Art. 4. Criminal liability.
— Criminal liability shall be although the one who gave the fist blow had no
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Application of Article 4.
Criminal liability is incurred by any person in the cases
mentioned in the two paragraphs of Article 4. This
article has no reference to the manner criminal liability
is incurred. The manner of incurring criminal liability
under the Revised Penal Code is stated in Article 3, that
is, performing or failing to do an act, when either is
punished by law, by means of deceit (with malice) or
fault (through negligence or imprudence).
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible
for all the consequences which may naturally and
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not.
Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony with malice,
he intends the consequences of his felonious act. But
there are cases where the consequences of the
felonious act of the offender are not intended by him. In
those cases, "the wrongful act done" is "different from
that which he intended."
In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person committing a
felony is criminally liable although the consequences of
his felonious act are not intended by him. Thus, where
the death of the 6-year-old victim was brought about by
the rape committed by the accused, it is of no moment
that she died by accident when she hit her head on the
pavement while struggling, because, having performed
an act constituting a felony, he is responsible for all the
consequences of said act, regardless of his intention.
(People vs. Mario Mariano, 75 O.G. 4802, No. 24, June
11, 1979)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural
consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one
does not intend to produce such consequences. (U.S. vs.
Brobst, 14 Phil. 310) Thus, one who fired his gun at B,
but missed and hit C instead, is liable for the injury
caused to C, although the one who fired the gun had no
intention to injure C.
One who gave a fist blow on the head of D, causing the
latter to fall with the latter's head striking a hard
pavement, is liable for the death of D, which resulted
intention to kill D. And one who stabbed another in the
dark, believing that the latter was E, when in fact he was
G, is liable for the injury caused to G, although the one
who stabbed him had no intention to injure G.
Rationale of rule in paragraph 1 of Article 4.
The rationale of the rule in Article 4 is found in the
doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del
mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused). (People vs. Ural, No. L-30801,
March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144)
IMPORTANT WORD S AND PHRASES IN PARAGRAPH 1
OF ART. 4.
1. "Committing a felony."
Paragraph 1 of Art. 4 says that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person "committing a felony," not
merely performing an act. A felony is an act or omission
punishable by the Revised Penal Code. If the act is not
punishable by the Code, it is not a felony. But the felony
committed by the offender should be one committed by
means of dolo, that is, with malice, because paragraph 1
of Art. 4 speaks of wrongful act done "different from
that which he intended."
If the wrongful act results from the imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill of the
offender, his liability should be determined under Art.
365, which defines and penalizes criminal negligence.
The act or omission should not be punished by a special
law, because the offender violating a special law may
not have the intent to do an injury to another. In such
case, the wrongful act done could not be different, as
the offender did not intend to do any other injury.
2. "Although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended."
The causes which may produce a result different from
that which the offender intended are: (1) mistake in the
identity of the victim; (2) mistake in the blow, that is,
when the offender intending to do an injury to one
person actually inflicts it on another; and (3) the act
exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater
than that intended.
Under paragraph 1, Art. 4, a person committing a felony
is still criminally liable even if —
a. There is a mistake in the identity of the victim
— error in personae. (See the case of People vs.
Oanis, 74 Phil. 257) In a case, defendant went
out of the house with the intention of assaulting
Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening,
defendant mistook Mapudul for Dunca and
inflicted upon him a mortal wound with a bolo.
In this case, the defendant is criminally liable for
the death of Mapudul. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil.
605)
b. There is a mistake in the blow — aberratio ictus.

Example: People vs. Mabugat, 51 Phil. 967, where

the accused, having discharged his firearm at Juana
Buralo but because of lack of precision, hit and
seriously wounded Perfecta Buralo, it was held that
the accused was liable for the injury caused to the
latter.

c. The injurious result is greater than that

intended — praeter intentionem.

Example: People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, where the

accused, without intent to kill, struck the victim
with his fist on the back part of the head from
behind, causing the victim to fall down with his
head hitting the asphalt pavement and resulting in
the fracture of his head, it was held that the
accused was liable for the death of the victim,
although he had no intent to kill said victim.

Requisites of paragraph 1 of Art. 4.

In order that a person may be held criminally liable

for a felony different from that which he intended
to commit, the following requisites must be
present:

a. That an intentional felony has been committed;

and

b. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be

the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony committed by the offender. (U.S. vs. Brobst,
14 Phil. 310, 319; U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 14, 19)