Aquino vs.

Pascua, 539 SCRA 1 , November 28, 2007

ISSUE:

Whether or no Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B.
Domingo.

Facts:

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial
Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December
28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on
December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having
notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial
Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached
to his comment.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed
as follows:
 
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda
entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10,
1998".
 
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B.
Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December
10, 1998.

RULING:
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly
reproduced as follows:

A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries
public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).

Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such a register, in chronological order, the
nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing,
swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register,
and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries" (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the
Revised Administrative Code).

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial
acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article
VI).
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission
as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before
him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The Court held
that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.

Thesis: 
Yes, Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his
Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

APPLICATION: 
His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a
dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true. After a close review of the
records of this case, we resolved to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of
the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for
failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio
B. Domingo.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the
imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since
his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed
upon him.

CONCLUSION:
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, the imposition of a three-
month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a
ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him. 
 
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
Bernardo, Jr. vs. Mejia, 211 SCRA 852 , July 29, 1992
 
ISSUE:
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
 
Facts:
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the
following administrative offenses:
1. misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
2. falsification of certain documents
3. issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan
obtained from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said
check with others known also to be insufficiently funded.
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the
charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT.
 
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law.
On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for
reinstatement.
 
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with
a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the
petition.
 
 
RULING:
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public
interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with
the applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law. 
 
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration
the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that
has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. 
 
THESIS:
Yes, the applicant is reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
 
APPLICATION:
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession.  Fifteen years had already
elapsed since Mejia’s name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is
begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and
he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and
redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
 
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and
social writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it "El Cristo Movement and
Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind."
 
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was
punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases
for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced
years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the
ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression
has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from
this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of
its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to
punish but to correct offenders.
 
CONCLUSION: 
The court reiterated however, and reminded petitioners that the practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by
Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED
Velez vs. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 , July 25, 2006
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Leonard S. Devera committed malpractice which amounted to
moral turpitude in the State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the course of his practice of
law. 
 
FACTS:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension
and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:
 
1. respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar of California; and 
2. respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
 
RULING: 
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27
November 1996), this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of the Court’s administrative powers."
 
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must
concur, namely: 
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; 
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; 
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and 
(4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter,
and identity of causes of action.
 
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
 
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. 
- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
 
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
 
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.
 
THESIS:
Yes, Atty. Leonard S. Devera has committed malpractice which amounted to moral turpitude in the
State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the course of his practice of law.
 
APPLICATION: 
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie
evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence
the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in
this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
 
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. 
 
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed
then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving
Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the
elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter
was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case.
Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of... the case which he then deposited to his personal
account. 
 
The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended
from the practice of law for three years; and Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which
resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.
 
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his
client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that,
unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the
elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty.
de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
 
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client.
 
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics
and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
 
CONCLUSION:
IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs
governed by the provisions of its By-Laws has been previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's
removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well
within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's resolution to
remove Atty. de Vera.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished... the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;