RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657

G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner,

vs. CA and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.

O. Pythogoras Oliver for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, modifying the decision of the trial court in a civil case for recovery of damages
against petitioner corporation by reducing the award to private respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages from P40,000 to Pl5,000, and attorney's fees from P3,000 to
P2,000.

The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram sent through its Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading as follows:

176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY

WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER

LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER

115 PM

SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

(p. 19, Annex "A")

Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment
and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know of said defamatory words. Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the
additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did
not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody
other than the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically receives telegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine and
placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the telegram when
delivered.

The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:

There is no question that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous. They clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff,
the effect on the plaintiff is the same. Any person reading the additional words in Tagalog will naturally think that they refer to the addressee, the plaintiff. There is no
indication from the face of the telegram that the additional words in Tagalog were sent as a private joke between the operators of the defendant.

The defendant is sued directly not as an employer. The business of the defendant is to transmit telegrams. It will open the door to frauds and allow the defendant to act with
impunity if it can escape liability by the simple expedient of showing that its employees acted beyond the scope of their assigned tasks.

The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but on the following articles of said Code:

ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog words. The office file of the defendant containing copies of telegrams received are open and held together only by a
metal fastener. Moreover, they are open to view and inspection by third parties.

It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. The plaintiff is a businessman. The libelous Tagalog words must have affected his business and social
standing in the community. The Court fixes the amount of P40,000.00 as the reasonable amount of moral damages and the amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fee which the
defendant should pay the plaintiff. (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal)

The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision confirming the aforegoing findings of the lower court stated:

The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the failure of the appellant to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the
humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak
well of its concern for their clientele's interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees.

The claim that there was no publication of the libelous words in Tagalog is also without merit. The fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed among other telegrams
and left to hang for the public to see, open for inspection by a third party is sufficient publication. It would have been otherwise perhaps had the telegram been placed and
kept in a secured place where no one may have had a chance to read it without appellee's permission.

The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the telegram are, as correctly found by the lower court, libelous per se, and from which malice may be presumed in the
absence of any showing of good intention and justifiable motive on the part of the appellant. The law implies damages in this instance (Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, L-
22794, January 16, 1968; 22 SCRA 44). The award of P40,000.00 as moral damages is hereby reduced to P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00 is
awarded. (pp. 22-23, record)
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court, petitioner came to Us with the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its
employee.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient publication of the alleged libelous telegram in question, as contemplated by law on libel.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of petitioner-company-employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles on Human
Relations.

IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees. (p. 4, Record)

Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent corporation not as an employer
subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The cause of action of the private respondent
is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. 1

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the facilities of the
petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the case
at bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the
petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees.
Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its
employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most
cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of
RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 In contracts the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of the employer (master). This is the master and servant rule.

6. Banal vs Tadeo, 156 SCRA 325

G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987

CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,
vs. THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch 105 and Rosario Claudia respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8 January 1987 which rejected
the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for mandamus to allow
Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the aforestated criminal cases.

It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913,
were filed against respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84.

The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio, through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19,1986.

The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to Branch 105 which was then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina

During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was then set on January
8, 1987.

In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105.

On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order."

The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.

Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1987.

In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private
prosecutor.

The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order. As such,
it is argued that it is the State and the public that are the principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a
private party or prosecutor may intervene.

On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be recovered from the
offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.

A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the case at bar.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised
Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely ( 1) the society in which he lives in
or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually
or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial
topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in
another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal
scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not.
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words,
criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or
omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978,
Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly
suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for
the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo,
19 Phil. 265).

Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief
as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services. She suffered with
the State when the checks bounced.

In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check transcend the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong done to the private
party defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public."

Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was
issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the
civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the
offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which
the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the speedy
and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for the purpose
would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.

WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of petitioner Charmina B. Banal,
in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases Nos. 40909 to 40913. The temporary restraining order issued by this court a quo for further proceedings. This
decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.