22 Arroyo vs. de Venecia - 277 SCRA 268 (G.R No. 127255, August 14, 1997)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R.

OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene A.V. Saguisag for
petitioners.
Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for De Venecia.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of

Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of
beer and cigarettes. Petitioners brought this suit against herein respondents
claiming that the latter violated Rule VIII, Section 35, Rule XVII, Section 103,
Rule XIX, Section 112, Rule XVI, Section 97, Rule XX Section 121-122, Rule XXI
Section 123 and Rule XVIII Section 109 of the House Rules. For this matter,
petitioners assert that violation of the House Rules is a violation of the
Constitution thereof. AEDISC
In its decision, the Supreme Court finds no ground for holding that
congress committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting Republic Act 8240. It
is clear from the facts of the case that what is alleged to have been violated in
the enactment of R.A. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than the constitutional requirement for the enactment of a law, that is,
Article VI, Section 26-27 of the 1987 Constitution, pertaining to the existence of
the quorum. The established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself. Verily, it follows that the case at hand does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the
constitutional limit of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of Article VIII,
Section I.
Moreover, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of House No. 7198
by speaker of the House and President of the Senate and certification by
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. In view of the foregoing, the petition
for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.
SYLLABUS
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY
RULES ARE MERELY PROCEDURAL AND COURTS HAVE NO CONCERN WITH
THEIR OBSERVANCE; FAILURE TO CONFORM THEREWITH WILL NOT INVALIDATE
ACTION WHEN THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS HAVE AGREED THERETO.
— Cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun , it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.'
And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES MUST NOT IGNORE CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRAINTS OR VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. — In United States v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co ., the rule was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house
to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by
the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time.
The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal." CIHAED
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case no rights of private
individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no
more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of
that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that each of the
three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others
may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter
upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; CANNOT DECLARE AN ACT OF LEGISLATURE
VOID FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE. — If, then,
the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as
to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES; THERE IS NO RULE REQUIRING THAT THE CHAIR MUST
RESTATE THE MOTION AND CONDUCT A VIVA VOCE OR NOMINAL VOTING. — No
rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report,
the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by
no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the
conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government
Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the
Tariff and Customs Code were approved. Indeed, it is no impeachment of the
method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even
more just. The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method
do not present any matter for judicial consideration. In the words of the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is
the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the
institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be
allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a
diagnosis of the problem."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING THAT THE
YEAS AND NAYS OF THE MEMBERS BE TAKEN EVERYTIME A HOUSE HAS TO
VOTE; EXCEPTIONS. — Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the
nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in
the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request
of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President. Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill
the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would
have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; QUESTION REGARDING MOTION
TO APPROVE AND RATIFY CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, NOT A QUESTION
OF PRIVILEGE ENTITLED TO PRECEDENCE. — Petitioners claim that they were
prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. It would appear,
however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the
problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did
not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for
adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo
could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. It is thus
apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead
of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted
on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the
bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order
or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. And even if Rep. Arroyo's
question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and
would have put an end to any further consideration of the question.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION, DEFINED. — The phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of
power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the
power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases where "a branch of
the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction."
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES; CONTINUED INTERPELLATION OF SPONSOR, AN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRESENCE OF QUORUM. — Here, the matter
complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was
no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly —
especially when the quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying
the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum.
10. ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; SIGNING OF HOUSE BILL BY THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND CERTIFICATION
BY THE SECRETARIES OF BOTH HOUSES, CONCLUSIVE OF ITS DUE ENACTMENT.
— Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of
evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and
abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: . . . As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of
the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a
solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
11. ID.; ID.; JOURNAL; CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS THAT

ARE REQUIRED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO BE RECORDED THEREIN. — The
Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by
the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons , this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of
the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired
today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240
is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
12. ID.; SUPREME COURT; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE
LEGISLATIVE ACTION AS VOID BECAUSE THE COURT THINKS THE HOUSE
DISREGARDED ITS OWN RULES. — It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty
of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case
may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment
of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its
rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE;
APPLICATION MUST BE LIMITED TO MINOR MATTERS RELATING TO FORM AND
FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH DO NOT MATERIALLY ALTER THE ESSENCE AND
SUBSTANCE OF THE LAW. — Reliance on the enrolled bill theory is not to be
discontinued but its application must be limited to minor matters relating more
to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and
substance of the law itself.
2. ID.; ID.; BILL; INTRODUCTION OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS IN THE

BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT VIOLATED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION AGAINST ANY AMENDMENT UPON THE LAST
READING. — The introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules
defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a
bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that
judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This
the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should
have justified the Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
PUNO; J.; concurring and dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

CONGRESSIONAL RULES; BOUNDARIES. — In the 1891 case of US. v. Ballin,
(144 US 1 [1891]) the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the
power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. Ballin clearly confirmed the
jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e.,
whether they are constitutional. Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v.
Smith (286 US 6 [1932]). The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis,
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction
although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the
applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Smith, of course, involves the
right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States (338 US 89
[1948]). A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined
t h e issue as "what rules the House had established and whether they have
been followed." The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in
deciding the case of Yellin v. United States (374 US 109 [1963]). In the
benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, (369 US 186 [1962]), the US Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-appointment of the Tennessee
legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of
government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that
"the courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether
some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority." THEDCA
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions n . It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitutional or
any foreign state constitution. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former,
Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by
undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at
bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LAW-MAKING
POWER; ENROLLED BILL, DEFINED. — An enrolled bill is one which has been
duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper officers
of each House and approved by the President. It is a declaration by the two
Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus
attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; RULES. — The enrolled bill
originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the
legislative branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being
regarded in their nature as judicial — as emanating from the highest tribunal in
the land — are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same
veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked.
In England, the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that
"an act of parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that
this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended,
dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same
authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it requires the same
strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. Over the years, the enrolled bill
theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted
t h e modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the
presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes
validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of
the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or
more of the constitutional requirements. Other jurisdictions have adopted the
Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie
evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption,
however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that
the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this
purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received.
Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERN RATIONALE. — The modern rationale for the
enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, viz.: . . . "The signing by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the
two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And
when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President
of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative
and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon the assurance, to accept, as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RULE SHOULD BE
ABANDONED. — The enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once
unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that starting in
the 1940's, ". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the
conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving only a
prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative
source of information." It is high time we re-examine our preference for the
enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (78 Phil.
1 [1947]) that this Court, with three (3) Justices dissenting, first embraced the
rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts . In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, (27 SCRA 131,
134-135) we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine. Significantly,
however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill doctrine.
The ponencia stressed: "All we hold is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy." In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, (56 SCRA
714) we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it
after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We
ruled: As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of
the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is
the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential. Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et
al., and its companion cases. These cases show that we have not blindly
accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice
Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the
enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court
to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer give our unqualified
support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this
suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in
England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution
and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United
States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in
light of contemporary developments in lawmaking. And more important, our
uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution,
laws and rules. In Mabanag, we relied on Section 313 of the Old Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the
enrolled bill. This section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of
Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive
presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled
bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often
results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987
Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only
under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also
adopted a national policy requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions
involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency
ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given
the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or
instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for
its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot
dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for
truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of
correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION; NEGATED IN CASE AT BAR. — I do not find any grave abuse of
discretion committed by the public respondents to justify granting petition. As
the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complaint that
petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition
does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it
involve the right of a non-member of the House which requires constitutional
protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are
procedural in character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to
help the House enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not
masters of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of
judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the
Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
VITUG, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH POWER TO DETERMINE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON ANY BRANCH
OF GOVERNMENT; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. — When the
1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been
imposed, could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with
the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term
grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as,
and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Absent a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would
respect the judgment of Congress under whose province the specific
responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be
an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it
been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of
separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of government. There
is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the
understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to
assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even
be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of
discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues — is shown
to have attended the contested act. DEICTS
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of

Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought

this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano,
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution. cdphil
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This

bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on
September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments
on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee
was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at
8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver
his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the
motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker
Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the
ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in
the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep.
Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that
he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following
transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of
Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and
ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I
want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the
Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the
motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for

one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until

four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the
House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the
transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of
audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after
the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner
Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the
transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21,
1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from
3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman;
and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four
versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
"approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be
heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word "no" on
line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times;
and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better
prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which
appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However,

there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in
order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding,
the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners
agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the
transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal
argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional
mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation
of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35
and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo
from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3
the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr.
Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in
violation of Rule XVI, §97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and
instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the
report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and
Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep.
Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion.
It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the
resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary
situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the
session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40
p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to
prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a
quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the
Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the
Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion
by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination
of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In

addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents'
defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled
bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for
reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in
Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings,
enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they
implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings
on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents
contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the
House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference
committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his
certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the
journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions
of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there
being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on
House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over
the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground
for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting
R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was
no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules
of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. cdrep
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin
with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10
the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business
free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the
opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law,
a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun , 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts
have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.'
And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rule was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised
by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."
I n Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to
a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and
when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority
extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power , in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon
it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution
and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having
made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the
subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last
resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."
I n State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall
determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary
for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of
proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This
authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly
within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of
the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void
because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own
rules of procedure."
I n McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it
appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain
whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules
in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage.
The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has
ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of
procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or
they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we
decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893
Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill
may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of
an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the
operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a
law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was
not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on
three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote.
Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature
should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own
rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision
of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the
direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It
receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at
legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and
consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner,
might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto;
but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which
the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no
reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed
by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself to govern its deliberations . McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50
N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C.
151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former
Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is
that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily
judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of
a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our
government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without
upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due
regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity,
compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged
violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation
to exercise our power.
Second . Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's
sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1,
"nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a
justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions
such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1
has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it
has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise
in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this
Court's function is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch
or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it
erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court
to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks
is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which
a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power. prcd
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
"railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair
when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of
the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval
and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none,
approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo
was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of
the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report should
have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a
legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that
one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically
requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce
or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out,
the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It
was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the
Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the
bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the
House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his
answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years
ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody
objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from

Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I
should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial
compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to
statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance,
to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying
"Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces
"The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to
the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that
motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the
measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if
anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the
Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.
22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way

would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this
Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as
a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to
manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem." 25
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-
fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill
the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would
have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration

allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment
of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to
allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m.
on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the
Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the
following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything
he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of
November 21, 1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair

declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of
Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (Emphasis
added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected

to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own
making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon,
petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle
to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or
substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to
adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further
consideration of the question. 31
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that
in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the
House acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled
meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial
power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said
in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1
extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of

the House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim
is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be
raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in
effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier
found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e. petitioners in this
case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on
H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one except Rep. Arroyo, appears to
have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John
Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral conference committee
proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not
to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of the conference
committee report. 37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by
the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted
in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing
this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the
EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a
conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had
been approved by the Senate. Cdpr
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will
respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has
been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims
that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the
Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts." 39 This Court
quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good,
if old-fashioned democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous
desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have
set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost
made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong
direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary
to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution;
but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to
reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill
sent to the President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously"
inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline
the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect
due the other two departments of our government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that
"upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is

cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule
rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of
the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it
was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated,
is in conformity with the Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the

massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure

from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the
Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano,
Bidin, and Quiason, JJ .) have departed from the Court since our decision in the
EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members
(Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, J J .) Petitioners are thus
simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is

confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that
the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240,
was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the
Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment,
affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall,
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the
Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are

required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other
matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons , 47 this Court spoke
of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public
memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that
rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting
only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A.
No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly
proven.
xxx xxx xxx
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal

department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because
the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The
Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion
were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead appropriately
be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or
amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith
belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49 cdtech
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ .,

concur.
Regalado, J ., concurs in the result.

Bellosillo, J ., took no part due to relationship to parties.
Panganiban, J ., took no part; former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J ., took no part; on leave during deliberations.
Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am
not backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I
cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and
inconsistent with, my firm stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration,
involved a similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax measure
namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural,
were posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion
of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of
instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree
with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching
upon substantive issues. My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled,
focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by
the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to
be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed
to have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill
theory 2 and the precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position
then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound
principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as presented before the
Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise
or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case
which I believe did not call for their application. cdtai
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill
theory, I was very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be
discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor matters relating
more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and
substance of the law itself. Thus:
"As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or
not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House
Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and
printing requirements which were exempted by the Presidential
certification, may no longer be impugned, having been 'saved' by the
conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why
we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with
respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the
enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment,
printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively
minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not
materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself .
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural
legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily
mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts — whether or not the bill
had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever — not over the
meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a
better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also
made that legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative
procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to
substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous
trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public
unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its
sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith." 4
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually
of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's review
power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
"I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution which provides that '(j)udicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.' We are
also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal
procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution." 5
I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was
applied. In this respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in
the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent
House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference
committee but that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment
upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these
lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold
the Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same
principle which should have justified the Court in questioning the actuations of
the legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the

aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino dissent. At the same time, I realize
that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant
petition.
For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of

Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the instant petition are
purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of the House's business.
They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions
of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the
Court's intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining
that substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act No. 8240. The
thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely
with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from
invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance thereof offends
constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to
invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be
conclusive as regards "substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end
of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted under
the circumstances of instant petition.
PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr.

Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have
to express my views on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by the
petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of
what I perceive as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987
Constitution and the winds of changing time.
I
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner
are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the
United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving
breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to

view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first
defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional
rules. 2 It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house

may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed
this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of
the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining
the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14,
1890) cdll
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining
the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may
of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages
or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only
one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more
just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other
body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was
examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental
right; and (3) its method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought
to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction
to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 I n Smith, the

meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator
voting in the majority may move for a reconsideration on the same day
on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual
executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation
or rejection of a nomination shall have been sent to the President
before the expiration of the time within which a motion to reconsider
may be made, the motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a
motion to request the President to return such notification to the
Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid
on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final
disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be

returned by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of the
time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a
motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered by the
Senate."
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal

Power Commission has been confirmed by the US Senate. The resolution of
confirmation was sent to the US President who then signed the appointment of
Mr. Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith
and requested the President to return its resolution of confirmation. The
President refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the question primarily at
issue relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to their
constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate interpretation of
its own rules even while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic
consideration.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a
construction different from that adopted by the Senate itself when the
present case was under debate is a serious and delicate exercise of
judicial power. The Constitution commits to the Senate the power to
make its own rules; and it is not the function of the Court to say that
another rule would be better. A rule designed to ensure due
deliberation in the performance of the vital function of advising and
consenting to nominations for public office, moreover, should receive
from the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons,
above stated, against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling.
We are confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the
attempted reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the Senate itself
seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of immediate notification
to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to perfect
the appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within
the test spelled out in Ballin.

Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4
Christoffel testified before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House
of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was charged with
perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the
committee had no quorum when the perjurious statement was given.
Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the members of
the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that —
"xxx xxx xxx
". . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at
least thirteen members of the said Committee, and that at least that
number must have been actually and physically present . . . If such a
Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did meet at the
beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and thereafter
during the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or
otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then
the fact that the majority did not remain there would not affect, for the
purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a competent
tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the
testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as
13 members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon
session . . ."
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to
assume there was a continuous quorum simply because it was present at the
start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once
established is presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again,
the court assumed jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr.
Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the House had
established and whether they have been followed." It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative

business is of course none of our concern, and by the same token the
considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of legislative
practice to treat as valid the conduct of its committees do not control
the issue before us. The question is neither what rules Congress may
establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of
continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The
question is rather what rules the House has established and whether
they have been followed. It of course has the power to define what
tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that
establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the
charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the
conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact
was not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts
contradicted the assumption. llcd
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which

defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An
essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such a
punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged shall be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in
the instant indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal, and the
trial court properly so instructed the jury. The House insists that to be
such a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree
with the trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that there were 'actually and physically
present' a majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a
finding that there was a majority present two or three hours before the
defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the
contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be
present when the offense is committed. This not only seems to us
contrary to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies petitioner
a fundamental right. That right is that he be convicted of crime only on
proof of all the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal
that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a
body can be the instrument of criminal conviction."
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and
practice that a quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and
until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect,
invalidates that rule . . ." The minority view commanded only the vote of three
(3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of
Yellin v . United States. 5 Yellin was indicted on five counts of willfully
refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court
of contempt of Congress on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he assailed his conviction
on the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in
executive session . He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV
which provides that "if a majority of the Committee or sub-committee, duly
appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives, believes
that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger
national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation of other
individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive
session for the purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of
conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public hearing." In a 5-4
decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial
review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been violated.
This is especially so when the Committee's practice leads witnesses to
misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of the
Committee's rules, which must be distributed to every witness under
Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that the Committee
actually does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To
foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply because the
witness was deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is
not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in
Yellin's case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the
Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own rules."
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has
pruned the "political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the
US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question
doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government order, will not be so applied
as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law
suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
'political' exceeds constitutional authority."
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will
cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is
new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions n . It
was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution.
The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine.
Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving
the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the
political question defense. Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this
defense when it provided:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ."
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense
in national security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to
protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield
with the new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, 7 I posited the following postulates:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Former Chief Justice Roberto R . Concepcion, the sponsor of this
provision in the Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the
reach of judicial power as follows:
'xxx xxx xxx
'. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute
political question.'
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to
deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this
Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction . Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against
the other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by the
people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg
to disagree for the view misses the significant changes made in our
constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered
during martial law. One of the areas radically changed by the framers
of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between and among
the three great branches of our government — the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary,
the Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security of
tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing 'No law shall be
passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members.' It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the
Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating
the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with screening the list of
prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming
appointments to the judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The
President was likewise given a specific time to fill up vacancies in the
judiciary — ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy in
case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of
the list of recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of
vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate appointments in the
judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was given the
power to 'appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.' And to make the separation of
the judiciary from the other branches of government more watertight,
it prohibited members of the judiciary to be '. . . designated to any
agency performing quasi judicial or administrative functions.' While the
Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced
the powers of the two other branches of government, especially the
Executive. Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the
Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to
proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power is now subject to
revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.cdt
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the

courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission
to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other branches of
government. This provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul
acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress — this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but
what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to

this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define
the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We
will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is
this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly
emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of
our courts. In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that
this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino
and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on
the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by
both Houses, signed by the proper officers of each House and approved by the
President. 9 It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding
officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due form the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to
him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written
Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the government, and the acts
of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial — as emanating from
the highest tribunal in the land — are placed on the same footing and regarded
with the same veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be
collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the conclusiveness of the bill was premised
on the rationale that "an act of parliament thus made is the exercise of the
highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be
altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same
forms and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it
requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. 11
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important
mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or affirmative
contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill
is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there
affirmatively appears in the journals of the legislature a statement that there
has not been compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements.
12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds
that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly
enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements in
enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other
extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic
evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14
These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the

enrolled bill. The modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in
Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
"The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill,
is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has
passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval,
and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that
has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of
the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it
was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon the
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated,
is in conformity with the Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the

enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience.
Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence. 16 It is also believed that it
will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty
on laws passed by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the
validity of every act published as law is to be tested by examining its history, as
shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an
amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its
contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the
law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that
journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in
various jurisdictions in the United States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance , and its companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited
some of the leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the
withering, if not demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive

presumption of validity originally attributed to that doctrine has long
been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the
competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder the
'enrolled bill rule'by which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its
contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment ,
it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to what
prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which journals of
respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of
Florida declared:
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by

the legislative offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as
it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown
from the legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled ,
and signed by the legislative officers, contains provisions that have not
passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a
part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade
vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
'This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the
journals speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled
bill is not conclusive.'
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the

decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et
al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively reproduced
hereunder.
. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the

validity of a long line of decisions of this court which created and
nurtured the so-called 'enrolled bill' doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain
procedures that the legislature must follow before a bill can be
considered for final passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky,

a court may not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the
appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects. cdta
xxx xxx xxx

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this
provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and approved by the
governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the propriety
of its enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for adopting the
enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the
processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second,
reasons of convenience prevailed, which discouraged requiring the
legislature to preserve its records and anticipated considerable
complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General
Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as
enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result
of judicial whim. There are four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An
enrolled bill was a 'record' and, as such, was not subject to attack at
common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of the three branches of
government, the courts, being coequal, must indulge in every
presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was
originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so
inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the final act, the
enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience
as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it
has not been without its critics. From an examination of cases and
treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial
presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a
rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results which do not
accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive
to fraud, forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings . (4) Modern
automatic and electronic record-keeping devices now used by
legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule
disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to
provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of
government. In light of these considerations, we are convinced that the
time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine
of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere,"
which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb
settled points of law. Yet , this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a
nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in
Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72
(1941)."
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the
question to be decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights
and practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or
the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations
are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons 'for neither
justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rule
to another,' and whether or not the evils of the principle that has
been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from
a change.'
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not
grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been
discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with
it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty
decision, the poor record-keeping of the legislature, has disappeared.
Modern equipment and technology are the rule in record-keeping by
our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating
machines, recording equipment, printing presses, computers,
electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as
to the ability of the General Assembly to keep accurate and readily
accessible records.
It is also apparent that the 'convenience' rule is not appropriate
in today's modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the
number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if
one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to
discover the truth and see that justice is done. The existence of
difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject
any doctrine or presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various
branches of government requires that we shut our eyes to
constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in government.
We simply do not agree . Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution
provides that any law contrary to the constitution is 'void.' The proper
exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is
unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without elaborating the point,
we believe that under section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our
obligation to 'support . . . the Constitution of the commonwealth.' We
are sworn to see that violations of the constitution — by any person,
corporation, state agency or branch or government — are brought to
light and corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that
silences our voices when confronted with violations of our constitution
is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which
Professor Sutherland describes as the 'extrinsic evidence.' . . . Under
this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is
valid, but such presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional requirements
have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v . Huffman and all other cases
following the so-called enrolled bill doctrine , to the extent that there is
no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . . ."
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable
respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's, ".
. . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive
presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie
presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative source of
information." 19
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It
was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three
(3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill
or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963,
we firmed up this ruling in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Hence, 'urea formaldehyde' is clearly a finished product which is
patently distinct and different from 'urea' and 'formaldehyde,' as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as 'urea formaldehyde.' Petitioner contends, however, that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction 'and'
between the term 'urea' and 'formaldehyde,' and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt 'urea' and 'formaldehyde' separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
'urea formaldehyde,' not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate,
during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. But said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the
view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House
of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank,
54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]).
Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled bill — which uses the term
'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and formaldehyde' — conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil.
118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on
Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree." cdti
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to the

enrolled bill doctrine, viz.:
". . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really
happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government
demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of
the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen
in the labyrinth of law-making, with consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative process. The investigation which the
petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in
Congress. After all , House cleaning — the immediate and imperative
need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be
effected by the occupants thereof . Expressed elsewise, this is a matter
worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a
Sherlock Holmes."
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the

enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:
"By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be
understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each
house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected
by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question
which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters
not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in the event of any discrepancy."
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled
bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding
offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his signature meant
that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect
than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct
in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode
of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the
bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to
the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its
passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935)
Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before
it becomes law, be presented to the President." In Brown vs . Morris,
supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in
the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill,
otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, the proof that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the
constitutional requirement ."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory
but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,
granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was
no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute.
Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and
binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry
to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its
absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes
farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is
there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In
such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting and
other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely
asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can
do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on
the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law , which
admittedly is a risky undertaking , but to declare that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do , as indeed
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate
and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body."
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as asecondary rationale
in the case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado. 24 In this case, the judges
claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the
franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee
Report. In rejecting this contention, this Court ruled:
"While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism
for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is
not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:
'A conference committee may deal generally with the
subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally
a conference committee produces unexpected results, results
beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the
rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a
Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).'
prcd
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on

the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales
and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having
been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to
and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not

inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like
the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old
(but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason
thus:
'To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine

legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws
by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.'
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy."
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , et al.

and its companion cases. 25 Involved in the case was the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The
majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity
of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases
manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not
even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or
that certain provisions of a statute had been 'smuggled' in the printing
of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings
of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to
depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the 'enrolled bill' rule is absolute. In

fact in one case we 'went behind' an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the
Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake
and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the

passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee 'surreptitiously'
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline
the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the 'enrolled bill' rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect
due the other two departments of our government."
These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness
of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough
to hold that "no claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute." I
respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive
pronouncement that we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled
bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance.
For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated
because in England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is
supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States have broken
away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of
contemporary developments in lawmaking. 27 And more important, our
uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution,
laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the
enrolled bill. This section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of
Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive
presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled
bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often
results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987
Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only
under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also
adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public disclosure of all state
transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on
transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this
Court was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any
branch or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the
enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations.
We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the
search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie
presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based
on truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I
do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondents
to justify granting said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely
involves the complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the question
of quorum. The petition does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the
Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the House which
requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question the existence of
a quorum are procedural in character. They are malleable by nature for they
were drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated, these rules are
servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a
matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business
of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J ., concurs.
VITUG, J ., concurring:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of

judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the
determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon
which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought of as
likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing
the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been
understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical
or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I
would respect the judgment of Congress under whose province the specific
responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be
an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it
been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of
separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of government. There
is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the
understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to
assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even
be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of
discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues — is shown
to have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs.

Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA
630) and vote to deny the instant petition. cdtai
Footnotes
1. JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo , pp. 210, 212; Transcript of November 21,
1996 session, pp. 39-52; Rollo , pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6. par. 10; Rollo , p. 8.
2. Rule VIII. §35. Voting. — Every member present in the session shall vote on
every question put unless he inhibits himself on account of personal
pecuniary interest therein.
Rule XVII. §103. Manner of Voting. — The Speaker shall rise to put a
question saying "As many as are in favor of (as the question may be), say
Aye" and, after the affirmative vote is counted, "As many as are opposed,
say Nay . . ."
3. Rule XIX. §112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions . — The Speaker shall state
the motion or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the Secretary General
before being debated. A motion may be withdrawn any time before its
approval.
4. Rule XVI. §97. Recognition of Member. — When two or more members rise at the
same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to speak first.
5. Rule XX. §121. Definition. — Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties,
conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of
its members, collectively or individually.
§122. Precedence. — Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of
privilege shall have precedence over all other questions, except a motion to
adjourn and a point of order.
Rule XXI. §123. Definition and Precedence. — A privileged motion
pertains to a subject matter which, under the rules, takes precedence over
others.
The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each
case by the rules.
Rule XVIII. §109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions. — When a bill,
report or motion is adopted or lost, a member who voted with the majority
may move for its reconsideration on the same or succeeding session day.
The motion shall take precedence over all other questions, except a motion
to adjourn, a question of privilege, and a point of order.
6. 235 SCRA 630 (1994).
7. Rollo , p. 228.
8. Id., p. 229.
9. Art. VI, §16(3).
10. E. g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1862);
Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F.2d 14
(1982); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n., 675 F.2d 1282
(1982). See also Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
11. 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance],
235 SCRA 630.
12. 144 U.S. at 5.36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).

13. 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).
14. 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).
15. 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).
16. 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).
17. 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).
18. ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 188-
189 (1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40
SCRA 58 (1971).
19. Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of the Constitutional
Commission, in 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436
(Session of July 10, 1986).
20. Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus , 177
SCRA 668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
21. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 701
(1991); Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42
SCRA at 480-481 (emphasis added).
22. 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).
23. United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25; State v.
Lewis, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).
24. United States v. Smith , 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).
25. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).
26. Art. VI, §26(2).
27. Id., §16(4).
28. Id., §27(1).
29. Id., p. 17; id ., p. 19.

30. INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED
AND ANNOTATED 331 (1963); REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF
PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 157-158, 172-173 (1963).
31. Rule XIX, §13.
32. 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10,
1986).
33. ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).

34. PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335 (1953).
35. Conference Committee Report, Rollo , p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo , p. 16.
36. Ibid.
37. Petition, p. 14; Rollo , p. 16.
38. Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
39. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).

40. Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW ON EVIDENCE
§1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is preserved in the Chadbourne edition of
this locus classicus. See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 at 834 (James H.
Chadbourne, ed. 1972).
41. EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf . Morales
v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).
42. Philippine Judges Ass'n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v. Subido ,
27 SCRA 131.
43. Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez , 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resins, Inc.
v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).
44. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6 MANUEL
V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 115 (1980); 7 VICENTE J.
FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).
45. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303 (1891).
46. The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and nays
on the third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, §26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays
on any question, at the request of one-fifth of the members present (Id.,
§16(4)); (3) the yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President's veto
(Id., §27(1); and (4) the President's objection to a bill which he has vetoed.
(Id.)
47. 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348
(1886).
48. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.

49. Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n., 675 F.2d 1282.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
1. 235 SCRA 630.
2. Id., at p. 672: "Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm
adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of
its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its
approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a state had
been 'smuggled' in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to
look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is
no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the 'enrolled bill' rule is absolute. In fact in
one case we 'went behind' an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by
the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who
had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his
signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another
allegation that the Conference Committee 'surreptitiously' inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation
to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the 'enrolled bill' rule
in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government."
3. Id., at p. 675: "Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled,
'parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the
courts have no concern.' Our concern is with the procedural requirements of
the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are
concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these
cases."
4. Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.
5. Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.
PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
1. 144 US 1 (1891).
2. The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in violation of
House Rule XV which provided that members present in the chamber but not
voting would be "counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business."
3. 286 US 6 (1932).
4. 338 US 89 (1948).
5. 374 US 109 (1963).
6. 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).
7. 235 SCRA 630.

8. Supra.
9. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.
10. Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Virginia 523 [1897].
11. Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel. Reed v.
Jones, 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to the
common law rule of the inviolability of the Sheriff's return. The Sheriff is
considered as an officer of the King just as a parliamentary act is deemed as
a regal act and no official can dispute the King's word. Dallas, Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed., pp. 408-418 (1972).
12. Sutherland, op cit., p. 410.
13. Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).
14. See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E.
2d 220 [1957].
15. Op. cit, footnote No. 2.

16. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350 (3rd ed.
1940)
17. 63 Miss 512 (1886).
18. Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).

19. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
20. 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
21. 7 SCRA 374.
22. 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.
23. 56 SCRA 714.
24. 227 SCRA 703.
25. Supra.
26. Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno dissented.
27. See writer's dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.
28. Op cit.
29. Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "1972 Constitutions" in the original
document.

22 Arroyo vs. de Venecia - 277 SCRA 268 (G.R No. 127255, August 14, 1997)

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22 Arroyo vs. de Venecia - 277 SCRA 268 (G.R No. 127255, August 14, 1997)

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R.

Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for De Venecia.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of

8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE

11. ID.; ID.; JOURNAL; CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS THAT

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

2. ID.; ID.; BILL; INTRODUCTION OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS IN THE

PUNO; J.; concurring and dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However,

The Solicitor General ﬁled a comment in behalf of all respondents. In

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair

This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ .,

Regalado, J ., concurs in the result.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of

PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the ﬁne legal disquisition of Mr.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house

Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 I n Smith, the

4. Nominations conﬁrmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

"Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

The provision deﬁning judicial power as including the 'duty of the

xxx xxx xxx

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the

"Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky,

xxx xxx xxx