GR No. L-25843. July 25, 1974.

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

Civil law; Parent and child; The mother, as natural

guardian is preferred over the uncle in the
possession and administration of the minor’s
property.—In a dispute between the mother and the
uncle of a minor over the possession and administration
of the proceeds of an insurance policy belonging to the
child, the mother is entitled to a distinct preference in
view of Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. With the
added circumstance that the child stays with the mother,
not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal
care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the
strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption,
both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust
imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a
mother than in the case of an uncle.

Constitutional law; Powers of the State; State acting

as parens patriae will see to the best interest of the
child.—The judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending
suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his best interest. ... What is more, there is this
constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads:
“The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social
institution.” If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is
the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does
not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were
presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it
did.

1
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RlGHT OF DOMICILE;
LlBERTY; HABEAS CORpus; CONTEMPT.—One
hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the
segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of
Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila
and the chief of police of that city isolated from society
and then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. No law, order, or
regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or
the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands to change their domicile from Manila
to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus
was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of
Manila who was primarily responsible for the
deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to
comply with the order of the court.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The remedies of the unhappy victims
of official oppression are three: (1) Civil action; (2)
criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. A civil action was
never intended effectively and promptly to meet a
situation in which there is restraint of liberty. That the act
may be a crime and that the person may be proceeded
against is also no bar to the institution of habeas corpus
proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—These women, despite their being in
a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles,
but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.
4.ID.; ID.—The privilege of domicile is a principle often
protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in
American jurisprudence.
5.HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE.—The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
6.ID. ; PARTIES. — Where it is impossible for a party to
sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is
proper for the writ to be submitted by some person in his
behalf.
7.ID.; JURISDICTION.—It is a general rule of good
practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be
presented to the nearest judge of the Court of First
Instance.
8.ID. ; ID.—The writ of habeas corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippine Islands.
9.ID.; ID.—Whether the writ shall be made returnable
before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court
rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances.
10.ID.; RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY.—A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus
is restraint of liberty. The essential objects and purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.
11.ID.; ID.—The forcible taking of these women from
Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region,
deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint
of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released
or until they freely and truly waived this right.
12.ID.; ID.—The true principle should be that if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has
it in his power to obey the order of the court, and thus to
undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so.
13.ID.; ID.—Even if the party to whom the writ is
addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ, is no reason
why the writ should not issue.
14.ID. ; ID.—The place of confinement is not important
to the relief if the guilty party is within the reach of
process so that by the power of the court he can be
compelled to release his grasp.
15.ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT.—For respondents
to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of habeas
corpus, three courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these
,persons could not safely be brought before the Court; or
(3) they could have. presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be
present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.)
16.CONTEMPT OF COURT.—The power to punish for
contempt of court should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. . Only
occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in
order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail.
2
17.ID.—When one is commanded to produce a certain
person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid
excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge
the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order
him either imprisoned or fined.

18.ID.—An officer's failure to produce the body of a

person in obedience to a writ -of habeas corpus, when
he has power to do so, is contempt committed in the
face of the court.

19.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A

GOVERNMENT OF LAWS.—The Government of the
Philippine Islands is a. government of laws. The court
will assist in retaining it as a government of laws and not
of men.

20.ID, ; ID.—No official, however high, is above the law.

21.ID.; ID.—The courts are the forum which functionate

to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors.

3
[GR No. L-1648. August 17, 1949]

PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and

LEOPOLDO SYQUIA, petitioners, vs. NATIVIDAD
ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of
Manila, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge of Court of
First Instance of Manila, GEORGE F. MOORE ET AL.,
respondents.

1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; CLAIM OP TITLE AND

POSSESSION OF PKOPERTY BY PRIVATE CITIZEN;
AGAINST OFPICERS AND AGENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT.—A private citizen claiming title and
right of possession of a certain property may, to recover
possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers
and agents of the Government who are said to be
illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing
so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for
the Government, and the courts may entertain such a
suit although the Government itself is not included as a
party-defendant.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF JUDGMENT WILL INVOLVE

FINANCIAL LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT, SUIT
CANNOT PROSPER OR BE ENTERTAINED EXCEPT
WITH GOVERNMENT'S CONSENT.—But where the
judgment in the suit by the private citizen against the
officers and agents of the ,government would result not
only in the recovery of possession of property in favor of
said citizen but alsp in a charge against or financial
liability to the Government, then the suit should be
regarded as one against the Government itself, and,
consequently, it cannot prosper or be entertained by
courts except with the consent of said government,

3. ID.; ID.; SUIT BY CITIZEN AGAINST FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT WITHOUT LATTER'S CONSENT;
COURTS LACK OF JURISDICTION.—This is not only a
case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government
without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an
action against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more obvious the
lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.

4
G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003.*
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
International Law; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations; Diplomatic Missions; Function;
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the
functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and
large, the representation of the interests of the
sending state and promoting friendly relations with
the receiving state.—The Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old
customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18
April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable.
Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the
peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment
of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the
person of the herald in time of war and the person of the
diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held
sacrosanct.By the end of the 16th century, when the
earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the
inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a
rule of customary international law, Traditionally, the
exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was
undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the
preeminent embodiment of the state he represented,
and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted
with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would
wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in
the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a
diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna
Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission
involve, by and large, the representation of the interests
of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with
the receiving state.
Same; Same; Same; Heads of diplomatic missions,
classified.—The Convention lists the classes of heads
of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or
nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys,
ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of
states; and (c) charges d’ affairs accredited to the
ministers of foreign affairs.Comprising the “staff of the
(diplomatic) mission” are the diplomatic staff, the
administrative staff and the technical and service staff.
Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the
diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the
administrative, technical and service staff of the mission,
are accorded diplomatic rank.
Same; same; Same; Diplomatic Immunity; Only
“diplomatic agents”, under the terms of the
Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic
immunity from civil and criminal suits.—Only
“diplomatic agents,” under the terms of the Convention,
are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil
and criminal suits. The Convention defines “diplomatic
agents” as the heads of missions or members of the
diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same
privileges from all others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeed, the main
yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of
whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature.—It might bear stressing that even consuls, who
represent their respective states in concerns of
commerce and navigation and perform certain
administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance
of passports and visas, authentication of documents,
and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the
traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded
diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not
charged with the duty of representing their states in
political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to
immunity is the determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Suing a representative of
a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself—the proscription is not accorded for the
benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose
service he is, under the maxim—par in parem, non
habet imperium.—The precept that a State cannot be
sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing
rule of customary international law then closely identified
with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from
suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made
to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or
his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in
its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be
barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit
without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under
the maxim—par in parem, non habet imperium—that all
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception; The doctrine
of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
—(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and
agents of the government is removed the moment they
are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a
well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
5
damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority and jurisdiction.

6
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107. February 23, 1995.*
ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO
BERADOR, FLORENTINO ESTOBIO, MARCELINO
MATURAN, FRAEN BALIBAG, CARMELITO GAJOL,
DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL,
SATURNINO LASCO, RAMON LOYOLA, JOSENIANO
B. ESPINA, all represented by MARIANO R. ESPINA,
and MARIANO R. ESPINA, petitioners, vs. UNITED
NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE)
represented by its operations manager, DR.
KYRIACOS LOUCA, OSCAR N. ABELLA, LEON G.
GONZAGA, JR., MUSIB M. BUAT, Commissioners of
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth
Division, Cagayan de Oro City and IRVING PETILLA,
Labor Arbiter of Butuan City, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Certiorari as a special civil
action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent
tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its
assigned errors.—Article 223 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended, provides that decisions of the
NLRC are final and executory. Thus, they may only be
questioned through certiorari as a special civil action
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Ordinarily,
certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a
motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct
its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 37 [1993]). In the case at
bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for
reconsideration is fatal to the instant petition. Moreover,
the petition lacks any explanation for such omission,
which may merit its being considered as falling under the
recognized exceptions to the necessity of filing such
motion.
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of Immunity; The
Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of
immunity granted to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies.—As a matter of state policy as
expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine
Government adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II., Sec. 2).
Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the
Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of
immunity granted to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and
effect of law.
Same; Same; The reason behind the grant of
privileges and immunities to international
organizations, its officials and functionaries is to
secure them legal and practical independence in
fulfilling their duties.—We recognize the growth of
international organizations dedicated to specific
universal endeavors, such as health, agriculture, science
and technology and environment. It is not surprising that
their existence has evolved into the concept of
international immunities. The reason behind the grant of
privileges and immunities to international organizations,
its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and
practical independence in fulfilling their duties (Jenks,
International Immunities 17 [1961]). Immunity is
necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their
functions. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with
international practice, from political pressure or control
by the host country to the prejudice of member States of
the organization, and to ensure the unhampered
performance of their functions" (International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
Same; Same; There is no conflict between the
constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights
of workers and to promote their welfare, and the
grant of immunity to international organizations.—In
the International Catholic Migration Commission case,
we held that there is no conflict between the
constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of
workers and to promote their welfare, and the grant of
immunity to international organizations. Clauses on
jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters
of international organizations to guarantee the smooth
discharge of their functions.
Same; Same; The issue whether an international
organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a
"political question" and such determination by the
executive branch is conclusive on the courts and
quasi-judicial agencies.—The diplomatic immunity of
private respondent was sufficiently established by the
letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing
and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in
accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine
Government was a party. The issue whether an
international organization is entitled to diplomatic
immunity is a "political question" and such determination
by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and
quasi-judicial agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto
U. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994;
International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja,
supra).
Same; Same; Courts can only assume jurisdiction
over private respondent if it expressly waived its
immunity.—Our courts can only assume jurisdiction
over private respondent if it expressly waived its
immunity, which is not so in the case at bench
(Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec.
4).
7
G.R. No. 106483.May 22, 1995.*

ERNESTO L. CALLADO, petitioner, vs.

INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
respondent.

International Law; Immunity From Suits; The IRRI is

immune from suit.—IRRI’s immunity from suit is
undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3
provides: “Article 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The
Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that
immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-
General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.”

Same; Same; A categorical recognition by the

Executive Branch that the IRRI enjoys immunities
accorded to international organizations is a
determination which is considered a political
question conclusive upon the Courts.—In the case of
International Catholic Migration Commission v. Hon.
Calleja, et al. and Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa
IRRI v. Secretary of Labor and Employment and IRRI,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the aforequoted
law. After the Court noted the letter of the Acting
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Labor
dated June 17, 1987, where the immunity of IRRI from
the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and
Employment was sustained, the Court stated that this
opinion constituted “a categorical recognition by the
Executive Branch of the Government that x x x IRRI
enjoy(s) immunities accorded to international
organizations, which determination has been held to be
a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order
not to embarrass a political department of Government.”

Same; Same; An express waiver by the IRRI’s

Director-General is the only way by which the IRRI
may relinquish or abandon its immunity.—The grant
of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an
express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by
which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

Same; Same; A memorandum meant for internal

circulation within the IRRI cannot be considered as
an express waiver of diplomatic immunity.—We
agree with private respondent IRRI that this
memorandum cannot, by any stretch of the imagination,
be considered the express waiver by the Director-
General. The memorandum, issued by the former
Director-General to a now-defunct division of the IRRI,
was meant for internal circulation and not as a pledge of
waiver in all cases arising from dismissal of employees.
Moreover, the IRRI’s letter to the Labor Arbiter in the
case at bench made in 1991 declaring that it has no
intention of waiving its immunity, at the very least,
supplants any pronouncement of alleged waiver issued
in previous cases.

8
G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000.*
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA,
DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T.
BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Section 78 of
the Revised Forestry Code makes mere possession
of timber or other forest products without the
accompanying legal documents unlawful and
punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime
of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the
Revised Penal Code.—This provision makes mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the
accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable
with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as
prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were
loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure.
But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess
and transport said load of forest products was duly
presented. These products, in turn, were deemed
illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation
of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code,
although as found by the trial court, the persons
responsible for said violation were not the ones charged
by the public prosecutor.
Same; Same; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure;
Actions; Replevin; It would be absurd to require a
confiscation order or notice and hearing before a
seizure could be effected where the vehicle owner
and his driver immediately went to court and applied
for a writ of replevin.—Note further that petitioners’
failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was
justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report
of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice
to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day
following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of
the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles
from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of
the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for
the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to
report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private
respondents immediately went to court and applied for a
writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their
load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of
the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require
a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said
seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there was a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure of the vehicles used in transporting illegally
cut timber was in accordance with law, the seized
vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis,
hence they could not be subject to an action for
replevin.—Since there was a violation of the Revised
Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with
law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly
deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of
the law, and not otherwise.
Same; Same; A property that is validly deposited in
custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin
suit.—Note that property that is validly deposited in
custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In
Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated
further: “. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly
used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel
earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers
of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are
implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law
otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture
proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple
devise of a writ of replevin . . .”
Same; Constitutional Law; State Immunity; A suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in
effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to
hold the State ultimately liable—thus, a suit against
officers who represent the DENR is a suit against the
State and cannot prosper without the States
consent.—Well established is the doctrine that the State
may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against
a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit
against the State if its purpose is to hold the State
ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to
public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to
activities within the scope of their authority in good faith
and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the
present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are
clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the
seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their
duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so
within the limits of their authority. There was no malice
nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the
petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the
State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies; Exhaustion must be raised at the earliest
time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion
to dismiss, otherwise such ground for dismissal
would be deemed waived.—Given the circumstances
in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We
9
ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the
earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion
to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground
for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court
could take cognizance of the case and try it.

10
[GR No. L-9990. September 30, 1957]

ENRIQUE J. L. Ruiz and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their

behalf and as minority stockholders of the Allied
Technologists, Inc., plaintiffs and appellants, vs.
HON. SOTERO B. CABAHUG, Secretary of National
Defense, Col. NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of the
Engineer Group, Office of the Secretary of National
Defense, THE FINANCE OFFICER of the Department
of National Defense, the AUDITOR of the Department
of the National Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and
ALLIED TECHNOLOGISTS, INC., defendants and
appellees.

ACTION; PUBLIC OFFICERS; WHEN SUIT is NOT

ONE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.—Where the facts
and circumstances show that the Government does not
any longer have interest in the subject matter of the
action which the defendants-officials have retained and
refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or entity
to which it should be paid, and plaintiffs do not seek to
sue the Government to require it to pay the amount or
involve it in the litigation, Held: That the suit is not one
against the Government or a claim against it, but one
against the officials to compel them to act in accordance
with the rights to be established by the contending
architects, or to prevent them from making payment and
recognition until the contending architects have
established their respective rights and interests in the
funds retained and in the credit for the work done.

11
G.R. No. L-16524 June 30, 1964

FRANCISCO S. OLIZON, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-
appellant.

1. TAXATION; PERIOD FOR PRESCRIPTION OF

ACTION FOR REFUND OF TAX NOT PROVIDED FOR
IN TAX CODE AND COLLECTED ERRONEOUSLY IS
SIX YEARS. — An action for refund of a tax not
provided for in the tax code and paid by reason of a
mistake in the interpretation of a law, is in the nature of
solutio indebiti, and, consequently, the law regarding
prescription applicable thereto is Article 1145 (2) of the
New Civil Code providing six years from the date of
payment as the prescriptive period for such action.

2. ID.; REFUND OF TAX: REFUNDING OFFICE

SHOULD NOT BE TOO TECHNICAL. — Where the
government office (the Central Bank in the case at bar)
admits its error in collecting the tax sought to be
refunded and accepts the timeliness of the suit, it ought
not to be too technical, but, on the contrary, it should
earnestly endeavor to remove the technicalities that
might stand in the way of prompt refund.

3. ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST CENTRAL BANK IS

NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE. — A suit brought
against the Central Bank an entity authorized by its
charter to sue and be sued, is not a suit against the
State without its consent.

12
[GR No. L-15751. January 28, 1961]

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and

MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners, vs. THE BUREAU
OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU),
PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA,
PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN,
respondents.

1.JURISDICTION; FUNCTIONS OF BUREAU OF

PRINTING NOT EXCLUSIVELY PROPRIETARY IN
NATURE; COURT OF INDUSTRAL RELATIONS
WlTHOUT JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE BROUGHT AGAINST THE BUREAU.—The
Bureau of Printing is primarily a service bureau and is
not -engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary
profit, Although it receives outside jobs and many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working
days and on holidays, these facts do not justify the
conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary
in nature." Hence, the Court of Industrial Relations is
without jurisdiction to hear and determine complaints for
unfair labor practice filed against the Bureau of Printing.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SUITS AGAINST THE

STATE; BUREAU OF PRINTING NOT SUBJECT TO
SUIT WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.—As an office of the
Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its objection. (Angat
River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers'
Union, et al., 102 Phil., 789.)

13
GR No. L-23139. December 17, 1966.
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-
appellant, vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
Pleading and practice; Parties; Constitutional law;
Arrastre; Bureau of Customs and Customs Arrastre
Service cannot be sued.—A defendant in a civil suit
must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3)
an entity authorized by law to be sued. The Bureau of
Customs and (a fortiori) the Customs Arrastre Service
are not persons. They are merely parts of the machinery
of Government. The Customs Arrastre Service is a unit
of the Bureau of Customs, set up under Customs
Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962. It
follows that they cannot be sued as natural or juridical
persons.
Same; Arrastre; Its nature.—The arrastre service is a
proprietary or nongovernmental function.
Same; Actions; Performance by a non-corporate
governmental entity of a proprietary function does
not make it suable.—The fact that a noncorporate
government entity performs a function proprietary in
nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If
said non-governmental function is undertaken as an
incident to its governmental functions, there is no waiver
thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to
such government entity (Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of
Printing Employees Association, L-15751, Jan. 28,
1961).
itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the end
should not be denied as to the necessary means to that
end.
Same; Constitutional law; State cannot be sued
without its consent.—Regardless of the merits of the
claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public
policy, cannot be sued without its consent. The Bureau
of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the
national government in the operations of the arrastre
service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as
a necessary incident of its prime government function, is
immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
Same; Strict construction of statutory provisions
waiving State immunity from suit.—Statutory
provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly
construed and waiver of immunity, being in derogation of
sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred.
Same; Remedy of consignee in case Customs
Arrastre Service does not deliver all the landed
cargo.—Where the Customs Arrastre Service did not
deliver all the landed cargo to the consignee, the latter's
remedy is to file a money claim with the General Auditing
Office pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327.

Same; Tariff and Customs Code; Administrative law;

Arrastre service is a necessary incident to the
functions of the Bureau of Customs.—The Bureau of
Customs has no personality of its own apart from that of
the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful
revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and
customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties (Sec.
602, Rep. Act No. 1937). To this function, arrastre
service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons
said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed
and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship
agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being
imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff
Law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that
the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually
landed. And this checking up requires that the landed
merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable
place in the customs premises to enable said customs
officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
Although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
engaging in the same does not necessarily render said
Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform
its governmental function without necessarily exposing

14
GR No. L-30044. December 19, 1973.*

LORENZO SAYSON, as Highway Auditor, Bureau of

Public Highways, Cebu First Engineering District;
CORNELIO FORNIER, as Regional Supervising
Auditor, Eastern Visayas Region; ASTERIO,
BUQUERON, ADVENTOR FERNANDEZ, MANUEL S.
LEPATAN, RAMON QUIRANTE, and TEODULFO
REGIS, petitioners, vs. FELIPE SINGSON, as sole
owner and proprietor of Singkier Motor Service,
respondent.

Constitutional law; State immunity; Mandamus;

Action against the government auditors to approve
payment to petitioner is a suit against the State and
may not prosper without the latter’s consent.—
Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to
compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for
payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot
prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the
consent of the State * * *. In other words, the respondent
should have filed his claim with the General Auditing
Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 * * * which
prescribe the conditions under which money claim
against the government may be filed

15
GR No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public
Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
defendants-appellees.

Political law; Immunity of State from suit; Exception.

—Where the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through
the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

Same; Same; Same; Reason for exception.—The

doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure
indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of
the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender
of the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed,
may it “have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use
defined in the judgment.”

Same; Relief available to aggrieved owner; Just

compensation.—As registered owner, she could bring
an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at anytime because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of
possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now
and has been used for road purposes, the only relief
available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine the due compensation for the
land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the
time of the taking.

16
[GR No. 11154. March 21, 1916,]

E. MERRITT, plaintiff and appellant, vs.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
defendant and appellant.

1.DAMAGES; MEASURE OF.—Where the evidence

shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for six
months it is an error to restrict the damages to a shorter
period during which he was confined in the hospital.

2.SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE

TO BE SUED; CONSTRUCTION.—The Government of
the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the
federal and state governments of the United States" the
decisions of the high courts of that country may be used
in determining the scope and purpose of a special
statute.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.—The state not being liable to suit except

by its express consent, an Act abrogating that immunity
will be strictly construed.

4.ID.; ID. ; ID.—An act permitting a suit against the state

gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless it is
clearly expressed in the act.

5.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS;

LlABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS
OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES.—The
Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for
the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees
when they are acting as special agents within. the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a
special agent.

17
GR No. L-35645. May 22, 1985.*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E,
GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V.M. RUIZ, Presiding
Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal
and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
Actions; Public Corporations; Constitutional Law;
Contracts; In suits against a foreign government, a
distinction must he made between acts jure imperil
and acts jure gestionis. As to the former, the State
immunity prevails.—The traditional rule of State
immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule
is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules
of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of
states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them—between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in
the United States, the United Kingdom and other states
in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago,
Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984]).
Judgments; An obiter has no value as an imperative
authority.—It can thus be seen that the statement in
respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was
purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no
value as an imperative authority.
Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed
the acceptance of a bid of a private company for the
repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is
deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived
the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and
descended to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its consent
to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of entering
into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Military Bases; Treaties;
The majority opinion seems to mock the joint
statement of Pres. Marcos and Vice-President
Mondale that Philippine sovereignty extends to U.S.
bases here.—The majority opinion seems to mock the
provision of paragraph 1 of the joint statement of
President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the
United States dated May 4, 1978 that “the United States
re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty extends over the
bases and that Its base shall be under the command of a
Philippine Base Commander,” which is supposed to
underscore the joint Communique of President Marcos
and U.S. President Ford of December 7, 1975, under
which “they affirm that sovereign equality, territorial
integrity and political independence of all States are
fundamental principles which both countries
scrupulously respect; and that “they confirm that mutual
respect for the dignity of each nation shall characterize
their friendship as well as the alliance between their two
countries.”

Actions; Public Corporations; Constitutional Law;

Contracts; States may be sued only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions.
Infrastructure projects of U.S. Naval Base in Subic
involve governmental functions.—The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts, It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

Actions; Public Corporations; Contracts; After U.S.
Naval authorities accepted the bid for repair of the
wharves at Subic Bay Naval Base, it waived the
mantle of State immunity from suits.—When the U.S.

18
G.R. No. 76607. February 26, 1990.*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M.
SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners, vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge,
Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City,
ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C.
TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.
Political Law; State Immunity from Suit; When the
government enters into a contract, it is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting
party, and divested of its sovereign immunity from
suit with its implied consent.—The general law
waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act
No. 3083, under which the Philippine government
“consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.” In Merritt v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a
person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit
with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the
government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim. The above rules are subject to
qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will
of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted
statute. We have held that not all contracts entered into
by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign
and proprietary acts. As for the filing of a complaint by
the government, suability will result only where the
government is claiming affirmative relief from the
defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Rule on waiver, not applicable
when the contract entered into involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity.— There is no
question that the United States of America, like any
other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the
contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling
in United States of America v. Ruiz, where the
transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the
wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this
was a clearly governmental function, we held that the
contract did not operate to divest the United States of its
sovereign immunity from suit.
Same; Same; Same; Officers acting in their official
capacity cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal which has not given its
consent to be sued.—It is clear from a study of the
records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named
petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their
official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against the complainant and thereafter
testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were
in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators and were charged precisely with the
function of preventing the distribution, possession and
use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of
such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they
were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when
they apprehended and later testified against the
complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as
agents of the United States, they cannot be directly im-
pleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has
not given its consent to be sued. As we observed in
Sanders v. Veridiano: Given the official character of the
above-described letters, we have to conclude that the
petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers
of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their
authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners
personally, that is responsible for their acts.
Same; Same; Express waiver of immunity cannot be
made by a mere counsel of the government but must
be effected through a duly enacted statute.—We
reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer
filed by the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff
Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by
the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we
noted in Republic v. Purisima, express waiver of
immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the
government but must be effected through a duly-enacted
statute. Neither does such answer come under the
implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.
Same; Same; By entering into an employment
contract with Geno-ve in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of
its sovereign immunity from suit.—From these
circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant
services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of
the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the
United States government in its proprietary capacity.
Such services are not extended to the American
servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the
Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it
appear that they are exclusively offered to these
servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they
are available to the general public as well, including the
tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to
visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing
themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all
other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the
prices are conced-edly reasonable and relatively low,
such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. The
consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot
invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove.
Such defense will not prosper even if it be established
19
that they were acting as agents of the United States
when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For
that matter, not even the United States government itself
can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering
into the employment contract with Genove in the
discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly
divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.

20
G.R. No. 129406. March 6, 2006.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, respondents.
Certiorari; Courts; Sandiganbayan; Certiorari will
issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment, upon showing that the respondent
tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.—For
sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its
findings, which does not seem to be in this case, it is a
well-settled rule of jurisprudence that certiorari will issue
only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Corollarily, errors of procedure or mistakes in
the court’s findings and conclusions are beyond the
corrective hand of certiorari. The extraordinary writ of
certiorari may be availed only upon a showing, in the
minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases;
“Grave Abuse of Discretion” connotes capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction.—The term “grave
abuse of discretion” connotes capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility.
party, it thereby descends to the level of a private
individual and thus opens itself to whatever counter-
claims or defenses the latter may have against it.
Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil
Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from
suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner
Republic cannot set up its immunity against private
respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case.
Same; Same; By entering into a Compromise
Agreement with private respondent Benedicto,
petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its
immunity from suit and placed itself in the same
level of its adversary.—By entering into a Compromise
Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner
Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit
and placed itself in the same level of its adversary.
When the State enters into contract, through its officers
or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose
and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority,
whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights
and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued
even without its express consent, precisely because by
entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the
level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from
the very act of entering into such contract, breach of
which on its part gives the corresponding right to the
other party to the agreement.

Constitutional Law; Immunity from Suit; When the

State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the
initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby
descends to the level of a private individual and thus
opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses
the latter may have against it.—In a last-ditch attempt
to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the
PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued, the
order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares
would fix monetary liability on a government agency,
thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to
satisfy the judgment claim. But, as private respondent
Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take
stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity
principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as
in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is
no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit
cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence
teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized
officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private

21
 G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO,
and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF
POWERS.—The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere.
2.ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES.—
But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers
are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of
various departments of government. For example, the
Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that his assent is required
in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the
further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve
it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case
may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special
session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive
in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other
than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their
support, the National Assembly exercises to a certain
extent control over the judicial department. The
Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
3.ID.; ID. ; ID. ; JUDICIARY THE ONLY
CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER TO ALLOCATE
CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES.—But in the main,
the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE
JUDICIARY is GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BY
CLEAR IMPLICATION.—As any human production, our
Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function
as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended, it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for,
then, the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in the
Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express
constitu tional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT is MEANT BY "JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY".—The Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself
has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as
the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO
ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR
EXPEDIENCY OF LEGISLATION.—Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
22
cantroversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments
not only because the Legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF
PALLADIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LlBERTY;
SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF
FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS.—But much as we
might postulate on the internal checks of power provided
in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be
remembered that, in the language of James Madison,
the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty * * * the people who are authors of
this blessing must also be its guardians * * * their eyes
must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce * *
* aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the
last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in the
consultation rooms and court chambers.
8.ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE
AMERICAN TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT.—Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the
framers of our Constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries
which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions
prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to
interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a
recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in
the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to
assume what is logically their function. For instance, the
Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that
courts shall have no power to examine the validity of
statutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts
have assumed this power. This is true in Norway,
Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakía (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the
validity of ordinary laws.
9.ID. ; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION.—The nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. If the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, a void would be created in
our constitutional system which may in the long run
prove destructive of the entire framework. Natura
vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and
authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of deter mining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
10.ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION;
CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO BE THE SOLE
JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE
ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.—The
original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the
rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its members",
was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each
House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, * * *." The Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified
this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as
follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members, * *
*" apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House
of the Legislature over the particular cases therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize
this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and
complete". (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte
and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
11.ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL
INSTANCES.—The transfer of the power of determining
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the Legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no
means a mere experiment in the science of government.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England
solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members
by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's
Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota
23
in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose.
Having proved successful, the practice has become
imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary
Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879
[42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and. Illegal Practices
Prevention Act 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring
Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws
of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the
Dominion of Canada, election contests which were
originally heard by the Committee of the House of
Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise,
in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests
which were originally determined by each house, are
since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the
organic law provides that all protests against the election
of members of the Upper House of Diet are to be
resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22
of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of
Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution
of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest
the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or
National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the
purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution
of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the
Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February
29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian
Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an
Electoral Commission.
12.ID. ; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED
STATES.—The "creation of an Electoral Commission
whose membership is recruited both from the legislature
and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United
States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a
dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by
each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution
made no adequate provision for such a contingency,
Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United
States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229),
creating a special Electoral Commission composed of
five members elected by the Senate, five members
elected by the House of Representatives, and five
justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be
selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision
of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by
the two houses voting separately. Although there is not
much moral lesson to be derived from the experience of
America in this regard, the experiment has at least
abiding historical interest.
13.ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
COSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE HlSTORY
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD; ELECTORAL
COMMISSION is THE EXPRESSION OF THE WlSDOM
AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE.—The
members of the Constitutional Convention who framed
our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in
years and experience. To be sure, many of them were
familiar with the history and political development of
other countries of the world. When, therefore, they
deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a
constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive
function of passing upon and determining the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light
of their own experience but also having in view the
experience of other enlightened peoples of the world.
The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed
to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention
to its creation, the plan was approved" by that body by a
vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that,
upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom
and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln,
First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.) '
14.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN
ITS TOTALITY POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY
BY THE LEGISLATURE OVER THE CONTESTED
ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS TO AN
INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL.—From
the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all
the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need
of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people acting
through their delegates to the Convention to provide for
this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this
end in view, a composite body in which both the majority
and minority parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and
further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
15.ID. ; ID. ; lD.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION is
AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION
ALTHOUGH FOR PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION
IT is CLOSER TO THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
THAN TO ANY OTHER.—The Electoral Commission is
a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary
authority in the performance and execution of the limited
and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of
government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when
acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative
department than to any other. The location of the
provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission
under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also
significant in that it is constituted by a majority of
24
members of the Legislature. But it is a body separate
from and independent of the Legislature.
16.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; GRANT OF POWER TO THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS
COMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED AS IF IT HAD
REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE.—
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the Legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in
the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1;
State vs. Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If
the power claimed for the National Assembly to regulate
the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off
the power of the Electoral Commission to lay down a
period within which protest should be filed were
conceded, the grant of power to the commission would
be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a case
would be invested with the power to determine contested
cases involving the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly but subject at
all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from
the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of
powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the
bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to,
but in reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and wherever the National
Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably
lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
17.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE
INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED
ALSO IN THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY
NECESSARY IMPLICATION.—The creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be
filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power isconferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or
the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138,
139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
18.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO
ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANT OF POWER.—The
possibility of abuse is not an argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not
susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been committed
in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not
judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary
processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the
government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. The people in creating the Electoral
Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in
the exclusive determination of the specified cases
assigned to it, as it has given to the Supreme Court in
the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the
Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each
constitutional organ working within its own particular
sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing
the great ends for which they were created by the
sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given
instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human
institutions. From the fact that the Electoral Commission
may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate
power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate
cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
19.ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATIONS.—The Commonwealth Government
was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date
the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned
in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The
new National Assembly convened on November 25, of
that year, and the resolution confirming the election of
the petitioner was approved by that body on December
3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent against
the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of
the same year. The pleadings do not show when the
Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does
appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protests. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met;
25
neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of
the National Assembly attached to the record of this
case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices
of the Supreme Court and the six members of the
National Assembly constituting the Electoral
Commission were respectively designated only on
December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly confirming nonprotested elections of
members of the National Assembly had the effect of
limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests,
the result would be that the National Assembly—on the
hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of
regulation in such cases—had already barred the
presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission
had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the
mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to
its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result
was not and could not have been contemplated, and
should be avoided.
20.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY CAN NOT DEPRIVE THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION OF ITS AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TlME
WITHIN WHICH- PROTESTS AGAINST THE
ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD
BE FILED.—Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming the election of members against whom no
protests has been filed at the time of its passage on
December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While
there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at
the time the power to decide election contests was still
lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the
Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the
Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for
the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the returns of its members against
whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of
any member is not required by the Constitution before
he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board
of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a
seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible
to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the
National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
21.ID. ; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE
JONES LAW.—Under the practice prevailing when the
Jones Law was still in force, each House of the
Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests
against the election of any of its members should be
filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the
Jones Law making each House the sole judge of the
election, returns and qualifications of its members, as
well as by a law (sec. 478, Act !No. 3387) empowering
each House respectively to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contest \a the election of
members of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after
the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had
already expired, each House passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members
against whose election no protest had been filed within
the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off
the filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs.
Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature,
Record—First Period, p. 89; Urgello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs.
Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record—
First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record—
First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus
[Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record—First
Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution
has expressly repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act
No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been
impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the
power to determine all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe
regulations for the exercise of that power. There was
thus no law nor constitutional provision which authorized
the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed
on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests
against the election of its members. And what the
National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do
by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
26
G.R. No. 166715             August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)
OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.
GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,  vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as
Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO
D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents.
Judicial Review; A constitutional question is
ripe for adjudication when the governmental act
being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.—An actual case or
controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
adjudication. A closely related requirement is ripeness,
that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a
constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the
governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be ripe for
judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal
stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself
that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the
Court.
Same; Where an action of the legislative
branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute.—This
notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of
the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave
nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And
where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Public Officers; Public Accountability; Public
office is a public trust—it must be discharged by its
holder not for his own personal gain but for the
benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust.—
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its
holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of
the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding
accountability and service with responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government
officials and employees have the duty to be responsive
to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Same; Presumption of Regularity; The
presumption of regularity enjoyed by public officers
in the performance of their duties necessarily
obtains in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and Bureau of Customs (BOC) officials and
employees.—Public officers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties. This
presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and
BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the
basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to
exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-
generation capability and collection. The presumption is
disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it.
It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in
advance (as petitioners would have the Court do)
specially in this case where it is an underlying principle
to advance a declared public policy.
Same; Attrition Act of 2005 (R.A. No. 9335);
Judicial Review; To invalidate RA 9335 based on
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not
only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.—A law enacted by
Congress enjoys the strong presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335
based on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront
to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it
but also of the executive which approved it.
Same; Same; A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is
not anathema to the concept of public account-
ability.—Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless,
public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary
and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact,
it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry,
efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving
government personnel.
Same; Same; Equal Protection; Equality
guaranteed under the equal protection clause is
equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated—it is equality among
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who
are classified based on substantial differences in
relation to the object to be accomplished.—Equality
guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality
under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be
accomplished. When things or persons are different in
fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law
differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), this Court declared: The
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order
to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected
27
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does
not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.
Same; Same; Same; The equal protection
clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary; Since the subject of
the law is the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC), the incentives
and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically
pertain to the said agencies.—The equal protection
clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335,
its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided
in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function
of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
Delegation of Powers; Test; A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and lays
down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.—Two tests
determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:
(1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard
test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient,
the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Same; Civil Service; Security of Tenure;
Inefficiency; Incompetence; The guarantee of
security of tenure only means that an employee
cannot be dismissed from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and only after due
process is accorded the employee; RA 9335 lays
down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least
7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection, a standard
analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for
disciplinary action under civil service laws.—RA
9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee
of security of tenure only means that an employee
cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other
than those provided by law and only after due process is
accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335, it lays
down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least
7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection. This standard is
analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary
action under civil service laws. The action for removal is
also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations
and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process. At any rate, this Court has recognized the
following as sufficient standards: “public interest,”
“justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare”
and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.
Separation of Powers; Legislative Veto;
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per
se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement
laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers, but to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress—it may not vest itself, any
of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power, and, when it exercises
its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures”
specified under the Constitution, including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment;
Any post-enactment congressional measure should
be limited to scrutiny and investigation—any action
or step beyond that will undermine the separation of
powers guaranteed by the Constitution.—It is clear
that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per
se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws
nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent
in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents
the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
28
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints
on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees
or its members with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures” specified under the
Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of
laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment
congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny
based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and
be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining
to their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond
that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legislative
veto is a statutory provision requiring the President
or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve
or disapprove such regulations before they take
effect; Congress has two options when enacting
legislation to define national policy within the broad
horizons of its legislative competence—it can itself
formulate the details or it can assign to the
executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with
those standards.—Legislative veto is a statutory
provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or
“power” to approve or disapprove such regulations
before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the
form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach
a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by
law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes
the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of
power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to
define national policy within the broad horizons of its
legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details
or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility
for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity
with those standards. In the latter case, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for
the executive branch or the concerned administrative
agency when it formulates rules and regulations
implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary
rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).
Congress; Statutes; Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass
upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance
of powers established by the Constitution—in
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the
Implementing Rules and Regulations based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with
the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated
judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested
in this Court by the Constitution.—Administrative
regulations enacted by administrative agencies to
implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted
to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been
written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force
and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with
finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an
overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting
them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the
Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether
or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Principle of Bicameralism;
Presentment Clause; The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval
by Congress as a condition for their effectivity
violates the cardinal constitutional principles of
bicameralism and the rule on presentment; A valid
exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers—it can be exercised neither solely by one
of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or
both chambers.—The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the
cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the
rule on presentment. x x x Legislative power (or the
power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the
Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid
exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely
by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either
or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto
and a congressional committee legislative veto are
invalid.
29
 Same; Same; Same; Every bill passed by
Congress must be presented to the President for
approval or veto and in the absence of presentment
to the President, no bill passed by Congress can
become a law.—Every bill passed by Congress must be
presented to the President for approval or veto. In the
absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed
by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-
making under the Constitution is a joint act of the
Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that
legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of
law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even
if approved by both chambers of Congress.
Same; Same; Publication; Subject to the
indispensable requisite of publication under the due
process clause, the determination as to when a law
takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress—
as such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may
be executed and the executive branch acquires the
duties and powers to execute the said law.—Where
Congress delegates the formulation of rules to
implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient
standards established in the said law, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be
deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of
the statute that legal rights and obligations become
available to those entitled by the language of the statute.
Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication
under the due process clause, the determination as to
when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a
law may be executed and the executive branch acquires
the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before
that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of
the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.
Same; Same; Same; From the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional.—From the moment the
law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive
or ruling made by the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the law.
Same; Statutes; Partial Unconstitutionality;
Separability Clause; The general rule is that where
part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and
be enforced; The presence of a separability clause in
a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity of
the statute.—In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy, 282 SCRA 361 (1997), the Court laid down the
following rules: The general rule is that where part of a
statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from
the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of
a separability clause in a statute creates the
presumption that the legislature intended separability,
rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this
result, the valid portion must be so far independent of
the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had
supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the
other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. x x x The exception to the general rule
is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each
other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the
rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent,
conditional, or connected with one another, the
legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a
whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void,
in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must fall with them.
Administrative Law; To be effective,
administrative rules and regulations must be
published in full if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.—To be effective, administrative rules and
regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May
30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation and
became effective 15 days thereafter. Until and unless
the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and
effective even without the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
30
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M.
VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO,
Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE
LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,
Respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual Case or
Controversy; No question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the Court unless
there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.―The prevailing
rule in constitutional litigation is that no question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the
Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of
these requisites, case law states that the first two are the
most important and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or
controversy is one which ― involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.―By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates
only when there is an actual case or controversy. This is
embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which pertinently states that “[j]udicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable x x x.” Jurisprudence
provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
“involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution
as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.” In other words, “[t]here must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.”
Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of “ripeness,” meaning
that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. “A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is
a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to itself as a result of the challenged action.” “Withal,
courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues
through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority
to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.”
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; The requirement
of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by
the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the ― Pork Barrel System.―The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on
the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also,
the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the
2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund — are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot and Academic;
Neither will the President’s declaration that he had
already ― abolished the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) render the issues on PDAF
moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify
or annul its legal existence. By constitutional
design, the annulment or nullification of a law may
be done either by Congress, through the passage of
a repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality.―As for the PDAF,
the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related
thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits. Differing from this description,
the Court observes that respondents’ proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy
nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since
said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not
the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will
31
the President’s declaration that he had already
“abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot
precisely because the Executive branch of government
has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal
existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or
nullification of a law may be done either by Congress,
through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court,
through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of
judicial review to actual cases and controversies”
carries the assurance that “the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches
of government.”―The “limitation on the power of
judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries
the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.”
Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of
the political question doctrine which, under the classic
formulation of Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691,
L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found,
among others, “a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it” or “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents submit
that the “[t]he political branches are in the best position
not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do
them in response to the specific demands of their
constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court] not to
impose a solution at this stage.”
Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of
the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon.―A political question refers to “those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.” The intrinsic
constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely
because it is an exercise of judicial power. More
importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested
the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but
essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any
clearer: “The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; does not
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature
[or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution.―It must also be borne in mind that “when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution.” To a great extent, the Court is
laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-
equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional
force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty.
Ultimately, it is the Court’s avowed intention that a
resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any
manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches
but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are
erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in
the best interest of the people that each great branch of
government, within its own sphere, contributes its share
towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the
problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court
cannot heed respondents’ plea for judicial restraint.
Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.―“The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.”
Petitioners have come before the Court in their
respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the
coffers of the National Treasury.” Clearly, as taxpayers,
they possess the requisite standing to question the
validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which
the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers,
are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of
public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
32
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Res
judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and
stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare
decisis] which means “follow past precedents and
do not disturb what has been settled”) are general
procedural law principles which both deal with the
effects of previous but factually similar dispositions
to subsequent cases.―Res judicata (which means a
“matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et
movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means “follow
past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled”) are general procedural law principles which
both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar
dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar,
the Court examines the applicability of these principles in
relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and
Phrases; The Court defines the Pork Barrel System
as the collective body of rules and practices that
govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local
projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive
branches of government, including its
members.―Considering petitioners’ submission and in
reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court
defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of
rules and practices that govern the manner by which
lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for
local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches
of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary
funds: First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel
which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually
or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or
practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF,
as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional
Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment
measure that allows individual legislators to wield a
collective power; and Second, there is the Presidential
Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons
earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such
term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of
separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government; To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress, belongs the power
to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President, belongs the
power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court, belongs the power
to interpret laws.―The principle of separation of
powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the
three fundamental powers of government. In the
celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it means that the
“Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the
government.” To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to
the executive branch of government, through the
President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the Court,
belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three
great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.”
Thus, “the legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law, the executive has no authority to make
or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law.” The principle of separation of
powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence
stem from the notion that the powers of government
must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers
in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid
any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the
divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of
government that are equally capable of independent
action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of
independence would result in the inability of one branch
of government to check the arbitrary or self interest
assertions of another or others.
Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional; Any post-enactment-measure
allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is
bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,
tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions.―The Legislative
branch of government, much more any of its members,
should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is
properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in
Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters
the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process
33
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no
money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon
approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-
making role necessarily comes to an end and from there
the Executive’s role of implementing the national budget
begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must “not concern itself with
details for implementation by the Executive.” The
foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively
enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom
the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of
law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and
is thus unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however,
that since the restriction only pertains to “any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress
may still exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution
itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’
role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-
enactment-measure allowing legislator participation
beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and
hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions.
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight
and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution; Towards this end, the Supreme
Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa
which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents’
reliance on the same falters altogether.―Clearly,
these post-enactment measures which govern the areas
of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere
of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized
to participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the
various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities” and the “regulation and release of funds” in
violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the moment the
law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the
same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court hereby
declares the 2013 Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) Article as well as all other provisions of
law which similarly allow legislators to wield any
form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of
the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.―The Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto,
informal practices, through which legislators have
effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the
years has not been substantially disputed here.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As
an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,
legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by
the body to which the Constitution has conferred the
same; It is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process
of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally
wield legislative power and no other;
Exceptions.―As an adjunct to the separation of powers
principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised
by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the
same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it is
clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body,
and the people, through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power
and no other. This premise embodies the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely
local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions
such as the authority of the President to, by law,
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
34
declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court
observes that the 2013 Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which ― as settled in Philconsa ― is lodged in
Congress.―In the cases at bar, the Court observes that
the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled
in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is
clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” To understand what
constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves
(a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially,
under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are
able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to
(b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves
also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the
power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby
declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the
similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A
prime example of a constitutional check and balance
would be the President’s power to veto an item
written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill
submitted to him by Congress for approval through
a process known as “bill presentment.”―A prime
example of a constitutional check and balance would be
the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as “bill
presentment.” The President’s item-veto power is found
in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which reads as follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x x (2) The
President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object. The presentment of appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may
exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the “single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures”
for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. As
stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making
process is the “submission [of the bill] to the President
for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after
the required publication.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the
President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of
policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the
legislature, as well as to fortify the executive
branch’s role in the budgetary process; It is meant
to “increase the chances in favor of the community
against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design.”―The justification for the
President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy
goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose
fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify
the executive branch’s role in the budgetary process. In
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the
US Supreme Court characterized the President’s item-
power as “a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of
factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good, which may happen to influence a majority of
that body”; phrased differently, it is meant to “increase
the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or
design.”
Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional
infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for
a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes.―What
beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which
merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be
tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes.
Since such appropriation type necessitates the further
determination of both the actual amount to be expended
and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must
still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the
law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence,
without a proper line-item which the President may veto.
As a practical result, the President would then be faced
with the predicament of either vetoing the entire
appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or
undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as
not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it
35
may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also
raises non-delegability issues considering that the
implementing authority would still have to determine,
again, both the actual amount to be expended and the
actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing
determinations constitute the integral aspects of the
power to appropriate, the implementing authority would,
in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in
violation of the principle of non-delegability.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact that individual
legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for
them to become disinterested “observers” when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law; Clearly,
allowing legislators to intervene in the various
phases of project implementation ― a matter before
another office of government ― renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.―The Court agrees with petitioners that certain
features embedded in some forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has
an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that
individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in
the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for
them to become disinterested “observers” when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain
extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in
which they themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 14.
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly
or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, allowing legislators
to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation — a matter before another office of
government — renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic
or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent
defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular, the
Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In
this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not
based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a
highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively “underdeveloped”
compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives — and in some years, even the Vice-
President — who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork
Barrel’s original intent which is “to make equal the
unequal.” Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become
personal funds under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole account of
their office.
Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the
contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets
apart a determinate or determinable amount of
money and (b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose.―“An appropriation made by law”
under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a)
sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of
money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. These two minimum designations of amount
and purpose stem from the very definition of the word
“appropriation,” which means “to allot, assign, set apart
or apply to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if
written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative
intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution “does not
provide or prescribe any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it
be “made by law,’” an appropriation law may —
according to Philconsa — be “detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be” for as long as the intent to
appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF); The 2013 Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) Article cannot be properly deemed as a
legal appropriation precisely because it contains
post-enactment measures which effectively create a
36
system of intermediate appropriations.―It is apropos
to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly
deemed as a legal appropriation under the said
constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier
stated, it contains post-enactment measures which
effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are
the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and
since they are made by individual legislators after the
GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the
Court observes that the real appropriation made under
the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated
for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment
determinations made by the individual legislators which
are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law.
Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute
an “appropriation made by law” since it, in its truest
sense, only authorizes individual legislators to
appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle
as afore-discussed.
Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The
Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of P.D.
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used.―The
Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President’s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be
confined only to “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government”
under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include —
or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government” states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a
statutory reference of specific things from which the
general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited;
second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the
government; and, third, the Executive department has, in
fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited
only to “energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government.” Thus, while
Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness
test since the policy of energy development is clearly
deducible from its text, the phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under the same provision of law should nonetheless be
stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that
the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of
the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government,” remains legally effective and
subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality
of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that
the Malampaya Funds would be used — as it should be
used — only in accordance with the avowed purpose
and intention of PD 910.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF); Special Allotment Release Order (SARO);
Words and Phrases; A Special Allotment Release
Order (SARO), as defined by the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) itself in its website,
is “[a] specific authority issued to identified
agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given
amount during a specified period for the purpose
indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or
regulations, or is subject to separate approval or
clearance by competent authority.”―The Court
agrees with petitioners’ posturing for the fundamental
reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet
to be “released” under legal contemplation. A SARO, as
defined by the DBM itself in its website, is “[a] specific
authority issued to identified agencies to incur
obligations not exceeding a given amount during a
specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover
expenditures the release of which is subject to
compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is
subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority.” Based on this definition, it may be gleaned
that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation
and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the
SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of
placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing
authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under
certain circumstances which will prevent the actual
release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release
of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,
which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may
be determined from the statements of the DBM
representative during the Oral Arguments.
Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation
(NCA); Unless a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) has
been issued, public funds should not be treated as
funds which have been “released;” The
disbursement of 2013 Priority Development
37
Assistance Fund (PDAF) funds which are only
covered by obligated Special Allotment Release
Order (SARO), and without any corresponding
Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) issued, must, at the
time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined
and consequently reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund.―Unless an NCA has
been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds
which have been “released.” In this respect, therefore,
the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only
covered by obligated SAROs, and without any
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this
Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of
the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant
thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds
coming from an unconstitutional source. This same
pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the
Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not
released — meaning, those merely covered by a SARO
— under the phrase “and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President” pursuant to
Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase “to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects” pursuant
to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
which were altogether declared by the Court as
unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be
reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead,
respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared
as unconstitutional.
Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact
doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the
invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act,
such act is presumed constitutional and thus,
entitled to obedience and respect and should be
properly enforced and complied with.―It must be
stressed that the Court’s pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its
Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork
Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)
“and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910,
and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in
view of the operative fact doctrine. To explain, the
operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until
the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the
invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such
act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced
and complied with. As explained in the recent case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the doctrine merely
“reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary
is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.” “In the language of an American Supreme
Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored.’ ”
Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must
strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in
the rules within which it operates.―The Court renders
this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in
the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the
Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it
has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations,
non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of
budget execution, the system has violated the principle
of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto
legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they themselves determine,
it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed
procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied
the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has
diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by
giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget
execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally
impaired public accountability; insofar as it has
authorized legislators, who are national officers, to
intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the
existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise
subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as
it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well
as other public funds under the broad classification of
“priority infrastructure development projects,” it has once
more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
38
 GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
Francisco vs. HR
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Separation of
Powers; Checks and Balances; The Supreme Court’s
power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution; In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.—This Court’s power of judicial review is
conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively
expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose
provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not
contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1,
par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice
Laurel discoursed: x x x In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The executive and
legislative branches of the government effectively
acknowledged the power of judicial review in Article
7 of the Civil Code.—In our own jurisdiction, as early as
1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised
by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.
And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the
executive and legislative branches of our government in
fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial
review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit: Article 7.
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the
courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial review is indeed
an integral component of the delicate system of
checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms
the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves.—As
indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the
benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation
of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government.It obtains not through express provision but
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department
of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. x x x And
thejudiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectivelychecks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine thelaw, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative
ofthe Constitution. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis;
Wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.—To
determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant
petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction. First, verba
legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared: We look to the language of the
document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not
of course stop there, butthat is where we begin. It is to
be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it
being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the
39
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Same; Same; Same; The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent
of the framers—ratio legis est anima—the object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of
the Constitution to enact the particular provision
and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby,
in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose.—Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est
anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the Intent of its framers.
And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary in this wise: A foolproof
yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision
will be examined in the light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact theparticular provision and the purpose sought to
be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole
as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.” (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole—ut magis valeat quam
pereat.—Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v.
De Leon, this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel
Moran declared: x x x [T]he members of the
Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2,they permitted,
if not willed, that said provision should function to the
fullextent of its substance and its terms, not itself alone,
but in con junctionwith all other provisions of that great
document. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Same; Same; Same; If the plain meaning of the word
is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available; The proper interpretation of a Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
constitutional provision depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than the
framers’ understanding thereof.—If, however, the
plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort
to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded: While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to
consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention “are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.” Theproper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understoodbythe
people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding
thereof. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Same; Same; Impeachment; American jurisprudence
and authorities on impeachment, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application
for these are no longer controlling within our
jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit
as Philippine constitutional law is concerned;
Although the Philippine Constitution can trace its
origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged—in the
colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the
umbilical cord.”—Respondents’ and intervenors’
reliance upon American jurisprudence, the Americana
Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited
to support the proposition that the Senate’s “sole power
to try and decide impeachment cases,” as provided for
under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues
pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and
restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process.
Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it
necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently
judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings. Said American
jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of
Garcia vs. COMELEC, “[i]n resolving constitutional
disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs.” Indeed, although the
United States, their paths of development have long
since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas,
“[w]e have cut the umbilical cord.”
Same; Same; Same; The major difference between
the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court
and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to
40
the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in
nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and
it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any government branch or
instrumentality; There are also glaring distinctions
between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House
of Representatives over impeachment proceedings.
—The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any government branch or instrumentality. There
are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect
to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution did not intend
to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress—it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or “judicially discoverable standards”
for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.—
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also
lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.
Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that “whenever possible,
the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride.” But did not the people also
express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in
the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially discoverable
standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; Checks and Balances; There
exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances.—There exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components
of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Requisites for Judicial Review.—As
clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the
courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and
Phrases; The gist to the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.—Locus standi or legal standing has been
defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Real-Party-in-
Interest; The rule on real-party-in-interest is a
concept of civil procedure while the rule on standing
has constitutional underpinnings—the question as
to “real party in interest” is whether he is “the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment,
or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit’ ” while
the question of standing is whether such party have
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional issues.”—There is, however,
a difference between the rule on real party-in-interest
and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of
41
civil procedure while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings. In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the
ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato to clarify what is
meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
party-in-interest. The difference between the rule on
standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: “It is important to note . . . that standing
because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to
whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or
has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are
directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can
maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy
concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in
certain areas. Standing is a special concern in
constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured
by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but
by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing
is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” x x x On
the other hand, the question as to “real party in interest”
is whether he is “the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the
avails of the suit.’ ” (Citations omitted)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizen’s Suits; When
suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal.—When suing as a citizen, the
interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able
to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he
is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when
the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suits; In the
case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there
is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or
that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law; Courts are vested with
discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.—In the case of a taxpayer, he
is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically
prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public. At all events,
courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer’s suit should be entertained. This Court opts to
grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their
allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate
of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of
the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure
of public funds.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislator’s Suits; For a
legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.—As for a
legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in his office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Association’s Suits;
While an association has legal personality to
represent its members, especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome
will affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member
of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly
true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing.—
While an association has legal personality to represent
its members, especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their
vital interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession
of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it
with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a
reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Class Suits; When
dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous
to fully protect the interests of all concerned to
42
enable the court to deal properly with all interests
involved in the suit, and where it clearly appears that
not all interests can be sufficiently represented as
shown by the divergent issues raised, a class suit
ought to fail.—In the same vein, when dealing with
class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect
the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal
properly with all interests involved in the suit, for a
judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata
principle, binding on all members of the class whether or
not they were before the court. Where it clearly appears
that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as
shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class
suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege
standing ascitizens and taxpayers, however, their
petition will stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;
“Transcendental Importance,” Explained; There
being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following instructive determinants
are instructive—(1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of
a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government, and,
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being
raised; In not a few cases, the Supreme Court has in
fact adopted a liberal attitude on locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people,
as when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public.—There being no doctrinal
definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1)
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
and, (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct
and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised. Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance. In not a few cases, this
Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as
when the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public. Such liberality does not, however, mean that
the requirement that a party should have an interest in
the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very
least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not
being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos’ case, he failed to allege any interest
in the case. He does not thus have standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention; An
intervenor must possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof.—With respect to the motions for
intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right,
it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant
shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Senator
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
he being a member of Congress against which the
petitions are directed.—Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on
the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view
that differs with Senate President Drilon’s. He alleges
that submitting to this Court’s jurisdiction as the Senate
President does will undermine the independence of the
Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the
Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the
House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he
being a member of Congress against which the herein
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully
ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at
hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was,
as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; A
motion to intervene as a taxpayer will be denied
where such party fails to allege that there will result
an illegal disbursement of public funds or in public
money being deflected to any improper purpose; A
lawyer’s mere interest as a member of the Bar does
not suffice to clothe him with standing.—As to Jaime
N. Soriano’s motion to intervene, the same must be
denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he
failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer’s suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, to
wit: x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held
involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in
their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax
money is “being extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power,” or that there is a misapplication of
such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. (Citations omitted) In
43
praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed
even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in
illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money
being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally,
his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not
suffice to clothe him with standing.
Same; Same; Same; Ripeness and Prematurity; For
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, “it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture.”—In Tan v.
Macapagal, this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, “it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture.” Only then
may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if
and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Justiciability; Political
Questions; Separation of Powers; Words and
Phrases; The term “political question” connotes, in
legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy—it refers to “those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government.”—In the leading case of
Tañada v. Cuenco, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
defined the term “political question,” viz.: [T]he term
“political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure. (Italics in the original)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prior to the
1973 Constitution, without consistency and
seemingly without any rhyme or reason, the
Supreme Court vacillated on its stance of taking
cognizance of cases which involved political
questions; The frequency with which the Court
invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to
take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion,
when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to
clarify the Court’s power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions.—
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and
seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court
vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases
which involved political questions. In some cases, this
Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review. In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court
assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Even in the landmark 1988 case of
Javellana v. Executive Secretary which raised the issue
of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in
force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine
and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people
of a Constitution is a political question, it being a
question decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity. The frequency with which this Court invoked
the political question doctrine to refuse to take
jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a
Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court’s
power of judicial review and its application on issues
involving political questions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; From the
record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not
only a power—it is also a duty, a duty which cannot
be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine.—From the
foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power
is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot
be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called
the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII
was not intended to do away with “truly political
questions.” From this clarification it is gathered that there
are two species of political questions: (1) “truly political
questions” and (2) those which “are not truly political
questions.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Truly
political questions are beyond judicial review while
courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.—Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On
the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards
for Determining Political Questions; Section 1,
Article VIII, of the Constitution does not define what
are justiciable political questions and non justiciable
political questions, and identification of these two
species of political questions may be problematic.—
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does not define
what are justiciable political questions and non-
justiciable political questions, however. Identification of
these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The
44
American case of Baker v. Carrattempts to provide
some: x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual, need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question. (Italics supplied) Of these standards, the
more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the
others are also present.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
problem in applying the standards provided in Baker
v. Carr, 227 U.S. 100 (1993), is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from
the current Philippine concept, for the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue; In our jurisdiction, the
determination of a truly political question from a
non-justiciable political question lies in the answer
to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies.—The problem in applying the
foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicial review is radically different from our current
concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining
whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue. In
our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard
to the present controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Impeachment; Words and Phrases; A determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense is a
purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislature—it is
beyond the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial
power; Although Section 2 of Article XI of the
Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these—other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust—elude a precise definition.—
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act
should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case
of Sotto v. Commission on Elections, this Court held: x x
x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised
by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record
also presents some other ground upon which the court
may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and
the constitutional question will be left for consideration
until a case arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable. [Emphasis and italics
supplied] Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Lis Mota; It is a well-settled
maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be
avoided whenever possible.—The first issue goes into
the merits of the second impeachment complaint over
which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly,
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution
enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows
that the framers could find no better way to approximate
the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut
definition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the issue
calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is
guided by the related canon of adjudication that it
“should not form a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied.”—Noted earlier, the instant consolidated
petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is
guided by the related canon of adjudication that “the
court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader
45
than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied.”
Same; Same; Legislative Inquiries; Standard of
Conduct for the Conduct of Legislative Inquiries.—
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the
conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, viz.: The 1987 Constitution expressly
recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected. The power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by
the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be “in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of
Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify
against one’s self.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political
Questions; Judicial Restraint; The exercise of
judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an
option before the Supreme Court, otherwise the
Court would be shirking from its duty vested under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution—The exercise of
judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option
before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred.” Otherwise, this
Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art.
VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the august
words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, “jurisdiction is not
just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be
renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would
be a dereliction of duty.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even in cases
where it is an interested party, the Court under our
system of government cannot inhibit itself and must
rule upon the challenge because no other office has
the authority to do so.—Even in cases where it is an
interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so. On the occasion that this Court had been an
interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted
upon the matter “not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness.” After all, “by [his] appointment
to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the
judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be
fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the
temptations lurking in [his] office.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Seven Pillars of
Limitations of the Power of Judicial Review.—In
Demetria v. Alba, this Court, through Justice Marcelo
Fernan cited the “seven pillars” of limitations of the
power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme
Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.’ 2. The Court will
not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of the necessity of deciding it.’ . . . ‘It is not the habit of
the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.’ 3.
The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it
is to be applied.’ 4. The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has
found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground. 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a
statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he
is injured by its operation. Among the many applications
of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the
right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or
property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will
not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who
sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on
behalf of all its citizens. 6. The Court will not pass upon
the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits. 7. When the
46
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The possibility of
the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a
reason for the Supreme Court to refrain from
upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases.—Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et al. raise
another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that
“judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the
[J]udiciary.” They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in
judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be
confusing and humiliating and risk serious political
instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official. Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce
its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary. Such an argument,
however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly
stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for
this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start,
if not precipitate, a crisis.
Impeachment; Statutory Construction; Words and
Phrases; “Initiate” of course is understood by
ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,
to commence, or set going.—The resolution of this
issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
“initiate.” Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in
order. That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5)
of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado,
who eventually became an Associate Justice of this
Court, agreed on the meaning of “initiate” as “to file,” as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Maambong during the Constitutional Commission
proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as
amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he
added that the act of “initiating” included the act of taking
initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that
indeed the word “initiate” as it twice appears in Article XI
(3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it. “Initiate” of course is
understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do,
to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language
concisely puts it, it means “to perform or facilitate the
first action,” which jibes with Justice Regalado’s position,
and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the
oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5,
2003.
Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the framers
intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the
complaint.—It is thus clear that the framers intended
“initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint. In his
amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained
that “the obvious reason in deleting the phrase “to initiate
impeachment proceedings” as contained in the text of
the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated
by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.” Amicus
curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the
same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
“initiate” as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file,
both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
Same; Same; Same; Reddendo Singula Singulis; The
term “cases” must be distinguished from the term
“proceedings”—an impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate but
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the
Senate, a “proceeding” must be followed to arrive at
a conclusion, and such proceeding must be
“initiated” in the House of Representatives.—Father
Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is “to initiate.” The object in the first
sentence is “impeachment case.” The object in the
second sentence is “impeachment proceeding.”
Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the
term “cases” must be distinguished from the term
“proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-
quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the House has “exclusive
power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other
body can do it. However, before a decision is made to
initiate a case in the Senate, a “proceeding” must be
followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
“initiated.” To initiate, which comes from the Latin word
initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding
is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and
an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House
and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a
verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a
Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there
is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee
rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be
47
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4)
there is the processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the Members
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House “initiates an impeachment case.” It is at
this point that an impeachable public official is
successfully impeached.
That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment “case” before the Senate impeachment
court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the
Constitution understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning.—The framers of the Constitution also
understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when
a proposal reached the floor proposing that “A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary . . . to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground
that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.
Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; From the records of the
Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae
briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners,
it is without a doubt that the term “to initiate” refers
to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint; Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may
not be filed against the same official within a one
year period.—To the argument that only the House of
Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says “The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment,” This is a misreading
of said provision and is contrary to the principle of
reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment
cases” with “impeachment proceeding.” From the
records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term “to
initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes
place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section
3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period.
Same; Separation of Powers; The power of
Congress to promulgate its rules on impeachment is
limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.”—the rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution; If
Congress had absolute rule-making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to
alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution
without need of referendum.—Respondent House of
Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of
Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it
has the power to make and interpret its rules governing
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is
misplaced. Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that “The
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly,
its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is
limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene
the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules
were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section
3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific
limitations on its power to make rules, viz.: It is basic that
all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is
the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule-making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
Same; Same; Where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the
Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
—In Osmeña v. Pendatun, this Court held that it is within
the province of either House of Congress to interpret its
rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
“disorderly behavior” of its members. However, in Paceta
v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,
Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking
for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United
States v. Smith, declared that where the construction to
be given to a rule affects persons other than members of
the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia, quoting United States v. Ballin,
Joseph&Co., Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this
Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and further that there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which
is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations
that all matters of method are open to the determination
of the Legislature.
48
Same; Same; The provisions of Sections 16 and 17
of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the
term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.”—
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient
in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the
term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.”
Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; The raison
d’etre of the judiciary is to complement the
discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society
upon the rule of law.—This Court in the present
petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on
the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief
Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-
year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of
this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government. Rather, the raison
d’etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by
the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring
about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded
and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part
in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this
entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the
Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when
one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply
a non sequitur.
Same; Same; The Chief Justice is not above the law
and neither is any other member of the Court, but
just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply
that he gets to have less in law than anybody else.—
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a
basic precept in any legal system which recognizes
equality of all men before the law as essential to the
law’s moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps,
there is no other government branch or instrumentality
that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its
application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law
than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual’s rights irrespective of his station in life.

Same; Same; To disqualify the entire institution that

is the Supreme Court from the suit at bar is to regard
the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality
when one of its members is a party to a case, which
is simply a non sequitur.—The institution that is the
Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
held and been entrusted with the judicial power to
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the
personalities involved in the suits or actions, This Court
has dispensed justice over the course of time,
unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer
therefrom, unafraid by whatever imputations or
speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it
not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these
petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate
who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch’s official act as tested by the limits
set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the

49
 G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.*
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA vs. EDGARDO ANGARA
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of
Powers;Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute.—In seeking to
nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that
it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a
“controversy y as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”
Same; Same; Actions; Special Civil Actions;
Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper,
acts of legislative and executive officials.—As the
petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is
no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in
holding that this petition should be given due course and
the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.
On this, we have no equivocation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In deciding to take
jurisdiction over this petition, the Supreme Court
does not review the wisdom of the decision of the
President and the Senate in enlisting the country in
the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said
international body, rather, it only exercises its
constitutional duty “to determine whether or not
there had been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the
part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement
and its three annexes.—We should stress that, in
deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court
will not review the wisdom of the decision of the
President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the
WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a
policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it
rule on the propriety of the government’s economic
policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies,
quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers.
Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty “to
determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction”
on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.
Same; Constitutional Principles and State Policies;
The principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not
self-executing provisions, the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.—By
its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration
of principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “bas ic
political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco.
These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and
by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the
leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and
some sections of Article XII are not “self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines
for legislation.”
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Due Process.—
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles are
sourced from basic considerations of due process and
the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making.”
Same; Same; Trade Liberalization; “Filipino First”
Policy; While the Constitution indeed mandates a
bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy.—All told, while the Constitution
indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest
of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and
limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In
other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments,
goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
50
Same; Same; Same; Same; World Trade
Organization (WTO);General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT); There is hardly any basis for the
statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos
will be deprived of control of the economy, for, quite
to the contrary, the weaker situations of developing
nations like the Philippines have been taken into
account.—Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in
protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices including anti-dumping measures,
countervailing measures and safeguards against import
surges. Where local business are jeopardized by unfair
foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these
measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the
statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be
deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary,
the weaker situations of developing nations like the
Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there
would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the
respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True,
they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state
into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But
such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree
with it or simply because we believe only in other
economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking
jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the
advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as
an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional
duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave
abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
fundamental law encourages industries that are
“competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a
sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in
favor of the gradual development of robust
industries that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets.—The WTO reliance on “most favored
nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and
reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries
that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a
sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor
of the gradual development of robust industries that can
compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed,
Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And
given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs
and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best
offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Political
Questions; The responses to questions on whether
WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the
public at large involve “judgment calls” by our
policy makers, for which they are answerable to our
people during appropriate electoral exercises—such
questions and the answers thereto are not subject to
judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of
discretion.—Consequently, the question boils down to
whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the
public at large. Will adherence to the W TO treaty bring
this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality? Will
WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos’ general
welfare because it will—as promised by its promoters—
expand the country’s exports and generate more
employment? Will it bring more prosperity, employment,
purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public? The responses to
these questions involve “judgment calls” by our policy
makers, for which they are answerable to our people
during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions
and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Same; It is to the credit of its drafters that the
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots
and infidels but at the same time bend with the
refreshing winds of change necessitated by
unfolding events.—It is not difficult to answer this
question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only
the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and
infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing
winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As
one eminent political law writer and respected jurist
explains: “The Constitution must be quintessential rather
than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base
and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is
but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly ‘in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,’ where it will in time
develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and
finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution
cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the
brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure
by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the
society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the
progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of
history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far
from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.”
Same; International Law; While sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and all—
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly,
as a member of the family of nations.—This Court
51
notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which
petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue.
However, while sovereignty has traditionally been
deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a
hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the
world.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Incorporation; Words and
Phrases; By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered
automatically part of our own laws.—In its Declaration
of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity,
with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and
most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda—international agreements must be performed
in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
Same; Same; Treaties; By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or
derived from a convention or pact.—By their inherent
nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange
for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to
limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
Same; Same; Same; World Trade Organization;
Pleadings and Practice; Article 34 of the General
Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) does not contain an unreasonable
burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in
Philippine judicial system.—Petitioners aver that
paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and
Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) intrudes
on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. x x x By
and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our
dis position of the third issue—derogation of legislative
power—will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to
say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such
intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does
not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is
with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system. So too, since
the Philippines is a signatory to most international
conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the
adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not
be substantial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Patents;
Evidence; Words and Phrases; Burden of Proof;
Burden of Evidence; The “burden of proof”
contemplated by Article 34 should actually and
properly be understood as referring to the “burden
of evidence” (burden of going forward) placed on
the producer of identical (or fake) product to show
that his product was produced without the use of the
patented process—the patent owner still has the
“burden of proof” since he still has to introduce
evidence of the existence of the alleged identical
product, the fact that it is “identical” to the genuine
one produced by the patented process and the fact
of “newness” of the genuine product or the fact of
“substantial likelihood” that the identical product
was made by the patented process.—From the above,
a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of
disputable (note the words “in the absence of proof to
the contrary”) presumption that a product shown to be
identical to one produced with the use of a patented
process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the
(illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such
product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2)
where there is “substantial likelihood” that the identical
product was made with the use of the said patented
process but the owner of the patent could not determine
the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the “burden of proof” contemplated by
Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of
the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually
refers to the “burden of evidence” (burden of going
forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake)
product to show that his product was produced without
the use of the patented process. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the “burden of
proof” since, regardless of the presumption provided
under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to
introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged
identical product, the fact that it is “identical” to the
genuine one produced by the patented process and the
fact of “newness” of the genuine product or the fact of
“substantial likelihood” that the identical product was
made by the patented process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;
“Final Act,” Explained.—“A final act, sometimes called
protocol de clÔture, is an instrument which records the
52
winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic
conference and usually includes a reproduction of the
texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and
other acts agreed upon and signed by the
plenipotentiaries attending the conference.” It is not the
treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of
a protracted conference which may have taken place
over several years.
Same; Judicial Review; Words and Phrases;
Certiorari; By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere
abuse of discretion is not enough—it must be grave.
—By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It mus t be grave abuse of discretion as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Failure
on the part of the petitioner to show grave abus e of
discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; In rendering
this Decision, the Supreme Court never forgets that
the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two
sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled
to great respect in its actions.—In rendering this
Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate,
whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign
houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect
in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent
and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed
regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof
and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow
such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in
its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of
grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of
regularity in the Senate’s processes, this Court cannot
find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate’s exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec.
21 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Treaties; World Trade
Organization; The Senate Act, after deliberation and
voting, of voluntarily and overwhelmingly giving its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a
part of the law of the land,” is a legitimate exercise
of its sovereign duty and power.—That the Senate,
after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We
find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by
reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise.
It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least
some of its members, may even agree with petitioners
that it is more advantageous to the national interest to
strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a
legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would
constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial
power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a
valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such
exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to
whether the nation should join the worldwide march
toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is
a matter that our people should determine in electing
their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political
desire of a member.
World Trade Organization; Trade Liberalization;
International Law; Notwithstanding objections
against possible limitations on national sovereignty,
the WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law.—The eminent
futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller
Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance where “the
East will become the dominant region of the world
economically, politically and culturally in the next
century.” He refers to the “free market” espoused by
WTO as the “catalyst” in this coming Asian ascendancy.
There are at present about 31 countries including China,
Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in
the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible
limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as
the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade
law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if
not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with
original membership, keenly aware of the advantages
and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line
experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the
Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an
international strategy for economic prosperity and
stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through
their duly authorized elected officers, make their free
choice.
53
G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998.*
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO AND SEN.
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners, vs. SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AND SEN. MARCELO
B. FERNAN, respondents.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Actions; Pleadings and
Practice; For special and important reasons or for
exceptional and compelling circumstances, the
Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts, and original
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
quo warranto, assailing acts of legislative officers
like the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House have been recognized as exceptions to the
rule.—In the regular course, the regional trial courts and
this Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and
decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to
the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in
the lower tribunals. However, for special and important
reasons or for exceptional and compelling
circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has
allowed exceptions to this doctrine. In fact, original
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House have
been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
Same; Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; The
present Constitution now fortifies the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political depart-ments—it
speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.—
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution
is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The
present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity
of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of
judicial prerogative in terms of duty.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and
Practice; Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted;
It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives.—
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or
petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is
entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the aforesaid
allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has
jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed
the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Constitutional Law; Parliamentary Rules; Statutory
Construction; Words and Phrases; “Majority” and
“Minority,” Explained; The plain and unambiguous
words of Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
simply mean that the Senate President must obtain
the votes of more than one half of all the senators,
and not by any construal does it thereby delineate
who comprise the “majority,” much less the
“minority,” in the said body.—The term “majority” has
been judicially defined a number of times. When
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate,
it simply “means the number greater than half or more
than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words
of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of more than
one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it
thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much
less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no
showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind
other than the usual meanings of these terms.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half
of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby
elect the minority leader.—In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting more than one
half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the
minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that
the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
Same; Same; Same; Same; History would also show
that the “majority” in either house of Congress has
referred to the political party to which the most
number of lawmakers belonged, while the “minority”
normally referred to a party with a lesser number of
members.—The Comment of Respondent Guingona
furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not
contested in petitioners’ Reply. During the eighth
Congress, which was the first to convene after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of
Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was
seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen.
Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth regular session,
when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate
presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign
committee chairmanships to all senators, including those
belonging to the minority. This practice continued during
54
the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was
allowed to chair a committee. History would also show
that the “majority” in either house of Congress has
referred to the political party to which the most number
of lawmakers belonged, while the “minority” normally
referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Majority may also refer
to “the group, party, or faction with the larger
number of votes,” not necessarily more than one
half—sometimes referred to as plurality—while
minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller
number of votes or adherents than the majority;” No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribes
which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right
to select the minority leader.—Let us go back to the
definitions of the terms “majority” and “minority.” Majority
may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the
larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one
half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a
smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.”
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be
the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is
not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select
the leader representing all the minorities. In a
government with a multiparty system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves),
there could be several minority parties, one of which has
to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant
minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In
the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision
prescribes which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to
select the minority leader.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political
Questions; The method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
Constitution, and such method must be prescribed
by the Senate itself, not by the Supreme Court.—
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which
to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto.—Notably, the Rules of the Senate do
not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing
specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner
of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At
any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are
actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the
acts of the Senate relative thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts may not intervene
in the internal affairs of the legislature—it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how
to do its work.—On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to
do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well
as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Being merely matters of
procedure, the observance of legislative rules are of
no concern to the courts, for said rules may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will,
upon the concurrence of a majority.—Needless to
state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have
the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during
their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of Law;
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for
the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the
Supreme Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate; The Supreme Court will be
neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and
majesty of the law.—In view of the foregoing, Congress
verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own
jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for
the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no
authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold—the
very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of
55
a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will
be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty
of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Legislation; To accede
to the interpretation of petitioners would practically
amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.—To
accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would
practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach
of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If
for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; While no
provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules
and even the practice of the Senate was violated,
and while the judiciary is without power to decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has
been lodged in the legislative department, the
Supreme Court may still inquire whether an act of
Congress or its officials has been made with grave
abuse of discretion.—While no provision of the
Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the
practice of the Senate was violated, and while the
judiciary is without power to decide matters over which
full discretionary authority has been lodged in the
legislative department, this Court may still inquire
whether an act of Congress or its officials has been
made with grave abuse of discretion. This is the plain
implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power
and the duty not only “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but likewise “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government” is restricted only
by the definition and confines of the term “grave
abuse of discretion.”—The all-embracing and plenary
power and duty of the Court “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government” is restricted only by
the definition and confines of the term “grave abuse of
discretion.” “By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the
Senate has been clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for
acts done within their competence and authority.—
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate
President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.” Where no
provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules
of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority.

Actions; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases;

“Usurpation” and “Quo Warranto,” Explained.—
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary
assumption and exercise of power by one without color
of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action
may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another. The action shall be brought
against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into
or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts;

Judicial Review; Words and Phrases; The all-
embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

56
 GR 162230, April 28, 2010
Vinuya vs. Exec. Secretary
DECISION
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To
establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari,
the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final
order or resolution or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the
petition; otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be
dismissed.—Petitioners did not show that their bringing
of the special civil action for certiorari was timely, i.e.,
within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 4. When and where
position filed.—The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60)-day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion. As the rule indicates,
the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner
receives the assailed judgment, final order or resolution,
or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new
trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not.
To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari,
the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order
or resolution or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the
petition; otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be
dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be
understated, for such dates determine the timeliness of
the filing of the petition for certiorari.
unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse; (b) There is a
material and substantial invasion of such right; and (c)
There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary,
speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.
Constitutional Law; Foreign Relations; The
Constitution has entrusted to the Executive
Department the conduct of foreign relations for the
Philippines; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot
interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct
of foreign relations by the Executive Department.—
The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive
Department the conduct of foreign relations for the
Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive
determination and judgment of the Executive
Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question
the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the
Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the
Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or
injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in
a certain manner.

Same; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction;

Preliminary injunction is provisional because it
constitutes a temporary measure availed of during
the pendency of the action; and it is ancillary
because it is a mere incident in and is dependent
upon the result of the main action.—Preliminary
injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct
to the main case, and is subject to the latter’s outcome.
It is not a cause of action itself. It is provisional because
it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the
pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a
mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the
main action.

Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there

is no more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction
sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of
the principal action.

Same; Same; Mandatory Injunction; A mandatory

injunction requires the performance of a particular
act.—In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the
performance of a particular act. Hence, it is an extreme
remedy, to be granted only if the following requisites are
attendant, namely: (a) The applicant has a clear and

57
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of
Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S.
INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan,
FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA,
JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G.
SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA
R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO,
Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES,
Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham,
ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY
E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA,
THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN,
NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ,
Petitioners, vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as
Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in
his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS
Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL
ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s,
HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary,
Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T.
GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense,
HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces,
VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine
Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA,
Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard,
COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA,
Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN.
VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed
Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN.
TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces.
Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director,
Respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi;
Words and Phrases; Locus standi is “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.”—Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a
party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where
he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result”
of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just
a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing
is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such
as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.
Constitutional Law; Balance and Healthful Ecology;
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224
SCRA 792 (1993), the Supreme Court (SC)
recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.”—In the
landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792
(1993), we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in
the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist
from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suit; On the
novel element in the class suit filed by the
petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that
not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to
sue for the enforcement of environmental rights,
they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.—On the novel element in the class
suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal
standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental
rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
Constitutional Law; State Immunity from Suit; This
traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a
State from being sued in the courts of another State
58
without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved
into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis).—This traditional rule of State immunity
which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without the former’s consent or waiver has
evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State
immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs.
Same; International Law; International Law of the
Sea; Words and Phrases; The international law of
the sea is generally defined as “a body of treaty
rules and customary norms governing the uses of
the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the
exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes.—The
international law of the sea is generally defined as “a
body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the
uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the
exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a
branch of public international law, regulating the
relations of states with respect to the uses of the
oceans.” The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was
opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego
Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984
but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the
submission of the 60th ratification.
Same; Same; Same; United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea; The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives to the coastal
State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the
different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal
waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4)
exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It
also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction
over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel
is located.—The UNCLOS is a product of international
negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty
(mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high
seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the world’s
marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles
of international law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal
State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the
different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters,
2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive
economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives
coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign
vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; Visiting
Forces Agreement; Writ of Kalikasan; The waiver of
State immunity under the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as the present petition
for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.—The VFA is an
agreement which defines the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote
“common security interests” between the US and the
Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further
defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even
common law is thus improper considering that it is
the VFA which governs disputes involving US
military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters
in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As
it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately: SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.
—The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of
kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil,
criminal or administrative actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A ruling on the
application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian,
would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.—In any case, it is our
considered view that a ruling on the application or non-
application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA
to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant
damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines
under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that
deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the
same violation of an environmental law.
Same; Same; Foreign Relations; It is settled that
“the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative — ‘the political’ —
departments of the government, and the propriety of
what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.”—A rehabilitation or restoration program to be
59
implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major
relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in
a citizens’ suit under the Rules, viz.: RULE 5 SECTION
1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.—If warranted, the court may
grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the
environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs of
suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the
violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall
be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special
trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the
court. In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the
Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels.
Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with
another State in the context of common security
interests under the VFA. It is settled that “[t]he conduct
of the foreign relations of our government is committed
by the Constitution to the executive and legislative —
‘the political’ — departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.”

60
[G.R. No. 144463. January 14, 2004]
SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION and SPORTS AND GAMES
ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
is presumed to exist for the common good. Hence, the
special privileges and franchises it receives are subject
to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter.
There is therefore a reserved right of the State to inquire
how these privileges had been employed, and whether
they have been abused.

Constitutional Law; Government; Powers;

Legislative Department; Senator; Legal Standing;
Actions; Ordinarily, before a member of Congress
may properly challenge the validity of an official act
of any department of the government there must be
an unmistakable showing that the challenged official
act affects or impairs his rights and prerogatives as
legislator.—Objections to the legal standing of a
member of the Senate or House of Representative to
maintain a suit and assail the constitutionality or validity
of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various
government agencies or instrumentalities are not without
precedent. Ordinarily, before a member of Congress
may properly challenge the validity of an official act of
any department of the government there must be an
unmistakable showing that the challenged official act
affects or impairs his rights and that the challenged
official act affects or impairs his rights and prerogatives
as legislator. However in a number of cases, we clarified
that where a case involves an issue of utmost
importance, or one of overreaching significance to
society, the Court, in its discretion, can brush aside
procedural technicalities and take cognizance of the
petition.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative Franchise; A

legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by
the state to corporations.—A legislative franchise is a
special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It
is a privilege of public concern which cannot be
exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved
for public control and administration, either by the
government directly, or by public agents, under such
conditions and regulations as the government may
impose on them in the interest of the public. It is
Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the
grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of
granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the
mode of conducting the business, the charter and the
quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the
grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are
almost always defined in clear and unequivocal
language.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The special

privileges and franchises received are subject to the
laws of the State and the limitations of its charter.—
The grant of franchise is a special privilege that
constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the
grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities
arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits
set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and
conditionalities. A corporation as a creature of the State

61
G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner, vs. HON.
JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S.
MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M.
ZANORIA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Enactments;
Presumption of Constitutionality; Presumption is
always in favor of the constitutionality of a
legislative enactment. ___ The basic principle
underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to
the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of
legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. In
every case where a question is raised as to the
constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine
in scrutinizing the terms of the law. In a great volume of
cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental rule
that there is a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
Same; Cruel and Unusual Punishments; A
punisment is not cruel or unusual or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless
it is barbarous, one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community. ___ We
note with approval the holding of respondent judge that
___ “The rule is established beyond question that a
punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual
or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it
is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community. Based on this
principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled
contentions of the defense that the punishment of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel
and unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs.
Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People
vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua, 96 Phil
738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language
of our Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided
after the last world war is appropriate here: ‘The
Constitution directs that ‘Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.’
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration
or amount, and apply to punishments which never
existed in America, or which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jr., p. 172), for
instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in
the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note.
35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus
be within the prohibition.’ (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil.
906).”
Same; Same; Same; The fact that punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it
cruel or unusual. ___ That the penalty is grossly
disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to
declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is
cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it
cruel or unusual. In addition, what degree of
disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the
Constitution has still to await appropriate determination
in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies,
no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being
“cruel and unusual” or “excessive.”
Same; Separation of Powers; Undue Delegation of
Legislative Powers; It is not for the courts to fix the
term of imprisonment where no points of reference
have been made by the legislature. ___ In the case
under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously
assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has
been provided for by the legislature, the court is
endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or
period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this
postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of
imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion
to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment
which must be encompassed within specific or
designated limits provided by law, the absence of which
designated limits will constitute such exercise as an
undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or
assumption, of legislative power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; RA 4670; Criminal Law;
Penalties; Sec.32 of RA 4670 which provides for an
indeterminate period of imprisonment,
unconstitutional. ___ Section 32 of Republic Act No.
4670 provides for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum
duration having been set by the legislative authority. The
courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix
the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may
range, in the words of respondent judge, from one
minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this
cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a
duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as
applied to this case, does violence to the rules on
separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of
legislative powers. This time, the presumption of
constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing
considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be,
as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Fine; A fine is as much a
principal penalty as imprisonment; it should not and
cannot be reduced to a prison term. ___ It follows,
62
therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the
actual term of imprisonment, as may have been intended
by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is,
however, worth mentioning that the suggested
application of the so-called rule or principle of
parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be
equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit
judicial acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single
or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be
reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be
considered as a separate and independent penalty
consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. It
is likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in the
graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code.
There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine
into a term of imprisonment. Neither does the Code
contain any provision that a fine when imposed in
conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter
penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty as
imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Courts;

Jurisdiction; Criminal jurisdiction of the court
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. ___ It has been the
consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. With the deletion by
invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section
32 of Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the
imposable penalty for violations of said law should be
limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more
than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in
determining which court may properly exercise
jurisdiction thereover. When the complaint against
private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law
then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as amended by
Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable
by a fine of not more than P3,000.00 fall under the
original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts.
Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein
private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.

63
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third
District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W. ANTONINO
(First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G.
CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte),
HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division, Misamis
Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second
District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS
(Lone District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO
(Second District, Lanao del Norte), and
CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT
(Lone District, Zamboanga City) petitioners, vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary;
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII,
CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V.
AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII,
DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA
S. CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.
IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner, vs. HON.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON.
FIDEL RAMOS, HON. SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS,
AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA
CAJUCOM, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Valid Delegation of the
Legislative Power; R.A. 5435 authorized the
President of the Philippines, with the help of
Commission on Reorganization, to recognize the
different executive departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the government,
including banking or financial institutions and
corporations owned or controlled by it. Purpose was
to promote “simplicity, economy and efficiency in
the government.”—It will be useful to recall first the
nature of administrative regions and the basis and
purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A.
No. 5435 was passed “authorizing the President of the
Philippines, with the help of a Commission on
Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities of the government, including banking or
financial institutions and corporations owned or
controlled by it.” The purpose was to promote “simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government.” The
Commission on Reorganization created under the law
was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan
not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who
was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress
within forty days after the opening of its next regular
session. The law provided that any reorganization plan
submitted would become effective only upon the
approval of Congress.
Administrative Law; Local Government Code; The
division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have
regional offices.—Thus the creation and subsequent
reorganization of administrative regions have been by
the President pursuant to authority granted to him by
law. In conferring on the President the power “to merge
[by administrative determination] the existing regions”
following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern
set in previous legislation dating back to the initial
organization of administrative regions in 1972. The
choice of the President as delegate is logical because
the division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local governments
but also the direction of executive departments which the
law requires should have regional offices.
Constitutional Law; Delegation of Legislative Power;
Power conferred on the President is similar to the
power to adjust municipal boundaries which is
administrative in nature.—As this Court observed in
Abbas, “while the power to merge administrative regions
is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X,
§4 of the Constitution].” The regions themselves are not
territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are “mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.” The
power conferred on the President is similar to the power
to adjust municipal boundaries which has been
described in Pelaez v. Auditor General as “administrative
in nature.”
Same; Same; There is no abdication by Congress of
its legislative power in conferring on the President
the power to merge administratives regions.—There
is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative
power in conferring on the President the power to merge
administrative regions. The question is whether
Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which
the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power
granted and whether in any event the grant of power to
him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the
law.
Same; Same; A legislative standard need not be
expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied.—
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard
need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the challenged legislation.
64
Same; Same.—With respect to the power to merge
existing administrative regions, the standard is to be
found in the same policy underlying the grant to the
President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize
the Executive Department, to wit: “to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to
pursue programs consistent with national goals for
accelerated social and economic development and to
improve the service in the transaction of the public
business.” Indeed, as the original eleven administrative
regions were established in accordance with this policy,
it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President
to “merge [by administrative determination] the existing
regions” in view of the withdrawal from some of those
regions of the provinces now constituting the
Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to
reconstitute the original basis for the organization of
administrative regions.
Local Government Code; Regrouping of
Administrative Regions; Autonomous Region; The
reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is germane to the general subject of R.A.
6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.—Nor is Art. XIX, §13
susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in
the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement
that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof” has always been given a practical rather than a
technical construction. The title is not required to be an
index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all provisions of the
statute are germane to that subject. Certainly the
reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is
germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which
is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.
Same; Same; Same; Non-assenting provinces and
cities are to remain in the region as designated upon
the creation of the Autonomous Region, may
nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous
provinces forming other regions as the exigency of
administration may require.—The contention has no
merit. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that “The provinces
and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions,” this provision is subject to the
qualification that “the President may by administrative
determination merge the existing regions.” This means
that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to
remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of
the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be
regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other
regions as the exigency of administration may require.
Same; Same; Same; Regrouping involves separating
of administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services.—The
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more
than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the
administrative supervision of local government units by
the President and insuring the efficient delivery of
essential services. There will be no “transfer” of local
governments from one region to another except as they
may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del
Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become
part of Region IX.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative regions are mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes, not for political
representation.—The regrouping of contiguous
provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to
the division or merger of local governments, which all
have political consequences on the right of people
residing in those political units to vote and to be voted
for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative
regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes, not for political representation.
Same; Same; Same; Examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742,
773, and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize
administrative regions carries with it the power to
determine the regional center.—To be sure Art. XIX,
§13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason
is that the President’s power cannot be so limited without
neglecting the necessities of administration. It is
noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the
reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational.
The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the
reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429
is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and
geographical features; (2) transportation and
communication facilities; (3) cultural and language
groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing
regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6)
socioeconomic development programs in the regions
and (7) number of provinces and cities. What has been
said above applies to the change of the regional center
from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners
contend that the determination of provincial capitals has
always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said
in Abbas, administrative regions are mere “groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. . . .
[They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.” There
is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress
can change or determine regional centers. To the
contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and
1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative
regions carries with it the power to determine the
regional center.
65
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB)
and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK,
INC. (ECN), Petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS
AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM
Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP
(SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.
(PECO), Respondents.
Courts; Judicial Review; Hierarchy of Courts;
Petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts when they filed this “Complaint” directly with
the Supreme Court—the Court’s jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with
that of the regional trial courts and the Court of
Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained
freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such
relief.—Petitioners filed before us an original action
particularly denominated as a Complaint assailing the
constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the
Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA’s IRR. No
doubt, petitioners have locus standi. They impugn the
constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they
sustained a direct injury as a result of the imposition of
the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills.
However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts when they filed this “Complaint” directly with us.
Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any
of the public respondents, in order for the Court to
consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition. But
this Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial
courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants
unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to
seek such relief. It has long been established that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. This
circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the
present action.
Police Power; Taxation; Police power is the power of
the state to promote public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property—it is
the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most
demanding of the three fundamental powers of the
State and the justification is found in the Latin
maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to
injure the property of others); The theory behind the
exercise of the power to tax emanates from
necessity, without taxes, government cannot fulfill
its mandate of promoting the general welfare and
well-being of the people; That the power to
“regulate” means the power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for
the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then
of the utility and of its patrons.—The power to tax is
an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that
security against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on
the constituency that is to pay it. It is based on the
principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government,
and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious
need. Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power
to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the
general welfare and well-being of the people. On the
other hand, police power is the power of the state to
promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the
least limitable, and the most demanding of the three
fundamental powers of the State. The justification is
found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex
(the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as
not to injure the property of others). As an inherent
attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all
public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae,
gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have
held that the power to “regulate” means the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due
regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public,
then of the utility and of its patrons.
Same; Same; Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001 (EPIRA); If generation of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax; In exacting the
assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA),
the State’s police power, particularly its regulatory
dimension, is invoked.—The conservative and pivotal
distinction between these two powers rests in the
purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally
raised does not make the imposition a tax. In exacting
the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA, the State’s police power, particularly its
regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced
from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which
the Universal Charge is imposed and which can be
amply discerned as regulatory in character.
66
Same; Same; Same; It is a well-established doctrine that
the taxing power may be used as an implement of police
power.—It is a well-established doctrine that the taxing
power may be used as an implement of police power. In
Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al., 162 SCRA
521 (1988), and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,
158 SCRA 626 (1988), this Court held that the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization
Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of the
police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmeña v.
Orbos, 220 SCRA 703 (1993), with respect to the OPSF.
Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the instant case
is different from the aforementioned cases. With the
Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also
created under the administration of PSALM.
Delegation of Powers; Separation of Powers; A
logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of nondelegation of powers,
as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata
non delegari potest (what has been delegated
cannot be delegated).—The principle of separation of
powers ordains that each of the three branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme
in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation
of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers,
as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non
delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be
delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that
such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.
Same; Subordinate Legislation; Completeness Test
and Sufficient Standard Test; Given the volume and
variety of interactions in today’s society, it is
doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that
will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life, hence, the need to
delegate to administrative bodies the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its policies; All that is
required for the valid exercise of this power of
subordinate legislation is that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and
that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law, which requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.—
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life,
delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to
this principle. Given the volume and variety of
interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the
legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately
with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday
life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies
—the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields—the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate
its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of
this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation
be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and
that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the
EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to
Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
Same; Same; Same; Provisions of the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) such as, among
others, “to ensure the total electrification of the
country and the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power” and
“watershed rehabilitation and management” meet
the requirements for valid delegation, as they
provide the limitations on the Energy Regulatory
Commission’s (ERC’s) power to formulate the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).—As to
the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as
sufficient standards the following: “interest of law and
order”; “adequate and efficient instruction”; “public
interest”; “justice and equity;” “public convenience and
welfare;” “simplicity, economy and efficiency”;
“standardization and regulation of medical education”;
and “fair and equitable employment practices.”
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to
ensure the total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply
of electric power” and “watershed rehabilitation and
management” meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s
power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
Police Power; Over the years, however, the range of
police power was no longer limited to the
preservation of public health, safety and morals,
which used to be the primary social interests in
earlier times. Police power now requires the State to
“assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the
excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of
an unrestrained industrial economy,” and police
power is now exerted “to further the public welfare—
a concept as vast as the good of society itself.”—In
his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the same case,
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Reynato S.
Puno described the immensity of police power in relation
to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory
67
functions over electric power as a vital public utility, to
wit: Over the years, however, the range of police power
was no longer limited to the preservation of public
health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary
social interests in earlier times. Police power now
requires the State to “assume an affirmative duty to
eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the
concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy.”
Police power is now exerted “to further the public welfare
—a concept as vast as the good of society itself.” Hence,
“police power is but another name for the governmental
authority to further the welfare of society that is the basic
end of all government.” When police power is delegated
to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its
exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power
takes on an even broader dimension in developing
countries such as ours, where the State must take a
more active role in balancing the many conflicting
interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued
by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the
exercise of police power. We should have exceptionally
good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is
more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric
power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is
a traditional instrument of economic growth that affects
not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important
factor in encouraging investment and promoting
business. The engines of progress may come to a
screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is
impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of
power outages or unreliable electric power services. The
State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police
power with great flexibility, when the need arises.
program.—As a penultimate statement, it may be well to
recall what this Court said of EPIRA: One of the
landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in
recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy,
legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric
power industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital
for the expansion and improvement of the industry as
the large government debt and the highly capital-
intensive character of the industry itself have long been
acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program.
To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded
structure of the industry had to be addressed. While the
generation and transmission sectors were centralized
and monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented
with over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic.
The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of
existing generation capacity; extremely high and
uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to
consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the
government power sector; high system losses; and an
inability to develop a clear strategy for overcoming these
shortcomings. Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework
for the restructuring of the industry, including the
privatization of the assets of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive
structure, and the delineation of the roles of various
government agencies and the private entities. The law
ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct
sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution
and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have
to privatized and its transmission business spun off and
privatized thereafter.

Taxation; Judicial Review; The determination of

whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves
questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded
from reviewing the same.—Petitioners failed to pursue
in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint
that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-
users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to
taxation without representation. Hence, such contention
is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution of
August 3, 2004. Moreover, the determination of whether
or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is
an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and
thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.

Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA);

One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by
Congress in recent years is the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) which
established a new policy, legal structure and
regulatory framework for the electric power industry
—the new thrust is to tap private capital for the
expansion and improvement of the industry as the
large government debt and the highly capital-
intensive character of the industry itself have long
been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the

68
G.R. No. L-46570 April 21, 1939
JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY
OF THE INTERIOR, respondent.
1. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR; EXECUTIVE
SUPERVISION OVER THE ADMINISTRATION OF
PROVINCES, MUNICIPALITIES, CHARTERED ClTIES
AND OTHER LOCAL POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.—
Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code speaks of
direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus
and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the
Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation
to section 86 of the same Code which grants to the
Department of the Interior "executive supervision over
the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered
cities and other local political subdivisions."
2. ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES; MEANING
OF THE WORD "SUPER. VISION".—In the case of
Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228) this court observed
that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an
active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at
least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions
in order to render the power real and effective. If
supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not
automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a
knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after
careful study and investigation." The principle there
enunciated is applicable with equal force to the present
case. The Secretary of the Interior is invested with
authority to order the investigation of the charges against
the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for
that purpose.
3. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; SUSPENSION BY THE SECRETARY.
—As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of
the Interior to decree the suspension of the herein
petitioner pending an administrative investigation of the
charges against him, the question, it may be admitted, is
not free from difficulties. There is no clear and express
grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary,
the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by
section 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides
that "The provincial governor shall receive and
investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office,
and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude."
4. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES.—The fact, however, that the
power of suspension is expressly granted by section
2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial
governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily
exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior
from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel
for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the
President of the Philippines may himself suspend the
petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of
removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code)
to be e ercised conformably to law.
5. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; ID.—Indeed, if the President could,
in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal
official, it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be
devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the
incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the
power both to suspend and to remove a provincial
official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President
were to be without the power to suspend a municipal
official.
6. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; ID.—It may be argued with some
degree of plausibility that, if the Secretary of the Interior
is, as we have hereinabove concluded, empowered to
investigate the charges against the petitioner and to
appoint a special investigator for that purpose,
preventive suspension may be a means by which to
carry into effect a fair and impartial investigation. This is
a point, however, which, for the reason hereinafter
indicated the court does not have to decide.
7. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Withal, at first blush, the
argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
circumstances, it should be observed that there are
certain prerogative acts which, by their very nature,
cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him
in person and no amount of approval or ratification will
validate the exercise of any of those powers by any
other person.
8. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The heads of the various
executive departments are as istants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executi e and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES.—With reference to the Executive
Department of the government, there is one purpose
which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the
projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive, The first
section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the
Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of
the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in
a President of the Philippines." This means that the
69
President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads
of the executive departments occupy political positions
and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the
President's bosom confidence" and, in the language of
Attorney-General Cushing, "are subject to the direction
of the President".

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; SECRETARIES OF

DEPARTMENT.—Without minimizing the importance of
the heads of the various depart ments, their personality
is in reality but the projection of that of the President.
Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief
Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States,
"each head of a department is, and must be, the
President's alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to exercise
authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21
at 30; 272. U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160),
Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain
powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any
way affect the constitutional power of control and
direction of the President. As a matter of executive
policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as
to certain matters, but this is by mere concession of the
Executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the
particular field,

70