T1Home Page PRS Contents TECHNICAL INTERPRETATIONS API Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems GENERAL |General General Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Our interest is in the basis for the "two-thirds rule" given in API 521, and the way in which this should be applied. The code states that, “For relatively low pressure equipment, complete tube failure is not a viable contingency when the design pressure of the low pressure side is equal to greater than two-thirds the design pressure of the high pressure side.” This Tuling is often used to avoid fitting a relief valve on the low pressure side by raising the design pressure to two-thirds of the high pressure side. Does “low pressure side" refer to just the exchanger itself, or to the low pressure ‘system as a whole? There would seem to be two explanations for the code’s guidance. The first is that by increasing the design pressure of the low pressure side, the exchanger construction becomes so robust that tube failure is no longer credible. The second is that if the low pressure side is designed for two-thirds it will have a test pressure (1.5 times design) equal to the design pressure of the high pressure side, and therefore is extremely unlikely to be damaged by any pressure rise caused by internal leakage. The first explanation would require only the low pressure side of th exchanger to be designed for two-thirds, whereas the second would require the whole of the low pressure side to be designed for this. Reply: Increasing the low pressure side design pressure will have little impact on the likelihood of a tube rupture. However, by raising the low pressure side design pressure to a point where the low pressure side test pressure is equivalent to the high pressure side design pressure will ensure that damage to the exchanger due {0/3 ube rupture is extremely unikely. In most stations, this may involve raising the low pressure side design pressure to two-thirds that of the high pressure side. ‘To effectively assess the consequences of a tube leak or rupture, the entire low Bressure system info which the high pressure side can flow should be evaluated ‘The latest edition of RP 521 (the Fourth Edition, March 1997) has an expanded and clarified write-up on the impact of tube ruptures. You might find this information helpful to your understanding of the issues involved. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: It is suspected that the need, or lack of need, for relief protection for heat exchange equipment could be based on the process, process piping components, and process controls for the heat exchange. There are four specific exchanger configurations where | feel interpretation of API 521 is desirable. Case 1: Is a separate relief protection device required to be located on a heat exchanger with no isolation valves between it, and a pressure vessel that contains adequate relief to prevent overpressurization for all contingencies including fire, tube leak/rupture, and control failure. Case 2: A heat exchanger can be isolated from a pressure vessel, The Isolation device is a manually operated gate valve. The pressure vessel contains adequate relief for the heat exchanger failure cases. What protection approach would be suggested by API for the following cases: hermal Relief, Fire, Tube/Leak Rupture, or Heat Source Control Failure. ‘Should the manually operated gate valve be Car Sealed Open to assure an ‘open path to the protection device and calculation done to assure that the allowable pressure is not exceed? Case 3: A heat exch: isolated from a pressure vessel that contains adequate reli exchanger relief cases. The isolation device is a control valve. In the worst case, itis a fall closed control valve. The air tubing to this control valve may fail during a fire causing the control valve to fail closed. What protection does API suggest for the following cases: Thermal Relief, Fire, Tube Leak/Rupture, or heat source control failure? A simple example of such a configuration would be a pump, check valve, and heat exchanger followed by a control valve. Case 4: The same as Case 3, but the control valve air failure position is open. Reply: No pressure relief device is required, assuming that the system has been evaluated for overpressure resulting from a tube rupture and found to be in ‘compliance. If the manually operated gave valve located between the heat ‘exchanger and the downstream vessel is car sealed open, then Case 2 is likeGeneral General (General SECTION 3 3.15.5.2 vessel, regardless of the failure position of the control valve. A pressure relief device is required if the control valve is located between the heat exchanger and the downstream vessel, regardless of the failure position of the control vaive. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: | What is the best approach to design vacuum column bottom under fire? If we need to consider latent heat, what will be the most reasonable value for this? What should be the most reasonable value of relieving temperature? Reply: itis our judgment that the best approach to handle the situation where the ‘vaporization temperature is about equal to the critical temperature and both are above the temperature where the vessel would fail, is to design the PRD for the products of thermal cracking as obtained from the client. The temperature ‘selected for thermal cracking should be below the temperature at which the vessel wil fail, We see no advantage in sizing the PRD for vaporization (or expansion if the fluid is critical) due to fire since the vessel will lose integrity under those conditions. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Does insulation jacketing have to maintain its mechanical strength in a fire environment, and if so, to what degree? Reply: RP 521, Third Edition, indicates that the jacket does not have to maintain its mechanical integrity as long as the insulation system retains its shape, most of its integrity in covering the vessel, and its insulating value during a fire where temperature may be as high as 16600 F. Therefore, it you have an insulation system that meets the above criteria, then the insulation jacket does not have to maintain its mechanical integrity during a fire. Conversely, if the insulating system does not meet the above oriteria, then the insulation jacket must maintain its mechanical integrity during a fire Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Is a pressure relief device necessary if the low pressure side design pressure can be exceeded during a viable contingency even though the low pressure side design pressure is two-thirds of the high pressure design pressure? Reply: Yes. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Regarding section 3.15.6.2 in API 521, would you please clarify for us a few points about jacketing material of construction for fireproof insulation? The wording “jacketing systems that use aluminum exclusively have not demonstrated satisfactory performance" suggests that aluminum is not acceptable. However, earlier wording ("jacketing and coatings may burn off or disintegrate . ..") suggests that it may be acceptable for the jacketing material to burn off as long as the underlying insulating material substantially m 6 its integrity. 1s aluminum jacketing acceptable if the second condition is met? Also, stainless steel jacketing is mentioned as having satisfactory performance, but carbon, galvanized, and aluminum coated steel are not mentioned. Does data exist for steel jacketing? We ‘searched for clarification by attempting to order Publication 2218 (cited in this section) but were told that Publication has been withdrawn. We would reatly appreciate any information or guidance that you can give us on these items. Reply: In your etter, you asked for clarification regarding jacketing materials for insulation used to reduce heat loads during fire exposure. The reference section (3.15.52) provides the guidance you require. Section 3.15.5.2 states: the insulating system should be functional at temperatures up to 1660F (904°C) for at least two hours. Although the jacketing and coating may bum off or disintegrate, the insulation system should retain its shape, most ofits integrity in covering the vessel, and its insulating value. “The finished installation should ensure that fre-protection insulation will not be dislodged when itis subjected to the high pressure water streams used for fire fighting. Insulation system materials selection should consider equipment metallurgy while providing required jacket integity. Stainless steeljacketing and bending have demonstrated satisfactory performance. Exclusively aluminum systems have not demonstrated satisfactory performance. This does not indicate that you cannot use carbon steel, galvanized ‘carbon steel, or even aluminized carbon steel. All it shows is that stainless steel jacketing and banding have maintained their integrity during a fire, whereas ‘aluminum systems have not proven satisfactory for this purpose. “The bottom line is that the system, (regardless of what you install) should be functional at3.18.4 3.484 3.18.2 3.18.2 Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Referring to paragraph 3.18.1 of API RP 521: for relatively low- pressure shell and tube heat exchangers, where low-pressure side has design pressure equal to two-thirds of high-pressure side design pressure, and a complete tube rupture has been excluded, but only minor leakage has been considered, may the pressure relief value on the low-pressure side not be provided? Reply: Yes. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: If the answer to the above question is “yes,” we can conclude that low-pressure side can reach the same pressure of high-pressure side operating pressure, that is well above low-pressure side design pressure. Does this mean that for low-pressure shell and tube heat exchangers it is, acceptable to have a pressure rise of more than 10% of MAWP? Reply: A pressure relief device is always required when a viable contingency will result in the pressure exceeding the maximum allowable working pressure of the equipment in question. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: | am seeking further background to the credibility of a heat exchanger fuptured tube case, referring to section 3.18.2 of AP! 821 of the 1990 3rd Edition. In this section, it is mentioned that if the low pressure side is greater than 2/3 of the high pressure side, a ruptured tube scenario is not a credible case. | am curious to know the reasoning behind this practice. Have all situations been taken into consideration? Reply: The guidelines presented in RP 621 fora tube rupture were established without consideration of a chemical reaction should the high pressure fluid mix with the low pressure fluid. If you have a reactive system, @ careful evaluation ‘would have to be performed to ensure that the reactive situation would not result in the low pressure side pressure exceeding test pressure limits. Whenever high and low pressure side pressures are discussed, itis intended to mean design pressure, not operating pressure. Its stated that a tube rupture is a remote possibility and that if the low pressure side pressure does not exceed its test pressure, then an atmospheric release is an unlikely result, The over pressure allowance per ASME Code is not a factor in this analysis. The intent of this section of RP 521 is clearly (0 reduce the likelihood of serious consequences should the unforeseen happen. Whenever using the guidance in this document, it is appropriate to remember the advice given in paragraph 3.1.1," . .. good engineering judgment, rather than blind adherence to these proposals, should be followed in ach case. The results achieved should be economically, ‘operationally, and mechanically feasible, but in no instance should the safety of a plant or its personnel be compromised.” ‘Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: We would appreciate a clarification of the interp exchanger tube rupture case as given under API RP 521, Sectior Transfer Equipment Failure"), subsection 3.18.2 ("Type of Failure”). When (under 3.18.2) you talk about “design pressure,” what exactly is the meaning. We understand this to mean as follows. Design Pressure (i.c., psig) = Maximum Operating Pressure + Design Margin. The design margin could vary from company to company, but is generally in the range of 5 to. 10% of the maximum operating pressure. Is this close, or does it agree with the publication's understanding of the design pressure? As stated by the tule, the tube failure case should be considered when design pressure on the LPS (low pressure side) is less than 2/3 the design pressure on the HPS jh pressure side), As an overall summary, high pressure gas on the tube side of heat exchanger E-1 is being cooled by relatively low pressure (25 psig) refrigerant on the shell side. Differential pressure across the exchanger is two fold: Case One Gperating Pressure diferential of 315 psig - 25 psi Design Pressure differential of 350 psig - 80 psic LP Side/HP Side = <<2/3 Case Two ‘Operating Pressure differential of 315 psig - 25 psig = 290 psi (unchanged) Design Pressure differential 350 psig - 350 psig = 0 LP Side/HP Side (operating conditions) = <2 LP Side/HP Side (design conditions) =3.18.3 3.18.6 considered since the operating conditions on the exchanger have NOT CHANGED. It is realized from an “overpressure” view point, a tube rupture will not overpressure the shell side. However, since the actual operating differential is still the same, conditions for a tube rupture are the same as before. If you agree, that tube rupture will take place (and even though this, is all right from a shell overpressure viewpoint) should PSV-1 take it account this scenario to prevent overpressure of the rest of the low pressure system on the shell side? Reply: The design pressure ofthe low pressure side does not affect the likelihood of a tube rupture. "However, i the design pressure of the low pressure side is increased to that of the high préssure side as indicated in your Case Two, the potential for overpressure in the low pressure side is nil, Analysis of the entire low pressure system is required. In order to be able to size the pressure relief device on the drum in the low pressure side, an estimate of the flow through the ruptured tube is needed. This can be calculated assuming the pressure differential across the ruptured tube is equal to the high pressure side design pressure less the overpressure when the pressure relief device on the low Pressure side is blowing, pus the low pressure side piping pressure drop. The latest edition of RP 521 (Fourth Edition, March 1997) has an expanded and clarified write-up on the impact of tube ruptures. ‘You might find this information helpful in your understanding of the issues invoived Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: We are currently investigating the effects of heat exchanger tube rupture. in particular, the use of a rupture disk to protect pipework and channelhead during tube rupture has been called into question. In the heat exchangers of concern, an LPG vapor stream is to be cooled by cooling water. In the event of tube rupture, high pressure vapor will expand into the discharge channelhead and pipework. The resultant pressure wave may exceed the yield stress of the tubeside channelhead. To determine if the yield strength is exceeded, a dynamic model was developed in accordance with the paper by V. H. Sumara et al., "Model to Predict Transient Consequences of a Heat Exchanger Tube Rupture.” This article was referred to in API 521, Section 3.18.3. The conclusions of Sumara et al. are that the “relief valves are ineffective and rupture discs marginal” for the purposes of protection from overpressure. Our model would suggest that a Tupture disk or relief valve at the inlet channelhead would serve little purpose, since the pressure peak was delayed and diminished at the inlet ‘channelhead. To resolve this disp: ‘would be comforting to establish whether the dampening effect we pr indeed real. We seek some guidance that could assist us in developing a system to protect the tubeside from overpressure. In particular, what can be expected for this system and what dampening through the system can be expected? Reply: Our experience is that a tube spit with high pressure gas going into low pressure cooling water has resulted in failure of the low pressure side. in ‘addition, modeling by some member companies using different programs has indicated that high peak pressures can be developed in the low pressure side and that fast response pressure relief devices (e.g. rupture disks) are required to relieve the resulting overpressure. However, the experiences of our member ‘companies may not be applicable since the systems may be different from the ‘ones that you have modeled. So, all we can say at this point is that, in lieu of modeling, a low pressure liquid side should be protected from a tube rupture ‘where the high pressure side is vapor and that a fast response pressure relief device (such as @ rupture disk) is required to relieve the resulting overpressure, RP 521 encourages engineers to dynamically analyze the tube spit scenarios it they have the capability to do so. Therefore, if your model has been validated, it would be appropriate for you to use the results from this model rather than provide overpressure protection where it may not be needed, Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question; Can a mult.tube exchanger be considered a "rue double pipe ‘exchanger as described in paragraph 3.18.6 of RP 521 if the tubes are designed as pipes? Reply: Section 3.18.6 states that a spit tube should not be considered when considering over pressure protection of a true double exchange (ie., one pipe inside of another), ‘The reason for this is that (based on experience) the rupture of a pipe in a plant is extremely unlikely. Hence, if the pipes in a double pipe ‘exchanger are designed as any other pipes, it will be extremely unlikely that one of these pipes will rupture. With a mult-tube shell and tube exchanger that has tube wall thicknesses equivalent to similar 3/4” or 1" pipes in the plant, the tubes should have a strenath similar to that of a true double pipe exchanger. However, While itis true that the extra strong walls would reduce the likelihood of a tube split, this exchanger would not generally be considered analogous to a true double pipe. You have mutpte tubes and, therefore, many more linear feet of pipe. You have connections at one or two tube sheets that can fail. And, you3.20 SECTIONS 2 5.4.2.4 Sheets, and possibly enhancing materials, you judge the probabilty of @ tube spit to be comparable with that of a double pipe exchanger, then 3.18.6 states that failure need not be considered a source of pressure relief requirement. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: ! would appreciate your assistance with the interpretation of the ‘API recommendation for backpressure and built-up back pressure on conventional devices which relieve to a closed collection and disposal system. The questions center on API 521 Sections 3.20.3.3 and 5.4.3.1. hypothetical system may be the best way to outline the questions. First, assume 3 PSV’s should relieve simultancously for a power failure event and needs 25 PSI to transport the total required’ flow to the final disposal point. is necessary to adjust the "cold test pressure” for the additional 25 S| to compensate the ‘set” pressure for "back pressure? Please respond considering that the non-relief backpressure is 1 PSIG. Secondly, assume that 2 other PSV's must relieve for a fire event which requires only 15 PSI. for transport. What is the adjustment to "cold test" for the two devices — 26, 16 or 1 PSI? Third, assume that 1 PSV is for a single event like a blocked outlet. Please consider two transport pressure drops -- § PSI and 30 PSI. What is the "cold test pressure" and does the 30 PSI case impact the response to the above cases? Finally, assuming that our interpretation of the API intent is as follows: Pressure drop from fluid flow (i.e. friction) due to simultaneous relief events is treated as a “constant” backpressure. Please confirm that the "variable" or “flow induced” portion of the total backpressure is the portion from the outlet of the device to the combined collection point only. Should our interpretation be incorrect please address the basis for allowing a relief device to open above the vessel design (MAWP) pressure. Reply: First, let us assume that built-up back pressure does not exceed 10% of the pressure relief vaive set pressure, otherwise a conventional pressure relief valve would not be an appropriate choice. Second, since you defined the downstream pressure as 1 psig, this is the superimposed back pressure and is, assumed to be constant. Therefore, the cold differential reset pressure, assuming ‘no temperature correction, would be the set pressure minus ‘psi, Please note that the Cold Differential Test Pressure is independent of the built-up back pressure, Thus when the set pressure is reached, the valve will open. The material flowing through the valve will create a built-up back pressure which will not affect valve capacity provided the built-up back pressure is limited to 10% of the pressure relief valve set pressure. Therefore, the answer to all of your uestions is thatthe cold differentia set pressure is adjusted by 1 ps and the ressure relief device will open at the set pressure which may be set at the IAVIP or lower. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Referring to paragraph 5.4.1.2 of API RP 521, | present the following scenario: In the case of relief due to process upset, the vapor ‘flowing through the vent header to the reliof valve will create a pressure drop less than the 3 percent of the set pressure. However, in the case of fire, the vapor flowing through the vent header to the relief valve and the rupture disc will create a pressure drop above the set pressure of the rupture disc (i.e., once the rupture disc opens, the pressure inside the vessels will be at the 21% allowable overpressure for fire case resulting in a large pressure drop in the header). Does the 3 percent rule need to be applied to the design of the header for the fire case if a rupture disc (sized {for fre) and a relief valve (sized for process) are both located at the end of is header? Reply: The intent of the pressure drop limitation of 3% set pressure is to prevent valve instability of typical pressure relief valves. Vaive instability may result in reduced capacity and valve chattering. However, since your system consists of a pressure/vacuum relief valve and a rupture disc, the pressure drop of 3% of set pressure for typical pressure relief valves may not be applicable here. Itis suggested that you consult with the manufacturer of your pressure/vacuum relief valve to determine if there are inlet piping pressure drop limitations for these devices Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Section 5.4.2.4 of API RP 521 suggests a minimum design pressure of 50 psig. How was this jum design pressure developed? If it was developed based on experience, which spe selected for comparison? Section 5.4.2.4 suggests that this mi design criteria is based on explosion. Is this internal or external explosion? Reply: The design pressure of 50 psig in Section 5.4.2.4 was selected to ensure ‘shat the seal-drum will not rupture due to-an internal exclosion- Should an intemal:APPENDIX Appendix A Appendix A FIGURES Figure C.3.A TABLES Table 8 ‘stoichiometric conditions are unlikely, the pressure rise due to an internal explosion will most likely be less than 8-10 times. Therefore, with a low initial starting pressure and a pressure rise less than expected at stoichiometric conditions for typical refinery gases, itis unlikely that the vessel will reach yield if ithas a design pressure of S0 psig or higher. However, for some gases (€.9., hydrogen-rich streams), a higher design pressure may be appropriate. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Referring to API RP 521 (3rd Edition) Section A.5.2.2, regarding the heat absorption across the unwetted surface of a vessel in equation A-7 using the relationship in A-6 I find that T, is in fact greater than T,,. lam concerned as to how I present such a case as the guide does not menti this eventuality. Reply: in your letter to API, you note that equation A-6 from RP 521, 3rd Edition, November 1990, results in a gas temperature higher than the wall temperature. ‘This may or may not be correct, depending upon your system and the degree of non-ideality of the gas. What is clear is that heat absorbed from a fire is not being removed ffom the System, and hence the wall ‘emperature wil approach the temperature of the fire engulfing the equipment. This may lead to vessel failure. This possibilty is noted in the Third Edition of RP 521 in sub-section A.5.2.5, Additional Protective Measures. In this sub-section, the document notes that ‘additional protective measures, such as insulation, water sprays, and depressuring should be considered to avoid vessel rupture. Please note that the current edition of this document is RP 521, Fourth Edition, March 1997. This topic is discussed in Section 3.15, but is virtually unchanged from the Third Edition Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: Referring to paragraph A.8.3.1 of Appendix A in API RP 521, what is the origin of the temperature of 1660 degrees F used in Equation AB and what thermal conductivity should be used in that equation? Reply: The estimated temperature of a typical hydrocarbon fire is about 1660 degrees F. Hence, this is the origin of that temperature in Equation A-8. Other ‘standards also recognize this temperature as typical for a hydrocarbon fire. if thermal conductivity values are unknown, itis recommended that you use a conductivity of 4 BTU/hv/FZ/degrees Flin. This is allowed in the notes to Table A- 3 on page 75. This is not too diferent from the thermal conductivity of low density refractory which has a thermal conductivity of 3.6 BTU/hr/Ft2/degrees F/in over wide temperature range. Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: While working through example 2 of API RP 521, | found contradictions in the graphs on pages 92 and 93. According to the heading the graph on page 92 (Figure C.3.A) is applicable to "customary units the y-axis is in meters. Likewise, the graph on page 93 is for "SI units” the y-axis is in feet. Will you please advise which should be corrected - the headings or the y-axis units? Reply: You are correct. The graphs were incorrectly labeled in the Third Edition ‘of RP-621. This was corrected in the Fourth Edition of RP 521 Edition: Third Edition, November 1990 Question: 1 would like to confirm that title name of Table 3, API RP 521 (page 36). Because the two different API RP 521 of the same edition (3rd Edition, November 1990) indicate different contents: one is "maximum. design flare radiation levels excluding solar radiation” and the other is “maximum design flare radiation levels including solar radiation.” Some flare stack manufacturers in the USA insist that "maximum design flare radiation levels excluding solar radiation” is correct, showing us the API RP 521, Third Edition. But my API [publication] indicates "maximum design flare radiation levels including solar radiation” is the correct title. Please let me know which is the correct title. Reply: In the original issue of RP 521, Third Edition, November 1990, the title of Table 3, page 36, was "Recommended Design Flare Radiation Levels Excluding Solar Raciation” In July 1993, AP! issued an “Errata notice for RP 621, Thi Edition, November 1990. Among other things, this "Errata" notice corrected the heading of Table 3 to read "Maximum Design Flare Radiation Levels Including Solar Radiation.” ‘The latest RP 521 's the Fourth Edition, March 197, In tis