ISSN 2423-2912 (Print), ISSN 2423-2920 (Online)

cirss
commentaries
VOL. V., NO. 4 MARCH 2018

Japan’s Security Policy and Relations:

Clearing the “Nuclear Clouds” in the Korean Peninsula
by Antonio Emmanuel R. Miranda

In his policy speech at the National Diet in November 2017, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe denounced the nuclear
provocations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the most severe risk to Japan’s national security
in its postwar history. Within the same year, the DPRK conducted one nuclear bomb test and 23 missile launches,
including test launches of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in August and September that flew over Hokkaido.
Asserting its ideology of “self-reliance”, the DPRK regime under Kim Jong-un has reiterated its intention of further
boosting its nuclear arsenal that can incapacitate Japan and even reach the North American continent. In response,
Japan augmented its stance on the DPRK by implementing maximum diplomatic pressure. Prior to his reelection, Abe
addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2017 to appeal for international support in disabling Pyongyang’s
capacity to develop more nuclear weapons and missiles, emphasizing that dialogue has proven to be ineffective in
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

The escalation of tensions has become a rallying call to enhance defense cooperation among Japan’s allies in the Asia-
Pacific region. Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera described the rapid development of the DPRK’s nuclear program as
“unprecedented, critical, and imminent” at the 2017 ASEAN+3 Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Clark, Philippines. As part
of its proactive security policy, Japan is investing in its strategic partnerships with the US and South Korea to enhance
the region’s collective ability to deter a nuclear war and maintain peace. In doing so, Japan faces numerous challenges
that complicate the formulation of coordinated responses that would establish the foundations of nuclear
disarmament in the region.

A “symmetric” Japan-US alliance

As long as the DPRK continues its provocative nuclear policy, the Japan-US alliance will be spurred to become stronger
and more relevant. Buoyed by warmer personal relations between Prime Minister Abe and US President Donald Trump
after the latter’s first state visit in Tokyo, the two countries’ diplomatic and defensive approaches more closely
resonated against the DPRK. For instance, joint military trainings between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the
US Pacific Command that project their combined strength can be expected to continue and even intensify.

Japan’s ramped-up capacity-building efforts for its national defense signal its desire to establish a more equitable
security relationship with the US. Guided by the principles of “self-help and mutual aid” under the 1952 US-Japan
Mutual Security Treaty, Japan is seeking to assume more responsibilities needed to develop its own capacities to
respond to provocations and resist attacks. With a record defense budget exceeding JPY 5 trillion for 2018, it has
approved the acquisition of F-35A joint strike fighters and the land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense system from the
US. Compared to the mobile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), the Aegis Ashore is a static and cost-
effective system that only requires two location sites to cover Japan’s territory. With Trump’s active support for the
acquisition of these equipment, the US welcomes Japan’s defense initiatives as being mutually beneficial to their

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interests. Nonetheless, a transition towards an enhanced security relationship still requires strategic coordination in
light of the key role of the US in Japan’s security architecture. The presence and operations of US bases throughout the
country are significant assets that support the strategic interests of the US and the activities of the SDF.

Rapprochement with South Korea

Among the East Asian countries threatened by their geopolitical proximity to the DPRK, South Korea remains an
important partner for Japan. Thus, Japan intends to explore avenues to rejuvenate its bilateral relations with South
Korea. Considering the similarities in their defense postures toward the DPRK and their respective military ties with the
US, the two countries would be naturally inclined to bind themselves in a stronger partnership that strengthens the
impact of trilateral cooperation and joint military exercises within the region. During the fifth meeting of the joint
chiefs of staff of the US, Japan, and South Korea in October 2017, the three military organizations expressed their
consensus in pursuing coordinated efforts to develop readiness for future provocations while reiterating their unified
call for the total suspension of the DPRK’s nuclear program for violating international norms. Security cooperation is
crucial as the three countries are expected to immediately respond to possible nuclear attacks.

However, the lack of closure on territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea impede greater cooperation. The
countries’ conflicting claims to the Liancourt Rocks1 are inextricable from unresolved animosities during the Second
World War, and have led to political confrontations between their governments. While enhancing regional security is
still a mutual priority, South Korea would oppose aggressive steps towards Japan’s full remilitarization that is
reminiscent of its wartime past.

Understanding paradoxes in Japan’s security policy

Departing from its traditional image as a pacifist state, Japan is undergoing a major shift in its security policy as it
aspires to a proactive presence in East Asia. Since the DPRK’s nuclear threats necessitate a pragmatic response, the
current trajectory of Japan’s security relations indicates its alignment to nuclear deterrence. While it stands firm with
its non-nuclear principles that prohibit the use of nuclear weapons within its territory, its heavy dependence on the US
nuclear umbrella is central in its security policy. Consistent with this stance, Japan has not signed the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons along with other states who possess nuclear weapons.

Some challenges to Japan’s augmented defense posture are deeply rooted in

“The Philippines is strategically
its own traumatic experiences in nuclear warfare. Fierce internal opposition
positioned as Japan’s most sympathetic
question the agenda of conservative government factions to enhance the
partner in its complex mission to clear
security roles of the SDF. Since the inauguration of the first Abe
the “nuclear clouds” in the Korean
administration in 2006, the Japanese people have become more divided on
Peninsula. Both countries have to
Abe’s pledge to revise the war-renouncing clause of the 1947 Peace
manage their aspirations of a nuclear-
Constitution which prohibits the maintenance of any war potential. Although
free world within the reality of US
such amendments are necessary in lifting the legal ambiguities of the SDF,
deterrence. To accomplish this common
opposition to the proposal grew to 54 percent in January 2018, marking the
goal, security relations between Japan
prevailing stigma of war in the Japanese psyche. Such weak public support
and the Philippines can be strengthened
could undermine the legitimacy of its proactive security measures. Moreover,
through the alignment of their security
the spike of accidents involving US and SDF assets that can potentially harm
policies that utilize diverse strategies for
Japanese citizens could challenge the sustainability of Japan’s expanded
regional peace and stability.“
military responsibilities. As such, the benefits of capacity-building measures
with security partners can be overshadowed by increased risks to the
Japanese people.

Japan as an East Asian military power?

Noting the unpredictability of the DPRK’s nuclear program, it may indeed be necessary for Japan to proactively
enhance its own defense capabilities to protect itself. In the long term, it is inclined to adopt a two-track policy
approach that combines diplomatic pressure and power-projection strategies with the US and South Korea to dissuade
the DPRK from further acts of provocation or aggression. At its current pace, Japan’s potential to emerge as a major
power in the Asia-Pacific region lies on its prudence in exercising these strategies with restraint, so as to allay fears of
excessive rearmament and open conflict. As Japan continues to rely on the effectivity of the US nuclear guarantee, its
 VOL. V, NO. 4 MARCH 2018
security policy is not expected to advance further to an offensive stage. Regardless, such strategies should be managed
deftly in order to lessen the risks of miscalculation and subsequent harm towards its own citizens.

The Philippines is strategically positioned as Japan’s most sympathetic partner in its complex mission to clear the
“nuclear clouds” in the Korean Peninsula. Both countries have to manage their aspirations of a nuclear-free world
within the reality of US deterrence. To accomplish this common goal, security relations between Japan and the
Philippines can be strengthened through the alignment of their security policies that utilize diverse strategies for
regional peace and stability. As labelled by President Rodrigo Duterte in his visit to Tokyo in 2017, a “golden age” of
strategic relations with Japan is a valuable opportunity to improve the defense capabilities of the Philippines and fortify
solidarity in denuclearization. This would not only magnify the prospects of a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but also
mitigate the liabilities of nuclear deterrence.

Endnote
________
1
The Liancourt Rocks are also known as Dok-do in South Korea, and Takeshima in Japan.

Antonio Emmanuel R. Miranda is a Foreign Affairs Research
Specialist with the Center for International Relations and
Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute.
Mr. Miranda can be reached at armiranda@fsi.gov.ph
CIRSS Commentaries is a regular short publication of the
Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies
(CIRSS) of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) focusing on the
latest regional and global developments and issues.
The views expressed in this publication are of the authors
alone and do not reflect the official position of the Foreign
Service Institute, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Government of the Philippines.

The Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) of the
Foreign Service Institute (FSI) undertakes studies in support of the formulation, review,
and dissemination of Philippine foreign policy. It also organizes conferences,
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