G.R. No.

194129               June 15, 2015

PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision  in CA-G.R. CR No. 30957
1

dated 23 April 2010 and Resolution  dated 13 October 2010. The CA affirmed the Decision of the
2

Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated 10 May 2006 in Criminal Case No. 00-183183, finding accused-
appellant Police Officer 1 (PO 1) Crispin Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide.

On 01 June 2001, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information reads:

That on or about May 27, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused, with intent to kill, did
[then] and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
one MARIO DE LUNA y HALLARE, by then and there firing his service firearm, .9 mm Barreta Pistol
with Serial No. M19498Z, hitting the said Mario De Luna y Hallare on the chest and other parts of the
body thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds which were necessarily fatal and mortal and which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law. 3

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 4

The prosecution’s version of the events as narrated by the CA is as follows:

On May 27, 2000, at about seven o’clock in the evening, Mario De Luna, Emil Hipolito and Florentino
Magante were having a drinking session at Mario’s house located at Panday Pira Street, Tondo,
Manila.

At about 8:30 in the evening, the three, together with Edwin Hipolito and Jaime Mabugat continued
their drinking session at the house of Edwin, also at Panday Pira Street, Tondo, Manila. While
drinking thereat, they noticed that another group, with appellant (accused-appellant), was also
having a drinking session along Panday Pira Street which was about three to four arms length from
Edwin’s place.

Emil, Mario, Jaime and Florante joined the group in their drinking session. While drinking, appellant
(accused-appellant) poked a gun at Jaime and told him "wag kang magulo, babarilin kita." Jaime
retorted, "san, bakit," and was then approached by her sister who asked him to go home to which he
acceded. Thereafter, appellant (accused-appellant) called on Mario De Luna and fired several shots
at him. Mario de Luna fell down to the ground. He was then immediately brought to the hospital by
his mother and sister where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr. Emmanuel Arenas, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, conducted a post-mortem examination of the body of Mario De Luna and found that the victim
died as a result of the gunshot wounds on the chest and different parts of his body. 5

For his part, accused-appellant admitted to having shot the victim to death, but claimed to have done
so in self-defense.  In support of this claim, defense witness Marita averred that the shooting incident
6

was precipitated by the victim’s unprovoked knife attack upon accused-appellant. The latter was
allegedly left with no other recourse but to use his service firearm to neutralize the aggressor.  As
7

testified to by witness Marita:

On May 27, 2000, at about 10:00 p.m., she was in front of their house at 1663 Interior 24, F. Varona,
Tondo, Manila, when she saw Ferdie Tapang, her nephew, and four othershaving a drinking spree
beside a lighted electric post. Shortly thereafter, she noticed appellant (accused-appellant) pass by.
Then Jaime together with Mario arrived at the scene and approached the group of Ferdie Tapang,
uttering the words: "Gusto nyo itaob ko tong lamesang ito." Sensing trouble upon seeing two of
Ferdie Tapang’s drinking buddies rise from the bench where they were seated, Marita rushed to the
house of appellant (accused-appellant) to ask for his help in preventing a confrontation between the
two groups.

Appellant (accused-appellant) had just arrived from his duty as police officer at the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit of the Western Police District and was changing into civilian clothes
when Marita came and apprised him of the situation. Together with Marita, he proceeded to the site
of the drinking spree. Noticing the group was becoming rowdy, appellant (accused-appellant)
approached Mario and asked if the latter knew him. When Mario replied yes, appellant (accused-
appellant) went on to tell the group to put an end to their drinking session. Mario and Jaime
immediately left the scene while the others voluntarily dispersed.

Minutes later, Mario and Jaime went back to the locus. While standing beside appellant (accused-
appellant), Marita heard Mario shout towards their direction the words: "Walang pulis-pulis sa
akin!"Appellant (accused-appellant) likewise heard Mario’s utterances: "Walang pulis pulis sa amin!
Anong akala mo sa amin, basta-basta mo na lang pauuwiin." Mario then pulled out a knifeand
lunged at appellant (accused-appellant) who evaded the first thrust. Mario tried to stab appellant
(accused-appellant) a second time but the latter dodged the knife, drew his pistol and fired two
successive shots at Mario. Appellant (accused-appellant) was leaning backwards when he fired at
Mario. Fatally hit, the latters lumped to the ground.

Having immediately left the crime scene after hearing the first gunshot, Marita failed to witness what
transpired thereafter. 8

On 28 May 2008, accused-appellant, accompanied by Police Senior Inspector (PS/Insp.) Rosauro

Dalisay, arrived at the Western Police District and surrendered his service firearm.  On 10 May 2006,
9

the RTC convicted accused-appellant of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of Homicide
and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the
heirs of Mario De Luna the amount of Php1, 600,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; Php50,000.00
as civil indemnity; Php2,577.00 as hospital expenses; and Php300.00 as funeral expenses; and
Php250,000 as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED. 10
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant, but modified some of the monetary
damages awarded. It affirmed the ₱50,000 civil indemnity in favor of the victim’s heirs.  But instead
11

of the actual damages in the total amount of ₱2,877 (₱2,577 for hospital expense plus ₱300 for
funeral expenses), temperate damages of ₱25,000 were awarded in their favor.  The appellate court
12

deleted the award of ₱1,600,000 for loss of earning capacity on the ground of lack of competent
proof to substantiate the claim and reduced the attorney’s fees from ₱250,000 to ₱100,000.  It 13

affirmed the factual findings of the RTC and the latter’s assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses.  The CA likewise found that the trial court did not err in overruling accused-appellant’s
14

plea of self-defense. 15

Hence, this appeal.

The sole issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove accused-appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court has carefully reviewed the case records and finds accused-appellant’s conviction proper.

It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect.  Having observed their deportment in court, the trial judge is in a better position to
16

determine the issue of credibility.  For this reason, the findings of trial judges will not be disturbed on
17

appeal in the absence of any clear showing that they have overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could have altered the conviction of
appellants.  In the case at bar, the circumstances pointed out by accused-appellant are too trivial to
18

affect the assessment and the eventual findings of the trial court that he indeed committed the crime.
The Court therefore finds that the courts a quo have correctly appreciated the facts.

Their Decisions are fully supported by evidence on record including the transcript of stenographic
notes, which are extant and complete.

We are convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. We note that he admitted to having
killed the victim albeit in self-defense.  The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that
1âwphi1

when the accused admit that they are the authors of the death of the victim, and their defense is
anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon them to prove the justifying circumstance to
the satisfaction of the court.
19

Self-defense is a time-worn excuse resorted to by assailants in criminal cases.  We have held in a
20

host of instances that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must be met: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person engaged in self-
defense. 21

In this case, accused-appellant has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the first
element of self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.  Appellant showed no attack
22

or assault that had placed his life in imminent or actual danger.  As aptly ruled by the CA:
23

[A]ppellant’s tale of self-defense is negated by the physical evidence, specifically the trajectory of the
bullets that penetrated the victim’s body. Medico-Legal Report No. W-359-2000, the autopsy report,
showed that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the base of his neck and another in
the chest area. In both injuries, after penetrating the victim’s body, the bullets traveled from left side
downward to the right portion of his body. Xxx
 xxxx

The graphic representation of the travel path of the bullets from the entry to the exit points is shown
in prosecution’s Exhibit "B-5." On the basis of the bullet’s trajectory, Dr. Aranas concluded that the
shooter must have been positioned higher than the victim when the shots were fired. Thus, the trial
court concluded that the results of the autopsy disproves appellant’s claim that he fired the shots
while leaning backward after the victim tried to stab him a second time.  (Emphasis supplied)
24

Indeed, physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks higher in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.  In criminal cases such as murder/homicide or rape, in which the
25

accused stand to lose their liberty if found guilty, this Court has, on many occasions, relied
principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.  Where the physical evidence on record
26

runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the physical evidence must be upheld. 27

Ineluctably, the victim in this case cannot be considered as the aggressor. For one, an eyewitness
attested that accused-appellant shot the victim without any provocation.  Also, as correctly noted by
28

the trial court, there was failure to impute ill motive on the part of the eyewitness who had implicated
accused-appellant in the fatal shooting of the victim.  Jurisprudence holds that when there is no
29

evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the witness to testify falsely against the
accused or to pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists, and that the
former’s testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.  With regard to the second element of self-
30

defense, the Court finds that the means employed by accused-appellant was grossly
disproportionate to the victim's alleged unlawful aggression. The victim suffered multiple gunshot
wounds in his chest and different parts of his body.  Besides, the Advance Information prepared by
31

Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Virgo Villareal, the investigator of the case, reveals that there was no
mention of either a stabbing incident that happened or a knife that was recovered from the crime
scene.  Suffice it to say that a plea of self-defense is belied by the "nature, number, and location of
32

the wounds" inflicted on the victim, "since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a determined
effort to kill and not just to defend."  Here, the wounds sustained by the victim clearly show the intent
33

of accused-appellant to kill and not merely to prevent or repel an attack. Verily, since the means
employed by the latter were unreasonable and excessive, his plea of self-defense is unacceptable.

We, therefore, find no reversible error in the Decisions of the CA and the RTC as to the guilt of
accused-appellant.

Anent the appropriate penalty, we affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA: an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum  to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of
34

homicide.

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal.  Considering that there is one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no
35

aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty,
pursuant to Article 64 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its minimum
period.  This being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law  is applicable. Accordingly,
36 37

accused-appellant can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum  of which shall be
38

within the range of prision mayor and the maximum  of which shall be within the range of reclusion
39

temporal in its minimum period, there being one ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and no aggravating circumstance.
With regard to the appropriate indemnity and damages, the CA retained the award of ₱50,000 as
civil indemnity and modified other monetary damages as follows: (a) ₱25,000 as temperate
damages; (b) ₱50,000 as moral damages; and (c) ₱100,000 as attorney’s fees. 40

As correctly ruled by the CA, an award for civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim must be
automatically imposed against the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the
commission of murder or homicide.  Based on recent jurisprudence,  however, the award of civil
41 42

indemnity ex delicto of ₱75,000 for the heirs of Mario de Luna is in order.

With respect to other compensatory damages, the Court in People v. Agudez  declared that
43

competent evidence must likewise be presented to support the claim for those damages. In this
case, the heirs of Mario de Luna claimed that they spent ₱2,577 for hospital expense and ₱300 for
funeral expenses. However, when actual damages substantiated by receipts presented during trial
amount to less than ₱25,000, the award of ₱25,000 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual
damages for a lesser amount, is justified.44

The award for moral damages by the CA shall be adjusted from ₱50,000 to ₱75,000 to conform to
the prevailing jurisprudence.45

We also depart from the CA and the RTC rulings awarding the heirs of the victim attorney's fees, as
none of the grounds therefor under Article 2208  of the Civil Code is present in this case. Finally, the
46

Court also imposes interest on all the monetary awards for damages at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.  WHEREFORE, the appeal
47

is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Manila in CA-G.R. CR No. 30957 dated 23
April 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant PO1 CRISPIN
OCAMPO y SANTOS is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay
the heirs of Mario de Luna the amounts of ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages,
and ₱25,000 as temperate damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206590

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial importance must be
given to "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." 1

This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
2

No. 00744 that aft1rmed in toto the April 12, 2007 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
3

Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Branch 3, in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 and 2078, finding Myrna
Gayoso y Arguelles (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 (illegal sale of
a dangerous drug) and 11 (illegal possession of a dangerous drug), Article II of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165, respectively, and imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000.00 for selling shabu, and the indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum, for
possessing 0.53gram of shabu.

Factual Antecedents

The Information in Criminal Case No. 2078 contained the following accusatory allegations against
appellant:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:30 o'clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy.
Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused who acted without the necessary pennit from proper authorities
whatsoever, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and folonioμsly hi:i.ve in her possession, control
and custody eleven (11) x x x sachets (containing] Methamphdamme Hydrochloride commonly
known as "shabu" weighing 0.53 [gram], a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law. 4

The Information in Criminal Case No. 2079 charged appellant in the following manner:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy.
Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who acted without the necessary permit or authority whatsoever, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, deliver and dispense one (1) pc. small heat sealed
sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu" weighing 0.06 [gram], a
dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 5

During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of ''not guilty" in both cases. Joint trial then ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

Based on the testimonies of SP03 Victorino de Dios (SP03 De Dios), SP03 Rolando G. Salamida
(SP03 Sa1amida), P02 Rex Isip (P02 Isip), SP04 Josefina Bandoy (SP04 Bandoy), P/Insp. Eleazar
Barber, Jr. (PI Barber), PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto (PSI Cruto ), and the documentary exhibits, the
following facts emerged:

PI Barber of the PNP  Guiuan Police Station directed SP03 De Dios to conduct a surveillance on
6

appellant after receiving several reports that she was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later,
SP03 De Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed
for and was issued a search warrant. However, prior to implementing the search warrant, PI Barber
decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer and giving
him ₱200.00 marked money for the operation.

On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of appellant and
asked her if they could buy shabu. The sale was consummated when appellant took the marked
money from SP03 De Dios after giving him a sachet of shabu. SP03 De Dios immediately informed
PI Barber by text message about the successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI Barber and his team of
police officers who were positioned 100 meters away n1shed towards the house of appellant. He
also instructed SP03 De Dios and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to witness
the search of the house. When he arrived together with a ko,gawad and a media representative,
SP03 Salamida read the search warrant to appellant.

During the search of the house, SP04 Bandoy found a tin foil under the mattress. SP03 De Dios took
it from SP04 Bandoy and gave it to SP03 Salamida who found seven sachets of shabu inside, in
addition to the four sachets of shabu found inside the right pocket of the short pants of appellant.
The search of the house also revealed several drug paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was
prepared and the same was signed by the Barangay Chairman, P02 Isip, SP04 Bandoy, and
appellant. The sachets of shabu were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
then to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination. The results of the examination verified
that the seized sachets contained shabu.

Version of Appellant

Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on March 24, 2004, somebody forcibly
kicked the front door of her house and tried to break it open. When she opened the door, PI Barber
pushed her aside and told his companions to move quickly. They went directly to her room; when
P02 Isip emerged therefrom seconds later, he was holding a substance that looked like tawas. SP03
De Dios and SP03 Salamida went in and out of her house. She maintained that the search warrant
was shown to her only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were planted. She argued that
the police officers fabricated the charges against her since her family had a quarrel with a police
officer named Riza1ina Cuantero regarding the fence separating their houses.

The Ruling of the' Regional Trial Court

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession
of shabu. It declared that the prosecution ably established the elements of illegal sale and
possession of shabu through the testimonies of its witnesses who arrested appellant after selling a
sachet of the illegal drug in a "test-buy operation" and for possessing 11 sachets of the same drug in
her house after enforcing a search watrant immediately thereafter. Appellant had no evidence that
she had license or authority to possess the shabu.

The RTC ruled that the evidence sufficiently established the chain of custody of the sachets
of shabu from the time they were bought from appellant and/or seized from her house, to its turn
over to the PDEA and submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The RTC rejected
appellant's defense of denial and frame-up in view of her positive identification by eyewitnesses as
the criminal offender.

The RTC therefore sentenced appellant to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for the
illegal sale of shabu. It also sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years and one (1) day, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum and a fine of ₱300,000 for illegal possession of shabu.

From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. In her Brief,  she assailed the validity of the
7

search warrant claiming that it was not issued by the RTC upon determination of probable cause.
She argued that the "'confirmatory test-buy" conducted by the poseur buyer and the confidential
asset was not valid since they forced her to engage in a drug sale. She maintained that
the shabu presented during trial was inadmissible in evidence due to several gaps in its chain of
custody.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Brief for the Appellee  praying for the affirmance of
8

the appealed Decision. It argued that the evidence on which the RTC based its determination of
probable cause was sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant. It asserted that the "test-buy
operation" was an entrapment and not an inducement. The OSG maintained that
the shabu confiscated from appellant was admissible in evidence since the prosecution established
the proper chain of custody.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of unauthorized sale and possession
of shabu. The CA ruled that all the elements for the sale of shabu were established during the "test-
buy operation". It held that the illegal sale of shabu was proven by SP03 De Dios who participated in
said operation as the designated poseur buyer. His offer to buy shabu with marked money and
appellant's acceptance by delivering the illegal drug consummated the offense. The CA likewise
declared that the elements for possession of shabu were present in the case against appellant. After
appellant's arrest for illegal sale of shabu, a valid search resulted in the discovery of 11 sachets
of shabu inside her house, which were under her possession and control. She did not have legal
authority to possess the same and failed to overcome the presumption that she consciously knew
she was in possession of the illegal drug discovered in her home.

The CA noted that the examination by the trial judge established probable cause in issuing the
search warrant, The deposition of P03 Salamida shows that he had personal knowledge of
appellant's drug activities, and the same served as basis for the finding of probable cause for the
purpose of issuing a search warrant.

The CA was not swayed by appellant's contention that the "test-buy operation" amounted to
instigation since it is settled jurisprudence that a "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement
or instigation. The CA was also unconvinced by appellant's claim that the proof against her was
inadmissible since the prosecution failed to show strict compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and
its implementing rules on the custody and disposition of the evidence.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.  On July 15, 2013,  the Court notified the parties to file their
9 10

supplemental briefs. However, appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since she had
extensively argued her cause in her appellants' brief.  For its part, the OSG manifested that it would
11

not file a supplemental brief since its appellee's brief filed in the CA had already discussed and
refuted the arguments raised by appellant. 12

Our Ruling

The RTC Issued A Search Warrant After

Finding Probable Case

Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. She
claims that PI Barber had no personal knowledge of her alleged drug dealings.

There is no merit in this contention.

Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."  The probable
13

cause must be "determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."  Probable cause does not mean actual and
14

positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable
cause is concerned only with the question of whether the affiant has reasonable wounds to believe
that the accused committed or is committing the crime charged. 15

Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrar1t after deposing two witnesses,
namely PI Barber and SP03 Salamida. In particular, the disposition of SP03 Salamida shows that he
had personal knowledge of appellant's drug pushing activities which served as basis for the finding
of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Thus, whether or not PI Barber had
personal knowledge of the illegal drug activities committed by appellant will not adversely affect the
findings of probable cause for the purpose of issuance of search warrant.

Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does

not constitute instigation.

Appellant argues that the "confirmatory test-buy" by the police officers was not valid since she was
induced by the' designated poseur buyer, SP03 De Dios, and the confidential informant to sell the
seized shabu.

There is no merit in this argument.

In inducement or instigation - the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator
practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
co-principal. ['This is distinguished from entrapment wherein] ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of capturing the lawbreaker inflagrante delicto. 16
The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law. It does not amount
to instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.  The police received an intelligence report that appellant
17

habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a
drug transaction with appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell
illegal drugs to him.

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, appellant still deserves an acquittal as will be discussed
below.

The chain of custody of evidence was not established

Appellant impugns the prosecution's failure to establish the charges of illegal sale and possession
of shabu against her due to the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable integrity of the
evidence in view of non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.

There is merit in this protestation.

The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements: "(1) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor."  On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of shabu has the following
18

elements: "(l) the accused is in possession of an item or an object which is identified to be a

prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed said drug."  In the prosecution for illegal sale and possession
19

of shabu, there must be proof that these offenses were actually committed, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. 20

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of [ shabu,] conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of said drug. The identity of the [shabu] must be established with
moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that
the [shabu] illegally possessed and sold x xx is the same [shabu] offered in court as exhibit must
likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 21

"The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." 22

Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to
presentation in court for destruction."  In People v. Havana,  the Court expounded on the custodial
23 24

chain procedure in this wise:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard obtains in case the evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and
even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tampering -without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates
the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be
established:

first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 25

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on
the items after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the
seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as
reference.  The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized contraband be
26

done "(l) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation." 27

In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with their
initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While P02 Isip testified that
the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police station,  no evidence was presented to show
28

that the marking was accomplished in the presence of appellant. Moreover, the author of the
markings on said items was never identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the
markings. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings.

While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates a case of
warrantless searches and seizures.  Here, the police officers secured a search warrant prior to their
29

operation. They therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation.
However, the police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside
appellant's house in spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the
said house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately
after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody.

The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to the investigating officer in the police
station constitutes the second link in the chain of custody.  In this regard, the Court takes note that
1âwphi1

the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to whom the seized items
were turned over at the police station. While SP03 Salamida was identified as the property custodian
of the police station, this does not necessarily mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is
nothing in the records to substantiate this presumption. This total want of evidence gains importance
considering that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses identified the shabu presented
during trial as the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the second link in the chain of custody is
missing.

The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist in the crime
laboratory is the third link in the chain of custody. While the seized shabu was turned over by PI
Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any personal knowledge of the manner it was handled
therein. He also did not identify the police officer in whose custody the seized sachets of shabu were
placed at the PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the
crime laboratory. The request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the police officer
who delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO1 Asis, but he was not presented to testify that
the shabu delivered to the crime laboratory was the same shabu confiscated from appellant. There
is a third break in the chain of custody.

Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI Cruto. His testimony is
not clear and positive since he failed to assert that the alleged packs of chemical substance
presented for laboratory examination and tested positive for shabu were the very same substance
allegedly recovered from appellant. His testimony was limited to the result of the examination he
conducted and not on the source of the substance.

From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What we have here
are individual links with breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly woven or tied together.
The so-called links in the chain of custody show that the seized shabu was not handled properly
starting from the actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the PDEA, as well as its
transfer to the crime laboratory for examination. The Court therefore cannot conclude with moral
certainty that the shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory
examination and then presented in court.

It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. In reality however,
this rarely occurs. The legal standard that must therefore be observed "is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused."  Here, the Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to properly
30

preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. There are just too many
breaks and gaps to the effect that a chain of custody could not be established at all. Failure of the
prosecution to offer testimony to establish a substantially complete chain of custody of
the shabu and the inappropriate manner of handling the evidence prior to its offer in court diminishes
the government's chance of successfully prosecuting a drug case. 31

Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, another
procedural lapse casts farther uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. This
refers to the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the most basic procedural safeguards
relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165,
which reads as follows:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

Corollarily, Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides as follows:
Section 2l(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and a public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, farther, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizure of and custody over said items.

In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized items at the
place where the search warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the Department of
Justice, nor did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant after their initial custody and
control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same. Neither was an
explanation offered for such failure. While this directive of rigid compliance has been tempered in
certain cases, "such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied
only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved."  Such an
32

exception does not obtain in this case. "Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of
the [shabu] in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. [Thus,] the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to the [apprehending officers] by the courts
below cannot arise."33

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC

No. 00744 dated June 23, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Myrna
Gayoso y Arguelles is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges, her guilt not having been established
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Superintendent for the Correctional Institute for Women is hereby ORDERED to

immediately RELEASE the appellant from custody, unless she is held for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203028               January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSELITO BERAN y ZAPANTA @ "Jose", Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

On appeal is the Decision  dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
1

04466 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Joselito Beran y Zapanta Beran) rendered by
the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Manila, Branch 13, in a Decision  dated April 19, 2010 in Criminal
2

Case No. 03-218039, for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, under an Information which reads, as
follows:

The undersigned accuses JOSELITO BERAN y ZAPANTA @ JOSE of Viol. of Sec. 5 Art. II of Rep.
Act No. 9165, committed as follows:

That on or about August 26, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having
been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale to a poseur buyer one (1) pc. plastic sachet
containing ZERO POINT ZERO THREE ZERO (0.030) gram of white crystalline substance known as
SHABU containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law. 3

At his arraignment on November 5, 2003, Beran pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and trial
followed.

The Facts

According to the prosecution, between three and four o'clock in the afternoon of August 26, 2003,  a
4

confidential informant (CI) went to the District Anti-Illegal Drug (DAID) Office of the Western Police
District (WPD) at the United Nations Avenue, Manila, and approached Police Officer 3 (PO3)
Rodolfo Enderina (Enderina) to report that a certain Joselito Beran, alias "Jose," a pedicab driver,
was selling prohibited drugs, particularly "shabu," in the vicinity of San Antonio Street in Tondo,
Manila. P03 Enderina relayed the information to Police Colonel Marcelino Pedroso, Chief of DAID-
WPD, who then ordered him to form a buy-bust team to apprehend the suspect. At around 5 :00
p.m., the buy-bust team, composed of PO3 Enderina, PO3 Hipolito Francia, PO3 Benito Decorion
(Decorion), PO2 Ernie Reyes, PO2 Alexander Delos Santos (Delos Santos) and PO3 Knowme Sia
(Sia), who was to act as the poseur-buyer, arrived in Tondo on board an owner-type jeep and two
scooters. In the jeep were PO3 Enderina, PO2 Delos Santos, and the CI, while the rest of the team
rode in the scooters. They parked near the Gat Andres Hospital and proceeded on foot towards San
Antonio Street. As arranged, PO3 Sia and the CI walked ahead of the others. PO3 Sia and the CI
reached the target area first, and there the CI saw Beran standing some 10 meters away near a
''poso" or deep-well.

After recognizing and pointing Beran to PO3 Sia, the CI approached him and the two men conversed
briefly. Then the CI signaled to PO3 Sia to join them, and he introduced PO3 Sia to Beran, who then
asked the CI how much PO3 Sia was buying. The CI replied, ''piso lang," or ₱100, and Beran took
out something from his pocket, a small, heat-sealed plastic sachet, which he then handed to PO3
Sia. PO3 Sia took the sachet and pretended to examine it discretely, after which he indicated to
Beran that he was satisfied with its content. He then took out a marked ₱100 bill which he handed to
Beran; all this time the back-up members of the buy-bust team were watching from strategic
locations around the vicinity.

Thereupon, PO3 Sia executed the pre-arranged signal of touching his hair to signify to the back-up
cops that the buy-bust sale of shabu had been consummated, even as he then placed Beran under
arrest. The back-up operatives quickly converged upon Beran, with PO2 Delos Santos arriving first,
to whom PO3 Sia then handed over the custody of Beran, while he kept the plastic sachet. The buy-
bust team brought Beran to the DAID-WPD office, where PO3 Sia marked the confiscated plastic
sachet with the initials of Beran, JB. He also recorded the incident in the police blotter, and
accomplished the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhibit F and F-1), and the Request for
Laboratory Examination (Exhibit G and G-1. He later brought the seized plastic sachet to the WPD
Crime Laboratory for examination, where after testing it was found to contain the prohibited drug
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 5

In his defense, Beran vehemently denied the above incident. Testifying alone in his defense, he
asserted that on August 26, 2003 at around 2:00 p.m., while he was resting alone upstairs in his
house, five WPD policemen arrived and ordered him to come with them. He resisted and asked why
they were arresting him, but without apprising him of his constitutional rights they handcuffed and
forcibly boarded him in an owner-type jeep and brought him to the WPD Headquarters. There, two of
his arrestors, PO3 Francia and PO3 Sia, demanded from him the amount of ₱20,000.00 in exchange
for his release without any charge. But he could not produce the amount they asked, and they
trumped up a charge against him of illegal sale of shabu. 6

The trial of Beran took all of seven years to wind up, mainly on account of many postponements
allegedly due to supervening illnesses or reassignments of the subpoenaed arresting officers. The
prosecution was able to present two witnesses, PO3 Francia and PO3 Sia, but only PO3 Sia gave a
witness account of the drug buy-bust itself. PO3 Francia admitted that he served as a mere look-out
to prevent any intruder from interfering in the buy-bust operation, and that he did not witness the
buy-bust transaction itself. As for PO3 Decorion, also a member of the buy-bust team, the RTC per
its Order  dated July 29, 2009 agreed to dispense with his testimony after the parties stipulated that
7

as the designated driver of the buy-bust team, he did not see the actual exchange of drug and
money between Beran and PO3 Sia, nor did he witness the actual arrest of Beran by PO3 Sia.

Ruling of the RTC

On April 19, 2010, the RTC of Manila, Branch 13 rendered its judgment,  the dispositive portion of
8

which reads:

THEREFORE premises considered and the prosecution having established to a moral certainty the
guilt of the accused JOSELITO BERAN y ZAPANTA JOSE of the crime charged, this Court in the
absence of any aggravating circumstance hereby sentences the Accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and to pay the fine of five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), without any subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In the service of his sentence, the actual confinement under detention during the pendency of this
case shall be deducted from the said prison term in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The evidence presented is ordered transferred to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
for destruction.

SO ORDERED. 9

Beran went up to the CA to interpose the following alleged errors in the RTC decision, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [BERAN] DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF
HIS ARREST AND THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED PROHIBITED
DRUG.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [BERAN] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE
PROHIBITED DRUG.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [BERAN] DESPITE THE POLICE
OFFICERS' NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165. 10

Ruling of the CA

In affirming in toto the RTC the CA ruled that Beran was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a
valid and legitimate buy-bust operation, an entrapment to apprehend law breakers while in the act of
executing their criminal plan.  Relying solely on the testimony of PO3 Sia, it found that Beran sold
11

the prohibited drug shabu to an undercover buyer, PO3 Sia; that Beran was arrested at the moment
of the consummation of the sale transaction and immediately brought to the DAID-WPD along with
the sachet of illegal drug confiscated from him; that when the substance was subjected to chemical
analysis by the WPD Drug Laboratory, the content thereof was shown to be methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

The CA further held that the arrest of Beran by PO3 Sia without warrant was valid under Section 5(b)
of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that "a police officer or a
private person may, without a warrant arrest a person when an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it." It also cited Section 5(a) of Rule 113, wherein it provides
that "a police officer can arrest a person without warrant when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Quoted below at length are pertinent portions of the testimony of PO3 Sia which according to the CA
have proved beyond reasonable doubt the material facts attending the buy-bust and establishing the
guilt of Beran:

xxxx

============================
DIRECT EXAMINATION
CONDUCTED BY
ACP LIBERTAD RASA ON WITNESS
PO3 KNOW ME SIA
============================

xxxx

Q: How did you know that there was that informant who arrived at your office giving information
about drugs activities of a certain Beran?

A: PO3 Rodolfo Enderina formed a team in DAID office, ma'am.

Q: Did you know why Enderina formed a group at DAID?

A: He relayed to us that we have an Anti-Illegal Drugs Operation, ma'am.

Q: That you will have an Anti-Illegal Drugs Operation where and against whom?

A: Against one Joselito Beran alias Jose ma am.

Q: Where?

A: In the area of San Antonio Street Tondo Manila.

Q: Was there anytime that you saw them in front at your office when he relayed the information to
Enderina?

A: Yes ma’am.

Q: What time of the day or the night was that?

A: Between 3-4 pm of August 26 2003 ma am.

Q: And what did your team leader Rodolfo Enderina do as soon as he received that information? A:
He formed his men and then he directed all of us and placed the confidential information for
interrogation ma’am.

Q: As a matter of standard operating procedure what does an operative of SAID or DAID do before
launching a buy-bust operation?

A: First there must be an information to be received then there was a plan of operation and then the
documents are required to be accomplished prior to the conduct of a buy-bust operation ma’am.
Q: What documents if any were you required to prepare prior to your operation?

A: Our dispatch record.

Q: Do you have a copy of this dispatch record?

A: Yes ma’am.

Q: Can you show it to the Court?

A: It is with the custodial of DAID ma’am.

xxxx

ACP Rasa:

Q: Aside from the dispatch record what other documents did you prepare?

A: The buy-bust money, ma’am.

Q: Do you have the buy-bust money with you?

A: I will bring it on the next hearing ma’am.

Q: How much buy-bust money did you prepare?

A: ₱100.00, ma’am.

Q: Who supplied that ₱100.00 buy-bust money?

A: Our team leader, ma’am.

Q: Who is your team leader?

A: PO3 Rodolfo Enderina, Ma’am.

Q: Aside from the dispatch record, the buy-bust money, what other preparations did you do before
launching on the operation of buy-bust against one Joselito Beran alias Jose?

A: There was a preparation of Pre-Operation Report and Coordination Sheet, however, we cannot
fax to the PDEA because the PDEA fax at that time was not fully operational, ma’am.

Q: What other documents aside from those already mentioned did you prepare?

A: That s all, ma’am.

Q: And what were the other instructions given to you by the team leader, Rodolfo Enderina?

A: During our briefing, I was then chosen as the designated poseur-buyer, ma’am.
Q: What else?

A: The marked money was marked by me and then during the briefing, it was agreed that the pre-
arranged signal was to touch my hair as indication that the deed was done, ma am.

xxxx

Q: What time did you proceed to San Antonio?

A: Around 5:00 of August 26, 2003, ma’am.

Q: How many vehicles did you use?

A: We utilized one (1) owner type jeep and the others were on their respective motorcycle or
scooter, ma’am.

Q: And the others were aboard on scooters?

A: Yes, Ma’am.

Q: Who were inside the owner type jeep?

A: PO3 Rodolfo Enderina, the confidential informant and PO1 (sic) Delos Santos, ma’am. Q: And
who took their scooters?

A: PO3 Benito Decorion and PO2 Ernie Reyes, ma’am.

Q: One scooter?

A: Two (2) scooters ma’am.

Q: Where did you park your vehicle?

A: We parked in the area of Gat Andres Hospital, ma’am.

xxxx

Q: As soon as you had parked your vehicles, what else happened?

A: When we parked our vehicle, PO3 Enderina grouped us and told us that at the area where we
were going, the vehicles could not enter San Antonio Street and after that, the confidential informant
was the first who proceeded to the target place, ma’am.

Q: You already said that you already parked your vehicles. So how did you arrive at San Antonio
Street?

A: On foot, ma'am.

Q: How did you scout or identify your target person?

A: Upon arrival in the area of San Antonio, the confidential informant was the first who arrived and
then in a few minutes later, the confidential informant pointed to one (1) male person in the area

of San Antonio, ma'am.

Q: You were saying that, the confidential informant went ahead of you?

A: No, ma'am. We were together, ma'am.

Q: Where did you first notice the presence of the accused?

A: Near the alley, ma’am, in the middle of San Antonio where there is a "poso".

Q: When pointed to you, how far were you from the accused or your target?

A: Approximately 8-10 meters, ma'am.

Q: What was the accused doing when he was pointed at by the confidential informant to you?

A: He was spotted standing, ma'am.

Q: Standing only?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: What happened after you saw him standing?

A: The CI went ahead of me to approach the suspect, ma'am.

Q: When you said the CI was ahead of you, about how far away were you following him?

A: 3-4 meters, ma'am.

Q: What else happened?

A: After that, ma am, the CI and the subject were conversing.

Q: Did you hear what the conversation was all about?

A: No, ma'am.

Q: After that conversation, what happened next?

A: The CI signaled to me to come close to them, ma'am.

Q: As soon as you were already with the group or with the CI and the target person, what else did
you do?
A: I approached them, ma am, then the CI introduced me as the buyer of the prospected illegal
drugs.

Q: What was the reply or the action of Beran?

A: He told the CI magkano ba'', ma'am.

Q: And what did the CI say?

A: The CI told him piso lang . Piso means One Hundred Pesos, ma'am.

Q: After knowing that you were only interested to buy "piso'', what happened after?

A: After that Beran took out something from his pocket, ma’am.

Q: What was that?

A: Beran showed me and the CI a small plastic sachet, ma am.

Q After showing to you, what else did Beran do with the plastic?

A: The subject handed to me one (1) plastic sachet, ma’am.

Q: What did you do after it was handed to you?

A: discretely examined the contents of the plastic sachet and after that, the subject person
demanded for the payment of said stuff, ma’am.

Q: What did you do?

A: gave the marked buy-bust money, ma’am.

Q: What happened after that?

A: After that, the pre-arranged signal was executed, ma’am.

Q What was the pre-arranged signal agreed upon?

A: Touching of the hair, ma’am.

Q: Who was able to recover that buy-bust money?

A: Me, ma’am.

Q: What happened next?

A: The other back-up operatives arrived and PO2 Delos Santos was the first to respond x x x and I
gave the suspect to him for custody, ma’am.
Q: What did you do with that plastic that you bought from the accused Beran?

A: immediately placed him (sic) in my custody, ma’am, and later on it was marked and forwarded to
WPD Drug Laboratory Office for laboratory examination, ma’am.

Q: Who brought that plastic sachet for the laboratory examination?

A: Me, ma’am.

Q: Who placed the marking on that plastic sachet?

A: Me, ma’am.

Q What marking did you place?

A JB, ma’am.

Q: Where did you place the marking?

A: At the office, ma’am.

Q: If shown that plastic sachet, will you be able to identify it?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Why?

A: I recognized the markings, ma’am.

Q: What did you use to mark it?

A: I think it was a pentel pen, ma'am.

Q: Aside from this drugs (sic) which you said they requested and you personally brought for
examination at the WPD Crime Laboratory, what other things did you do as soon as you arrived at
the office?

A: It was recorded it (sic) in our police blotter, ma'am, and the pertinent documents were prepared.

Q: Do you have a copy of the police blotter?

A: Yes, ma'am, but it's in the office.

Q: The buy-bust money and the dispatched report are also at your office. Can you bring all of those?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: What was the result of the laboratory examination which you said you personally brought to the
laboratory?
A: It turned out to be positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, ma'am.

Q: What happened next after the examination?

A: After preparing the documents, we presented the case before the inquest fiscal, ma'am.

Q: Did you subject the accused for drug test?

A: I cannot remember, ma'am.

Q: You did not prepare a request for drug test?

A: I prepared the request for drug test, ma'am.

Q: And what was the result of the drug test?

A: I do not know the result, ma'am. Q: Can you bring the result of the drug test?

A: "Sa Crime Lab na lang po", ma'am.

x x x x.
12

====================================
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT EXAMINATION
CONDUCTED BY:
FISCAL PURIFICACION A. BARING-TUVERA
====================================

FISCAL TUVERA:

xxxx

Q: Mr. Witness, during your testimony on August 8, 2006, you were asked by former Prosecutor
Rasa if you will be able to identify the specimen which you said you bought from accused Joselito
Beran, do you remember having said that?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Will you still be able to identify the specimen if it will be shown to you again?

A: Yes, ma am. I was the one who. . . (interrupted)

Q: Will you be able to identify it?

A: Yes, ma am.

Q: And how will you be able to identify it, Mr. Witness?

A: I was the one who placed the marking on the alleged shabu.
Q: And what were the markings that you placed on the plastic sachet?

A: It was marked JB ma am.

Q: J?

A: JB.

Q: And will you kindly tell us who placed the markings JB on the plastic sachet?

A: I was the one who marked the specimen.

Q: And where did you place the markings Mr. Witness?

A: On the plastic sachet.

Q: At what time did you place the markings on the plastic sachet?

A: After the arrest of the suspect when he was brought to our office for investigation.

Q: In other words, when did you place the markings?

A: After 5 pm of August 23, 2003.

Q: And at what place Mr. Witness?

A: At the office.

Q: I am showing you Mr. Witness a plastic sachet, by the way, how many plastic sachets did you buy
from the accused?

A: One (1) plastic sachet.

Q: One plastic sachet only, Mr. Witness, I am showing you a plastic sachet with markings JB, will
you kindly tell us if that is the same plastic sachet that you bought from the accused and
subsequently marked at the police station?

A: This is the plastic sachet subject of the sale, I marked JB on the said plastic sachet.

FISCAL TUVERA: We manifest Your Honor that [t]he plastic sachet was already marked as Exhibit
B-1 for the prosecution.

Q: What did you use Mr. Witness in buying this shabu?

A: We utilized ₱100 bill.

Q: Do you have the genuine ₱100 bill with you now Mr. Witness?

(pause)
Q: Nasa iyo ba yung ₱100 bill?

A: I have it in my custody.

Q: You have it in your custody?

A: But I did not bring it today.

Q: Why did you not bring it today Mr. Witness?

A: I only knew ma am that I have my hearing on Joselito Beran but I forgot to bring it, next scheduled
hearing nalang po.

Q: Mr. Witness, before you used that buy-bust money to buy shabu from the accused Mr. Witness,
did you place markings on the ₱100 bill?

A: Yes ma’am

Q: And what were these markings did you place on the ₱100 bill?

A: I marked DAID at the left portion of the buy-bust money.

Q: And what else did you do aside from placing markings on the ₱100 bill?

A: The said money was then xeroxed for five (5) pieces and then the original was kept in our
custody.

x x x x.
13

(Continuation of Direct-Examination of Witness PO3 Know me Sia by ACP Baring-Tuvera)

xxxx

ACP BARING-TUVERA

Q: Mr. Witness, you are here today for the continuation of your direct-examination. May we know if
you already brought with you the buy-bust money in connection with this case?

THE WITNESS

A: Yes, ma’am.

ACP BARING-TUVERA

Q: Will you kindly bring it out and show it to this Honorable Court so that the Court may be able to
appreciate it?

THE WITNESS

A: Here, ma’am.
COURT:

Q: The money is attached to a blank sheet of paper. Will you write something about it, the case
number?

THE WITNESS

A: Yes, your Honor.

ACP BARING-TUVERA:

Q: May I just have this identified, your Honor? Mr. Witness, you said that you were the one who
placed the markings on this One Hundred Peso (₱100.00) bill. Will you kindly tell us on what part of
this money did you place the markings?

THE WITNESS

A: I marked DAID at the left center portion of the buy-bust money.

xxxx

ACP BARING-TUVERA

Q: Mr. Witness, you said that you were the one -you were the poseur-buyer in this case. If you will
be shown the item again, will you be able to identify it again Mr. Witness?

THE WITNESS

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: I am showing to you Mr. Witness -and how will you be able to identify it?

A: I was the one who marked it.

Q: And what markings did you place on the plastic sachet?

A: JB, ma’am.

xxxx

ACP BARING-TUVERA

Q: And who were present when you marked this plastic sachet at the office?

THE WITNESS

A: The arresting officers ma’am, my companions in the conduct of the buy-bust operation, ma am.
THE COURT:

Q: Who?
THE WITNESS

A: PO3 Rodolfo Enderina, PO2 Hipolito Francia.

THE COURT:

Q: In the presence of your fellow officers?

THE WITNESS

A: Yes, Your Honor.

ACP BARING-TUVERA

Q: How about the police investigator, was he also present when you place this markings?

THE WITNESS

A: In that case ma’am, I was also the investigator.

Q: You were also the investigator. And after you placed the markings on that plastic sachet Mr.
Witness, the plastic sachet containing shabu, what else did you do?

A: We prepared the laboratory examination, ma’am.

Q: Who prepared the request for laboratory examination?

A: I prepared it, ma’am.

Q: Okay. And after you prepared the request for laboratory examination, what else happened?

A: And then we submitted the said specimen to the crime laboratory for laboratory examination.

Q: Was the laboratory examination actually conducted on the plastic sachet that you submitted? A:
Yes, ma’am.

Q: And what was the result of the laboratory examination that was conducted on the specimen that
you submitted?

A: It yielded positive result for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, ma’am.

xxxx

ACP BARING-TUVERA

Q: After you have arrested or after the buy-bust operation Mr. Witness, do you remember having
executed any document?

THE WITNESS
A: I executed the Affidavit of Poseur-Buyer. I also prepared the Referral for Inquest, the Request for
Drug Test and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report.

x x x x. 14

On cross-examination, PO3 Sia was asked why he omitted to mention in his affidavit his claimed
marking of the confiscated sachet of shabu. He could not explain his oversight except to say that he
"forgot to include a mention of the said fact, ma'am." 15

Our Ruling

According to the CA, the following elements are required to sustain Beran's conviction and these
have been shown to be present in the case below, namely: the identity of the buyer and the seller;
the object of the sale and the consideration; and the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor.  It held that the prosecution was able to establish the following facts: the identities of the
16

poseur-buyer, PO3 Sia, and the seller, Beran; the object of the sale, shabu contained in a heat-
sealed plastic sachet handed by Beran to PO3 Sia; and, the consideration which PO3 Sia paid for
the staged purchase, a marked ₱100.00 bill confiscated in the possession of Beran. Thus, according
to the CA, a complete narrative was built of an illegal sale of shabu leading to the arrest of Beran by
PO3 Sia.

We disagree.

The crucial issue in this case is whether, to establish the corpus delicti the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized drug have been preserved in an unbroken chain of custody. We find no unbroken
chain of custody, and we rule that the prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged. Beran must be set free.

Evidentiary gaps in the chain of

custody of the confiscated plastic
sachet cast reasonable doubt on its
integrity.
17

It is well-settled that in the prosecution of cases involving the illegal sale or illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the evidence of the corpus delicti which is the dangerous drug itself, must be
independently established beyond reasonable doubt.  In People v Pagaduan  we ruled that proof
18 19

beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs demands that
unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti the body of the crime whose
core is the confiscated illicit drug.  The case of People v. Tan,  cited in People of the Philippines v.
20 21

Datu Not Abdul,  elucidates and reminds us why:

22

"By the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of
shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be
planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds
all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra
vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties
for drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower court should have exercised the utmost diligence and
prudence in deliberating upon accused-appellants' guilt. It should have given more serious
consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence offered by both the defense and the State and
many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in determining the merits of the present
case.
Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established, and the chain of custody
requirement under R.A. No. 9165 performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that any
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.  Blacks Law Dictionary describes
23

"chain of custody," as follows:

"In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a trial of drug case, must
account for the custody of the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody until the
moment in which it is offered in evidence, and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of
evidence. Com. V. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E. 2d 335." 24

Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody, Section 1(b) of Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 nonetheless
explains the said term, as follows:

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.

The purpose of the requirement of proof of the chain of custody is to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drug are preserved, as thus dispel unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence. To be admissible, the prosecution must establish by records or testimony
the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit, from the time it came into the possession of the police
officers, until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, and all the way to the time
it was offered in evidence.25

A review of the facts of this case will readily make evident that the appellate decision failed to take
note of vital gaps in the recording by the apprehending officers of authorized movements and
custody of the seized shabu as we shall point out, and these gaps compel us to rule that reasonable
doubt exists as to the identity of the very corpus of the offense herein charged, the sachet of shabu
recovered from Beran. In People v. Alcuizar,  we reiterated the rule that under R.A. No. 9165 the
26

dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti and that to sustain a conviction the identity
and integrity of the drug must definitely be shown to have been preserved:

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from
the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any
doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show
that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-
appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.  (Citation
27

omitted)

Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides
that to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized pursuant to a
buy-bust operation, or under a search warrant, the following procedures shall be observed by the
apprehending officers, to wit:
 xxxx

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

x x x x.
28

In People v. Dela Rosa  we ruled that the prosecution must establish by records or testimony the
29

continuous whereabouts of the exhibit, from the time it came into the possession of the police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, and all the way to the time it
is offered in evidence.  In the instant case, from the testimony of PO3 Sia it is clear that the
30

apprehending operatives did not, immediately after seizure and confiscation of the illegal item,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused, his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and an elected public
official, notwithstanding that they were supposed to have been conducting a planned sting operation.
Indeed, it is not gratuitous to state that they took no efforts whatsoever to observe even a modicum
of the above procedures. Worse, the prosecution did not bother to explain why they failed to observe
them, although they knew these procedures were intended to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the item seized.

Moreover, none of the other witnesses of the prosecution could corroborate the culpatory narrative
of PO3 Sia at any of its material points to create the successive links in the custody of the seized
drug. Of the six-man buy-bust team, only PO3 Sia and PO3 Francia testified in court, and PO3
Francia himself twice stated that he did not witness the actual buy-bust sale as it was taking-place:

(On Cross-examination of PO3 Francia by Atty. Anne Geraldine Agar)

xxxx

Q: And what was your participation in this case, Mr. Witness?

A; I acted as alalay or back-up, ma'am.

Q: Did you act as alalay on that day?

A; Yes, ma'am.

COURT:

Did you see what happened while you were acting as alalay or back-up?
WITNESS:

None, your Honor. Malayo po kasi ako.

COURT:

Wala pala, eh ..

ATTY.AGAR:

Nothing further, your Honor.

FISCAL:

Redirect, Your Honor.

COURT:

Proceed Fiscal.

Q: P03 Francia, you were one of those appointed to form a team?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And you said, you were only as alalay ?

A: Yes, back-up, ma’am.

Q: What does an alalay or back-up do?

A: We are there to prevent any intruder that may prevent our operation, ma’am.

Q: How far were you positioned from the poseur-buyer?

A: More than 5-7 meters, ma’am.

Q: Was there any incident or intruder that stopped you from arresting the accused?

A: None, ma’am.

Q: From where you were, were you able to see the pre-arranged signal by the poseur-buyer?

xxxx

A: No, I did not see, ma’am.

Q: As a back-up, when did you come to see that the deal was consummated?

A: When my companions moved to Know me Sia to assist him, ma’am.

Q: And what was your last act at that time?

A: "Umalalay," ma’am. 31

Incidentally, neither did PO3 Francia corroborate PO3 Sia's claim that he and PO3 Enderina were
present when he marked the subject sachet at the precinct.

In People v. Morales,  we acquitted the accused due to the failure of the buy-bust team to
32

photograph and inventory the seized items or to give justifiable grounds for their non-observance of
the required procedures. In People v. Garcia,  the accused was acquitted because "no physical
33

inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the
circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules."  We issued the same ruling in
34

Bondad Jr. v. People,  where the police without justifiable grounds did not inventory or photograph
35

the seized items. We reiterated the same ruling in People v. Gutierrez,  People v.
36

Denoman,  People v. Partoza,  People v. Robles,  and People v. dela Cruz.  In all these cases, we
37 38 39 40

stressed the importance of complying with the required mandatory procedures in Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 concerning the preservation of the chain of custody of confiscated drugs in a buy-bust
operation.

Further, in Mallillin v. People  we emphasized that the chain of custody rule requires that there be
41

testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time
it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the possession of the
witness, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain.
42

The RTC and CA both convicted Beran on the basis alone of the uncorroborated testimony of PO3
Sia, and despite the buy-bust team s unexplained non-observance of the procedures laid down in
Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165. As the Court of last resort, we are now called
upon to correct this error. Unlike in People of the Philippines v. Erlinda Mali y Quimno a k a
"Linda",  where we found that the prosecution adequately established the unbroken links in the chain
43

of custody of the confiscated drug, and the apprehending officers were able to preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the item seized and justified their non-compliance with the above
procedures, in the instant appeal we rule that the chain of custody has not been established at all,
and thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug seized has not been preserved.

Contrary to the settled rule in a

buy-bust operation, the confiscated
shabu was not (1) marked in the
presence of Beran (2) immediately
upon confiscation.

Concerning the marking of evidence seized in a buy-bust operation or under a search warrant, vis-a-
vis the physical inventory and photograph, it must be noted that there are distinctions as to time and
place under Section 21 of R A No. 9165. Thus, whereas in seizures covered by search warrants, the
physical inventory and photograph must be conducted in the place of the search warrant, in
warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, consistent with the "chain of custody" rule. In People v. Sanchez  the Court held that:
44
"Physical inventory and photograph
requirement under Section 21
vis-à-vis "marking" of seized evidence

While the first sentence of Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
9165 states that "the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same," the
second sentence makes a distinction between warrantless seizures and seizures by virtue of a
warrant, thus:

"(a) x x x Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."

Thus, the venues of the physical inventory and photography of the seized items differ and depend on
whether the seizure was made by virtue of a search warrant or through a warrantless seizure such
as a buy-bust operation.

In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and photograph must be conducted
in the place where the search warrant was served. On the other hand, in case of warrantless
seizures such as a buy-bust operation, the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the nearest police station or office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable;
however, nothing prevents the apprehending officer/team from immediately conducting the physical
inventory and photography of the items at the place where they were seized, as it is more in keeping
with the law's intent of preserving their integrity and evidentiary value.

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
marking of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities
are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the marking of the seized items—to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the
process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as
well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section
29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.  (Citations omitted and emphases in the original)
45

It needs no elaboration that the immediate marking of the item seized in a buy-bust operation in the
presence of the accused is indispensable to establish its identity in court. PO3 Sia admitted that he
marked the sachet of shabu only at the DAID-WPD precinct, several kilometers from the buy-bust
scene, as well as impliedly admitted that Beran was not then present. Indeed, none of the buy-bust
team attested that they saw him take custody of the confiscated shabu and later mark the sachet at
the DAID-WPD office.

Also, the operatives rode in separate vehicles on the trip back to the WPD, and PO3 Sia took a
scooter with another teammate, who could then have attested as to his exclusive custody of the
subject drug, but that person was not presented to affirm this fact. So even granting that P03 Sia did
mark the same sachet at the precinct, breaks in the chain of custody had already taken place, first,
when he confiscated it from Beran without anyone observing him do so and without marking the
subject sachet at the place of apprehension, and then as he was transporting it to the precinct, thus
casting serious doubt upon the value of the said links to prove the corpus delicti.

It has been held that "while a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve, an
unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the prosecution of drug cases owing to its
susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange."  Moreover, as the investigator of the case, PO3 Sia claimed that he personally took the
46

drug to the laboratory for testing, but there is no showing who the laboratory technician was who
received the drug from him. The records also show that he submitted the sachet to the laboratory
only on the next day, without explaining how he preserved his exclusive custody thereof overnight.
All these leave us with no conclusion but that there is serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item have not been fatally compromised.

Lapses in the strict compliance with

the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 must be explained in
terms of their justifiable grounds,
and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be
shown to have been preserved.

In People v. Coreche,  we explained that the above-cited rules are intended to narrow the window of
47

opportunity for tampering with evidence, as expressed in Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165.  As noted
1âwphi1

by the Court which is worth stating:

RA 9165 is silent on when and where marking should be done. On the other hand, its implementing
rules provide guidelines on the inventory of the seized drugs, thus: "the physical inventory x x x shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures"
(Section 21(a) of Implementing Rules and Regulations). In People v. Sanchez G.R. No. 175832, 15
October 2008, 569 SCRA 194), we drew a distinction between marking and inventory and held that
consistent with the chain of custody rule, the marking of the drugs seized without warrant must be
done "immediately upon confiscation" and in the presence of the accused.

The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with evidence found legislative
expression in Section 21(1) of RA 9165 on the inventory of seized dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of
inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs the
duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof." Although RA 9165 is silent on the effect of non-compliance with Section
21(1), its implementing guidelines provide that "non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items." We have interpreted this provision to mean that the prosecution bears the
burden of proving "justifiable cause" (People v. Sanchez, id.; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, 25
February 2009, 580 SCRA 259). 48

In Sanchez, we recognized that under varied field conditions the strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible, and we ruled that under
the implementing guidelines of the said Section "non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items."  But we added that the prosecution bears the burden of proving justifiable
49

cause."

Thus, in Almorfe, we stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.  In People v. de Guzman,  we emphasized that the
50 51

justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist. 52

In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer an explanation for why an inventory and
photograph of the seized evidence was not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the
police station, as required by the Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests, or why the
marking of the seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of Beran. Indeed,
the very identity of the subject shabu cannot be established with certainty by the testimony alone of
PO3 Sia since the rules insist upon independent proof of its identity, such as the immediate marking
thereof upon seizure. And as we already noted, PO3 Sia claimed that he personally transported the
shabu to the WPD station, yet other than his lone testimony there is no other evidence of his
exclusive and uninterrupted custody during the interval from seizure and transportation to turn over
at the WPD. Then, the record shows that PO3 Sia submitted the sachet of shabu for laboratory
examination only the next day,  and therefore presumably he retained custody of the subject sachet
53

overnight. In view of his self-serving admission that he marked the sachet only at the precinct, but
without anyone present, along with his lack of mention of the laboratory technician or officer who
received the sachet from him, the charge that the subject drug may have been tampered with or
substituted is inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04466 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, Joselito Beran y Zapanta is hereby
ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. His
immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED unless he is being held for another lawful
cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City for immediate implementation, who is then also directed to report to this Court the action he has
taken within five (5) days from his receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191366               December 13, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO,
and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. HC-
NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating
Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous
Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.

The Facts

The Information indicting the accused reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES,
EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y CAROLINO, ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and
RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of law, confederating together, acting jointly
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess
dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil,
during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2)
person[s].

Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.3

Version of the Prosecution

As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon (PO1
Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp.
Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it appears that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45
o’clock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along
Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a
pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
(PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was
located.

As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria (Doria) coming
out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales,
Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The
four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets
(containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.

The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room were
seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp.
Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic
sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test and, except
for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Version of the Defense

The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that in the
morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who
was to give the materials for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision
looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person
pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen emerged
and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan
City, where they were incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.

The Ruling of the RTC

The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.

On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ARNOLD

MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL
GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Possession of Dangerous
Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized under Section 13 in
relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of
suit.

The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in
accordance with the law.

SO ORDERED.4
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1 Azardon, without
any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of denial and alibi put up by the
accused. The accused were held to have been in constructive possession of the subject items. A
conspiracy was also found present as there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to the
constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further held that although the
procedure regarding the custody and disposition of evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence were
nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.

Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying for the reversal
of the subject decision, presenting the following

Assignment of Errors

For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez

1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants to be having a pot session
at the time of their arrest;

2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police to plant the
shabu paraphernalia to justify the arrest of the accused-appellants without warrant;

3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently
established;

4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Azardon
insufficient to convict the accused-appellants of the crime charged;

5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.

For accused Rafael Gonzales

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED
CONFISCATED DRUG.

After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed
to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused
are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been
duly established.

Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure

Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue
before arraignment.5 However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest.6

Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, it has been
held that this Court has the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if such is necessary in
arriving at a just decision,7 especially when the transcendental matter of life and liberty is at
stake.8 While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends
of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Time and again,
this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate
the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never be used to defeat
substantive rights.9 Thus, despite the procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the
admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear infringement of the accused’s right to be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.

The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its
citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects.10 Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution
provides:

Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures
without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a
warrant — (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;11 (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;"
(iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and
frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.12

This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a
plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to
the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the
circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.

A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were
confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint
Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales
based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house, to
wit:

Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you how many
persons were actually conducting the pot session?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed with a
search warrant, correct?

A: None, sir.

Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not know
personally Rafael Gonzales?

A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.

Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot session in
the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report to you placed in the police blotter before you
proceeded to the house of Rafael Gonzales?

A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.

Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of the person
who told you that he was allegedly informed that there was an ongoing pot session in the
house of Rafael Gonzales?

A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does not want to
be identified because he was afraid, sir.

Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot session in
the house of Rafael Gonzales?

A: No more, sir.
 Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group
and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could not see
what is happening inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of shabu on
the table while you were outside the premises of the property of Rafael Gonzales?

xxx

Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?

COURT: Answer.

A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.

Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you that he
was informed by another person that there was an ongoing pot session going on inside the
house of Rafael Gonzales?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael Gonzales and
you arrested the persons you saw?

A: Yes, sir.14

Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other
hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless
arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.15

Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases16 that tipped information is sufficient
probable cause to effect a warrantless search,17 such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench
because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances
other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police
officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an informer’s
tip. The case of People v. Bolasa18 is informative on this matter.

In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman were
repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the house of the
suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their informer. When they reached the
house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking marijuana.
They then entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug
paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:

The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-
enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing,
or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a
crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants
committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal
establishment.

Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion.
As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea
bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of
accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of
a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot
even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such
showing.

On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance
considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-
appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure.
The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus
obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal
must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.19

It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 20

As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that
at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a
crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to
arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an offense. As
admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself
had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the police:

Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was based on
a tip-off by an informant?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?

A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of
one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.
 Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information originated
but from somebody else?

A: That was what he told me, sir.

Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on? [No
Answer]

Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot session was
going on?

A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.

Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going on
somewhere in Arellano but you don’t know the exact place where the pot session was going
on?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of the alleged pot
session because he claimed that he derived that information from somebody else?

A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session, sir.

Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?

A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.

xxx

Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot session?

A: No, sir.

Q: That was, because your informant don’t [sic] know physically what was really happening
there?

A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there,
sir.21 [Emphasis supplied]

Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of plainview
are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and,
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.22

The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered the house
with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused with the subject items.
If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to constitute plain view,
then more so should the warrantless search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be
considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, a
stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency circumstances.

The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity
and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior
to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is
likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is
deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.23 The
subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes
conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges have glossed
over illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to present the alleged
evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This attitude
tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law enforcement. It is ironic that such
enforcement of the law fosters the breakdown of our system of justice and the eventual denigration
of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the
law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.24

Chain of Custody

Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused would
still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody
requirement in dangerous drugs cases.

The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with moral certainty as
the chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities having failed to comply with
Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series
of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated
items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items taken, no compliance with the rule
requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how
the items were handled from the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime
laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing reasonable
doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor was not
overcome by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was
in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by law, and (iii) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.25 Additionally, this being a case for
violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of
the dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the
proximate company of at least two (2) persons.

The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish the existence of the
drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently established. The chain of custody requirement is
essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the
monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the
forensic chemist, and finally to the court.26 Malillin v. People was the first in a growing number of
cases to explain the importance of chain of custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.27

Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,28 defines chain of custody as follows:

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in
court as evidence, and the final disposition;

Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the protection of the
identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized or
confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity, as follows:

Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer,
who would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable
that possession of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is imperative for the officer
who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking on its plastic container and seal the
same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic
container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure he
observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this
way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from
the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance in
the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic container and seal it again with a new seal
since the police officer’s seal has been broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe the
sealed condition of the plastic container when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure he
took afterwards to preserve its integrity.

If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to present
every police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of
custody, no matter how briefly one’s possession has been. Each of them has to testify that the
substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted while in his care.29

Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further elaborates,
and provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
[Emphasis supplied]

Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not necessarily render
the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, provided that (i) there is a justifiable ground for
such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. In this case, however, no justifiable ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there
was a failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure
the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. A review
of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary records of the case reveals
irreparably broken links in the chain of custody.

According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following were confiscated
from the accused, to wit:

a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residues.

b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs colored yellow,
one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white ).

c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.

d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.

e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.30

[Emphases supplied]

At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were indorsed to Duty
Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for proper disposition.31 A
letter-request for laboratory examination was prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna
Basbag for the following items:

a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-1."

b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-2."

c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A-3."32

[Emphases supplied]

The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. Maranion by SPO3 Froilan
Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L listed the specimens which were
submitted for testing, to wit:

SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:

A – A1 to A115 – One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with tag each
containing suspected shabu residue without markings.

B – B1 to B11 – Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected
shabu residue without markings.

C – C1 to C49 – Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected
shabu residue without markings.33

[Emphases supplied]

Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a Confiscation Receipt
was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:

DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006

CONFISCATION RECEIPT

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together with our
precinct supervisor, SPO4 Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of SPO1 Marlon
Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin Guarin apprehended the
following names of persons of ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married, jobless, a
resident of Lucao Dist., this city; EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a
resident of 471 Lucao Dist., this city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney
driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old, married,
businessman, resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui, Pangasinan and RAFAEL GONZALES Y
CUNANAN, 49 yrs old, separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.

Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to Dagupan City Police
Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk Officer to record the incident
and the sachet of suspected Shabu Paraphernalias were brought to PNP Crime Laboratory,
Lingayen, Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.

Seizing Officer:

(sgd.) (sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
Affiant Affiant

Remarks:

Refused to Signed

Refused to Signed

Refused to Signed

Refused to Signed

Refused to Signed34

[Emphases supplied]

The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 (of the 49)
pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as identified in the Final Chemistry
Report, were presented in court and marked as Exhibits "H" and series, "I" and series, and "J" and
series, respectively. Said items were identified by PO1 Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness
stand.35

The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved as
there was sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized from the accused were the same ones
forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the
letter-request for laboratory examination.

A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.

First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After seizure and
confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the
accused, or their representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared, signed, and provided to the accused in the
manner required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,36 admitted that no photographs were taken.
The only discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply with the prescribed procedure
was that the situation happened so suddenly. Thus:

Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group
and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
 A: Yes, sir.

Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place of Rafael
Gonzales?

A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.

Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken, is that
correct?

A: Yes, sir.37

[Emphasis supplied]

The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance. The suddenness
of the situation cannot justify non-compliance with the requirements. The police officers were not
prevented from preparing an inventory and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the IRR of
R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and
photographs shall be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the situation may have had should have dissipated
by the time they reached the police station, as the suspects had already been arrested and the items
seized. Moreover, it has been held that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the
apprehending officer from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the
items at their place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the law’s intent to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value.38

This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items. Some cases are People v. Garcia,39 People v. Dela Cruz,40 People v. Dela
Cruz,41 People v. Santos, Jr.,42 People v. Nazareno,43 People v. Orteza,44 Zarraga v.
People,45 and People v. Kimura.46

Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is instructive
on the requirement of marking, to wit:

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities
are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in
the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates
the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting
as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under
Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.

For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-
buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the seized items shall be
placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the seized items require a
different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall accordingly be
signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of custody.47 [Emphasis
in the original]

Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz does it appear
that the subject items were at all marked. It was only in the letter-request for laboratory examination
that the subject items were indicated to have been marked with "DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and "DC&A-3."
There is no showing, however, as to who made those markings and when they were made.
Moreover, those purported markings were never mentioned when the subject items were identified
by the prosecution witnesses when they took the stand.

The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets, rolled and cut
aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to any individual item in each
group. Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry Report48 that the precise number of each type of
item was indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in all documents prior to said report, the
subject items were never accurately quantified but only described as "pieces,"49 "several pcs,"50 and
"shabu paraphernallas."51 Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates that all the subject items had
"no markings," although each item was reported to have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the
course of processing the subject items during laboratory examination and testing.52 Doubt, therefore,
arises as to the identity of the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty that the
subject items seized from the accused were the same ones subjected to the laboratory examination
and presented in court.

This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of seized items in
dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v. People,53 People v. Kimura,54 and People v. Laxa.55

Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below gives rise to
more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the seizure of the items, it was prepared
only three days after. More important, the receipt did not even indicate exactly what items were
confiscated and their quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation receipt should
provide. The only information contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of the
accused and the general description of the subject items as "the sachet of suspected Shabu
paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory." The receipt is made even more dubious
by PO1 Azardon’s admission in his testimony56 that he did not personally prepare the Confiscation
Receipt and he did not know exactly who did so.

Fourth, according to the Certification57 issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject items were
indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper disposition. These were
later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and
when the subject items were transferred from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.

Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness testified on
how the subject items were kept after they were tested prior to their presentation in court. This Court
has highlighted similar shortcomings in People v. Cervantes,58 People v. Garcia,59 People v.
Sanchez,60 and Malillin v. People.61

More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to PO1 Azardon’s
testimony62 that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at the police station, the Letter63 to
the Executive Director of the DDB states that the apprehending officers were tipped off "while
conducting monitoring/surveillance." Said letter also indicates, as does the Confiscation Receipt, that
the arrest and seizure occurred on September 4, 2006, and not September 2, 2006, as alleged in the
Information. It was also mentioned in the aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan Police and
Joint Affidavit of the police officers that a glass tube suspected to contain shabu residue was also
confiscated from the accused. Interestingly, no glass tube was submitted for laboratory examination.

In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecution’s position
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved. The two
documents specifically relied on by the CA, the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for
laboratory examination, have been shown to be grossly insufficient in proving the identity of
the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This
means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential before
the accused can be found guilty.64

Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165,
in People v. Sta. Maria,65 this Court held that said section was silent as to the consequences of such
failure, and said silence could not be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the
participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Section
86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the investigation and
prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to
perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to
the latter.

Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not affect the
admissibility of the evidence but only its weight.66 Thus, had the subject items in this case been
admissible, their evidentiary merit and probative value would be insufficient to warrant conviction.

It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty should prevail. However, such presumption obtains only
when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty.67 Where the official act in question
is irregular on its face, the presumption of regularity cannot stand.

In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be irregular.
When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the presumption of regularity cannot
prevail over the presumption of innocence of the accused.68

This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous drugs cases
due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search and seizure procedure under
the law.69 Some bona fide arrests and seizures in dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the
accused because drug enforcement operatives compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the
seized items. It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement agencies to exert greater effort to
apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs.

It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165 may not always
be possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not necessarily fatal. However, the
lapses in procedure must be recognized, addressed and explained in terms of their justifiable
grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved.70

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 1171 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 1572 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the
charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing
charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is
only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11.
Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under
Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a
positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day,
while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone
would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the
arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law
enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs
and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 1473 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties,
Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec.
1274 (Possession of Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession
of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the possessor has
used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15. 1avvphi1

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law
enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges
when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory
test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the
accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous
drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere
residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.

WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING the accused and
ordering their immediate release from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City,
for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this
Court within five days from receipt of this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be
furnished the Director-General, Philippine National Police, and the Director-General, Philippine
Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information and guidance.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized items to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205745

CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALISI, and BREGIDO MALA CAT, JR., Petitioners

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Pride, when unchecked, can waste our youth and cause the forfeiture of all meaning in life, even in
the most inconsequential things: in this case, a basketball game.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of
establishing moral certainty. The prosecution's case must rise on its own merits, not merely on
relative strength as against that of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden,
acquittal must follow as a matter of course.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari  under Rule 45,  praying that the assailed May 31,
1 2

2012 Decision  and January 14, 2013 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 27951
3 4

be reversed and set aside, and that petitioners be acquitted of the offense of which they are
charged.

The Court of Appeals' assailed Decision affirmed the April 24, 2003 Decision  of the Regional Trial
5

Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 37, which found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals' assailed January 14, 2013 Resolution denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.

In an Information, petitioners Capistrano Daayata (Daayata), Dexter Salisi (Salisi), and Bregido
Malacat, Jr. (Malacat) were charged with frustrated murder, as follows:

That on December 17, 1995, at about 6:00 [o]'clock in the morning at Zone 3, San Simon, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with intent to kill, attack, assault[,] box and struck one Rolando 0. Bahian with a
stone and hitting the latter's head and several parts of his body, thereby inflicting injuries[,] to wit:
"Depressed Fracture, Open frontal bone, left, and advised for surgery,["] thus performing all the acts
of execution which would produce the crime of Murder, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of some cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to the said offended party which prevented his death. 6

Upon arraignment, all three accused, now petitioners, pleaded not guilty.  Trial then ensued. 7 8

Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution: the offended party, Rolando Bahian (Bahian);
Kagawad Leonardo Abalde (Kagawad Abalde) of Barangay San Simon, Cagayan de Oro City;
Barangay Captain Reynaldo Yafiez (Barangay Captain Yafiez); Dr. Percy H. Arreza (Dr. Arreza) of
the Cagayan de Oro City Hospital; and Dr. John Mata (Dr. Mata), the surgeon who tended to
Bahian. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 16, 1995, at about 6:00 p.m., Bahian went to the house
of Kagawad Abalde.  Bahian recounted to Kagawad Abalde a violent altercation between him and
10

the petitioners in the course of a basketball game earlier that afternoon.  Bahian claimed that Salisi
11

had committed a foul against him, making him fall to the ground.  He complained to the referee and
12

this infuriated Salisi. In response, he threatened Salisi, telling him that "he would just get even with
him."  Malacat heard his threat and positioned himself to punch Bahian. Bahian, however, dodged
13

the blow.  Daayata then came, pointing a gun at Bahian.  Bahian then backed off and pleaded that
14 15

they should not fight as they were friends. 16

Kagawad Abalde advised Bahian to bring the matter to the attention of Barangay Captain Y afiez. 17

Accordingly, the following morning, Bahian and Kagawad Abalde made their way to Barangay
Captain Yafiez' house.  While on their way, they were blocked by petitioners.  Daayata hit Bahian on
18 19

the left part of his chest.  Bahian staggered and fell onto a parked jeep.  Salisi then hit Bahian with a
20 21

stone on the left side of his forehead, causing Bahian to fall to the ground.  While Bahian was lying 22

prostrate on the ground, petitioners boxed and kicked Bahian.  Kagawad Abalde tried his best to get
23

Bahian away but to no avail.  All he could do was to shout for help.  Daayata then poked a gun at
24 25

Bahian, Malacat unsheathed a bolo, and Salisi wielded an iron bar. 26

Barangay Captain Yafiez rushed to the scene.  There, Bahian lay on the ground as Kagawad
27

Abalde tried to ward off his attackers.  Barangay Captain Yafiez shouted to petitioners to
28

stop.  Shortly after, they retreated.  Barangay Captain Yafiez and Kagawad Abalde then brought
29 30

Bahian to Barangay Captain Yafiez' house, and later to Cagayan de Oro City Hospital. 31

Upon examination, Dr. Arreza made the following findings on Bahian: "depressed fracture, open
frontal bone, left."
32

Bahian was noted to have possibly died, if not for the timely medical intervention.  Dr. Mata 33

subsequently performed surgery on Bahian. 34

The defense offered a different version of events. Apart from the three petitioners, it offered the
testimonies of Delfin Yafiez (Delfin),  Rodolfo Yafiez (Rodolfo), Danzon Daayata (Danzon) and
35

Rosemarie Daayata (Rosemarie ). 36

Petitioners Salisi and Malacat claimed that they were having coffee at the house of Vicente Daayata
(Vicente), brother of petitioner Daayata, in the morning of December 17, 1995.  Bahian arrived, 37

together with Kagawad Abalde, and called for Salisi to come out.  When Salisi acceded, Bahian
38
challenged him to a fight and threw the first punch that started a scuffle.  In the course of the melee,
39

Bahian took a swing for Salisi, who ducked, causing Bahian to lose his balance. Bahian then fell on
the pavement and hit his head.  Kagawad Abalde then drew a gun, poked it at Salisi, and threatened
40

to kill him.
41

For his part, petitioner Daayata claimed that he was in his house, some 50 meters away from
Vicente's house when the incident recalled by petitioners Salisi and Malacat transpired.  He rushed
42

to Vicente's house upon hearing a commotion.  There, he saw Bahian and Kagawad Abalde, who
43

was pointing a gun at Malacat. 44

All three (3) petitioners claimed that it was not until an hour after the incident that Barangay Captain
Yafiez arrived.  They also acknowledged that an altercation did take place during a basketball game
45

the day before, or on December 16, 1995.  They added however, that in the evening of December
46

16, while they were on their way home, Bahian waited for them to pass by his house, where he
challenged them to a fight.  Defense witness Rodolfo allegedly pacified Bahian.
47 48

In its Decision  dated April 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City
49

found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of its
Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi,
and Br[e]gido Malacat, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder
committed against Rolando Bahian, and they conspired in committing the crime, and, accordingly,
each of the said accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of nine (9) years of
prision mayor medium as the minimum term to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal medium as
the maximum term.

Moreover, all the three accused are sentenced and ordered (1) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly and
severally the sum of Fifty Seven Thousand Pesos (₱57,000.00) by way of reimbursement for the
expenses he incurred for medicines; (2) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly and severally the sum of
Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00) for the income that

Rolando Bahian could have earned for two (2) years as a farmer; (3) to pay Rolando Bahian jointly
and severally the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) by way of moral damages; and (4) to
pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 50

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the Regional Trial Court's conclusions. It affirmed the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court, but replaced the award of actual damages to temperate
damages amounting to ₱25,000. The Court of Appeals also deleted the award for loss of earning
capacity, there being no proof in support of it. It also awarded ₱20,000 as civil indemnity. The
dispositive portion of its assailed May 31, 2012 Decision  read:
51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated April 24, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37 of Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 96-266 is hereby AFFIRMED as
to the penalty imposed with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages.

All three (3) accused-appellants, CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALIS[I] and BREGIDO
MALACAT, JR., are ordered to pay jointly and severally Rolando Bahian the following amounts:
1. Php20,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. Php30,000.00 as moral damages; and

3. Php25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

52

Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present Petition,  where
53

they insist on their version of events. They emphasize several factual details and maintain that they
did not initiate an assault on Bahian. They assert that Bahian sustained the injury on his forehead
through his own fault; thus, they could not be held liable for acting with intent to kill Bahian.

On July 24, 2013, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed its Comment.  It insisted that it was supposedly improper for this Court to re-evaluate the factual
54

findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in the context of the present Rule 45
Petition.  Apart from pleading the nature of a Rule 45 Petition, the five (5)-page Comment devoted a
55

singular paragraph to arguing that the positive identification of the petitioners as Bahian's supposed
attackers must prevai1. 56

On May 12, 2014, petitioners filed their Reply,  noting that respondent failed to directly confront the
57

factual issues they had raised.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated murder.

Petitioners seek relief from this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is basic that Rule 45 petitions may only raise pure questions of law,  and that
58

the factual findings of lower courts are generally binding and conclusive on this Court. Still, there are
recognized exceptions permitting this Court to overturn the factual findings with which it is
confronted. These exceptions are:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record . 59

Specifically concerning criminal cases, this Court has stated that "in exceptional circumstances, such
as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters ... this Court will re-calibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the [lower courts]."
60

A careful review of this case and of the body of evidence that was available for the Regional Trial
Court's perusal reveals that there has been a gross misapprehension of facts on the part of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, we reverse and acquit petitioners Capistrano
Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr.

II

The defense points out several facts, which lend greater plausibility to its claim that the possibly fatal
injury sustained by Bahian on his forehead was not inflicted by any of the petitioners, and that
petitioners did not initiate an assault against Bahian. Negating the fact of the alleged perpetrators'
assault and infliction of a potentially fatal injury negates the corpus delicti of the offense charged.

First, it appears that the location where the altercation occurred between Bahian and Kagawad
Abalde, on the one hand, and petitioners, on the other, is not as plain and austere as the
prosecution made it seem. The prosecution merely claimed that Bahian and Kagawad Abalde were
on their way to Barangay Captain Yafiez's house when they were suddenly blocked and assaulted
by petitioners.  However, it was actually settled during trial - consistent with the defense's contention
61

- that the confrontation took place in the vicinity of the house of vicente.
62

This detail does not intrinsically weigh in favor of either the prosecution or the defense. For indeed, it
may simply have been necessary to pass by Vicente's house en route to Barangay Captain Yafiez's
house and, consistent with what the prosecution claimed, that it may have merely been the spot
where Bahian's attackers chose to launch their assault. But while specificity of location may
ultimately be inconsequential to the prosecution's case, it is the genesis of the defense's case. As
the defense asserts, the altercation was precipitated by Bahian and Kagawad Abalde's arrival
outside Vicente's residence, where Bahian then called out and challenged Salisi. 63

Second, while the prosecution painted a picture of a relentless assault that lasted for as much as 30
minutes  - with petitioners supposedly not content with Bahian falling onto a parked jeep, but even
64

attacking him until he lay on the pavement, and thereafter still continuing to punch and kick him 65

- Bahian's "medical certificate showed no injury other than that on [his] forehead." 66

"Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses."  They have been characterized as "that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which
67

rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence."  Thus, in People v. Vasquez,  this Court refused
68 69

to undiscemingly lend credence to the incriminating assertions of prosecution witnesses as to an

alleged mauling, and stated that "[t]his Court cannot be persuaded by the prosecution's claim of
perpetrati on of physical violence in the absence of any marked physical injuries on the various parts
of the victim's face and body." 70

As the defense correctly points out, if the prosecution's assertion of a relentless assault were true,
the greater probability was that Bahian must have been "black and blue all over."  Quite contrary to
71

the sort of physical evidence that a purported relentless and prolonged assault should have
reasonably yielded, however, there was but one injury that Bahian was noted to have sustained.

Third, Bahian himself was noted to have admitted that his head injury was "caused by [him] hitting
the edge of the concrete pavement." As the following excerpt from Bahian's cross-examination
reveals: 72

Q - And on February of 1995, your forehead was operated on by a certain Dr. John Mata, is that
correct?

A- Yes.

Q - And you told Dr. Mata that the wound on your forehead was caused by you hitting the edge of
the concrete pavement, is that correct?

A - Yes, I told him a lie so that I could be treated.

Q - But nobody in the German Doctors told you that you would not be operated if that was caused by
a stone or in a fight?

A- He asked me the reason why I got this injury?

Q-And then?

A - Then I told him the reason how I got this injury.

Q - That you hit the edge of the concrete pavement?

A- Yes.

Q-And that was the first time you talked to him before the operation?

A- Yes.

Q - The first time you talked to him, you lied to him?

A - Yes, I told a lie because I wanted to be operated.  (Citations omitted)

73

As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, it is true that the prosecution has sought to extenuate the
weight of Bahian's admission by having him explain that he only lied to Dr. Mata because otherwise,
"he would not have been admitted to the hospital and his injury would have not been operated
on."  However, even this extenuating explanation does not completely diminish the significance of
74

his admission.
As the same excerpt from Bahian's cross-examination indicated, nobody intimated to Bahian that he
would not have been operated on if his injury arose from a violent altercation. Confronted with this
detail, Bahian never offered a direct response, and instead appeared to have evaded the question.
He merely reiterated that, "Yes, I told a lie because I wanted to be operated."  Thus, the defense's
75

revelation that Bahian's alleged lie was not predicated on a rational basis stands unrefuted.

Moreover, in the present Petition, the defense points out the curious parallelism between, on the one
hand, the admission or otherwise lie made by Bahian to Dr. Mata, and on the other hand, the
defense's main contention that Bahian sustained a head injury through his own fault:

There is no showing that petitioners knew that complainant told his doctor that he hit his head on the
edge of the concrete pavement. They came to know of it only when they heard him admit it on cross-
examination. And yet, that's exactly what they have always been asserting right from the very start,
even during the preliminary investigation, or long before they heard him say it on the witness stand.

It is too much of a coincidence that petitioners and the complainant should say exactly the same
thing, that he hit his head on the edge of the concrete pavement - unless it is true. 76

Finally, several witnesses - both from the defense and the prosecution - have belied the
prosecution's claim that petitioners Daayata, Malacat, and Salisi wielded a gun, a bolo and an iron
bar, respectively.

The most compromising of these witnesses is the prosecution's own, Barangay Captain Yañez. He
categorically stated that he was well in a position to "see or identify if they were armed."  Ultimately,
77

however, his observation was to the contrary:

Q - They were armed or not?

A- Who?

Q - The three of them?

A - I could see or identify if they were armed.

Q - Nobody brought a bolo?

A - When I arrived there, I did not see anybody holding a bolo.

Q - Nobody brought a steel pipe?

A - I have not seen.

Q - You did not see anybody holding a gun?

Q - No.  (Citation omitted)

78

Danzon, a defense witness whom the prosecution never bothered to cross-examine, stated:

Q - Tell us what was that unusual incident all about?

A - What I could say is that: I heard noise outside and because I was watching them, I saw Kag.
Abalde holding a gun pointing upward and I saw Rolando Bahian already wounded on his
face.  (Citation omitted)
79

Two (2) other defense witnesses - Rosemarie and Delfin -were noted to have made the same
observations. 80

III

Conviction in criminal actions demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence states:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the prosecution with the immense
responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very
conscience. While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is borne, not by a mere
abstraction, but by constitutional necessity:

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon
the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course,
that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees.  Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This
1âwphi1

reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course,
mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the
weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.  (Citations
81

omitted)

The details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish the moral
certainty and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While
not per se demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense's entire version of events,
they nevertheless disclose how the prosecution's case is unable to stand on its own merits.

They cast doubt on whether the complainant and his companion were actually stopped in their tracks
to be assaulted, and support the possibility that they may have instead deliberately intended to bring
themselves to Vicente's house to provoke or challenge one (1) of the petitioners.

They also cast doubt on whether the complainant was relentlessly assaulted, with the specific
purpose of ending his life; whether the ostensible fatal blow was dealt to complainant by one (1) of
the petitioners or was dealt upon him by his own violent imprudence; and whether petitioners had
actually brandished implements for maiming and killing.

Not only do these doubts persist, details disclosed by the prosecution itself - taken together with how
the defense accounted for the events of December 16 and 17, 1995 - demonstrate the dubiety of the
prosecution's claims.

As Bahian himself recalled to Kagawad Abalde, it was he who threatened Salisi that "he would just
get even with him."  By his own recollection too, he acknowledged that it was only upon his
82

utterance of that threat that Malacat and Daayata responded with correlative aggression. He
conceded having been put in a situation where he had to back off. By his own recollection, the clash
between him and petitioners could have ended there, yet it did not. It appears that, rather than letting
the better part of reason and modesty prevail, Bahian elected to make good on his threat to
eventually just get even with his adversaries. Along the way, it even appears that he enlisted the aid
of Kagawad Abalde, whose participation in the clash in the morning of December 17, 1995, as the
defense recounted, was not as a pacifier but also as an aggressor. Unfortunately for Bahian, it
appears that his own hubris and lack of fighting prowess not only prolonged his quarrel, but even
brought him potentially fatal physical harm.

Taking off from the events in the basketball game of December 16, 1995, the prosecution unravelled
a narrative of petitioners' supposed vindictiveness. Yet the contrary is apparent. The confluence of
Bahian's admissions of a prior altercation, his self-issued threat, how he was constrained to desist,
and his own account to Dr. Mata of how he sustained his injury, as well as the glaring dissonance
noted by the defense and backed by physical evidence, demonstrate how the prosecution has fallen
far too short of discharging its burden of proving petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No.

27951 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido
Malacat, Jr. are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Any amount they each paid by way of a bail bond is ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 105830           January 15, 2002

ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On February 23, 2001, this Court rendered a Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed decision

subject of G.R. No. 105830 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum, with all the accessory penalties.

(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P42,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages,

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Eladio C. Tangan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking the rule that factual findings
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. Thus, he argues that this Court
erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstances which were appreciated by the lower courts and in
raising the indeterminate penalty imposed on him from a maximum of two years and four months
of prision correccional to a maximum of fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal. This, he claims, exposed him to the "horrifying reality" of being re-incarcerated after having
been preventively confined for more than four years. 1
It bears stressing that at no time during the trial of the case did petitioner raise self-defense.
Nevertheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the attendance of the mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense, sufficient provocation, and passion and obfuscation. 1âwphi1.nêt

When petitioner appealed the decision, he threw open the whole case for review. It became the duty
of this Court to correct any error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it was made
the subject of assignment of errors or not. 2

Thus, this Court reviewed the records of the case and found that the evidence fails to support or
substantiate the lower court's findings and conclusions. Clearly, therefore, this case falls within the
recognized exceptions to the rule that an appellate court will generally not disturb the assessment of
the trial court on factual matters considering that the latter, as a trier of fact, is in a better position to
appreciate the same. 3

First of all, the physical evidence belies petitioner's version of the incident. As we clearly explained in
our assailed Decision:

The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the
target was about 2 inches but definitely not more than 3 inches. Based on the point of exit
and trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the alleged assailant were facing each
other when the shot was made and the position of the gun was almost perpendicular when
fired. These findings disprove Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A revolver is not prone
to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it were uncocked, then
considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. 4

Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the hierarchy of
our trustworthy evidence. For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks
5 

more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. 6

The physical evidence is amply corroborated by the eyewitness accounts of Rosalia dela Cruz and
Mary Ann Borromeo to the effect that petitioner took a gun from his car and suddenly fired it at the
deceased. 7k

Likewise, this Court found that the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the trial court are not
present. Petitioner refutes this and insists on his version of the facts. However, the testimony of his
witness, on which he heavily relies, suffers from material inconsistencies which render it unworthy of
belief.

It was shown that defense witness Nelson Pante was 10 meters away when he saw the incident,
and his line of vision was blocked by petitioner's car. From that distance and vantage point, he could
8 

not have heard anything or have had an unobstructed view of the events. Sure enough, the details of
his statement betray the falsity thereof. He testified that petitioner was hit on the eyebrow, while
petitioner said he was hit on the jaw. Pante was also unable to identify Manuel Miranda, the person
9 

whom he supposedly saw punch petitioner. 10

All of these, and the incredibility of petitioner's account when compared with the physical evidence,
belie self-defense. From the established facts, it can be plainly gleaned that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased. What merely transpired before petitioner's gun went off was
a heated exchange of words between the protagonists. This does not qualify as unlawful aggression.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof. The person defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with
actual use of weapon. 11
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself. 12

By the same token, the evidence does not show the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party. As stated, the provocation must be sufficient
to excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In this
case, all that the deceased did immediately before he was shot was shout expletives and slap
petitioner's hand when the latter pointed it to his face. These acts, while offensive, were grossly
disproportionate to petitioner's act of drawing and firing of a gun.

Furthermore, there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence that could have naturally produced a
powerful excitement in petitioner's mind causing him to lose his reason and self-control. As shown by
the facts, no passion and obfuscation could have clouded his mind.

On the whole, therefore, this Court correctly imposed on petitioner the proper penalty for Homicide,
without the attendance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and sentenced him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum.

While his Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioner filed with the Court an "Omnibus
Motion to Re-Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse." He alleged, among others, that the ponente of the
assailed Decision is biased in favor of respondents and, therefore, must recuse herself from this
case. Petitioner's accusation, however, is based on nothing more than this Court's own evaluation of
the evidence and departure from the rule that findings of facts of lower court are not to be disturbed.

Petitioner should bear in mind that the Decision, although penned by a member of the Court, is a
decision of the whole Court. Hence, any attack on the integrity of the ponente, or any member of the
Court for that matter, is an attack on the entire Court. More importantly, petitioner fails to establish
with concrete proof his imputations of bias. Such irresponsible and unfounded statements will not be
taken lightly by this Court. Hence, petitioner and his counsel should be admonished for making such
baseless and unsubstantiated accusations of bias against the Court. Moreover, the Omnibus Motion
should be denied for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioner faults the Court for increasing the penalty five times such that, despite having served the
penalty imposed by the trial court, he now faces the "intolerable specter of reincarceration." It should
13 

be recalled that petitioner, by consciously and deliberately firing his gun, snuffed the life out of a 29-
year old optometrist. Suffice it to state that petitioner should bear the consequences of his felonious
act.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Omnibus Motion to Re-Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse is likewise DENIED. This denial
is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169432             October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. No. 145508]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO TAAN @ "Bebot" CORONA, and DANNY DOE, CARPIO MORALES, appellants.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Accused-appellant Eduardo Taan @ Bebot was found guilty of murder aggravated by the use of an
unlicensed firearm and sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. U-10383 in the Decision1 dated 19
July 2000 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered, CONVICTING EDUARDO TAAN OF the

crime of Murder aggravated with the use of unlicensed firearm and the Court sentences him
to suffer the penalty of DEATH to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law;
Taan is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mitimus and to transmit the whole
records of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines for automatic review.

The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Urdaneta District Jail,
Urdaneta City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living body of Eduardo Taan alias "BEbot"
 [sic] to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.2

The relevant antecedents are as follows:

The Information3 in Criminal Case No. U-10383 for murder alleged:

That sometime in July, 1999, at Barangay Canarvacanan, Binalonan, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO TAAN, alias
"BEBOT", in conspiracy with DANNY DOE, whose true name has not yet been fully
established, armed with a big stone and an unlicensed short firearm, with deliberate intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully unlawfully, and
feloneously [sic] attack, assault, hold, hit, strike, tie and shoot Ricardo Ladaga, inflicting upon
him the following injuries:

-Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo-parietal area;

Right.

-Fracture, 1 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, mid-posterior aspect of the hard

palate, most probably of a gunshot wound entrance.

-Skull Fracture, 1.3 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, upper third of the occipital
area, most probably of a gunshot wound exit, Right.

-Avulsion, teeth, Left and Right Lower Central Incissors. [sic]

-Avulsion, tooth, Left Lateral Lower Incissor [sic].

which caused the instantaneous death of said Ricardo Ladaga, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 7659 and
8294.4

During his arraignment, Taan, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial
ensued.5

The prosecution’s evidence consist of the testimonies of (1) Juanito Ochinang, a relative of the
victim, Ricardo Ladaga (Ladaga), and an eyewitness to the shooting incident;6 (2) Dr. Danilo
Rebugio, Municipal Health Officer of Laoac, Pangasinan, who conducted the autopsy on the body of
Ladaga;7 (3) Cipriano Culiao, Jr., member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Binalonan,
Pangasinan, who entered into the police blotter the report that Ladaga was missing since 18 July
1999;8 (4) SPO2 Wilfredo Tagala, member of the PNP Records Section of the Firearms and
Explosives Division, who identified in court the certification that Taan is not a licensed firearm
holder;9 (5) Dave Fronda, PNP-CIDG, who took down the statement of Ochinang and found
Ladaga’s body on 15 September 1999 buried at the nearby irrigation canal at Barangay
Canarvacanan, Binalonan, Pangasinan;10 (6) Silvino Ladaga who testified that the white t-shirt and
slippers he last saw his brother, Ladaga, wearing were found ten (10) meters away from Taan’s
house after the fateful incident;11 and documents consisting of (1) the Autopsy Report dated 17
September 1999 on Ladaga;12 (2) the Sworn Statement dated 14 September 1999 of Ochinang;13 (3)
the Certification dated 25 April 2000 of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the PNP, showing
that Taan does not possess any authority or license from the government to possess the subject
firearm;14 (4) the Police Blotter with the entry regarding the disappearance of Ladaga;15 (5) the Radio
Message for Transmission accomplished by the Police Superintendent in September 1999, reporting
that Ladaga was last seen by witnesses accosted by Taan, Ochinang, and a certain Danny, and that
Ochinang has vowed to pinpoint the location where Ladaga was shot four (4) times in the head and
buried by Taan;16 and (6) the Memorandum prepared by the Team which investigated the incident
reporting that Taan poked a revolver inside Ladaga’s mouth and simultaneously a gunshot rang four
(4) times.17

The prosecution sought to prove that on 18 July 1999, the witness Ochinang, a Barangay Kagawad
and relative of the deceased, was at Mariano Domaoal’s (Mariano) house in Sitio Obbog, San Maria,
Binalonan, Pangasinan having a "drinking spree" with Mariano, Romeo Domaoal, Mario Rivera,
Eduardo Taan, Danilo Marquez, Marlon Ruar and Romeo Tacadena.18 At around 4:30 p.m., Taan
invited the group to continue their drinking session at his house in Sitio Obbog, Barangay Dumayat
of the same town.19 Ochinang, Marquez, Tacadena and Ruar accepted the invitation and on their
way to Taan’s house, they met Ladaga. Surprised, Taan told his godfather, Tacadena, "this is the
one we are looking for, he was the one who robbed the school." Taan continued to say, "Take him,
Ninong, Danny because I have been looking for that guy."20 Tacadena and Marquez took hold of
Ladaga and carried him towards a mango tree. To force Ladaga to confess to the crime of stealing,
which he later did, Marquez tied Ladaga’s hands with a palm leaf while Taan held the latter’s
legs.21 Marquez then struck Ladaga’s forehead with a big stone.22 Taan removed Ladaga’s shirt to
wipe the blood off the latter’s face.23 At around 8:00 p.m., Ladaga was brought inside Taan’s
house.24 Afterwards, Taan asked Tacadena and Ruar to go home.25 Between midnight to 1:00 a.m.,
Marquez, who had with him a shovel, and Taan, armed with a gun, brought Ladaga to a two (2) foot-
deep irrigation canal at Barangay Canarvacanan. Thereat, Ladaga was made to lie down and Taan
poked a gun in his mouth and fired it four (4) times. Ochinang, then at the dike of the irrigation canal,
about a meter away from the scene, witnessed the incident and how Taan buried Ladaga in the
irrigation canal.26

Two days later, Taan summoned Ochinang to dig a deeper burial site for Ladaga because of the foul
odor coming from the original gravesite. Nonetheless, it was Taan who dug a deeper site which was
more or less six (6) meters from the original site. Taan removed Ladaga’s body from the original
gravesite and transferred it to the new excavation.27

On 14 September 1999, Ochinang reported the matter to the Central Intelligence Division Group
(CIDG), Dagupan City. Thereat, he executed a sworn statement28 asserting Taan’s authorship of the
crime and indicating the place where Ladaga had been buried. Subsequently, Ladaga’s body was
recovered from the place pointed to by Ochinang.29

Dr. Danilo Rebugio, Municipal Health Officer of Laoac, Pangasinan, conducted an autopsy of the
victim and made the following post-mortem findings, viz.:

SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

- An [almost] decomposed body of a male cadaver.

SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:

-Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo-parietal area;

Right.
 -Fracture, 1 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, mid-posterior aspect of the hard
palate, most probably of a gunshot wound entrance.

-Skull Fracture, 1.3 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, upper third of the occipital
area, most probably of a gunshot wound exit, Right.

-Avulsion, teeth, Left and Right Lower Central Incissors [sic].

-Avulsion, tooth, Left Lateral Lower Incissor [sic].

CAUSE OF DEATH: MASSIVE

INTRA-CRANIAL INJURIES MOST

PROBABLY SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT

WOUND.30

The prosecution likewise presented a certification dated 25 April 2000 from the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the PNP stating that Taan is "not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind and caliber per verification from available records with this office as of this date."31

Taan, as sole witness for the defense, interposed the defense of denial. He alleged that Ochinang
falsely accused him of the crime because he had previously imputed against the latter the stealing of
three (3) of his uncle’s goats and he had refused to help Ochinang in his bid for the position
of barangay kagawad.32

Taan testified that on 18 July 1999, after attending a wedding celebration, he and Marlon Ruar went
to Mariano’s house and had a drinking session with Mariano, Rogelio Dumali, Romeo Pulido, Luding
and Romeo Domaoal. While thereat, Taan saw Ochinang pulling a person whose identity Taan did
not know and whose hands were tied with "buri." Taan and the rest of the group were shocked to
see the person with a blackeye. Afterwards, Taan left for home with Marlon Ruar, Rogelio Dumali,
Romeo Tacadena and Danny Marquez.33

At his house, Taan again saw Ochinang with the person who had a blackeye and whose hands were
tied with "buri." Taan asked who the person was. Ochinang replied that he is "[m]y nephew who is a
theft [sic] whom I cannot control." Taan then ordered Ochinang and the man to leave to avoid
involvement in the situation.34

Several days after, Ochinang dropped by Taan’s house while the latter was having a drink with
Romeo Tacadena and Danny Marquez. Taan invited Ochinang to join them. Ochinang acceded.
During their conversation, Taan asked Ochinang whether he had heard about the disappearance of
the man he had previously been with. Ochinang, in response, told them not to talk anymore and to
just keep silent. Taan and the group proceeded to tell Ochinang, "You again killed a person."
Ochinang replied, "Just keep your cool and shut up your mouth."35

Taan was found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for
automatic review. In a Resolution36 dated 14 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. No. 145508,37 the
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People v. Efren
Mateo.38
Before the Court of Appeals, Taan argued that the trial court erred in: (1) convicting him of the crime
of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) giving
full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while completely ignoring the
defense’s evidence; (3) appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery where none existed;
(4) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of Ladaga the sum
of P75,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.39

The Court of Appeals in a Decision40 dated 30 March 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00257, affirmed
with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, The 19 July 2000 Decision of Branch 46, Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta
City in Criminal Case No. U-10383, finding appellant Eduardo Taan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder and imposing upon him the penalty of death, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Ricardo
Ladaga, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral

damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.41

The Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to deviate from the trial court’s observation that
Ochinang was clear and categorical in identifying Taan as the assailant and that his testimony is
sufficient to support a conviction.

Taan is now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the Court of
Appeals. Through his Manifestation and Motion dated 9 January 2006, Taan stated that there is no
more necessity to file a supplemental brief and prayed that the case be resolved on the basis of the
records and the brief earlier filed.42 Earlier, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was
no longer filing a supplemental brief.43

The Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The
Court affirms the judgment of conviction but reduces the sentence of death to reclusion perpetua.

Settled is the rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence
of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions anchored on said
findings are accorded great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the
trial court in observing and monitoring at close range the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the
witnesses as they gave their testimonies before the trial court.44 Unless it is shown that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated certain facts and circumstances which if considered
would have altered the outcome of the case, appellate courts are bound by the findings of facts of
the trial court.45

The trial court gave credence and full probative value to the testimony of Ochinang. The trial court
characterized Ochinang’s testimony as "positive, categorical and straightforward."46 The trial court
also found Ochinang’s testimony to be adequately supported by documentary evidence. Ochinang’s
testimony that Marquez struck Ladaga’s face with a stone was confirmed by the Autopsy Report, to
wit:

SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:

 -Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo- parietal area;
Right.

Ochinang’s allegation that Taan put the barrel of the gun inside Ladaga’s mouth and fired it, causing
the latter’s death, was likewise established by the Autopsy Report, viz:

SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:

xxxx

-Skull Fracture, 1.3 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, upper third of the occipital
area, most probably of a gunshot wound exit Right.

Thus, leading the trial court to declare that:

Between the positive, clear, unequivocal and specific declarations of Ochinang, who was in
the company of the accused Taan and Marquez on July 18, 1999, and defense’ contention
that it could have been that the person who could have killed Ricardo Ladaga was Juanito
Ochinang because of his reputation. The declaration of Ochinang prevails over the denial of
Taan. The Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it was Taan, with the assistance
of Marquez, who inflicted injuries to the face of the victim. Likewise, Taan was the one who
shot the victim by putting the barrel of his gun to the mouth of Ladaga.47

Evidently, Ochinang testified in a clear and convincing manner leaving no room for doubt that indeed
it was Taan who killed Ladaga.

That Ochinang’s testimony is at variance with his Sworn Statement48 does not persuade us to rule
that Ochinang should be discredited as a witness. Taan points out that on the witness stand,
Ochinang testified that after the drinking spree, he was with the rest of the group when they met
Ladaga; while in his Sworn Statement, Ochinang stated that after parting ways with his drinking
mates, he was about to cross a river by means of a foot bridge when he saw Taan and Marquez
holding Ladaga.49 We believe, however, that the alleged inconsistencies are trivial and insignificant
and refer only to minor details and as such, do not impugn Ochinang’s credibility. Discrepancies
and/or inconsistencies between a witness’s affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his
credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or
absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.50 Between the ex-parte affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the latter commands greater weight particularly when the defense
had the full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.51

Next, Taan contends that Ochinang’s failure to protect his relative, Ladaga, from harm and to
immediately report the matter to Ladaga’s family erode Ochinang’s credibility.52

We are not persuaded. Ochinang testified that he had tried to stop Taan and Marquez from tying
Ladaga’s hands,53 but could not because Taan was holding a gun and he had taken
shabu.54 Ochinang also implored Taan and Marquez four (4) times not to kill Ladaga to no
avail.55 The reason Ochinang failed to immediately report the incident to the authorities was his fear
of Taan, who had warned him not to disclose the incident, and his several bodyguards.56 Pertinently,
we have ruled in People v. Hernandez,57 that:

Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are
sufficient explanations for a witness’ delay in reporting the crime to the authorities. Such
 failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of
the complaint. Likewise, the natural hesitance of the witnesses in this country to volunteer
information about a criminal case, and their unwillingness to be involved or dragged into a
criminal investigation is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect their
credibility.58

The supposed grudge Ochinang had against Taan which provoked the filing of the criminal case is
flimsy to be believed. Even assuming that the allegation were true, the existence of a grudge does
not automatically render Ochinang’s testimony bereft of credibility.59

All told, pitted against the categorical and positive testimony of Ochinang, Taan’s defense of denial
miserably fails. Denials, as negative and self-serving evidence, do not deserve as much weight in
law as positive and affirmative testimonies.60 Remarkably, Taan did not any present corroborating
witness, i.e. his drinking buddies, to strengthen his testimony that Ladaga, the previously unidentified
individual who had a blackeye and whose hands were tied, was last seen with Ochinang.

With respect to the non-presentation of the subject firearm, such is not fatal to the prosecution of an
illegal possession case as long as the existence thereof can be established by testimony.61 In this
case, Ochinang testified that he saw Taan in possession of a ".38 caliber revolver"62 which the latter
used to shoot Ladaga.63 Significantly, this was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Rebugio, who
conducted the post-mortem examination on Ladaga. He reported that Ladaga sustained a gunshot
wound the entry of which is a hole 1.3 cm. in diameter located in the mid-posterior aspect of the hard
palate while the exit thereof is another hole 1.3 cm in diameter in the upper third of the occipital
area.64

In qualifying the crime to murder, the trial court correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery.
For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.65 Treachery clearly attended the killing
as Ladaga, pinned down by Taan, was tipsy when he was killed, and thus was enfeebled and did not
have full control of his senses.66 Previously, Ladaga’s hands had been tied and his forehead had
been struck with a stone.67 With Marquez carrying a shovel and Taan armed with a gun, the
unarmed, weakened Ladaga was clearly defenseless. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.68

Article 24869 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,70 prescribes
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed
firearm,71 which was proven through Ochinang’s testimony and the Certification that Taan is not a
licensed holder of a firearm, the proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, in view
of the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty, the
penalty that should be imposed is reclusion perpetua.72

Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.73

We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the awards of civil
indemnity ex delicto to P75,000.00 and moral damages to P50,000.00 for the heirs of Ladaga, based
on recent jurisprudence.74
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00257 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Eduardo Taan @ "Bebot" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, aggravated with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The proper imposable penalty is death.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim, Ricardo Ladaga, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages; all with
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from this date until fully paid. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.