While desisting from being seen ‘overtly pro-China’,

the presenters emphasised balanced relations with

US and China and working on a relationship with
America, ostensibly after the PM’s tough line on US
basing/partnership in war etc. In response to a sly
question, Shahbaz Sharif was apprised that the “PM
had refused” to re-provide Shamsi, distancing the
establishment. There are indications of strategic
reorientation of our foreign policy, that has
implications for CPEC and Sino-Pakistan relations.

On Afghanistan, the meeting was informed of

Pakistan not supporting the Taliban “forming an
emirate” as the 1990s, and that “the 18th century
mindset is unacceptable.” That the extended troika
(Pakistan, US, Russia and China) does not support a
Taliban military takeover. And that Pakistan’s major
strategic interest remains preventing Afghan
territory from being used against Pakistan. This
obviously is a fraction of our strategic interest(s).
That Islamabad frets over the estimated 6,500
Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters, joining
hands with the Afghan Taliban, if Kabul falls. That
this eventuality would embolden other violent
extremist groups in Pakistan. That the TTP and the
Afghan Taliban are “two sides of the same coin”.
With dwindling influence on the Afghan Taliban,
Pakistan expects around 700,000 new refugees, if
the situation escalates.

These are interesting iterations. First, re-pivoting to

the US/West is the cherished goal of our sold-out
ashhrafiyya (elite), tasked to keep Pakistan in the
West’s exploitative orbit, by scaring its leaders and
creating hurdles for projects like CPEC and friends
like China. Their penetration is deep and significant.
Imran Khan might be a lone voyager. CPEC, one
firmly believes, is Pakistan’s only chance to break
away from the US/western dependency. America,
as a declining superpower is likely to be second
fiddle to China in a not-too-distant future, making
pivoting to its side, a poor choice.
Second, the US did not sign the Doha accords
(ignoring the puppet and puppeteer, Ashraf Ghani
et al) out of love for the ragtag. It was a sheer
compulsion. For Biden’s America, Afghanistan is a
far away and insignificant foreign policy priority, a
bottomless pit; unnecessarily distracting US policy
from containing an unstoppable Middle Kingdom
and a resurgent Russia; besides, domestically,
addressing the worsening race-relations, crumbling
infrastructure, faltering education system, Covid-
induced poverty and economic stagnation etc.
The US, in tossing the proverbial Afghan “blanket”,
and hastening to exits is calling Ashraf Ghani’s bluff
leaving him no choice but to sit with a more
conciliatory Taliban, that America considers more
important. Why would it otherwise cut a deal with
an enemy, it fought for 20 long years? The world
gets it, only we seem to not get it.
Third, the “18th century savages” are not replicating
their 1996 version. Then, in a spontaneous reaction
against lawlessness, corruption and lack of
governance; the seminary students burst on the
national scene routing the warlords. Then they
were inexperienced in combat, governance,
administration and media handling. Their 2021
version is experienced in running a credible shadow
government for two decades under the nose of the
US/NATO and Afghan government, providing
security, administration and other services in all
provinces, following a proper chain of command.
They are media-savvy and very sensitive to their
erstwhile unpopular legacy.
And Taliban.21 are following an effective strategy.
Nibbling spaces, dominating the night, ruling the
countryside so effectively that even the US/NATO
had been paying rahdari (toll) for their military
movements; occupying areas surrounding major
cities; emphasising on the peaceful surrender
(tasleem) invoking Afghan brotherhood, and issuing
reassuring broadcasts to allay fears and rumours
are clever deeds.
Taliban.21 are experienced in diplomacy,
negotiations and realpolitik. Their year-long Doha
parleys establish their credentials in dealing with a
superpower, better than many states. They remain
exposed to modern influences like education,
foreign habitation and media in all forms. Realising
the power of unofficial media, their footage
regarding surrendered ANA troops, is poles apart
from their 1996 model.
Fourth, militarily, they are getting boots on ground
in the non-Pashtun highland (mainly north), sealing
important borders. This suppresses potential
challenges to their rule, stopping Central Asian
support for such challengers. Pashtun east and
south are theirs to take, as recent surrender of a
Kandahar district validates. This is not the work of
the run of the mill, the uncouth and the
unschooled. Today, the Taliban occupy more areas
than they did in the 1990s and follow a defined and
efficacious chain of command, keeping well-
informed of popular pulse, strategic dynamics and
ground situation.
So, who will fight them in the feared civil war? The
warlords with no moral authority (if not foreign-
supported), the politicians already in secret parleys
with the Taliban, the dispirited ANA troops
surrendering/fleeing in droves, the urban vigilantes
and/or the general public? People lived under their
shadow government all these years, despite the
almost 50 nations keeping over 150,000 troops on
Afghan soil. We do not seem to get it.
Yes, there would be panic flights, desertions and
localised violence. Those desperate to flee are
either complicit in crimes against the Taliban, or
gullible and scared individuals, or opportunists
fleeing for greener pastures.
So, what to expect? With the north pacified through
military presence, a tasleem strategy delivers rural
hinterland to the Taliban. The restarted Doha
parleys might lead to an outline political settlement.
Pockets of defiance (if any), would resist till foreign
patronage runs out (the Taliban purposefully
captured Tajikistan crossing). And the Taliban
patiently wait-out the fall of besieged cities,
especially Kabul.
The Taliban would remain a US/West-reliant given
the crucial US assistance ($4 billion yearly upto
2024) and other aid under the Doha agreement.
However, any dithering by the US would deliver
Afghanistan to an eagerly waiting China, under the
Belt and Road Initiative. A sullen India would
reluctantly reach out to the Taliban, ditching Ghani
(like Dr Najeebullah).
Lastly, the Taliban rule may be the only chance for
regional/neighbourhood stability. Pakistan and the
US knew it back in 1996. So, why is our ashhrafiyya
so afraid of sharia/Islam in our neighbourhood?
China gets it, the Taliban get it, we do not.
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