Allan S. Montao, Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation- Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (NMCSC- SUPER) G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009 (MORALDE) Subject: Juridical Capacity Doctrine: Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born; Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. These Articles of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads: Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. FACTS: Under consideration before the Supreme Court is a petition for review filed by the petitioner questioning the decision/ resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the resolution of the respondent Voluntary Arbitrator awarding bereavement leave and other benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano. Hortillano, an employee of petitioner and a member of respondent Union claimed for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent. The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. Continental Steel granted Hortillano’s claim except claims for bereavement leave and other leave benefits. At the Arbitration level, the Voluntary Arbitrator sustained the position of the union the Hortillano was entitled for bereavement leave and other death benefits, notwithstanding the position expressed by Continental steel that the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported. The Voluntary Arbitrator opined that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals questioning the resolution of the public respondent in favour of Hortillano. The Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the public respondent Voluntary Arbitrator. ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary that a fetus should be delivered from the mother’s womb for it to be considered dead for all legal intents and purposes. HELD: No. Reliance by Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads: Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. Further, the Court ruled that in deciding the case, there’s no need to establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. According to the Supreme Court, it is not a question whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death. The unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else. Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child status in relation to his/her parents. The Supreme Court held that the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception. Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently