TWA FLIGHT 800

Enigma of an Accident

Did the Ignition of JET -A Fumes

By
Frayed Wiring
Cause the Center Wing Tank Explosion

Jeannette Remak
© Phoenix Aviation Research 2015

Dedicated to the 230 Passengers and Crew

 Lost on
TWA Flight 800
On
July 17, 1996
“Sorely Missed and Never Forgotten”

Introduction

On the night of July 17, 1996, a Trans World Airlines owned Boeing 747-131, with the tail number
N93119, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean 8 miles from the East Moriches N.Y. coastline, killing the
230 souls that made up the compliment of her passengers and crew.
The flight originated from JFK International Airport and was bound for Charles De Gaulle
International Airport, Paris France. This was a routine flight in the TWA schedule. Other than a one
hour delay on the JFK tarmac due to some concerns about luggage that was not properly identified,
there were no other outstanding problems with N93119. Flight 800 departed JFK at approximately
8:12P.M. At 8:25 P.M., approximately twelve minutes after Flight 800 departed JFK International
Airport, and after reaching 13,000 ft. altitude, the captain opened a cross feed connection that fed the
engines via the fuel lines in both wings and to allow the four Pratt and Whitney engines to feed evenly
from the wing tanks and maintain balance in the aircraft. Underneath the aircraft was the Center Wing
tank that carried only 59 gallons of Jet-A fuel, as prescribed by TWA for a transatlantic flight.

By 8:31 P.M. approximately six minutes after the cross feed was opened, an explosion in the center
fuel tank caused a massive breech of the center tank, thus precipitating the forward section of the
aircraft to rip away from the rest of the fuselage. Approximately five seconds later, the nose of the
747 broke away causing the aircraft to pitch up and climb for at least ten seconds, banking left and
right, until at 17,000 feet the engines finally starved and what was left of TWA 800 started a high
speed dive for the Atlantic ocean to die. Approximately forty- nine seconds had elapsed from the
point of the explosion to the point of final impact on the water. This is what is written in the NTSB
report. It’s not exactly what happened. According to the radar tracks, it seems that the nose of the
Flight 800 in fact, broke away second before the center fuel tank exploded. The NTSB claimed that
the aircraft then rose another 2700 feet before going into its death dive, in fact she carried on straight
ahead until momentum was lost and she plummeted into the ocean below. Why the NTSB had chosen
to deny this evidence is a bigger mystery.

While there have been mid-air explosions in commercial jet liners, there had never been an accident
as violent and as quick as this. While there have been other accidents involving center fuel tanks,
there were none with this intensity. Another B-747-100 actually the one that was built right before
N93119, her sister N92119, suffered a mid-air explosion due to a lightening strike to her fuel tanks in
1976. This caused Boeing to reconfigure the shielding for the fuel tanks to prevent this from ever
happening…. again.

The ensuing NTSB and FBI investigations into the reason why TWA Flight 800 did die so violently
has been a long, arduous task riddled by innuendoes of conspiracy, friendly fire bombs and missiles.
However, neither agency had been able to pinpoint the source of the explosion other than it originated
in the center fuel tank. The investigation had been a tug of war between the NTSB ( who wanted the
FBI to declare a criminal act and take the case from them) and the FBI ( who was looking for signs of
criminal intent and not finding it), thus not relieving the NTSB of its duty. It is our opinion that the
report that followed while expansive, is far from concise and somewhat vague considering the
amount of time that is involved and the vast resources given the investigation. However, we will
view the concepts that have been presented as the possible cause of Flight 800’s demise, and explore
one in particular. That being the concept that wiring may have sparked the explosion of the center fuel
tank.

Theories of the Accident:

The concepts that were put forward by the NTSB and various other independent sources on what
actually caused the center fuel tank to explode as follows:

1. Bomb plant and explosion that was left on board or carried out by a passenger on board
Flight 800.
2. Missile – from terrorist source or from a military exercise led by the U.S. Navy.
3. EMI (electromagnetic interference) caused by either a military aircraft in the area at the
time of the explosion or some other source in the vicinity.
4. Pressure of Jet A fuel vapor build up in the center fuel tank caused by extraneous heat from
 the running of the air conditioning unit with only 59 gallons of Jet A as part of TWA’s
specific orders for center fuel tanks not to be filled for this overseas flight.
5. Transient Voltage* A possible spark or transient voltage causing arcing in the wiring
crossing the center fuel tank via the FQIS ( fuel quantity indicating system) or fuel probe.

* Transient voltage of a coated, undamaged wire which could be made to induce a current into
an adjacent wire, also coated and undamaged.

As the investigation from NTSB and the FBI experts proceeded to reconstruct the pieces of the center
fuel tank, the above factors were all examined. It is quite obvious that “something” caused that center
fuel tank to explode. However, no positive source of ignition was found. Wiring became suspect due
to a service letter that Boeing sent out addressing the issue of wiring in the center fuel tank as being a
“ possible suspect” on the list. As more of the wreckage was brought up and re-assembled, the
concept of wiring being the source of ignition became the possibility but not the answer.

Inerting the Center Fuel Tank as a solution to volatile fuel problems

There is a process that is used with military high speed aircraft that is called inerting. Inerting
summed up basically means that the oxygen in the fuel tank is pumped out via liquid nitrogen, an inert
gas, during loading of fuel. While the very volatile fuel used in these aircraft is loaded in, the oxygen
enters the vapor space above the fuel called the ullage and escapes through the vents in the tank.
Attempts at using this system as an example, it was used by the XB-70 Valkyrie bomber that was
developed by the Air Force in the late 1950s’ early 1960s due to the use of the very volatile fuel JP-
6. The JP-6 had a very low flash point ( ignited quickly) and was difficult to handle even in the
fueling stages of aircraft preparation. It was also used in the SR-71 even though the JP-7 used in this
aircraft had a very high flash point and resorted to Triethylborane -TEB to start the engines. The main
reason that inerting was not used commercially was the bottom line, it just was not cost effective. In
essence, it would have cost approximately $200 per pound for every one hundred pounds of fuel
flown. It would have cost fortunes to equip each and every airport that supported the 747 or other
aircraft with inerting systems. Besides, the aircraft manufacturers and the airlines were not convinced
that they really had a problem with the center fuel tank heating to a dangerous level.

Why fuel tanks are left unfilled—Business and Mechanical reasons

The ground crew at JFK International noted that the Athens to New York leg of a flight had drained
the fuel tank located between the wings down to the last 500 gallons, but since that tank would not be
needed for the shorter trip to France, it was not refilled. Thirty thousand gallons of Jet A was pumped
into the six wing tanks only. The wing tanks held enough fuel to get the plane to Paris. Filling the
center fuel tank would have increased the plane’s weight, making the flight more expensive and
causing the aircraft to use more fuel for the shorter run to Paris. We should mention here that the
policy of TWA at the time of the accident was that it was not unusual that the center fuel tank be left
unfilled with only the residual fifty nine gallons of fuel residing in the tank. This procedure was on the
fueling charts and in the company procedure manuals. The reason for this was that when the aircraft is
coming west to east (international flights) the additional weight of the center fuel tank would only be
dead weight.

Jet A- Fuel Vapor Build Up

Jet –A is a derivative of kerosene and a phlegmatic explosive. It is the equivalent to Military JP-4. A
study was sponsored by the NTSB in relation to the concept that possibly the arcing of wire could
have cause the center fuel tank to blow up given that there were vapors building up in the tank with
only fifty nine gallons of Jet A in the tank. This study was done by the Graduate Aeronuatical Labs of
Cal Tech, Pasadena California –October 1997. The issues that is chose to explore were:

1. Chemical composition of fuel vapors vs. liquid.

1. Effect of temperature
2. Effect of fuel amount
2. How does flammability depend on ignition energy?
3. Laminar and turbulent flame speed
4. Combustion within multi-compartment vented tanks.

The survey was not showing anything that wasn’t already known about the Jet-A product. At this time,
the Wright Patterson AFB (Dayton, Ohio) labs also tried to recreate conditions that might cause the
center tank to explode. To create a static charge by using Wiggins couplers and the center tank lines
to produce enough voltage to cause a spark. They continually hiked the charge to 650 volts, higher
than they liked, but under 3,200 volts that would be needed to create a spark. Wright Patterson could
not make it happen. It was only when they used a different fuel, one that could not have been used by
Flight 800, they maintained a charge of 4,800 volts. But even with that, they couldn’t cause enough
voltage to light the fuel.

The temperature in the center fuel tank had to be approximately 100 degrees volatile enough for any
accident or explosion to occur. The Boeing engineers in a simulation out in the Arizona desert,
created a condition that caused the tank to go over 100 degrees. It proved that it was possible for a
tank to reach a higher degree, even though the tank in question did not explode, it was in the position
to. Thus, the theory of a spark in the right place, at the right time causing the center tank to explode
was a possibility but a long shot.

The case for the center tank having been overheated by the air conditioning constantly running raised
the issue that possibly the tank could become overheated. However, there are 747s in every part of
the world running air conditioning in all kinds of situations, there would have been more explosions
of center fuel tanks by now. The tanks were designed to be unable to heat to four hundred degrees
which would cause an auto ignition.

Conduits and wiring in the Center Fuel Tank of the Boeing 747

Insulation:

What causes wiring to go bad? Wiring degradation in aircraft can go bad when there is :

1. Vibration
2. Maintenance error
3. Indirect damage
4. Chemical contamination
5. General lack of maintenance
6. Heat
7. Metal filings left over from maintenance or chafing of wiring due to movement.

This examination of the wiring as evidence of being the source of ignition should be studied in the
context of the NTSB examination of other aircraft carrying center fuel tank wiring systems.

Air conditioning pack and location in relation to the center fuel tank.

There are three air conditioning packs on the 747 under the center fuel tank. While many would think
that this could be a potential problem, it is well known that the fuel tank is sometimes used as a heat
sink[1]. Heating could potentially occur when there is little or no fuel in the tank. The heating of
vapors can cause a problem. However, with the consideration of how many aircraft fly every day
from all points of the globe, including some of the hottest climates on earth, there has never been a
problem. Consider how many flights occur in one day all around the world, with many varying
aircraft and maintenance procedures. How many center fuel tanks have exploded? Not enough to
warrant serious, costly and time consuming changes, or to prove that TWA 800 blew up because of
overheating of its fuel tank. Boeing in fact, has taken measures to insure the shielding of the center
fuel tank to prevent such an accident from occurring. This shielding procedure was instituted when the
sister aircraft of N93119 had a fuel tank explosion nearly 35 years ago due to a lightening strike.

Other Center Fuel tank Accidents

Pan Am 214:

PANAM Flight 214 was a Boeing 707 leaving Baltimore, Maryland for Philadelphia on the night of
December 3, 1963. The aircraft had no problem, was being flown by a senior crew on a short hop,
with the only question being the weather. The weather had deteriorated with thunderstorms prevalent
in the flight area. It should also be noted that the aircraft had been fueled with Jet B[2] instead of A.
this was done on the Puerto Rico leg of the flight. With only 100 miles to go on the leg to Philadelphia
from Baltimore there was no need to refuel the aircraft. It should also be noted that both Jet A and Jet
B were used in topping off tanks at the time and was within regulation on mixing the more volatile Jet
B with Jet A. the aircraft was hit by lightening during a storm approximately 45 miles southwest of
Philadelphia. At 8:58 PM PanAm crashed into the ground. The aircraft was hit by lighting on the left
wing tip that set off caused a resultant explosion of the center fuel tank.

It should be noted that while this example is not the same as TWA 800, it is the only example that is
close to the concept of the Flight 800 fuel tank exploding. There have been other accidents that have
happened, but none that can directly be related to the 800 concept of the center tank explosion. Other
analogous center fuel tanks explosions on Boeing aircraft were found to be caused by other mishaps
like the ground collision of two aircraft on the runway as seen in the Teneife Island accident. This
accident caused the death of 500 people, the largest, most deadly accident to date.

Concept of wiring as the source of ignition --NTSB Report on wiring for TWS Flight 800.

This examination of the wiring as evidence of being the source of ignition should be studied in the
context of the NTSB examination of other aircraft carrying center fuel tank wiring systems.

In the inspection of over 25 different aircraft, including Boeing 747s, DC-9s Boeing 737s, 757s,and
767s, along with an Airbus A-330B4, the age dates of these aircraft ranges from 25 years old to 8
months old ( see breakdown on chart) 15 minute visual inspections concluded that all of these aircraft
to some degree, had some “damage” to their wiring and insulation. In fact, while this was an NTSB
formal investigation, it hardly bore fruit in proving that the “wiring” theory was plausible. The
aircraft that were examined either were retired or derelict or never delivered to a customer. Indeed,
it was at least something to show that aircraft in various states of disrepair or non-repair had some
wiring abnormalities. However, it did not prove that the maintenance of N93119 was below par, or
that wiring in the conduit of the center fuel tank was questionable. It would have been better to
examine line aircraft of the same age as N93119, with the same maintenance specification instead of
searching out derelict aircraft to prove that old aircraft and new aircraft or any aircraft can have a
wiring deficiency. This investigation also did not examine the wiring on the center fuel tanks of these
aircraft, but the wiring on the nose section only:

This included:

1. The flight engineer’s station ( right side)

2. The cockpit escape door( right)
3. The nose landing gear compartment ( STA 400) * station area on aircraft
4. Avionics P54 panel access
5. Forward cargo compartment STA 920 STA 1000 * station area on aircraft
6. Water bottles on forward spar
7. Pressure seal to wing wire route.

Breakdown of comparative aircraft examined in TWA Flight 800 accident:

1. 13- Classic B-747

2. 1- Undelivered to customer B-747
3. 2- Undelivered to customer B-737
4. 1- B-757 retired
5. 1-B-767 retired
6. 1-DC-9
7. 1-MD90
8. 1-Airbus 300-B-4

Of the Aircraft examined:

Thirteen of these aircraft were retired and in storage for various amounts of time, some of them being
actual derelicts with parts missing in the airframe such as engines, engine cowls, doors, panels in the
airframe. It should be noted at this time that there was a “Service Letter 747-SL-20-048”[3] sent out
by Boeing concerning what Boeing cited were the principal causes of wire degradation “areas that
merit special attention during wiring inspections and locations that could be included in a special
inspection of high time 747 wiring.”
The areas examined such as the stations forward of the center fuel tank like STA 100 were not
relevant to the fuel tank in question of the FQIS or fuel probes. This examination of these aircraft
seemed to be more interested in how the aircraft were stored and what was left in them in various
place such as an Air Magazine from 1997, international flight plans that were left behind in the
derelict aircraft along with other materials .

The Report the NTSB investigators filed found the following:

1. Metal shavings on or between wiring bundles, as well as in one instance next to the cooling
holes on the avionics boxes.
2. Accumulation of “ foreign material” on wiring including:
1. lint ( fiber particles and dust)
2. hardware
3. structural corrosion preventative compound
 4. grease
5. brown and blue stains
6. paper

Metal shavings and other debris:

On examination of one B-747 found wire bundles were in “slid masses” with additional wires
strapped to existing bundles. In other B-747s that were examined, wires were “ segregated into
separate parallel bundles and were contacting each other. Dried and crumbly rubber cushions were
found in clamps along with curled O-rings. Cracks in the insulation of wires were found in five of the
aircraft inspected. In all the aircraft inspected, there were conditions found that were not surprising at
all. In any aircraft , regardless of age or condition, there will always be some form of anomaly when
it comes to wiring. One only has to look at the conditions at NASA during the Space Shuttle era.
How many times were flights aborted due to a wrench or some piece of hardware left in some critical
part of the spacecraft inner workings. It is a problem called FOD known as foreign object damage.

It was only in Aircraft #21, which was the B-757 and the last studied, which was last flown May of
1998, that the NTSB did examine an FQIS ( Fuel Quantity Indicator System). This system however,
was an experimental system in that it was installed parallel to the existing Honeywell FQIS system (
as seen in Flt 800, N93119). The wires inside the fuel tank were found attached to a nylon loop
clamp that was dated January 1998. The free space in the clamps, were filled with rubber “O” rings,
some of which had split. According to the specifications for this system, there was a directive ”Not”
to use filler plugs, insulation tape or film strips with the clamps in the fuel cells. If anything came
free, the fuel filters could be clogged. The wires attached to the Honeywell system FQIS probes and
compensator, were flat or kinked where pressed beneath metal clamping bars. There were chafed
wires found at the cove of the Honeywell compensator and at rivets along the wire route. Dark
sulfuridation residues were seen at the ring connectors on the end of the wiring attached to the fuel
probes, and some darkened residue streamed down the plastic insulation from exposed metal. The
end of the fill tube was gouged where I contacted an electrical banding strap. Fuel tank sealant was
found on the FQIS parts and on wiring. It was also noted that this particular aircraft had extensive
modifications within four years before the NTSB inspection.

While investigating their data bank, the NTSB did come up with one interesting find: a Lockheed C-
130A with an 8/31/94 date of incident, stated that “ witnesses saw the aircraft in level flight and
observed a bright orange flash near the wing root”. The probable cause of the accident was listed as a
fuel leak and arcing of the wiring. The dry bay area of the right wing contained high pressure fuel
lines, unshielded and exposed electrical wiring which was in close proximity to the #3 engine.
Another event that was listed in this summary had to do with a B-747 that had been converted to a
freight carrier. The date of this incident is July 19, 1997. Circuit breakers had opened while the
aircraft was on an approach to JFK International Airport. The investigation found burned wiring in
the front cargo hold. Drill shavings were found in the area of the damaged wires in this and other
airplanes.

Chemical or Wet Arc Tracking

On any aircraft, liquids can and do get into the wiring. For many reasons spilled beverages, leaking
lavatory water or other surface contaminants find their way to wire bundles. This wetting can lead to
“ carbon tracking” where carbon builds up overtime due to low level electrical discharges on the
surface of the wire. This can lead to arcing.

In the tests done for the NTSB by independent contractors, there were three types of electrical activity
shown on wires supplied by the NTSB:

Scintillation:

The first type of electrical activity seen was scintillation. It began as pinpoints of light that flickered
at the edge of pre-damaged cracks in the insulations of the test wiring. As the scintillation went on, a
“char” track built up on the insulation. Then, flashes of light appeared at various places along the path
between the pre-damaged cracks. While more scintillation occurred, an electrical buzzing or
crackling sound was heard, however no scintillation can cause the circuit breakers to open.

Flashing:

Over time, flashing can cause damages to insulation and wiring. In the test run by the independent
contractor, the total electrical energy dissipated was about 4 joules. This amount of energy would
melt about 6 milligrams of aluminum, equal to the fraction of a paper clip. The rest of the tests were
run in various different configurations which showed how chemical or wet arc tracking could
influence electrical activity enough to cause an arc or flash capable of damaging a wire.

The tests, however, were inclusive in showing if this is what truly happened to Flt. 800. In the
recovered wiring of TWA Flight 800, there were no frayed wires that showed a short circuit, the
voltage that runs through the FQIS system and the compensator could be measured as being equal to a
cell phone, even the scavenger pumps could not be shown at fault. The fuel compensator that adjusts
the temperature in the fuel tank, sitting submerged at the bottom of the tank had shown when retrieved
from the ocean floor that the darkening had only been the polyurethane coating on the probes which
had been slightly burned in the fire of the explosion.

Even the Boeing engineers couldn’t produce enough voltage in the fuel probes to make them spark in
the laboratory. The same went for the tests that were run at the Wright –Patterson AFB labs, in
Dayton, Ohio. To date, no wiring retrieved could prove that this was the “spark” that sent Flight 800
to the ocean floor.

Summary

Why fuel vapor build up and wiring as the source of ignition didn’t contribute to the explosion of the
Center Wing Tank of TWA 800:

It is evident in the investigation into the death of Flight 800, that while all the possibilities though
credible were looked at, the ones that should have been explored by NTSB were not. This is evident
in the case of the wiring. While it is part of the investigative process to look at other aircraft in
“similar” circumstances, the direct issue of looking at older 747s still on the flight line in daily
service with daily maintenance routines and schedules inspections had not been observed. Instead,
aircraft that were derelict, left to the elements in the desert with no comparable significance to the
aircraft in question (N93119) were examined for a total of 15 minutes. The wiring used in sample for
lab testing came from the derelict aircraft. You cannot compare apples to oranges and this is
something that the NTSB process overlooked or possibly wanted to overlook.

The final “summary” of what happened to Flight 800 is now available on the NTSB website
https://twa800.sites.usa.gov/docket/dca96ma070/. As you can view all of the tests and photographs
for yourself, it won’t take long to see that the conclusions of the NTSB while they claim that it was
the center fuel tank wiring that caused the explosion, there is in the evidence inconclusive parts. One
instance is the test study done on the liquids in the center fuel tank, a good portion was unidentifiable.
It is included in the appendix section. Many of the images included in this report are directly from the
NTSB and personal photos of the wreckage taken during the re-assembly in Calverton hangar,
Riverhead NY. There had been no other report of a center wing tank explosion right up to today’s
2015 date since TWA 800. There have been no reports of overheating fuel vapor causing problems in
the hundreds of Boeing aircraft that fly all day and night long. Jet A fuel is a derivative of kerosene. It
must mix with air in order to explode, which means that one or more of the right fuel cells in the 747’s
wings had to have been damaged, either by violent engine failure( of which there is proof that the
engines had no part in the explosion nor did the internal pumps driving the hydraulic fluids) or
mechanical failure. There is no conclusive proof of the structural failure in the fuselage, wings,
elevons, etc. Hence, there had to be some other outside source. There was most definitely a source of
ignition, an external source of ignition. This source was not directly related to the aircraft in any way,
other than causing the initial damage to the airframe. This “source” caused the separation of the
forward section (nose) of the aircraft and then the resultant explosion of the center wing tank. There
is no tangible evidence that Jet-A fuel vapor pressure build up (caused by the heating of the center
wing tank via the air conditioning packs) can stand as the explanation of the explosion. Nor is there
proof that the wiring (via arcing, flashing etc) caused the explosion, since the wiring recovered from
the ocean floor crash site and inspected by the NTSB and outside sources showed no evidence of
failure.

The NTSB findings are going around the question of what killed TWA Flight 800. Logical
progression in investigation would dictate that the ‘one in a million shot” for all the right
characteristics of a fuel vapor explosion caused by arcing of old wires, should not be excluded from
the list of possible events leading to the disaster. Yet, it should not be the main focus. Given the
amount of Boeing 747 aircraft flying today, in so many configurations and levels of maintenance, it
would stand to reason that the NTSB should look elsewhere to solve the enigma of the murder of
Flight 800.

Witnesses that were cast aside

There is one issue that again, has been left wide open. It has to do with the many witnesses that gave
testimony to the FBI and those witnesses were tossed to the side, not given any type of credence at
all. There is also the evidence given of something flying up towards the aircraft and it is now known
that the U.S. Navy was having exercises in the nearby waters. There is also the report of a small,
white boat that was seen speeding from the area of the explosion shortly before the aircraft exploded.
All of this has been pushed to the side as “heresay”, people not understanding that what they saw was
the aircraft breaking up and pieces falling down. That is a statement that is hard to grasp considering
the people in question saw something flying towards the aircraft BEFORE she exploded. Last that we
heard, the law of physics doesn’t work that way. Hence there is an open issue here as well.

Books written and conspiracy theories

This author has read the conspiracy books and the very technical reports regarding the TWA 800
explosion. While this paper is not meant to point out exactly what killed those 230 souls, what it
does do is sort out the fact that the small amount of fuel vapor being heated by the air conditioning
packs was not the cause, neither was the “frayed old wiring “ which short circuited or sparked,
setting off the Jet A fuel vapor. This paper shows that the NTSB has a lot of holes in it. It is extensive
should you wish to read it all as this author has. However, what I did see was an extensive report on
a concept, not a fact. The NTSB report while extensive is inconclusive and to this day has yet to
amend it. The families that suffered the loss of a loved one have to face that anniversary, every year
with a question in their mind, was it something else? Was it a missile? Was it a fuel tank explosion?
What was it? We have shown in this writing that the wiring was not the issue. If we gave anyone
closure to that point, then so be it. If not, we tried. Whatever took that aircraft out of the sky will be
found out, maybe not today even though it’s been 19 long years since this tragedy occurred, but
someday. We hope someday very soon so that the families of those lost can have some closure and
those lost can have peace.

RESEARCH
NTSB Report on TWA 800 Disaster

https://twa800.sites.usa.gov/docket/dca96ma070/
(There are other reports that are tagged to the main report)

NTSB REPORT #99-136 Materiels laboratory factual report-July 19, 1999

NTSB

Group Chairman’s Factual Addendum concerning re-examination of fuel probes. Explosion of

Aviation Kerosene ( Jet A Vapors)

Graduate Aeronautical Labs. CalTech, Pasedena California Oct 7, 1997

Electrical Arcing of Aged Wire: Lectromechanical Design Company
Report#N191-RPT4AU99 August 12, 1999

NTSB Contracted Laboratory Documentation

9B—339 pgs.
Docket #SA-516
Exhibit 9B

NTSB
Airplane Interior Documentation Group Factual Report of Investigation

NTSB
Metallurgist’s Factual Reprot#97-82 April 22, 1997
Section 41/42 Joint Forward Cargo Door
Docket# SA-516
Exhibit 15C

NTSB
Materiels Laboratory Factual Reprot #99-137
July 19, 1999

NTSB
Metallurgy/Structures – Sequencing Group Chairman’s Factual Report
Nose Landing Gear Doors Sequence
Materiel Report #97-155, #97-155A
Docket # Sa516
Exhibit 18C

Medical Forensic Group Chairman’s Factual Reprot of Investigation

DCA-96-MA -070 October 17, 1997

NTSB
Fire and Explosion Group Factual Report
Docket # SA-516
Exhibit #20A

Books
In the Blink of an Eye
The FBI Investigation of TWA Flight 800
Pat Milton, Random House, NY 1999
The Downing of TWA Flight 800
James Sanders, Zebra Books Kensington Publishing, NY 1997

TWA800 Accident or Incident

Kevin E . Ready Cap Parlier
St. Gaudens Press 1998

Deadly Departure
Why the Experts Failed to Prevent the TWA Flight 800
Disaster and How it Could Happen Again
Christine Negroni
Cliff Street Books, 2000

The Boeing service letter relating to principal causes of wire degradation:

Boeing 747
Service Letter
______Customer Services Division___________________
S ERVICE ENGINEERING BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP PO. BOX 3707 S EATTLE WAS HINGTON 98124-2207

747-SL-20-048
ATA-2020-00
January 25th, 1995
INSPECTION OF WIRING ON
SUBJECT:
HIGH TIME AIRPLANES

MODEL: 747
APPLICABILITY: All 747-SP-100-200-300 Aircraft
DC-54446, Chapter 20, Standard
REFERENCE:
 Wiring Practices Manual

SUMMARY
This service letter discusses inspection recommendations for
airplane wiring and highlights wiring components and areas that
may experience degradation during long term operation of 747
airplanes.
BACKGROUND:
Boeing has been requested by operators to provide guidance on
areas of wiring that warrant special attention on high time 747
airplanes. On all wiring repair and modifications the reference
document is the authoritative guide. Overall, Boeing has found
that most airplane wiring exceeds the economic design goal of
the airplane. The current high time 747 exceeds 95,000 flight
hours and many more exceed 50,000 flight hours. Boeing
generally does not recommend special general wiring inspections
unless a fault is experienced or an area is disturbed for other
reasons.
DISCUSSION:
Based on observations during surveys of hightime airplanes,
Boeing believes the following are the principal causes of wiring
degradation. Photo examples of many items are shown in
Attachment 1 to aid personnel when doing wiring inspections:

Vibration in conjunction with other factors is felt to be

Vibration -
a leading cause of wiring degradation.

Maintenance -Improper rework can contribute to long term

problems and wiring degradation. Repairs made by line
maintenance can have limited durability and should be redone at
convenient maintenance opportunities. Repairs done per
the reference document are considered permanent and should not
require rework.

Events, such as pneumatic duct ruptures, can

Indirect Damage -
cause damage that, while not initially evident, can later cause
wiring problems.

Page 2 747-SL-20-048 =
January 25,1995
- Boeing takes great effort to make wire and
Chemical Contamination
associated components impervious to chemical contaminants.
However, to maintain required properties of wiring components,
they are not impervious to all chemicals. To gain resistance to
one class of chemicals, a basic resistance to other classes of
chemicals is sometimes reduced. Hydraulic fluid requires
special consideration, as it is a common cause of wiring
component degradation.
Hydraulic fluid is very damaging to connector grommets and
wire bundle clamps, this can lead to indirect damage such as
arcing and chafing. Wiring that may have been exposed to
hydraulic fluid should be given special attention during
wiring inspections. Connector cleaning instructions are found in
Section 20-60-01 of the reference document. Other common
chemicals can potentially cause degradation of electrical
components. i.e fuel, corrosion inhibiting compounds
(BMS 3-23), waste system chemicals, cleaning agents, and de-
icing fluids.
General Maintenance - As a general rule, wiring that is undisturbed
will have less degradation than wiring that is reworked. As
wiring and components become more brittle with age this effect
becomes more pronounced.

Heat - Wiring that is not designed for high temperatures and is

exposed to heat can accelerate degradation. Even low levels of
heat can degrade wiring over long periods of time. This type of
degradation is sometimes seen on engines, in galleys, and behind
lights. The following are the types of installations that merit
special attention during wiring inspections. Examples of the
following are also shown in Attachment 1:

- Wire chafing is aggravated by damaged clamps,

Clamping points
clamp cushion migration or improper clamp installations.

Connectors- Worn environmental seals, missing seal plugs,

missing dummy contacts, or lateral pressure on connector
grommets can compromise connector integrity and allow
contamination to enter the connector, leading to corrosion or
grommet degradation.

Terminations- Terminal lugs and splices are susceptible to

mechanical damage, corrosion, heat damage and chemical
contamination. Also, the build up and nut torque on large-gauge
wire studs is critical to their performance.

Backshells - Wires may break at backshells due to excessive

flexing, static pressure, or missing build -up.
 - Damage to sleeving and conduits, if not
Sleeving and Conduits
corrected, will often lead to wire damage.

Following are locations that could be included in a special

inspection of high time 747 airplane wiring. The first three are in
high vibration areas. Attachment 2 suggests specific areas for
inspection and was adapted from an inspection developed by an
operator. The inspection was used during refurbishment and
Section 41 modification of their airplanes:

Wings - The wing leading edge and pylons are the areas that
experience a difficult environment for wiring installations. The
wing leading edge wiring is exposed

Page 3 7479SL-20-048
January 25,1995
whenever the leading edge flaps are extended. The area that is
the most susceptible to damage lies between the inboard and
outboard engines. The inboard section of the wing experiences
less flexing and there is very limited wiring outboard of the
outboard engine.
Engine and Nacelle Area - This area experiences high vibration,
heat, frequent maintenance, and is susceptible to chemical
contamination.

Landing Gear- This area is exposed to severe external

environmental conditions in addition to vibration and chemical
contamination. Because of regular landing gear maintenance and
associated routine inspections, this area should not generally
require other special inspections for wiring.

Panel wiring is particularly prone to broken

Electrical Panels -
wires and damaged insulation when these high density areas are
disturbed during major modifications and refurbishments. One
repair facility has found that wire damage was minimized by
tying wiring to wooden dowels. This reduced wire disturbance
during section 41 modification. This repair facility also removes
entire disconnect brackets, -when possible, instead of removing
individual receptacles.

Power feeders- Operators may find it advantageous to inspect

splices and terminations for signs of over- heating. If any signs of
overheating are seen the splice or termination should be
replaced. This applies to galley power feeders in addition to the
main and APU generator power feeders

One frequently encountered hindrance to inspections is dirt and

grime. The reference document recommends several materials
for cleaning electrical connectors. Wire may be cleaned with
chemicals like isopropyl alcohol, as listed in the reference
document, section 20-60-01. (Note: Many cleaning agents are
flammable.) For wire inspections, a soft cloth, such as a cotton
glove, can be used to clean individual wires. With any cleaning
process, care should be taken not to remove wire markings and
I.D. tape. In addition, airplanes are often pressure washed with a
general purpose detergent. Moderate pressure and a general
purpose detergent are not harmful to wiring, but water under high
pressure can penetrate components such as connectors and
splices. Moisture penetration into components tends to increase
with elevated water temperatures.
In conclusion, Boeing believes that the wiring on high time 747
airplanes is holding up exceptionally well. Wiring damage is
hard to predict but some areas of wiring experience degradation
more frequently.
BOEING ACTION:
This service letter is the result of Boeing observations recorded
during surveys of high time 747 airplanes and a survey of
selected operators. Boeing will continue to observe the condition
of wiring on high time airplanes and welcomes operator input on
this subject. Boeing will update this service letter as additional
knowledge is gained.
Page 4 7470SL-20-048
January 25,1995
SUGGESTED OPERATOR ACTION:
The above information is provided for general guidance. Special
inspections should be conducted as deemed appropriate by each
operator, based on airplane maintenance experience. Any
discrepancies found should be repaired per the reference
document.
INDUSTRY SUPPORT INFORMATION:
Warranty remedies are not available for the inspection and repair
procedures given in this service letter.
R.D. Vannoy
747 Service Engineering Manager
SJB:jw
Attachments
The following images were taken from the NTSB –TWA 800 report.
While you may consider that they are taken “out of context” from
their report, you must consider that these images are from aircraft
that were found in the “ desert bone yard” and aged via that
environment. It does not allow for the circumstances that occurred
in the TWA 800 flight itself.

Systems 9 - Photo 41. Airplane 19. B767 burned wires seen after chiller removed from the rack over the oxygen tank. The edge of the
chiller was near the burned area,
damaged wire insulation was found on unburned wires, and foam on chiller burned.
(Courtesy of NTSB TWA800 report)
Figure 1. A bundle of Mil-W-81381 wire with visible carbon tracking. ( courtesy of NTSB TWA 800 Report—ARCING)

Metal drill shaving on a wire bundle of a commercial aircraft. ( courtesy of the NTSB TWA 800 Report on Arcing)
Example of scintillation of a pre- damaged cut. .The image is out of focus (Courtesy NTSB—TWA 800 Report)

Example of a flashing effect created in the lab ( courtesy of NTSB- TWA 800 Report)
A Chemical combustion flame observed after a series of flashing events. ( Courtesy of TWA 800 Report)

Sample bundle after 25 minutes of wet arc tracking ( Courtesy NTSB TWA 800 Report)
Flash event during a metal shavings short circuit test. ( courtesy of NTSB TWA 800 Report)

Sample bundle after the flash shown in above photo ( Courtesy of the NTSB TWA 800 Report)
Airplane 7 (which was an MD-90) Arrow points to wire rub on structure behind B-747 flight engineer panel. Paint rubbed off metal to
right. Lighting is sunlight from aft right cockpit window. (Right edge of photo is up) (Courtesy of the NTSB -TWA 800 Report)

These images were taken from the reconstructed wreckage of TWA 800 at the
Grumman -Calverton Hanger in Riverhead , Long Island NY—March 15, 2000
—Courtesy Domenic Proscia- Vaughn College of Aeronautics, LI NY.
The number 3 air conditioning pack from TWA 800.

Back view of the reconstructed fuselage and the wing box extension just below is where the center fuel tank was.
Close up of the forward right hand section of the aircraft. The devastation of the forward section below is truly heart rending.

FBI tag of the fuselage fragment of the flight control surface or wing of TWA 800
Long shot of the reconstructed fuselage showing the area of the “explosion” and the forward rise where the nose would have been.

Right hand station #1306 of the right wing keel of TWA 800
Right forward section of the fuselage showing the wing box and where the wing root would have been just forward of the extension .

Just above the wing root or start of where the wing would have been this blow up shows where the seats would have been and the metal
twisted outward shows the force of the explosion
The right wing bundle of wires shows how they were bundled together and in acceptable shape after the explosion and lying on the
ocean floor for months.

The windshield of the nose section of TWA 800. Notice the glass is not shattered .
Wires found at the bottom of the ocean that were not yet identified and might never be.

[1] Heat Sink- Heat sink uses the fuel ( which would have to have a high thermal stability so that it would not break down) to absorb some of the heat created by
skin friction of an aircraft at high mach numbers) Since Airliners don’t fly at M ach 1 but below that creating a system for heat sink would have been extremely costly.

[2] Jet A- uses Keosene as a base

Jet B is more volatile uses a naptha-keosene base and is better in cold weather areas.
[3] See appendix for letter contents