The Moral Purpose of the Human Body

A Reading of Timaeus 69-721

CARLOS STEEL

In a poem dating from the twelfth century, ÒFons Philosophiae,Ó Plato is

represented as the great master in Physics, sitting opposite Aristotle, the
authority on matters of Logic.2 This poetical representation corresponds to
the knowledge that scholars had at that time of both philosophers. Of
Aristotle only the logical works were available in translation, whereas
Plato was known through one dialogue, the Timaeus, in the incomplete
Latin translation with commentary by Calcidius. Introducing PlatoÕs phi-
losophy by starting from the Timaeus might indeed lead to the distorted
view that Plato was primarily interested in physics, when in fact the intent
of his whole philosophical project was always ethical-political. It is from
that ethical perspective that the Timaeus too must be understood, as I shall
argue. To be sure, one Ž nds in this dialogue an account of the constitu-
tion of the physical world, and Plato treats here the great topics of the
natural sciences: astronomy, of course, and mathematics, but also ana-
tomy, physiology, biology, medicine, optics, and chemistry. In all of those
domains he proves to be something of an expert. However, throughout
the dialogue he reminds the reader that his real interest is not in the sci-
entiŽ c explanations as such, although, as he admits, he Ž nds some plea-
sure in them, between engagements with the more serious occupation of
philosophy. 3 What he wants to show is how this world and the human
beings existing therein have been created by the divine Demiurge aiming
Òat the best.Ó It is this teleological approach that most differentiates his
physical discourse from the work of his predecessors and of contemporary

1
This is a revised version of the Kassman lecture which I delivered at the Institute
of Classical Studies in London (22.1.2001). This context explains the rhetorical char-
acter of the argumentation. I thank Keimpe Algra and Christopher Rowe for their com-
ments and John Steffen (Leuven) for polishing my English text.
2
See Godefroy de Saint-Victor, Fons Philosophiae, texte publiŽ et annotŽ par
P. Michaud-Quantin, Namur 1956, v. 189ff.: Òsedet ex opposito uenerandus Plato . . .Ó.
The poem dates from 1178.
3
See Tim. 59c7-d2: ÷tan tiw Žnapaæsevw §neka toçw perÜ tÇn öntvn ŽeÜ kata-
y¡menow lñgouw, toçw gen¡sevw p¡ri diayeÅmenow eÞkñtaw Žmetam¡lhton ®don¯n kttai,
m¡trion ’n ¤n tÒ bÛÄ paidiŒn kaÜ frñnimon poioÝto.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001 Phronesis XLVI/2

106 CARLOS STEEL

scientists, to whom he is probably deeply indebted. It is precisely via this

teleology that his whole cosmology is situated within an ethical perspec-
tive. For it is not possible to explain what is ÒbetterÓ or ÒbestÓ in the uni-
verse without referring to the human beings existing in this universe and
to the goals they try to achieve.

I
The importance of this political-ethical perspective is immediately made
clear by the literary composition of the dialogue, 4 which opens with an
extensive summary of the discussion about the sort of ideal state that one
Ž nds in the Republic. Socrates is not fully satisŽ ed with that argument:
he wants to see what would happen if we were to bring this abstract state
into actual existence, to see how it would perform. Critias will meet this
challenge by describing how, in the remote past, primitive Athens had
resisted the invasion from Atlantis. This will be the subject of the fol-
lowing dialogue, the Critias. But Critias Ž rst gives a long summary of the
story he will tell later. This surprising anticipation of the Critias at the
beginning of the Timaeus should remind us again of the political purpose
of the discourse that is to follow on the nature of the universe. It is only
after the presentation of these two political summaries that Timaeus (who
not only is a natural philosopher, but also played an important political
role in his city)5 will take over the discussion, offering his account of the
generation of the cosmos. Here again one should notice that the cos-
mogony terminates in an anthropogony, with the creation of the human
soul and the human body, and a discussion of the diseases to which they
are subject and of their therapy. The cosmological discourse seems to be
but a long preface to the political discussion that will follow.6 The liter-
ary composition of the dialogue makes it clear that we must read all the
physiological, biological, medical, etc., arguments as contributing to the

4
Cf. P. Hadot, ÒPhysique et PoŽ sie dans le TimŽ e de PlatonÓ in: Revue de thŽ olo-
gie et de philosophie, 115 (1983), pp. 113-133, and in particular p. 118: Òon voit donc
dans quel contexte sÕins re la cosmogonie du TimŽ e: elle fait partie intŽ grante dÕun
ensemble politico-historiqueÓ.
5
See Tim. 20a.
6
Cf. F.M. Cornford, PlatoÕs Cosmology, London, 1937, p. 20: ÒPlatoÕs interest may
have been to indicate that, now as ever, his chief interest lies in the Ž eld of morals
and politics, not in physical speculationÓ. Like all modern scholars of the Timaeus I am
deeply indebted to the commentary of Cornford. I shall use his translation in quotations
from and paraphrases of the argument, though adapting it according to the context.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 107

dialogueÕs overarching ethical-political purpose, that is, to the question

about how to live the best life.7
In fact, Plato wants to demonstrate in this dialogue how the universe
has been organised as an intelligent and harmonious cosmos so that human
beings can attain in it the fulŽ lment of the best life: t¡low toè protey¡ntow
ŽnyrÅpoiw êpò yeÇn ŽrÛstou bÛou.8 To ask human beings to lead beauti-
ful, harmonious lives in a world that was without intelligence and mean-
ing, the haphazard result of mechanical necessity, would be absurd. For
Plato, this is the challenge posed by a purely mechanistic explanation of
the universe. 9 Against such a view he attempts to understand this world
in such a way that the moral life and pursuit of wisdom Ž nd in it a mean-
ingful context. Moral Ž nality, that is, the good we pursue in a harmonious
human life, is set within the Ž nality of the universe, which as a whole is
wonderfully organised by the divine intelligence in light of the Good. The
Timaeus, then, is a grandiose attempt to understand the universe in the
context of the ethical Ž nality of human life, as was the wish of Socrates
in the celebrated text in the Phaedo. We are told there how disappointed
Socrates was with traditional cosmology (as exempliŽ ed by Anaxagoras),
which explains the order of the universe only through necessary physical
conditions and never indicates the real causes, namely: Òthat it is best
(b¡ltiston) for things to be as they are, and to act and undergo action as
they doÓ.10 Thus, he wishes to know Òwhy it is best for the earth to be in
the centreÓ, and he raises similar questions about the sun and the others
stars and their respective movements and speed. One might well wonder
what such an explanation of the cosmos from the viewpoint of the ÒbestÓ

7
I know that the Neoplatonists from Iamblichus on follow a quite different strat-
egy of interpretation. Taking for granted that the Timaeus is a dialogue about ÒphysicsÓ
they attempted to interpret the political-historical discussion in the preface from a
physical point of view. Both the summary of the Republic and the story of the Ž ght
between Atlantis and Athens have a physical meaning if one knows how to interpret
the symbolic expression. See Proclus, In Tim. I,4,11-13: ² m¢n gŒr t°w PoliteÛaw
¤pan‹lhciw kaÜ õ perÜ t°w ƒAtlantÛdow mèyow t¯n diƒ eÞkñnvn ¤mfaÛnei toè kñsmou
yevrÛan: (cf. also 12,29). Even the account of the human body has in ProclusÕ view a
cosmological signiŽ cance, in so far as the human organism can be considered as a
microcosmos: cf. 5,8-13: diñti kaÜ pros®kous‹ ¤stin ²mÝn ² perÜ aétoè yevrÛa tòn
ŽnyrÅpou lñgon probeblhm¡noiw kaÜ katŒ toèton zÇsin, µ diñti mikròw kñsmow õ nyrvpow
kaÜ ¦sti kaÜ ¤n toætÄ p‹nta merikÇw, ÷sa ¤n tÒ kñsmÄ yeÛvw te kaÜ õlikÇw. Proclus
concludes (I,12,28-29): kaÜ d°lon Žpò toætvn, ÷pvw õ di‹logow fusikñw.
8
Cf. Tim. 90d6.
9
As appears from the defence of divine providence in Laws X.
10
Phaed 97c8-d1.
108 CARLOS STEEL

could be! And Socrates indeed seems to doubt whether it is possible after
all. This attempt at the impossible, however, is made in the Timaeus, not
by Socrates himself (who tells us in the Phaedo that he is incapable of
it), but by the Pythagorean Timaeus, Òwho has made the knowledge of
the nature of the universe his chief objectÓ (27a). As is well known,
Timaeus explains the generation of the world as the mixed result of Neces-
sity and Intelligence, whereby Intelligence overrules Necessity and uses it
to achieve its own goals. In its creation, Intelligence always aims at what
is good and desirable, whereas Necessity produces its effects at random.
We must distinguish, Timaeus says, in all explanations, two kinds of
cause: Òthose that work with intelligence to produce what is beautiful and
good and those that are destitute of reason and produce their sundry effects
at random and without orderÓ.11 The two kinds of cause are not, however,
equivalent: the divine Intelligence uses Necessity as an auxiliary cause to
achieve the best possible result.
Every scholar is ready to recognise that here in the Timaeus Plato intro-
duces a very important distinction, which dominates all future discussions
about the physical world until the dawn of modern science. Starting from
this distinction, Aristotle develops his own explanation of the physical and
biological world, though he situates Ž nality within nature: it is part of the
natural process, not imposed on the world by an external agent like the
Demiurge.12 However, although scholars credit Plato with Ž rst drawing
this important distinction, they are largely disappointed with the use he
makes of the teleological principle, particularly when he turns to the
explanation of biological phenomena: they are, in a way, as disappointed
as Socrates was with Anaxagoras. In fact, unlike AristotleÕs use of Ž nal
causality in his biological work, which continues to be of interest even
after Darwin, the application of this principle by Plato seems often to lead
to silly, somewhat naive, childish explanations of biological and physio-
logical processes. ÒThe effect of much of it is bizarre rather than illumi-
natingÓ writes J.E. Raven. 13 And in his introduction to the Loeb edition
of the Timaeus, R. Bury, having asserted that there is not much that is
original in PlatoÕs physical arguments apart from their teleological stand-
point, remarks: Òunfortunately, it is just this standpoint which tends most

11
Tim. 46e.
12
See D. Balme, ÒTeleology and NecessityÓ in: Philosophical Issues in AristotleÕs
Biology, eds. A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 275-290, in particular,
p. 275: ÒThe novelty of AristotleÕs theory was his insistence that Ž nality is within
nature: it is part of the natural process, not imposed upon it by an independent agent.Ó
13
J.E. Raven, PlatoÕs Thought in the Making. A study of the Development of his
Metaphysics, Cambridge, 1965, p. 238.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 109

to hamper the student of ÔnatureÕ by luring him to look for ÔdesignÕ in the
wrong place, and by Ž xing his gaze on what ÔoughtÕ to be rather than
what is. Plato was too much of an idealist to be a good naturalist.Ó 14
But, of course, Plato never had any ambition to be a good Ònaturalist.Ó
The teleological perspective he introduces in his explanation of the world
is not that of a natural or biological Ž nality, but is primarily an ethical
point of view. Plato wants to demonstrate that the world and the human
beings in it are made as perfect as possible Òfor the sake of a life of hap-
pinessÓ (69a1). Therefore it is wrong to read the Timaeus as somehow a
primitive anticipation of AristotleÕs physics and biology. In Aristotle, the
teleological principle introduced by Plato has indeed become a naturalis-
tic and biological principle: it explains the function of the different bod-
ily organs, the heart, the lungs, the role of the circulation of the blood,
the use of having horns or a trunk, the reason that some animals need tes-
ticles for sexual generation and others not, etc. This is not to suggest that
Aristotle is not following Plato when he criticises the older natural
philosophers for limiting their interest to physiology and the processes that
result with necessity from the material elements and for failing to raise
questions about the Òwhat forÓ. In his view, the functioning of a living
being cannot be explained by referring only to the mechanical interaction
of its material elements. Rather, the naturalist must always try to under-
stand the Ž nality of biological processes, how they aim at the best:
ÒClearly there are two ways of causing, the for-the-sake-of-which and the
of-necessity (tñ yƒ oð §neka kaÜ tò ¤j Žn‹gkhw) and our account should if
possible arrive at both . . .; and all who fail to state this give virtually no
account of matter.Ó15
This methodological introduction to the treatise ÒOn the Parts of AnimalsÓ
is clearly inspired by PlatoÕs Timaeus and his distinction between the
ÒnecessaryÓ and the Òbest.Ó However, in AristotleÕs interpretation the dis-
tinction acquires a new purport. The Òfor-the-sake-of-whichÓ becomes bio-
logical Ž nality. Plato, of course, also knows the biological function of the
different organs of the human body. Thus for example he has an interesting
theory of respiration and the circulation of the blood. However, he rele-
gates all of these considerations to the level of the Ònecessary.Ó A teleo-
logical explanation of biological processes from the viewpoint of the
ÒbestÓ must show how these processes are organised in such a way that
they make it possible for the human being to attain a good life, that is, a

14
Plato with an English Translation. Vol. IX: Timaeus e.a. by R.G. Bury (Loeb
Classical Library, 1929), p. 15.
15
De part. animalium, I,1, 642a1-17 (translation D.M. Balme).
110 CARLOS STEEL

life of virtue and wisdom. Timaeus formulates this explicitly in a passage

introducing his explanation of the location of the soul in the body, which
is the main subject of this paper: ÒWe must distinguish two kinds of
causes, the necessary and the divine. The divine we must seek in all things
for the sake of a life of such happiness as our nature admits (kt®sevw
§neka eédaÛmonow bÛou); the necessary for the sake of the divine, re ecting
that apart from the necessary those other objects of our serious study can-
not by themselves be discerned or grasped, nor can we in any other way
have part in them.Ó16 It appears from this text that a serious study (spoud‹-
zomen) of nature must try to grasp the divine purpose in it and that such
an explanation is Òfor the sake of the good life,Ó not only because it will
help us to lead a good life, but also because the divine purpose in mak-
ing the physical universe has been Òfor the sake of the good life,Ó or, in
the solemn words of the conclusion of the discourse, Òfor the sake of
attaining the fulŽ lment of the best life (t¡low ŽrÛstou bÛou) set by the gods
before mankind both for this present time and for the time to come.Ó17 But
Timaeus also insists that without a thorough understanding of the neces-
sary processes in nature, the divine purpose could never be discerned.
Therefore, we must give much attention to the explanation of such phe-
nomena as the functioning of sense perception, the bodily organs, colours,
the formation of metals, etc. Though this is not the primary goal of the
discourse, the author Ž nds an obvious pleasure in those long digressions.
It should also be noticed that Timaeus introduces the fundamental dis-
tinction between the two kinds of causes (the necessary and the divine
intelligence aiming at the good) rather late in his exposition, when he
comes to explain how the human body functions. This distinction is not
placed among the general axiomatic principles of all physical explanation.
Suppose the Demiurge had created only the celestial spheres and their
divine souls and the world as a whole but had not created in it particular
mortal animals, there would not have been any necessity involved in the
process. It is only when discussing the production of mortal bodies for the
embodiment of particular souls that we are confronted with necessity as
an independent sort of causality in the universe. Thus the explanation of
psycho-physical acts such as seeing makes Timaeus abandon his Ž rst attempt
to understand the world as the sole work of divine intelligence (29d-47e).
In a second section (47e-69a) he will have to make a fresh start and con-
sider the world as the result of mechanical necessity. Finally the two per-

16
Tim. 68e6-69a5.
17
Tim. 90d.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 111

spectives will be woven together in a third section (69b-72d), which will

explain the anatomy and the functioning of the human organism in full
detail. The very structure of TimaeusÕ discourse conŽ rms that the distinc-
tion between divine causality and necessity is introduced with reference
to human life and its goals. This was also why Socrates had been attracted
by the doctrine of Anaxagoras concerning the divine Intelligence. He had
hoped to learn from Anaxagoras how he is to understand the universe from
the perspective of the good, that is, from the viewpoint of the same kind
of cause that also explains why he, Socrates, is sitting in prison rather
than making an attempt to escape, that is because Òhe preferred what was
betterÓ (t» toè beltÛstou aßr¡sei).18
The ethical purport of the distinction between the necessary and the
good is also evident from a passage in the Republic where Socrates argues
that the sophists are incapable of making a distinction between Òthe nec-
essary and the nature of the goodÓ: t¯n d¢ toè ŽnagkaÛou kaÜ Žgayoè fæsin,
÷son diaf¡rei tÒ önti, m®te ¤vrakÆw eàh m®te llÄ dunatòw deÝjai.19 For
they call ÒgoodÓ whatever pleases the moods and the appetites of the
Òstrong beast,Ó and do not distinguish the necessary pleasures that are rel-
ated to the fulŽ lment of our bodily needs from what a philosopher would
consider to be truly good. ÒWhat are we to suppose that the philosopher
thinks of other pleasures compared with that of knowing the truth and
being always engaged in the pursuit of it? WonÕt he rank them far lower,
regarding them as necessary in the strict sense, things that heÕd do with-
out if they werenÕt unavoidable?Ó 20 In fact, it is because we are confronted,
in our attempts to lead the good life, with the mechanism of our bodies
and bodily needs that we arrive at the distinction between the necessary
and the good. The necessary is what we are forced to accept, the good
what we desire to achieve.
It is from this ethical perspective that we must also understand how
Timaeus applies the distinction between the good and the necessary when
explaining the functioning of the human body, as is apparent from the fol-
lowing. In his discussion of the function of the mouth Timaeus declares:
ÒThe mouth was equipped by our makers for its ofŽ ce with teeth, tongue,
and lips arranged as now, for the sake at once of what is necessary and
what is best.Ó21 Knowing that a mortal living being requires food for the

18
Phaedo 99b1.
19
Resp. VI 493c5-6.
20
Resp. IX 581e.
21
Tim. 75d-e.
112 CARLOS STEEL

sustenance of its body, the gods made an opening in the body where Ònec-
essary thingsÓ might enter, and provided it with teeth to cut and chew the
food so that it can be digested. But that same mouth, with the same equip-
ment, is also used Òfor the best,Ó namely, as a passage for the stream of
discourse (logos) at the service of intelligence. In fact, it is thanks to the
lips, tongue, and teeth that we can articulate sounds and speak. If we wish
to know the purpose of the mouth, the reason the gods have given us a
mouth, our answer cannot be that we require an opening to take in food.
Indeed, this is a necessity: the gods had to foresee it when creating mor-
tal beings. However, they transformed this biological system for consum-
ing food in small pieces into a amazing instrument at the service of intel-
ligent life. Without the mouth we would be without logos.
A similar distinction is made in the account of the function of the eyes
and sight. Timaeus Ž rst develops a long argument about the mechanism
of sight and the interaction between sense organs and coloured objects.
All these phenomena, he says, must be carefully studied, but they do not
reveal the true explanation of vision, its purpose. They tell us how we see,
but not why.22 Why, then, do we see? One could answer in terms of the
locomotion of the living being, of the need to locate food, to anticipate
danger, etc. Nothing of this is mentioned here: not that it is not true; but
this is again a feature of biological necessity. The gods have given us
eyes, says Timaeus, in order that we may observe the intelligible order of
the universe as is most manifest in the revolutions of the stars and thereby
learn to calculate and to practice philosophy and bring harmony into our
lives.23 This then is the purpose of eyesight: it is a divine gift for the sake
of the philosophical life. As for its biological function, this is of much
less importance: Òwhy should we praise all the lesser goods, for which
one who is not a philosopher, if he were deprived of the sight of them,
might Ôlament with idle moanÕ?Ó A similar explanation is given of sound
and hearing: Òthey are gifts from heaven having the same intent and pur-
poseÓ (47c). For it is owing to the possibility of articulating and hearing
sounds that we are able to communicate in logos and also participate in
music and harmony.
It is interesting to contrast PlatoÕs argument about the purpose of hear-
ing with a passage of the De Sensu in which Aristotle compares the facul-

22
Cf. Cornford, PlatoÕs Cosmology, p. 157: ÒAll such physical transactions we need
to study; but they will not reveal the true reason or explanation of vision, the purpose
it is rationally designed to serve. They tell us ÔhowÕ we see, but not ÔwhyÕ.Ó
23
Tim. 47a-c.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 113

ties of sight and hearing. ÒFor the sake of the necessities of life,Ó he says,
as well as Òin itself,Ó sight seems to be more important than hearing,
because it provides us with much more information about our surround-
ings. ÒBut for the beneŽ t of intelligenceÓ hearing is the more important,
for we teach and learn by means of hearing. Aristotle notices, however,
that this advantage is linked to hearing, not per se, but per accidens.
In fact, the sounds that we hear might happen to be vehicles of meaning,
and thus contribute to understanding, but this is not essential to this sen-
sitive faculty as such. 24 What Plato takes to be the primary reason that
human beings have been endowed with the faculty of hearing is for
Aristotle a welcome side-effect that was not as such intended.
If we read PlatoÕs account of the composition of the human body from
an ethical perspective, and not from a biological-naturalistic viewpoint,
we will appreciate all the more this wonderful text, witty, playful, ironi-
cal, employing a whole array of metaphorical expressions and images. For
we must not take his teleological explanations too literally. They are often
comically meant. After all, the work of creation is done, not by the
Demiurge himself, but by his assistant imitators (and we know what Plato
thinks of imitators!). Many scholars, however, writing serious studies,
seem ashamed to admit that Plato is often fooling with them. Even the
great Cornford says: ÒMany passages strike us as ÔquaintÕ and funny, that
may not have seemed so to his contemporaries. The evidences of design
in the human body were a serious matter to Plato.Ó25 I think, however,
that the explanations Plato offers for the function of the lungs, the liver,
and spleen would also have been comical to PlatoÕs contemporaries, and
that Plato intended them to be so. Yet, Cornford is right: for Plato the
Ž nality of the body is Òa serious matter,Ó but only if we understand it in
view of ethical Ž nality. Otherwise PlatoÕs account is Òrather bizarre than
illuminating,Ó as Raven remarks. I would rather turn the argument around.
Because Aristotle did not understand the playful, ironical use of the tele-
ological argument and its moral signiŽ cance, his own biological teleology,
which he meant to be taken literally (e.g., his explanation why elephants
have trunks), is often more comical for modern readers than the so-called
bizarre passages of Plato.

24
De sensu 1 437a12: katŒ sumbebhkòw d¢ pròw frñnhsin ² Žko¯ pleÝ- ston sum-
b‹lletai m¡row.
25
Cf. Cornford, PlatoÕs Cosmology, p. 151.
114 CARLOS STEEL

II
As we have seen, the explanation of the location of the mortal soul in the
body (69-72) occupies a crucial place in the Timaeus. For it is in this sec-
tion that the two perspectives, divine Ž nality and necessity, are interwo-
ven. Already in antiquity this text was subject to much discussion, as we
learn from the De placitis of Galen, to which I will turn at the end,
because it offers an interesting example of how we must not read the
Platonic text. Though it provides a description of the position, structure,
and function of the different organs of the body, and of their relation to
the passions and activities of the soul, it is not a text written Òfrom a phys-
iological standpoint.Ó As Cornford says, Òthe emphasis falls on the pur-
poses the organs serve as the seats of feelings and desires that contribute
to moral conduct.Ó26
The fabrication of the mortal human body is delegated by the Demiurge
to his assistants, the younger gods, as he himself can only make incor-
ruptible beings. He himself made our immortal rational soul with a struc-
ture similar to that of the world soul, but the younger gods were charged
to shape a mortal body appropriate to house our divine soul. Having observed
how the Demiurge had made the whole universe as a perfect sphere for
the world soul, they imitate him (Žpomimhs‹menoi) by forming a body as
round as possible to install in it our divine soul. It is what we now call
the Òhead.Ó But the gods were not Ž nished with their job after they had
made this head. For, as a mortal being in need of nourishment, a human
body must move around on earth. It cannot enjoy the perfect circular
movements of celestial bodies, but must move up and down and forward
and backward and right and left. Can one image, then, this living head
rolling all over the ground without the means to walk and climb? It would
be damaged and fouled, and all this would go against the dignity of the
head, which is, as it were, the tabernacle, the sacred place housing what
is most holy in us, our intelligence. Therefore the gods envisaged an excel-
lent solution. They fabricated, for the safe transportation of this holy head
all over the earth, an appropriate vehicle, an öxhma. This carriage is the
human body, elongated and equipped with its  exible four limbs, so that

26
Cf. Cornford, PlatoÕs Cosmology, p. 282: ÒThe position, structure, and function
of these organs are described, not from a physiological standpoint, but in relation to
the feelings and appetites of the two inferior parts of the souls. The emphasis falls on
the purposes they serve as the seats of feeling and desires that contribute to moral
conduct; little is said about their behaviour as indispensable means to the preservation
of the physical lifeÓ.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 115

it can be entirely at the service of the head (pn tò sÇma par¡dosan êphresÛan
aétÒ).27
While awaiting their embodiment, human souls had already been placed
on a vehicle, on the star to which they had been assigned, Òpassengers
rather than drivers in a temporary vehicle.Ó28 But the vehicle they now
needed for transportation had to be quite different. Whereas the star-char-
iots had their eternal movement given by the Creator, the human body
must be moved and directed by the soul, its own driver, i.e., it must
become a living organism, an animated body, an Òautomobile.Ó In order
to do so, the gods had to make another kind of soul, which could func-
tion as the principle of the vital activities of this mortal body, so that it
could move, eat, grow, spot danger or food, and defend itself. Taking on
this mortal soul, the divine rational soul can govern its body-automobile
from within. Two kinds of mortal soul must be distinguished: the appeti-
tive kind and the assertive, or spirited, kind. For, like all other animals,
humans have not only all sorts of bodily desires, but also a tendency to
Ž ght when necessary. Having been placed within its corporeal vehicle, this
twofold mortal soul is subjected to all kinds of dreadful affections result-
ing from the sense perceptions. These passions, however, are necessary
concomitants of the functioning of a mortal living being in interaction with
its surrounding. Even if the gods had wished so, they could not have made
the human soul immune from the passions, once it enters a body. Though
they cannot exclude the passions from their design, they try nevertheless
to arrange the body in such a way that the rational soul does not suffer
damage from the passions of the inferior souls but even controls them. In
planning the body they follow some general principles: (1) keep the mor-
tal soul removed as far as possible from the rational soul, so as to avoid
the noise and the nuisance that may result from the passions; (2) at the
same time keep the lines of communication open, so that the command-
ments from above can reach the inferior parts. To realise this seemingly
contradictory goal, the gods invented the neck, which both connects and
separates the head and its vehicle body: ÒFearing to pollute the divine part,
save insofar as was altogether necessary, they housed the mortal part apart
from it in a different dwelling-place in the body, building between head
and breast, as an isthmus and boundary, the neck, which they placed between
to keep the two apart.Ó 29

27
Tim. 44d.
28
A.W. Price, Mental Con ict, London and New York, 1995, pp. 82-83.
29
Tim. 69d-e.
116 CARLOS STEEL

In the breast of the body they established two separate chambers to

house the two parts of the mortal soul. They separated them with a diaphragm,
the midriff, as in a house the apartments of the woman are separated from
those of the man. The appetitive soul with its strong desire for food and
drink and other bodily needs they placed as far as possible from the ratio-
nal soul in the lower chamber; the higher chamber is reserved for the spir-
ited part, which can obey reason. For, as we know from the argument in
the Republic, this assertive force is of great importance to the rational soul,
because with its help, at least if it is well-trained, the soul can keep the
many insatiable desires under control. 30 Therefore, the gods put it in that
part of the body that has a direct communication with the head, so that it
can listen to the commandments that come from the rational soul in its
ÒacropolisÓ and enforce its orders. If the head can be regarded as the
Òacropolis,Ó the gods made for the thymos a Òguard roomÓ (doruforik¯
oàkhsiw), namely, the heart Òat the junction of the veins and fountain of
all the blood which circulated vigorously through all the limbs.Ó 31 When-
ever we get angry or aggressive, the blood is boiling in us, and this excite-
ment is communicated throughout the body. The heart is indeed the centre
of communication because, through the veins, it receives every piece
of information about injuries and sends out its reaction. It can thus be
fully at the service of the assertive soul, which must react to all danger
and actual injuries. That the heart also has an important biological func-
tion, with its role in the circulation of the blood and respiration, is not
even mentioned in this text. Only its relation to the service of the thymos
is discussed.
Along with the heart, the gods placed the two lungs in the thorax. What
is their function? Plato knows of course the important role of the lungs in
the respiration system. He has Timaeus discuss the respiration apparatus
at length in 77c-81e. There respiration is ingeniously explained as a quasi-
mechanical process that serves as a pumping machine for the circulation
of the blood through its channels. But about this obvious biological func-
tion of the lungs we hear nothing in the passage we are examining. It
seems that once again Plato considered all this as a mechanical necessity,
important only for explaining how the body makes blood and is nourished,
etc. This does not, however, in his view, explain why we have a heart and

30
On PlatoÕs doctrine about the threefold division of the soul and a comparison of
his views in the Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus and Timaeus, see the excellent discus-
sion by A.W. Price in his Mental Con ict.
31
Tim. 70b (transl. Bury).
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 117

lungs. It is only when we can show why it is good to have a heart and
lungs and what their function is for our moral life that we will have explained
their purpose. The heart, we have seen, functions as a guard house, an
instrument of communication for the assertive soul. The lungs are at the
service of the heart: they cool the heart and provide refreshment and ease
when it is boiling with rage. They are situated on both sides of the heart
as a kind of buffer, like a sponge against which the heart may leap and
be cooled down when it is in anger. For there is always a great danger
that the thymos might react with more violence than is needed. Therefore
is must be cooled down in order that its assertive force can be better used
in function of a rational life.
The whole explanation of the purpose of the lungs is bewildering if one
attempts to discover in this text a biological argument. To be sure, PlatoÕs
moral argument has again a biological basis: according to some medical
treatises the lungs indeed play a role in cooling the heart. But Plato gives
this role of the lungs an entirely different meaning, putting them at the
service of the assertive soul. This bizarre Ž nalistic reading of the body
will become even more evident in the discussion of the organs that are
put in the second chamber in the torso, that is, in the region between the
navel and the midriff, where the appetitive soul is located.
The most conspicuous organ in this part of the body is, of course, the
stomach: it is the very large organ where all the food and drink is col-
lected in order to satisfy our bodily desires. It is, as it were, Òa manger
for the wild beast in us,Ó the appetitive soul, which is by its very nature
insatiable. Therefore the gods wisely decided to tie up this beast in this
manger so that it is always close to its food and remains quiet. In addi-
tion to the stomach we Ž nd in this region of the body two other organs,
the liver and a smaller neighbouring organ, the spleen. Why do we pos-
sess a liver and a spleen? Timaeus again does not mention any biologi-
cal Ž nality of these organs, their role in the circulation of blood or in the
process of nourishment, although he seems to be well informed about their
anatomical structure and their diseases. The only reason that he invokes
for their function is again a moral one. Unlike the thymos, which can have
direct communication with the logistikon and even collaborate with it, the
appetitive soul is a purely irrational force and can neither hear nor obey
a rational commandment. If, however, there is no communication at all
with the rational soul, the appetitive soul will always be a wild beast and
strive to fulŽ l its desires outside the control of reason. In order to cope
with this difŽ culty, the gods have invented an ingenious system of indi-
rect communication: not through words or thoughts, but through such images
118 CARLOS STEEL

as the phantasms we see during sleep. For that reason the gods have
installed in the region where the appetitive soul resides an organ that can
function as a transformer of conceptual thought into images. That is pre-
cisely the function of the liver. ÒIts purpose was that the in uence pro-
ceeding from reason should make impressions of its thoughts upon the
liver, which would receive them like a mirror and give back visible
images.Ó Those images can be either threatening or gentle depending on
the condition of the mirror. The mirror indeed is of a special kind; it is
not an artefact but a living organism that can exist in different states. By
nature it is Òdense and smooth and bright and sweet, yet containing bit-
terness.Ó When there is terror and menace, Òit swiftly suffuses this bitter-
ness throughout the liver: it makes it all rough and wrinkled by contraction,
it obstructs the vessels and thus produces pain and nausea.Ó In the con-
trary case, sweetness dominates, and the liver becomes as straight and
smooth as possible. 32
The whole description shows that Plato is rather well informed about
the physiology of the liver in its healthy and unhealthy states. But he uses
all this knowledge for developing a strange Ž nalistic argument about the
function of the liver as a sort of mirror re ecting thought as images. There
are of course reasons why he might have developed this curious theory.
Thus it was known that the different states of the liver could in uence the
irrational moods of a character. Besides, there was the religious tradition
whereby the examination of the liver by the ÒharuspicesÓ played an impor-
tant role in the divination of future events. 33 Though Plato is very ironi-
cal about this use of the liver in rituals, he applies the idea of divination
as a non-rational form of communication to the function of the liver in
the human body. We have in our body an organ that transforms thoughts
into irrational images and thereby threatens or warns or consoles the irra-
tional part in us. Thus, in making the liver, the gods have done their very
best Òto make the mortal race as perfect as possible.Ó In fact, the gods
could not have avoided making the appetitive part of the soul, for the
human animal could not survive without experiencing the need for food
and drink and those items that fulŽ l the all other bodily desires. However,
they fancied some remedy to rectify this baser part in us (katoryoèntew
kaÜ tò faèlon ²mÇn), establishing in it the organ of divination so that even
this soul may have Òsome apprehension of the truth.Ó34 As we see again,

32
This is a paraphrase of Tim. 71a-d.
33
See L. Brisson, ÒDu bon usage du dŽ r glementÓ, in: Divination et RationalitŽ,
Paris, 1974, pp. 220-248.
34
Tim. 71d-e.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 119

the ultimate explanation for the installation of the liver is a moral, and
not a biological, one.
Next to the liver we Ž nd a small organ, the spleen, which exists in func-
tion of the liver. It is porous and without blood; it can be Ž lled with impu-
rities coming from the liver when the body is sick, and waxes when
swollen and festered. But when the body is purged, it is reduced to its
former state. This is reliable biological information. But listen to what Plato
makes of it: ÒThe spleen, he says, is a kind of napkin provided to wipe a
mirror and must always lay beside itÓ (72cd). In fact we need such a nap-
kin to clean the liver, so that the latter can be smooth and re ective and
thereby better perform its role as transformer of thought into images. So
even this organ has a moral Ž nality, whatever its biological role might be.
In the lower part of the belly, under the navel, we Ž nd no more speciŽ c
organs, but an endless winding of the bowels. This again has a moral rea-
son. For if there had been a direct exit from the stomach, we would have
a continuous need and desire to drink and to eat, and this gluttony would
make us incapable of culture and philosophy and disobedient to the most
divine part in us. So even the coiling of the bowels is for the higher inter-
est of the soul, Òwhereby Plato passes lightly over the necessary functions,Ó
as Cornford remarks.35 No scholar will deny the ironical character of this
remark on the moral Ž nality of the bowels. But why should the previous
sections be taken more seriously? There is question of the spleen as the
napkin of the liver, of the liver as a mirror re ecting thought, of the heart
as the guardian house of the assertive soul, of the lungs as sponges and
cousins for the heart, of the head as the acropolis and the temple of the
divine soul, related to the body by the neck as an isthmus. The whole
description of the functioning of the body is full of metaphorical language.
Even though Plato discusses in this section all the vital organs inside
the human body, he seems scarcely to be interested in their biological
function in the preservation of life, although he is well informed about it.
Rather, he uses all of his biological knowledge to demonstrate how won-
derfully the gods have equipped us with such a body and organs that we
can live a moral intelligent life notwithstanding the permanent threat of
being overtaken by the passions, which are necessarily involved in hav-
ing a mortal body. 36 Thus, to take up the last amusing example, nobody

35
Cornford, PlatoÕs Cosmology, p. 291.
36
I do not agree with L. Brisson that biology is Òthe foundation of ethicsÓ. After
all, biology only discusses the necessary conditions of the ethical life. Cf. L. Brisson,
Platon.TimŽ e.Critias, Paris Flammarion, 1992, p. 57: Òbiologie et mŽ dicine peuvent
 tre considŽ rŽ es comme le fondement de lՎ thiqueÓ.
120 CARLOS STEEL

can Ž nd an excuse for his insatiable appetites in the fact that he is linked
to a body with needs to be fulŽ lled. This excuse would only be accept-
able if we had been built like those animals that need to eat continuously
because the food they consume passes immediately through, as is the case
with Ž shes and the torrent-birds, which Plato mentions in the Gorgias
(494b6) in his refutation of the hedonistic life. If we are intemperate, we
must blame ourselves for the vice, and not the fact that we have bodies.
On the contrary, the gods, by winding our intestines in such an intricate
manner, have built in, as it were, a system to retard continuous eating and
drinking. 37 The whole argument of Timaeus provides the same Òmoral
messageÓ: see how wisely the gods made us, allowing us to live as har-
moniously as possible! It is an argument, then, about the moral purpose
of the human body and its organs, not a biological text about the location
of the faculties of the soul in the body, though this is how the text has
been read since antiquity.

III
An interesting example of such a misinterpretation is to be found in Galen,
an author with great sympathy for Plato. In his major work, De placitis,
Galen attempts to prove that Plato and Hippocrates fundamentally agree
with his own medical-philosophical views on the location of the three
commanding parts of the soul, the rational, the sensitive, and the vegeta-
tive. For Galen, the brain with the system of nerves connected to it is the
seat of the rational soul; the heart with the circuit of arteries with the puls-
ing blood is the seat of the sensitive life; and the liver with the circuit of
blood in the veins plays an important role in the vegetative life of the
soul, in particular, in digestion. Galen believes that this threefold location
of the soul is conŽ rmed in the text of the Timaeus that we have been
studying so far. It is, however, not an easy task to reconcile PlatoÕs moral
doctrine, which is based on rather rudimentary biological knowledge, with
later physiological insights, such as the discovery of the nervous system
and the distinction between the arteries and the veins. 38 Nevertheless,
Galen tries to interpret Plato in such a way that he conŽ rms the latest
advances in anatomy.

37
ÒStrictly, the intemperance is of the soul and not of the body: the intricacy of
our intestines denies us the physiological excuse for physical insatiability of the
torrent-bird (Gorg. 494b6)Ó (A.W. Price, p. 85).
38
On GalenÕs attempt to Òreconcile PlatoÕs moral doctrine with later physiological
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 121

It was not too difŽ cult to Ž nd in Plato conŽ rmation of the idea that the
brain is the seat of the rational soul, thought, and will. But the location
of the inferior parts of the soul gave more difŽ culty. As we have seen, the
gods placed the thymos in the area between the neck and the midriff, and
they gave it the heart as guardian house. But we cannot infer from this
that Plato considered the heart to be the seat of the sensitive life. In the
Timaeus the heart seems to function like the connection point of a system
of communication, namely, the circuit of the veins. But Galen gives this
task to the nerves and locates the centre of sense perception in the brains
and not in the heart. Though Plato was unaware of the distinction between
veins and arteries, Galen deduces from PlatoÕs description of the role of
the blood around the heart that Plato must have meant the pulsing blood
in the arteries and not the blood in the veins. 39 The greatest difŽ culty, how-
ever, is the location in the liver of the third soul, which for Galen is the
regulative principle of the vegetative life.40 We have seen that the gods
placed the appetitive soul (which is not exactly the same as the vegetative)
in the lower chest and placed in it the liver as an organ to control the
appetites indirectly. Never, however, is it suggested that the liver is the
ÒseatÓ of this soul. If there is a seat of this soul, it must be the stomach,
the manger where this soul is tied up as a wild beast. Plato never men-
tions the role of the liver in the digestive process, which is so important
to Galen. Further, in GalenÕs view the three commanding souls (dioikoæsai)
function quasi-independently, the one from the other, as is demonstrated
by some medical experiments. Plato, on the contrary, wants to keep the
commandment of the whole psychic life under the rational soul.
All of this makes it evident once again that one should not read
Timaeus 69b-72d as an explanation of the location of the three parts of
the soul in the body. To be sure, Plato talks about the three places (tñpoi)
where the different souls dwell: the head, the upper chest, and the lower
chest between diaphragm and navel. However, as we have seen, one
should read this text as a moral topology of the body. Plato is not dis-
cussing here the doctrine of the ÒseatsÓ of the souls, understood as the
places from which the psychic faculties interfere with the bodily processes.

insightsÓ see the introduction of T. Tieleman to his study Galen and Chrysippus on
the Soul. Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis, Books II-III, Leiden, 1996, pp.
XXVIII-XXXI (with further bibliography).
39
See PHP VI,8, p. 419.
40
See T. Tieleman, p. XXXI: ÒStrictly speaking the claim that Plato made the liver
the seat of desire (PHP VI,3,1; 8.52) is inaccurate. Nonetheless, it is found elsewhere
in Platonist and other literature.Ó
122 CARLOS STEEL

If one is interested in discovering the mysterious connecting point between

the soul and body, something like the pineal gland of Descartes, then one
should read somewhat further in the dialogue, where the formation of the
marrow is described (73bff.). Of all the bodily substances, the marrow is
the most precious and the closest in nature to the incorporeal soul. The
gods, Plato says, implanted in the marrow the several kinds of the soul
after having Ž rst divided it into as many shapes as the different kinds of
soul it was destined to wear. The upper part of the marrow is moulded
into a spherical shape, the brains, which are, as it were, Òthe ploughland
to contain the divine seed,Ó that is, the rational soul; the other part, which
was to retain the mortal kinds of the soul, was divided into Òshapes at
once round and elongatedÓ along the spinal column and the ribs attached
to it. For, via this circuit of bones, the marrow comes down from the brain
into the ultimate parts of the ribs and forms the anchor cables, the bond
whereby the soul is connected to the body for the span of its mortal life
(desmoÜ toè bÛou). It is through the mediation of the marrow that souls are
really anchored, seated in the body, and control the vital processes. 41 This
section, then, might offer a better occasion for a discussion of the bio-
logical question concerning the location of the soul in the body than does
the earlier text, which was fully exploited by Galen to defend his own
medical views.
Galen not only defends Plato in function of his own doctrine, he also
severely attacks the Stoic Chrysippus for his wrong views on the location
of the soul. For Chrysippus rejected the views of the Timaeus and argued
that there is only one soul, the rational pneuma, exercising the diverse
functions that Plato divided among the different souls, and that this soul
is located in the heart, centre of the circulation of blood, and not in the
brain. Galen is irritated by the fact that Chrysippus does not attempt to
prove the Stoic doctrine on the location of the soul by means of experi-
ments or acceptable dialectical arguments. 42 Instead, Chrysippus seems to
bombard us with quotations taken from poetry, from Homer to Euripides.

41
Since Cornford (following Rivaud) most commentators understand tŒ tÇn cuxÇn
g¡nh (Tim. 73c4) as referring to the irrational souls of the animals that will originate
from a perversion of the human souls. I do not accept this interpretation. The context
shows clearly that Timaeus is talking about the Òthree kinds of soulÓ he had discussed
in 62-71.
42
On GalenÕs presentation of ChrysippusÕ arguments see the excellent study of
T. Tieleman. On the reliability of Galen as a source of Chrysippus, see also R. Sorabji,
Emotion and the Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford,
2000, pp. 99-108.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 123

But how could a quotation from the Iliad like, ÒFor me the thymos in my
breast arouses me even more to war and to battleÓ (N 73), be an argu-
ment about the location of the h gemonikon in the heart? And what are
we to think of the notorious argument that the way we pronounce the pro-
noun ¤gÅ and the fact that we point to ourselves at the breast and that we
nod downwards with the head when assenting to some true proposition
prove that the breast is where thought appears to be and thus the place of
the h gemonikon? Modern scholars are at pains to argue that the argu-
ments of the Stoics are not as absurd as Galen makes them appear.43 It
seems to me that the Stoic argument about the so-called location of the
ruling part was not so remote from PlatoÕs moral topology in Timaeus
69-72. After all, Plato himself uses many quotations from the poets in his
argument about the tripartition of the soul in the Republic. ChrysippusÕ
divergence with Plato was not just about the physiology of the body and
the seats of the soul. The discussion concerned a very important moral
problem: how we are to understand the unity of the soul and the mental
con ict between the rational and non-rational. 44

IV
As we have argued, the Timaeus is not primarily a dialogue about physics
or biology, but an attempt to explain from a moral perspective the con-
stitution of the world and the creation of the human animal in it. The
Demiurge has made the universe Òin the best possible wayÓ so that human
beings may lead in it Òthe best possible life.Ó Therefore we cannot blame
the creator(s) for any evil we might experience in this life. This is the

43
For a discussion of the arguments, see T. Tieleman, p. 206ff. and his entire chap-
ter V on the use of poetry.
44
For the Stoics of course the physiological and the teleological or intentional
causality cannot be separated: cf. D. Sedley, ÒChrysippus on psychophysical causal-
ityÕ in: J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum (eds.), Passions and Perceptions. Studies in
Hellenistic Philsophy, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 313-331. ÒChrysippus might have seen
the TimaeusÕ account of the spirited part as antcipating his own psychophysical model
more generallyÓ. Thus Ch. Gill, ÒGalen versus Chrysippus on the tripartite Psyche in
Timaeus 69-72Ó in: T. Calvo and L. Brisson (eds.), Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias,
Sankt Augustin, 1997, pp. 268-273 (p. 269). According to Gill ÒGalen does not say
whether Chrysippus discussed PlatoÕs account in any detailÓ (p. 268); therefore Gill
speculates about what Chrysippus might have said. But Galen does say that Chrysippus
was completely silent about PlatoÕs arguments for the location of the tripartite soul:
ÒChrysippus did not mention any of the strong arguments by Plato . . . nor did he try
to answer themÓ (PHP V.7.51-52, transl. de Lacy, p. 349). See also III.1.20 and 27.
124 CARLOS STEEL

sense of the solemn message of the Demiurge given to human souls before
they are sent to their respective bodies on earth. Mounting them Ž rst on
their chariot-stars, he offers them a grandiose view of the whole universe
from above. But in this cosmological tour he also declares to them Òthe
laws of DestinyÓ: t¯n toè pantòw fæsin ¦deijen, nñmouw te toçw eßmarm¡nouw
eäpen aétaÝw. Those laws are not cosmological laws but the moral laws
that establish a correspondence (ÒretributionÓ) between the diverse grades
of moral behaviour and the (happy or unhappy) conditions of life.45 For,
in accordance with our way of life, we will either return to our ÒstarÓ or
be reincarnated in ever more degraded animals. In fact, these laws high-
light again that, in the view of the Demiurge, there is an essential link
between the Ònature of the universeÓ and the Òmoral order.Ó In the same
way Plato had described in the myth of Er in the Republic how human
souls Ž rst enjoy a magniŽ cent cosmological view before they make a new
choice of life in accordance with the laws of Fate.46
After all, the embodiment of souls has itself a cosmological function.
Human souls do not fall because of some ÒfaultÓ: they are sent down by
the Demiurge for the sake of the perfection of the universe. 47 For, if this
universe is to be perfect, it must contain all sorts of living beings, includ-
ing mortal animals: thus is the will of the Demiurge. The Ž rst incarnation
is for all souls one of identical conditions. But, if souls do not lead a good
life, then in future reincarnations they will need to suffer worse conditions
(being reborn Ž rst as women, then as irrational animals). They should not
complain about receiving such worse conditions, as they are responsible
themselves for their own fate. At the beginning, however, at the Ž rst
descent of the souls, the gods did whatever they could to make our bodily
residence on earth as comfortable as possible. Unfortunately, it is unavoidable
that the rational soul, when entering a mortal body and taking on the mor-
tal forms of soul, will be subject to dreadful passions, beginning with the
terrible shock experienced at the moment of birth. All this follows by neces-
sity from the fact that human souls are connected with mortal bodies.
ÒWhen of necessity they must be implanted in changing and corruptible

45
Cf. Laws 904c (referring to degradation of souls according to character) quoted
by Cornford, p. 143, n. 1.
46
Cf. Resp. X 616bff.
47
On the reasons for the descent of the soul there was a great debate in the Platonic
tradition. See Festugi re, La rŽ vŽ lation dÕHerm s TrismŽ giste. vol. III, pp. 63-96; 216-
220 (with text from IamblichusÕ De Anima). See also Plotinus, IV,8: ÒOn the Descent
of the SoulÓ.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 125

bodies, there must be needs in them and sensations and passions: desire
blended with pleasure and pain, as well as with fear and anger.Ó Souls
need not despair, however. For they are told that, Òif they should master
these passions, they would live well during this span of life and after-
wards return to their consort stars for an eternally happy lifeÓ (42a-c).
ÒTo master the passionsÓ is certainly a difŽ cult task for embodied souls,
but it is not an impossible one! For human souls are similar to the divine
world-soul, having all of its cognitive faculties, and the gods have pre-
pared for them a wonderful body to serve as a chariot for the attainment
of a good life. Yet if they fail, they must begin another mortal life and,
after another failure, begin again an even more degraded life. Thus they
will descend into ever less perfect bodies corresponding to their degrad-
ing behaviour. For, though all human beings alike were equipped with
the best possible body at the Ž rst incarnation, this is no longer the case
afterwards. According to the character of his depravation, a man will
be changed into a woman, or even into inferior sorts of animals of a na-
ture resembling that character. This degeneration of the human body is
described in a very funny appendix to the Timaeus, in which we Ž nd a
reverse theory of evolution. Humans animals degenerate into the diverse
types of irrational animals: birds, land creatures, and Ž shes. Plato explains
here in a wonderfully ironic way the close relation between the biologi-
cal formation of the body and the purpose of life. Thus the land animals
are formed for those souls that have no interest in philosophy and its
divine contemplation, but prefer to follow the guidance of the inferior
parts of the soul, which reside in the breast, being interested only in the
satisfaction of their desires. ÒBy reason of these practices the gods let their
forelimbs and heads be drawn down to earth by natural afŽ nity and there
supported, and their heads, which lost their spherical form, were stretched
out and took any sort of shape into which their circles were crushed
together through inactivityÓ.48 The whole appendix (which most scholars
ignore because it strikes them as lacking in serious content) is a remark-
able negative illustration of the positive description of the human body
found in 69ff. (which is as serious or as witty as the other). It proves again
that the description of the body and its organs must be understood meta-
phorically as an expression of the moral purpose of the body.

48
Tim. 76a. In a recent paper D. Sedley defended a literal interpretation of this
squashing! See Calvo-Brisson, Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias, p. 330. This is not my
view.
126 CARLOS STEEL

So human beings should neither complain nor blame the gods who
made them, as their unhappiness is not due to the world they are placed
in, not due to the body they are residing in. They are themselves respon-
sible; the divinity is not to be blamed for the future wickedness of any of
them (t°w ¦peita kakÛaw ¥k‹stvn ŽnaÛtiow).49 To be sure, it is no easy task
to become a righteous person: we need to live in mortal bodies in inter-
action with other bodies; we are subject to all kind of needs; our bodies
might suffer from various diseases; our souls are subject to dreadful pas-
sions. But that is no reason to be ashamed or angry about our being in a
body. Nor can we use it as an excuse for all kinds of vices. The gods
fashioned the human body so as to be the best possible servant for the
soul, in view of the good life, organising it in a wonderful way to guar-
antee that reason will be in control. In fact, when the Demiurge delegated
to the younger gods the task of moulding mortal bodies and framing the
rest of the human soul, he asked them explicitly to govern those bodies
in the best way possible, so that they suffer no evil Òexcept for that evil
they cause for themselves (÷ti m¯ kakÇn aétò ¤autÒ gÛgnoito aàtion).
õ yeòw ŽnaÛtiow. The gods are not responsible for any of the evil in this
world: that responsibility lies with the soul, as we learn from the Re-
public.50 Does this mean, then, that we human beings must support the
full burden of responsibility? Are we by sinning the sole causes of all evil,
as Christian authors like Augustine would contend? 51 This is not PlatoÕs
view in the Timaeus. As he explains, the gods endeavoured to make the
world and the human body as good as possible, but there is always the
effect of mindless Necessity. Thus, if there is to exist a mortal living
being, it is unavoidable that it will have a body subject to illness, ageing,
and death. The hormonal equilibrium can sometimes be lost. Some indi-
viduals might have in their bodies abnormal amounts of  uids, and thereby
be more prone to licentious behaviour. Because of the acid and salt

49
Tim. 42d.
50
See Resp. X, 617e4-5: aÞtÛa ¥lom¡nou: yeòw ŽnaÛtiow (cf. also II 279b-c). On the
question of the ÒcausesÓ of evil: see J. Opsomer-C. Steel, ÒEvil Without a Cause.
ProclusÕ Doctrine on the Origin of Evil, and its Antecedents in Hellenistic PhilosophyÓ,
in: Th. Fuhrer and M. Erler (eds.), Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in
der SpŠtantike, Stuttgart, Steiner, (Philosophie der Antike: 9), 1999, pp. 229-260.
51
Of course Augustine does not forget the Ž rst fall, that of the bad angels, who
are also responsible for the evil in the universe. On AugustineÕs non-explanation of
evil, see my ÒDoes Evil Have a Cause? AugustineÕs Perplexity and ThomasÕ AnswerÓ,
in: The Review of Metaphysics, 48 (1994), pp. 251-273.
 THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE HUMAN BODY 127

phlegms and the bitter billious humours roaming about the body, there
will be Òdiverse types of ill temper and despondency, of rashness and cow-
ardice, of dullness and oblivion.Ó No human being would willingly choose
those hateful affections. If some human beings are wholly subject to these
passions, it might be Òbecause of some evil condition of the body.Ó Thus
human beings are never fully responsible for the evil they cause them-
selves, in particular not if they must live in states with a perverse form
of constitution that tends to stimulate all those vices rather than to cor-
rect them (87a-b).
The gods are not the causes of evil; we human beings are, but only
partially. It is indeed inescapable that, in this sublunary world, there will
always exist some evil opposed to the good, as Socrates admits in the
Theaetetus: ÒIt must inevitably haunt human life, and prowl about this
earthÓ (176a). This is not, however, a reason for moral fatalism. As
Timaeus exhorts us: ÒEach man must endeavour, as best as he can, by
education, pursuits, and study to  ee (fugeÝn) from evil and to uphold its
contrary, the good.Ó 52 This is also what Socrates advises us to do in the
Theaetetus: Òwe must try to escape (feægein) from earth to heavenÓ; and
this escape entails Òbecoming as much like God as possibleÓ by being
Òjust and pure, with understandingÓ. This text from the Theaetetus has
often been used by later Platonists to defend an otherworldly philosophy.
The parallel with the Timaeus shows that one should not read this text
so.53 The whole account given by Timaeus is a defence of the order and
harmony of this universe, a hymn praising this sensible god made by the
divine father as the best possible image of the ideal paradigm. Souls are
sent into this world to give life to the particular animals inhabiting it.
However, to exist in this wonderful, living, intelligent world as a partic-
ular mortal animal is necessarily to be subject to all kinds of affections,
and some of us are more affected by them than others. The gods have
cleverly invented all sorts of devices to remedy what could go wrong in
our body and soul. And human society – if it is not perverted, as the story
of Atlantis would have it – can develop institutions, ways of education and

52
Tim. 87b6-8: proyumht¡on m®n, ÷pú tiw dænatai, kaÜ diŒ trof°w kaÜ diƒ
¤pithdeum‹tvn mayhm‹tvn te fugeÝn m¢n kakÛan, toénantÛon d¢ ¤leÝn. On the inter-
pretation of this text by Galen (who understands the trofh not as ÒnurtureÓ but as a
Òregimen in dietÓ, see the stimulating discussion by R. SorabjiÕs in his book Emotion
and the Peace of Mind, pp. 256-258.
53
Theaet. 175a-b. Cf. Plotinus, I,8,6-7 and Proclus, De malorum subsistentia, 6,30ff.
(I,8,6-7).
128 CARLOS STEEL

medicine to correct and improve what went wrong. Even if our souls have
been sent by the father, we have to perform the task of giving life to the
mortal animal and taking care of its needs in such a way that we never
forget our primary task, to bring order and harmony into our life by
contemplating the harmony of the whole universe. 54

Institute of Philosophy
University of Leuven

54
See the solemn conclusion Tim. 90a-d. For a similar reading of the Timaeus, see
D. Sedley, ÒÔBecoming like GodÕ in the Timaeus and AristotleÓ, in: Calvo-Brisson,
Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias, pp. 327-339.