00 Digest - Special Proceeding (Part 1) (121019)

Rules 72-90 – Settlement of Estate
Silverio vs. Silverio

G.R. Nos. 208828-29, August 13, 2014
Facts: Beatriz Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal
heirs, her husband, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., and their children (Edmundo, Edgardo, Ricardo Silverio, Jr.,
Nelia, and Ligaya). An intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate was filed by Silverio, Sr. In
the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging several orders
of the intestate court that went all the way up to the SC. The administrator first appointed was Edgardo,
who eventually withdrew, and in his stead, Silverio, Sr. was appointed as the new administrator.
Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between
Silverio, Sr. and Jr.
In 2005, Silverio, Sr. was removed as administrator and in his stead was Silverio, Jr. The intestate court
also granted the motion of Silverio, Jr. to take his oath as administrator effective upon receipt of the
order and expunged the inventory report filed by Silverio, Sr. Later, the intestate court acting on the
motion filed by Silverio, Sr. recalled the Order granting letters of administration to Silverio, Jr. and
reinstated Silverio, Sr. as administrator. Then again, the intestate court acting on the motion for partial
consideration to said Order filed by Silverio, Jr. issued an Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006
upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to Silverio, Jr. and removed Silverio, Sr., as
administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions. The intestate court in said Omnibus
Order, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties in Makati City belonging to the estate.
Silverio, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the above Order whereas Nelia on the other hand, filed a
Petition for Certiorari (Certiorari Petition) before the CA with prayer for injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, by virtue of the aforesaid Order, Silverio, Jr. on October 16, 2007 executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Citrine Holdings, Inc. over one of the properties. Citrine became the registered
owner thereof in 2010 as evidenced by a TCT. A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of
Monica Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for the other lot. In 2010, a TCT was issued to
Ocampo. The latter subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. and a TCT was issued in
2011 under its name.
In the Certiorari Petition, on February 29, 2008, the CA issued the WPI. Eventually, on August 28,
2008, the CA rendered a decision reinstating Silverio, Sr. as administrator, the decretal portion of the
Order reads: “The portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and
the taking of an oath of administration by [Silverio, Jr.], as well as the removal of [Silverio, Sr.] as
administrator to the Estate of [Beatriz], are declared NULL and VOID. The [WPI] earlier issued is MADE
PERMANENT in regard to the said portions. [RTC] is ORDERED to reinstate [Silverio, Sr.] as administrator
to the Estate of [Beatriz]…”
Silverio, Jr. filed a Petition for review on Certiorari before the SC (G.R. No. 185619) challenging said
decision of the CA. On February 11, 2009, the SC issued a Resolution denying the petition. Acting on
Silverio, Jr.’s MR, the SC on February 11, 2011, denied the motion with finality. Eventually, Silverio, Sr.
filed before the intestate court, an urgent motion to be reinstated as administrator of the estate, which
was granted. Thereupon, Silverio, Sr. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) to declare as null and void the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 16, 2010; (b) to cancel the TCT issued pursuant thereto; and (c)
to reinstate the TCT in the name of Silverio, Sr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz.
The intestate court rendered a decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale null and void, as well as the
subsequent transfers of the property and the registration of the TCTs. However, the CA reversed the
Order of the intestate court annulling the sale of the subject properties. Hence, this petition contending
that the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of sale of the subject properties upon
the ground that the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and which
does not include resolving issues of ownership.
Issue: Whether or not the probate court has the authority to annul sales despite its limited jurisdiction?
Held: Yes. The probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the authority
not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the
prospective heirs or administrator. Court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent’s estate. The sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the
probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. It is the probate court that has the
power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Secs. 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is
1|Special Proceedings
said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been
closed or terminated. Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property
by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for
a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
Here, the sale of the subject properties was executed by Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate
court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. While it is true that Silverio, Sr. was eventually
reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the decision in the Certiorari Petition filed by Nelia, the
permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the
portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of
administration by Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in
the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject properties . Moreover, the CA Decision attained
finality only on February 11, 2011 when the SC denied with finality Silverio, Jr.’s MR of the February 11,
2009 Resolution denying his petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).
Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by
the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the
intestate court under its Omnibus Order which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the
aforesaid sale.
San Luis vs. San Luis
G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
Facts: During the lifetime of Felicisimo San Luis (former governor of the Province of Laguna), he
contracted three marriages. First, with Virginia Sulit out of which were born 6 children (including
petitioners Edgar and Rodolfo). Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Felicisimo then married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce in
the US, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody. In 1974,
Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis. He had no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death in 1992. Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC-Makati City. Felicidad alleged that she is the
widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico St.,
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are Felicidad as legal
spouse, his 6 children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Felicidad
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to
her.
Rodolfo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
He claimed that the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee. The RTC denied the Motion. Unaware of the denial of the Motion, Felicidad
filed her opposition thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued in the US to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her pursuant to Par. 2 of Art.
26 of the Family Code. Later, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed there, and not in Makati City. It also ruled that Felicidad was without
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
The CA reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC. It ruled that under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the term “place of residence” of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of
a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged
his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City. It also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry Felicidad.
Before the SC, petitioners insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid. They contend that pursuant to the rulings in Nuval v. Guray and Romualdez v. RTC, Br.
7, Tacloban City, “residence” is synonymous with “domicile” which denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any
given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Issue (1): Whether or not the venue was properly laid in Makati City?
Held: Yes. Under Sec. 1, Rule 73, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the RTC of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” “The term
“resides” connotes “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term
“resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules – Sec. 1, Rule 73 is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.”
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, i.e., the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
Here, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Felicidad proved
that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Felicidad submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale in 1983 showing that the deceased purchased
the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital in 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at “100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa.” Felicidad also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city
address is at “100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa” while his office/provincial address is in
“Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.”
From the foregoing, the Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the RTC which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The
subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the RTC
Makati City.
Issue (2): Whether or not Felicidad has legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration?
Held: Yes. [The case was remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo.] Even assuming that
Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad in 1974, nevertheless, the Court finds that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Sec. 6, Rule 78 states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Sec. 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part that: “a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner…” An “interested person” has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
Here, Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo
by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the US, then she may be considered as a co-owner under Art.
144 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, if Felicidad fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Art. 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Art.
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
Agtarap vs. Agtarap
G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011
Facts: Eduardo Agtarap filed with the RTC-Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the
estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap who died intestate (SP No. 94-4055). During his lifetime,
Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia, with whom he had three children—Jesus,
Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children [Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa]). When Lucia died, Joaquin
married Caridad. They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her
daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay
City. Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special administrator
to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a
regular administrator. He also prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the named
compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and
allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c) entitling
the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate individually
awarded to them.
Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the petition, and conceding to the
appointment of Eduardo as special administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin
with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties.
They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the
expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant was
built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of
Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2)
his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the
best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator.
The RTC issued a Resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquin’s estate.
Consequently, it issued him letters of administration. Later, the RTC issued an Order of Partition. On MR,
it declared that the subject properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also
directed the modification of the Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA,
which affirmed the RTC. Before the SC, the parties dispute the jurisdiction of the probate court to resolve
the issue on the ownership of the subject real properties. Sebastian also claims that Joaquin’s estate
could have already been settled after the payment of the inheritance tax.
Issue (1): Whether or not the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the issue on the
ownership of the subject real properties?
Held: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during
the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. A probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse
to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising
general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the
probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each
heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of
Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is
but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
Sec. 2, Rule 73 provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC had
jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal
partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a
settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the
settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s spouse. Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the
estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Issue (2): Whether or not Joaquin’s estate could have already been settled after the payment of the
inheritance tax?
Held: No. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. Under
Sec. 1, Rule 90, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts
of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax.
The records of these cases do not show that these were complied with.
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012
Facts: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate on June 4, 1990. She was survived by her spouse, Dr.
Federico Suntay and 5 grandchildren (3 legitimate, including Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay; and two
illegitimate, including Emilio Suntay III and Nenita) all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio
Suntay I, who predeceased his parents. Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by Sps.
Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, lived with their mother
Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco, whose
marriage was declared as null and void.
More than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren. Isabel filed
before the RTC-Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s
estate. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he
should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel
and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more than 30 years; (4) the enumeration
of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and
Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and
thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the
estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the
properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of
administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing
the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was
better equipped than Isabel to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
Almost a year after Federico died, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed Isabel as
administratrix of the subject estate. On appeal by certiorari, the SC reversed and set aside the ruling of
the CA. It decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his
interest in Federico’s estate.
In this MR, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the CA’s Decision in favor of her sole administratorship
based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer. Isabel
contends that the explicit provisions of Sec. 6, Rule 78 on the order of preference for the issuance of
letters of administration cannot be ignored. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated
adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator
thereof. Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an
heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a “next of kin” of the decedent, has no
interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations since
his appointment as administrator by the RTC emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the
order of preference; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no “opposing parties or
factions to be represented.”
Issue: Whether or not the co-administratorship between Emilio III and Isable is proper?
Held: No. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down
in Sec. 6, Rule 78: “If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving [spouse], or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving [spouse], or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing
to serve;
(b) If such surviving [spouse], or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the surviving [spouse], or next of kin, neglects for 30 days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Sec. 6, Rule 78
takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the
estate. Given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but
an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator of

a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception.
Reference is made to Sec. 6(a) of Rule 78 which specifically states that letters of administration may be
issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, reference can be made
to Sec. 2 of Rule 82 which says that “when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone.”
Mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person
to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate
the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Sec. 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest
in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the
estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest “next of kin,” the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a
matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate
makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be
an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s
appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Lee vs. RTC of QC
G.R. No. 146006, February 23, 2004
Facts: Dr. Juvencio Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc.
(Philinterlife), in which he owned 90% of the subscribed capital stock. He died leaving behind a wife
(Juliana), 3 legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and 5 illegitimate children (Ma. Divina
Ortañez-Enderes, et al.). Rafael filed before the RTC-Quezon City a petition for letters of administration of
the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez. Enderes, et al. filed an opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special
administrator. The RTC appointed Rafael and Jose as joint special administrators of their father’s estate.
Rafael and Jose submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included the 2,029 shares of
stock in (Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the company’s outstanding capital stock. Juliana,
claiming that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said
shares with right to repurchase in favor of petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented
by its president, petitioner Jose Lee. Juliana failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated
period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name. Jose, acting in his
personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of FLAG. FLAG
consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose failed to repurchase
the same. It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings at the RTC-Quezon City), Juliana and her two children, Rafael and Jose, entered into a MOA
for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including the
Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately
sold by Juliana and Jose in favor of FLAG.
Enderes, et al. filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock,
which the intestate court granted and appointed Enderes special administratrix of the said shares of
stock. Enderes then filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the subject MOA. Later, she filed a
motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate. Enderes, et
al. filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock. All
these foregoing motions were opposed by Jose. He then filed an omnibus motion for the approval of the
deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and the release of Enderes as special administratrix of
the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to
administer. The intestate court denied the omnibus motion for the approval of the deeds of sale for the
reason that they were entered into without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the
Estate. The intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Enderes for the annulment of the
MOA insofar as the Philinterlife shares of stocks are concerned.
Jose filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, which was denied. The matter was elevated the case to the
SC which was dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His MR was denied with finality on
January 13, 1999. On February 23, 1999, the Resolution of the SC dismissing the petition of Jose became
final and was subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
Enderes, et al. filed a motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court because the orders of the
intestate court nullifying the sale had long became final, which was granted. Petitioners subsequently
filed before the CA a petition for certiorari, alleging that the intestate court gravely abused its discretion
in (1) declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock was null and void; (2)
ordering the execution of its order declaring such nullity and (3) depriving the petitioners of their right to
due process. The CA dismissed the petition outright. Petitioners elevated the case to the SC which initially
denied the petition. However, upon MR filed by the petitioners, the SC granted the motion and reinstated
their petition.
Meanwhile, Enderes filed a motion to direct the branch clerk of court in lieu of Lee and Aggabao to
reinstate the name of Dr. Ortañez in the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the
corresponding stock certificate. Lee and Aggabao opposed the motion on the ground that the intestate
court should refrain from acting on the motion because the issues raised therein were directly related to
the issues raised by them in their petition for certiorari at the CA. The intestate court granted the motion,
ruling that there was no prohibition for the intestate court to execute its orders inasmuch as the CA did
not issue any TRO or WPI. Lee and Aggabao filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, questioning this time
the order of the intestate court directing the branch clerk of court to issue the stock certificates. They
also questioned in the CA the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale made in their favor by Juliana
and Jose. The CA denied their petition and upheld the power of the intestate court to execute its order.
Now, before the SC, petitioners assail not only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate
court but also the validity order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock
made by Juliana and Jose, in their personal capacities and without court approval, in favor of FLAG.
Issue (1): Whether or not the petitioners may still raise the validity order of the intestate court nullifying
the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock?
Held: No. It is clear that Juliana, and her three sons, invalidly entered into a MOA extrajudicially
partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs
or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the
appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana and her children was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof
by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale
of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate
property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or
probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of
estate property before final adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale was affirmed by the CA and the
SC in 1998. The finality of the decision of the SC was entered in the book of entry of judgments on
February 23, 1999. Considering the finality of the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as
affirmed by the appellate courts, it was correct for Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of execution and
for the intestate court to grant it. Petitioners, however, contend that the probate court could not issue a
writ of execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale because said order was merely provisional.
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on the facts of this case, that the
Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate of Dr. Ortañez from the very start as in fact these
shares were included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael Ortañez after he
and his brother, Jose Ortañez, were appointed special administrators by the intestate court.
The controversy here actually started when, during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr.
Ortañez, his wife Juliana sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock in favor petitioner FLAG without the
approval of the intestate court. Her son Jose later sold the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares also in
favor of FLAG without the approval of the intestate court. We are not dealing here with the issue of
inclusion or exclusion, of properties in the inventory of the estate because there is no question that, from
the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr. Ortañez. Rather, we are
concerned here with the effect of the sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana and Jose, without the
required approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the
determination of the intestate court was merely provisional and should have been threshed out in a
separate proceeding is incorrect.
Issue (2): Whether or not the writ of execution should not be executed against the petitioners because
they were not notified, nor they were aware, of the proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of stock?
Held: No. The title of the purchaser, like FLAG, can be struck down by the intestate court after a clear
showing of the nullity of the alienation. The sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or
prospective heir without order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. Thus, the probate court may cancel the transfer certificate of title issued to the vendees at the
instance of the administrator after finding that the sale of real property under probate proceedings was
made without the prior approval of the court.
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only to them, did not appeal the decision of the
intestate court nullifying the sale of shares of stock in their favor. Only the vendor, Jose, appealed the
case. A careful review of the records shows that petitioners had actual knowledge of the estate
settlement proceedings and that they knew Enderes was questioning therein the sale to them of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.
10 | S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s
Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA
G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996
Facts: Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond. The testator
named Edmond executor of his estate. Immediately after the death of Hilario, the cash component of his
estate was distributed among Edmond and private respondents in accordance with the decedent’s will.
However, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father’s will. Four
years after the testator’s death, it was Montes who filed before the RTC-Pasig, a petition for the probate
and approval of Hilario’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond.
One of the properties of the estate—Valle Verde property bequeathed to the granddaughters—was leased
out by Edmond to third persons. The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of
Court (BCC) the rental deposit and payments totalling representing the lease of the Valle Verde property.
In compliance, Edmond turned over the amount representing the balance of the rent after deducting a
portion thereof for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate. Later, Edmond moved for the release
of an amount to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate, which the probate court
approved. Consequently, the probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond upon his filing of the required bond.
The Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond as executor, filed an “ Ex-Parte Motion for Release of
Funds,” praying for the release of the rent payments deposited with the BCC. Montes opposed the motion
and concurrently filed a “Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs” and “Motion for Issuance of
Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will.” Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to the
granddaughters and for the distribution of the testator’s properties, specifically the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
The probate court denied Edmond’s motion for release of funds but granted Montes’ motion in view of
Edmond’s lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent’s
granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties
bequeathed to the granddaughters and Montes upon the filing of a bond. Edmond moved for
reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to Montes’ motion for release of rent
payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Edmond likewise reiterated his previous motion
for release of funds. Later, Edmond manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of funds
in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed.
Despite Edmond’s manifestation, the probate court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only
“such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support”
of the testator’s granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.
The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to Montes and the granddaughters until the
lapse of 6 months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. Edmond assailed this order
before the CA. Finding no grave abuse of discretion, the CA dismissed the petition and sustained the
probate court’s order. Hence, this petition.
Issue (1): Whether or not whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before
payment of the estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of
the estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren?
Held: No. Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court provides: “The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.” Allowances for support under said section
should not be limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the deceased. During the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, the deceased’s legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil
status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. Be that as
it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The
law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it to the deceased’s
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
Issue (2): Whether or not whether the probate court has the authority to order the release of the titles
to certain heirs?
Held: No. The courts a quo also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
properties to private respondents 6 months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. In
settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all
the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
Here, the questioned order speaks of “notice” to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario
allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate.
If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the
said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the
order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles 6 months after
admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.
The intrinsic validity of Hilario’s holographic will was controverted by Edmond before the probate court in
his Reply to Montes’ Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his MR of the order of the said
court. Therein, Edmons assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his
father’s will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of
his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent
and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as
in ordinary cases.
Issue (3): Whether or not whether the probate court has the authority to grant possession of all
properties of the estate to the executor of the will?
Held: No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration , as explicitly provided
by Sec. 3 of Rule 84. When Edmond moved for further release of the funds deposited with the BCC, he
had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses
on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But Edmond moved again
for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate
court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before
releasing any further money in his favor. It was relevantly noted by the probate court that Edmond had
deposited with it only a portion of the rental income from the Valle Verde property. Edmond did not
deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such
funds.
Edmond must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate
as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his
father’s estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all
his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real
and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination
by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
Union Bank vs. Santibanez
G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005
Facts: First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement.
The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of a tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note (PN) in favor of the FCCC. Later, FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of
the same tractor, with accessories, and a unit of a different tractor. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a PN in favor of the FCCC. In addition, a continuing guaranty agreement was also executed.
Later, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC-Iloilo City.
Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency
of the testate proceedings, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a “Joint Agreement,” wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the 3 tractors. Each of them was to assume
the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
Meanwhile, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor assigned all its assets and liabilities
to said Bank. Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by Union Bank of the Philippines
(UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, UBP filed a Complaint
for sum of money against the Heirs of Efraim, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC-Makati City. Only
Florence was served with summons, who filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not
bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to UBP
under the joint agreement.
The complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The trial court found that the claim of UBP should have
been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim was pending (RTC-
Iloilo City), as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial
court also found that the Joint Agreement was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent, which
is void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court.
The CA affirmed the said decision. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and
void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, the
provision of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the
deceased referred to them as “all other properties.”
Issue (1): Whether or not the Joint Agreement executed by Edmund and Florence is valid?
Held: No. A probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of
the estate. The rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will. Here, the deceased, Efraim, left a holographic will which contained a provision
which reads as follows: “All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later
after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.”
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may
acquire thereafter. Included therein are the subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the
said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The Joint Agreement executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there
was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said
tractors.
The probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased,
including the tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount
to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint
agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative,
and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. Here,
there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent.
When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to
determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and Florence to adjudicate unto
themselves the tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors
who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
Issue (2): Whether or not Edmund and Florence’s assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is
binding?
Held: No. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto “ have agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them
to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of
[FCCC].” The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, i.e., that each heir
shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on
the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid, the heirs in effect did not receive any such
tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The loan was contracted by the decedent. UBP, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim, should have
thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether
it is a proper one which should be allowed.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred
by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the PNs and the continuing
guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the Efraim and Edmund. As UBP failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund
may have as against UBP. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, it is
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Facts: Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon, represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the RTC-Las Piñas City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo Quiazon having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation
to the decedent, Elise attached to the Petition her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.
In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left vast amounts of real and personal properties. In order
to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment
as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, the petitioners opposed the issuance of the
Letters of Administration. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Thus, the petition for
settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratrix of Eliseo’s estate.
The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
RTC ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the
position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. On appeal,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA. In validating the findings of the RTC, the CA
held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from
1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
Eliseo’s estate, the CA upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las
Piñas City. The petitioners’ MR was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Issue (1): Whether or not the venue was properly laid in Las Piñas City?
Held: Yes. Under Sec. 1, Rule 73, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death: “Where
estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the [RTC] in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the [RTC] of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.”
The term “resides” connotes “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This
term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules — Sec. 1, Rule 73 is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence”
and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and
the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No.
26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement
of his estate may be laid in the said city.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of
his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. It was found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
properties against Amelia before the RTC-Quezon City on the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law
renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and
her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings
arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
Issue (2): Whether or not Elise has interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration?
Held: Yes. Sec. 6, Rule 78 lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus: “When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving [spouse], or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving [spouse], or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing
to serve;
(b) If such surviving [spouse], or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the surviving [spouse], or next of kin, neglects for 30 days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.”
Upon the other hand, Sec. 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed
by an “interested person.” An interested party, in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship
with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.
Here, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove
her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway the Court to reverse the findings of the CA.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts
of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
Pilapil vs. Heirs of Briones
G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007
Facts: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones, consisting of her surviving sister,
Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila; Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda Pilapil; and the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in
representation of her two other deceased sisters. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the
late Maximino Briones, composed of his nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did
not produce any children. When Maximino died on May 1, 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings
to settle her husband’s estate with the CFI-Cebu City.
The CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate.
She submitted an Inventory of Maximino’s properties. On January 15, 1960, the CFI subsequently
issued an Order (CFI Order) awarding ownership of the subject real properties to Donata, who caused it
to be recorded in the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said
properties, now in her name on June 27, 1960. When Donata died, Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces,
instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her
husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.
On January 21, 1985, Silverio Briones, a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters
of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. Gregorio
then filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were already
under his and his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
On March 3, 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for
the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and
without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.
The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Maximino. It declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to
½ of the subject properties. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said
properties and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The SC,
in its Decision, reversed the Decisions of the CA and RTC, and dismissed the Complaint for partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino. The SC held that
the heirs of Maximino failed to prove that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties,
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no
implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino. Donata was able to register the
real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to the CFI Order. The CFI Order,
presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real
properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband.
Issue (1): Whether Donata committed fraud in securing the CFI Order which declared her as the sole
heir of her deceased husband and authorized her to have Maximino’s properties registered in her name?
Held: No. Donata was able to secure certificates of title to the disputed properties by virtue of the CFI
Order in the proceedings she instituted to settle Maximino’s intestate estate, which declared her as
Maximino’s sole heir. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the Court accorded to said proceedings the
presumptions of regularity and validity. While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino
still had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal
notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether
testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the
filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner
prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in
newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of
the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the
publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of
compliance therewith. The Court cannot find any reason or explanation as to why Maximino’s siblings
could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother. Moreover, even if
Donata’s allegation that she was Maximino’s sole heir does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify
abandonment of the CFI Order.
Issue (2): Whether or not respondents’ right to recover their shares in the estate is imprescriptible?
Held: No. An implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to prescription and laches. Since an
implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by Art. 1456 of the Civil Code), then
respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s
properties. The general rule is that an action for reconveyance of real property based on implied trust
prescribes 10 years from registration and/or issuance of the title to the property, not only because
registration under the Torrens system is a constructive notice of title, but also because by registering the
disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any other
claim to the same. By virtue of the CFI Order, dated January 15, 1960, Donata was able to register and
secure certificates of title over the disputed properties in her name on June 27, 1960. The respondents
filed with the RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed
real properties only on March 3, 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said properties in the
name of Donata. Therefore, respondents’ action for recovery of possession of the disputed properties had
clearly prescribed.
Moreover, even though respondents’ Complaint before the RTC also prays for partition of the disputed
properties, it does not make their action to enforce their right to the said properties imprescriptible. While
as a general rule, the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-
ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, it bears to emphasize that Donata had never recognized
respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly. Her assertion before the CFI that she
was Maximino’s sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir to the
inherited properties. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned
in common does not apply to the case at bar.
Issue (3): Whether or not the respondents’ right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based
on implied trust, is barred by laches?
Held: Yes. The defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced,
applies independently of prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is
equitable. Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to
assert it.
Here, the heirs of Maximino even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street as some of the
siblings of Maximino. This works against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby, Maximino’s
siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the status of the estate of their
deceased brother. Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate of Maximino, were also
located within the same area as their residences, and Maximino’s siblings could have regularly observed
the actions and behavior of Donata with regard to the said real properties. It is uncontested that from the
time of Maximino’s, Donata had possession of the real properties. She managed the real properties and
even collected rental fees on some of them until her own death. After Donata’s death, Erlinda took
possession of the real properties, and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon.
Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of ownership over the real
properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they
truly believed that they still had rights thereto. The heirs of Maximino knew he died. They even attended
his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from Maximino’s death
before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of
Maximino in 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled, they waited
another two years, before instituting the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real
property belonging to the estate of Maximino.
Sabidong vs. Solas
A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013
Facts: Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the long-time occupants of a parcel of land
(Lot 11) originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated in Jaro, Iloilo City. The Sabidongs
are in possession of ½ portion of Lot 11 of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other ½ was occupied
by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate (Civil Case
No. 14706) with the MTCC-Iloilo City. On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering
the Saplagio to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the rentals due,
attorney’s fees, expenses and costs. At the time, Nicolasito Solas was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC,
Iloilo City.
In 1984, Soalas submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the
Hodges Estate rejected Solas’ offer in view of an application to purchase already filed by the actual
occupant of Lot 12, “in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the actual occupants in
awarding approval of Offers”. Solas was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot
11 and that if he could put up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for
approval of the Probate Court so that the property can be awarded to him “should the occupant fail to
avail of the priority given to them.” In 1986, Solas again submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11. Under
the Order issued by the probate court (RTC-Iloilo) in Special Proceedings No. 1672, Solas’ Offer to
Purchase Lot 11 was approved. The probate court issued another Order granting Solas’ motion for
issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of possession over Lot 11 was eventually issued.
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale with Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed between Solas and
the Hodges Estate represented by its Administratrix, Ruth Diocares. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to
Solas. Consequently, the TCT in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a one in the name of Solas
was issued. Lot 11 was later subdivided into two lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for which the corresponding
titles, also in the name of Solas, were issued.
On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the Hodges Estate, a writ of demolition was issued by
the probate court in favor of Solas and against all adverse occupants of Lot 11. Later, the SC received a
sworn letter-complaint filed by Rodolfo Sabidong asserting that as court employee, Solas cannot buy
property in litigation pursuant to under Art. 1491, Par. 5 of the Civil Code. Sabidong and his siblings, are
possessors and occupants of Lot 11.
Issue: Whether or not Solas violated the rule on disqualification to purchase property?
Held: No. Art. 1491, Par. 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers – justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice – from acquiring by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession.
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised
by these persons. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of Par. 5, Art. 1491 attaches.
Here, when Solas purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which
was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the
property is no longer “in litigation” at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then
under settlement proceedings. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or
litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation
until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule
is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC-
Iloilo had already been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With
Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be “in litigation” subject to the operation of
Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, the Court held that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of Solas did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court
(RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
Aranas vs. Mercado
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
Facts: Emigdio Mercado died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita, and their five children; and
his two children by his first marriage (respondent Franklin Mercado and petitioner Thelma Aranas).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation. He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir
Realty.
Thelma filed in the RTC-Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
Emigdio’s estate, which the RTC granted. The letters of administration were consequently issued in favor
of Teresita. Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate indicating therein that at the time of Emigdio’s
death, he had left no real properties but only personal properties consisting of cash, furniture and
fixtures, pieces of jewelry, 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty, and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory,
Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it.
The RTC granted Thelma’s motion. Teresita filed a compliance with the order supporting her inventory
with copies of certificates of stocks covering the Mervir Realty shares of stock; the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio involving real properties in exchange for the Mervir Realty shares of stock; and the
certificate of stock issued for the shares of stock of Cebu Emerson.
On March 14, 2001, the RTC issued an Order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita
had excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly ordered Teresita to re-do the inventory
of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio by including therein the
subject properties and then submit the revised inventory.
Teresita, et al. sought the reconsideration of said Order on the ground that one of the real properties
affected, a lot, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed
of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty. The
CA opined that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had
been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime.
Issue (1): Whether or not certiorari was the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
Held: Yes. A final order disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to
be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case ? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.
Here, the assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory
and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as
basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at any time
during the course of the administration proceedings. The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the
parties.
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the
assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 41, which also
governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions)
of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that
an interlocutory order or resolution is expressly made non-appealable.
The assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, do not come under any of the instances in which
multiple appeals are permitted. Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical
recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the
special proceedings. Sec. 1, Rule 109 enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be
resorted to in special proceedings, viz.: “An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an
order or judgment rendered, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate
to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or
any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of
the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.”
Issue (2): Whether or not the order of inclusion was attended by grave abuse of discretion?
Held: No. Under Sec. 6(a), Rule 78, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the
court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate.
Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct
the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse,
as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within 3 months from the
issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 83, viz.: “Within 3 months after his
appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal
of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge…”
The usage of the word all in Sec. 1 demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his
possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to
belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Sec. 1 allows no exception, for the
phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded
from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
Here, it is clear that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of
the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001. Firstly, the shares in the properties
inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al.
did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio. Secondly, with Emigdio and
Teresita’s property regime was conjugal partnership of gains. For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s
estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. Lastly,
the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of
resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Art. 1061 of the Civil Code
required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass
of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed
in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.” Sec. 2, Rule 90 also
provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir .” Rule 90 thereby expanded
the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the
inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was
best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of
the estate.
Butiong vs. Plazo
G.R. No. 187524, August 5, 2015
Facts: On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his
children with his first wife (respondents Ma. Gracia Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras), as well as several properties
including a resort and a family home both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. In their Amended Complaint
for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents alleged that
sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio and
other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners (spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong), who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel Villafria, without their knowledge
and consent. Benita acknowledged the sale showing respondents a document she believed evidenced
receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan
obtained by Pedro and Benita releasing them from their indebtedness. Respondents found that the
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu has no record of any transaction involving the subject properties.
Respondents also discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished.
Subsequently, respondents learned that about a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their
late father. Thus, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties and filed
their complaint praying for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the
petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal
knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. Francisco further contended that what they
purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation,
Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides that respondents’ co-heirs sold the family
home to Sps. Bondoc as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners.
The trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and Sps. Bondoc due to
irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the same. On the basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son
Ruel, filed a MR raising the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for
Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no
settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of
the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate of
Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was for Judidal Partition. Considering that the
instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its probate
jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus,
petitioner argued that. Said ruling is void and has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
The MR was denied by the CA.
On appeal, the SC denied petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting a defective
verification and a certificate of non-forum shopping. The SC also denied petitioner's MR. Petitioner’s 2 nd
MR was noted without action. Thus, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Partial Writ of Execution of its
Decision with respect to the portions disposing of petitioner’s claims as affirmed by the CA. The foregoing
notwithstanding, petitioner filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Order before the CA assailing
RTC Decision on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and
affirmed the rulings of the RTC. When the CA denied petitioner’s MR, petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents should have filed a special proceeding for the settlement of
estate instead of an action for judicial partition?
Held: No. It is true that some of respondents’ causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by
the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon, may fall under
an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show
that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is
clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession. Sec. 1, Rule 74
provides: “Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.—If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition…”
In this relation, Sec. 1, Rule 69 provides: “Complaint in action for partition of real estate.—A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth
in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested
in the property.”
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their complaint are
but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint
alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their coheirs, are all of legal
age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the
purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account
and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro’s estate has no known indebtedness;
and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in
accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the
complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying
the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an
action for settlement of estate.
The general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will
or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the
Rules of Court, then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall
appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Sec. 6 of Rule 78. An exception to this rule,
however, is found in the afore-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will
and no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for
partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there
is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive
the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.
Here, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will,
leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents
were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate to a special proceeding for
settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extrajudicially. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. Thus, it
has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be
paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings.
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law. That the complaint
contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not mean that there was a
prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to the estate’s properties as well as a
determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate,
may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone. In fact, a complete inventory of the estate
may likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Indeed,
where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled
to submit to administration proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being
dissipated.
Rule 91 – Escheat
Alvarico vs. Sola

G.R. No. 138953, June 6, 2002
Facts: The Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of Fermina
Lopez over Lot 5 at the Waterfront, Cebu City. Lopez executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer
of Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Lopez’s adoptive daughter, Amelita Sola, who agreed to assume all the
obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Lopez under the MSA. The Bureau issued an order
approving the transfer of rights and granting the amendment of the application from Lopez to Sola. Then,
an OCT was issued in favor of Sola. Sola’s biological father Castorio Alvarico filed a case for reconveyance
against Sola. He claimed that Lopez donated Lot 5 to him and immediately thereafter, he took possession
of the same. He averred that the donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to
Sola. For her part, Sola maintained that the donation to Alvarico is void because Lopez was no longer the
owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to Alvarico, the property having been transferred
earlier to her. She added that the donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau, and
that she had validly acquired the land as Lopez’s rightful heir. The RTC ruled in favor of Alvarico; but the
CA reversed this decision. Before the SC, Alvarico claims that Sola was in bad faith when she registered
the land in her name and, as he (Alvarico) has a better right over the property because he was first in
material possession in good faith.
Issue: Whether or not Alvarico has a legal standing to question the validity of Sola’s title?
Held: No. Even assuming that Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the State can
institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Thus: “All actions for reversion to
the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.” In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action
which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on
the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since Sola’s title originated from a grant by
the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, Alvarico
has no standing at all to question the validity of Sola’s title. It follows that he cannot “recover” the
property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.
Maltos vs. Heirs of Borromeo
G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015
Facts: In 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued a Free Patent over a piece of agricultural land located in
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, covered by an OCT. In 1983, well within the 5-year prohibitory period,
Borromeo sold the land to Maltos. Borromeo later on died. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he
allegedly told his wife and his children to nullify the sale made to Maltos and have the TCT cancelled
because the sale was within the 5-year prohibitory period. Thus, the Heirs of Borromeo filed a Complaint
for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title against Sps. Maltos. Sps. Maltos filed their Answer, arguing
that the sale was made in good faith and that in purchasing the property, they relied on Borromeo’s title.
Since the sale was made during the 5-year prohibitory period, the land would revert to the public domain
and the proper party to institute reversion proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor General.
The trial court dismissed the Complaint. It ruled that the sale was null and void because it was within the
5-year prohibitory period under the Public Land Act, thus, such transfer resulted in the cancellation of the
grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. The trial court further held that since the sale
was null and void, no title passed from Borromeo to Maltos.
The CA reversed the Decision of the trial court and held that since Borromeo sold his property within the
5-year prohibitory period, the property should revert to the state. However, the government has to file an
action for reversion because “reversion is not automatic.” While there is yet no action for reversion
instituted by the OSG, the property should be returned to the heirs of Borromeo.
Issue: Whether or not the Heirs of Borromeo have the legal personality to institute the present action?
Held: No. Reversion is a remedy provided under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act: “All actions for the
reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted
by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
[Republic] of the Philippines.” The purpose of reversion is to restore public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain.” The general rule is that
reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, and the OSG is the proper party to file an action
for reversion.
The “remedy of reversion” is not the same as the “remedy of declaration of nullity of free patents and
certificate of title.” In reversion, the “allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land,” while in an action for the declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title, the
allegations would include “plaintiff’s ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of the free
patent and certificate of title.
Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the state, it is proper
that the action be filed by the OSG, being the real party-in-interest. There is, however, an exception to
the rule that reversion is not automatic. Sec. 29 of the PLA provides: “After the cultivation of the land
has begun, the purchaser, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may convey
or encumber his rights to any person, corporation, or association legally qualified under this Act to
purchase agricultural public lands, provided such conveyance or encumbrance does not affect any right
or interest of the Government in the land: And provided, further, That the transferee is not delinquent in
the payment of any installment due and payable. Any sale and encumbrance made without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and
shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights
to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government
shall be forfeited. After the sale has been approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire
agricultural public lands under the provisions of this Act, provided he has the necessary qualifications.”
In Francisco v. Rodriguez, et al., the Court differentiated reversion under Secs. 29 and 101 of the PLA.
Reversion under Sec. 29 is self-operative, unlike Sec. 101 which requires the OSG to institute reversion
proceedings. Also, Sec. 101 applies in cases where “title has already vested in the individual.
Here, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio Borromeo. This shows that he
already had title to the property when he sold it to Eliseo Maltos. Thus, Sec. 101 of the PLA applies.
Discussion: Francisco was covered by Sec. 29 and not Sec. 101 of the PLA: “By transgressing the law,
i.e., allowing herself to be a dummy in the acquisition of the land and selling the same without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Francisco has eliminated the
very source (Sales Application) of her claim to the lot, as a consequence of which, she cannot later assert
any right or interest thereon… The invalidity of the conveyance by Francisco “produced as a consequence
the reversion of the property with all rights thereto to the State.” As a matter of fact, Sec. 29 of the
Public Land Law (CA 141) expressly ordains that any sale and encumbrance made without the previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources “shall be null and void and shall produce
the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting property and all rights thereto to the State, and all
payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited.” … In fact, even
if a sales application were already given due course by the Director of Lands, the applicant is not thereby
conferred any right over the land covered by the application. It is the award made by the Director to the
applicant (if he is the highest bidder) that confers upon him a certain right over the land, namely, “to
take possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law.” It is at this
stage, when the award is made, that the land can be considered “disposed of by the Government,” since
the afore-stated right of the applicant has the effect of withdrawing the land from the public domain that
is “disposable” by the Director of Lands under the provisions of the PLA… However, the disposition is
merely provisional because the applicant has still to comply with the requirements prescribed by law
before any patent is issued. After the requisites of the law are complied with by the applicant to the
satisfaction of the Director of Lands, the patent is issued. It is then that the land covered by the
application may be considered “permanently disposed of by the Government.”
Narcise vs. Valbueco
G.R. No. 196888, July 19, 2017
Facts: Valbueco, Inc. filed an action for Annulment of the Free Patents, Certificates of Title and Damages
against petitioners Narcise, et al., the DENR and the Register of Deeds of Bataan before the RTC.
Valbueco alleged that it is the possessor of the subject lots in an actual, peaceful, adverse and peaceful
possession since 1970. Valbueco averred that from 1977 until 1999, OCTs, Free Patents and TCTs
covering the lots in question were issued in the name of the petitioners. The latter filed several Motions
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, failure to state cause of action, defect in the
certificate of non-forum shopping and prescription. The RTC issued granted the petitioners’ motions. The
RTC ruled that the instant case is an action for reversion because the petitioners are not qualified to be
issued said free patents. As such, the land must revert back to the State. Thus, it is the OSG who is the
real party-in-interest, and not Valbueco.
Issue: Whether or not the instant case is actually a reversion case, and not a case for annulment of free
patents and certificates of title?
Held: No. It is a case for annulment. An action for reversion, a remedy provided under CA 141, seeks to
cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the
transfer of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through
fraud and misrepresentation. In cancelling and nullifying such title, it restores the public land fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. Such action
is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code.
On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks for the
cancellation and nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it does not operate
to revert the property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity arises not from
fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to
bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty
whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint
would admit State ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for annulment of patent and
certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with plaintiff’s ownership of the contested land prior to the
issuance of the same as well as defendant’s fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these documents
of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
A careful perusal of respondent’s complaint reads: “3. That the herein plaintiff has been in the actual,
peaceful, adverse, continuous and peaceful possession since sometime in 1970 and up to the
present time, by itself and its predecessor-in-interest, some of which it acquired by transfer of rights,
claims, interest as evidence [sic] by the documents… and the rest by occupation and planting of root
crops and other including trees… 4. That the plaintiff and its workers and employees of its ranches and
the cultivation and planting of different root crops and trees were always in the premises since 1970
or thereabouts, and their presence were never disturbed nor molested by anybody until sometime in the
year 2000.”
In this view, the Court held that the action is one of annulment of patents and titles. The allegations in
the complaint show that Valbueco asserts its ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive
prescription. The allegations in the complaint sufficiently show that Valbueco claims its ownership right by
expounding on its uninterrupted possession of the same for a period of at least 35 years. Also, Valbueco’s
claim of its possession in a public, peaceful and uninterrupted manner constitutes an allegation of
ownership by acquisitive prescription. Being an action for annulment of patents and titles, it is Valbueco
who is the real party-in-interest for it is the one claiming title or ownership adverse to that of the
registered owner.
Republic vs. Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera
G.R. No. 218418, November 8, 2017
Facts: In 1971, Meynardo Cabrera filed an Application for Free Patent concerning a parcel of land
situated in Pining, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. In said application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in
possession of such parcel of land since 1936, through his predecessor-in-interest Marcelo Cabrera. In the
same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued a Free Patent in favor of Meynardo, covering two lots (Lot
1 and Lot 2). On the basis of said patent, the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro issued an OCT
covering both lots in Meynardo’s name. Thereafter, a portion of Lot 1 (Lot 1-A) was transferred to
Consolacion. Thus, a TCT covering Lot 1-A was issued in Consolacion’s name. Later still, Consolacion sold
portions of Lot 1-A to several purchasers (Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, Calma, and Liwanag). Learning of the
issuance of the TCT, Jose and Leticia De Castro, claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A, filed
before the DENR a petition urging DENR to conduct an investigation to determine Lot 1-A’s land
classification status. Consequently, in the DENR Report, the Free Patent covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2
(Roxas Properties), was declared null and void for having been issued over land forming part of the
public domain.
Later, the Republic filed against the Respondents a complaint for the annulment and/or cancellation of
Free Patent, OCT, and TCT. The Complaint also prayed for the reversion of the Roxas Properties in the
State's favor. The Republic based its claim on the DENR Report; and National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority (NAMRIA) certifications, all stating that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A)
had been reclassified as forest land as early as November 24, 1949. The statements in these documents
were, in turn, based on the inscriptions appearing on Land Classification Map covering the Roxas
Properties. The Republic reasoned that while the LC Map indicates that the parcels of land thereunder
were classified as alienable and disposable at the time it was prepared, a subsequent annotation made
thereon indicates that they were reclassified as forest land sometime thereafter, and had thus become
inalienable.
In their respective answers, the Respondents averred, among others, that: (i) Lot 1-A forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as evidenced by the original statements appearing on
the LC Map; (ii) the annotations appearing on the LC Map do not serve as sufficient proof of reversion;
and (iii) the land area which had been purportedly reclassified as forest land was not properly identified
since the Republic failed to present the technical description corresponding thereto. In addition to these
common assertions, respondents Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, and Liwanag further averred that they acquired
portions of Lot 1-A from Consolacion in good faith, and have, since then, been in actual, exclusive, open,
and continuous possession of their respective portions as owners.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, dismissed the complaint. It found that the Republic failed to present
proof that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) have been reclassified as forest land. It held that in
order to prove reversion of alienable and disposable land to forest land, a positive government act
evincing the same is necessary.
Issue: Whether or not the failure on the part of the Republic to show a positive act of the government to
evince the reclassification of land from alienable and disposable to forest is fatal?
Held: Yes. In reversion proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving that the property in question
was inalienable at the time it was decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant. A land registration
proceeding is the manner through which an applicant confirms title to real property. In this proceeding,
the applicant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. Accordingly, the
applicant is bound to establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered
had been declared alienable or disposable through a positive act of the State.
Conversely, reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to revert land to the mass
of the public domain; it is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of in favor of
private individuals or corporations, or when a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which
includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system as they form part of
the public domain. Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a favorable
decision therein entails, the State bears the burden to prove that the land previously decreed or
adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be owned by private individuals.
Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of registered titles through the cancellation of the
original title and the others that emanate from it, the State bears a heavy burden of proving the
ground for its action.
In Republic v. Espinosa, the Court held that the dismissal of the Republic's action for reversion is proper
since the Republic failed to establish that the land subject thereof was classified as forest land at the
time the cadastral decree in favor of the defendant was issued: “It is undisputed that Espinosa
was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued an OCT. Having been granted a decree in a
cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought
to be registered forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to
prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral
proceedings. In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor
misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa's favor. The
argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title
because it is of the public domain. Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration,
the burden is on the State to prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the
time it was decreed to Espinosa. To reiterate, there is no burden on the present owner to prove that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that
Espinosa, from whom the present owner derives her title, had already established that the property is
alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. In this
reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the
property in Espinosa's title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the
burden of proof rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts
the affirmative of an issue.”
Here, the Complaint should be dismissed as the Republic failed to show that the Roxas Properties
(including Lot 1-A) were classified as forest land at the time the Free Patent was issued in Meynardo's
favor.
Rules 92-97 – Guardians and Guardianship
Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo

G.R. No. 147148, January 13, 2003
Facts: Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed at the RTC of Makati a “Petition for Letters of Guardianship” over
the person and properties of her sister Julieta Ledesma. She alleged that for the most part during the
year 1995 and 1996, Julieta has been a patient in the Makati Medical Center (MMC) where she is under
medical attention for old age, general debility, and a “mini”-stroke which she suffered in the US in early
1995; that Julieta is confined to her bed and cannot get up from bed without outside assistance; that
Julieta owns real estate and personal properties with an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of
P1 Million; that Julieta needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in ongoing corporate
and agricultural enterprises; that the nearest of kin of Julieta are her sisters of the full blood (including
Amparo), all of whom have given their consent to the filing of the petition; that Amparo has extensive
experience in business management of commercial, agricultural and corporate enterprises, many of which
are in the same entities where Julieta holds an interest, and that she is in a position to monitor and
supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical services to Julieta whether in the Metro Manila area, or
elsewhere.
Pilar Goyena filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship, alleging that the petition
lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to
appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property; that she is very able to take charge of her
affairs, and this is clearly evident from her letters to Pilar; that Amparo is not fit to be appointed as the
guardian of Julieta since their interests are antagonistic; that in the event that the Court should find that
Julietais incompetent and resolve that there is need to appoint a guardian over her person and property,
the Court should appoint as such guardian: oppositor Pilar. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found Julieta
“incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property” and appointed Amparo as
guardian of her person and properties.
Issue: Whether or Amparo is suitable to be appointed as guardian of Julieta?
Held: Yes. In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly
with the parties. As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting
the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged
by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen
into grievous error.
Here, Pilar has not shown that the lower courts committed any error. Pilar cannot rely on Garchitorena v.
Sotelo with respect to the existence of antagonistic interests between Amparo and Julieta. In that case,
the interest of Gabriel as creditor and mortgagee of the minor-wards’ properties is antagonistic to the
interests of the wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel’s appointment as guardian was erroneous. For while
he sought to foreclose the wards’ properties as creditor and mortgagee on one hand, he had to, on the
other hand, endeavor to retain them for the wards as their guardian. Added to that was Gabriel’s
appointment as guardian without him informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on the
properties. Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that the first mortgagee was the
Santa Clara Monastery when it was him. None of the said circumstances obtain in the present case.
Pilar can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there existed a rift between
the two which amounts to antagonistic interests. The first letter sent by Julieta to Amparo merely shows
Julieta’s lack of interest in future investments, not necessarily a business disagreement, and certainly not
per se amounting to antagonistic interests between her and Amparo to render the latter unsuitable for
appointment as guardian. The second letter shows that: Amparo did not visit Julieta when she was
confined at the MMC on account of her stroke; there was disagreement as to who should run the
hacienda, with Julieta favoring a certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue; and Amparo took over management of
the hacienda with their brother Carlos supporting her. No inference as to the existence of antagonistic
interests between Amparo and Julieta can thus be made. The third letter has no relevance to the issue of
whether or not the lower courts erred in finding that Amparo is not unsuitable for appointment as
guardian. The letter in fact discloses, that it was Julieta’s nephew Julio, and not Amparo, who ignored the
“request.” As for the fourth letter, it has no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not
even addressed to Amparo but to a certain Connie (a sister-in-law of Julieta).
Pilar’s assertion that Amparo’s intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of
Julieta’s properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the
records. The claim that Amparo is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That Amparo
removed Julieta from the MMC where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily
show her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the trial court, cited in the present petition,
that Julieta was still placed under the care of doctors after she checked out and was returned to the
hospital when she suffered another stroke.
Finally, the Court notes two undisputed facts: (1) Pilar opposed the petition before the trial court
because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked by Amparo, a ground which does not render
Amparo unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and (2) Pilar concealed the deteriorating state of mind
of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good faith.
Cañiza vs. CA
G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997
Facts: Being then 94 years of age, Carmen Cañiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor
of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of UP, was declared incompetent by judgment of the RTC-
Quezon City, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo Evangelista. She was so
adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and
senile dementia. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Cañiza was the
owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. Evangelista commenced a suit in the MeTC to eject Sps.
Estrada from said premises. The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Cañiza as
plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Evangelista.
The amended Complaint alleged that Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out
of kindness, she had allowed the spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily
reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her
advanced age and failing health, “so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment”; that through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally
and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that “by the defendants’ act of
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they were enriching themselves
at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they were saving money by not paying any rent for
the house, the incompetent was losing much money as her house could not be rented by others.” Also
alleged was that the complaint was “filed within one year from the date of first letter of demand.”
Sps. Estrada declared that they had been living in Cañiza’s house since the 1960’s; that in consideration
of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact
executed a holographic will by which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MeTC in Cañiza’s favor, the Estradas being ordered to vacate the
premises and pay Cañiza. But on appeal, the decision was reversed by the RTC, holding that the “action
by which the issue of the spouses’ possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining
factual and legal situation demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession
cognizable in the first instance by the RTC.” The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Through her guardian, Cañiza came to the SC praying for reversal of the CA’s judgment. Later, however,
Cañiza died, and her heirs—guardian Evangelista, and Ramon Nevado, her niece and nephew,
respectively—were by the SC’s leave, substituted for her. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house
to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would
be inconsistent with the ward’s will. They aslo argue that Evangelista may no longer continue to
represent Cañiza after the latter’s death.
Issue (1): Whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza’s legal guardian had authority to bring the action of
unlawful detainer?
Held: Yes. Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and
the estate of her aunt, Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the “guardian over the
person and properties of the incompetent Carmen Cañiza with full authority to take possession of
the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to
perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties.” By that appointment, it became
Evangelista’s duty to care for her aunt’s person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure
her wellbeing, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became
her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza’s property, both real and
personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property
during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward’s estate carries with it the right to take
possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may
be needful for this purpose.
Actually, in bringing the action of unlawful detainer, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to
attend to “the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward” explicitly imposed on her by Sec. 4,
Rule 96, viz.: “Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward.—A guardian
must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits
thereof, so far as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his
family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may
sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the
proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.”
Issue (2): Whether or the Cañiza’s death automatically terminated the guardianship and, thus,
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent
her in the present appeal?
Held: No. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the
Estradas. Evangelista, as niece of Cañiza, is one of the latter’s only two surviving heirs, the other being
Cañiza’s nephew, Nevado.
On their motion and by Resolution of the Court, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at
bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 17 (now Sec. 16), Rule 3, viz.: “Death of a party.—
After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice,
the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of
30 days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.”
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza’s demise did not extinguish the
unlawful detainer suit instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal
one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at
bar.
Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy
G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012
Facts: During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri had 7 children (the petitioners), 2 from her first marriage
with Gonzalo Illut (Eutropia and Victoria) and 5 from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Napoleon,
Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa). Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they
acquired several homestead properties in Samal, Davao del Norte. Anunciacion died intestate. Her
husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and
Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
with Absolute Deed of Sale in 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and
thereafter, conveying them to the late Sps. Uy.
In 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties
against Sps. Uy (later substituted by their heirs) before the RTC, assailing the validity of the sale for
having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and
Victoria as additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of
Anunciacion from her first marriage. The Heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-
year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of
Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and
interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering the annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale
is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no
judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. Consequently, it rejected the
defenses of laches and prescription raised by Sps. Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties
for 17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the complaint. It held that,
while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject
properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of
the sale considering Sps. Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and that Eutropia and Victoria belatedly
filed their action in 1997, or more than two years from knowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994
when their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their
legitimes from their co-heirs. Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent
sale as valid and binding with respect to Enrique and his children, holding that as co-owners, they have
the right to dispose of their respective shares as they consider necessary or fit. While recognizing Rosa
and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to
question it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because of their inaction
for a long period of time.
Issue: Whether or the sale made with respect to the portions pertaining to minor children Rosa and
Douglas was valid?
Held: Rosa: Yes. Douglas: No. All the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of
Anunciacion from her first and second marriages, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in
equal shares. Hence, in the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale in favor of Sps. Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia
and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total
nullity. However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject
properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of Sps. Uy is valid
but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and
sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, Enrique
was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of the minor
children’s shares in the estate of their mother. Sec. 7, Rule 93 provides: “Parents as Guardians.―When
the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the
child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of
the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the
petition required by Sec. 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable
persons.”
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to
the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of
the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural
guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or
encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the
ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper
judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in
accordance with Arts. 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code. Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s
Manifestation and Joint-Affidavit before the RTC, they stated: “…we both confirmed that the same was
voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far
as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned…” Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification
of the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at the time
of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s share in the estate of Anunciacion to Sps. Uy.
The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the
homestead properties have effectively been disposed in favor of Sps. Uy.
Oropesa vs. Oropesa
G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012
Facts: Nilo Oropesa filed with the RTC of Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Louie Ginez to
be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, Gen. Cirilo Oropesa. In the said petition, it is
alleged among others that the Cirilio has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
10 years already having suffered a stroke; that his judgment and memory were impaired and such has
been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the Cirilio was observed to have had
lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to
his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has
become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ma. Luisa Agamata,
his girlfriend.
Cirilo filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. Thereafter, Nilo presented his evidence which
consists of his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and Nilo’s former nurse, Alma
Altaya. After presenting evidence, Nilo filed a manifestation resting his case. Nilo failed to file his
written formal offer of evidence. Thus, Cirilo filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to declare Nilo to have
waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they
were not formally offered; (2) to expunge the documents of the Nilo from the Record; and (3) to grant
leave to Cirilo to file demurrer to evidence. The RTC granted the Cirilo’s Omnibus Motion. Thereafter,
Cirilo then filed his Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC also granted.
Issue (1): Whether or not Cirilo is considered an “incompetent” person as defined under Sec. 2, rule 92
of the Rules of Court who should be placed under guardianship?
Held: No. A “finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite
evidence.” The Court considers that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the
case at bar. With the failure of Nilo to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest
in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony,
were insufficient to convince the trial court of Nilo’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the
demurrer to evidence that was filed by Cirilo.
Even if Nilo’s procedural lapse will be overlooked in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his
documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his
father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real
estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his father’s alleged
incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the “Report of
Neuropsychological Screening” which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never
identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said report was ambivalent at best,
for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of Cirilio, it also
contained findings that supported the view that Cirilo on the average was indeed competent.
In guardianship cases where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary and that
the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity
will suffice. Thus, it is significant that in its Order which denied Nilo’s MR on the trial court’s unfavorable
ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that Nilo’s own documentary evidence played in disproving
its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondent’s physical and
mental state, to wit: “The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states
that [Cirilo] does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On
the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that
[Cirilo], (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of
mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that
[Cirilo] possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning
and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.”
Issue (2): Whether or not the grant of demurrer to evidence is proper in this case?
Held: Yes. A demurrer to evidence is defined as “an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not,
to make out a case or sustain the issue.” A demurrer to evidence “authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do,
if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.”
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship without
first requiring Cirilo to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to
evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting
his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
Discussion: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
“guardian” acts for another called the “ward” whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own
affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven
to be a minor or an incompetent. A reading of Sec. 2, Rule 92 tells us that persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be
placed under guardianship.
Abad vs. Biason
G.R. No. 191993, December 5, 2012
Facts: Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura Abad with
the RTC. In support thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains residence in Quezon City and that he is
Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura, who is single, more than 90 years old and a resident of
Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her
advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her
properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation. Subsequently, Leonardo
Biason filed an Opposition. Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and he vehemently opposed
the appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he
resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that
he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of
attorney to manage her properties.
The RTC denied Abad’s petition and appointed Biason as Maura’s guardian. The RTC held that Abad is
disqualified to act as guardian of Maura because of his residence and Biason is in a better position to be a
guardian. On appeal, the CA held that although Abad was correct in arguing that there is no legal
requirement that the guardian must be residing in the same dwelling place or municipality as that of the
ward or incompetent and that the rule that “courts should not appoint as guardians persons who are not
within the jurisdiction of our courts” pertains to persons who are not residents of the country, the CA still
upheld the Decision of the RTC to appoint Biason instead of Abad.
Pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion,
informing the Court that Biason passed away. Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and
academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the
guardianship be terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the issues raised in the petition had been rendered moot and academic by
Biason’s death?
Held: Yes. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases,
there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition.
In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision and Resolution which dismissed his
appeal from the RTC Decision and denied his MR. Basically, he was challenging Biason’s qualifications and
the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it
has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-
established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the
death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to
delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has
already been dissolved.
The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any
substantial relief. Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition has lost its
purpose and even consented to Maura’s prayer for the dismissal of the petition.
Rule 98 – Trustees
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez

G.R. No. 166884, June 13, 2012
Facts: Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC)
executed a Credit Line Agreement. In various instances, ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust Receipts
Facility of the Agreement to buy construction materials. The respondents (Lamberto Perez, Nestor Kun,
Ma. Estelita Angeles-Panlilio and Napoleon Garcia), as officers and representatives of ACDC, executed
trust receipts in connection with the construction materials, with a total principal amount of
P52,344,096.32. The trust receipts matured, but ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the
construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts. Thus, LBP filed a
Complaint for Estafa in relation to PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) against respondents as officers and
representatives of ACDC. In their defense, respondents argued that ACDC had yet to receive the
proceeds of the materials that were the subject of the trust receipts because their clients have not yet
paid them. As there were no proceeds received from these clients, no misappropriation thereof could
have taken place. The Makati City Assistant Prosecutor dismissed the complaint. He pointed out that the
evidence presented by LBP failed to state the date when the goods described in the letters of credit were
actually released to the possession of the respondents. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the
Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor. The CA reversed the Resolution of the SOJ. It ruled that this
case did not involve a trust receipt transaction, but a mere loan.
Issue: Whether or not transactions in this case are trust receipt transactions?
Held: No. In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in the
alternative—the return of the proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or
processed. When both parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods subject of
the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt
transaction penalized under Sec. 13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon by the parties
would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where
the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
Here, at the onset of these transactions, LBP knew that ACDC was in the construction business and that
the materials that it sought to buy under the letters of credit were to be used for the following projects:
the Metro Rail Transit Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition Project. LBP had in fact authorized the
delivery of the materials on the construction sites for these projects, as seen in the letters of credit it
attached to its complaint. Clearly, they were aware of the fact that there was no way they could recover
the buildings or constructions for which the materials subject of the alleged trust receipts had been used.
It is fundamental in a trust receipt transaction that the person who advanced payment for the
merchandise becomes the absolute owner of said merchandise and continues as owner until he or she is
paid in full, or if the goods had already been sold, the proceeds should be turned over to him or to her.
Here, LBP knew that the construction materials were to be used for the construction of an immovable
property, as well as a property of the public domain. As an immovable property, the ownership of
whatever was constructed with those materials would presumably belong to the owner of the land, the
ownership then would pertain to the government and not remain with the bank. Furthermore, goods and
materials that are used for a construction project are often placed under the control and custody of the
clients employing the contractor, who can only be compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay the
contractor and often only after the requisite legal proceedings. The contractor’s difficulty and uncertainty
in claiming these materials (or the buildings and structures which they become part of), as soon as the
bank demands them, disqualify them from being covered by trust receipt agreements.
Based on these premises, the agreements between the parties in this case cannot be considered to be
trust receipt transactions because (1) from the start, the parties were aware that ACDC could not possibly
be obligated to reconvey to LBP the materials or the end product for which they were used; and (2) from
the moment the materials were used for the government projects, they became public, not LBP’s,
property.
Even assuming that the transactions are trust receipts, the complaint against the respondents still should
have been dismissed. The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the
handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another, regardless of whether the latter is the owner or
not. In this case, no dishonesty or abuse of confidence existed in the handling of the construction
materials. The misappropriation could be committed should the entrustee fail to turn over the proceeds of
the sale of the goods covered by the trust receipt transaction or fail to return the goods themselves. The
respondents could not have failed to return the proceeds since their allegations that the clients of ACDC
had not paid for the projects it had undertaken with them at the time the case was filed had never been
questioned or denied by LBP. What can only be attributed to the respondents would be the failure to
return the goods subject of the trust receipts.
Rules 99-100 – Adoption and Custody of Minors
Castro vs. Gregorio

G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
Facts: Atty. Jose Castro sought to adopt Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro and the father of Joanne
Benedicta Charissima Castro, also known by her baptismal name, “Maria Socorro Castro” and her
nickname, “Jayrose.”
Rosario Castro and Atty. Jose Castro were married in 1962. Rosario left Jose after a couple of months
because of the incompatibilities between them. Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969.
Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario
alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies.
In 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption of Jed and Regina before the RTC. In the petition, he alleged
that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio. The trial court
approved the adoption. This decision had attained finality.
In 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the trial court’s
decision approving the adoption of Jed and Regina. In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they
learned of the adoption sometime in 2005. They allege that Rosario’s affidavit of consent, marked by the
trial court as “Exh. K,” was fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates showed
different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They
argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of NSO certificates
shows the father to be Larry, Jose’s driver and alleged lover. It was further alleged that Jed and Regina
are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
married at the time of their birth. The CA denied the petition. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of adoption should be annulled on the ground that the wife and the
legitimate child of the adopter never consented to such adoption?
Held: Yes. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or
her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the
spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must
first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the
requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have
had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained,
Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older. The
consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective
siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent’s
love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
Here, it is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years
old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the
adoption to be valid. To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he
and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her
written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, Rosario and Joanne’s consent was required by RA 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice [the publication of the
petition for adoption] as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged
over substantive statutory rights. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and
Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
Cang vs. CA
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
Facts: Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married. They begot three children, namely:
Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony. Subsequently, after learning of her husband’s alleged
extramarital affair, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation which the trial court granted and
awarded the children’s custody to Anna Marie. Herbert then left for the United States where he sought a
divorce from Anna Marie. The Nevada Court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of
the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving “rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places”
to Herbert.
Subsequently, Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law
of Anna Marie, filed a petition for adoption of the three minor Cang children. The petition bears the
signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an
affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had “evaded his legal obligation to support” his children;
and that her husband had “long forfeited his parental rights” over the children. Upon learning of the
petition for adoption, Herbert immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that although Ronald and Maria Clara were financially capable of supporting the children while
his finances were “too meager” compared to theirs, he could not “in conscience, allow anybody to strip
him of his parental authority over his beloved children.
Subsequently, the trial court issued the decree of adoption. The trial court concluded that Herbert
abandoned his children and abandonment is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing
with the consent of the parent to the adoption. In such case, adoption will be allowed not only without
the consent of the parent, but even against his opposition. The CA affirmed the adoption decree. It held
that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. In his petition before the
Supreme Court, Herbert avers that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his
written consent as a natural father.
Issue: Whether or not Herbert had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to
their adoption?
Held: No. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate.” The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided
that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
This is in consonance with the liberality with which the Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
In this case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption.
Herbert’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father as follows: Herbert Cang had already left
his wife and children and had already divorced the former, as evidence by a decree of divorce which was
filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an
illegal immigrant. The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child
by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and dispense with the
requirement of written consent to jurisprudence the adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.
The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court
must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports “any conduct of
the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support
which parents owe their children.”
In this case, records disclose that Herbert’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While
admittedly, Herbert was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his
natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by
mail and catered to their whims. Aside from the letters, Herbert also presented certifications of banks in
the USA showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for
the benefit of his children.
The trial court and the CA attached a high premium to the prospective adopters’ financial status but
totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-
being of the children. Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give
the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent.
Moreover, the transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not necessarily deprive Herbert of parental authority for the purpose of placing the
children up for adoption. The law only confers on the innocent spouse the “exercise” of parental
authority. What is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In this case for adoption, the issue
is whether or not Herbert had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their
adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot
be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because the Court finds that Herbert did not abandon
his children.
Vda. de. Jacob vs. CA
G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999
Facts: During the proceeding for the settlement of estate of Dr. Alfredo Jacob, Pedro Pilapil claiming to
be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s
estate as Alfredo’s adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Tomasa Vda. De Jacob who claimed to be
the surviving spouse of deceased Alfredo opposed the Motion for Intervention. Pedro questioned the
validity of the marriage between Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. While Tomasa questioned
Pedro’s claim that he is a legally adopted son of Pedro. To support his claim, Pedro presented an Order
issued by Judge Jose Moya of Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo
in favor of Pedro Pilapil. Tomasa questioned the authenticity of Judge Moya’s signature in the Order. In
an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya’s signature in the Order granting
the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his residence. A handwriting
examination was also conducted by Binevenido Albacea, NBI Document Examiner, who concluded that
concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one and
the same person. On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya’s signature, Pedro
presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief
Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio Pagui. Atty. Pagui concluded that the signature of Judge Moya
appearing in the Order granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of
deceased Alfredo. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC relying on the presumption that the judge had
acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to the testimony
of Pedro’s handwriting expert. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Alfredo’s adoption of Pedro was sufficiently established?
Held: No. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.
This Pedro Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by Tomasa shows that the alleged
adoption is a sham.
In the deposition of Judge Moya, he said that he could not recall having ever issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was
not his. Judge Moya’s declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner
Albacea. Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of Pedro. The alleged Order was purportedly
made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in
adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused
pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always
indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. No proof
was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records
Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together,
these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of Pedro.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996
Facts: A petition for adoption was filed by Spouses Jaime and Zenaida Caranto for the adoption of Midael
Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with Jaime since he was seven years old. When Jaime
and Zenaida got married in 1986, the minor Midael Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. The spouses prayed that a judgment be rendered declaring Midael Mazon as their child for all
intents and purposes; and the surname of the child be legally changed to Carando and that the first
name which was mistakenly registered as “MIDAEL” be corrected to “MICHAEL.” The RTC set the case for
hearing, giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Cavite and by
service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the Office of the
Solicitor General. The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the
name of the child from “Midael” to “Michael.” He argued that although the correction sought concerned
only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General
on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. It cited Rule 108,
Sec. 1, which provides that “any person interested in an act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto.” It held that the correction of names in the civil
registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, Sec. 2 as “entries subject to cancellation or
correction.” According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption
to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners. The Solicitor General appealed to
the CA. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case for adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was “Michael,”
instead of “Midael,” which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth. The CA affirmed
in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption on the ground that
the notice by publication did not state the name of the child as stated in his Certificate of Live Birth?
Held: Yes. The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any
objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication
of notice in this case. Here, the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters “ch” for the letter
“d,” so that what appears as “Midael” as given name would read “Michael.” Even the Solicitor General
admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from “Midael C. Mazon” to
“Michael C. Mazon” cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names “can be read and
pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).” Thus, the RTC correctly
granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon.
Issue: Whether or not the prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry from
Midael to Michael was properly granted by the courts a quo?
Held: No. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case
and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the
correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error
in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons.
The present case falls under letter “(o),” referring to “changes of name.”
Sec. 3 of Rule 108 requires the local civil registrar to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not
impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as
it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void.
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Rule 108. While there was
notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with
Rule 99, Sec. 4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was
mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local
civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial
court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to
party and as to the subject matter.
Reyes vs. Mauricio
G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010
Facts: Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan
covered by TCT No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the
name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to
Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
Librada Mauricio and her daughter, Leonida, filed a Complaint before the DARAB for annulment of
contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties. They alleged that they
are the lawful heirs of Godofredo Mauricio, who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through
his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo
had been working on the subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means,
Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to
eject the Mauricios from the subject property. Eugenio denied the existence of tenancy relationship
between him and the Mauricios. The Provincial Adjudicator concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of
Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of the
subject land. The DARAB affirmed the conclusion of the Provincial Adjudicator. Aggrieved by the DARAB
ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the CA issued a
resolution regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute Librada, who died
during the pendency of the case. On the main case, the CA affirmed the ruling of the DARAB. Hence, this
petition. As an incidental issue, Eugenio assails Leonida’s legal standing as a party. Eugenio contended
that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
Issue: Whether or not Eugenio can collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the present case?
Held: No. Filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Citing Arturo Tolentino, the Court said:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is
more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: “The contest of the legitimacy
of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court;
any contest made in any other way is void.” This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170
and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This
action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles.”
Legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through collateral attack. The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made
subject to a collateral attack.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
Facts: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged in his petition that Stephanie’s mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mother’s middle name and surname. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be
changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his
surname. The trial court granted the petition for adoption and declared that Stephanie shall now be
known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Honorato filed a motion for clarification/reconsideration praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name. The trial court denied this motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?
Held: Yes. There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176
of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as “ An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father ,” is silent as to what middle name a child may
use. The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), in case there is
identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name
or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of
the Civil Code merely provides that “ an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter .” Also, Article
189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
However, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code
recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Additionally, Stephanie’s
continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.
It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by Honorato
for them. Honorato provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and
father. She calls them “Mama” and “Papa.” Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court found no reason why she should not be allowed
to do so.
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Facts: Monina Lim was married to Primo Lim. They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them. Being so eager to have a child of their own, Monina and registered
the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle
Lim and Michael Jude Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They
sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in all their school records and
documents. In 1998, Primo died. In 2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Thereafter,
Monina availed of the amnestry provided under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. In 2002, Monina filed two separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. At the time
of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael
was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption. Michael also gave his consent. Monina’s
husband, Olario, likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent. However, the trial court dismissed the
petitions for adoption. The trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is mandatory. Hence, this petition. Monina contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the
child to be adopted. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the
time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already
18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having
attained the age of majority.
Issue: Whether or not Monina, despite being married, can singly adopt Michelle and Michael?
Held: No. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 requires that the husband and wife shall adopt jointly, subject
to certain exceptions. This is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
Here, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, Monina had already remarried. She filed the
petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. Thus, the petitions must be denied.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption does not suffice. There are certain requirements
that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7
of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter
the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of Monina or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of Monina.
Also, the contention that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority is untenable. Parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. Adoption has the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the
adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of
the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to
be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled such as support and successional rights.
Nery vs. Sampana
A.C. No. 10196, September 9, 2014
Facts: Melody Nery lleged that in June 2008, she engaged the services of Atty. Glicerio Sampana for the
annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was
eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if
she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a
blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid
Sampana P100,000.00, in installment.
In 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for adoption and
it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the
hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of
Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed
that her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told
Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010. On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of
Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such
petition filed in the court. Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the
reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the
filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition for
adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the
P100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded. This prompted her to file a
disbarment complaint against Sampana.
In his defense, Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old
age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana
suggested that “if the [alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended
[adoption by an alien] could be possible.” Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents,
including the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the
Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification.
Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still waiting
for the certification.
The IBP Commissioner found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed
the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. He
recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved this recommendation.
Issue: Whether or not Sampana should be held administratively liable?
Held: Yes. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter
would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic
Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of
the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of
the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use,
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession.
Bartolome vs. Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
Facts: John Colcol, born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc., onboard the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, an accident occurred onboard the
vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day. John was, at
the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, Bernardina Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social
Security System (SSS). However, the clam was denied because Bernardina was no longer considered as
the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. The Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC) affirmed the ruling of SSS. The ECC ruled that the adoption decree severed the
relation between John and Bernardina, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and,
consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
It appears from the record that John and her sister, Elizabeth, were adopted by their great grandfather,
Bernardina’s grandfather, Cornelio. However, Cornelio, the adoptive father, died on October 26, 1987, or
only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.
Issue: Whether or not Bernardina qualifies as John’s beneficiary as a dependent parent?
Held: Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, Bernardina’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside
from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after
the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in this case. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account the Court’s consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and
that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a
novel concept. Section 20 of RA 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission .—If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights
and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee,
while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously,
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
The rule can only be applied by analogy since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Nevertheless,
state policies behind RA 8552 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child justify
such disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his
welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as
a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his formative years, and in the absence or, as in this case, death
of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the
adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of
adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate
of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS
covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their
minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second
chance at a better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel
grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if
he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority
resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

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00 Digest - Special Proceeding (Part 1) (121019)

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Rules 72-90 – Settlement of Estate

Silverio vs. Silverio

It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator of

Alvarico vs. Sola

Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo

Issue: Whether or Amparo is suitable to be appointed as guardian of Julieta?

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez

Castro vs. Gregorio

Issue: Whether or not Alfredo’s adoption of Pedro was sufficiently established?

Issue: Whether or not Sampana should be held administratively liable?

Issue: Whether or not Bernardina qualifies as John’s beneficiary as a dependent parent?

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