Baer vs. Tizon | G.R. No.

L-24294 May 3, 1974

Question:

If a Filipino was granted with a timber license, may he conduct his logging operations in
a US Military Base where the US Commander refuses to grant him permission to do so?
NO.

DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and
EDGARDO GENER, respondents.

Facts:
Edgardo Gener was engaged in the business of logging in an area situated in Barrio Mabayo, Bataan. His
logging operations was, however, stopped by American Naval Base authorities - who were headed by
Donald Baer, the Commander of the US Naval Base in Olongapo.

Gener filed a complaint in the CFI [RTC] of Bataan praying for a writ of preliminary injunction with
restraining order against Baer for interfering with his logging operations.

Baer, on the otherhand, contested the jurisdiction of the CFI [RTC] of Bataan and invoked the doctrine
of state immunity from suit. He claimed that cessation of the logging operations within the Naval Base
is within the scope of his authority and official duty. Thus, a suit filed against him is one against a foreign
sovereign.

Issue:
Whether Baer may invoke the doctrine of state immunity, thus, he is outside the jurisdiction of the CFI
[RTC] of Bataan?

Ruling:
Yes. Baer may validly invoke the doctrine of state immunity, thus, the suit against him will not prosper.

What was sought by Gener and what was granted by the respondent Judge amounted to an interference
with the performance of the duties of Baer in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by
him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement.

His point has been made clear, "Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the Philippine Government,
through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a Timber License to cut logs" inside a
military base, the Bases Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under a timber license issued by the
Philippine Government to the exercise by the United States of its rights, power and authority of control
within the bases; and the findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the Philippine and
United States Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the
U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base," is conclusive upon
the respondent Judge.
Gemperle vs. Schenker

G.R. No. L-18164; January 23, 1967

Facts:

This case was the result of William Gemperle’s retaliatory act when respondent spouses Paul and
Helen Schenker filed a case against him for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription
to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-
emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as
well as for an accounting and damages. Petitioner alleged that the said complaint tainted his name as a
businessman. He then filed a complaint for damages and prays for the retraction of statements made by
Helen Schenker.

Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to Paul Schenker. Helen then filed an
answer with a counterclaim, but Paul Schenker filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the court never
acquired jurisdiction over his person since admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich,
Switzerland, and has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker.

Ruling:

Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in an accion in

personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired only through voluntary
appearance or personal service of summons. But this case is an exception to the said rule. The Supreme
ratiocinated:

“We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the
summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the
representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which
apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs.
Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also,
empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar,
which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.”

Briefly, in an accion in personam where the defendant is a non-resident, substituted service of summons
does not apply. However, by way of exception, substituted service of summons may be effected, if the
following requisites are present:

1. The summons is served to the spouse of the defendant

2. The spouse must be residing in the Philippines

3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the spouse defendant in a previous case involving
the non-resident spouse.

Heine v. New York Life Insurance Company

Facts
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the insurance
companies") were corporations created in New York, USA. As conditions to be allowed to conduct
business in Germany, they were made to agree to be supervised by German authorities, to invest the
proceeds of policies in German securities, and to establish a local agency to whom summons may be
served. The insurance companies were later sued before courts in both the US and Germany for the
recovery on some 240 life insurance policies issued in Germany to German nationals, payable in German
currency.

Arguments for the Plaintiff

As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they have no choice but to try
the case.

Issue
Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held
Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German courts.

Ratio Decidendi
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may be served upon the
insurance companies in both jurisdictions. Requiring the insurance companies to defend their interests in
the US would subject them to great and unnecessary inconvenience and expenses, including the
possibility of having to bring documentary evidence all the way from their office in Germany. Moreover,
trying the case in the US additionally burden the courts in that jurisdiction, to the detriment of other
litigants. The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the cause of action of which arose from another
jurisdiction and wherein both parties are non-residents is discretionary upon the court.

Testate Estate of C.O. Bohanan, et al. vs. Magdalena C. Bohanan, et al.

G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
106 SCRA 997
FACTS:
C. O. Bohanan, a citizen the United States and of the State of Nevada executed a last
will and testament in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada on April 23, 1944
in Manila. The testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909.
He secured a divorce which was granted to him on May 20, 1922. Sometime in 1925,
Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time
of the death of the testator in 1944.
On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate the last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan. The Philippine Trust
Company was named as the executor of the will.
The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance
with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator’s grandson Edward
George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies;
(2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his
sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of
cash and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator’s grandson;
(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his
daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000;
Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000.

Claiming having been deprived of the legitime, the respondents, the wife Magadalena
C. Bohanan and her two children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner that:
out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the
testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining
companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of
only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
ISSUE 1? Is the wife entitled to a legitime?
No. The laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of
all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his
or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator’s
debts.
Moreover, in an order dated June 19, 1955 – the court found that there existed no
community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree
of divorce was issued. This order was already final and executory and she had not
appealed therefrom.
ISSUE 2: Are the testator’s children entitled to a legitime in accordance with the laws of
the forum?
No. In accordance with Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art.
16, New Civil Code legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of
their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession
is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is
found. It is therefore the Law of Nevada which will govern the disposition of the
properties of the testator but this foreign law must first be proved as our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, the laws of Nevada were not introduced in
evidence by the executor’s at the hearing of the project of partition. It is Magdalena C.
Bohanan, upon her motion for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, who introduced in
evidence the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. Said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor was admitted by the Court. Also the children
of the testator, did not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of
Nevada.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice by the
court, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.
The order of the court approving the project of partition was affirmed.
NOTES:
How are foreign laws proved?
Foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our
Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

Fluemer vs. Hix

In the matter of the Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased
A.W. Fluemer vs. Annie Cousin Hix
G.R. No. 32636, March 17, 1930
54 Phil 610
FACTS:
An application for probate of the will of Edward Randolph Hix was filed on February 20, 1929.
Petitioner who is the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph alleged that the will
was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who resided therein.
Petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code,
Annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p1690 and as certified to by the Director of the
National Library.
Trial Court’s decision: denied the probate of the document alleged to be the last will and
testament of the deceased.
Petitioner filed an appeal from the judgment of the probate court before the Supreme Court.
Pending appeal, petitioner presented an unverified petition for the Court to accept as part of the
evidence documents, one of which was a paper purporting to be the last will and testament of the
testator which was presented for probate on June 8, 1929 to the clerk of Randolph County, State
of West Virginia.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not appellant as a special administrator is authorized to appeal the decision of the
trial court.
2. Whether or not the pertinent law of West Virginia was duly proven?
3. Whether or not the will was duly executed.
RULING:
1. Right of Special Administrator to Appeal from Disallowance of a Will
The special administrator of an estate is a person interested in the allowance or disallowance of
a will by a Court of First Instance, within the meaning of Section 781, as amended, of the Code
of Civil Procedure, and so may be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the
disallowance of a will.
2. No. The law was not proved as fact. The requirements in proving the foreign law were not
met. Findings of the court are as follows:
a. It did not show that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under
the authority of the State of West Virginia.
b. The extract from the law was not attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia.
c. It did not show that the extract of the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged
will was executed.

3. No, The due execution of the will was not established. It did not indicate that the will was
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses
subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia
requires. Also, petitioner failed to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and
not in the Philippines.
The due execution of a will alleged to have been executed in another jurisdiction must be
established. Where the witnesses to the will reside outside the Philippines, it is the duty of the
petitioner to prove execution by some other means.

NOTES:
No judicial notice of foreign laws
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of
the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. The requirements of Sections 300 and
301 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be met.
Domicile
Where it is desired to establish the execution of a will in another jurisdiction, it is necessary to
prove that the testator had his domicile in that jurisdiction and not in the Philippines.
Margaret Querubin vs Silvestre Querubin

On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre under an interlocutory decree (although
the child was still kept in the neutral home) because at the time of the trial, Margaret was living
with another man.

July 29, 1950 G.R. No. L-3693 Ponente: Pablo, J. Mara (This case was in Spanish ~.~’’ Lifted
from 3B 2009-2010 Digest Group)

Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she had then married the
man she was living with and had a stable home, the Court granted custody to Margaret with
reasonable limitations on the part of the father.

SUMMARY: Spouses Querubin residing in New Mexico, after a decree of divorce was awarded
joint custody in the form of equal visitation rights towards their child named Querubina which
was placed in a “neutral home”. Because Margaret started living with another man, Silvestre got
custody through an interlocutory order and to protect the child from the mom’s scandalous
conduct, went to the Philippines. Margaret had that interlocutory order modified to retaining her
custodial rights because she was now married and stable. She filed a writ of habeas corpus to
take back her child on the basis of the modified interlocutory order. SC disagrees.

Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on November of the same year, went to
the Philippines and stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting the child from the
effects of her mother's scandalous conduct. He wanted the child to be raised in a better
environment.

DOCTRINE: Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines.

Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the Court
which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties.

FACTS: In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner Margaret Querubin, in

Albuquerque, New Mexico. 'They had a daughter, Querubina. Margaret filed for divorce in 1948
alleging "mental cruelty." Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Margaret's infidelity. In
1949, the Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the
child. Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both parties.
Both parents were restrained from taking Querubina out of California without the permission of
the Court.

In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a petition for habeas corpus for the
custody of Querubina urder the interlocutory decree of the California Court. She claims that
under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the decree of the Los Angeles Court, granting her the child's custody,
must be complied within the Philippines.] ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON the decree of a foreign court
may be complied with in the Philippines. RATIO: "The decree is by no means final. It is subject
to change with the circumstances. The first decree awarded the custody of the child to the
father, prohibiting the mother from taking the child to her (Margaret's) home because of her
adulterous relationship with another man. The decree was amended when Margaret was not in
Los Angeles. Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines.
Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the Court
which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties. In general, a decree
of divorce awarding custody of the child to one of the spouses is respected by the Courts of
other states "at the time and under the circumstances of its rendition" but such a decree has no
controlling effects in another state as to

facts and conditions occurring subsequently to the date of the decree; and the Court of another
state may, in proper proceedings, award custody otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to
the decree which justify the decree to the interest of the child. In the case at bar, the
circumstances have changed. Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur,
under her father's care. It is a long way from one place to the other. Neither can Margaret prove
that she can pay the cost of passage for the minor. She is not a packet of cigarettes one can
send by mail. Neither can she answer for Querubina's support, care and education. In
comparison, the father has shown both interest in the child and capacity to provide for the needs
of the child."

Hilton v. Guyot - 159 U.S. 113, 16 S. Ct. 139 (1895)

RULE:

Comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Guyot, an administrator of a French firm, sued defendants Libbey and Hilton,
who were U.S. citizens doing business in Paris, France, in a French court under a
contract claim. Defendants appeared and litigated the merits of the case, alleging fraud
on the part of plaintiffs, and sought an injunction from bringing suit, but the court would
not admit evidence and entered a directed verdict for plaintiff. The judgment was
affirmed in a French appeals court. Plaintiff Guyot sought to enforce the French
judgment in the district court of New York, which, without retrial on the merits, directed a
verdict for plaintiffs in the amount a French court had awarded. Libbey and
Hilton sought review in the United States Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

Did the comity of the United States require the court to give conclusive effect to the
judgments of the courts of France?

ANSWER:

No

CONCLUSION:

The United States Supreme Court found that comity was reciprocal. Because France
did not recognize final judgments of the United States and would try such judgments
anew, French judgments would be given the same treatment. Thus, the comity of the
United States did not require the court to give conclusive effect to the judgments of the
courts of France. Defendants could receive a new trial.

JOHNSTON V. COMPAGNIE GENERALE

TRANSATLANTIQUE

WAGNER, J.

The plaintiff has instituted an action against the defendant, a steamship corporation organized and

existing under the laws of the Republic of France, to recover the value of fifty cases of merchandise

delivered to the defendant by one Frank Webb, to whom the defendant delivered a triplicate

original bill of lading and a fourth copy stamped by the defendant "non-negotiable." The three

original bills were delivered by Webb to the plaintiff against advances made him by plaintiff. They

were indorsed in blank, the merchandise deliverable to order or to his or their assigns "Notify

Haillot-Delcourt Company, Paris, France, also Henry Johnson Sons Co., Ltd. * * * Paris, France."

The non-negotiable bill of lading was also indorsed, for what reason it is unapparent, and upon it
the goods were delivered to Haillot-Delcourt and Henry Johnson Sons, non-consignees. Their

value, limited by a provision of the bill of lading, is herein sought. It is conceded by the admission

in evidence of the judgment roll that the plaintiff sued the defendant in the 8th Chamber of the

Tribunal of Commerce of the Department of the Seine, sitting in Paris in the Republic of France,

and that thereafter judgment in said action was entered against the plaintiff. The defendant pleads

this judgment as res adjudicata and as constituting a bar against the maintenance of the within

action. It is upon the effect of such judgment that the disposition of the case hinges, and the French

law, as well as our own decisions and opinions of experts therein, have been examined with the

care that the importance, though non-novelty, of the question presents. Though instances and

exceptions may be found in the jurisprudence of that country, peculiar to us by reason of its

unsymmetric structure where recognition has been afforded to judgments of this country, the great

bulk and trend of their authority and leaning and disposition of application in their decisions

emphasize the absence of comity on their part in observance as binding of the adjudications of this

country, which want of reciprocity on similar grounds, set forth at length by our Supreme Court

in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 215, in an opinion as comprehensive as it is discriminating,

deprives the judgment of their courts of finality here. Fraud or prejudice may be a true motive for

declining observance. In addition, principles of international law and comity may deprive them of

full, not prima facie, credit and effect. The doctrine of revision au fond exercised there has been

so stated, "by the law of France, settled by a series of uniform decisions of the Court of Cassation,

the highest judicial tribunal, for more than half a century, no foreign judgment can be rendered

executory in France without a review of the judgment au fond — to the bottom, including the

whole merits of the cause of action on which the judgment rests. (Pardessus, Droit Commercial, §

1488; Bard Précis de Droit International, (1883) Nos. 234-239; Story's Conflict of Laws, §§ 615-

617; Piggott, 452; Westlake on Private International Law (3d ed. 1890), 350)." Sirey extends it

without limit to the form and to the merits, 1892, 1201. "In other words, whether judgment of
exequatur should be given is a matter of discretion in which the highest regard is paid to the rights

and interests of its subjects." Its right of intervention would appear uncramped and control full and

absolute as to any matter so founded and so submitted before it. Reservations, it is true, there are,

as exceptions always serve to reinforce the tenor of the rule. Additional burdens may not be cast.

Reduction is perhaps prohibited as restrictions upon the introduction of new matter. The principle,

however, remains that the minutest inspection is made with eye singly to discovery of commands

or inhibitions contrary to principles of French law or applications based on foundations of injustice

as appearing to them. Reversing the situation, the course of conduct is, I think, plainly marked.

Does the logic and reason of the judgment commend itself to enforcement by recognition here?

The contract was made here. The validity, construction and obligations of it are determinable by

the laws of the place where the original bill of lading was drawn. The law of the place where the

completion was to be made is ineffectual as determinative. Its construction, as made by the French

court, is obviously incorrect. By principles of law, assuming a state of conflict, its interpretation

was compulsorily dependent upon our law. The stamp "non-negotiable" deprived it of any validity

as a transfer of title. The obligation was alike fixed here. Delivery could only be properly made to

order or assigns. The intent of the parties, loosely and inaccurately referred to by the courts as to

other aspects of conflicting rules of law, here stands on solid ground and must be respected.

Delivery to definite consignees was stipulated. Delivery to no other can be claimed as performance.

Physical matters as to the law or customs either as to time and place are of no concern; they are

governed by the law where the performance was to take place. The question here is one of

obligation, not performance, and the breach was of the former and must be so dealt with. Other

grounds have been raised, including that of the peculiar constitution of the French court to deny

its judgment authority. Its composition of law merchants has already been discussed by the courts

of this state. In my mind it has no bearing on the matter. Our sense of justice and repugnance

against the patent breach of delivery here disclosed, as to which inquiry is allowed by the doctrine
of revision which the French courts in transverse situations apply, forces the decision that

recognition should not be given the judgment pleaded in the answer and that it constitutes no bar

to this proceeding, as comity otherwise might compel. The limitation of liability in the provisions

of the bill of lading control the amount of the judgment. Judgment, therefore, is ordered in favor

of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $5,000, with interest from December 31,

1914.

Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York

Facts.
Loucks was killed when a negligent driver employed by Standard Oil (Defendant) ran him
down. The accident took place in Massachusetts, but he was a resident of New York,
and his administrator (Plaintiff) brought a suit for wrongful death in New York. The suit
was based on the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, which provided a minimum
recovery of $500 and a maximum recovery of $10,000 with the amount of damages
awarded to be based on the degree of fault of the defendant. Standard Oil (Defendant)
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the Massachusetts Statute was penal
in nature and therefore unenforceable in New York.

Issue.

May a right created by statute in one state be enforceable in another state if the
enforcement of the right would not violate the public policy of the forum and the underlying
statute is not penal in nature?

Held.

(Cardozo, J.) Yes. One state’s penal laws are not enforceable in any other
state. Whether a statute is penal depends on the type of liability it creates. Where the
penalty is awarded to the state or a member of the public is suing in the interest of the
whole community to right a public wrong, the statute and/or recovery is penal. While
this statute is penal in the sense that damages are awarded on the basis of the
defendant’s conduct rather than the plaintiff’s measure of damages, the right to recover
is private and therefore the statute is not penal in the international sense. The public
policy of New York is not violated by the enforcement of the right, as New York recognizes
the right of survivors to recover for wrongful death. The fact that the Massachusetts
Statute is different in the way it is enforced does not make the Massachusetts Statute
wrong. The forum may refuse to enforce a right based on a foreign statute only where
enforcement would violate an express strong public policy of the forum. That is not the
case here and since the Statute is not penal in the international sense, there is no bar to
its being enforced in New York. Judgment reversed and order of the Special Term
affirmed.

Discussion.

Note that the forum has much wider latitude in applying its own public policy to deny relief
where the original action is being brought and where it is not a suit on a judgment obtained
somewhere else.