Dean Candelaria’s Survey of Recent

Significant Cases in Political Law

Magallona v. Ermita

Is the New Baselines Law (R.A. No. 9522) constitutional?

Yes. Baselines laws are statutory mechanisms to delimit the extent of a state’s maritime zones
and continental shelves. It was passed in compliance with UNCLOS. It had nothing to do with
acquisition or loss of territory but only to regulate sea-use rights. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 187167)

Cudia v. PMA

Can the PMA dismiss a First Class Cadet found guilty of lying about the cause of his
tardiness during an examination?

Yes. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, PMA has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules, including the Honor Code. Schools
have the right to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel.
(Cudia v. PMA, G.R. No. 211362)

Is the denial of cross-examination during administrative proceedings in academic

institutions violative of due process?

No. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Cross-
examination is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing. It is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. (Cudia v. PMA, G.R. No.
211362)

Garcia v. Drilon

Does the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. 9262)
violate the equal protection clause?

No. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinction. Classification is justified under the law due to
the unequal power relationship between women and men. Women are more likely to be
victims of violence and there is widespread gender bias and prejudice against them. (Garcia
v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267)

Would an ex parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) violate due

process?

No. Courts are authorized to issue ex parte a TPO when the life, limb or property of the victim
is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect
the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence.
Notice is immediately given to the respondent requiring him to file an opposition. "To be
heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267)

Does the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. 9262)
constitute undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials?

No. The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order is a function that is purely executive in
nature pursuant to the Local Government Code. It is in line with the function “to enforce all
laws and ordinances” and “to maintain public order in the barangay.” (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R.
No. 179267)

Imbong v. Ochoa

When does life begin?

A zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819)
Are all contraceptives unconstitutional?

No. Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and
thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819)

Does the RH Law violate the one title-one subject rule?

No. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include
the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

Are conscientious objectors obliged to refer a person seeking health care and
services to another accessible healthcare provider despite objections based on
religious or ethical beliefs?

No. The obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction
of a conscientious objector. Accordingly, he should be exempt from compliance with the
mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

Is the RH-IRR constitutional insofar as it defines abortifacient as one which

primarily induces abortion, or destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or
the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb?

No. The insertion of the word "primarily," must be struck down for being ultra vires. To uphold
the validity of Section 3.01 (a) and (G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives
that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to
the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception or fertilization. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

May skilled health professionals, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the RH Law, be prohibited from being
considered as conscientious objectors?

No. This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The protection accorded
to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. The conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. (Imbong v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

Does the RH Law discriminate against the poor as the program allegedly makes
them the primary target of the promotion of contraceptive use?

No. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health
care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development
of the people. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

Does Sec. 17 of the RH Law which requires private and non-government health care
service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health
services amount to involuntary servitude?

No. The provision only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth,
no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. They are given liberty to choose
which kind of health service, when, where, and how to provide it or not to provide it all.
(Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

Should the RH Law be struck down as unconstitutional for violating natural law?
No. The Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law.
Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to
strike down a law. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

May a married individual, not in any emergency or life-threatening case, undergo

reproductive health procedures like tubal ligation and vasectomy without consent
of the other spouse?

No. It should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they
affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. The decision whether or not to
undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive
unit, as they chart their own destiny. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

May a minor who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without the written consent from the parents
or guardians?

No. It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice,
and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father
when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer
relevant is clearly anti-family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819)

Paje v. Casino

What are the requisites for a writ of kalikasan under Section 1 of Rule 7?

The following requisites are:

1) That there is an actual or threatened violation of a constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology;
2) That the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3) That the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces. (Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 207257)

West Tower Corporation v. FPIC

Does a petition for a writ of kalikasan require that the petitioner be directly
affected?

No. The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan does not require that a
petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule allows juridical persons
to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated, or threatened with violation. (West Tower Corporation v. FPIC, G.R. No.
194239)

LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. v. Agham Party List

Are mere general allegations proper for a valid writ of kalikasan?

No. A party claiming the privilege for such issuance has to show that a law, rule, or regulation
was violated or would be violated. (LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. v. Agham Party List, G.R.
No. 209165)

Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano

What is the two-fold aspect of freedom of religion?

1) Freedom to believe; and

2) Freedom to act on one’s beliefs. (Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC)

What is the policy of accommodation?

Accommodation is recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be
imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary
to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not
impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be
an unconstitutional encroachment. (Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC)
Genuino v. De Lima

Does the DOJ have the authority to issue hold departure orders?

No. There is no law particularly providing for the authority of the Secretary of justice to curtail
the exercise of the right to travel. (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930)

Arigo v. Swift

Will the Writ of Kalikasan lie against a foreign government wherein such acts giving
rise to a suit are done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity?

No. The complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit. Suing
a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription
is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under
par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over another. (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510)

Belgica v. Ochoa

Decide on the constitutionality of the PDAF and the “Presidential Pork”.

The Malampaya Fund, providing “… and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President” and the President Social Fund, providing “… to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects …, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President” fail the test of non-delegability of legislative power. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 208566)

In re: Production of Court Records

May an examination of a rollo of a Supreme Court case yet to be decided be furnished

the Impeachment Prosecution Panel?

No. Members of the Court, and Court officials and employees may not be compelled to testify
on matters that are part of internal deliberations and actions of the Court while testimony on
matters external to adjudicatory functions may be subject of compulsory processes. (In re:
Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and
Employes as Witnesses)

PSB v. Senate Impeachment Court

Does anyone have a clear right to maintain the confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits?

Yes. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposit Act) establishes absolute
confidentiality. The deposit may only be examined upon written permission of the depositor.
(PSB v. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No. 200238)

Legaspi v. City of Cebu

Is an ordinance authorizing traffic enforcers to immobilize any motor vehicle
illegally parked without notice and hearing violative of procedural due process?

No. The clamping of vehicles falls under the category of a nuisance per se. (Legaspi v City of
Cebu, G. R. No. 159110/G. R. No. 159592).

Remman Enterprises v. PRC

R.A. 9646 was passed professionalizing real estate services by requiring persons
and/or entities to be duly licensed and certified before entering into the practice of
real estate service. Is it violative of the equal protection clause?

No. Professionalizing the real estate service is a valid exercise of police power, which has
general welfare for its object, considering that real property transactions are susceptible to
manipulation and corruption, and real estate service practitioners serve a vital role in
promoting overall national progress. (Remman Enterprises v. PRC, G. R. No. 197676).

Ferrer v. City Mayor

Can an ordinance be passed taxing real property owners to provide funds for the
housing of informal settlers?
Yes. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied
with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the
general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. (Ferrer v. City
Mayor, G. R. No. 210551).

Is an ordinance taxing a particular class violative of the equality clause?

No. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state is free to select the subjects of taxation.
Inequities which results from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation. (Ferrer v. City Mayor, G. R. No. 210551).

Are there substantial distinctions between an occupant of a lot, and an occupant of

a unit in a condo or socialized housing project?

For the purposes of garbage collection, there are none. (Ferrer v. City Mayor, G. R. No.
210551).

Villanueva v. JBC

Can JBC require five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can
qualify as applicant to second level courts?

Yes. The function of the JBC to select nominees is discretionary. Placing a premium on many
years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional
standards of proven competence. A five-year stint can also provide evidence of integrity,
probity and independence of judges seeking promotion. This classification satisfies the
“rational basis test.” (Villanueva v. JBC, G. R. No. 211833).

1-UTAK v. COMELEC

Can the COMELEC prohibit the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals to
post election campaign materials within their properties?

No. The prohibition constitutes prior restraint on the right of free expression of the owners of
PUVs and private transport terminals. They are forcefully inhibited from expressing their
preferences under the pain of indictment. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020)

When is a content-neutral regulation on speech valid?

When the following requisites concur:

(1) The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;
(2) It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(4) The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020)

Is there a necessary government interest in restricting the rights of the owners of

PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials?

No. While ensuring equality of time, space, and opportunity to candidates is essential to the
conduct of an orderly election, this lofty aim may be achieved sans any intrusion on the
fundamental right of expression. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020)

Does the COMELEC have the power to regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
PUVs and transport terminals when the latter violate election offenses?

Yes. However, the COMELEC's constitutional powers of supervision and regulation do not
extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. Regulating the expression of
opinion in a PUV is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but is already a
regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020)

Disini v. Sec. of Justice

The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 preserves traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services provided by a service provider for
six months from the date of transaction. Is this a violation of the right to property
of the internet users who are owners of such data?

No. Since the traffic data and subscriber information is still accessible to to the internet user,
it is not a violation of the right to property. (Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 punishes those who acquire information
such as a person’s name, citizenship, address, contact number, place and date of
birth, name of spouse if any, occupation, and similar data and use such information
to cause damage. Is this a violation of due process?

No. There is nothing in the statute which violates the the right to due process of law. (Disini
v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 punishes cyber-squatting. Is this a violation

of the equal protection cause?

No. The law is reasonable in penalizing the acquisition of a domain name in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same. (Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

What is cyber-squatting, as defined in The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012?

It is the acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with
the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant,
in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it. (Disini v. Sec. of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 authorizes law enforcement authorities with
due cause to collect or record traffic data associated with specified communications
in real-time. Is this a violation of the right to privacy?

No. The state has a compelling interest to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat
all sorts of cybercrimes. The statute aims to provide law enforcement authorities with the
power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace.
(Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 restricts access to computer data when it is
prima facie found to breach the provisions of the said statute. Is this a violation of
the freedom of expression?

Yes. Since the content of computer data is considered as speech and the law merely requires
that a crime be found in prima facie manner in order to block that data, it disregards the
established jurisprudential guidelines used to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
(Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 restricts access to computer data when it is
prima facie found to breach the provisions of the said statute. Is this a violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures?

Yes. Since this provision of the law seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant, it violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Computer data constitute personal property, hence, a valid warrant is needed to restrict its
access. (Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

Can libel under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 be filed simultaneously with
libel under the Revised Penal Code when the same, libelous material is posted online
and published on print?

No. This is a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy since Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements
and are in fact one and the same offense. (Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 directs the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC) to formulate a national cybersecurity plan. Is this an
undue delegation of legislative power?
No. The definition of cybersecurity in the statute serves as the parameters within which the
CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan. Hence, the law is complete in itself
and it provided the standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity. (Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335)

Re: petition for radio and television coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre

Is media coverage inside the courtroom allowed during the trial of the Maguindano
Massacre?

Yes. But it is subject to regulations issued by the Supreme Court. (Re: petition for radio and
television coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre, A.A. No. 10-11-5-SC)

Is a public trial synonymous with a publicized trial?

No. A public trial means that a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions,
who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. (Re:
petition for radio and television coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre, A.A. No. 10-11-5-
SC)

Pollo v. David

Can a government employer conduct a search in its employee’s office and computers
for purposes of an investigation involving a work-related misconduct even without
a warrant?

Yes. A search in consideration of an investigation is a reasonable exercise of the managerial

prerogative of an employer as it is aimed at ensuring its operational efficiency by going after
the work-related misfeasance of its employees. (Pollo v. David, G.R. No. 181881)

Can a government employee invoke his right to privacy when his employer conducts
a search on his government-issued computer?

No. The government employee has no expectation of privacy on the computer because the
item is a property of the government. The government, therefore, has the absolute right to
regulate and monitor the computer’s use. (Pollo v. David, G.R. No. 181881)

Sps. Hing v. Choachuy

Can video surveillance cameras be set-up and installed facing another’s property?

No. An individual‘s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined
to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access. (Sps. Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736)

What places do the phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residency” cover?

The phrase "prying into the privacy of another‘s residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private, including a business
office. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for
the protection and safety of everyone. (Sps. Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736)

How should the installation of video surveillance cameras be limited?

The installation of video surveillance cameras should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained. (Sps. Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736)

Vivares v. STC

What is the writ of habeas data?

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (Vivares v. STC, G.R. No. 202666)
When can a person have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social
Network activities?

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network activity, it
is first necessary that said user, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through
the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. (Vivares v.
STC, G.R. No. 202666)

Lee v. Ilagan

How can a person support a petition for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Data?

The petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations
in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. (Lee v. Ilagan, G.R.
No. 203254)

Can a petition for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Data that was not able to
sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be
violated prosper?

No. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security
are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders
a habeas data petition dismissible. (Lee v. Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254)

GMA v. COMELEC

Can the COMELEC issue a resolution which computes the airtime on political
advertisements on an aggregate basis involving all the media of broadcast
communications instead of a “per-station” basis?

No. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. (GMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357)

When can an “aggregate-based” airtime limits on political advertisements be

allowed?

When it constitutes a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. (GMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357)

Diocese of Bacolod et. al v. Comelec

What is an election campaign?

It is an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
to a public office. (Diocese of Bacolod et. al v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728)

Can the COMELEC regulate private peoples’ expressions that are not related to
elections?

No. COMELEC has no legal basis to regulate expression made by private citizens. The
tarpaulins were not campaign materials belonging to candidates. Existing election law
provisions on the subject refer to matters done by or on behalf of and in consideration with
candidates and political parties. (Diocese of Bacolod et. al v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728).

Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, et al.

When is a concerted mass action done within a government office during office
hours allowed?

When it is done without intent at work stoppage or service disruption. (Davao City Water
District v. Aranjuez, et al., G.R. No. 194192)
SWS and Pulse Asia v .COMELEC

Are election surveys covered by the Fair Elections Act?

Yes. While election surveys are not per se election propaganda, when published, however,
the tendency to shape voter preference comes into play. As such, these surveys partake of
the nature of election propaganda, hence, subject to regulation of the Fair Elections Act. (SWS
and Pulse Asia v .COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062)

Perfecto v. Esidera

How should the court determine “immoral conduct” of lawyers and judges?

For purposes of determining liability of lawyers and judges, “immoral conduct” should relate
to their conduct in Court. Religions morality is not binding whenever the Court decides the
administrative liability of lawyers and judges. The Court, in resolving cases about morality
should limit the bases of its judgment on “secular moral standards.” (Perfecto v. Esidera, 763
SCRA 323)

SPARK, et al. v. Quezon City

Can public safety be a ground to restrict the minor’s right to travel?

Yes. Public safety may be basis to restrict the minors’ right to travel. Under the strict scrutiny
test government must prove that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest; and, (2) is the least restrictive means. (SPARK, et al. v. Quezon City, G. R. No.
225442, August 8, 2017)

Is community service a valid form of intervention program?

Yes. Community service is a valid form of intervention program. What the law prohibits is the
imposition of penalties on minors. Admonition is a mere warning. These are not penalties. On
the other hand, reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment are penalties prohibited by R.A.
9344. (SPARK, et al. v. Quezon City , G. R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

Sereno v. Committee

What are the requisites for the right to information be compelled by writ of
mandamus?

The two requisites are:

1. the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public
interest; and
2. it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
(Sereno v. Committee, G.R. No. 175210, Feb. 1, 2016)

What are the kinds of information exempted by law from the constitutional
guarantee?

The information exempted by law are national security matters and intelligence information,
trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, diplomatic correspondence, closed-
door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. (Sereno v. Committee, G.R. No. 175210, Feb. 1,
2016)

NPC v. Manalastas

Should inflation be factored in the computation of just compensation?

No. The valuation of the land for purposes of determining just compensation should not
include the inflation rate of the peso because this is sufficiently recompressed through
payment of interest on the market value of the land. (NPC v. Manalastas, G.R. No. 196140,
Jan. 27, 2016)

Goldenway v. Equitable Bank

What is the purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution?

The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of
contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be
tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of
the parties. (Goldenway v. Equitable Bank, G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013)

When is a contract impaired?

Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is an impairment if
a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of
the rights of the parties. (Goldenway v. Equitable Bank, G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013)

Is there an exception in the non-impairment clause?

Yes. Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the Government. The right granted by this provision must submit
to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. (Goldenway v. Equitable
Bank, G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013)

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan

When is grant of bail discretionary?

Granting of bail is discretionary:

1. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment; or
2. If the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none
of the circumstance denying grant of bail is present. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 213847)

What is the purpose of bail?

It is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
trial court. It acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in
his provisional liberty, and the interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847)

Maquiling v. COMELEC

Is the use of a foreign passport of a dual citizen by naturalization after renouncing

foreign citizenship affects one’s qualification to run for public office?

Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship which results to the
reversion of one into a dual citizen thereby disqualifying him from running for an elective local
position. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649)

What is the twin requirement imposed by R.A. 9225 for dual citizens by
naturalization before they can run for elective public office?

1. Take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and

2. Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649)

Distinguish dual citizens from birth and dual citizens by naturalization with respect
to the requirements imposed by RA 9225 for dual citizens who wants to run for
elective public office.

Dual citizens by virtue of birth are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the
mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship. On the other hand, dual citizens by naturalization, are required to take
the oath of allegiance and to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as
candidate for public office. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649)

David v. Agbay

Is reacquisition and retention the same under R.A. 9225?

No. Reacquisition refers to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before
the effectivity of R.A. 9225, while retention refers to those who became foreign citizens after.
Retroactivity of natural-born Filipino citizenship cannot be applied to those who fall within the
first category. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 19911)
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC

Under international law, what is the citizenship of foundlings?

They are considered to have the nationality of the country where they were found until the
contrary is proved. (Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697)

David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

Are foundlings considered natural-born citizens?

Yes. There is a presumption that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. Such presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction
that considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and
international instruments. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538)

Kabataan Party-list v. COMELEC

What are the qualifications in order for a person exercise the right of suffrage?

1. He must be a Filipino citizen;

2. He must not be disqualified by law; and
3. He must have resided in the Philippines at least one (1) year in the place wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
(Kabataan Party-list v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221318)

Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission

How can a classification be constitutional?

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace

all persons who naturally belong to the class. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R.
No. 192935)

When is a classification unconstitutional?

A classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Substantial similarity will suffice;
and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally.
(Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935)

Deutsche Bank v. CIR

What is the international principle of pacta sunt servanda?

This time-honored international principle demands the performance in good faith of treaty
obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty must be performed by them in
good faith. More importantly, treaties have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.
(Deutsche Bank v. CIR, G.R. No. 188550)

Aquino v. COMELEC

Is there a minimum population requirement of 250,000 for a legislative district?

No. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution succinctily provides:
“Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.” The provision draws aplain and clear distinction between
the entitlement of a city to a district on one hnad, and the entitlement of a province toa district
on another. (Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793)

Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

What are the three different groups which may participate in the party-list system?

1. National parties
2. Regional parties; and
3. Sectoral parties. (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766)

Can political parties participate in the party-list elections?

Yes, provided that they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. Otherwise, they can participate only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. Such wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. (Atong Paglaum v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766)

Lico v. COMELEC

When does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) acquire

jurisdiction over a case?

When there is 1) proclamation of the winning party-list, 2) oath of the nominee and 3)
assumption of office. (Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505)

Can the COMELEC rule on the expulsion Lico in a party-list such that said person will
vacate the seat in the house of representative and another person will be declared
as the duly-qualified nominee?

No, COMELEC has no jurisdiction to expel Lico from the House of Representatives because it
touched upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bonafide member of the
party-list group sought to be represented. It was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the
requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. (Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
205505)

Ampatuan v. Secretary Puno

What differentiates calling out power from emergency power?

The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is
a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President and it does not need a
congressional authority to be exercised. (Ampatuan v. Secretary Puno, G.R. No. 190259)

Araullo v. President Aquino

Is the Disbursement Allocation Program constitutional?

Yes, because is not a fund or appropriation but a program of prioritizing spending in pursuit
of Executive Power to faithfully execute the laws. (Araullo v. President Aquino, G.R. No.
209287)

Velicaria-Grafel et al. v. O.P.

What are the requirements to make a valid appointment?

1) Authority to appoint and evidence of exercise of such authority;

2) Transmittal of appointment paper and evidence of such transmittal;
3) Vacant position at the time of appointment; and
4) Receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. (Velicaria-Grafel et al.
v. O.P., G.R. 203372)

Kulayan, et al. v. Tan, et al.

Does the governor possess the same calling out power as the President?

No, the calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President,
and an exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. (Kulayan,
et al. v. Tan, et al., G.R. No. 187298)

Risos-Vidal v. Lim

What are the only instances wherein the President may not extend a pardon?

1. In impeachment cases;
2. In cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
3. Cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. (Risos-Vidal v. Lim, G.R. No.
206666)
San Diego v. People

May a judge impose a penalty in a criminal case that prohibits the possibility of the
accused being granted an executive pardon?

No. The exercise of pardoning power is under the discretion of the President. The decision
that prohibited the possibility of pardon is unconstitutional because it had the effect of limiting
the power of the Chief Executive. (San Diego v. People, G.R. No. 176114)

Ocampo v. Enriquez

Is the President’s act allowing the burial of a former dictator of the Philippines in
the Libingan ng Mga Bayani a violation of the constitution? Yuck marcos, duterte
corrupt

No. Article 7, Section 17 of the Constitution, on faithful execution of laws, empowers the
President to take necessary and proper steps towards the proper execution of our laws.
Pursuant to E.O. 292, the Libingan ng Mga Bayani was created to provide for a burial site for
former Presidents, National Heroes and Patriots. Hence, the President was acting in accord
with his duty to execute the laws. (Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973)

Lagman v. Medialdea

To what extent may the Supreme Court review the decision of a President declaring
Martial Law?

The Court may only examine whether the President acted within permissible constitutional
boundaries and not with grave abuse of discretion and that ordinary police action may be
undertaken. The actual use of the Armed Forces is not within judicial review. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231657)

Landbank v. Atlanta Industries

Can a law enacted by Congress increase or decrease the obligations of parties under
an executive contract?

No. The country’s commitment to abide by its obligations under any treaty or international
or executive agreement must be observed and respected—the agreement by the parties and
the state should not be altered without their consent. (Landbank v. Atlanta Industries, G.R.
No. 193796)

Vinuya v. Romulo

May the Courts interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive Department through injunctive reliefs?

No. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Accordingly, the Court cannot direct the Executive Department,
either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with other countries
in a certain manner. (Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. 162230, August 12, 2014)

Bayan Muna v Romulo

Can an executive agreement be used to amend a duly ratified and existing treaty?

No. An executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its
ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the product of
the ratifying acts of the Executive and the Senate. (Bayan Muna v Romulo, G.R. 159618,
February 1, 2011)

China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v Santamaria

What are the requisites of an executive agreement?

The following are the requisites of an executive agreement under the Vienna Convention: (1)
the agreement must be between states; (2) it must be written; and (3) it must be governed
by international law. (China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v Santamaria, G.R.
185572, February 7, 2012)

Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa

Is the President authorized by law to allow foreign military bases and troops to
enter the Philippines?

No. Article XVIII, Section 25 does not authorize the President to allow foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities to enter the Philippines, except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate.
This constitutionally restricted authority pertains to the entry of the bases, troops, or facilities,
and not to the activities to be done after entry. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R.
212426 and 212444, January 12, 2016)

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Munoz

What is double criminality rule in extradition proceedings?

The extraditable offense must be criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the
requested states. In other words, the requested state comes under no obligation to surrender
the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the request for extradition as
criminal. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Munoz, G.R. 207342,
August 16, 2016)

Philconsa v. GPH

May agreements between the government negotiation panel and the MILF calling
for an autonomous political entity named Bangsamoro to replace ARMM be declared
unconstitutional even without the implementing law?

No. The agreements mandate the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in order for them
to be implemented. Any question on their constitutionality without the implementing law, i.e.,
Bangsamoro Basic Law, is premature. (Philconsa v. GPH, G.R. No. 218406, November 29,
2016)

Film Development Council v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation

May Congress pass a law requiring all revenue from amusement taxes on graded
films which may accrue to cities and municipalities to be instead remitted to a Film
Development Council who shall reward the taxes to the producers of the graded
films?

No. Such law infringes on the principle of local autonomy. Congress will not be excluding the
authority to levy amusement taxes from the LGUs but instead will be confiscating the income
to be received by the LGUs from the taxpayers. Taxes levied by LGUs should accrue
exclusively to the LGUs. The law is also repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their
resources in line with their priorities. (Film Development Council v. Colon Heritage Realty
Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, June 16, 2015)

Estipona Jr. v. Hon. Lobrigo

Does Section 23 of R.A. 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining violate the rule-
making authority of the Supreme Court?

Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, the rule making power is vested solely in the Supreme
Court. Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure found in Section 2 of Rule 116 and Rule 118 of
the Rules of Court. It is allowed during arraignment, pre-trial, or even up to the point when
the prosecution already rested its case. (Estipona Jr. v. Hon. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August
15, 2017)

Hon. Aguinaldo v. H.E. President Aquino III

The JBC submitted to the President 6 shortlists for the 6 vacant positions of
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Out of the appointees of the President, 2
came from the same shortlist. Does this violate Section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution?

No. Clustering practiced by the JBC impinges upon the President’s power of appointment, as
well as restricts the chances for appointment of qualified nominees. To meet the minimum
requirement under Section 9, Article VIII on the 3 nominees per vacancy, there just needs to
be 18 nominees for the 6 vacancies. (Hon. Aguinaldo v. H.E. President Aquino III, G.R.
224302, August 8, 2017)

League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

R.A. 9009 increased the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality
into a city to P100M. 16 municipalities were allowed to be exempt from such
requirement because they had complied to the prior requirements and have filed
cityhood bills, although left unacted, before amendment of the law. Is there a
violation of the equal protection clause?

No. There is a substantial distinction between the 16 municipalities and other municipalities.
The 16 municipalities were able to comply with the previous requirements of the law before
its amendment. The extraneous circumstances which left their cityhood bills unacted upon by
Congress should not be attributable to such municipalities. (League of Cities of the Philippines
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011)

Navarro v. Ermita

What are the requisites for the creation of a province?

1. Average income of P20,000,000, as certified by the Department of Finance; and

2. Either a contiguous land area of at least 2,000 sq. kms, or a population of not less
than 250,000. (Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050)

When will the land requirement to the creation of the province not apply?

The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of 1 or
more islands. (Navarro v. Ermita, citing Article 9(2) of the IRR of the LGC)

Abas Kida v. Senate

Is the synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections
constitutional?

Yes. R.A.No. 10153 and R.A. No. 9333, which re-set ARMM elections, did not amend the ARMM
Law R.A. No. 9054 because the latter did not fix the date of the regular elections in ARMM but
merely fixed the first ARMM elections. (Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271)

Gutierrez v. House of Representatives

Is the simultaneous referral of impeachment complaints valid?

Yes. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding.
(Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459)

Gonzales III v. Office of the President

Does the Office of the President have administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman?

No. Under Section 21 of R.A. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman. The exercise of the President of the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the office of the
Ombudsman. (Gonzales III v. Office of the President, 714 SCRA 611)

Carpio-Morales v. CA

Is the condonation doctrine still applicable?

No. The condonation doctrine is abandoned, but the abandonment is prospective in effect.
(Carpio-Morales v. CA, 774 SCRA 431)

Knights of Rizal v. DMCI

Was there a violation of the law when DMCI was allowed to construct a
condominium at the back of Rizal’s monument?
No. Republic Act No. 10066 declares that the State should protect the "physical integrity" of
the heritage property or building if there is "danger of destruction or significant alteration
from its original state." Physical integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong and sound
the structure is. The same law does not mention that another project, building, or property,
not itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of a cease and desist order when
it adversely affects the background view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property or building.
(Knights of Rizal v. DMCI, G.R. No. 213948)

Gamboa v. Teves

What does “capital” mean in Section 11 of Article 12?

The term “capital” refers to shares with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the
right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks,
translates to effective control of a corporation. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579)

Roy III v. Herbosa

What is full beneficial ownership?

For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere
legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the
stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of
which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine
citizens or Philippine nationals. (Roy III v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246)

Hacienda Luisita v. PARC

Does the fact that the farmers in the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 do not
own the agricultural land but are merely given stock certificates unconstitutional?

No. As it were, the principle of "land to the tiller" and the old pastoral model of land ownership
where non-human juridical persons, such as corporations, were prohibited from owning
agricultural lands are no longer realistic under existing conditions. Practically, an individual
farmer will often face greater disadvantages and difficulties than those who exercise
ownership in a collective manner through a cooperative or corporation. (Hacienda Luisita v.
PARC, G.R. No. 171101)

CIR v. DLSU

Is there is a marked distinction between the treatment of non-stock, non-profit

educational institutions and proprietary educational institutions?

Yes. The tax exemption granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions is

conditioned only on the actual, direct and exclusive use of their revenues and assets for
educational purposes. While tax exemptions may also be granted to proprietary educational
institutions, these exemptions may be subject to limitations imposed by Congress. (CIR v.
DLSU, G.R. No. 196596)

Funa v. MECO

What is a government instrumentality?

These are agencies of the national government that, by reason of some special function or
jurisdiction they perform or exercise, are allotted operational autonomy and are not integrated
within the department framework. (Funa v. MECO, G.R. No. 193462)

What is a government-owned or controlled corporation?

A government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or non-stock corporation vested with

functions relating to public needs that are owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities. (Funa v. MECO, G.R. No. 193462)

Saluday v. People

A police officer stationed at a checkpoint flagged a bus. He asked the male

passengers to step down, and subsequently, the officer entered and searched the
inside of the bus. The officer saw a small black bag at the rear of the bus, and lifted
it. Upon lifting, the officer noticed that the bag was heavy, thus, he asked who the
owner of the bag was. The bus driver pointed at the accused as the owner since he
was seated at the rear of the bus. The officer asked the accused to open the bag to
which the accused consented to, thereby revealing that the bag contained a firearm
and a grenade which led to the arrest of the accused. The accused now contends
that the search was unreasonable because it was done without a search warrant.
Decide.

The search was valid. Aside from the accused consenting to the search, there is a reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the accused as a passenger when he rode the bus which,
being a public transportation, is accessible to the public. The expectation of privacy in relation
to the constitutional right against unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the same as
that in a person's dwelling. This is based on the principle that a reasonable search arises from
a reduced expectation of privacy. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305)

When can a search be conducted on a public bus?

Prior to entry – Passengers and their bags can be subjected to a routine inspection;
passengers can also be frisked. Should passenger object, he or she can validly be refused into
the terminal.

While in transit – The bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel
of the bus owner in three instances:
1. Upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles.
2. Whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked
and his baggage be subjected to the same routine inspection.
3. A bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State
agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags.
(Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305)

What constitutes a valid reasonable search of a public bus?

1. It must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person being searched
to minimize any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule;
2. The search must not result from any discriminatory motive;
3. The purpose of the search must be confined to ensuring public safety; and
4. As to the evidence seized, the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures
were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused. (Saluday
v. People, G.R. No. 215305)

DFA v. BCA International Corporation

Department X wanted to terminate its Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement with

Company Y before an Arbitration tribunal. Company Y sought for the issuance of
subpoenas to certain witnesses and documents in their custody. Department X
invokes the Deliberative process privilege. Can the Deliberative process privilege
apply?

Yes. It can also be invoked in arbitration proceedings under RA 9285. Deliberative process
privilege is one kind of privileged information within the exceptions of the constitutional right
to information. It exempts materials that are predecisional and deliberative but requires
disclosure of policy statements and final opinions that have the force of law. (DFA v. BCA
International Corporation, G.R. No. 210858)

What are the three policy bases of Deliberative Process Privilege?

1. It protects candid discussions within an agency;

2. It prevents public confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the
agency establishes final policy; and
3. It protects the integrity of an agency's decision; the public should not judge officials
based on information they considered prior to issuing their final decisions. (DFA v. BCA
International Corporation, G.R. No. 210858)

Arroyo v. DOJ

The COMELEC and DOJ constituted a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team to
investigate and gather evidence on electoral fraud and manipulation cases during
the national elections. The team then recommended filing a complaint against X for
Electoral Sabotage. X argues that the creation of the Joint Committee undermines
the independency of COMELEC. Is X correct?
No. Under the law, COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the
DOJ, exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction."
(Arroyo v. DOJ, G.R. No. 199082)

La Suerte v. CA

Is a transfer of stemmed leaf tobacco between manufacturers subject to excise tax?

No, if the following conditions concur:

(1) The transfer shall be under an official L-7 invoice on which shall be entered the
exact weight of the tobacco at the time of its removal;
(2) Entry shall be made in the L-7 register in the place provided on the page for
removals; and
(3) Corresponding debit entry shall be made in the L-7 register book of the factory
receiving the tobacco under the heading, “Refuse, etc., received from the other
factory,” showing the date of receipt, assessment and invoice numbers, name and
address of the consignor, form in which received, and the weight of the tobacco. (La
Suerte v. CA, G.R. No. 125346)

Can the Department of Finance issue regulations relating to the taxation of tobacco
products?

Yes. Though the power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed or revoked
only by the legislature, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to
the enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance. (La Suerte v. CA, G.R. No. 125346)

Quezon City PTCA v. DepEd

Can the Department of Education issue an order reorganizing the Parents-Teachers-

Community Associations even without conducting public consultations?

Yes. Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its
rule-making power. (Quezon City PTCA v. DepEd, G.R. No. 188720)

Tagolino v. HRET

Mr. X filed his COC for the position of District Representative. He was then
disqualified because he misrepresented his compliance with the 1 year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI. Can there be a valid substitution by Mrs. Y?

No, because there is a denial of due course or cancellation of Mr. X’s COC under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code for misrepresentation. Unlike those who are disqualified under
Section 68, a candidate whose COC is declared cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have
not been a candidate at all. Thus, there can be no valid substitution by Mrs. Y. (Tagolino v.
HRET, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2003)

Reyes v. COMELEC

Is a Filipino citizen who was naturalized in a foreign country and subsequently

reacquired his Filipino citizenship considered to have complied with the residency
requirement for the position of District Representative of Marinduque?

No. A Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized in a foreign country is deemed to have
abandoned his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show
that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts. The period of
residency shall be counted from the time he made the Philippines his domicile of choice.
(Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)

Baguilat v. Speaker Alvarez

Can Congress be compelled to recognize a Representative as the Minority Leader of

the House of Representatives through a writ of mandamus?

No. The Supreme Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of Constitutional principles that it is bound to protect
and uphold, except when there is a grave abuse of discretion. (Baguilat v. Speaker Alvarez,
G.R. No. 227757)
Nazareth v. Villar

Can the savings of an agency be used to pay the benefits?

Yes. In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still
be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will
determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only
exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings
in other items of their respective appropriations. (Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635)

St. Luke’s Medical v. CIR

Can tax-exempt charitable institutions engage in activities conducted for profit

while remaining tax-exempt?

Yes. Even if the charitable institution must be “organized and operated exclusively” for
charitable purposes, it is nevertheless allowed to engage in activities conducted for profit
without losing tax-exempt status for its not-for-profit activities. However, the activities
conducted for profit will be taxed pursuant to the NIRC. (St. Luke’s Medical v. CIR, G.R. No.
195909)

Philcoco v. Republic

Can a special fund be used for the purchase of stocks by members of the community
for which the fund was created?

No. The conversion of special funds into a private fund for the benefit of private individuals
cannot be allowed. Special funds are public funds. Even if the private individuals belong to or
are part of the industry protected by the special fund, the distribution of stocks bought with
the public funds cannot be justified. (Philippine Coconut v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58).

Macalintal v. PET

Is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal a separate entity from the Supreme Court?

No. The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change
in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court. (Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No.
191618)

What is the scope of power of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal?

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof.
The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of
law, expressly provided in the Constitution. (Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No. 191618)

What kind of power does the Presidential Electoral Tribunal exercise when it
performs its duties?

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. (Macalintal v.
PET, G.R. No. 191618)

Fortun v. Arroyo

What are the limitations to the President’s power to proclaim martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;

2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in
person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of
the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
 4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the President’s proclamation or
suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress
deems warranted. (Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293)

What is the relationship between the proclamation or suspension power of the

President and Congress?

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution, the President and the Congress act in tandem
in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain
the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have. (Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293)

What power/s do the Supreme Court exercise when martial law has been
proclaimed or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspended?

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is
implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is
automatic rather than initiated. (Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293)

When could only the Supreme Court exercise its power to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension?

Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of
the Court. (Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293)

Boy Scouts v. COA

Are all corporations not owned nor controlled by the government considered private
corporations?

No. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be
considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or
chartered institutions which are otherwise known as "public corporations” (Boy Scouts of the
Philippines v. COA, G.R. No. 177131).

What are Public Corporations?

They are corporations treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which
are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different
criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and
their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices (Boy
Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, G.R. No. 177131).

Does the Commission on Audit have the power to audit public corporations?

Yes. Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a
government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the
exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of
the BSP Charter (Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, G.R. No. 177131).

De Castro v. JBC

Does Section 15 of Article VII apply to appointments made by the President in the
Judiciary?

No. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so (De
Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002).

Can the President appoint members of the Judiciary two months immediately
preceding the next presidential elections?

Yes. The prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or
Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court (De Castro v.
JBC, G.R. No. 191002).

Espiritu v. Lutgarda

What is a de facto officer?

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He
may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. (Espiritu v. Lutgarda, G.R. No.
204964)

Are acts of de facto officers valid?

Yes. Acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer,
in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. Furthermore,
their acts are valid because they are public officers. (Espiritu v. Lutgarda, G.R. No. 204964)

Mitsubishi v. CIR

Is senate concurrence required when two countries resort to “exchange of notes”?

No. An exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes

binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress.
(Mitsubishi v. CIR, G.R. No. 175772)

What is “exchange of notes”?

An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the
parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under
the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its
assent. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its
speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval. (Mitsubishi v.
CIR, G.R. No. 175772)

Villafuerte v. Robredo

Is MC No. 2010-138 unconstitutional because it restricted the meaning of

“development” and enumerated activities which the local government must finance
from the 20% development fund component of the IRA and provided sanctions for
local authorities who shall use the said component of the fund for the excluded
purposes stated there?

No. A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision
in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated
in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It
was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying with
the law. (Villafuerte v. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390)

What is fiscal autonomy?

Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources
of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to
work within the constraints thereto. (Villafuerte v. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390)

Mandanas v. Ochoa

Has Congress exceeded its constitutional boundary by limiting to the NIRTs the base
from which to compute the just share of the LGUs?

Yes. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more
restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually
departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the
base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Equally
impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in
favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802)

Did the exclusion of other national taxes like customs duties from the base for
determining the just share of the LGUs contravene the express constitutional edict
in Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution?

Yes. Although customs duties have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation
of economic or social activity as their moving purposes, it is often difficult to say which of the
two is the principal objective in a particular instance, for, verily, customs duties, much like
internal revenue taxes, are rarely designed to achieve only one policy objective. (Mandanas
v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802)

Is the inclusion of the just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs necessary?

The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in ordering that the just share of the LGUs
in the national taxes shall be automatically released to them. With Congress having
established the just share through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that the inclusion
of the just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary, if not superfluous. Hence,
the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be released to them without need of
yearly appropriation. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802)

Abundo v. COMELEC

Under what instances are the consecutive terms not involuntary broken or
interrupted?

1. Succession or assumption of office by operation of law;

2. Preventive suspension;
3. Declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest;
4. Declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest;
5. Proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election;
6. Removal of the official by operation of law; and
7. Other analogous causes. (Abundo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716)

To violate the 3-term rule, the following requisite must concur:

1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms; and
2. That he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Abundo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
201716)

Naval v. COMELEC

Is the election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in
representation of a renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule?

No. The Constitutional Commission concluded that there is no immediate reelection after three
successive terms. This formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear
command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. (Naval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207851)

Cagas v. COMELEC

Can the COMELEC conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by law?

Yes. Even though the Constitution recognizes that the power to fix the date of eletions is
legislative in nature, the SC upheld the COMELEC’s broad power or authority to fix other dates
for a plebiscite, as in special elections, to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage.
(Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185)

Umali v. COMELEC

Can the power to create, divide, merge, abolish, or substantially alter boundaries of
provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays, solely legislative in nature?

No. The framers of the Constitution have allowed for the delegation fo such power in Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution, as long as:
1. The criteria prescribed in the LGC is met; and
2. The creation, division, merger, abolition, or the substantial alteration of the boundaries
is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite. (Umali v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 203974)
Pimentel Jr. v. Executive Secretary Ochoa

What are the compositions and purposes of regional development councils?

Regional Development Councils shall be composed of local government officials, regional

heads of departments and other government officers, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization
to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social
growth and development of the units in the region. (Pimentel Jr. v. Executive Secretary
Ochoa, G. R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012)

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Reyes

What are the safeguards that must be observed for a service contract compliant
with the Constitution?

1. The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standards or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements;
2. The President shall be the signatory for the government;
3. Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress
to give it an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections,
if any. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)