Case

Telecom in India in 2017: Asian Journal of Management Cases

17(2) 147–168, 2020
Uncertainty Calling © 2020 Lahore University of
Management Sciences
Reprints and permissions:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/0972820120927184
journals.sagepub.com/home/ajc
Ravi Kumar Jain1, Saradhi Kumar Gonela1
and Raghavendra BT2

Abstract
The Indian telecom industry, one of the fastest-growing markets in the world, was at crossroads.
The industry grew in two decades by focusing primarily on reducing voice call charges. By the end of
2016, a new entrant disturbed the strategies of all the incumbents. Reliance Jio, the new competitor,
disrupted the market by promising completely free voice calls—hitherto staple revenue stream for
the incumbents—and undercut data price to approximately tenth of incumbents’ prices. The resulting
cacophony severely damaged the incumbents to the extent that Vodafone and Idea Cellular, the second
and third largest incumbents, announced a merger. Airtel, the unchallenged market leader for more
than 15 years, was bracing to face financial losses.
  The changed scenario posed several difficult questions to all the operators. Finding answers, though
vital for existence, would prove to be a horrendous task. This case presents the students with the
dilemma of how to face the new entrant, with unconventional strategies. This case will be ideal in the
Business Strategy course.

Keywords
Disruptive business models, Indian telecom industry, industry life cycle, strategic inflection points,
strategies of challenger

Discussion Questions
1. What are the changes (both regulatory and competitive) that resulted in increasing the number of
subscribers in the Indian telecom industry?
2. What are the strategies adopted by various competitors to increase the subscriber base? In the
changed environment where one competitor is offering free voice calls, how relevant is the
subscriber base?
3. What are the strategies available for the incumbents to compete with the new competitor in the
short term and long term?

1
Symbiosis Institute of Business Management (SIBM), Hyderabad, Telangana, India.
2
Symbiosis International (Deemed University) (SIU), Hyderabad, Telangana, India.

Corresponding author:
Raghavendra BT, Symbiosis International (Deemed University) (SIU), Hyderabad, Telangana, India.
E-mail: raghavendra.bt@sibmhyd.edu.in
148 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

Telecom is a strange category; you are remembered only when you fail, and with the physics of the
spectrum and mobile networks, you will have failures, you cannot have success all the time. (Raj, 2017)
The telecom sector has been one of the primary drivers of India’s economic growth. Though direct
contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) was 6.5 per cent, in 2017, the telecom sector’s indirect
contribution was immense as it helped various other sectors, ranging from education to healthcare to
banking, to become more efficient. The industry has invested `9,200 billion while attracting the highest
foreign direct investment (FDI) of `1,100 billion in the last two decades. All of this had been achieved
while providing telecom services at the lowest tariffs in the world. Despite the above achievements, the
industry was going through one of its most challenging phases in 2018 caused by the price war (Cellular
Operators Association of India, 2018). In a bid to increase the subscriber base, all the competitors
resorted to aggressive tariff reductions, casting doubts over the future of the industry. All the major play-
ers were reporting losses. Even Bharti Airtel, the biggest operator in India, was predicted to post losses
in 2018 for the first time in 15 years. To face losses, all the operators were resorting to consolidation, with
no clear operating plan to turn profitable.

The Background
Until 1850, the only means of communication available in India was by post. In 1854, the use of the
telegraph for communication was open to the public. In 1881, telephone exchanges were set up in India
by the Oriental Telephone Company, England, which had 93 subscribers in 1882. During the colonial
rule, until 1947, the majority of the telephones were used by the British for administrational purposes.
Indians hardly had access to telephones. Only a few privileged Indians, who had clout with the colonial
masters, had access.
By 1947, the year of independence, India had over 82,000 telephones served by 321 exchanges.
The government administered the phone under the department of post, telephone and telegraph with no
role for private players. A separate unit for administering telecommunications, the Department of
Telecommunications (DoT) was established in 1985, that is, for over four decades, telecommunications
was not a separate department. During that time, the growth in the number of telephones was rather slow:
in 1951, there were 160,000 subscribers, by 1971 the number reached 980,000 subscribers, which
increased to 2.15 million by 1981 and to 5.07 million by 1991. DoT was instrumental in changing the
landscape of telecommunications by ushering various reforms, but the real thrust was provided by dereg-
ulation measures announced in 1991. In 1991, the Indian government deregulated the economy by priva-
tizing most of the key sectors. It is believed that telecommunication was one sector that had greatly
benefitted by privatization.
More than 100 years after setting up the first telephone exchange, there were a total of 7.03 million
telephone connections in India (including the waiting list) in 1992. In 1994, the total number of working
telephone connections was 8 million, and another 2.5 million were on the waiting list. The telephone
density—that is, the number of telephone connections per 100 individuals within a geographical area—
in India was 0.8 in 1994 as against the world average of 10, compared to China at 1.7, Pakistan 2 and
Malaysia 13. To improve connectivity, 140,000 villages out of 600,000 million villages in India were
covered with telephone connectivity in 1994 (TRAI, 2017). The Planning Commission of India, set up
by the government of India in March 1950, set a target of 7.5 million telephone connections for the
eighth five-year plan (1992–1997). One of the objectives of the Planning Commission was to draw five-
year plans which would help the economic policies of the government.
Jain et al. 149

In 1994, the DoT released the national telecom policy. The main objectives of this policy were to
make telephone available on demand by 1997 to have one public call office (PCO) for every 500 persons
in urban areas. The policy intended to provide all the value-added services that were available interna-
tionally in India by 1996, which included wireless telephony.
To meet the target fixed by the Planning Commission, DoT identified a resource gap of `75 billion
(TRAI, 2017). Additionally, there was a need for `40 billion (TRAI, 2017) for developing the rural tele-
com infrastructure. The government of India needed to encourage private investment to bridge this
resource gap.
Subsequently, the government invited private sector participation in value-added services, which
included wireless connections. After competitive bidding, licences were awarded to eight Cellular and
Mobile Telephone Services (CMTS) operators in four metro circles. The Indian telecom landscape is
divided into 22 geographical circles in four categories (metro, A, B, C and D) as per the population of
each area. There were four metro circles, namely, Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. In 2007, the
Chennai circle was merged into the Tamil Nadu circle. In November 1994, 14 CMTS operators were
given licences in 18 circles from 1995 to 1998.
A maximum of two licences were issued for CMTS in every circle, which were called first licence and
second licence for a fixed amount of annual fee. Mahanagar Telecom Nigam Limited (MTNL), formed
by the government of India in 1986, was set up to upgrade and expand telecom services in Mumbai and
Delhi. It is the provider of landline telephone service in two metro cities—Mumbai and Delhi—and was
issued the third licence in the four metro circles. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), incorporated
in 2000, took over the telecom services business and network management from the DoT. It operates
across India, except the Delhi and Mumbai circles. BSNL, wholly owned by the government of India,
was issued the third licence in the remaining 18 circles. The government of India indirectly paid this
licence fee.
The annual licence fee was a fixed overhead cost for private players. If private telecom operators
failed to generate revenue, which was the case often, as the subscriber base was 14.5 million (TRAI,
2017) in 1997, the operators made losses.
In 1997, the government established the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). TRAI’s
mandate was to regulate and promote competition in the telecom sector. This was a time when tariffs
were at standard airtime—airtime is considered for both incoming and outgoing cellular mobile calls—
charge of `16.80 (India Today, 2009) per minute, in addition to monthly rental, activation and security
deposit. Tariffs combined with rentals and deposit summed up to an average of `32.00 per minute, which
was prohibitively expensive for a common man, and, thus, mobile phones were restricted to business
executives and the affluent class.
In 1999, the DoT released the New Telecom Policy 1999. The DoT had provided 8.73 million wired
telephone lines. The urban PCO penetration at this point was 2 per 1,100 persons. The DoT could pro-
vide telephone coverage to 310,000 villages by 1999 (Government of India, 2018). Additionally, the new
telecom policy converted the licence fee for CMTS to a proportion of revenue generated against the
incumbent fixed fee regime. In 1999, fixed-line services were the monopoly of BSNL, except in Mumbai
and Delhi, where MTNL operated.
Cellular services were competitive as three operators were given licences in each circle. TRAI started
regulating tariffs by imposing a standard tariff package (STP), which placed a ceiling for monthly
charges, call charges on both landline and cellular services. Operators were also allowed to offer alter-
nate tariff packages within the ceiling specified in the STP. In 1999, the tariff for rural landline subscrib-
ers was `0.80 per call for the first 500 calls and `1.20 per call– thereafter (180 seconds was considered
as one phone call); for urban landline subscribers, the tariff was `1.00 per call for the first 500 calls and
150 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

`1.20 per call from thereon. The pulse rate of each call was 180 seconds. The CMTS tariff was set at
`6.00 per minute (airtime charges) with a pulse rate of 20 seconds. In January 2002, a ceiling was fixed
on the tariff of the national roaming service. In September 2002, the CMTS tariff was reduced to `3 per
minute (airtime charges) with a pulse rate of 30 seconds. In 2002–2003, the ‘calling party pays’ regime
was introduced; hence, incoming calls were made free of charge for consumers (TRAI, 2017).
In November 2003, the Unified Access Service guidelines were released. Accordingly, the Unified
Access Service Licensee (UASL) could provide wireless, wireline and value-added services. All the
existing license holders were provided with UASL, allowing them to offer all kinds of services.
Because of regulatory changes and innovative plans offered by various operators, the average sub-
scriber outgoing tariff per minute, which was `8.55 in 2000, reduced to `2.89 in 2004. In 2004, the total
number of wireless phone subscribers in India increased to 33.69 million compared to 11.3 million in
2002. In 2005–2006, BSNL came up with a One India Plan, which was a single tariff that offered a call-
ing rate of `1 across India, which further made mobile charges affordable to the rural population with
lower income. Lifetime schemes were introduced in 2006, and this drove down the average subscriber
outgoing tariff per minute to less than `2.00. The lower charges resulted in the expansion of the sub-
scriber base manifold. The wireless mobile subscriber base in 2006 rose to 98.77 million.
By 2007, however, only 18 per cent of the 1.1 billion Indian population were mobile phone subscrib-
ers. Mobile operators started coming up with more affordable prepaid packages, as 85 per cent of mobile
subscribers were using prepaid connections. Prepaid mobile subscriptions helped telecom operators to
penetrate deeper into the Indian market. Mobile operators introduced recharge options for prepaid sub-
scribers with recharge value as low as `10.
In 2008, the average subscriber outgoing tariff reduced to `0.92 per minute, and the wireless sub-
scriber base at the time was 261.07 million. In 2009–2010, Tata Teleservices redesigned its tariff by
bringing down the pulse rate to one second (TRAI, 2017), which helped increase the subscriber base. In
2012, the average subscriber outgoing tariff was further reduced to `0.49 per minute and stayed around
the same number through 2016. The subscriber base in this time frame grew from 919.17 million in 2012
to 1,033.63 million in 2016 (TRAI, 2017).
From 2001–2002 to 2015–2016, the yearly revenue in the telecom sector grew from `873.12 billion
to `2,453.21 billion at a CAGR of 10.88 per cent (TRAI, 2017), the majority was driven by wireless
service providers.

Development of Telecom Infrastructure

The backbone of the telecommunications industry was the telecom infrastructure. Telecom infrastructure
included telecom towers, fibre and cables. They played a significant role in the expansion of
telecommunication services. Telecom towers transmitted wireless signals from one place to another and,
hence, facilitated in connecting villages, towns and cities.
Over `2,500 billion had been invested in the telecom infrastructure in India. There were approxi-
mately 450,000 telecom towers across India; about 20 to 25 per cent of these towers had been fiberized.
These towers accommodated about 1.5 million base trans-receiver stations.
Initially, telecom operators operated their own tower infrastructure. The capital investment on these
towers had a significant impact on the financial performance of telecom companies. Operators felt the
need to focus on customer acquisition and managing costs. Hence, the tower operations business spun
into separate entities around 2005.
Jain et al. 151

Three types of entities emerged out of this exercise: wholly owned subsidiaries of telecom opera-
tors—for example, Reliance Infratel was demerged from Reliance Communication as a wholly owned
subsidiary of Reliance Communication; joint ventures—Airtel, Vodafone and Idea came up with a joint
venture called Indus Towers to manage and operate their own tower infrastructure—and independent
companies—independent tower companies such as Towervision, GTL and ATC emerged.
Tower infrastructure was widely shared in India following global practices. An industry estimate said
that about 65 per cent of the tower infrastructure was shared worldwide. In Asia, close to 77 per cent of
the telecom tower infrastructure was shared. In January 2017, the TRAI said that telecom operators
could not forge exclusive contracts for giving telecommunication access in different areas, hence laying
impetus on telecom infrastructure sharing.
By outsourcing and sharing tower infrastructure, operators benefitted as they reduced capital invest-
ment, that is, new infrastructure need was not created by the operator. As the tower infrastructure was
spread across various geographic locations, new operators/services could be launched quickly. Operators
also saved on operational expenditure, yielding higher profits.
The telecom infrastructure evolved to support various types of services over a period of time. Initially,
the telecom infrastructure could support circuit-switching networks. Circuit-switching networks were
analog networks supported only voice transmission, and this constituted the 1G (first-generation) net-
works. With the development of technology, these networks supported data and voice, albeit not simul-
taneously; these networks were popularly known as 2G networks. Later, digital data were transmitted
over networks, which constituted to be 2.5G networks. As technology improved, data could be transmit-
ted faster, and these networks constituted to be 2.75G networks. At this stage, subscribers could make
calls, receive calls, browse the internet and access e-mail over the mobile network. With improved tech-
nology came 3G, which enabled complete digital transmission of data over the network, which led to
uninterrupted access to videos. The use of voice over long-term evolution led to voice calls being made
over the internet. Hence, the complete range of services offered by the telecom companies could be
offered over wireless broadband. These networks were popularly known as 4G networks.
On the one hand, technological developments increased the subscriber base; on the other hand, devel-
opments resulted in lower costs for operators. Ideally, this could have resulted in a favourable environ-
ment for the industry. However, this resulted in a double whammy for the Indian mobile operators, as the
competitive pressure forced every operator to reduce charges while the technological changes demanded
higher investments. By the end of 2017, most of the operators were staring at an uncertain future both
public and private operators alike.

Spectrum
Spectrum had been the lifeline of telecom companies across the world, nothing different in India. The
entire market was divided into 23 circles. In 2007, Chennai and Tamil Nadu were merged, leaving
22 circles. The DoT, established in 1994, awarded two licences to two different operators per circle.
Spectrum was first auctioned in 1995, which resulted in some complications. First, it was a single
company, Koshika Telecom. The company was incorporated in 1995 and offered cellular services. As of
2018, the company was under liquidation. Then it operated under the brand name Usha Fone, which was
awarded multiple licences, creating a potential monopoly. To avoid this, operations of the company were
restricted to only three circles. Then, Koshika Telecom won licences to the tune of $15 billion (around
`570 billion according to the then conversion rate), whereas its turnover was $60 million (around `2.28
billion). As a result, DoT re-auctioned the spectrum.
152 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

Another way of awarding licences was allocation based on certain parameters, which was called
‘beauty contest’. Parameters included, but not limited to, financial resources, reliability, investment in
research, rate of network rollout, pricing, quality and competitiveness. In Mumbai and Delhi, MTNL was
allocated spectrum in 1997 to start basic GSM services. BSNL was created in 2000, which increased the
government’s coverage across the country. After 2001, due to difficulties in auctioning, the government
adopted the administrative allocation model for allocating the spectrum (Daman, 2016).
In 2008, 122 new 2G licences (1,800 MHz band, please refer to Exhibit 1 for various technologies and
supporting bands) were allocated on a first-come, first-served basis at the 2001 price. Many foreign
companies, such as Telenor and Etisalat, entered the Indian telecom market. Subsequently, all these
licences were cancelled due to legal intervention, which was known as the ‘2G spectrum scam’. In 2010,
the Comptroller and Auditor General of India tabled its report in Parliament, estimating that the 2G
spectrum scam had resulted in a revenue loss of `1.76 trillion (US$25 billion) due to non-auctioning of
2G spectrum in 2008. In February 2012, the Supreme Court of India cancelled 122 licences issued in
2008 under A. Raja, the minister of communications and IT from 2007 to 2009, declaring that the allot-
ment of the spectrum (in 2008) was unconstitutional and arbitrary. TRAI disclosed that the government
earned over `30 billion (US$420 million) by selling the 2G spectrum in 2008. However, subsequent to
cancellation, in August 2012, the government of India revised the base price for 2G spectrum auctions to
`140 billion (US$1.9 billion)—which led to the resignation of the federal cabinet minister under whose
governance licences were issued in 2008. In 2012, the government auctioned the spectrum to award
licences, but could not generate as much income as it had anticipated.
In 2010, 3G and 4G telecom spectrums were auctioned in highly competitive bidding (please refer to
Exhibit 2 for auction results). The government’s income was `677 billion (US$15 billion) from the 3G
spectrum auction and `385 billion (US$8.6 billion) through the broadband wireless spectrum auction.
Further, in 2012, the 3G spectrum was auctioned, expanding the 3G operations in the country (please
refer to Exhibit 3 for auction results).
After 2012 auctions, the government auctioned 2G, 3G and 4G spectrums multiple times during
2013–2017. As a result of these auctions, all the 22 operators were offering 4G services (please refer to
Exhibit 4 for 4G operators in each circle). In 2016, the government made policy decisions to provide a
stimulus to the industry. Some of these decisions were harmonization of the spectrum, Aadhar-based
e-KYC, streamlining of ‘right of way’ rules, reduction in spectrum usage charges to 3 per cent for all
future auctions across all bands, and a simplified assessment procedure for a low-power base trans-
receiver station. Further, the policy on spectrum trading and sharing, as well as active infrastructure
sharing, has led to an overall reduction in cost.
Further, in August 2016, the largest ever quantum of the spectrum was made available for auction. Out
of 2,355 MHz total spectra (across seven bands) put up for auction, 40 per cent was successfully sold. As
a positive first step towards increased ease of doing business, the DoT dispensed with the requirement of
Wireless Operating Licence for access services (Cellular Operators Association of India, 2018).

BSNL and MTNL

In the 1980s, the telecommunication infrastructure in India was built and operated by the DoT. In 1986,
MTNL was established to provide telephone and telex services in Mumbai and Delhi. At this time, the
responsibility for providing telephone services throughout India, except Mumbai and Delhi, was retained
by the DoT.
Jain et al. 153

In September 2000, BSNL was formed to provide telecommunication services across the country
except for Mumbai and Delhi. The government of India fully owned BSNL.
The company owned a spectrum across circles in the country (except Mumbai and Delhi). It owned
a spectrum across 800, 900, 1,800, 2,100 and 2,500 MHz. It also owned 760,000 route kilometres of
optical fibre, 80,492 GSM towers and over 31,738 3G nodes.
BSNL and MTNL held about 69 per cent market shares of the wireline subscribers as of July 2017.
At the end of March 2004, India had a total of 33.69 million wireless telephone subscribers; the sub-
scriber base grew to 1,186.79 million at the end of July 2017 (TRAI, 2017), which was a 35-fold increase
in 13 years. At the end of March 2007, the total wireline telephone subscribers in India were 40.75 mil-
lion; this subscriber base came down to 23.91 million in July 2017. With the decreasing subscriber base,
the company’s profits also reduced over a period of time (see Exhibit 5 for brief financials of BSNL).

Bharti Airtel Limited

In 1992, Bharti Cellular Limited was incorporated by forming a consortium with a French tele-
communications company Société Française du Radiotelephone (SFR), a Mauritius-based telecom
company, Emtel, and a UK-based telecom consultancy, Micro-Star International (MSI), to bid for CMTS
licences for the metro circles in India. The company won the licence to provide mobile services in the
Delhi-National Capital Region (NCR) in 1994; Bharti Cellular launched the first GSM mobile services
in Delhi-NCR in 1995 under the brand name Airtel.
In 1996, Airtel launched mobile services in Himachal Pradesh. In 1997, it became the first telecom
operator to cross the 100,000 subscribers. That year, it became the first private company in India to
acquire a licence to provide fixed-line services. The fixed-line services were launched in the subsequent
year in Indore, Madhya Pradesh. During that time, Bharti Telecom and British Telecom formed a joint
venture to offer Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) services.
In 1998, the company became the first Indian company to launch telecom services overseas by launch-
ing mobile services in Seychelles. That year, British Telecom increased its stake in Bharti Cellular to 44
per cent. Bharti Telecom and British Telecom formed another joint venture to provide ISP services in
India. The ISP services were launched in Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore in the subsequent year under the
brand name Mantra Online.
In 1999–2000, Warburg Pincus, an investment bank based in the United States, acquired an equity
stake in Bharti Tele Ventures, New York Life International acquired 3 per cent equity in Bharti Cellular,
and Bharti and Singtel, a Singapore-based company Telco, got into a strategic alliance, with Singtel
investing US$400 million in Bharti, after which Bharti and Singtel announced a US$650 million partner-
ship to lay undersea optic fibre cable between India and Singapore. Bharati and Singtel also formed
Bharti Telesonic together to operate and manage national long-distance operations. The national long-
distance operations were launched in 2001 under the brand name India One.
In 2001, the company expanded its mobile services in eight circles and fixed-line services in four
circles. It also acquired three additional licences to provide ISP services. It also got into a licence agree-
ment with DoT to provide national long-distance services across India.
In 2002, the company was listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange, the National Stock Exchange and
the Delhi Stock Exchange. The same year, it expanded its mobile services to Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Mumbai, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh (West). In addition, it
expanded its fixed-line services to Delhi, Haryana, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Further, the company
started outsourcing its back-end activities by entering into a partnership with Teletech Holdings (USA).
154 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

In 2004, the company got into the first comprehensive information technology outsourcing deal in the
telecom industry in India with IBM. It further outsourced the management of its mobile network to
Ericsson and Nokia in multi-million-dollar deals. That year, all the telecom services offered by the Bharti
Group were unified under one brand Airtel.
In 2005, the Bharti Group became the first mobile service operator in India to be operational in all the
23 telecom circles. It outsourced its customer care services for the telecom business to four global busi-
ness process outsourcing companies, Hinduja TMT, IBM-Daksh, Mphasis and Teletech Services. The
Vodafone Group Plc. also acquired a 10 per cent stake in Bharti’s telecom business for US$15 billion.
In 2006, the company launched 3G services in Seychelles. That year, Bharti Tele Ventures Ltd was
renamed Bharti Airtel Ltd. In the following year, Bharti Airtel Ltd, Idea Cellular Ltd and Vodafone India
Ltd came together to form Indus Towers, an independent tower infrastructure company.
In 2008, the Bharti Group launched its own tower infrastructure company, Bharti Infratel, with an
investment of US$1.25 billion. At that time, the company had more than 60 million customers. In 2009,
the company expanded its operations to Sri Lanka, where it launched its 2G and 3G mobile services
network. The company, at that time, had more than 100 million customers.
In 2010, the company expanded to Bangladesh by acquiring a 70 per cent stake in Warid Telecom,
Bangladesh. Similarly, it also took over the mobile service operations of Zain in 15 African countries. In
the subsequent year, the company had more than 50 million customers in Africa.
In 2011, the company launched 3G in India. In 2011, the company launched 4G services in Kolkata,
West Bengal, India. It crossed 200 million customers (mobile, fixed line, and DTH) the same year in
India.
In 2013, Bharti Airtel created a wholly owned subsidiary called Nxtra Data Limited and bundled its
Data Centre and Managed Service business to the subsidiary. In 2014, Bharti Airtel had more than 200
million mobile service customers.
In India, the company offered 2G, 3G and 4G wireless services, mobile commerce, fixed-line ser-
vices, high-speed home broadband, DTH, enterprise services, including national and international long-
distance services to carriers (see Exhibit 6 for revenue mix of Bharti Airtel Limited for the financial year
2016–2017). In other geographical locations, it offered 2G, 3G and 4G wireless services and mobile
commerce. The company launched the Airtel Payments Bank in India during the financial year 2016–
2017 and was amongst the first to get a licence to go live in India (TRAI, 2017). Bharti Airtel had over
372 million global customers at the end of March 2017 (TRAI, 2017).
The global revenue of the company for the year 2016–2017 was `954.7 billion, with a revenue market
share and a non-mobile revenue share of 33.8 and 24.3 per cent, respectively (TRAI, 2017). The com-
pany made the largest rollouts globally by rolling out 180,000 mobile sites during the financial year
2016–2017. It was the only industry player in India during the financial year 2016–2017 with 3G and 4G
services in 22 circles (TRAI, 2017). The company had invested `930 billion in the spectrum until the end
of financial year 2016–2017 (TRAI, 2017).
Bharti Airtel Limited revenue streamed broadly from six areas—mobile services (India and South
East Asia), mobile services (Africa), homes (landline and internet), digital TV, Airtel business and tower
infrastructure. The company was the first to launch 4G in India. It offered mobile services with bundled
plans with unlimited voice packs.
The ‘Homes’ vertical offers landline services with 24/7 online support and value-added services. This
vertical also offered internet using V-Fibre technology up to the speed of 100 Mbps. The revenues gener-
ated by the Homes vertical for the financial year 2015–2016 and financial year 2016–2017 were `25,066
and 27,518 million, respectively, and the EBITA for the respective financial years were `10,648 and
12,998 million (TRAI, 2017).
Jain et al. 155

The ‘Digital TV’ vertical offered interactive services, customized plans, universal remote and Android
TV. The revenues and EBITA generated by this line of business in the financial year 2015–2017 were
`29,178 and 9,976 million, respectively, and the revenues and EBITA for the financial year 2016–2017
were `34,306 and 12,219 million, respectively (see Exhibit 7 for brief financials of Bharti Airtel Limited).
Four per cent of the world’s population was connected through Bharti Airtel Limited. It has more than
335.7 million mobile subscribers across Asia (India and Sri Lanka) and Africa (TRAI, 2017). The wire-
less data customers across Asia and Africa are about 76 million. In the financial year 2016–2017, it added
22.4 million new mobile subscribers in India (TRAI, 2017).
Bharti Airtel Limited’s plan for the future was to increase the higher revenue (ARPU) customers by
increasing the share of 4G devices and driving rapid data consumption, accelerating SIM consolidation
and also accelerating post-paid connections. The company was also looking forward to offering more
services per customer—by building the largest Payments Bank which created differentiation, accelerated
Airtel Homes through brilliant service bundling, and drove depth of product portfolio in the B2B sector.
The company also intended to focus on maintaining brilliant customer experience by eliminating cus-
tomer frustration across clusters, delivering world-class network experience and revamping stores for
improved growth and customer experience. The company also wanted to drive new revenue streams
through a combination of content, innovation and alliances. The company also wanted to focus on driv-
ing down costs and accelerate active sharing, fibre and joint sourcing of bandwidth (TRAI, 2017).
In March 2017, for the first time in 15 years, the company reported losses because of the competition
from the new incumbent, Reliance Jio, which cut in the international termination rates and subscribers
opting for lower tariffs.

Idea Cellular Limited

In 1995, Birla Communications Ltd was incorporated, which obtained licences to provide services in
the Gujarat and Maharashtra circles. In 1996, it was rechristened as Birla AT&T Communications Ltd
following a joint venture between Grasim Industries and AT&T Corporation. The operations commenced
in 1997 in the Gujarat and Maharashtra circles.
In 1997, Birla AT&T Communications Limited and Tata Cellular Limited, Andhra Pradesh circle,
signed an agreement for the merger. The merger was completed in 2000 for the Andhra Pradesh circle.
The company acquired RPG Cellular Limited in 2001, followed by the licence for operating in the
Madhya Pradesh circle. In 2001, service provider licences were obtained as a fourth licensee in the
Delhi-NCR circle. The company was renamed as Birla Tata AT&T Limited.
In 2002, the company launched the brand name ‘Idea’ and changed the name of the company to Idea
Cellular Limited. The company commenced operations in Delhi-NCR in November 2002 and also
reached a subscriber base of 1 million this year. In 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, the company reached the
subscriber base of 2, 4, 5 and 12 million, respectively.
In 2006, the Tata Group transferred all its equity shares in the company to the Aditya Birla Group.
That year the company also expanded to new circles. In 2007, the company offered an initial public
offering of its equity shares on the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange, India,
aggregating to `28,187 million. Seven subsidiaries of the company were also merged into it in 2007.
In 2008, 2009, and 2010, the company reached a subscriber base of 40, 59, and 81 million, respec-
tively. In 2009, the company acquired 3G spectrum in 11 circles. These markets account for more than
80 per cent of the company’s total revenue.
156 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

The company launched 3G services in 10 circles in 2011. The subscriber base of the company touched
106 million in 2011. It also entered the devices category by launching affordable smartphones the same
year. In 2012, 2013 and 2014, the company reached a subscriber base of 113, 128 and 150 million,
respectively.
The company’s market share in the mobile services space grew from 10.92 per cent in March 2010 to
16.94 per cent in March 2016. The market share marginally declined to 16.34 per cent in July 2017. In
the broadband services space, the company’s market share declined from 15.31 per cent in March 2016
to 8.91 per cent in July 2017.
The total number of Minutes of Usage decreased from 199.3 billion in the first quarter of the financial
year 2017 to 195.5 billion in the second quarter of the same financial year. It then increased to 250.7 bil-
lion in the first quarter of the financial year 2018. On the other hand, the Voice Average Revenue Per
Minute (ARPM) decreased gradually from 34.3 paisa in the first quarter of the financial year 2017 to
24.4 paisa in the first quarter of the financial year 2018 (see Exhibit 8 for brief financials of Idea Cellular
Limited). To remain in competition with the new incumbent, Reliance Jio, the company initiated a
merger with Vodafone India.

Vodafone India
In 1992, Hutchison Whampoa, Hong Kong and Max Group, India, formed a joint venture called
Hutchison Max Telecom Ltd. In 1995, the joint venture launched mobile services and paging service
operations in Mumbai under the brand names Max Touch and Max Page, respectively.
In 2000, the company expanded its operations to Delhi, Kolkata and Gujarat markets by acquiring
licences from the Essar group. In 2003, the company acquired Aircel Digilink and expanded operations
to Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh (East) and Haryana. In the same year, all the circles started operating under
the brand name Hutch, and the Mumbai circle was operating under the brand name Orange.
In 2005–2006, the company started operations in Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Maharashtra by acquiring
BPL Mobile. BPL used to operate in the Mumbai circle under the name Loop Mobile. In 2007, Vodafone
acquired a 67 per cent stake in the company for US$11.1 billion. The company was renamed Vodafone
Essar Limited. The brand name Hutch was rebranded as Vodafone. The subscriber base of the company
was 30 million.
In 2010, the subscriber base of the company was 100 million. In the same year, the company acquired
spectrum in nine circles in India and launched 3G in India.
In 2011, the Vodafone Group bought out its partner Essar’s 33 per cent stake in Vodafone Essar Ltd
for US$5.46 billion, and the company was renamed as Vodafone India Ltd. This buyout increased the
stake of the Vodafone Group in the Indian entity to 74 per cent. In 2013, with the government of India
allowing for 100 per cent FDI in the telecom sector, Vodafone India Ltd became a fully owned subsidiary
of Vodafone Group Plc.
In 2015, the company launched 4G services. In 2016, the subscriber base of Vodafone India Ltd was
200 million; an increase in subscriber numbers resulted in the growth of revenue (see Exhibit 9 for brief
financials of Vodafone India).
To stay in the competition to fight the new incumbent Reliance Jio, Vodafone India had taken the
consolidation route by initiating a merger with Idea Cellular Limited, which would possibly give both
the companies a competitive and financial advantage.
Jain et al. 157

Reliance Communications
Reliance Industries Limited incorporated Reliance Communications Ltd in 2002. The company launched
mobile services using CDMA technology. The company introduced free incoming calls in the year of
launch; this scheme was launched under the name Monsoon Hungama.
In 2006, the Reliance Group split into two. The telecom business became a part of the Anil Dhirubhai
Ambani Group (ADAG) from then on. During this year, the company wrote off an `45 billion loss
incurred due to Monsoon Hungama. The Reliance Industries Limited entered into a time-bound non-
compete agreement with the ADAG.
In 2009, Reliance Communications was among the first to cut the outgoing call rates to `0.5 paise per
minute. In 2010, the non-compete agreement was annulled. In 2013, Reliance Communications signed
an agreement with Reliance Jio to share its telecom infrastructure—Optic Fibre and Towers.
Reliance Communications’ debt was mounting from 2010 through 2015. In 2014, It split its GSM and
CDMA businesses and initiated intra-circle roaming to control costs and reduced capital expenditure. In
2015, it decided to sell its non-core assets to cut the debt.

Reliance Jio
In 2016, Reliance Communications got into an agreement with Reliance Jio to share the spectrum. In
the same year, Reliance Communications initiated a proposal to merge with Aircel and decided to sell its
tower assets to a private equity firm, Brookfield Assets. In the subsequent year 2017, the proposed deal
to merge Reliance Communications and Aircel fell apart, which led Brookfield Assets to back off from
purchasing the tower assets of Reliance Communications.
In 2016, Reliance Industries Limited launched a telecom service under an entity called Reliance Jio
Infocomm Ltd. The company offered voice calls for free to its customers and made data usage a new
focal point. The consumption of data increased fivefold from 200 million gigabyte (GB) pre-launch to
1 billion GB after the launch of Reliance Jio (Economic Times, 2018). The average price of 1 GB of data
dropped from `152 to `10. This disrupted the telecom market.
In 2017, Reliance Communications announced a plan to cut its debt of `450 billion to `60 billion by
leveraging its assets. After this announcement, Reliance Jio got into an agreement with Reliance
Communications to purchase the latter’s assets such as optical fibre, towers and spectrum at an estimated
all-cash deal of `240 billion.

Data, the New Growth Driver

The share of internet usage on mobile phones in India was close to 80 per cent compared to the global
average of 50 per cent (see Exhibit 10 for mobile share of web traffic). In 2016, the average time spent by
individuals in India on a mobile phone was 28 hours a week when compared to print and television media,
which were at 2  and 4 hours a week, respectively (see Exhibit 11 for time spent with media per week).
Indian wireless internet users on the mobile phone spend 45 per cent of the time on entertainment, 34 per
cent on search, social media and messaging, 4 per cent on shopping online, 2 per cent on news and media,
2 per cent on finance-related activities and the rest on other activities (Meeker, 2017) (see Exhibit 12 for
total internet subscribers in India and Exhibit 13 for internet subscribers per 100 population in India).
158 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

From 2015 to mid-2016, Bharti Airtel, Vodafone India and Idea Cellular collectively maintained a 60
per cent market share of broadband subscribers. However, by March 2017, the collective market share
of these incumbents came down to about 40 per cent in the broadband subscribers’ segment (see Exhibits
14–17for market share of wireless subscribers in India). The monthly ARPU (voice + data + value-added
services) was in the range of US$2.80 to US$3.20. In anticipation of the launch of Reliance Jio in
September 2016, wireless data providers started cutting data rates. The data costs per GB at that time
came down from US$3.50 to US$3.15 (see Exhibit 18 for average revenue per user in India).
The total time spent on Android phones in India between 2014 and 2016 was close to 150 billion
hours compared with the United States, which was between 75 and 100 billion hours (Exhibit 19 for total
time spent on Android phones).
In 2009, the average selling price (ASP) of a smartphone in India was more than US$300, which was
almost 30 per cent of the per capita GDP. In 2016, the ASP of a smartphone in India came down to less
than US$150, which was about 14 per cent of the GDP per capita (Exhibit 20 for average selling price of
mobile phones).
The price of 1 GB of data was about US$4.40 in March 2014. This cost came down to US$1.9 in
March 2017. However, the new incumbent Reliance Jio offered data at US$0.17 per GB in March 2017
(see Exhibit 21 for data prices per GB). The total monthly wireless data consumed in India rose from
under 200 million GB in June 2016 to about 1,300 million GB in March 2017 (see Exhibit 22 for total
monthly wireless data consumed).
While the 4G transformed the consumer space from communication devices, 5G could revolutionize
both the consumer and industrial markets. The transition was pertinent to the development of the Internet
of Things (IoT), machine to machine (M2M) and cloud computing, which will comprise millions of
devices for the benefit of billions of people.
M2M and IoT, which was a buzzword, started picking up in a more formal way around the globe; in
the markets in the United States, operators already deployed LTE-M (LTE for machine-type communica-
tion) while many European markets embraced another variant of 3GPP technology, NB-IoT (narrow
band IoT). With diverse technological options available to serve diverse requirements such as from smart
metering requiring high data rates of megabytes per second, cellular networks running on 3GPP
technologies were to play an important role; it is projected that the number of mobile-connected
M2M modules in India would grow 6.2-fold between 2016 and 2021, reaching 91 million in number.
The growing importance of digitization was evident in various government initiatives related to gov-
ernance. E-governance would play an important role in bringing people closer to the government for the
effective delivery of various government initiatives. The healthcare sector was another vertical which
would be benefitted by initiatives such as telehealth, which would bring a lot of efficiency in the system
and increase the reach of health services to remote areas.

The Future
The telecom sector, from a business standpoint, suffered on two fronts. In essence, on the one hand,
capital spending to revenues ratio was high, and on the other hand, cash flow was an issue (cash flow
= EBITDA − capital expenditure). These issues could be mitigated by using digital-age management
practices (Frisiani et al., 2017a) enabled by data analytics, artificial intelligence, network equipment and
other technologies.
To gain insights and capture maximum value from capital investments, operators could use analytical
tools. By using analytical tools, operators could automate the process of establishing usage patterns up
Jain et al. 159

to a precision of an area as small as five metres by five metres over a period of time by collecting data
on where, when and how subscribers used mobile handsets.
Digitized customer support had three levels (Frisiani et al., 2017a):

1. Self-care: Provided, guided and automated tips. It could help customers solve 75 per cent of
the issues.
2. Instant messaging chats with the operators’ employees or automated artificial intelligence agents
or online discussion groups: 15 per cent of the problems could be solved on their advice.
3. Customer service agents: 10 per cent of the customers could be served through this level.

For the past 20 years, orthodoxies drove the behaviour of telecom operators, such as cost-cutting and
operating efficiencies, to squeeze out three to six per cent of costs annually (Frisiani et al., 2017a).
This led to head-count reduction—made it less attractive for top talent, capex optimization and process
efficiencies. The primary differentiators of the industry had been spectrum ownership, network assets
and distribution channels. The unprecedented change could be brought in the cost structure by bringing
in the ability to digitize a large number of operator processes through machine learning and advanced
analytical techniques. By digitizing processes, operators could act on information both cost-effectively
and at scale, products and services could be tailor-made, and there could be effective interactions with
individual customers. By effectively using technology, costs could be reduced by 30–40 per cent, and
cash flows could be improved from 25 to 40 per cent (Frisiani et al., 2017b).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Exhibit 1.  Frequency Bands

Technology Frequency Band

2G 900, 1,800 MHz
3G 2,100, 900 MHz
4G 1,800, 2,300 MHz
Source: Review on spectrum auctions in India (2018, August 27). http://www.careratings.com

Exhibit 2. Results of 3G Auction in India, 2010

Winner No. of Circles Bid Amount (` Crore) Bid Amount (US$ mn)
Idea 11 5,765 1,153
Bharti Airtel 13 12,290 2,458
Vodafone 09 11,617 2,323
Reliance Communications 13 8,583 1,717
BSNL/MTNL 22 16,761 3,352
Source: Chattopadhyay, S., & Chatterjee, S. (2014, February). Telecom spectrum auctions in India: The theory and the practice.
www.iimcal.ac.in
160 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

Exhibit 3. Circle-wise 3G Auction Held in 2012 (` in Crores: 1 Crore = 100 Million)

Circle
Service Area Aircel Bharti Idea Reliance STEL Tata Vodafone Total
Delhi 3,316.93 3,316.93 3,316.93 9,950.79
Mumbai 3,247.07 3,247.07 3,247.07 9,741.21
Maharashtra 1,257.82 1,257.82 1,257.82 3,773.46
Gujarat 1,076.06 1,076.06 1,076.06 3,228.18
Andhra Pradesh 1,373.14 1,373.14 1,373.14 4,119.42
Karnataka 1,579.91 1,579.91 1,579.91 4,739.73
Tamil Nadu 1,464.94 1,464.94 1,464.94 4,394.82
Kolkata 544.26 544.26 544.26 1,632.78
Kerala 312.48 312.48 312.48 937.44
Punjab 322.01 322.01 322.01 322.01 1,288.04
Haryana 222.58 222.58 222.58 667.74
Uttar Pradesh (E) 364.57 364.57 364.57 1,093.71
Uttar Pradesh (W) 514.04 514.04 514.04 1,542.12
Rajasthan 321.03 321.03 321.03 963.09
Madhya Pradesh 258.36 258.36 258.36 775.08
West Bengal 123.63 123.63 123.63 123.63 494.52
Himachal Pradesh 37.23 37.23 37.23 37.23 148.92
Bihar 203.46 203.46 203.46 203.46 813.84
Orissa 96.98 96.98 96.98 290.94
Assam 41.48 41.48 41.48 124.44
North East 42.3 42.3 42.3 126.90
Jammu & Kashmir 30.3 30.3 30.3 30.3 121.20
Telco Total 6,499.46 12,295.46 5,768.59 8,585.04 337.67 5,864.29 11,617.86 50,968.37
No Spectrum 1959–1964 Mhz 1969–1974 Mhz 1974–1979 Mhz 1964–1969 Mhz
Source: Nikhil Pahwa (2010, May 19). India’s 3G auction ends; operator and circle-wise results. www.medianama.com

Exhibit 4.  Circle-wise 4G Licence-holder Operators in 2017

Telecom Circle Airtel Reliance Jio Vodafone Idea Cellular BSNL Aircel
Delhi Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Mumbai Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Kolkata Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Andhra Pradesh Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Gujarat Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Karnataka Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Maharashtra Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Tamil Nadu Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Haryana Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Kerala Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Exhibit 4 continued)
Jain et al. 161

(Exhibit 4 continued)

Telecom Circle Airtel Reliance Jio Vodafone Idea Cellular BSNL Aircel
Madhya Pradesh Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Punjab Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Rajasthan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Uttar Pradesh (East) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Uttar Pradesh (West) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
West Bengal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Assam Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bihar Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Himachal Pradesh Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Jammu and Kashmir Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
North East Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Orissa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Source: Varma (2017). 4G circles in India. www.datareign.com

Exhibit 5.  Brief Financials of BSNL

2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017

Revenue (` million) 271,278 279,963 286,452 324,113 315,334
EBIDTA (` million) 9,153 (6,920) (6,717) 29,313 16,840
PAT (` million) (78,844) (70,197) (82,340) (48,591) (47,932)
Source: Annual reports of the company.

Exhibit 6.  Revenue Mix: Bharti Airtel Limited 2016–2017

Revenue Stream Percentage of Revenue Share

Mobile Services—India and South East Asia 56
Mobile Services—Africa 21
Homes 3
Digital 3
Airtel Business 11
Tower Infrastructure 6
Total 100
Source: Bharti Airtel Limited, Annual Report 2016–2017.

Exhibit 7.  Brief Financials of Bharti Airtel Limited, India

2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017

Revenue (` million) 468,140 507,719 606,894 604,732 624,606
EBIDTA (` million) 149,633 171,522 246,241 225,860 241,096
PAT (` million) 50,963 66,002 132,005 77,769 (99,281)
Source: Annual reports of the company.
162 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

Exhibit 8.  Brief Financials of Idea Cellular Limited

2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017

Revenue (` million) 220,868 264,034 317,318 359,810 354,756
EBIDTA (` million) 51,564 75,096 101,257 120,719 102,918
PAT (` million) 8,182 16,893 28,098 26,328 (8,343)
ARPU (`) 55 104 150 147 110
Source: Annual reports of the company.

Exhibit 9.  Brief Financials of Vodafone India

2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017

Revenue (`million) 362,188 376,127 423,780 444,900 429,560
EBIDTA (` million) 18,530 108,476 125,980 131,150 117,840
Source: Economic Times and Business Standard.

Exhibit 10.  Mobile Share of Web Traffic

Source: Meeker (2017).
Jain et al. 163

Exhibit 11.  Time Spent with Media per Week

Source: Meeker (2017).

Exhibit 12.  Total Internet Subscribers (India)

Source: TRAI. www.trai.gov.in
164 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

Exhibit 13.  Internet Subscribers per 100 Population (India)

Source: TRAI. www.trai.gov.in

Exhibit 14.  Market Share of Wireless Subscribers in India (March 2014)

Source: TRAI. www.trai.gov.in
Jain et al. 165

Exhibit 15.  Market Share of Wireless Subscribers in India (March 2015)

Source: TRAI. www.trai.gov.in

Exhibit 16.  Market Share of Wireless Subscribers in India (March 2016)

Source: TRAI. www.trai.gov.in

Exhibit 17.  Market Share of Wireless Subscribers in India (March 2017)

Source: TRAI. www.trai.gov.in
166 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

Exhibit 18.  Average Revenue per User (India) in INR

Source: TRAI. www.trai.gov.in

Exhibit 19.  Total Time Spent on Android Phones

Source: Meeker (2017).
Jain et al. 167

Exhibit 20.  Average Selling Price of Smartphones in India

Source: Meeker (2017).

Exhibit 21.  Data Prices per GB

Source: Meeker (2017).
168 Asian Journal of Management Cases 17(2)

Exhibit 22.  Total Monthly Wireless Data Consumed

Source: Meeker (2017).

References
Annual Report Cellular Operators Association of India. (2018). Annual Report. https://www.coai.com/
Daman, Viranch. (2016). The history of telecom spectrum in India: The 900 MHz auctions. https://gadgets.ndtv.
com/telecom/features/the-history-of-telecom-spectrum-in-india-the-900mhz-auctions-827495
Economic Times. (2018). Jio’s entry led to $10 billion annual savings for India: Report. https://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/tech/internet/jios-entry-led-to-10-billion-annual-savings-for-india-report/articleshow/63637786.cms
Frisiani, G., Jubas, J., Lajous, T., & Nattermann, P. (2017a). A future for mobile operators: The keys to success-
ful reinvention. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/our-insights/
a-future-for-mobile-operators-the-keys-to-successful-reinvention#
Frisiani, G., Jubas, J., & Nattermann, P. (2017b). Hello, mobile operators? This is your age of disruption calling.
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/our-insights/hello-mobile-
operators-this-is-your-age-of-disruption-calling
Government of India. (2018). Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Communication. Retrieved on 20
January 2018, https://dot.gov.in/
India Today. (2009). 1995-Telecom licensing begins: The call of change. https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/
cover-story/story/20091228-1995-telecom-licensing-begins-the-call-of-change-741625-2009-12-24
Meeker, M. (2017, May 31). KP internet trends report 2017. https://www.kleinerperkins.com/perspectives/internet-
trends-report-2017/
Raj, A. (2017). The shakeup in India’s telecom sector. https://www.livemint.com/Industry/rws5uR2FeOti3o3n
U7AirL/The-shakeup-in-Indias-telecom-sector.html
TRAI. (2017). Performance indicators reports. https://www.trai.gov.in/release-publication/reports/performance-
indicators-reports