Javellana v.
Executive Secretary Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents
from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed constitution not found in
the present constitution. Javellana maintained that the respondents are acting
without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing proposed constitution and that
the president is without power to proclaim the ratification of the constitution.
Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners
pray for the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order,
decree, and proclamation which are similar in their objectives.
ISSUES:
1.    Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?
2.    Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention ratified
validly in compliance with applicable laws?
3.    Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?
4.    Are the petitioners entitled to relief?
5.    Is the proposed Constitution in force?
HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an
existing constitution is a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to
determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the manner required by
the constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly
ratified in accordance with Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which
provides only one way for ratification (election or plebiscite held in accordance with
law and only with qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social conditions
in the Philippines (i.e. martial law), the Court cannot honestly say that the people
acquiesced to the proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to dismiss the cases as
the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue posed by the cases
which considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new
constitution is in force as there are not enough votes to say otherwise.
Estrada v. Desierto
JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)
G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001
FACTS:
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went
on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords.
House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of
Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.
Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took
their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
presiding.
When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA
Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11
senators.
January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's
resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain
from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA
Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. 
January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable.
Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would
not be a candidate. Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General
Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.
General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000
strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director
General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.
January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang
Palace. 
January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency.
February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal
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complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted."  decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He
prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution."  FACTS:
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo
is an Acting President.  and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to
HELD:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20,
2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the
issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case
covers the seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality
of PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the former. it is alleged that in
doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion
defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very
freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional
HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial law nor a state
of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military
to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family
and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only
order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress
lawless violence.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of
when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to
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the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if
the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of
the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from
October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there
was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement
of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced
from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no
record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one
SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position
of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit
documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for
those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the
private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she
resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated
as coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs
from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15
years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and
that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There
was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno
was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against
Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The
House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable
cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not
made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as
pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN,
but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her
husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter,
in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against
Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66,
the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of
the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a
Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-
De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment
hearing before the House of Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being
sought is to question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment
complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v.
Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be
removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that
Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period
under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during
the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible
right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi
(“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake
of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is
applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have
no other means by which to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC
which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to
investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against
members of the SC and contending that this is not a political question because such
issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed
to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
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requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The
failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified
Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good
faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of
malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through
impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon.
Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio.
Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to
create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of
removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment
suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to the
continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may”
on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the
mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the
present case because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed
by means other than impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests
relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no
such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases
cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the
RTC, such would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have
effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an
official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and
administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo
warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through
impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66
provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the
“cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file
her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her
appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption
created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all
administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question
which can only be decided by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing
cannot give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were
filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.
Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that
she possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of
determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover,
submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only required is the
imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such
as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as
competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective
considerations.
ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention
Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five
Justices
Main Issues:
Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto.
Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that an impeachment complaint has already been filed
with the House of Representatives.
Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer
is impeachment.
Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the
principle of separation of powers
Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the
character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the
position of Chief Justice.
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If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs
as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules
and regulations
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not
filed properly and promptly.
Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the
JBC
If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit
SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
President cured such ineligibility.
Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
HELD:
Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third
party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those
proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the
sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal
interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The
justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and
uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’
intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-
judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the
impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated
by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the
name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or
group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.
Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court to inhibit in the case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of
doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a
judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to
decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and
convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment
proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given
that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition,
especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of
bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on
distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may
have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President
Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being
unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance between the Court
and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the
sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus
inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent
litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be
received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court
adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety of
sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable
officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary
writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to
issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed
against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental
importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise
its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable
officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal
of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on
impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy
squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in
character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and
power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty
cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch
of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court
through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination
of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based
on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the
violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled
by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to
a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto
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proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries
with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General
or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal
authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest
and the government policy on the matter at hand.
Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment
proceeding is not forum shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these
remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules
pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is
the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto
proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief
Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the
other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable
offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo
warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally
holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being
whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from
office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto
proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is
ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the charges of
impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public
office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a
person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally
hold or occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings
before the House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a
determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by
the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment,
there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the
House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may
be reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses
the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as
having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an
option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for
removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by
other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express
provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers
cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for
their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not
extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she
occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is,
only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not
equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial
review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining
to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation
where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even
when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in
offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
represented to be a member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a
person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a
disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the
difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An
6
action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such
culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings
does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining
probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally
committed power of impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain
arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be
removed from the position immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal
requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case
impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended
to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch
to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment
proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may
clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at
the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold
office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a
quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof
are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of
integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be
construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster
from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of
such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”.
Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private
individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private
individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government
itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the
qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor,
when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated
that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or
prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the
reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead
as a defense to an action by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very
purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a
continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to
say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public
office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic
cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon
discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not
been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s
appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately
rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes
ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council
is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of
supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the
subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court
as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore
not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to
recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy
decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s
supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC
in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion
to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is
not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the
same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
[yourlawyersays]
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot
be waived or bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the
Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to
an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct,
and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by
the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the
7
litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a
member of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory
requirement.
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee
shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has
likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is
a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result
in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so
important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply
with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but
also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a
fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily
mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities.
According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept
a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as accepting
its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject
themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and
undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to
demand the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in
the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s
integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the
mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering
that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is
the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character
or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated
the Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been
filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the
unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to
withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The
Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case,
there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the
missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the
repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in
the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of
filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial
evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is
categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for
calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the
Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the
certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon
Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo
warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the burden
rests upon the respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her
from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government
service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any pay for the periods she was on
leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to
be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno.
During the period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized
official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had not yet established
compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of
State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to
issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P.
HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance
is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative
responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative
charges as of the date of her resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete
requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her
compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates
for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite
proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the
JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does
not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the
body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the
position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications.
8
Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought
to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs,
again in violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements .
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to
dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being
accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized
in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received
the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for
2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of
P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate
Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with the
physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity,
honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of
dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for
nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who
are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have
been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From the minutes of
the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of the
applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service
in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still
required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno
who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead
of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no
longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then
resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is not
continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus
infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative
responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno
submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was
nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to
mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in
U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the
JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court.
[yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of
the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave
offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A
person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act
that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity
and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the
JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in
UP, her false representations that she was in private practice after resigning from
UP when in fact she was counsel for the government, her false claims that the
clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs requirement, her
commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for
the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least
P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding,
misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La
Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary
to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ
request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored
rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits
which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of
deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then
SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving
national security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has
integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for
several years means that her integrity was not established at the time of her
application
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is
eyeing the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting,
Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for the
next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to
submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption
or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of
bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit
her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries
indicated in the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot
be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
9
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the
time of appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire
tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a
necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first
place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for
said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so
without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of
the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto
proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to
the action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although
the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the
selection and nomination process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing
power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-
negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal
requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible
to attack.
Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo
warranto
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is
that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on
him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno
is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable
right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment,
is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is
proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice.
[yourlawyersays]
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY
HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is
OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the
Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination
process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the
Court.
Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she
should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting
aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819)
Facts:
The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the
executive and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate.
Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of
modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is
an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women’s health and population control.
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming
that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population
control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a
birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible
parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.
Issue:
Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the
Constitution
Ruling: NO
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
10
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full
range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning
methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of
pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to
reduce the number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the
petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH
Law.
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not
to cripple or impede legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right
to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable
human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect
to certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante
Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar,
filed this petition, questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for
TRO.
RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER
A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986
Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be
national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in
their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
ISSUEs:
Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference
with, and an abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-
chief powers”
HELD:
Power of Administrative Control
NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In
the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power
of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of
Chief Executive.”
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his
control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of
them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
11
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and
other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an
administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.
Power of Executive Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply
provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would
gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the
State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war
powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He
remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are
clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent
with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military.”.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GR No. 160261,
2003-11-10
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution... which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the... manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint[4] (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices[5] of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."[6] The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003[8] in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"[9] but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint [11] was filed with the
Secretary General of the House[12] by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First
District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the... alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House of
Representatives.[13]
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most
of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
Issues:
Issue no. 1
Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
Issue no. 2
Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
Issue no. 3
Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
Issue no. 4
Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution.
Issue no. 5
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution.
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Ruling:
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over
which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue
would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is... a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that... the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than
by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their
clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.[114] Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non- justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of
its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Principles:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction,... and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an... elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its... power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of
the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
A Republican form of government rests on the conviction that sovereignty should
reside in the people and that all government authority must emanate from them. It
abhors the concentration of power on one or a few, cognizant that power, when
absolute, can lead to abuse, but... it also shuns a direct and unbridled rule by the
people, a veritable kindling to the passionate fires of anarchy.
Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order
their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public
offices, agencies and commissions;
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the
part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President
will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so
there is no impropriety in the funding.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No.
73748 - May 22, 1986)
FACTS: 1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 2. On March
25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court
further held that: 1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country;
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2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
and Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government. under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of
the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not
Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211) a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the
October 27, 1989 | 177 SCRA 668 President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to
protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the
Ferdinand Marcos, et al., petitioners return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present
Hon. Raul Manglapus, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al., time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
respondents 2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be
confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate
FACTS: pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual powers of the President under
On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos the 1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution
family to allow the return of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, refers to an express grant of power.
Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held that President Corazon Aquino did not act
arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare.
The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior
refusal, fearing the instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of
former President Marcos were to be brought back to the country. In a statement,
she said:
"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and
order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be
brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos'
remains.
2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains
is tantamount to dictatorship.

HELD:
1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to
what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution.
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