Journal of Applied Psychology

© 2020 American Psychological Association 2021,2020, Vol. No.

Vol. 106, 2, No. 999, 000
2, 230– 249
ISSN: 0021-9010 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/apl0000502

Pay Communication, Justice, and Affect: The Asymmetric Effects of

Process and Outcome Pay Transparency on Counterproductive
Workplace Behavior
Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli and Peter Bamberger
Tel Aviv University

Grounded on uncertainty management theory, the current research examines the role of employee
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

justice perceptions in explaining the distinct effects of two forms of pay transparency—process
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versus outcome pay transparency— on counterproductive workplace behavior (CWB). Study 1, a

field study of 321 employees, revealed that process pay transparency is inversely related to CWB
targeting the organization (i.e., less CWB-O), with this effect explained by enhanced employee
procedural justice perceptions. It also indicated, however, that among employees perceiving their
pay position as being lower than that of referent others, outcome pay transparency is positively
associated with both CWB-O and CWB-I (i.e., CWB targeting other employees), with this effect
explained by reduced employee distributive justice perceptions. Study 2, using an online simulation-
based experiment conducted on 394 employees and assessing actual deception behaviors (targeting
both the agency sponsoring the study and other participants in the study), replicated these findings
and extended our understanding of the negative consequences of outcome pay transparency on CWB.
Specifically, when pay allocations were transparent (vs. secretive) and participant’s pay was
manipulated to be lower (vs. higher) than that of teammates, participants reported lower distributive
justice perceptions leading to heightened deception behaviors, with this effect explained by a more
negative emotional state. Theoretical and practical implications of both the positive and negative
consequences of pay transparency on CWB are discussed.

Keywords: process versus outcome pay transparency, counterproductive workplace behavior (CWB),
organizational justice perceptions, upward comparisons

Despite a growing trend toward greater transparency in pay
(Trotter, Zacur, & Stickney, 2017), research on pay transparency is
still narrow in scope, “considering only a limited range of out-
comes” (Marasi & Bennett, 2016, p. 50). More specifically, while
several studies have examined and generally found a positive
impact of pay transparency on employee task performance (e.g.,
Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger,
2014; Futrell & Jenkins, 1978; Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner,
2011; Tremblay & Chênevert, 2008), little is known about the
impact of pay transparency on employee contextual behaviors such
as organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and counterproduc-
tive workplace behavior (CWB), which, like task performance, are
key components of employee job performance (Rotundo & Sack-
This article was published Online First April 9, 2020.
X Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli and X Peter Bamberger, Coller School of
Management, Tel Aviv University.
We are grateful to Elena Belogolovsky, Rebecca J. Bennett, Sanghee
Park, and Tae-Youn Park for their helpful comments and suggestions on
earlier drafts of this article. We also thank Etti Doveh for her statistical
advice. We acknowledge with gratitude the Henry Crown Institute for
Business Studies for its funding of this research.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ilanit
SimanTov-Nachlieli, Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University,
P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel. E-mail: ilanitsn@tauex.tau.ac.il
230
ett, 2002). Consistent with a conceptual analysis of pay commu-
nication practices (Colella, Paetzold, Zardkoohi, & Wesson, 2007),
a straightforward assertion is that relative to more secretive com-
munication practices, pay transparency should be associated with
more positive and less negative employee behaviors (i.e., more
OCB and less CWB). Yet, while Marasi, Wall, and Bennett (2018)
indeed found a positive association between pay transparency and
OCB, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2017) revealed just the op-
posite—that pay transparency can adversely affect the amount of
help (a key aspect of OCB) individuals afford their peers.
One explanation for this inconsistency may be that these studies
each examined different forms of pay transparency, with each
having its own independent effects on employee outcomes. Indeed,
scholars have recently proposed that pay transparency is best
conceptualized in terms of multiple, distinct forms including pro-
cess pay transparency, referring to information provided to em-
ployees regarding the procedures and processes governing pay and
reward allocation decisions (i.e., how pay is determined in the orga-
nization), and outcome pay transparency, denoting the disclosure of
actual pay levels of individual employees or employee groups (Ful-
mer & Chen, 2014; Smit & Montag-Smit, 2019). If, as these scholars
suggest, there are multiple forms of pay transparency, it may be that
how pay transparency relates to contextual behavior depends on the
particular form of transparency examined. Given the growing move-
ment toward pay transparency (Trotter et al., 2017), understanding
 PAY TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR
whether, when, and how pay transparency may drive contextual
behavior at work is both important and timely.
In the current study, we examine these form-specific effects of
pay transparency on employee contextual behavior through the
lens of CWB (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Bennett,
1995). We do so for two main reasons. First, CWB— deliberate,
deviant behaviors intended to cause harm to the organization itself
(CWB-O; e.g., voluntary absenteeism) and/or its members
(CWB-I; e.g., harassment of other employees)—is pervasive in
organizations and expensive (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Second,
while limited, prior research has examined the link between pay
transparency and contextual behavior, these studies have focused
largely on OCB (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Marasi et al.,
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2018). As these are two, independent forms of contextual behavior,
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with conditions driving more or less OCB not necessarily driving
less or more CWB (Dalal, 2005; Kelloway, Loughlin, Barling, &
Nault, 2002), the question remains open as to whether pay trans-
parency is negatively or positively associated with CWB, and
when and how these effects may operate.
In the current study, we extend uncertainty management theory
(UMT; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) in order to answer that open
question. UMT proposes that uncertainty over salient processes
and outcomes has robust implications on fairness attributions
which, in turn, have the potential to drive individual action. Ap-
plying UMT, we propose that while process pay transparency, by
boosting perceptions of procedural justice, diminishes CWB di-
rected at the organization (CWB-O), outcome pay transparency’s
effects via distributive justice depend on one’s pay position rela-
tive to referent others. We then extend UMT by integrating recent
research on the affective consequences of injustice in order to
better understand how perceptions of distributive (in)justice may
drive not only organizationally oriented CWB (i.e., CWB-O), but
CWB directed at peers (i.e., CWB-I) as well.
Our findings extend theory and research on pay communication
and uncertainty management in several ways. First, they demonstrate
that the effects of pay transparency on employees’ justice perceptions
and contextual behaviors are more nuanced than suggested to date
(Colella et al., 2007; Marasi et al., 2018), with their nature contingent
upon the particular form of pay transparency being investigated.
Moreover, they highlight the conditions and underlying mechanisms
driving what might otherwise be viewed as inconsistent effects. Sec-
ond, they demonstrate that even one particular form of pay transpar-
ency, namely outcome transparency, can have asymmetrical effects
depending on the individual’s pay position relative to referent others.
Finally, they extend UMT by highlighting how, through the negative
emotions potentially elicited by perceptions of unfairness, a
transparency-based reduction in pay uncertainty can drive deceptive
behaviors against both organizational agents and innocent coworkers.
Pay Transparency, Uncertainty Management Theory,
and CWB
It has long been known that organizations vary with regard to the
degree to which they provide employees pay information (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Milkovich, Newman, & Gerhart, 2013). Schol-
ars have recently proposed, however, that beyond differing in the
degree of pay transparency, organizations also differ from one another
in terms of transparency form with three distinct forms of pay trans-
parency recognized to date (Arnold, Fulmer, Sender, Allen, &
231
Staffelbach, 2018; Fulmer & Chen, 2014; Smit & Montag-Smit,
2019). These include the two forms noted above (i.e., process trans-
parency and outcome transparency), as well as communication open-
ness transparency—the degree to which the organization allows em-
ployees to discuss personal pay matters with one another.
Communication openness transparency differs from the two former
modes in that it captures the degree to which the organization limits
or facilitates pay information sharing by employees. Yet, even when
employees are allowed to freely discuss personal pay matters, they
may nevertheless, refrain from disclosing such information (Bierman
& Gely, 2004; Pappu, 2001; Smit & Montag-Smit, 2019). Accord-
ingly, given our interest in exploring the implications of pay-related
information when it is shared by the organization itself, in our theo-
rizing we focus on two former modes of pay transparency, namely
process versus outcome pay transparency.
As noted above, our theorizing regarding the asymmetrical impli-
cations of these two forms of pay transparency on CWB is grounded
on the UMT (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). Gleaning insights from
both social and cognitive psychology, and integrating procedural and
outcomes fairness perceptions, this theory suggests that fairness judg-
ments play a critical role in uncertainty management and have im-
portant behavioral implications. Employees’ fairness judgments serve
as one key mechanism linking pay communication practices to CWB
because pay communication influences the amount of uncertainty
associated with the wage-effort bargain (a highly salient feature of the
employment relationship; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990) and because “fair-
ness helps people deal with uncertainty” (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002,
p. 3). Specifically, UMT proposes that as fairness uncertainty is both
aversive (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Jost, 1995) and highly salient (Van
den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998), employees are naturally driven to
search for information as a means by which to reduce their uncertainty
about whether they are treated fairly by their organization. Accord-
ingly, the theory suggests that aside from any direct, uncertainty-
reducing effect (via reduced information asymmetry) that more trans-
parent pay communication practices may have, such practices may
also be interpreted by employees as signaling employer goodwill, thus
further reducing fairness uncertainty. That is, pay communication
practices may serve as an important source of uncertainty-reducing
information, with employees inferring that employers are more fair
when pay communication practices are more transparent in nature,
and less fair, when pay communication practices are more secretive
(Colella et al., 2007; Lytle, 2014; Marasi & Bennett, 2016). Further-
more, the theory views employees’ fairness inferences as a primary
driver of behavior, with those experiencing what they deem to be
unfair treatment being less likely to cooperate (Lind, 2001), showing
covert disobedience (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996), and “behav-
ing in antisocial ways” (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002, p. 2).
While UMT suggests that signals emanating from pay communi-
cation practices are largely processed on the basis of conscious and
effortful reflection (Kahneman’s, 2011 System 2), it also recognizes
the role of more implicit, cognitive (System 1) heuristics in drawing
fairness inferences (Lind, 2001), with different heuristics driving
distinct effects on employees’ ultimate behavior. On the one hand, in
the case of pay transparency, attribute substitution heuristics (Kahne-
man, 2011) stemming from the transparency practice itself (i.e.,
“transparency ⫽ trust”) may generate high fairness judgments and
thus diminish any tendency of employees to engage in negative
contextual behaviors. On the other hand, consistent with system
justification theory (Jost, 1995), UMT suggests that in the absence of
 232 SIMANTOV-NACHLIELI AND BAMBERGER
hard evidence that they are being treated unfairly (such as in the case
of pay secrecy), employees may dismiss and implicitly deny more
aversive fairness judgments because attributions of unfairness suggest
a lack of control which in turn can lower one’s self-esteem and
self-efficacy (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). In contrast, consistent with
the certainty effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)—that is, the over-
weighting of outcomes that are certain relative to those that are
probable—when pay is more transparent, the vivid content of that
information may make it difficult for employees to deny unfair
treatment (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017), thus generating low
fairness judgments and the negative contextual behaviors associated
with them. In this way, UMT suggests that distinct employees behav-
iors associated with various pay communication practices are likely to
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be explained by the (un)fairness judgments (or, in other words,
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[in]justice perceptions) elicited by such practices.
In the sections below, we expand on this theorizing, focusing on
the potential asymmetrical effects of the two forms of pay trans-
parency (process vs. outcome) on CWB, with each working
through a distinct, underlying justice mechanism. Specifically,
after explaining why we expect process and outcome forms of pay
transparency to have distinct effects on CWB more generally, we
explicate our model detailing how and when these distinct effects
on CWB-O and CWB-I are likely to emerge, and the role of
procedural versus distributive justice perceptions in this process.
Pay Transparency and CWB: The Basis for
Asymmetrical Effects
A common theme of the pay communication research published in
the last decade is that more secretive pay communication practices are
often interpreted by employees as a signal of sinister employer inten-
tions or deception (Day, 2007; Milkovich et al., 2013; see also Bergh,
Ketchen, Orlandi, Heugens, & Boyd, 2019, for a review on informa-
tion asymmetry in management research), whereas pay transparency
elicits and reinforces a climate of openness among employees, sig-
naling to employees that their employer can be trusted (e.g., Bam-
berger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Colella et al., 2007; Day, 2007) and is
treating them fairly (Lytle, 2014). In other words, earlier examinations
of pay transparency as a general practice suggest that it is associated
with more positive fairness judgments, and thus should be inversely
associated with counterproductive work behaviors directed toward
those responsible for enacting such transparent practices (i.e., lower
CWB-O). Aside from the positive signals that more transparent pay
practices may transmit, however, these practices also entail the actual
sharing of pay-related information, be it process- or outcome-related.
Although both information types (i.e., process and outcome) serve as
an important source of uncertainty-reducing information, UMT sug-
gests that the nature of this information and how it is processed can
also affect procedural or outcome fairness judgments, and thus the
behavioral response to the pay communication practice itself.
Process Pay Transparency and CWB
In organizations whose process pay practices are more transparent,
information about the processes and procedures used to determine pay
outcomes are provided to employees (Day, 2012). Such practices are
likely to elicit positive procedural fairness judgments for two reasons.
First, as noted above, research suggests that transparency is typically
associated with attributions of fairness and trust (e.g., Bamberger &
Belogolovsky, 2010; Lytle, 2014). In this way, attribute substitution
heuristics (“transparency ⫽ trust”) may generate inferences of greater
procedural fairness perceptions when process pay transparency is
higher.
Second, organizations sharing information on pay-related pro-
cesses and procedures typically take steps to ensure that the
disclosed processes and procedures are in fact perceived as fair and
consistently applied. They do so in order to inform the conscious/
reflective processing of such information by employees, and in this
way positively influence employee perceptions of procedural jus-
tice (Colella et al., 2007; Lind & Tyler, 1988). For example,
companies like Buffer and WholeFoods, typically highlight pro-
cedures aimed at ensuring the accuracy of performance-linked
metrics and their consistent application, and accompany the spec-
ification of their procedures with a narrative explicating how they
have been developed and applied to ensure fairness and consis-
tency (Bird, 2018). In sum, because such procedural information
sharing is often done with the intent of driving employee percep-
tions of processes and procedures as fair, one can expect more
positive procedural fairness judgments when pay processes are
more transparent.
Consistent with social exchange theory (e.g., Blau, 1964; Homans,
1961), UMT suggests that such positive fairness judgments are likely
to generate reciprocal action (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), moti-
vating employees to engage in more positive organization-directed
behavior and refraining from engaging in acts deemed potentially
harmful to the organization, namely CWB-O (Van den Bos & Lind,
2002). Such a theorized effect has been well-supported empirically.
Indeed, one of the most frequently replicated findings in social psy-
chology is the “fair process effect—namely, the positive impact of
perceived procedural fairness on people’s reaction to their outcomes
(e.g., Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979).
Moreover, meta-analytic results have consistently demonstrated that
perceived procedural fairness has a positive impact on organization-
oriented employee behaviors (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001;
Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Accordingly, opera-
tionalizing procedural fairness judgments in terms of procedural jus-
tice perceptions, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Procedural justice perceptions mediate the
negative association between process pay transparency and
CWB-O.
While employees may be disinclined to engage in CWB-O as a
function of process pay transparency, there is little logical basis to
expect a similar effect on CWB-I (deviant behaviors directly harmful
to other individuals within the organization). This is because, to the
extent that process pay transparency generates positive procedural
fairness judgments, the target of reciprocation is likely to be the
organization promulgating these practices rather than the individual’s
coworker. Accordingly, we do not posit any procedural-justice-
mediated effect of process pay transparency on CWB-I.
Outcome Pay Transparency and CWB
UMT is grounded on the premise that in assessing the fairness of
outcomes, individuals follow the principles of equity theory and its
analogues (Adams, 1963; Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961), engaging in
the social comparison of their own inputs and outcomes with the
input/outcome ratio of referent others. The disclosure of actual pay
 PAY TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR
levels as a function of outcome pay transparency facilitates such
conscious/reflective social comparison processes (Bamberger & Be-
logolovsky, 2017). As such, to the extent that organizations may tend
to disclose pay levels in a manner more reflective of pay equity
(Arnold et al., 2018; Marasi & Bennett, 2016), the outcomes of such
social comparison processes might be expected to align with that of
substitution-based, heuristic (“transparency ⫽ trust”) processing, gen-
erating more positive distributive fairness judgments.
Outcome pay transparency and negative distributive fair-
ness judgments. In contrast to this position, Van den Bos and Lind
(2002, p. 23) emphasize that “how people form judgments of outcome
fairness is more complicated than equity theory suggests.” Specifi-
cally, regardless of whether pay information is disclosed and how
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much information is disclosed, UMT suggests that because of the
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averseness of uncertainty, individuals are highly motivated to engage
in social comparison, using heuristically derived estimates of others
inputs and outcomes (Lind, 2001). Moreover, even within any single
category of referent others (e.g., employees doing the same job in the
organization or contributing the same level of value to the organiza-
tion), there are potentially a range of pay levels to compare with
(Rynes & Milkovich, 1986). Specifically, an employee can choose to
compare his or her outcomes with the average or median pay level
(i.e., a more lateral comparison), the upper end of the pay distribution
(i.e., engaging in upward comparisons with those in a preferred
situation; Buunk & Gibbons, 2007), or the bottom end of the pay
distribution (i.e., a downward comparison). Thus, distributive fairness
judgments are likely to be influenced by one’s perceived pay position
compared to referent others (i.e., perceived pay position within his or
her pay distribution), with employees perceiving their pay position as
being lower than that of referent others, inferring more negative
distributive fairness judgments (i.e., appraising their outcome as un-
just; Lawler, 1971).
Several studies report support for the negative consequences of
upward comparisons on fairness perceptions (e.g., Austin,
McGinn, & Susmilch, 1980), and related concepts such as pay
(Harris, Anseel, & Lievens, 2008) and job (Brown, Ferris, Heller,
& Keeping, 2007) satisfaction. Moreover, consistent with individ-
uals’ tendency to overweigh negative (over positive) comparison
information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001),
as well as to overestimate the pay of peers (Lawler, 1971), prior
research has found upward comparisons to serve as an important
factor in determining pay level dissatisfaction, even when control-
ling for downward and lateral comparisons (Harris et al., 2008).
Exacerbating these negative heuristic influences, the certainty ef-
fect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that the consequences of
pay comparisons vary depending upon the vividness of the informa-
tion underlying them (Goethals & Klein, 2000; Kahneman & Tver-
sky, 1979). Consistent with this reasoning, Bamberger and Bel-
ogolovsky (2017) found that when pay was transparent (but not when
it was secret), the more vivid pay discrepancies were significantly
associated with envy toward upward comparison others. This suggests
that outcome pay transparency, by increasing the vividness of pay
discrepancies, may make employee’s perceived negative pay discrep-
ancies (when one perceives his or her pay position as relatively low
within his or her pay distribution) all the more salient, leading to more
negative distributive fairness judgments.
While the vividness afforded by outcome pay transparency may
increase the salience of negative pay discrepancies for those, such as
employees at the bottom half of a pay range, tending to engage in
233
upward comparisons, is transparency likely to generate similar effects
for employees at the upper half of the pay range? On the one hand, the
same upward comparison tendency noted above may apply even for
those with higher rates of pay. On the other hand, given their position
in the pay range, there may be an increased likelihood of downward
comparisons, with outcome pay transparency making such favorable
pay discrepancies more vivid. As research in social psychology
(Wills, 1981) suggests that more vivid downward comparisons have
the potential to drive more positive distributive fairness judgments, it
is likely that for those perceiving their pay position as relatively high
within their pay distribution, any adverse impact of outcome pay
transparency on fairness judgments, and in turn, on CWB, will, at the
very least, be attenuated. Hence, we expect the interaction of outcome
pay transparency with the employee’s perceived pay position within
his or her pay distribution to influence distributive fairness judgments,
and through these fairness judgments, CWB. More specifically, we
expect outcome pay transparency to be negatively associated with
distributive fairness judgments, with this effect amplified among
employees perceiving their pay position as being lower than that of
referent others, and attenuated among those perceiving their pay
position as being higher than that of referent others.
Negative fairness judgments, emotion, and CWB-O. As
noted earlier, UMT suggests that perceptions of outcome (i.e.,
distributive) injustice boost the likelihood that employees will
engage in greater antisocial behavior (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002);
however, UMT itself offers little insight into the psychological
mechanism linking injustice perceptions to negative behavior, nor
does it specify who is likely to be targeted by such behavior. Based
on recent theorizing in the justice literature, we extend UMT to
propose that negative emotions elicited by the perception of dis-
tributive injustice underlie retaliatory behavior directed against the
organization (i.e., CWB-O), as well as displaced aggression di-
rected against one’s peers (CWB-I).
Justice scholars have long posited that distributive injustice and
inequity perceptions have the potential to elicit a robust emotional
response (Adams, 1963; Homans, 1961). Yet, although there have
been periodic calls for research on how emotions may link unfair-
ness perceptions to action (e.g., De Cremer & Van den Bos, 2007),
as noted by Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh (2005, p. 629), “little
empirical research has examined the mediating role of emotion.”
Two notable exceptions lie in the work of (a) Spector and Fox
(2002, 2005), and (b) Tripp, Bies, and Aquino (2007). The former
propose the stressor-emotion model of CWB (Fox, Spector, &
Miles, 2001; Spector & Fox, 2002, 2005) which argues that “CWB
is a response to emotion-arousing situations in organizations, par-
ticularly feelings of anger and frustration” (Spector & Fox, 2005,
p. 163). More specifically, according to this model, injustice
perceptions serve as a stressor which, like other stressors, have the
potential to elicit state negative emotions (Spector & Goh, 2001).
In the case of perceived organizational injustice, the dominant
emotions likely to be elicited are those of anger and frustration.
Drawing from Folger and Baron (1996) and Skarlicki and Folger
(1997); Spector and Fox (2005, p. 153) argue that as such emotions
are aversive, people are driven to address the situation causing
them, with “retaliation . . . against the party or parties perceived as
the cause” adopted as a means by which to attempt to “restore
equity and justice.”
The latter (Tripp et al., 2007, p. 13) offer the “vigilante” model
which similarly suggests that, the more intense the negative emo-
 234 SIMANTOV-NACHLIELI AND BAMBERGER
tions generated by perceptions of distributive unfairness, “the more
often and seriously the victim contemplates getting even.” This
model is grounded on the assumption that justice violations often
elicit intense emotions, such as frustration, anger, and rage (Bies &
Tripp, 1996), with more intense emotion serving as a “strong
motivator of revenge” (Tripp et al., 2007, p. 21). Tripp et al. (2007)
argue that in response to more intense injustice-based emotions,
victims are likely to take revenge—“an action in response to some
perceived harm or wrongdoing by another party that is intended to
inflict damage, injury, discomfort, or punishment on the party
judged responsible” (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001, p. 53). Such
revenge can manifest in two ways, namely as behaviors aimed at
reducing the inequity generated (e.g., withholding effort or sup-
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port) or as “retributive justice,” acts aimed specifically at harming
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the agent responsible for the injustice such as public humiliation
and embarrassment or bad-mouthing. To the extent that these
negative behaviors are directed at the party responsible for the
perceived outcome unfairness, it is likely that they will manifest as
CWB-O.
Empirical findings are consistent with the logic underlying both
of these perspectives. More specifically, several studies have
found injustice perceptions to be positively correlated with nega-
tive state emotions (Bies & Tripp, 2002). Additionally, research
suggests that negative affect is highly correlated with CWB. For
example, using the Job-Related Affective Well-Being scale (Van
Katwyk, Fox, Spector, & Kelloway, 2000), an instrument that
assesses the experience of a variety of emotions at work, three
studies (Fox et al., 2001; Goh, Bruursema, Fox, & Spector, 2003;
Miles, Borman, Spector, & Fox, 2002) found significant correla-
tions between negative emotions at work and CWB, with correla-
tions as high as .45. Accordingly, we propose the following two
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Pay position moderates the indirect and
adverse effect of outcome pay transparency on CWB-O via
distributive justice perceptions such that the inverse associa-
tion of outcome pay transparency on distributive justice per-
ceptions (and thus positive effect on CWB-O) is amplified for
employees perceiving their pay position as being lower (vs.
higher) than that of referent others.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The distributive justice-mediated and
pay position-moderated effect of outcome pay transparency on
CWB-O operates via a heightened negative emotional state
such that, particularly for employees perceiving their pay
position as being lower (vs. higher) than that of referent
others, distributive justice is inversely associated with a neg-
ative emotional state, which in turn is positively associated
with CWB-O.
Negative fairness judgments, emotion, and CWB-I. As
noted by Tripp et al. (2007), because the revenge behaviors noted
above are directed at those deemed responsible for the unfair
outcomes (i.e., the organization or its agents), engagement in such
behaviors can entail significant risk. Indeed, these scholars posit
and find (in two studies—Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001, 2006) that
power moderates the degree to which justice-grounded negative
emotion is likely to elicit such revenge behaviors, with employees
tending to “get even” against those deemed responsible for the
injustice only when they have the organizational power to do so.
This suggests that intense negative emotions generated by per-
ceived unfairness may drive individuals to direct their response
toward less risky targets.
Indeed, the literature on displaced aggression—“aggression to-
ward a target that incommensurately exceeds that which is ordi-
narily seen as justified by the level of provocation emitted by that
target” (Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & Miller, 2000, p.
680)—suggests that while negative behavior following perceived
injustice is frequently directed toward the agent perceived respon-
sible for the unjust treatment (i.e., CWB-O), it may also be
redirected toward individual others (CWB-I). More specifically,
drawing from decades of research, Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen,
Carlson, and Miller (2000, p. 680), argue that while aggressive
behaviors are “frequently directed toward the agent perceived to
have provoked it,” a number of factors including fear of retaliation
or punishment from the provoking agent (e.g., the provocateur is
one’s boss or has other sources of power), can result in the
redirection of this behavior, “onto less powerful or more available
targets,” such as one’s peers.
Meta-analytic evidence supports this notion indicating first
that a key negative emotion, frustration, is highly associated
(mean effect size ⫽ 0.46) with displaced aggression (Marcus-
Newhall et al., 2000). Second, the meta-analytic evidence in-
dicates that relative to those not provoked, “those who are
provoked and are unable to retaliate reliably respond more
aggressively toward an innocent other” (effect size of 0.54;
Marcus-Newhall et al., 2000, p. 682). Taking both findings into
account, we posit that:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Pay position moderates the indirect and
adverse effect of outcome pay transparency on CWB-I via
distributive justice perceptions such that the inverse associa-
tion of outcome pay transparency on distributive justice per-
ceptions (and thus positive effect on CWB-I) is amplified for
employees perceiving their pay position as being lower (vs.
higher) than that of referent others.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The distributive justice-mediated and
pay position-moderated effect of outcome pay transparency on
CWB-I operates via a heightened negative emotional state
such that, particularly for employees perceiving their pay
position as being lower (vs. higher) than that of referent
others, distributive justice is inversely associated with a neg-
ative emotional state, which in turn is positively associated
with CWB-I.
To summarize, we posit that two key forms of pay transparency,
namely process and outcome transparency have asymmetrical ef-
fects on CWB operating via distinct justice perceptions. In partic-
ular, we posit that process pay transparency is associated with
heightened procedural justice perceptions and hence reduced
CWB-O. In contrast, we posit that, particularly for those perceiv-
ing their pay position as being lower (rather than higher) than that
of referent others, outcome pay transparency is associated with
reduced distributive justice perceptions, and that by heightening
state negative affect, elicits heightened levels of both CWB-O and
CWB-I.
 PAY TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR
Overview of Studies
We tested the hypotheses above in two studies1 conducted
among actual employed adults. Study 1, a correlational field study
conducted among U.S., United Kingdom, and Canadian employees
at two separate points in time, tested the conceptual model shown
in Figure 1 (i.e., Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 3a). Study 2, an online
simulation-based experiment conducted among employed Israelis
aimed to replicate the potential adverse impact of outcome pay
transparency on CWB in a more controlled setting. It manipulated
participants’ relative pay compared with that of their teammates,
assessed actual deceptive behaviors, and tested Hypotheses 2b and
3b—the role of state negative emotions in the distributive justice-
mediated effect of outcome pay transparency on CWB.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Both studies were reviewed and approved by Tel Aviv Univer-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
sity’s Research Ethics Committee (IRB approval of November 27,
2017 for “The Effect of Compensation Policies on the Ethical
Behavior of Work Group Members”). Data and syntax for both
studies are available online at https://data.mendeley.com.
Study 1
We used the “Prolific” online platform (http://prolific.ac) for
data collection with invitations sent to U.S., United Kingdom, and
Canadian citizens currently residing and working for pay (mini-
mum of 20 hr per week for at least 6 months in their current
organization) in those three countries, and speaking English as
their first language. Individuals with less than a secondary school
education, as well as those either self-employed or employed in the
public sector were excluded from participation in the study.
Method
Participants. Participants were 321 employees2 (151 women,
Mage ⫽ 36.66, SD ⫽ 9.42, 29% U.S., 66% United Kingdom, and
5% Canadian) who met the criteria above and completed the two
separated time phases (T1 and T2) described below. Participants
received $2.50 for their participation. Participants worked in var-
ious fields for varying pay levels (0.6% earn below $10,000 per
year, 7.2% between $10,000 to $20,000, 23.0% between $20,000
to $30,000, 21.4% between $30,000 to $40,000, 16.0% between
$40,000 to $50,000, 11.3% between $50,000 to $60,000,7.9%
between $60,000 to $70,000, 3.8% between $70,000 to $80,000,
2.8% between $80,000 to $90,000, 2.2% between $90,000 to
$100,000, and 3.8% ⬎ $100,000).
Procedure. Participants were told that they will participate in
a study examining work-related attitudes and behaviors, requiring
survey completion at two separate points in time. At T1, taking
place in the beginning of the work week, we measured employees’
general positive and negative affectivity (see control variables), as
well as our key independent variables, namely: (a) process and
outcome pay transparency; (b) participant’s perceived pay position
within one’s pay distribution (compared with referent others); and
(c) the two dimensions of organizational justice,3 perceived pro-
cedural and distributive justice. The order in which the two forms
of pay transparency and the two dimensions of organizational
justice (as well as the individual items comprising these measures)
were presented in the survey was randomized. Additionally, at T1
we collected data on participant demographics and work-related
235
variables such as organizational tenure and participants’ actual pay
level. At T2, taking place at the end of the same week, we
measured CWB-O and CWB-I (randomized in order of presenta-
tion in the instrument). As such, we time-separated our dependent
variables from the independent variables and mediators. Partici-
pants were thanked and debriefed by e-mail.
Measures. In addition to the Cronbach alphas reported below,
we also calculated coefficient alphas (based on polychoric corre-
lations) and omegas for ordinal indicators.4
Process pay transparency. We used Day’s (2012) four-item
scale (␣ ⫽ .85) to assess process pay transparency; for example,
“My company has held formal educational sessions in which they
explain how pay levels are determined for its jobs.” Items were
rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree).
Outcome pay transparency. For outcome pay transparency
we used Smit and Montag-Smit’s (2019) four-item scale (␣ ⫽ .92);
for example, “Information on employees’ annual salaries/income
is freely available.” Items were rated on a 7-point scale; from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
1
The sample size for Study 1 was determined using a-priori statistical
power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Conservatively
assuming a main effect of .14 (in line with prior findings from a pilot study
consisting of 123 U.S. employees) with power ⫽ .80 and alpha of .05, we
calculated a minimum sample size of ⬃300. Considering prescreening
checks, IMC checks, and a reasonable attrition rate between time phases
(T1 and T2), we aimed for a target sample of 400 employees. The actual
sample recruited (N ⫽ 391) was just below that target. For Study 2, based
on recent common practices in psychology recommending the targeting of
approximately 100 participants per cell to detect mediation effects (Fritz &
MacKinnon, 2007; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2018), we targeted
400 participants for four experimental conditions.
2
We excluded 28 participants who failed to correctly answer our in-
structional manipulation checks (IMC; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Da-
videnko, 2009) as it indicated that they were responding without reading
the instructions. Additionally, 41 (out of 391) participants did not complete
the CWB items on the T2 questionnaire (10.5% attrition rate) and thus were
not included in our final analyses, However, tests for sample bias indicated
that these 41 did not significantly differ from those completing the T2
survey with respect to any of the other theoretical variables. Finally, to
avoid the disproportionate influence of single observations on our analyses
(McClelland, 2000), one outlier with an extreme Cook’s (1977) distance
score (ⱖ.10) on both mediators was excluded as well. Thus, the final
sample comprised 321 (out of a total of 391) participants.
3
In a pilot study consisting of 123 U.S. employees, we also measured
perceived informational and interpersonal justice (Colquitt, 2001). Although,
consistent with the current findings, asymmetrical effects via procedural and
distributive justice were revealed in this pilot, we found no significant medi-
ating effects for informational and interpersonal justice perceptions.
4
We used R version 3.6.2 and the reliability function of semTools R library
(Jorgensen, Pornprasertmanit, Schoemann, & Rosseel, 2019) to calculate co-
efficient alphas (based on polychoric correlations) and omega values for
ordinal indicators. Coefficient alphas—specifically, 0.94 for outcome pay
transparency, 0.91 for process pay transparency, 0.96 for perceived distributive
justice, 0.90 for perceived procedural justice, 0.84 for CWB-O, and 0.87 for
CWB-I—are distinct from the Cronbach alpha which assumes equal factor
loadings across items within a scale (McNeish, 2018) and is inappropriate for
ordinal Likert scale data (Furr & Bacharach, 2014; Yang & Green, 2011).
Coefficient omegas were calculated by accounting for both item covariances
and item thresholds using Green and Yang’s (2009, formula 21) approach
designed for latent factors measured by ordinal indicators. We report here ␻_3,
corresponding to the original formula from Green and Yang (2009)—specif-
ically, 0.91 for outcome pay transparency, 0.89 for process pay transparency,
0.94 for perceived distributive justice, 0.94 for perceived procedural justice,
0.93 for CWB-O, and 0.82 for CWB-I.
 236 SIMANTOV-NACHLIELI AND BAMBERGER
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Figure 1. CWB ⫽ counterproductive workplace behavior. Theorized model (Study 1): T1 (consisting of: the
two forms of pay transparency, perceived pay position and the two perceived justice dimensions) and T2
(including CWB-O and CWB-I).
Perceived pay position relative to referent others. We adapted
the well-known measure of subjective socioeconomic status
(Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 2003; Singh-Manoux, Mar-
mot, & Adler, 2005) to measure one’s perceived pay position
within his or her pay range. Specifically, participants were in-
structed to: “Think of a ladder with 10 rungs representing where
employees in your organization, doing similar jobs or contributing
the same level of value to the organization as you do, stand in the
pay range. At the top of the ladder are the employees who have the
highest pay. At the bottom are the employees who have the lowest
pay. Between 1 (bottom rung) and 10 (top rung), where do you
think you stand on this ladder?”
Perceived organizational procedural and distributive justice.
We used Colquitt’s (2001) seven-item scale (␣ ⫽ .87) to measure
perceived procedural justice “regarding the procedures used to
determine your pay at your current job”; for example, “Have those
procedures been applied consistently,” “Have those procedures
been free of bias.” We used four items (␣ ⫽ .94) from the same
instrument (Colquitt’s, 2001) to measure perceived distributive
justice; for example, “Does your pay reflect the effort you have put
into your work,” “Does your pay reflect what you have contributed
to the organization.” Items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging
from 1 (to a small extent) to 5 (to a large extent).
Finally, we assessed participants’ demographics such age, gen-
der, ethnicity, and their actual pay level (using 11 categories,
going from 1 ⫽ less than $10,000 to 11 ⫽ more than $100,000).
Participants were reminded that they would be contacted for the
second phase of questionnaire at the end of the week. To encour-
age participation, payments were delayed until completion of the
T2 questionnaire (assessing their CWB—see next).
Counterproductive work behavior (CWB). We used the CWB
measure developed by Dalal, Lam, Weiss, Welch, and Hulin
(2009) to capture variance in counterproductive behaviors. This is
a self-report measure5 consisting of higher frequency and lower-
severity items—with six items representing behaviors intended to
harm the organization (CWB-O; e.g., “Did not work to the best of
my ability,” “Spent time on tasks unrelated to work,” “Worked
slower than necessary”), and six items representing behaviors
intended to harm other individuals in the organization (CWB-I;
e.g., “Behaved in an unpleasant manner toward a coworker,”
“Spoke poorly about a coworker to others,” “Excluded a coworker
from a conversation”). Employees were asked to indicate how
often, in the past 3 months, they displayed those behaviors on their
present job. Items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1
(never) to 5 (always). For each form of CWB, responses were
summed into an index going from 6 to 30.
Control variables. In our analyses, we controlled for gender
because prior research has found that compared to women, men
have more positive attitudes toward cheating (Whitley, Nelson, &
Jones, 1999) and engage in more unethical behaviors at the work-
place (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011). We also
controlled for organizational tenure as it was associated with CWB
in a recent meta-analysis (Ng & Feldman, 2010). Additionally, we
accounted for negative (and positive) affectivity (␣ ⫽ .87 and ␣ ⫽
.86; respectively), on the basis of the short, 10-item scale of the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule scale (PANAS; Thompson,
2007; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Negative affectivity has
been found to be associated with CWB (Fox & Spector, 1999; Fox
et al., 2001). As pay level may reflect hierarchical level, with those
at higher pay levels potentially having greater access to pay
information, we controlled for employees’ actual pay level cate-
gory (ranging from 1 to 11). Finally, disentangling between the
two forms of pay transparency, when assessing the effects of
process pay transparency (see Hypothesis 1), we controlled for the
parallel effects of outcome pay transparency. Similarly, when
assessing the joint effects of outcome pay transparency and per-
ceived pay position (see Hypotheses 2a and 3a), we controlled for
the parallel effects of process pay transparency and perceived pay
position. Figure 2 illustrates our tested model (dashed lines repre-
sent parameters controlling for parallel effects).
5
Although many have viewed self-reports of CWB with skepticism, the
results of a recent meta-analysis support their use in most CWB research as
a viable alternative to other-based reports (Berry, Carpenter, & Barratt,
2012).
 PAY TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR 237

Figure 2. CWB ⫽ counterproductive workplace behavior. Tested model (Study 1).

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Results parameter estimates and standard errors for the tested model
(shown in Figure 2). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the indirect
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations effect of process pay transparency on CWB-O via perceived pro-
of all variables. Mplus 8.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998 –2012) was used cedural justice was negative and significant, effect esti-
for assessing construct validity and testing the hypotheses. mate ⫽ ⫺.17, 95% CI [⫺.401, ⫺.013].
Construct validity. Given the high correlations between pro- As for the moderated mediation effects of outcome pay trans-
cess pay transparency and outcome pay transparency, between parency on CWB-O and CWB-I (Hypotheses 2a and 3a), we found
perceived procedural justice and perceived distributive justice, and that, as hypothesized, perceived pay position moderated the effect
between CWB-O and CWB-I (r ⫽ 0.60, 0.62, 0.55, ps ⬍ .01,
of outcome pay transparency on perceived distributive justice (B ⫽
respectively), prior to testing our hypotheses, we ran a confirma-
.07, SE ⫽ .03, p ⬍ .01). Consistent with our theorizing, outcome
tory factor analysis accounting for the ordinal nature of our indi-
pay transparency was inversely related to perceived distributive
cators (i.e., using the categorical command). Results showed that
justice among participants perceiving their pay position as being
the model with six latent factors (i.e., process and outcome pay
lower (1 SD below mean) than that of referent others (esti-
transparency, perceived procedural and distributive justice at T1
mate ⫽ ⫺.14, 95% CI [⫺.264, ⫺.011]), but not among those
and CWB-O and CWB-I at T2) fit the data well (␹2 ⫽ 1039.77,
perceiving their pay position as being higher (1 SD above mean)
df ⫽ 419, p ⬍ .001; CFI ⫽ .96; RMSEA ⫽ .07; SRMR ⫽ .08).
than that of others (estimate ⫽ .11, 95% CI [⫺.019, .242]).
Additionally, this model had a better fit compared with several
Furthermore, consistent with Hypothesis 2a, the indirect effect of
alternative models: (a) three five-factor models with items mea-
outcome pay transparency on CWB-O via perceived distributive
suring process and outcome pay transparency loaded on the same
justice among employees perceiving their pay position as being
latent factor; perceived procedural and distributive justice items
lower than that of referent others was significant (estimate ⫽ .07,
loaded on the same latent factor, and CWB-O and CWB-I items,
95% CI [.005, .211]), whereas for those perceiving their pay
loaded on the same latent factor; (b) a three-factor model—that is,
position as being above that of referent others, the indirect effect
with process and outcome pay transparency, perceived procedural,
was not significant (estimate ⫽ ⫺.05, 95% CI [⫺.186, .003]).
and distributive justice, and CWB-O and CWB-I loaded on three
Similarly, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the indirect effect of
latent factors; (c) a two-factor model with pay transparency and
outcome pay transparency on CWB-I via perceived distributive jus-
perceived justice items (measured at T1) loaded on one latent
tice among employees perceiving their pay position as being lower
factor, and CWB-O and CWB-I (measured at T2) loaded on
than that of referent others was significant (estimate ⫽ .05, 95% CI
another. Results showed that these alternative models had worse fit
[.002, .149]), whereas for those perceiving their pay position as being
than the six-factor model (␹2 ⫽ 1295.34, df ⫽ 424, p ⬍ .001;
higher than referent others, the indirect effect was not significant
CFI ⫽ .95; RMSEA ⫽ .08; SRMR ⫽ .09; ␹2 ⫽ 1448.04, df ⫽ 424,
(estimate ⫽ ⫺.04, 95% CI [⫺.131, .002]). It is notable that, as shown
p ⬍ .001; CFI ⫽ .94; RMSEA ⫽ .09; SRMR ⫽ .09; ␹2 ⫽ 1115.58,
in Table 2, the opposite direct effects of process versus outcome pay
df ⫽ 424, p ⬍ .001; CFI ⫽ .96; RMSEA ⫽ .07; SRMR ⫽ .09;
transparency on CWB-O remained significant (B ⫽ ⫺.83, SE ⫽ .27,
␹2 ⫽ 1700.55, df ⫽ 431, p ⬍ .001; CFI ⫽ .92; RMSEA ⫽ .10;
p ⬍ .01, and B ⫽ .41, SE ⫽ .17, p ⬍ .05, respectively) when testing
SRMR ⫽ .11; ␹2 ⫽ 3351.11, df ⫽ 433, p ⬍ .001; CFI ⫽ .83;
the conditional indirect effects noted above, suggesting that other
RMSEA ⫽ .14; SRMR ⫽ .17, respectively), thus, indicating
mechanisms may also partially explain the asymmetric relationships
discriminant validity.
between process versus outcome pay transparency and CWB-O.
Hypotheses testing. After centering process and outcome pay
Additional findings and supplementary analysis. Several
transparency and perceived pay position, and taking into account
additional findings offer further insight into the relationships ex-
the direct effects of process and outcome pay transparency on
amined. First, while we predicted and found that process pay
CWB-O and CWB-I, we tested the hypothesized indirect (Hypoth-
transparency is negatively associated with CWB-O via perceived
esis 1) and conditional indirect (Hypothesis 2a and 3a) effects,
controlling for employees’ positive and negative affectivity, gen-
der, tenure, and actual pay level,6 and using bias-corrected boot- 6
Three participants did not report their actual pay level category. Thus,
strap with 20,000 replications. Table 2 presents the unstandardized the path analysis reported in Study 1 was based on 318 observations.
 238 SIMANTOV-NACHLIELI AND BAMBERGER

Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations of Variables (Study 1)

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1. Outcome pay transparency 2.40 1.65 —

2. Process pay transparency 2.04 1.05 .60ⴱⴱ —
3. Perceived pay position 5.13 1.81 .02 .13ⴱ —
4. Perceived distributive justice 3.05 1.17 .10 .27ⴱⴱ .35ⴱⴱ —
5. Perceived procedural justice 2.82 0.92 .23ⴱⴱ .39ⴱⴱ .25ⴱⴱ .62ⴱⴱ —
6. CWB-O 12.93 4.11 ⫺.05 ⫺.23ⴱⴱ ⫺.08 ⫺.25ⴱⴱ ⫺.29ⴱⴱ —
7. CWB-I 9.31 2.87 ⫺.09 ⫺.11ⴱⴱ .00 ⫺.18ⴱⴱ ⫺.20ⴱⴱ .55ⴱⴱ —
8. Gender 0.47 0.50 ⫺.03 ⫺.09 ⫺.08 ⫺.09 ⫺.18ⴱⴱ ⫺.06 ⫺.01 —
9. Tenure 87.61 88.62 ⫺.01 .03 .11ⴱ .11ⴱ ⫺.04 ⫺.07 ⫺.04 .06 —
10. Actual pay level 4.92 2.24 ⫺.12ⴱ .04 .34ⴱⴱ .30ⴱⴱ .16ⴱⴱ .08 .09 ⫺.15ⴱ .01 —
11. Positive affectivity 3.09 0.79 .08 .18ⴱⴱ .09 .13ⴱ .23ⴱⴱ ⫺.25ⴱⴱ ⫺.11ⴱ .04 .10 .10 —
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12. Negative affectivity 1.67 0.72 ⫺.07 ⫺.04 ⫺.10 ⫺.09 ⫺.12ⴱ .26ⴱⴱ .26ⴱⴱ .18ⴱⴱ ⫺.09 ⫺.04 ⫺.18ⴱⴱ
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Note. N ⫽ 321. CWB ⫽ counterproductive workplace behavior. Gender coded as: male ⫽ 0, female ⫽ 1, Tenure is in months, Actual pay level is rated
using 11 categories, going from 1 (⫽ less than $10,000) to (11 ⫽ more than $100,000). Three participants did not provide their actual pay level category.
Thus, results in Row 10 are based on 318 observations.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.

procedural justice (H1), we also suggested that it is unrelated to
CWB-I. Indeed, our results confirm that the indirect effect process
pay transparency ¡ perceived procedural justice ¡ CWB-I was
not significant (estimate ⫽ ⫺.08, 95% CI [⫺.236, .025]).
Second, although we predicted perceived pay position to mod-
erate the effect of outcome pay transparency on perceived distrib-
utive justice, we merely controlled for the possible conditioning
effect of perceived pay position on the process pay transparency-
procedural justice relationship. Nevertheless, our analysis revealed
that perceived pay position moderates this effect of process pay
transparency on perceived procedural justice (B ⫽ ⫺.09, SE ⫽
.03, p ⬍ .01) as well. Specifically, process pay transparency is
positively related to perceived procedural justice among employees
perceiving their pay position as being lower than that of referent
others (estimate ⫽ .43, 95% CI [.272, .593]), but not among
employees perceiving their pay position as being higher than that
of others (estimate ⫽ .11,95% CI [⫺.039, .267]). Furthermore, the
conditional indirect effect (i.e., the moderated mediation) of pro-
cess pay transparency on CWB-O via perceived procedural justice
among employees perceiving their pay position as being lower
than that of others was significant (estimate ⫽ ⫺.27, 95% CI
[⫺.610, ⫺.018]). We return to these findings in the Discussion
section. The fact that the results for those in low versus high
perceived pay position were in similar directions likely underlies
the significance of the overall mediating role of perceived proce-
dural justice in the process pay transparency-CWB-O relationship
(i.e., H1).
Finally, to test the robustness of the specified model, we tested
a series of parameter constraints using the model test command.
First, we fixed the mediators’ and moderator’s effects to zero.

Table 2
Unstandardized Coefficients of the Path Analysis Model (Study 1)

Perceived Perceived
procedural justice distributive justice CWB-O CWB-I
Variables Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE

Control variables
Gender ⫺.20ⴱ .09 ⫺.02 .12 ⫺1.04ⴱ .42 ⫺.39 .33
Tenure ⫺.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Actual pay level .03 .02 .11ⴱⴱⴱ .03 .32ⴱⴱⴱ .09 .20ⴱ .08
Positive affectivity .17ⴱⴱ .06 .04 .08 ⫺.72ⴱⴱ .27 ⫺.13 .22
Negative affectivity ⫺.08 .06 ⫺.09 .09 1.37ⴱⴱⴱ .34 .99ⴱⴱⴱ .24
Hypothesized predictors
Process pay transparency .27ⴱⴱⴱ .06 .28ⴱⴱⴱ .08 ⫺.83ⴱⴱ .27 ⫺.08 .18
Outcome pay transparency .02 .04 ⫺.02 .04 .41ⴱ .17 .01 .11
Perceived pay position .08ⴱⴱ .03 .14ⴱⴱⴱ .03
Process Pay Transparency ⫻ Perceived Pay Position ⫺.09ⴱⴱ .03 ⫺.14ⴱⴱ .04
Outcome Pay Transparency ⫻ Perceived Pay Position .05ⴱ .02 .07ⴱⴱ .03
Perceived procedural justice ⫺.62ⴱ .32 ⫺.31 .23
Perceived distributive justice ⫺.52ⴱ .22 ⫺.34ⴱ .17
R2 26.1% 24.6% 23.3% 13.0%
Note. N ⫽ 318. CWB ⫽ counterproductive workplace behavior.
ⴱ
p ⱕ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.
 PAY TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR
Constrained Wald test results confirmed that model fit without
mediation and moderated mediation was significantly worse (␹2 ⫽
109.79, df ⫽ 14, p ⬍ .001). Second, fixing direct and moderator
effects to zero was again worse (␹2 ⫽ 26.12, df ⫽ 8, p ⫽ .001).
Discussion
On the basis of UMT, we find asymmetric effects of process and
outcome pay transparency on counterproductive workplace behav-
ior via distinct justice mechanisms. Offering one potential expla-
nation for the inconsistent findings of the effects of pay transpar-
ency on OCB (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017, and Marasi et
al., 2018), we find that pay transparency’s effects may not neces-
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sarily be as straightforward and universally positive as would be
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expected assuming strictly conscious/reflective processing, with
their nature contingent upon both the particular form of pay
transparency and one’s perceived pay position. Specifically, pro-
cess pay transparency is inversely related to CWB-O, with this
effect explained by enhanced procedural justice perceptions.
Among participants perceiving their pay position as being lower
than that of referent others, however, outcome pay transparency is
positively associated with both CWB-O and CWB-I, with this
effect explained by reduced employee distributive justice percep-
tions.
Interestingly, the positive effect of process pay transparency on
CWB-O via perceived procedural justice was even more pro-
nounced among participants perceiving their pay position as being
lower (vs. higher) than that of others. Consistent with the tendency
to justify rather than challenge the existing status quo (Jost, 1995),
we suspect that, particularly when pay discrepancies are to one’s
disadvantage, transparent pay procedures take on greater salience
as a means by which to more objectively explain pay discrepan-
cies.
Although Study 1 confirmed our hypotheses, several study
limitations should be noted. First, despite the longitudinal nature of
the field study, causality cannot be assured. Second, we measured
perceived rather than objective pay position (pay discrepancies)
relative to referent others. Due to percept-percept bias, this could
inflate the association between transparency and justice percep-
tions. Third, we measured self-reported rather than actual coun-
terproductive behaviors. Finally, another limitation of the study
was the reliance upon the same participants for assessments of all
study variables, thus raising the risk of common method variance
(CMV). We used Harman’s single-factor test to assess this risk,
finding a single factor accounting for only 19.92% of variance (far
below the 50% cutoff, Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The risk of
CMV is further reduced by several study design elements includ-
ing the time-separated assessment of the independent/mediating
and outcome variables, the incorporation of a moderating effect,
the randomization of question and scale order, and controlling for
general positive and negative affectivity in our analyses (Podsa-
koff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Finally, as mentioned
above, using a series of confirmatory factor analyses, we found
that alternative models (combining constructs) had worse fit com-
pared with a six-factor model, indicating that our measured con-
structs were indeed distinct.7
Study 2 aimed to replicate the adverse impact of outcome pay
transparency on CWB using an experiment in which we manipu-
lated participants’ relative pay compared with that of their team-
239
mates and assessed actual deceptive behaviors. Additionally, in
Study 2 we sought to test the role of state negative emotions in
mediating the positive association between outcome pay transpar-
ency, distributive injustice perceptions and CWB (Hypotheses 2b
and 3b).
Study 2, offers several key advantages for the study of the
potential negative effects of outcome pay transparency. First, it
allows us to precisely manipulate the amount and type of pay
information made available to participants, something that is dif-
ficult to do in the field. Second, these manipulations are suffi-
ciently simple and realistic to effectively capture the construct of
interest–pay transparency versus secrecy, thus facilitating experi-
mental realism (Colquitt, 2008). Finally, it addresses the issue of
causality and enables an assessment of individuals’ actual (as
opposed to reported) behaviors.
Study 2
Focusing on the potential negative effects of outcome pay
transparency on justice perceptions and CWB, we designed a
follow-up, online team simulation to replicate and extend Study
1’s findings. We manipulated secrecy versus open disclosure of
pay levels as well as participants’ relative pay (compared with that
of their teammates) for those in the open disclosure condition (for
similar manipulations see Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010,
2017). Thus, we used a between-subjects design, randomly assign-
ing participants into four distinct experimental conditions—
transparency-pay-low (large discrepancy), transparency-pay-low
(more moderate discrepancy), transparency-pay-high, and secrecy.
Extending Study 1’s findings, we tested whether perceptions of
distributive justice and state negative emotions sequentially medi-
ate the negative effect of outcome pay transparency on deception
for employees in the transparency-pay-low (vs. secrecy) conditions
(see H2b and H3b).
Method
Participants. Participants were 394 Israeli employees8 (198
women, Mage ⫽ 40.01, SD ⫽ 10.33) employed at least 20 hr per
week, supplementing their income by participating in an online
survey panel (“Panel4All”). Thus, like MTurkers, they serve as
virtual employees of the panel. To maximize the study’s general-
izability to a pay-for-performance context and further facilitate
mundane realism (Colquitt, 2008), employees received base pay
for their participation in the study, as well an opportunity to earn
additional payments based on their performance on the study’s
tasks.
Procedure and measures. Upon registration, participants
were told that they would engage in an online, team-based simu-
7
We also tried to control for an unmeasured latent common factor
(Model 3A in Podsakoff et al., 2003) but this model, probably due to high
complexity, failed to converge.
8
Two participants were excluded from the analyses. One did not provide
any answer to the first task and thus, made our feedback (dividing partic-
ipants into experimental conditions) unreliable. Another participant com-
mented that “the study incorporated unreliable manipulation (allegedly
being investigated online).” Accordingly, we refrained from using his/her
data in our analysis. Additionally, as gender was unrelated with of the
theoretical variables (ps ⬎ .36) we did not include it as a control variable
in our analysis.
 240 SIMANTOV-NACHLIELI AND BAMBERGER
lation and thus had to begin the experiment at specific timeslots.
Panel4all sent an invitation for specific timeslots and employees
could run the study only within these timeslots. Participants were
informed that they would be matched with two other participants
ostensibly connected online (and serving as their teammates).
Upon “matching,” they began the “team” task. First, they were
asked to solve an organizational problem (see Appendix A), and
informed that their teammates would do the same. They were also
informed that each team member would provide his or her solution
individually to the experimenter who would then review their
responses and determine their individual pay. In order to give team
members a sense that no member performed a task of greater value
than any other, we established team outcome interdependence
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(Wageman, 1995) by informing team members that “depending on
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the solutions provided by all team members, the experimenter will
decide whether team members can move on to an additional study
phase, providing those teams selected with opportunities to receive
additional financial rewards.”
While allegedly waiting to receive their feedback from the
experimenter, we verified that participants understood the proce-
dure and measured their perceptions of interdependence (using two
items adjusted form Allen, Sargent, & Bradley, 2003); specifically
“Moving to the next phase in the study depends upon all the
teammates’ solutions” and “Moving to the next phase in the study
depends on your own solution solely.” Participants rated their
agreement on a 7-point scale (1 ⫽ to a very low extent, 7 ⫽ to a
very high extent), r ⫽ ⫺.52, p ⬍ .001. In reality, however, aiming
to control for teams’ success, all participants were informed that
“after going through your solutions (yours and your team mem-
bers’), the experimenter has concluded that all of you have taken
the task seriously and therefore you are moving on to the next
phase of the study.”
Next, participants got their randomly assigned feedback from
the experimenter—specifically the pay that the experimenter de-
cided to reward them for their solution. The absolute level of pay
that participants received was held constant (20 NIS; approxi-
mately $5.50) across conditions. Participants in the secrecy con-
dition received information solely on their own pay (i.e., NIS 20).
In order to make pay secrecy more salient, participants in the pay
secrecy condition were also told that “pay is a personal matter and
you will not be able to know the pay of others in your team at any
time during the study.” In contrast, participants assigned to the
transparency-pay-high and two transparency-pay-low conditions
received information regarding their own pay (again 20 NIS), as
well as information regarding the pay of their (in fact nonexistent)
fellow team members (listed by code-numbers in order to “ensure
privacy and anonymity”).
Participants’ pay relative to the other members was varied such
that participants in the transparency-pay-high condition were told
that they received NIS 20 while the other members received NIS
10 and 8. In contrast, participants in the transparency-pay-low
condition were randomly assigned to two alternative subconditions
for transparency-pay-low. We did so because given the artificial,
“one-shot” nature of this interaction, as well as the relatively low
levels of compensation, we were concerned that smaller discrep-
ancies would yield no significant effect. Indeed, in our pilot tests,
operationalization of transparency-pay-low using very small dif-
ferentials (e.g., NIS 10 vs. 6 and 4) yielded null results. Accord-
ingly, in order to take into account any potential sensitivity of
justice perceptions to the magnitude of adverse pay discrepancies,
those assigned to the transparency-pay-low (small discrepancy
condition) were told that they received NIS 20 while their team-
mates received NIS 30 and 32 (i.e., keeping absolute discrepancies
constant between one’s pay and their teammates’). For those
assigned to the transparency-pay-low (large discrepancy condi-
tion) we applied proportional (rather than absolute) discrepan-
cies—specifically, participants were told that they received NIS 20
while their teammates received NIS 40 and 50. Note that in
contrast to the secrecy condition (in which participants could only
speculate about their pay position within the team), participants in
the transparency conditions were able to verify their advantageous
or disadvantageous position within the team. Participants’ under-
standing of the graph (i.e., absolute pay vs. relative to others [in the
transparency conditions]) was verified with a manipulation check
(see Appendix B for the graph provided to participants in each
condition).
Participants next completed the instrument9 used in Study 1 to
assess perceived distributive justice (␣ ⫽ .88, ␻ ⫽ .89) and a state
affect measure adopted from the short PANAS. Specifically, using
four positive and four negative items, they were asked to indicate
how they felt on a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ not at all to 5 ⫽ very much):
frustrated, satisfied, angry, calm, happy, sad, and so forth . . .
Items, presented in random order, loaded on one factor and a single
score of state negative emotions was calculated after reversing the
four positive emotion items (␣ ⫽ .89, ␻ ⫽ .88).
Counterproductive work behaviors were assessed on the basis of
participants’ engagement in unethical behavior directed toward the
agency sponsoring the study and another participant in the study.
Specifically, participants were reminded about their current com-
pensation— using the same graph they viewed upon completing
the organizational problem (depending on experimental condition;
see Appendix B) and then told that they would move to an
additional study phase and participate in two tasks, “allowing you
to increase your financial rewards.” Following prior procedures
used by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008), these tasks allowed
participants to engage in deception as a means by which to in-
crease their rewards. As mentioned above, designed to assess
CWB-O, participants were able to cheat the agency providing
funding for the study in order to receive higher compensation
(general-deception). A second task, designed to assess CWB-I,
offered participants the ability to directly cheat another participant,
randomly chosen by the computer and not one of their teammates
(other-deception). The order of these tasks was randomized and
comprehension was verified.
In the general-deception task, participants were told that, de-
spite budget limitations, the investigators had contributed addi-
tional resources to the study, to be divided among the highest
performers on this task. With this in mind, participants were then
told that they would be presented with 10 remote association
riddles and asked to solve as many of them as possible. The
number of riddles was such that no participant could ever solve all
of them in the allotted time (1 min). Participants were asked to
9
As this study was conducted in Israel, the instrument was translated
into Hebrew. The back-translation procedure (Brislin, 1970) was followed
to ensure the accuracy of the translation of the English-based measures into
Hebrew.
 PAY TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR
record their answers on paper. After the time elapsed, we displayed
the correct answers and asked participants to indicate only the
number of riddles they correctly identified (not their responses).
Because participants did not complete their responses online and
nothing could be monitored, this task allowed them to deceive and
claim higher compensation from an experimental resource with
responses ranging from zero to 10.
For the other-deception task, we applied a single-period Ulti-
matum game with an uncertain pie size (Moran & Schweitzer,
2008; Straub & Murnighan, 1995), having each participant play
against another participant (randomly chosen by the computer)
who was simultaneously connected to the system but who was not
one of their teammates. Per convention, the individual assigned to
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the role of the “Proposer” in an ultimatum game proposes a split of
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money between themselves and their opponent—the “Responder.”
The Responder can accept the split, resulting in both players
receiving the amounts indicated by the Proposer. Alternatively, if
the Responder reject the split, both players receive nothing (e.g.,
Thaler, 1988). In contrast to a typical ultimatum game in which
both players know the initial sum (or pie size) to be divided, in the
uncertain pie size version, the initial sum is known only to the
Proposer. Thus, when making an offer to the Responder, in order
to increase his or her gain, the Proposer can lie about the pie size
to increase the probability that the Responder accepts a smaller
offer. For example, if the actual initial pie size (known only to the
Proposer) is NIS 20, the Proposer can substantially increase his or
her earnings by lying and claiming that the initial size was only
NIS 10, such that the Responder is more likely to accept a low but
seemingly “fair” offer (such as NIS 5).
In the current study, participants were told that the computer
assigned them to be the “Proposer” and they had NIS 30 (about
$8.50) to divide. It was further emphasized that only they knew the
exact sum to be divided and that the other participant (the “Re-
sponder”) only knew that the sum was between NIS 10 to 50, with
any number within that range being equally likely. After verifying
all the above details (understanding of the rules of the game and
their role in it), participants were asked to send an offer to the other
participant, consisting of two parts: (a) a claim about the initial pie
size they were given to divide (allowing us to calculate the degree
of deception [lie-sum], that is, 30 minus participants’ claim; with
responses ranging from zero to 30); and (b) the amount of money
they decided to forward the other participant (forward-amount;
with responses ranging from 0 to 30). Participants were told that
once data collection was completed, 10% of participants would be
randomly selected and given the compensation earned on the basis
of this task (see Appendix C for a general outline of main phases
in this study).
Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations (Study 2)
Variable M SD
1. Perceived distributive justice 4.50
2. State negative emotions 1.92
3. General-deception 2.69
4. Other-deception: Lie-sum 3.09
5. Other-deception: Forward-amount 13.42
Note. N ⫽ 394.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.
241
Upon completion of the two tasks, participants were thanked
and debriefed by e-mail. Their final bonus pay was sent once data
collection was completed.
Results
Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and correla-
tions of the main variables. There was no impact of our experi-
mental manipulation on perceived interdependence, F(3, 390) ⫽
0.61, p ⫽ .60, ␩2p ⫽ .005, and as intended, participants indicated
high levels of interdependence (M ⫽ 5.97, SD ⫽ 1.69), that is,
significantly higher than the “4” midpoint, (t393 ⫽ 23.09, p ⬍
.001).
Main analysis. We examined the serial mediation hypotheses
(H2b and H3b)—that is, perceptions of distributive justice and
state negative emotions as sequentially mediating the negative
effect of pay transparency (vs. secrecy) on deception—in Mplus
using bias-corrected bootstrap with 20,000 replications. Because
we aimed to test the impact of transparency (pay-high and pay-
low) versus secrecy on participants’ deceptive behaviors, we coded
our experimental conditions using three dummies: transparency-pay-
high versus secrecy, transparency-pay-low-absolute (i.e., small dis-
crepancy) versus secrecy, and transparency-pay-low-proportional
(i.e., large discrepancy) versus secrecy. Figure 3 illustrates our tested
model. Consistent with Study 1, we first tested a model with addi-
tional direct effects (going from each dummy variable to the three
dependent variables). As there were no significant differences in
model fit (p ⫽ .07) nor meaningful differences in the hypothesized
effects between the model with and the model without these direct
effects, we report the results of the more parsimonious model, or in
other words the model without direct effects (see Figure 3). Table 4
presents the unstandardized parameter estimates and standard errors
for our model.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the indirect effects of pay trans-
parency on general-deception via perceived distributive justice and
negative emotions among employees in the transparency-pay-low
(vs. secrecy) conditions were significant (estimate ⫽ .10, 95% CI
[.023, .218] for transparency-pay-low-absolute, and estimate ⫽
.11, 95% CI [.025, .229] for transparency-pay-low-proportional,
respectively). Similarly, consistent with Hypothesis 3b, the indi-
rect effects of pay transparency on lie-sum and forward-amount
via perceived distributive justice and negative emotions among
employees in the transparency-pay-low (vs. secrecy) conditions
were significant (estimate ⫽ .27, 95% CI [.100, .554] for lie-sum,
and estimate ⫽ ⫺.12, 95% CI [⫺.286, ⫺.025] for forward-amount
in transparency-pay-low-absolute (vs. secrecy) condition, and es-
timate ⫽ .29, 95% CI [.107, .607] for lie-sum and esti-
1 2 3 4
1.63 —
0.76 ⫺.55ⴱⴱ —
2.33 ⫺.05 .13ⴱ —
5.34 ⫺.05 .15ⴱⴱ .15ⴱⴱ —
3.09 .08 ⫺.14ⴱⴱ ⫺.10ⴱ ⫺.80ⴱⴱ
 242 SIMANTOV-NACHLIELI AND BAMBERGER

Figure 3. Tested model (Study 2).

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mate ⫽ ⫺.14, 95% CI [⫺.314, ⫺.027] for forward-amount in more negative emotional state. We also found that when partici-
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transparency-pay-low-proportional (vs. secrecy) condition).
Interestingly, not only was the adverse effect of pay transpar-
ency on deception attenuated for those in transparency-pay-high
(vs. secrecy) condition (i.e., was not significant, as observed in
Study 1), it was in fact reversed. Specifically, our findings indicate
obverse, sequential indirect effects for employees in the
transparency-pay-high (vs. secrecy) condition (estimate ⫽ ⫺.07,
95% CI [⫺.155, ⫺.016] for general deception, estimate ⫽ ⫺.18,
95% CI [⫺.402, ⫺.065] for lie-sum, and estimate ⫽ .08, 95% CI
[.019, 200] for forward-amount). Thus, employees in the
transparency-pay-high condition deceived less and forwarded
more money than those in the secrecy condition.
Additional findings and supplementary analysis. Finally, to
assess the causal robustness of the serial mediation findings, we
tested an alternative model in which state negative emotions were
specified to explain perceived distributive justice. Notably, the
serial indirect effects—namely, pay transparency (vs. secrecy)
conditions ¡ state negative emotions ¡ perceived distributive
justice ¡ deception were nonsignificant (ps ⬎ .45).
Discussion
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b and 3b, and extending Study 1’s
findings in a more controlled, experimental setting, we find that
when pay allocations were transparent (vs. secretive) and partici-
pant’s pay was manipulated to be lower than that of teammates,
participants reported lower distributive justice perceptions leading
to heightened deceptive behaviors, with this effect explained by a
pant’s pay was manipulated to be higher than that of teammates,
participants showed contrasting effects, namely less deceptive
behaviors. Such asymmetry is consistent with other findings re-
vealing asymmetric effects of pay transparency for people below
versus above the median pay on job satisfaction and turnover (e.g.,
Card, Mas, Moretti, & Saez, 2012) and offer further evidence in
support of the more general notion that outcome pay transparency
may be harmful with respect to employees’ ethical behaviors
toward the organization and its employees, but only when one’s
pay position is low (or perceived as lower) compared with that of
referent others.
General Discussion
Joining the call for extending research on whether and how pay
transparency may impact employees’ perceptions and contextual
behaviors (Colella et al., 2007; Marasi & Bennett, 2016), we
examined how pay transparency influences employees’ justice
perceptions and the detrimental contextual workplace behavior
(i.e., CWB) potentially associated with such perceptions. Extend-
ing uncertainty management theory and applying a variety of
methods (field and experimental studies) to examine the CWB-
related consequences of distinct forms of pay transparency, our
findings reveal that distinct forms of pay transparency can yield
asymmetrical effects on this important aspect of contextual per-
formance. More specifically, we found that process pay transpar-
ency is inversely related to CWB-O, with this effect explained by
enhanced employee procedural justice perceptions. In contrast,

Table 4
Unstandardized Coefficients of the Path Analysis Model (Study 2)

Other
Other deception:
Perceived State negative General deception: Forward-
distributive justice emotions deception Lie-sum amount
Variables B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE

Transparency-pay-high .82ⴱⴱⴱ .18 ⫺.05 .07

Transparency-pay-low-absolute ⫺1.21ⴱⴱⴱ .20 .37ⴱⴱⴱ .09
Transparency-pay-low-proportional ⫺1.31ⴱⴱⴱ .21 .50ⴱⴱⴱ .09
Perceived distributive justice ⫺.18ⴱⴱⴱ .02 .05 .08 .13 .17 .01 .11
Negative emotions .44ⴱ .19 1.23ⴱⴱ .42 ⫺.56ⴱ .24
R2 29.7% 37.1% 1.7% 2.5% 2%
Note. N ⫽ 394.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ
p ⬍ .001.
 PAY TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR
our findings also indicated that among employees perceiving their
pay position as being lower than that of referent others, outcome
pay transparency is positively associated with both CWB-O and
CWB-I, with this effect explained by reduced employee distribu-
tive justice perception (Study 1). Further extending the underlying
process linking injustice perceptions to CWB, Study 2, using a
more controlled experimental approach, demonstrated that com-
pared with secrecy practices, participants whose pay was manip-
ulated to be lower (higher) compared with referent others indicated
lower (higher) perceived distributive justice, leading to more (less)
negative emotions, and consequently to more (less) deceptive
behaviors against both the agency sponsoring the study and an
unrelated study participant.
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Our findings extend theory and research on pay communication
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and uncertainty management in several ways. First, they demon-
strate that the effects of pay transparency on employees’ justice
perceptions and contextual behaviors are more nuanced than sug-
gested to date (Colella et al., 2007; Marasi et al., 2018), with their
nature contingent upon the particular form of pay transparency
being investigated—process versus outcome pay transparency.
Specifically, demonstrating a straightforward positive effect, our
results indicate that process pay transparency is positively related
to procedural justice perceptions. In contrast, pointing to the role
of heuristic biases in fairness judgments, and consistent with
research pointing to the importance of directional social compar-
ison processes in organizational settings (e.g., Austin et al., 1980;
Brown et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2008), they reveal that outcome
pay transparency is negatively related to perceived distributive
justice among employees perceiving their pay position as being
lower than that of referent others. We suggest that outcome pay
transparency, by increasing the vividness of pay discrepancies to
one’s disadvantage, may make employee’s perceived negative pay
discrepancies all the more salient (Bamberger & Belogolovsky,
2017), leading to more CWB.
Second, our findings highlight the conditions and underlying
mechanisms driving what might otherwise be viewed as inconsis-
tent effects of pay transparency on OCB (Bamberger & Bel-
ogolovsky, 2017, and Marasi et al., 2018). We demonstrate that
even one particular form of pay transparency, namely outcome
transparency, can have asymmetrical effects depending on the
individual’s pay position relative to comparison others. This is
important in that to date, much of the pay transparency research
has viewed the concept as a unitary construct with either positive
or negative consequences. Our findings suggest that by adopting
the multidimensional conceptualization proposed by Fulmer and
Chen (2014) and examined in the current study, researchers may
be able to design studies that help us better understand how and
when distinct forms of and approaches to pay communication may
affect a variety of perceptual and behavioral outcomes.
Finally, joining the call to extend research on the affective
consequences of injustice (De Cremer & Van den Bos, 2007;
Barclay et al., 2005), we extend UMT by highlighting how,
through the negative emotions potentially elicited by perceptions
of distributive unfairness, a transparency-based reduction in pay
uncertainty can drive deceptive behavior not only against the
organization or its agents (responsible for the unfair treatment), but
also against innocent (i.e., unenvied) coworkers. Our findings in
this regard are important for several reasons. First, they extent
UMT by explicating an important mechanism through which fair-
243
ness judgments can impact behavior. More specifically, they offer
some of the first empirical evidence that, as suggested by Spector
and Fox (2002, 2005), the behavioral consequences of injustice
perceptions operate via the negative affect such perceptions may
generate. Second, consistent with more general research on dis-
placed aggression (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2000) and the heuristic
elements of UMT, they suggest that injustice perceptions, and the
pay communication practices potentially driving them, may have
harmful behavioral implications extending beyond those responsi-
ble for (e.g., managers) or somehow associated with (i.e., envied
peers) the injustice. These findings are not only consistent with
prior experimental studies revealing that upward social compari-
sons may induce deception and unethical behaviors toward envied
peers (e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2009, 2010; John, Loewenstein, &
Rick, 2014), they are also consistent with experiments showing
that individuals recalling or experiencing an unjust situation (in
which they were treated unfairly) transgressed against individuals
unrelated to the unjust situation (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach,
2010). While others (e.g., Greenberg, 1990, 1993; Greenberg &
Lind, 2000) have proposed and found that employees may seek to
restore a sense of justice by retaliating against the organization or
its agents deemed responsible for their deprivation, our findings
regarding employees’ displaced aggression suggests that the ad-
verse implications of unfairness judgments may be both broader
and subtler than currently recognized.
On a more practical level, given the growing movement toward
pay transparency and the pervasiveness of CWB in organizations,
understanding whether, when, and how pay transparency may
drive (or attenuate) such detrimental behaviors at the workplace is
both important and timely. Our findings suggest that it may be
more desirable for organizations to be transparent about the criteria
and procedures by which pay and rewards are determined (i.e.,
enact a process pay transparency practice) than to disclose actual
pay levels (i.e., enact an outcome pay transparency practice),
because the latter may have detrimental consequences on em-
ployee justice perceptions and CWB.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Despite the contributions noted above, those interested in the
topic of pay communication should take note of several study
limitations. First, in Study 1, we assessed CWB in terms of more
prevalent, but less severe behaviors. Accordingly, the generaliz-
ability of our findings to more severe counterproductive behaviors
such as theft, sabotage, and bullying remains uncertain. Nonethe-
less, as such moderate behaviors can precede and instigate higher
severity CWBs in a sort of upward spiral of severity (Andersson &
Pearson, 1999), understanding the link between pay communica-
tion and even more moderate CWBs may offer a viable basis for
down-the-road theorizing regarding how such practices may serve
as direct or indirect antecedents of more severe forms of such
behavior.
Second, in order to maximize the likelihood of observing any
effect of pay transparency, we designed both studies to signal to
employees that any differences in pay were largely unjustifiable
(i.e., NOT merit based). In Study 1 we did this by asking employ-
ees to indicate their perceived position relative to others “doing
similar jobs or contributing the same level of value to the organi-
zation as you do.” In Study 2, we did this by establishing outcome
 244 SIMANTOV-NACHLIELI AND BAMBERGER
interdependence among the team-members, making it clear that
none of them could proceed without all team members collectively
offering a sufficient contribution. The fact that visible pay differ-
ences were implied in both studies to be less than justifiable raises
an important question, namely, what might happen if the visible
pay differences are justifiable (i.e., clearly linked to variance in
individual contribution)? Put in other words, the degree to which
merit is perceived as underlying one’s position in a pay distribu-
tion may serve as an important boundary condition that should be
examined in future research. In particular, significant differences
may emerge in the way that people react when they feel they are
justifiably (vs. unjustifiably) low in a pay distribution. More spe-
cifically, when individuals feel that they are justifiably low in a
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pay distribution, even the vivid negative discrepancies likely to
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emerge as a function of outcome pay transparency may be less
likely to generate the kind of adverse behavioral consequences
manifested in the current study.
Third, although in many workplaces performance is assessed
subjectively and the link between individual performance and pay
is unclear (as it was in Study 2), our findings may have limited
generalizability to those pay contexts in which this is not the case
(i.e., contexts in which performance is measured objectively and/or
bonus criteria are better clarified or certain). Relatedly, when
employees perceive that pay discrepancies to their disadvantage
are stable and consistent (rather than unstable and varying) over
time, they may become more motivated to use unethical behavior
and perceive themselves as having a reasonable basis upon which
to justify such behavior (Greenberg & Lind, 2000). Thus, a po-
tentially fruitful area for further investigation concerns whether
and how status stability/variability may condition the adverse
effects of outcome pay transparency on CWB.
It is also important to highlight a number of methodological
limitations. First, Study 2’s design contrasted two rather extreme
pay communication conditions, namely complete secrecy versus
complete transparency. As organizations often adopt less extreme
practices of pay communication (e.g., “partial openness”; Lawler
& Jenkins, 1992), such a dichotomous study design may fail to
fully capture how variance in this “middle ground” between com-
plete transparency and total secrecy links to contextual perfor-
mance. Additionally, in Study 2, data on the mediating variables
were collected at one point in time (i.e., together with the inde-
pendent/dependent variables). Accordingly, we tested and con-
firmed statistical mediation effects rather than causal mediation.
Scholars aiming to gain deeper insights into mechanisms by which
various pay communication influence employee attitudes and be-
havior might consider adopting more precise experimental designs
or event sampling methods to better capture the sequential effects
of pay-related perception and affect on behavior proposed in our
theorizing.
Conclusion
While much of the research on pay communication suggests that
more transparent pay practices offer important benefits to organi-
zations and their members, our findings support our central claim
that pay transparency’s effects on organizations and their members
are not only multidimensional, but also asymmetrical across and
even within these dimensions. More specifically, our findings
indicate that process pay transparency may indeed offer significant
benefits to employees (i.e., more positive fairness judgments) and
their employer in terms of reduced CWB-O. They also indicate,
however, that a second form of transparency—namely, outcome
pay transparency—is associated with adverse employee justice
perceptions for those for whom it offers a vivid indication of their
pay deprivation relative to referent others, with such perceptions
driving negative affective and behavioral responses. By identifying
the specific conditions and underlying mechanisms potentially
involved in the complex relationships between various pay com-
munication practices and CWB, the current research offers a more
nuanced perspective on pay transparency and its behavioral con-
sequences, allowing managers to potentially adopt pay transpar-
ency practices with fewer adverse externalities.
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An Organizational Problem (Study 2)
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 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

248

Figure B1.
Appendix B

Your Pay for Task

(Appendices continue)
Pay Feedback (Study 2)
SIMANTOV-NACHLIELI AND BAMBERGER

See the online article for the color version of this figure.
 PAY TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR 249

Appendix C
A General Outline of Main Phases (Study 2)

1. Transfer participants to the team-based simulation. 5. Repeat pay feedback (see Appendix B)

2. Task—Solving an organizational problem (see Appendix A). 6. Two deception tasks (randomized in order):

3. Experimenter pay feedback—Randomly assigning participants to a. General-deception (manifesting CWB-O)

four conditions (secrecy, transparency-pay-high, transparency-
pay-low-absolute, transparency-pay-low-proportional). b. Other-deception (manifesting CWB-I)

4. Potential mediators (randomized in order):

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

a. Perceived distributive justice Received March 1, 2019

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Revision received March 11, 2020

b. State negative emotions Accepted March 11, 2020 䡲

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