association between class and
participation are confirmed by empirical evidence. This approach is particularly
apposite because most empirical testing of the alleged decline of class politics has
been too narrowly focused on changes in class voting, while disregarding other
dimensions of political activity. General theories of “the death of class” have neglected
the findings of a long tradition of research that has shed light on the social correlates of
political action2.
2
Of course, the examination of class patterns in political participation is not a substitute – but a
supplement – to the study of class alignments. Class politics cannot be reduced to the existence of class
differences in participation: even if these differences were tiny, it could be argued that class politics
continues to be relevant as far as classes take distinct positions on political issues or give support to
different political parties..
5
Recent research in this tradition tends to corroborate long-established empirical
generalizations about the pervasiveness of class inequalities in political participation.
Work done over the last two decades in the wake of the now classical studies
conducted by Verba et al. (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) on the U.S. and
by Parry et al. (1992) on Britain tend to confirm the propositions in which Milbrath and
Goel (1977, 92-105) summarized the findings of previous research: “no matter how
class is measured, studies consistently show that higher-class persons are more likely
to participate in politics than lower-class persons” (and the same can be said about
people of higher occupational status), “professional persons are the most likely to get
involved in politics”; “businessmen, compared to the rest of the population, tend to be
quite active in politics”, and “most studies show labouring persons disinclined, on the
whole, to become involved actively in politics”3. These differential behaviours have
been explained by a wide variety of intervening variables or causal mechanisms, most
conspicuously: inequality of resources (including economic resources, time, knowledge
and social skills); differential civic norms; membership in social networks that entail
selective exposure to mobilization factors; and differential recruitment practices by
political organizations (Verba et al., 1995; Nagel, 1987; Leighley, 1995).
The main nuance that recent research has added to this standard view is a more fine-
grained description of variations in the behaviour of professionals and managers. Even
though as a whole they are overrepresented in all kinds of political activity, they can be
divided into two groups that display a more intense leaning towards certain forms of
action: towards protest activities in the case of “socio-cultural professionals” and
towards more conventional participation in the case of managers and other
professionals. This distinction fits with the evidence of more extensive differences in
their overall socio-political orientations, which have been well documented – even if
there is heated controversy on their explanation (Brint, 1984; Lamont, 1987; Kriesi,
1989; Macy, 1988; Wallace and Jenkins, 1995; Jenkins and Wallace, 1996; De Graaf
and Steijn, 1996; Caínzos, 2004; Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf, 2004; Güveli et al.,
2007a, 2007b; Gayo-Cal, 2007).
A last point worthy of mention is the fact that research indicates that inequalities of
voice among classes appear to be no lower in the emerging – or “elite-challenging” –
forms of participation than in more traditional “elite-oriented” actions (Stolle and
Hooghe, 2005). Quite the opposite, evidence tends to convey the impression that
inequalities are isomorphous and cumulative across forms of participation (see, e.g.,
Norris, 2002; Caínzos, 2004).
Our main purpose in this paper is to bridge the gap between general debates on the
decline of class and the empirical research on – and explanations of – political
participation. First, we will try to empirically adjudicate between two contrary
expectations: on the one hand, the prediction of independence between class and
political action that can be derived from theories of class decomposition; on the other
hand, support for the persistence of class differentials resulting from empirical studies
of the determinants of political participation. If we find significant inequalities among
classes, the second objective will be to describe the overall pattern of those
inequalities, testing whether they follow the lines established by previous research.
3
An overview of recent research in this tradition can be found in Conway (2000), Schlozman (2002),
Verba et al. (2004), and Schlozman, Page et al. (2005). In keeping with this tradition, we talk about
(class) “inequality” in political participation, instead of (class) “differences” or “variations”, assuming
that differential patterns of political involvement imply inequalities of political voice that generate both
inequalities in the social visibility of specific class interests and demands and unequal influence on the
political decision-making process.
6
Finally, we will make a comparative evaluation of the overall level of class inequality
existing in different kinds of action, in order to check whether inequalities in “new”
forms of participation are weaker than inequalities in “traditional” political activities, or if
they follow a different pattern.
Though it has implications for the validity of alternative understandings of the dynamics
of class politics in contemporary societies, the main aim of our study is descriptive. In
Mertonian terms, we try to “establish a phenomenon”, i.e., to depict a social regularity
before proceeding to explain it (Merton, 1987). Further research must be made to
identify the social mechanisms underlying the causal relationship between class and
participation and to disentangle the effects of class from the effects of other variables,
including education and income.
2. Data and methods.
For this study, we used data from the first wave of the “European Social Survey” (2002-
2003), which includes twenty two European countries. Our analysis includes all but two
of these countries: Israel and Austria. Israel was excluded because of the peculiarities
of its political and social environment. Austria was excluded due to the existence of
errors in the coding of occupation.
We examined the patterns of association among three variables: country, occupational

class and political participation.
Class was measured using a nine-category schema that parallels the distinctions made
in the well-known EGP class scheme, but departs from it in three important ways.
Firstly, employers are allocated to a unique entrepreneurial class, separate from
managers and professionals, without taking into consideration the number of
employees4. Secondly, the professional-managerial (“service”) class is divided into two
different categories: socio-cultural professionals (i.e., professionals in education and
social services, humanist intellectuals, and creative and artistic professionals) and
managers and all other professionals. Thirdly, unskilled workers in the service sector
are allocated to a separate category. Hence, the resulting categories are:
- socio-cultural professionals (SCP),

- managers and other professionals (MP),
- non-manual routine workers (NMW),
- employers in manufacturing, construction and services (EMP),
- self-employed workers in manufacturing, construction and services (SELF),
- farmers (FARM),
- unskilled service workers (USW),
- skilled manual workers in manufacturing and construction (SMW),
- semi- and unskilled manual workers in manufacturing and construction and
agrarian workers (UMW)5.
4
However, both self-employed professionals and professionals who hire employees are allocated a class
position (either SCP or MP) according to their occupational title, without considering their employment
status.
5
Details of the operationalization of this class schema on the basis of information regarding employment
situation and of ISCO88-COM codes can be obtained from the authors. All individuals who can be
allocated into a class position have been included in the analysis. Wherever it has been possible,
allocation has been made on the basis of the respondent’s current or last job; in other cases, allocation to a
“mediated” class position has been made on the basis of information on the current or last job of
respondent’s partner. Data available in the ESS do not allow to impute a class position when neither
respondent nor his or her partner have ever had a job.
7
Throughout this article, the term class is used to refer to broad categories defined by
their common position in basic employment – or production – relationships, i.e., the
kind of highly aggregated categories that have traditionally received that name in
mainstream class analysis. It has been suggested, however, that the most appropriate
level of aggregation in class analysis is not that of these “big classes” but of individual
occupations (Grusky and Sorensen, 1998; Grusky, Weeden and Sorensen, 2000;
Grusky and Weeden, 2001; Grusky and Galescu, 2005). Whatever the merits of this
view, there are still good reasons – both of principle and of a pragmatic nature – for
adopting a “big classes” approach to the analysis of inequalities in political
participation. Firstly, the call to taking the occupation as relevant unit of aggregation
seems particulary compelling when the analysis is focused on social behaviors that
depend on the existence of strongly institutionalized labour market relationships (and,
above all, when it deals with the structuring of subjective perceptions about those
relationships). However, class differentials in political activity do not fit this description,
and can better be understood as an example of “conscious but not class-conscious”
behavior (Breen and Rottman, 1995), akin to what Weber (1922 [1978], 929) named
“mass action”, i.e., the production of an essentially homogeneous response to shared
social conditions of action. Secondly, as Grusky and Galesku (2005, 63-65) recognize,
the degree of occupationalization of the labour market and the relative importance of
aggregate (“big classes”) and disaggregate (“occupational”) class structuration is cross-
nationally variable, something that undermines the plausibility of a really general case
for the “microclasses” approach. Thirdly, the returns of a disaggregated analysis of
class patterns in social action and attitudes are significant when we look at the upper
zones of the class structure but are rather small when attention is paid to its lower
levels (see, e.g., Svallfors, 2006, 145-150, 169). Occupational distinctions within the
professionals are particularly important and our class schema is sensible to this
heterogeneity, allocating the socio-cultural professionals to a specific category. Internal
differentiation is also quite salient in the case of the self-employed (Carabaña, 1997;
Arum and Müller, 2004), but we cannot draw similar distinctions inside this class due to
its small size in the samples we analyze. Finally, the disagregated strategy for class
analysis is virtually impracticable in the context of comparative survey data research,
because of limitations in sample sizes – the ESS not being an exception.
Five dichotomous measures of political participation were used, each of them covering
a specific form of political action: voting in the last general election, taking part in legal
public demonstrations, boycotting certain products, signing petitions, and participation
in at least one of three kinds of “conventional” political activities (contacting politicians,
working for a political party, working for another kind of civic association)6.
Information on the distribution of class by country and on the overall rates of

participation in the five kinds of action in every country can be found in tables A1 and
A2 of the Appendix7.
For each of the five modes of participation, a separate analysis was carried out,
according to the pattern of association in the three-way class*participation*country
6
Wording of the questions used can be found in the survey documentation available through the ESS
homepage (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org).
7
Because of an error in the CAPI programming of the questionnaire, Norwegian data lack some
information needed to distinguish among farmers, employers and self-employed workers. All
interviewees having employees or working on their own have been allocated to the self-employed class,
and cells for employers and farmers have been treated as “structural zeros”. Hence, estimates for self-
employed workers in Norway should not be taken as reliable.
8
contingency table (henceforth, K*P*C). Analyses were run using the statistical software
package LEM for Windows, a program for the analysis of categorical data developed
by J. Vermunt. We applied log-linear models in order to achieve a parsimonious
description of the relationships among these variables. The models were identified
setting to zero the value of the parameters for Spain (reference country) and for the
“semi- and unskilled manual workers in manufacturing and construction, and agrarian
workers” (reference class category). Our starting-point and baseline was the model that
includes the main-effect terms (K, P, C) and two first-order interaction terms (KC, PC).
It allows cross-country variations in class composition and in overall level of
participation but assumes that class and participation are independent of each other. If
this model shows a good fit to the data, the hypothesis of the political irrelevance of
class will receive full support. In a second step, we applied the model that assumes the
existence of a constant association between class and participation, i.e., the model
involving three main-effect terms and three first-order interaction terms ({KC, PC, KP}).
In this case, the basic message of the model would be that neither the form nor the
magnitude of the association between class and participation varies across countries.
Finally, we added a log-multiplicative layer effect or unidiff model that allows cross-
country variation in the magnitude of the overall association between class and political
action, even though it assumes that the pattern of association is uniform and the
relative distance among classes is constant across countries ({KC, PC, *KP})8.
It became evident that these three types of models did not have a good fit to the data
for any of the forms of participation. This means two things: first, the relationship
between class and participation is not negligible, and second, the pattern of association
is neither constant nor uniform. The only way it can be appropriately represented is by
including specific country peculiarities in the picture. Hence, second-order interaction
between class, participation and country must be taken into account by including some
KPC parameters in the model to capture the specific forms of class*participation
association in the different countries.
These parameters were determined using a two-step inductive approach. First, taking
the saturated model as a starting-point, we deleted all KPC parameters that were not
significantly different from zero for a given confidence level (p<.10 or p<.20), until we
found a model that had a good fit to the data. In this way we obtained a model defined
by the restriction that the value of a particular subset of the KPC parameters must be
zero. It revealed that national specificities should be understood as deviations from a
quite regular cross-country pattern that we will describe, using Spain as the reference
country, and that these deviations can be captured by a rather small number of
parameters9. In a further step we simplified the model, imposing an additional set of
constraints (“equality restrictions”) that equalize the KPC parameters across countries
for each class category whenever possible. This means that specific national
8
The unidiff model (or log-multiplicative layer effect model) was independently developed by Xie
(1992) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) for the analysis of mobility tables. Its use has become
widespread in other fields of research, including research on class voting (see, e.g., Heath, 1995, and a
brief discussion in Manza et al., 1995, 154).
9
This kind of parameterization (setting to zero the value of a reference category) requires to keep in mind
that KPC parameters must always be interpreted in comparative terms and not isolated from the KP
parameters that depict the basic association pattern. The choice of reference category entails to select a
point of view from which the comparison is made and there is no single rule of thumb to make it, because
there is no country that could be seen as a “normal” or “natural” reference. Here, Spain has been chosen
as reference because the sample is quite large, the distribution of most variables is less skewed than in
other countries and it fits fairly well the pattern of association expected on the basis of classic research on
participation – offering a substantively clear starting-point for comparisons. Of course, choice of
reference was also needed for the other variables included in the analyses: class (unskilled manual
workers in industry and construction) and participation (non-participant).
9
deviations from the general pattern of association that we have identified can
themselves be reduced to quite a narrow pattern of variation. Finally, we imposed
constraints forcing some of the KP parameters to be equal, i.e., we tried to use a
common parameter to represent the behaviour of more than one occupational class in
order to test some general hypotheses about the relative levels of political activism that
characterise the different classes.
As we have mentioned, our approach is both inductive and descriptive, but three
important qualifiers must be included. Firstly, we will actually be adjudicating between
two opposite hypotheses about the impact of class location on political participation:
the hypothesis of independence – which we take as a rather extreme reading of the
theories of “the death of class”; and the contrary hypothesis of robust association with a
regular cross-national pattern - which, if confirmed, would be taken here as support for
the idea of the ongoing political significance of class. We are conscious that a full test
of these theses would require the analysis of long-term longitudinal data, because the
finding of an association between class and participation could always be ruled out as
the remnant of an older and stronger association. However, at least to our knowledge,
the kind of longitudinal data needed for this purpose are not available and we think that
the analysis of comparative cross-national data from a large number of advanced
societies allows an indirect and tentative test. The existence of a consistent pattern of
association between class and participation across countries and forms of political
actiont could be seen, at least, as a finding that diverges from the statement that
classes are disappearing. Such an interpretation would be even more solid if the
pattern of association that emerged was in agreement with expectations derived from
classical research on political participation.
Secondly, in the last step of our analysis we compared two opposing hypotheses in
terms of the overall level and shape of the inequalities that are present in different
types of participation: the expectation that similar levels – and a common pattern – of
inequality will be found in all forms of action, and the expectation that “new”, less
conventional and “elite-challenging” political activities lead to a decrease in inequality –
or at least to inequalities of a different form.
Finally, although our modelling strategy is mainly inductive, it is possible to advance

some strong expectations as to the relative degree of activism of each class, based on
empirical generalizations emerging from decades of research. They are summarized in
Table 1, and our analysis can be read as a test of their validity. Entries in the second
column of the table symbolize the level of activism expected of each class. They
translate in terms of our class schema the general propositions in which, as told in
previous section, Milbrath and Goel (1977) summarized the findings of classic research
on participatory inequalities, which have received additional support from more recent
research. Professionals and managers are expected to be the most participative
classes, closely followed by employers and nonmanual employees, due both to their
privileged access to different kind of resources and social networks and to their
exposure to civic norms and organizational appeals that facilitate participation. These
expectations could be understood as an application of the main tenets of the civic
voluntarism model of political participation (Verba et al., 1995) to the case of class
inequalities. The third column reports what could be called the “participatory
specializations” expected of some classes – i.e., the kinds of action towards which
these classes are supposed to have an especially intense propensity or aversion. Once
again, these expectations are built on the basis of the findings of previous and more
partial studies, and the causal mechanisms – and, hence, the theoretical understanding
– underpinning them are complex and quite controversial. For instance, the propinquity
of sociocultural professionals to become involved in protest activities has been
variously attributed to occupational subcultures, self-selection in specific occupations,
10
educational effects and disproportionate presence in the public sector (Brint, 1984;
Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; Macy, 1988; Wallace and Jenkins, 1995; Jenkins and
Wallace, 1996; De Graaf and Steijn, 1996; Caínzos, 2004; Van de Werfhorst and De
Graaf, 2004; Güveli et al., 2007a, 2007b; Gayo-Cal, 2007).
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3. Results.
Table 2 displays goodness of fit statistics for the models fitted in each of the steps we
have just listed. There are five panels, one for each form of political activity. The first
panel gives information on the models for electoral participation. It is fairly evident that
there is not even a minimally satisfactory fit until KPC parameters are introduced into
the model. Regardless of the goodness of fit measure chosen, the model for
conditional independence between class and participation fits very poorly. The
inclusion of KP parameters improves the fit, but its values are still far from acceptable.
Hence, we can confidently state that a significant association exists between class and
voting, and that this association is subject to cross-national variations that go beyond
any log-multiplicative relationship.
The fourth model takes into account all KPC parameters of the saturated model that
cannot be said to be equal to zero, with p<.10. This produces a further reduction of L2.
However, in order to get a model that fits well the data, it is necessary to relax the
requirement imposed by the previous model, moving up the probability threshold, to
p<.20. The resultant model exhibits an optimal fit, shown in the low and non-significant
value of L2 and in the value of AIC; but is not very parsimonious, as can be seen by
comparing the BIC values in this model and the previous one. For this reason we have
added a new set of restrictions – equality constraints – in order to avoid redundant
parameters, equalizing across countries any KPC parameters that have similar values.
This yields a model that simultaneously optimizes L2, BIC and AIC.
Panel 1 of table 3 provides some parameters from the selected model for electoral
participation. PC parameters depict variation in the overall level of participation among
countries. KP parameters describe the general pattern of association between class
and electoral participation across countries, such as this is revealed taking Spain as
the reference country. An examination of these parameters reveals some general
trends: employers, self-employed, and professional and non-manual employees are
overrepresented among voters, while all types of manual workers are
underrepresented. The right side of the table presents KPC parameters that illustrate
the peculiarities in the behaviour of certain classes in specific countries. These
parameters can be constrained to be equal for some sets of countries, making it
possible with only eleven parameters to represent the entire array of national
deviations from the pattern previously defined in reference to Spain. Without going into
great detail, three points deserve particular attention. Firstly, although there are quite a
11
few countries where at least one class shows a behaviour that deviates in some degree
from the pattern defined by the KP parameters, in most countries the number of
deviations is small and most deviations have a positive sign. This means that they
usually signal an increase in the relative difference in electoral activism between that
class and unskilled manual workers in comparison with the reference country – Spain.
Only in a few cases do we find that inequalities are cancelled or reversed. Secondly, in
three countries (Germany, The Netherlands and Finland) several classes show
overrepresentation among voters (in comparison with the UMW) that is significantly
higher than what would be suggested by the KP parameters10. Finally, a few
parameters have a particularly conspicuous value or sign: they refer to farmers in
France and employers in Belgium and Sweden.
On the whole, the results we have just summarized suggest a significant and
substantively relevant association between class and electoral participation. Overall,
the pattern of this association is quite regular throughout European countries. This
finding is particularly telling because previous research has shown that, at least in
Europe, political inequalities of voice are usually smaller in voting than in other forms of
political activity (Parry et al., 1992; Topf, 1995; Anduiza, 1999; Norris, 2002; Teorell et
al., 2007). This has usually been explained by the relatively lower costs of voting and
by the fact that elections form part of the institutional core of liberal democracies (to the
extent that in some countries voting is compulsory). The resources and effort that
political parties invest in mobilizing voters generally exceed what is available to actors
who promote other kinds of political activity. Thus, the replication of our modelling
strategy in the relationship between class and other forms of political participation
should reveal a robust association between these variables – rejecting the hypothesis
of the political irrelevance of class. The results presented in panels 2 to 5 of Table 2
and in panels 2 to 5 of Table 3 meet this expectation.
Looking first at table 2, it can be seen that the simplest models (i.e., the model of
conditional independence between class and participation, the model of constant
association and the uniform difference model) show a very poor fit for all forms of non-
electoral political action. Once again, it is necessary to add some KPC parameters in
order to satisfactorily model the cross-national variation of the relationship between
class and participation. However, in all cases, after dispensable KPC parameters are
erased from the saturated model and equality constraints are imposed, it is possible to
obtain a model that fits well the data, using relatively few KPC parameters (eight
parameters for participation in demonstrations, nine for signing of petitions and for
“conventional” political activities, and ten for boycotting products). The final model
consistently offers a very good fit.
In spite of similarities in the number of KPC parameters included in the preferred model
for all forms of participation, it is worth pointing out that without the equality restrictions
(that is to say, if we only impose KPC=0 constraints), the number of KPC parameters
needed to capture cross-national variation in the class*participation association differs
greatly among the four kinds of political action. In the case of both participation in
demonstrations and signing of petitions, there are relatively few deviations from the
pattern that uses Spain as the reference point. The opposite is found when measuring
product boycotting and “conventional” participation: here the number of required KPC
parameters increases greatly, suggesting that the country that we have taken as a
reference (Spain) does not provide the norm for defining the shape of class inequalities
10
This should not be taken as an indication of a particularly high level of overall inequality in electoral
participation in these countries, because it is due to the low participation rate of the reference class
(UMW) and does not affect the relative distances among the other classes.
12
in these two forms of political action and some additional information is needed to
represent the behaviour of some classes in other countries11.
Panels 2 to 5 of table 3 reveal a nuance to the last point: the KPC parameters for
boycott and “conventional” participation almost always have a negative sign, indicating
that in these forms of participation the difference in activism between unskilled manual
workers and members of other classes is especially high in Spain.
A closer examination of table 3 shows a general picture of participatory inequalities in

non-electoral activities. What stands out first is the pervasive polarization between
professional and non-manual workers (the most active classes) and manual workers
(the least active categories). Employers and self-employed individuals tend to be
overrepresented when compared with manual workers - with the very foreseeable
exception of participation in demonstrations - and are especially prone to be involved in
“conventional” politics. Finally, farmers show the greatest variability in behaviour from
one form of activity to another and across countries.
Of course, caution is needed when interpreting the KP parameters, keeping in mind

what has been said regarding the rather atypical participatory profile found in Spain –
our reference country – in the instances of boycott and “conventional” political
activities. However, in most cases the KPC parameters attenuate the magnitude of the
differences among classes but do not reverse their direction or cancel them. There are
four major exceptions to this rule. Firstly, there is a cluster of countries (Luxembourg,
Sweden, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Greece, Great Britain and Ireland) where
farmers are much more involved in protest activities (demonstrations or signing
petitions) than unskilled workers (the reference category)12. Therefore, these countries
depart from the pattern of extremely low participation of farmers in this kind of actions,
which is found in Spain and certain other countries with a significant proportion of
farmers in their class structure (such as Finland, Poland, Italy, Portugal and France).
Secondly, there are four countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Hungary and Poland) where
unskilled workers in the service sector participate in product boycotts at a particularly
low rate. Thirdly, it appears possible to make a distinction between two large groups of
countries according to the probability that employers will become involved in boycotts.
In Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Slovenia, Greece, Italy and Great Britain, employers
do not differ significantly from manual workers; but in all the other countries
entrepreneurs are relatively more prone to this kind of action. Finally, something similar
can be seen in the case of self-employed workers and “conventional” participation:
they are among the overrepresented classes in ten countries (with a level of
participation similar to that of non-manual employees), while they do not deviate (or, in
the case of Portugal, deviate in a negative way) from the behaviour of unskilled
workers in the other ten countries.
Taken as a whole, these and other deviations from the pattern of participatory
inequalities found using Spain as a reference cannot be easily explained in terms of a
typology of countries based on criteria with clear substantive meaning and common
usage in comparative political studies. Nor do they seem to be correlated with any
conceivable indicator of “degree of post-modernization”. It is only possible to state that
11
It could be argued that this invalidates the choice of Spain as reference category. However, had we
taken another country as reference, similar problems would have emerged, because no country displays
the basic pattern of association for all forms of participation without some added specificities in the
behaviour of some classes. The main point to stress is the need to keep in mind the relative nature of the
parameters and to interpret them accordingly.
12
It should be noted, however, that in most of these countries (all but Greece and Ireland) estimations of
the parameters for farmers are based on a tiny number of cases.
13
there are some countries, like Sweden, that present a larger number of deviations from
the reference country, at least in some forms of action (e.g., boycotts and
“conventional” participation).
To summarize, using Spain as reference country, we identified a pattern of class

inequalities in political participation and found significant deviations from this pattern for
some countries and some classes. These deviations were captured with relatively few
parameters, and fewer still were needed when we imposed a set of equality restrictions
that constrain KPC parameters to be equal for each class category across countries
wherever possible. National peculiarities in the behaviour of particular classes can be
reduced to a rather narrow pattern of variation, even when this pattern is different for
each type of action and cannot be matched with theory-based typologies of “families of
countries”.
A further step in our analysis led us to impose additional constraints on our models,
forcing some of the KP parameters to be equal, using a common parameter to depict
the behaviour of more than one class in order to test our general hypotheses about the
relative levels of political activism that can be expected from different classes. Table 4
shows that these additional restrictions do not lower the goodness of fit of the models
in any significant way. All models fit very well the data, and the improvement in both
BIC and AIC values suggests an optimal balance between information and parsimony.
The KP parameters exhibited in Table 5 help us grasp the relative levels of activism of
different classes across all forms of participation. The first thing to highlight is the
polarization between the upper and lower zones of the class structure. On one end of
the scale are the professionals, managers, employers and non-manual employees,
who are all overrepresented in all forms of political action, with the exception of
entrepreneurs in public demonstrations. On the other end are unskilled manual
workers, who tend to show the lowest propensity to be involved in political activity;
much the same can be said – with minor variations – about skilled and service workers.
Beyond this crude dichotomy, some distinctions can be made within each group.
Firstly, socio-cultural professionals stand out as the class category most prone to
participate in any form of action considered here. In terms of activism, they are always
followed by other professionals and managers, and in some cases they are joined by
non-manual employees and/or entrepreneurs. At the other extreme of the participation
continuum we find more homogeneity. It is worth mentioning that unskilled service
workers are slightly more inclined than the UMW to engage in boycotts, petition-signing
and conventional political activities, though to a lesser extent and in a degree similar to
that of skilled manual workers. The behaviour of self-employed people and farmers
tends to blur this neat dual picture. At first glance, self-employed people follow – in a
subdued fashion – a pattern similar to that of employers; but in some forms of action
such as petition-signing and participation in demonstrations, they behave in the same
way as unskilled service workers or manual workers in general. Farmers are quite
atypical because they are overrepresented in the kinds of activity that are channelled
through formal institutions – voting and conventional politics – but are strongly reluctant
to become involved in other types of action, and particularly in protest actions like
demonstrations or the signing of petitions.
14
If we go into more detail and look at particular parameters, two additional points seem
especially remarkable. Firstly, the activist profile of socio-cultural professionals – which
is pervasive across all forms of participation – reaches its peak in the case of boycotts,
where the parameter for this class is almost twice as large as that of the next category.
Secondly, although the profile of employers is quite consistent and we can usually
regard them as a fairly participative class, two features of their behaviour stand out:
they match the professionals and move up to the top layer of the participatory ranking
in conventional activities, but rank equal to farmers in their relative aversion to
participating in public demonstrations.
Looking at Table 5 from another perspective, it is possible to discern some differences

among forms of action. Moving from the left to the right of the table we see a
decreasing number of class categories with participation above that of unskilled
workers, and the distance between the most activist and the least activist groups
becomes greater. A binary pattern can be perceived under this variation, with less
polarization in electoral and conventional politics and more marked polarization in
protest activities.
This impression was confirmed by the measures of overall inequality in each form of
participation summarized in Table 6. We used a measure proposed by Goodman
(1991, 1089), commonly used to analyse class voting and political cleavages in general
and usually known as kappa index. It is the standard deviation of the KP log-linear
parameters across all categories of K. The index was computed for both the final model
and the reduced model, in order to check the consistency of the results.
Inconsistencies are possible, either from the loss of information in the last step of our
analysis or due to the main limitation of the kappa index: that it is computed on the
basis of point estimates of every parameter, ignoring variations in their accuracy levels.
This makes it particularly responsive to unstable estimators. In general, findings were
consistent for each form of participation: the ordering of political activities by the degree
of class inequality was largely independent of the model chosen. The lowest inequality
was found in voting, followed by conventional participation, while protest activities
showed the highest levels of inequality, with boycott at the top position. The only
discrepancy between models had to do with demonstrations – which were virtually
identical to boycotts in the final model and to petition signing in the reduced model.
However, this incongruity should not be overemphasized, since it is entirely due to the
extreme value of the parameter for farmers in the final model. This parameter can be
decreased in the reduced model without significantly affecting the goodness of fit.
4. Discussion.
We began this paper by asking whether class inequalities continue to have political
relevance in advanced post-industrial societies. This question arises because a broad
array of influential theories has suggested that the logic of social change has lead to –
or is leading to – the “death of class”. It is not easy to give a categorical answer to this
question because the very idea of the “death of class” is evasive and its proponents
tend to be unclear about what kind of evidence would be necessary to confirm or reject
it. This task is especially difficult when attention is focused on a field – such as political
15
participation – in which there is shortage of longitudinal data and long-term trends in
the impact of class therefore cannot be traced.
We deduced that a plausible indirect strategy for dealing with this question would be to
run a comparative cross-national analysis. If we found a consistent pattern of
association between class and participation across countries and forms of political
action, this could be taken as evidence supporting the ongoing relevance of class. At
the very least, it could be seen as a finding that diverges from the statement that
classes are disappearing. Such an interpretation would be even more solid if the
pattern of association that emerged was in agreement with expectations derived from
classical research on political participation.
What kind of evidence would counterbalance the idea of the “death of class”? This is a
delicate question since the most obvious way to support the “death of class” would be
to demonstrate conditional independence between class and political action. However,
this test suffers from two shortcomings. On the one hand, it is too stringent. It is
reasonable to think that, even if class were basically irrelevant for political life, with
large samples and a relatively large number of countries, class and political
participation would be unlikely to appear statistically unrelated. Therefore, it would be
difficult to fully satisfy the demand for complete independence. On the other hand, as
“death of class” theories tend to see class decomposition as an ongoing process and
do not specify the threshold beyond which societies become “classless”, defenders of
these theories can always rule out evidence contrary to independence by arguing that
the observed association is simply a remnant of the past, because classes have not yet
come to an end. For this reason, we relaxed the test of this hypothesis: occasional
evidence of association between class and participation would be seen as compatible
with the “death of class” view, while only the pervasiveness of the association across
countries and forms of participation would provide strong basis to reject it.
The main lesson that can be drawn from the findings reported in the previous section is
quite straightforward: in the field of political participation, class still matters. A
significant and substantively meaningful association between class and political action
can be observed in most European countries. With cross-sectional data, it is impossible
to make any statement on the temporal evolution of the strength of this association, but
its consistency and pervasiveness across countries with quite different economic,
social and political arrangements and histories does not square with a picture of
general class decomposition – and, more specifically, of breakdown of class politics.
The crucial point is not just that models of conditional independence have a poor fit to
the data on all types of political activity, but that the relationship between class and
political action is present in all countries and follows a fairly regular pattern, although it
cannot be formally depicted as being constant – or even uniform – across countries
(i.e., models of constant association or unidiff models do not show a good fit). National
deviations from this pattern (represented in our models by KPC parameters) can be
seen as isolated peculiarities expressing the behaviour of certain classes in specific
countries, consisting mostly of changes in the intensity – not in the direction – of their
common behavioural propensities, and should probably be understood as the outcome
of short-term contextual factors. Taken as a whole, the evidence offered in this paper
seems most compatible with the idea of a continuing political relevance of class,
contrary to the prophecies of class decomposition and in keeping with the findings of
research both on class voting and on the relationship between class and political
preferences which have questioned the “new orthodoxy” of declining political
significance of class (e.g., Müller, 1998; Evans, 1999, 2000; Caínzos, 2001; Carabaña,
2001; Elff, 2004; Brooks et al., 2006; Barone et al., 2007). This general conclusion
receives further support from the results of our comparison of the overall levels of class
16
inequality in different kinds of political action, and from a more detailed description of
the behaviour of particular classes.
Our findings on the typical behaviour of each class – summarized in the KP parameters
of the final model – tended to be in agreement with the expectations we had developed
on the basis of previous research (see Table 1), and showed no signs of radical
changes. An overall reading of all activities confirmed the idea of a sort of “participatory
ladder” in which three main levels can be distinguished: professionals and managers
are located at the top, manual workers at the bottom, and employers, self-employed
and non-manual employees somewhere in-between. The behaviour of farmers was
especially variable from one form of action to another, which made it more difficult to
locate them on one single level of the “ladder”. Examining each of the nine classes
provided some more fine grained conclusions. As predicted, professionals and
managers were the most participative category, but the two classes of professionals
that we had distinguished turned out to be more divergent than we had expected. They
diverged not only in their relative preference for different forms of action but also in
their overall level of activism. Fitting well with previous studies, socio-cultural
professionals demonstrated the highest rates of participation in all forms of action while
demonstrating a relative specialization in actions that fit under the heading of protest
activity: participating in boycotts, demonstrations and the signing of petitions. Other
professionals and managers participated at somewhat lower rates in all but the
“conventional” activities, which – as expected – were their preferred domain of action.
The difference between both types of professionals regarding attendance at
demonstrations was sizeable, which confirms a recurrent finding of recent research, but
it was not clear that this should be taken as something qualitatively different from what
happens with boycotts. Non-manual employees showed a consistent profile of fairly
high activism across all forms of action, confirming the expectation that they would
occupy a middle position between professionals and manual workers. Employers also
tended to be at a mid-point, but with two peculiarities that were in keeping with what
previous work has suggested: they ranked equal to professionals in conventional
participation and were one of the classes most averse to involvement in
demonstrations. The behaviour of self-employed workers was somewhat ambiguous,
mirroring employers in some aspects and manual workers in others. Farmers were
characterized by a low overall level of participation, though they exhibited quite
extreme fluctuations across different forms of action. They were more likely than
manual workers to vote or to join conventional activities, but were equally unwilling to
become involved in boycotts and were the most reluctant class to sign petitions or take
part in demonstrations. Looking at the three classes of manual workers, we found more
similarities than differences. Contrary to our expectation of greater participation among
skilled workers, unskilled and skilled workers in manufacturing, construction and
agriculture were almost indistinguishable. Differences were extremely weak and
confined to conventional political actions and the signing of petitions. Unskilled service
workers had almost the same behaviour pattern, with only a slight overrepresentation
in petition-signing and boycotting. These patterns of class differentiation in political
participation basically coincided with the findings of previous research, which increases
our scepticism about the decline of class thesis.
The same can be said of the comparative results of the overall levels of inequality in
different forms of participation. Following the views of class decomposition, we would
expect to find less class inequality in the “new” or expanding forms of activity –
boycotts, demonstrations and other acts of protest. Yet the main findings of our
analysis pointed in the opposite direction: these forms of action demonstrated greater
involvement inequalities than conventional activities, while voting was the least unequal
form of participation and other kinds of conventional action fall inbetween.
17
Beyond their immediate significance as a confirmation of the validity of classical
findings on political participation, the interest of these conclusions lies in their
implications for the controversy on the usefulness of the concept of class in the study of
contemporary advanced societies. One focal point of this quarrel has been the
persistence of the impact of class on politics, yet discussions have usually been
restricted to a very narrow field of political behaviour – voting. We have tried to broaden
the scope of the debate, bringing into it evidence related to other forms of political
action that have been extensively studied by a research tradition commonly neglected
in the “death of class” literature. The outcome of this broader view of the relationship
between class and politics tends to reinforce the conclusion that rumours of the death
of class are greatly exaggerated.
Although we have provided evidence supporting the existence of a significant

association between class and political involvement, our work has some limitations that
signal avenues for future research. On the one hand, due to lack of longitudinal data,
we have only been able to make an indirect evaluation of the thesis of the decline of
the political relevance of class. A direct test of this thesis will have to wait until truly
longitudinal data are available. On the other hand, our analysis is of an essentially
descriptive nature. Further research must address the task of indentifying the social
mechanisms underlying the causal relationship between class and participation and
disentangling the effects of class from the effects of other variables, including
education and income.
18
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24
Table 1: Expected behaviour of each class, based on previous research
CLASS Overall level of activism Specialization in particular
forms of activity
Sociocultural professionals ++ + D, + B, + S
Other professionals and
++ + C, - D
managers
Non-manual workers +
Employers + + C, - D
Self-employed +/-
Farmers - - D, - B, - S
Unskilled service workers -
Skilled manual workers in
manufacturing and -
construction
Unskilled manual workers in
manufacturing, construction --
and agriculture
Expectations on over- or under-representation of classes are symbolized by signs ranging from ++ to --

D: demonstrations; B: boycotts; S: signing of petitions; C: conventional political activities
25
Table 2: Goodness of fit statistics for log-linear models for cross-classification of
political participation (P) by class (K) by country (C)
L2 G.L. p BIC AIC
1. Voting in the last general election
Model 1.1.{KC, PC} 829.16 160 .0000 -823.66 509.16
Model 1.2.{KC, PC, KP} 241.11 152 .0000 -1329.07 -62.89
Model 1.3.{KC, PC, *KP} 210.54 133 .0000 -1163.36 -55.46
Model 1.4. {KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.10 178.49 139 .0134 -1257.39 -99.51
Model 1.5.{KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.20 125.13 123 .4296 -1145.47 -120.87
Model 1.6.{KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.20
140.27 141 .5015 -1316.27 -141.73
and equality restrictions
2. Participation in “conventional” political
activities
Model 2.1.{KC, PC} 1114.13 160 .0000 -545.19 794.13
Model 2.2.{KC, PC, KP} 246.58 152 .0000 -1329.78 -57.42
Model 2.3.{KC, PC, *KP} 191.85 133 .0006 -1187.46 -74.15
113.13 143 .9690 -1369.89 -172.87
3. Signing of petitions
Model 3.1.{KC, PC} 1033.60 160 .0000 -624.72 713.60
Model 3.2.{KC, PC, KP} 229.03 152 .0000 -1346.37 -74.97
Model 3.3.{KC, PC, *KP} 191.89 133 .0006 -1186.59 -74.11
135.64 143 .6565 -1346.47 -150.36
4. Boycotting certain products
Model 4.1.{KC, PC} 971.50 160 .0000 -686.75 651.50
Model 4.2.{KC, PC, KP} 257.44 152 .0000 -1317.90 -46.56
Model 4.3.{KC, PC, *KP} 209.32 133 .0000 -1169.10 -56.68
140.78 142 .5132 -1330.91 -143.22
5. Taking part in legal public demonstrations
Model 5.1.{KC, PC} 468.10 160 .0000 -1190.51 148.10
Model 5.2.{KC, PC, KP} 225.24 152 .0000 -1350.45 -78.76
Model 5.3.{KC, PC, *KP} 185.17 133 .0017 -1193.55 -80.83
151.71 144 .3136 -1341.04 -136.29
26
Table 3: Estimated KP, PC and KPC parameters from the final models for cross-
classification of political participation (P) by class (K) by country (C)-
KP KPC
CH DE BE NL LU DK FI SE NO CZ HU SI PL GR IT PT FR GB IE
SCP 1.10
MP .73 .55 .55 -.42 .55 .55
NMW .56 .57 .57 .57 .57 .57
EMP .69 .65 -.96 -.96
SELF .41 .68 .68 -.89
FARM .68 .66 .66 1.5 .66
USW .03 .45 .45 .45
SMW .03 .34 .34
UMW .00
PC -.84 .06 .61 -.02 -.42 1.19 -.31 .42 .34 -.90 .18 .12 -.68 .79 .82 -.34 -.44 -.55 -.07
2. Participation in conventional political activities
KP KPC
SCP 1.20 -.41 -.41 -.41 -.41
MP 1.22 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40 -.40
NMW .75 -.42 -.42 -.42 -.42 -.42 -.42 -.42 -.42 -.42 -.42 -.42
EMP 1.06 -.56 -.56 -.56 -.56 -.56
SELF .79 -.51 -.51 -.51 -.51 -.51 -.51 -.51 -1.37 -.51 -.51
FARM .47 1.00 1.00 1.00
USW .16 -.33 -.33
SMW .24 -.33 -.33 -.33 -.33 -.33
UMW .00
PC .20 .14 .62 .25 .33 .32 .84 .69 .84 .47 -.31 -.59 -.66 -.21 -.45 -.52 .32 -.16 .38
KP KPC
SCP 1.37 -.44 -.44 -.44
MP .88 -.22 -.22
NMW .72
EMP .54 -.82 -.82 -6.63 -.82
SELF .37 .70 -1.90 .70
FARM -.49 .70 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.61 .70 1.61
USW .34
SMW .14 -.38
UMW .00
PC .64 .28 .41 -.10 .14 .14 -.09 .62 .54 -.68 -1.94 -.80 -1.40 -1.87 -.28 -1.45 .42 .65 .14
4. Boycotts
KP KPC
SCP 1.80 -.54 -.54 -.54 -1.04 -.54 -.54 -.54 -.54 -1.04 -1.04 -.54 -.54 -.54
MP 1.00 -.31 -.31 -.31 -.31 -.31
NMW .91 -.39 -.39 -.39 -.39 -.39 -.39 -.39 -.39
EMP .74 -.85 -.85 -.85 -.85 -.85 -.85 -.85
SELF .67 -.58 -.58 -.58 -.58
FARM -.07 .51 1.63 1.63 1.63 .51
USW .36 -.85 -.85 -.85 -.85
SMW .00 .43
UMW .00
PC 1.83 1.32 .53 .06 1.05 1.22 1.41 1.78 .95 .44 -.27 -.30 -.62 .26 .02 -1.03 1.24 1.36 .47
5. Participation in legal public demonstrations
KP KPC
SCP 1.23 -.41 -.41 -1.39
MP .62 -.54 -.54 -.54 -.54 -.54
NMW .42 -.47
EMP -.27 1.65
SELF .02
FARM -.92 1.38 1.38 3.84 1.38 1.38 1.38
USW .02
SMW .09 .89
UMW .00
PC -1.08 -.67 -.76 -1.91 .05 -1.21 -2.48 -1.30 -.88 -1.52 -1.79 -2.30 -2.85 -1.56 -.60 -1.62 -.09 -1.62 -1.09
27
Table 4: Goodness of fit statistics for reduced log-linear models for cross-classification
of political participation (P) by class (K) by country (C)
L2 G.L. p BIC AIC

{KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.20,

equality restrictions for KPC and equality 147.67 146 .4458 -1360.52 -144.33
restrictions for KP
2. Participation in “conventional” political

activities

restrictions for KP

restrictions for KP
4. Boycotting certain products

restrictions for KP
5. Taking part in legal public demonstrations

restrictions for KP
28
Table 5: Estimated KP parameters from reduced models for political participation
Voting in Participation in
Boycotting Taking part in
the last “conventional” Signing of
certain legal public
general political petitions
products demonstrations
election activities
SCP 1.08 1.18a 1.37 1.81 1.20
MP .65a 1.18a .88 .99a .58
NMW .65a .76b .72 .99a .39
EMP .65a 1.18a .54 .71b -.49a
SELF .39 .76b .34a .71b .00b
FARM .65a .47 -.49 .00c -.49a
USW .00b .20c .34a .36 .00b
SMW .00b .20c .14 .00c .00b
UMW .00b .00 .00 .00c .00b
NOTE: Superscripts identify parameters within each column that have been forced to be equal in order to represent
through a single parameter the behavior of several classes. Hence, classes whose parameters have been equalized
form a subset of classes showing the same level of association with participation.
29
Table 6: Overall levels of class inequality in different forms of participation
Forms of political action Kappa index

Final model Reduced model
Voting in the last general election .36 .36
Participation in conventional political activities .43 .44
Signing of petitions .51 .51
Boycotting certain products .57 .57
Participating in legal public demonstrations .56 .50
30
APPENDIX
Table A1: Overall rates of participation in different forms of political action.
Voting Conventional Petition signing Boycotts Demonstrations

Country activities
CH 69 29 39 31 8
DE 85 25 30 26 11
BE 85 34 34 13 8
NL 86 30 22 10 3
LU 65 28 29 16 21
DK 94 29 28 23 8
FI 82 42 24 27 2
SE 87 34 41 32 6
NO 85 42 37 20 9
CZ 66 32 16 11 5
HU 81 16 4 5 4
SI 80 14 12 5 3
PL 66 14 7 4 1
ES 78 24 24 8 17
GR 91 18 5 9 5
IT 89 16 17 8 11
PT 73 14 7 3 4
FR 75 29 35 27 18
GB 72 24 40 26 4
IE 76 29 28 14 7
Total 80 26 24 16 7
31
Table A2: Distribution of class by country (unweighted frequencies).
Country CH DE BE NL LU DK FI SE NO CZ HU SI PL ES GR IT PT FR GB IE Total
Class
SCP 121 182 121 202 97 97 146 148 139 73 72 49 78 62 98 61 53 80 154 99 2132
MP 654 635 419 803 282 333 430 536 497 262 265 292 351 159 254 172 216 351 519 415 7845
NMW 312 358 198 302 142 197 109 177 200 175 83 146 163 137 179 135 146 194 183 186 3722
EMP 69 86 66 75 54 57 59 52 0 24 65 40 56 61 152 77 68 37 54 90 1242
SELF 64 62 83 82 32 36 56 44 235 44 68 53 74 85 255 83 70 96 112 74 1708
FARM 53 34 29 30 60 21 127 27 0 6 19 23 188 84 368 52 32 39 20 143 1355
USW 209 380 209 259 200 220 301 367 352 127 217 130 203 248 226 111 221 219 422 278 4899
SMW 231 493 261 230 200 195 264 219 264 284 300 293 347 283 258 98 260 168 224 218 5090
UMW 110 290 166 140 98 162 201 159 161 243 340 163 276 265 230 143 219 103 222 229 3920
Total with information 1823 2520 1552 2123 1165 1318 1693 1729 1848 1238 1429 1189 1736 1384 2020 932 1285 1287 1910 1732 31913
Without information 217 399 347 241 387 188 307 270 188 122 256 330 374 345 546 275 226 216 142 314 5690
Sample total 2040 2919 1899 2364 1552 1506 2000 1999 2036 1360 1685 1519 2110 1729 2566 1207 1511 1503 2052 2046 37603
32
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Class Inequalities in Political Participation and the ‘Death of Class’ Debate

Article in International Sociology · May 2010

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded ﬁle.

Published in: International Sociology, 25 (3): 383-418, 2010

* University of Santiago de Compostela and “Escola Galega de

** “Escola Galega de Administración Pública”, Santiago de

1. Political participation and the controversy regarding the political

Although it was explicitly presented as an alternative to post-modern theory, the “risk

2. Data and methods.

We examined the patterns of association among three variables: country, occupational

- socio-cultural professionals (SCP),

Information on the distribution of class by country and on the overall rates of

Finally, although our modelling strategy is mainly inductive, it is possible to advance

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

A closer examination of table 3 shows a general picture of participatory inequalities in

Of course, caution is needed when interpreting the KP parameters, keeping in mind

To summarize, using Spain as reference country, we identified a pattern of class

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Looking at Table 5 from another perspective, it is possible to discern some differences

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Although we have provided evidence supporting the existence of a significant

Anduiza Perea, E. (1999): ¿Individuos o sistemas? Las razones de la abstención en

Arum, R.; and W. Müller (2004): “The Reemergence of Self-Employment: Comparative

Brooks, C.; P. Nieuwbeerta; and J. Manza (2006): “Cleavage-based Voting Behavior in

Caínzos, M. (2004): “Desigualdades sociales y participación política en España”. Zona

Carabaña, J. (1997): "Occupational classes inside the petty bourgeoisie". Paper

Carabaña, J. (2001): “Clase, voto y políticas sociales en España, 1982-2000”. Zona

Conway, M.M. (2000): Political Participation in the United States. Washington,

Evans, G. (2000): “The Continued Significance of Class Voting”. Annual Review of

Gayo-Cal, M. (2007): Comportamiento, ideología y actitudes políticas de los

Grusky, D.; and G. Galescu (2005): “Foundations of a neo-Durkheimian class

Heath, A.F. (1995): “Modelling the Class-Party Relationship in Britain, 1964-92”.

Inglehart, R. (1990): Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, Princeton

Inglehart, R. (1997): Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and

Merton, R.K. (1987): “Three Fragments From a Sociologist’s Notebooks: Establishing

Müller, W. (1998): “Klassenstruktur und Parteiensystem. Zum Wandel der

Nagel, J.H. (1987): Participation. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.

Norris, P. (2002): Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing political activism. Cambridge,

Pakulski, J. (2005): “Foundations of a Post-Class Analysis”. In E.O. Wright (ed.):

Rose, R. (1974): Electoral Behaviour: A comparative handbook. London, Collier

Schlozman, K.L. (2002): “Citizen participation in America: What do we know? Why do

Topf, R. (1995): “Electoral participation”. In H.D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs (eds.):

Waters, M. (1994): “Succesion in the Stratification System: A contribution to the ‘death

Weber, M. (1922) [1978]: Economy and Society. Berkeley, University of

Xie, Y. (1992): “The Log-Multiplicative Layer Effect Model for Comparing

Expectations on over- or under-representation of classes are symbolized by signs ranging from ++ to --

L2 G.L. p BIC AIC

{KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.20,

2. Participation in “conventional” political

{KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.10,

{KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.10,

4. Boycotting certain products

{KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.20,

5. Taking part in legal public demonstrations

{KPC} with restrictions KPC =0; p<.10,

Forms of political action Kappa index

Table A1: Overall rates of participation in different forms of political action.

Voting Conventional Petition signing Boycotts Demonstrations

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