Purpose trust (Trusts of Imperfect Obligation)

Can refusal to recognize purpose trust be justified?

A trust cannot exist for purposes is a fundamental principle. The rule against confidence
has been laid down for a long time. Sir William Grant MR said in Morice v Bishop of
Durham that every trust should have a specific purpose. Some people must be able to
declare performance in their favor. In the case of Bowman v. Secular Security, Lord
Parker voiced similar opinions, that it should be to the interest of persons to be legitimate
for a trust.The result is that the Court is unable to give effect to a trust it cannot monitor a
designed private purpose trust. No beneficiary can implement such a confidence with a
locus stand. The effect of the trust, see Re Astor's Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch. 534, in
support of the donor or settlor if a trust for a non-charitable purpose fails.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE `ASTOR' PRINCIPLE

There are several private trusts that are deemed to be especially genuine. Notwithstanding
the concerns against the legitimacy of the trusts as outlined above, there are some
anomalous exceptions. This faith is a surrender to the fragility of man. However, the sole
concession made by the courts is that the recipients (proposals) do not need to apply the
trust.These anomalous trusts are also subject to the usual restrictions governing express
trusts (see Re Endacott ante). These extremely lawful trusts are not necessary but are just
"directory" since the trustees have the right to decline to fulfil the settlor's desires and
tribunals will not force them to act differently.

At the same time, if they indicate an intention to execute the wishes of the settlor, the
courts will not prevent the trustees from performing the conditions of the trust. In the
latter scenario, the trustees are subject to the standard fiduciary obligations. These
abnormal trusts are known as the 'miscarrying trusts' or 'miscarrying trusts.'

Firstly, English law acknowledges a variety of exemptions where, despite absence of

beneficiaries, pure non-charitable trusts are maintained. There are three sorts of trusts that
are pure non-charitable, lawful trusts. The following are:

(i) Trusts for the care of animals:

Animal maintenance donations are normally philanthropic, although special animal

welfare trusts, such as domestic animals, are considered as legal private trusts. A gift of
will was lawful for the benefit of the black mare testator in Pettingall v Pettingall
(1842)11 L.J. Ch.176, since the executor desired to execute the request of the testator.

(ii) Monument cases:

There is no charitable trust in erecting a monument or creating a monument for a person,

but a genuine trust may exist if the trustees indicate their wish to exercise such trust, see
Mussett v Bingle [1876] W.N.170.
(iii) Masses

The House of Lords determined in Boerne v Keane [1919] AC 815 a lawful gift for mass
speech. Given that public masses are considered generous, the Boerne principle appears
to be confined to private masses.

The maximum term during which the above three anomalous trusts can be established is
life plus 21 years. Life is merely a person who is living when the purpose trust is created.
The trust for a private purpose can be restricted to a term of perpetuity by stating that it
will last more than 21 years or for life, or as long as the law allows. However, if the faith
does not persist beyond the duration of eternity, it can still be saved without limiting it to
the duration of eternity. However, the anomalous classes listed above are unique and give
rise to human frailty or sensibility (Re Astor's Roxburgh Justice Settlement) and will not
be elevated (Harman Lord Justice in Re Endacott).

THE DENLEY APPROACH

The method used in Denley by the courts is to determine whether a gift or a trust is to
promote an unimpaired purpose (within the Astor principle) or if the trust is to benefit
those able to implement the trust. This is a matter for the courts to determine on building
the appropriate trust instrument. Virtually all purposes are promoted by individuals.

In Re Denley's Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch. 373, a parcel of land was transmitted as a sports
ground to trustees, mainly for the advantage of workers of a corporation and, secondly,
for the advantage of others or individuals whom the trustees may authorize to utilize that
parcel of land. The court concluded that the trust was legitimate for people.

The methodology used in the Re Bowes [1896] 1 Ch 507 Supreme Court was identical to
that taken over a century earlier.

There are several frequent reasons why private trusts fail. The list is not complete, but
dangers should be avoided by a settler: (a) the absence of the beneficiary principle, (b)
the uncertainty about the subject matter and (c) the violation of the rule of perpetuity.

(a) Missing beneficiaries:

In nature, a trust is essential. The courts have always been jealous of the trusted
beneficiaries' rights and interests. Such rights can, however, only be safeguarded if the
recipient is enforcing the same standard. Proceedings against trustees cannot be launched
by Purposes. 10 Ves. 522 per Grant M R in Morice v Durham Bishop (1804).

"There needs to be somebody who can declare performance in favor of the court." The
General Prosecutor as parents, however, is responsible for the obligation of enforcing
public trusts for a benevolent purpose trusts. To implement private trusts, no
governmental authority is necessary.

(b) Uncertainty:
Because of the preceding rule, it is evident that recipients' rights are illusory unless the
court can determine which recipients belong to them. The trust thus failed to be uncertain
as a second reason for the Re Astor judgement. Re Astor by Roxburgh J

"If there may be a list of purposes beyond the field of charities, then the purpose must be
set out in sentences that contain precise concepts and the method by which the trustees
endeavor to achieve these ideas must also be sufficiently certain."

Re Endacott [1960] ch. 232 is a case which exemplifies this idea, where a gift "for me
was empty in order to provide some helpful memorial."

Charity trusts, on the other hand, are tested to see whether objects are only charitable, for
the certainty of objects.

(c) Perpetuity rule:

The perpetuity rule needs not just a future interest in a lifetime, but also the maximum
time for that benefit. In essence, this perpetuity rule needs a future interest in that interest.
The lifetime span is 125 years according to the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009.

However, it is maintained that there is always somebody who is entitled to property in

default, even though a trust is founded to a purpose, when the objective does not achieve.
The settler himself or the residual legate may be such a person.

In addition, it might be developed legislative systems to assist the implementation of

private trusts. Such legal frameworks have been developed in certain other jurisdictions.
For instance, under the Alternative Regimes of Law 1997, Cayman Island Special Trusts
(Special Trust Law) that enforces trusts that cannot own interest in trust property,
provides the trustee and third parties with the same personal and proprietary remedies as
recipients of an ordinary trust.

There has been a counterargument that there should always be certain beneficiary with a
fair stake and equitable ownership since many situations have not had the property's
shareholder. For instance, a Sandra trust will not have beneficiaries at least for a period
until Sandra's grand children are born till Sandra's grandkids are born.

Applying the same concept previously applicable to recognized anomalous categories can
satisfy the objection to the norm of perpetuity, that if trust is not limited to the time of
perpetuity it fails.

But English law now refuses to allow (non-charitable) trusts such purposes, unless under
extraordinary situations.