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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

NARAYANHITI, KATHMANDU

S.N. 2 PSY OPS AND CIVIL AFFAIR COURSE

HTA IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM & OPERATION
IRAQI FREEDOM
)ANALYSIS(
COMMANDANT

LT COL PRABIN RAJ GHIMIRE

INSTRUCTORS PRESENTED BY

MAJ BABIN BASNET PSY 24

CAPT SUDIP BASNET

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HUMAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS IN OPERATION ENDURING

FREEDOM & OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

INTRODUCTION

1. In response to the attacks of 11 September, the early combat operations that took place on 7 October
2001 to include a mix of strikes from land-based B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress bombers,
carrier-based F-14 Tomcat and F/A-18 Hornet fighters, and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from both
U.S. and British ships and submarines signaled the start of Operation Enduring Freedom.
The initial military objectives of OEF, as articulated by President George W. Bush in his 20 September
address to a Joint Session of Congress and his 7 October address to the country, included the destruction
of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of al-Qaeda leaders, and the
cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.
2. In January 2002, over 1,200 soldiers from the United States Special Operations Command
Pacific (SOCPAC) deployed to the Philippines to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in
their push to uproot terrorist forces on the island of Basilan. Of those groups included are Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. The operation consisted of training the AFP in counter-
terrorist operations as well as supporting the local people with humanitarian aid in Operation Smiles.
3. In October 2002, the Combined Task Force 150 and United States military Special Forces
established themselves in Djibouti at Camp Lemonnier. The stated goals of the operation were to provide
humanitarian aid and patrol the Horn of Africa to reduce the abilities of terrorist organizations in the
region. Similar to OEF-P, the goal of humanitarian aid was emphasized, ostensibly to prevent militant
organizations from being able to take hold amongst the population as well as reemerge after being
removed.The military aspect involves coalition forces searching and boarding ships entering the region for
illegal cargo as well as providing training and equipment to the armed forces in the region. The
humanitarian aspect involves building schools, clinics and water wells to enforce the confidence of the
local people.Since 2001, the cumulative expenditure by the U.S. government on Operation Enduring
Freedom has exceeded $150 billion.
4. In response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, President George W. Bush launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT). As it evolved, his
objective was two-fold to destroy al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and
around the world, and to remove Saddam Hussein from power to forestall threats from his presumed
possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to start operation Iraqi freedom.
5. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was
launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and
destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over
time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the
Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic
development.
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6. In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of the
insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek management of their
own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that went into effect on January 1, 2009, which
confirmed the Iraqis’ responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era in OIF and in US-Iraqi
bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the agreement a “watershed, a firm indication
that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down.” U.S. military commanders on the ground
have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from
counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and
supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp
Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech addressing “how the war in Iraq will
end,” in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of
the rest of the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism
operations, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel.

7. The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including some
140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors, who provide
substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance, and development.
Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates,
have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S.
military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue. The Government of Iraq
(GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering strands of the
insurgency; and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in
improving its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for
the Iraqi people.

AIM

8. The aim of this paper is to get idea about the human terrain analysis in
i. operation enduring freedom and
ii. operation Iraqi freedom

SCOPE

9. Implication of HTA in ;
a) Operation endurance freedom
b) Operation Iraqis freedom
10. Importance / Challenges faced during HTA
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11. Conclusion and recommendation

DESCRIPTION

12. The Main goal of Operation Enduring Freedom was to build and maintain pressure inside
Afghanistan, with the objective of the destruction of the al Qaeda terrorist network and the government
of the Taliban.Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001, under President George W.
Bush's administration, with allied air strikes on Taliban and al Qaeda targets.the result was the execution
of at least 3,000 captured Taliban soldiers by Malik and the Hazaris. In August, 1998, the Taliban retook
Mazar-i Sharif and summarily massacred at least 2,000 Hazaris. Also, several Iranian citizens, including
diplomats, were killed, nearly touching off an Iran-Taliban war.
13. The combat mission, code-named Operation Enduring Freedom, lasted for 13 years until being
brought to an end in December 2014. The military operation was launched to stop the Taliban from
providing a safe haven to al Qaeda and to stop al Qaeda's use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorist
activities. Since the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001, over 1.9 million US military
personnel have been deployed in 3 million tours of duty lasting more than 30 days as part of Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
14. OEF is considered a success chiefly because it led the swift annihilation of the Taliban's Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan. Today, the Taliban's emirate is on the verge of resurrection in at least parts of
the country.But the leadership of the Taliban and al-Qaeda think that victory is close at hand.
15. For Afghanistan specifically, Operation Enduring Freedom costs totaled roughly $578 billion, and
Operation Freedom's Sentinel costs are currently about $256 billion. The Pentagon, therefore, estimates
spending a total of $837 billion as the cost for the Afghanistan war.

Implication of HTA IN OPERATION ENDURANCE FREEDOM

16. The Human Terrain System (HTS) was a United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) support program employing personnel from the social science disciplines – such as
anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies, and linguistics to provide military
commanders and staff with an understanding.

Notable operations focusing HTA

a. Operation Khyber

During a 15-day operation in the late summer of 2007, 500 Afghan and 500 US soldiers were
deployed to ;
i. Clear an estimated 200 to 250 Taliban insurgents out of Paktia Province,
ii. Secure southeastern Afghanistan's most important road, and
iii. halt a string of suicide attacks on US troops and local governors.
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During the operation, they identified an unusually high concentration of widows in poverty,
creating pressure on their sons to join the well-paid insurgents. 
US officers developed a job training program for the widows. As a result, Afghan and US officials
focused on uniting the Zadran, one of southeastern Afghanistan's most powerful tribes, as a way of
hindering the Taliban's operations in the area.

b. Operation Maiwandi
800 Afghan soldiers, 400 US soldiers and 200 Afghan policemen took part in Operation
Maiwand, in which Afghan soldiers raided houses of suspected militants. Stars and Stripes reported
that in one Pashtun village, Kuz Khadokhel, the Human Terrain Team (HTT) was done ;
i. to understand body language in the context of the culture,
ii. to identify leaders during negotiations, and
iii. to reinforce a perception of leadership
iv. demonstrating good faith through projects facilitated by the Ghazni Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT), which included roads, a visit by the PRT's mobile medical
clinic, the construction of a deep well for irrigation, and the beginnings of a road to
Afghanistan's main Highway 1.

IMPLICATION OF HTA IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

17. At the operational level, units did not understand that information in Iraq is passed through
word of mouth and focused more on broadcast and print media to transmit messages, missing
crucial opportunities to influence the public early in the war. In general, few attempted to fully
understand the culture and leverage cross-cultural interactions to increase effectiveness in
influencing the population. The result was an incoherent approach to the conflict at all levels of
war. Some commanders emphasized wielding a heavy hand and focusing on lethal operations, while
others, often separated by only a few city blocks, emphasized a more non-lethal approach to gaining
the support and trust of the population. Beginning in 2005, with violence increasing at a dramatic
rate and as Iraqi public opinion of coalition efforts was declining, military leadership at all levels
recognized that a change was necessary. Although the situation faced by the U.S. military on the
ground in Iraq was extremely complex, it did not take long for the operational headquarters in
theater and units on the ground at the tactical level to recognize the challenges and adapt. In
particular, this included elevating cultural understanding as vitally important to the daily
interactions with the population of the officers and soldiers on the ground. In 2005 after a tour as a
brigade commander, BG Benjamin Freakley recognized that the U.S. military struggled to
understand the significance of culture to military operations and acknowledged “the complexity of
the contemporary operating environment demands that we provide our tactical commanders a
robust analytical tool” for cultural awareness. MG Peter Chiarelli commanded the 1st Cavalry
Division in Baghdad from 2004 to 2005, and one of the significant lessons he noted was a
requirement for a “keen understanding of demographics as well as the cultural intricacies of the
Iraqi population.” When conducting operational planning, the 1CD also ensured that “the impact of
Western actions on a Middle East society were constantly at the forefront. Principles of
counterinsurgency had been implemented in certain areas around Iraq under several forward
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thinking commanders, but it was not until 2007 that those principles were applied theater-widein
response to the continued call for an additional asset geared towards cultural understanding, the first
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) deployed to Iraq in 2007, marking the first time anthropologists
were employed on the ground to conduct localized study of Iraqi culture. Initially, the Human
Terrain System (HTS) was a proof-of-concept program designed to meet requirements defined by
military field commanders returning from Iraq. The intent of the program was for cultural
anthropologists to advise brigade commanders on the local socio cultural environment, capture the
information to minimize impact of unit rotation, and for reach back support to cultural expertise.
Since inception, the program has been the subject of significant criticism. Most notably, the social
science community and the American Anthropological Association (AAA) have revived arguments
about the ethical use of anthropology in the prosecution war. In a statement on HTS in 2007, the
AAA opposed the program based on the conflict between the responsibilities of the anthropologists
to the people they study and the responsibilities to the U.S. military. Anthropologist Hugh
Gusterson voiced concerns with the program based on professional obligations to other
anthropologists and the field of anthropology, to not damage the ability to conduct future research,
to obligations to informants or subjects they study, and to rules for informed consent. The ethical
conflict over whether to support a war in any capacity is ultimately an individual decision, although
most in the anthropological community believe the decision must be guided by “the most basic
responsibility of the anthropologists to serve, rather than oppress or fight.

IMPORTANCE AND CHALLENGES OF HTA IN OPERATION ENDURING

FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM

18. The importance and challenges of human terrain analysis on operation enduring freedom and
iraqi freedom are as follows :
a. Analysis of human terrain analysis helped the troops to understand the ideological
difference, social values and norms ,practice culture and tradition in Iraq and Afghanistan
b. Understanding the Shia and Sunni communities rivalry in the region was near impossible
and wasn't implemented in the strategic planning making process before implication of human
terrain analysis in Iraq
c. Using human terrain analysis US troops were able to launch different combat and non
combat operation which was people friendly and were able to create positive attitude among the
local people of Afghanistan and Iran
d. Human terrain analysis also provide topographical information to the troops which is quite
essential for US troops
e. HTA has somehow full filled the sociocultural gap between the local civilians and US
troops as both side are found to be positive towards each other and has also developed the sense of
cooperation and mutual understanding.
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f. Human terrain analysis is more expensive and costly and even American army is
rethinking of implication of HTA .
g. Needs of the specialist of different field to conduct HTA and is very vast and complicated
h. Huge investment in uncertainty
i. Political division at home, ideology differences, physical danger, lack of consistent
access to local persons of US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.
j. Cultural gaps between the military and civilian academics working with the mission-
oriented military units.

FINDINGS

a) Planning was effective in producing a quick and decisive defeat of Iraqi military forces
yet ineffective in preparing for postwar operations.

b) Problems arose from the failure of the planning process to identify resource
requirements for the transition from combat to post-combat operations, as well as from the
failure to challenge assumptions about what postwar Iraq would look like.

c) Problems arose from the failure of the planning process to identify resource
requirements for the transition from combat to post-combat operations, as well as from the
failure to challenge assumptions about what postwar Iraq would look like.

d) Iraq's rapid collapse was due to a number of factors.

e) Strategic miscalculations on the part of Saddam Hussein led to deployments of Iraqi

forces to the north and east, leaving these forces in poor position to counter an attack from the
south.

f) Saddam was preoccupied with internal threats to his person as well as his regime,
leading him to shape his forces with an eye to forestalling coups rather than defending the
country.

g) Shortcomings in planning, leadership, command and control, coordination, battlefield

positioning, situational awareness, and training plagued the Iraqi forces and severely
diminished morale among troops.
h) The glaring weakness of the Iraqi forces limits the lessons that can be drawn from this
conflict.
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i) The authorities and procedures established to exercise command and control over
coalition and U.S. forces consisted of a combination of doctrinal and ad hoc constructs that
worked reasonably well throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

j) Situational awareness did not always go as well as it could have during Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM.

k) Battle damage assessment (BDA) — necessary to make the ground commander aware
of the effectiveness of the enemy about to be faced — often was not available to commanders
because the assets used to conduct BDA were given other, higher-priority tasks.

l) Sensor coverage of the battlespace was unprecedented, but did not alone translate into
situational awareness. Timely processing and dissemination are needed as well, as is
information at an appropriate level of resolution, to be useful to tactical commanders.

m) Postwar operations struggled to develop an approach to reconstructing Iraq.

n) Lack of sufficient prior planning for the peace contributed directly to the civil unrest that
followed once the war's major combat operations came to an end

o) The single most important failure in the postwar planning and execution process was the
failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath
of major combat operations.

p) Prewar planning assumptions and expectations were not seriously challenged, even as
postwar events began to indicate that most of those assumptions were invalid.

q) Deployments to the Gulf using the Request for Forces (RFF) process was more agile
than traditional deployment procedures, but had disadvantages as well.

r) Approval of each RFF at the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense level opened the
deployment process to micromanagement.

s) A new support concept called Distribution Based Logistics worked overall, but enc
ountered problems for all classes of supply other than fuel.

t) The United States will continue to need a balanced mix of land forces to accomplish a
broad range of future missions.

u) These forces will range from small, light special operations forces to large, heavily
armored and mechanized forces.
v) Urban combat is unavoidable when the United States has to occupy a country or region
and will require combined arms teams well supported by air forces.
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CONCLUSION

19. The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq pose unique challenges to DOD and VA.
Even as they continue to address the readjustment needs of OEF and OIF service members,
veterans, and their families, more work remains. The demands on the forces, the repeated
deployments, the shorter dwell times, the activation of parents, and the separation of families
have all resulted in unmet needs for many of those who serve.

RECOMMENDATIONS

a. This writing can be recommended to Nepal army to learn about the importance of the
human terrain analysis before and during the war time as well as in peace.

b. Government should emphasis on analyzing the socio cultural, physical ,economic situation
of the specific region before launching the projects also,

c. Not only in military aspects , but also in the projects n plan of the national level need to do
assessment of the region of influence.

(……………)

PSY. 24
LT. BIJAYA
LAMICHHANE
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