EI Corrosion Management O&G

Guidance for corrosion management in
oil and gas production and processing

Issued under licence to Chevron employees only.
IMPORTANT: This file is subject to a licence agreement issued by the Energy Institute, London, UK. All rights reserved. It may only be used in accordance with
the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: pubs@energyinst.org.uk t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
GUIDANCE FOR CORROSION MANAGEMENT IN OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
AND PROCESSING
May 2008
Published by
ENERGY INSTITUTE, LONDON
The Energy Institute is a professional membership body incorporated by Royal Charter 2003
Registered charity number 1097899

The Energy Institute (EI) is the leading chartered professional membership body supporting individuals and organisations across
the energy industry. With a combined membership of over 13 500 individuals and 300 companies in 100 countries, it provides
an independent focal point for the energy community and a powerful voice to engage business and industry, government,
academia and the public internationally.
As a Royal Charter organisation, the EI offers professional recognition and sustains personal career development through the
accreditation and delivery of training courses, conferences and publications and networking opportunities. It also runs a highly
valued technical work programme, comprising original independent research and investigations, and the provision of IP
technical publications to provide the international industry with information and guidance on key current and future issues.
The EI promotes the safe, environmentally responsible and efficient supply and use of energy in all its forms and applications.
In fulfilling this purpose the EI addresses the depth and breadth of energy and the energy system, from upstream and
downstream hydrocarbons and other primary fuels and renewables, to power generation, transmission and distribution to
sustainable development, demand side management and energy efficiency. Offering learning and networking opportunities
to support career development, the EI provides a home to all those working in energy, and a scientific and technical reservoir
of knowledge for industry.
This publication has been produced as a result of work carried out within the Technical Team of the Energy Institute (EI),
funded by the EI’s Technical Partners. The EI’s Technical Work Programme provides industry with cost-effective, value-adding
knowledge on key current and future issues affecting those operating in the energy sector, both in the UK and internationally.
For further information, please visit http://www.energyinst.org.uk
The EI gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions towards the scientific and technical programme
from the following companies
BG Group Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited

BHP Billiton Limited Murco Petroleum Ltd
BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd Nexen
BP Oil UK Ltd Saudi Aramco
Chevron Shell UK Oil Products Limited
ConocoPhillips Ltd Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Ltd
ENI Statoil (U.K.) Limited
E. ON UK Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd
ExxonMobil International Ltd Total E&P UK plc
Kuwait Petroleum International Ltd Total UK Limited
Copyright © 2008 by the Energy Institute, London:

The Energy Institute is a professional membership body incorporated by Royal Charter 2003.
Registered charity number 1097899, England
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced by any means, or transmitted or translated into
a machine language without the written permission of the publisher.
The information contained in this publication is provided as guidance only and while every reasonable care has been taken
to ensure the accuracy of its contents, the Energy Institute cannot accept any responsibility for any action taken, or not taken,
on the basis of this information. The Energy Institute shall not be liable to any person for any loss or damage which may arise
from the use of any of the information contained in any of its publications.
ISBN 978 0 85293 497 5
Published by the Energy Institute
Further copies can be obtained from

Portland Customer Services, Commerce Way, Whitehall Industrial Estate, Colchester CO2 8HP, UK.
Tel: +44 (0) 1206 796 351
email: sales@portland-services.com
Electronic access to EI and IP publications is available via our website, www.energyinstpubs.org.uk.

Documents can be purchased online as downloadable pdfs or on an annual subscription for single users and companies.
For more information, contact the EI Publications Team.
e: pubs@energyinst.org.uk

GUIDANCE FOR CORROSION MANAGEMENT IN OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION AND PROCESSING
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Scope of application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 Structured framework for corrosion management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Policy and strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3 Roles, responsibilities and accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4 Competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6 Co-operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Corrosion risk assessment and planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

4.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3 Corrosion risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5 Implementation and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

5.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4 Reporting, analysis and corrective action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6 Monitoring and measuring performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

6.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3 Performance measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4 Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.5 Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.5 Reporting and corrective actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7 Performance review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3 Performance reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
iii
Contents cont... Page
8 Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.3 Scope and frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Annex A Guidance to normative requirements and examples of good practice . . . . 23

A1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A2 Policy and strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A3 Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A4 Corrosion risk assessment and planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A5 Implementation and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A6 Monitoring and measuring performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A7 Performance review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A8 Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Annex B Top corrosion threats and main mitigation methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

B1 CO2 corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
B2 H2S corrosion and cracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
B3 O2 corrosion of seawater and water injection systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
B4 Microbially influenced and dead leg corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B5 Galvanic corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
B6 Weld corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B7 Grooving corrosion of pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
B8 Flange face corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B9 Atmospheric external corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
B10 Corrosion under insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B11 Stress corrosion cracking and localised corrosion of stainless steels in chloride
environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
B12 Erosion/corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
B13 Chemical treatment management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
B14 Mitigation by coatings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
B15 Mitigation by cathodic protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Annex C Checklist for assessment of corrosion management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Annex D Glossary of terms and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

D1 Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
D2 Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Annex E References and Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

E1 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
E2 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
iv
FOREWORD
Following a discussion on corrosion issues at the Major Accident Hazard Strategic Programme
Influencing Workshop in 2006, the Oil and Gas UK led Installation Integrity Working Group (IIWG)
and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) requested the formation of an industry working group,
under the HSE’s Key Programme 3 (KP3) banner to address the corrosion of plant and structures on
offshore installations.
The Corrosion Management Work Group thus formed, comprised representatives from operators,
regulators, verification bodies and service providers and was managed by the Energy Institute. The
primary objective of the initiative is to revise and update existing HSE research report (Review of
Corrosion Management for Offshore Oil and Gas Processing, Offshore Technology Report 2001/044)
and to supplement it with more detailed operational guidance and in particular, introduce sections
which would aim to address external corrosion or 'physical state of plant' condition.
This document was written and compiled following consultation with a large cross-section of UK
Offshore Operators, specialist contractors and independent verification bodies who have a role in
corrosion control in the offshore oil and gas industry. Input to its development was sought via
working group discussion meetings, individual contributions and with provision of example
information. The information gathered has been collated and reviewed to identify commonalities in
the approach taken to corrosion management across the industry.
It is intended that these guidelines should provide good practice for the management of corrosion
for offshore installations and will be of use to duty holders, managers of operations, safety,
engineering and maintenance functions, and as an initial introduction for those who wish to become
involved in the subject. Although produced for the UK offshore industry, it is regarded as being
applicable to similar industries throughout the world and also to onshore terminals.
This publication has been compiled for guidance only and while every reasonable care has been taken
to ensure the accuracy and relevance of its contents, the Energy Institute, its sponsoring companies,
the document writer and the Working Group members listed in the Acknowledgements who have
contributed to its preparation, cannot accept any responsibility for any action taken, or not taken,
on the basis of this information. The Energy Institute shall not be liable to any person for any loss or
damage which may arise from the use of any of the information contained in any of its publications.
This guideline may be reviewed from time to time and it would be of considerable assistance for any
future revision if users would send comments or suggestions for improvements to:
The Technical Department,

Energy Institute,
61 New Cavendish Street,
London
W1G 7AR
E: technical@energyinst.org.uk
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Institute wishes to record its appreciation of the work carried out by the following individuals:
Mike Pursell of Mike Pursell Consultant Engineer Ltd; for compiling this document and for input of
expertise into its detail and content.
Members of the Corrosion Management Working Group, which was set up to steer the programme,
who provided valuable expertise through meeting attendance and correspondence. In particular,
those who have provided contributions that were key to the development of this publication:
Elspeth Allan ConocoPhillips

Richard Carroll BG Group
Andy Duncan HSE OSD
Keith Hart Energy Institute (Secretary)
David Hillis Total E&P UK Ltd
Rob Howard Lloyds Register EMEA
Dan Kirkwood Oceaneering International
Philip Ligertwood Shell UK Limited/Chevron Energy Technology Company
Jim MacRae Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd
Bill Miller Talisman Energy (UK) Limited
Raman Patel HSE OSD
Robert Paterson Oil & Gas UK
Steve Paterson Shell UK Limited
Catriona Smith BP Operating Company Ltd (Chair)
Yee Chin Tang DNV
Jonathan Wells AMEC Natural Resources
Chris Williams BP Operating Company Ltd
Liam Williams iicorr Ltd
The Institute also wishes to recognise the contribution made by those who have provided input and
guidance on the various documents which were issued during the development period:
Wayne Jones HSE OSD

Bob Kyle Oil & Gas UK
Martin Munday CNR
Mike Swidzinski ConocoPhillips
vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document provides general principles, engineering guidance and requirements for improving
Corrosion Management practices in oil and gas production and processing. It has been produced by
an oil and gas industry work group with the objective of:
— reducing the number of corrosion related hydrocarbon releases and other safety related and
environmentally damaging outcomes;
— identifying good practices for setting up an optimal corrosion management scheme, and
— providing an overview of the top corrosion threats to production and processing facilities
downstream of the wells.
Corrosion management has been defined as the part of the overall management system that
develops, implements, reviews and maintains the corrosion management policy and strategy and
includes a clear set of corrosion management system requirements that can, and should, be
considered normative.
They are based on the elements of a simple management model:
Health
and safety, Getting it
integrity and right
corrosion
issues
a
Clear policies
and objectives
Reports
b used to achieve
Organisational
structure and improvements
responsibilities
c Reviews
Corrosion risk
assessment used to provide
and planning correction
d
Implementation
and
analysis
e
Monitoring and
measuring
performance Yes No
f
Review Meeting
system the control
performance criteria?
g
Independent
audit
Figure 1: The basic corrosion management process model
vii
Annex A provides informative guidance for the key elements a. to g. of the corrosion management
system. It describes good practices and techniques which have been demonstrated as necessary and
successful in the identification and the management of corrosion threats.
Annex B provides an overview of the top corrosion threats and mitigation methods and the
particular features of their management.
Annex C provides a structured checklist of activities and requirements against which a

management system can be reviewed or audited, assisting with element g., Independent Audit, of
the corrosion management system.
The system that is described can operate at various managerial and technical levels within an
organisation. The degree of complexity will depend on the size of the operation as will the number
of personnel involved and the roles and responsibilities of managers, engineers, technical support
staff and contractors.
The system will have risk assessments for both safety critical and safety related elements and
management activity to ensure ongoing availability and effectiveness of barriers to failure due to
corrosion.
Practical experience from the UKCS has shown that an effective corrosion management system,
coupled with commitment by the operator and their contractors can lead to major improvement in
safety, environmental protection and reliability in oil and gas production operations.
viii
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE
It is widely recognised within the oil and gas industry that effective management of
corrosion will contribute towards the maintenance of asset integrity and achieve the
following benefits:
— compliance with statutory and corporate safety, health and environmental
requirements;
— reduction in safety and environmental hazard from leaks and structural failures;
— increased plant availability, improving income;
— reduction in unplanned maintenance, reducing costs;
— reduction in deferment costs;
— optimisation of mitigation, monitoring and inspection costs, and
— improvement in the working environment with associated benefits.
The aim of this document is to provide guidance to individuals and organisations within
industry involved in the development and operation of Corrosion Management Systems for
facilities used in the upstream production and processing of oil and gas. The guidance has
been supplemented with practical examples of good practice and descriptions of how the
management model can be applied to address a number of key mitigation measures for the
control of each of the major corrosion threats experienced within the industry.
1.2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION
1.2.1 Management system scope
In this document corrosion management is defined as the part of the overall management
system that develops, implements, reviews and maintains the corrosion management policy
and strategy. The corrosion policy provides a structured framework for identification of risks
associated with corrosion, and the development and operation of suitable risk control
measures.
1.2.2 Production facilities scope
The document is intended to apply to the following facilities:

— offshore installations (including process plant, utilities and supporting structures);
— pipelines and subsea gathering, manifolds and processing systems, and
— onshore plant for reception, separation and stabilisation.
It not intended to apply to wells and well control equipment, to the transportation of oil and
natural gas by sea and after separation and stabilisation onshore, or to oil refining or gas
liquefaction.
The document is primarily written to address corrosion management within the UK
regulatory framework for offshore installations – specific details are included in Annex A.
However, the system model described in this document can also be applied elsewhere and
to the onshore elements of production schemes.
Page 1
1.2.3 Deterioration processes scope
Corrosion management covers the management of threats to technical integrity arising from
mechanisms of material deterioration and failure, including but not limited to:
— corrosion processes – general, localised and galvanic;
— environmental cracking – stress corrosion, hydrogen induced, sulphide stress
cracking, corrosion fatigue, etc.;
— erosion, erosion corrosion, cavitation assisted corrosion and other flow related
degradation mechanisms, and
— mechanical damage – vibration induced fatigue, brittle fracture.
1.3 STRUCTURED FRAMEWORK FOR CORROSION MANAGEMENT
In the operation of an oil and gas production facility, the management of corrosion lies
within the function of many parts of the operator’s organisation and increasingly extends
into contractors’ organisations. It is therefore important that corrosion management
activities are carried out within a structured framework that is visible, understood by all
parties and where roles and responsibilities are clearly defined.
This document focuses on the management of corrosion during operation of the
production facilities. However, it also acknowledges the importance of the design phase in
planning and implementing barriers to corrosion risk. The management system model
described in this document is based upon an existing HSE model for the management of
safety related activity[1], (see Figure 2).
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues a. Clear policies and objectives adopted by
an organisation. (Section 2)
a
Clear policies
and objectives
b. Organisational structure and
responsibilites within the organisation.
b Reports (Section 3)
Organisational used to achieve
structure and improvements c. Corrosion risk assessment and planning
responsibilities
of acitivities according to risk. (Section 4)
c Reviews
Corrosion risk d. Implementation and analysis of planned
assessment used to provide
and planning correction activity and its reported outcomes.
(Section 5)
d
Implementation
and e. Measure system performance against
analysis pre-determined criteria. (Section 6)
e
Monitoring and f. Systematic and regular review of system
measuring
performance Yes No performance. (Section 7)
f g. Periodic independent audit of the

Review Meeting
system the control management and monitoring systems.
g (Section 8)
Independent
audit
Figure 2: Framework for successful corrosion management
Page 2
The document is in four parts, as detailed:
1.3.1 Normative requirements
The first part, Sections 2 to 8 of this document, sets out the essential requirements to be
met by an effective corrosion management system for each element of the model. The
content of this part should be taken as normative.
Steps (a) to (f) are concerned with the setting up and operation of a management
system, whilst step (g), auditing, ensures that the overall structure is operating and that
lessons are learnt and fed back for future improvement. The steps are connected with
specific feedback loops necessary for control, review, audit and reporting purposes.
The simple framework shown in Figure 2 is expanded for use throughout this
document to illustrate the process.
1.3.2 Informative guidance
Annex A provides informative guidance to the management process and examples of good
industry practice related to the 'normative' requirements. (The main item numbering in
Annex A corresponds with the normative requirements to assist in relating the guidance to
the normative requirements.)
1.3.3 Control of the top corrosion threats and key mitigation methods
Annex B addresses a number of top corrosion threats and a number of key mitigation
methods and outlines how the corrosion management system model can be applied to their
control.
1.3.4 Checklist
The success of any corrosion management system is reliant upon the review of measures of
performance and on audit to ensure continuous improvement in corrosion management
activities. To assist in these activities Annex C contains a checklist for the self-assessment of
the corrosion management system.
Page 3
2 POLICY AND STRATEGY
2.1 PURPOSE
Effective policies and strategies set a clear direction for the organisation to follow in the
elimination of safety related risk and improvement of operational reliability.
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues
Policies on risk and reliability

Targets for incident avoidance Clear policies
Targets for reliability and cost and objectives
Standards for measuring performance
Reports
structure and improvements
responsibilities
Reviews
Corrosion risk
used to provide
assessment and
correction
planning
Implementation
and analysis
Measure
system
performance Yes No
Review Meeting
system the control
Independent
audit
Figure 3: Setting the policy
2.2 GENERAL
Policies should reflect the vision of the organisation and a genuine commitment to action.
Strategies provide the means by which the policy is implemented.
This section identifies key aspects that contribute toward an effective policy and
strategy for the management of corrosion.
Policy and strategy should be widely communicated. This can be included in
corrosion awareness activity, (see section 3.5).
Page 4
2.3 POLICY
2.3.1 Organisations should have in place policies that deal with the hazards and risks associated
with safety, health and environmental protection.
2.3.2 Policy may also address risks to business profitability and business interruption but these
policies should not override or conflict with those that address the hazards and risks
associated with safety, health and environmental protection.
2.3.3 Policies may be specific to corrosion management or may be part of a wider integrity
management policy.
2.3.4 The corrosion management policy should be issued with the authority of the most senior
manager of the facilities to which it relates.
2.3.5 The corrosion management policy should clearly state:

— expectations and objectives by which compliance with the policy may be measured
('what');
— organising to meet the objectives ('who'), and,
— specifying arrangements for carrying out the policy ('how').
2.4 STRATEGY
2.4.1 A corrosion strategy should exist which provides the method by which the policy is
implemented.
2.4.2 The corrosion management strategy should be clearly derived from the policy.
2.4.3 The strategy adopted should describe the links between the parties involved with corrosion
management. This is particularly important where alliances between owner, contractor and
specialist subcontractors and consultants exist.
2.4.4 The strategy should undergo review whenever there are significant changes in operations
or its policy basis and, otherwise, at set intervals. When appropriate the strategy should be
updated on the basis of the findings of such reviews.
2.4.5 The strategy should address a clearly defined asset life or life extension.
2.4.6 The strategy should align with any separate plans that conform to statutory requirements.
Page 5
3 ORGANISATION
3.1 PURPOSE
Effective management structure and corrosion management practices are required to deliver
the policy and strategy. The establishment of a positive 'corrosion culture' means less risk
to individuals and less damage to the integrity of a facility.
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues

Reports
Assess skills and competence Organisational used to achieve
Define roles and responsibilities structure and improvements
Ensure cooperation and communication responsibilities
Reviews
Corrosion risk
used to provide
assessment and
correction
planning
Implementation
and analysis
Measure
system
performance Yes No
Review Meeting
system the control
Independent
audit
Figure 4: Identify ownership of the corrosion management process
3.2 GENERAL
Corrosion management crosses many functions of an organisation and in all but the smallest
operations the various roles in the corrosion management system will be undertaken by a
variety of individuals and groups in different corporate departments and their contracted
bodies.
Operators should ensure that all relevant requirements for organisational
effectiveness apply equally in-house and to their contracted bodies.
Page 6
This section identifies key aspects that contribute toward an effective organisation for the
management of corrosion.
The key aspects divide into:

— appropriate structure, comprising:
– defined roles, responsibilities and accountabilities, and
– competence of individuals filling the defined roles.
— enabling activities, comprising:
– co-operation between individuals and groups, and
– communication throughout the organisation
Except in the smallest organisations a cross-function corrosion management team should

be formed to foster co-operation and communication, enable co-ordination, review
performance and own the corrosion management system.
The corrosion specialists, whether in-house or contractor’s personnel, must be
involved in the formal processes for the management of change, both engineering change
and the change of process routes, limits and set points.
3.3 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
3.3.1 The corrosion management processes and roles should be clearly defined and documented.
3.3.2 Roles, responsibilities and both managerial and technical authority should be allocated and
stated in a clearly defined structure.
3.3.3 Key areas that require special expertise should be identified.
3.3.4 The interfaces between operational and functional organisation units should be clearly
defined with respect to responsibility, authority, accountability and reporting.
3.3.5 Managers, supervisors and team leaders should have the time and resources needed to fulfil
their allocated responsibilities.
3.3.6 Roles, responsibilities and authority of contracted bodies and their personnel, and interfaces
between the contractor’s personnel and the operator’s personnel, should all be addressed
in the same way as within the operator’s organisation. Responsibility for supervising
contracted bodies should be assigned.
3.4 COMPETENCE
3.4.1 All involved in the management of corrosion should have the qualifications, experience and
expertise appropriate to clearly defined duties and responsibilities. Fundamental to this
should be the provision of a documented competence system.
3.4.2 Competence should be defined for all operational and functional roles in terms of education,
training and experience. Prior to recruitment a clear specification should be prepared. Any
gaps identified at recruitment stage should be subsequently managed via supervision,
training and development.
Page 7
3.4.3 Training should be planned and implemented as part of a clear training policy and
programme for those holding operational and functional responsibility to ensure they are
competent for their roles and to develop behavioural skills.
3.4.4 Performance should be assessed routinely and corrective provisions made as appropriate on
issues of competence.
3.4.5 Experienced personnel and external advisors should be sought and used for advice where
necessary.
3.4.6 All involved should have an understanding of the risks, understanding of the working
practices and awareness of their own role, their own limitations and the limitations of those
for whom they are responsible.
3.4.7 Contracted bodies should have appropriate competence demonstrated by accreditation and
certification, including the possession of an appropriate 'tool kit' of methods and
equipment, corporate experience and appropriate processes for the recruitment and training
of personnel.
3.5 COMMUNICATION
3.5.1 Appropriate information should be disseminated to the correct people.
3.5.2 Written information on hazards, risks and preventative measures should be provided.
3.5.3 Procedures, work instructions and guidelines should be published and shared.
3.5.4 Corrosion awareness information should be distributed to those who need to be aware of
the importance of corrosion management to assist those directly involved. Training and
information to develop corrosion awareness should be provided.
3.5.5 Key 'players' in the organisation and their contracted bodies that comprise the 'corrosion
management team' should be identified.
3.5.6 Regular meetings of the corrosion management team on implementation status, trends in
deterioration and failure, status of corrective action and planning and budgetary issues
should be undertaken.
3.5.7 Managers, technical specialists and authorities, and supervisors including, where
appropriate, contractors’ personnel should be visible through the publication of charts and
guides.
3.5.8 Experiences should be shared with other facilities, other operators and with appropriate
external bodies.
3.6 CO-OPERATION
3.6.1 Appropriate input from managers, designers, operational staff and maintenance engineers,
inspection departments, corrosion engineers and consultants should be obtained in the
control of corrosion risks.
Page 8
3.6.2 Change of management procedures should require review of engineering and operating
changes by materials and corrosion specialists.
3.6.3 Staff should be consulted for opinions and involved in planning and reviewing performance.
3.6.4 Co-ordination with contracted bodies should be achieved through clear, written interface
rules.
3.6.5 Co-ordination should be maintained with external bodies.
Page 9
4 CORROSION RISK ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING
4.1 PURPOSE
To implement the policy and strategy through an effective corrosion management plan. To
identify the corrosion threats and rank the risks they present and then plan appropriately for
their effective avoidance or mitigation.
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues

Reports
Identify hazards and assess risks Reviews

Corrosion risk
Plan mitigation, monitoring, inspection used to provide
assessment and
Schedule and specify activities correction
planning
Implementation
and analysis
Measure
system
performance Yes No
Review Meeting
system the control
Independent
audit
Figure 5: Planning is vital for success
4.2 GENERAL
Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) allows threats and their potential consequences to be
identified and the risks they present to be ranked. As a result plans can be made to apply
resources to combat the significant risks and to avoid effort being wasted on insignificant
risks.
In the design process CRA can be based on theoretical considerations and industry
experience. Throughout the life of the facility CRA can be refocused and refined through
operational experience, inspection, etc.
Page 10
In the design stage the task is to plan activities in both design and construction and in initial
operations. At that stage there are opportunities to eliminate some risks completely and
achieve inherent safety though process design and the use of resistant materials.
Planning is made at both the strategic level, which outlines the key choice of
barriers to the threats, and at the tactical level where the activities to implement, and to
monitor the effectiveness of, those barriers are detailed.
Threat and consequence identification

Corrosion risk Threat and consequence assessment
assessment Risk assessment
Assessment confidence assessment
Identify barriers to failure (corrosion mitigation methods)

Operating procedures. Corrosion management matrices.
Planning
RB schemes. Work packs. Written schemes of examination.
Planned maintenance routines. Maintenance scheduling.
Implementation
Feedback
into Data gathering
planning
Analysis
Reporting
Corrective
action
Figure 6: Corrosion risk assessment and planning
4.3 CORROSION RISK ASSESSMENT
4.3.1 All safety related and environmentally critical elements of the facilities should be identified
and recorded. Additional business critical elements may also be identified and recorded.
4.3.2 The corrosion threats to the integrity of the critical elements and the likelihood that they will
result in failure should be defined. The rate of deterioration should be identified where
appropriate.
4.3.3 The consequences that can arise from failure should be determined and quantified.
4.3.4 The likelihood of failure and the level of the safety related, environmental and commercial
consequences should be combined to give a risk ranking to each threat for each identified
element.
Page 11
4.3.5 The identified elements should be broken down to an item level and risk rankings
determined as a basis for risk based inspection planning and other tactical plans.
4.3.6 A formal, documented method should be used for CRA. Quantitative and logic based
assessments should be tested to ensure they produce rational results.
4.3.7 The operating and environmental conditions used as the basis for assessment and any
assumptions made should be recorded with the results.
4.3.8 The assessment should be routinely reviewed and additionally if operating conditions
change.
4.4 PLANNING
Strategic planning:
4.4.1 The appropriate barriers/mitigation activities to reduce the risk of failure to a level which is
'as low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP) should be defined in the strategic plan.
4.4.2 A measurable performance limit for the barrier/mitigation activity should be defined.
4.4.3 The method of monitoring and measurement of the barrier/mitigation performance should
be defined.
4.4.4 The frequency of measurement, (or the basis on which the frequency is determined), should
be defined.
4.4.5 The corrective action to be taken in the event of non-conformity to the performance limit
should be defined.
4.4.6 The organisational functions responsible for barriers/mitigation, monitoring/measurement

and corrective action should be defined.
4.4.7 The plan should be published in a form in which all the contributors to the corrosion
management system can identify their own responsibilities and interfaces with others, e.g.
as a matrix.
4.4.8 The corrosion management plan should be owned and maintained by the corrosion
management team.
4.4.9 The plans should recognise the need for involvement of statutory bodies.
Tactical planning:
4.4.10 The strategic requirements should be translated into tactical plans and schedules in a form
compatible with plans and schedules produced generally for activities of the implementing
unit.
4.4.11 Registers should kept at the item level and for special items.
4.4.12 Performance limits should be defined at the item level, where appropriate.
4.4.13 Written procedures should govern implementation and define actions to be taken in the
event of nonconformity to the performance limit.
Page 12
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
5.1 PURPOSE
To ensure effective implementation of the plans and analysis of the implementation and
monitoring data leading to timely corrective action where necessary.
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues

Reports

Corrosion risk
assessment and
planning
Implement planned activities

Implementation
Collect and analyse data
Identify corrective actions
and analysis
Measure
system
performance Yes No
Review Meeting
system the control
Independent
audit
Figure 7: Implementation is the core element of corrosion management
5.2 GENERAL
Implementation follows the strategic and tactical plans. The requirements of the plans
should be developed into procedures and instructions that are in line with the organisation
that has been developed. Training and corrosion awareness activity should be undertaken
to ensure that the personnel understand and can work effectively to the procedures and
instructions.
This section identifies key aspects which contribute toward effective implementation
and is focused on corrosion management in the operational phase of an installation or
facility’s life. However, it should be noted that plans can be made in the design phase and
implemented in construction that may provide for inherent safety.
Page 13
Implementation covers both the mitigation activities that provide barriers to the
corrosion risk and the monitoring and inspection activities that ensure that the mitigation
remains effective and the facility remains fit for purpose. This includes corrosion rate and
process monitoring and inspection, data collection, analysis and reporting and corrective
action.
Threat and consequence identification

Corrosion risk Threat and consequence assessment
assessment Risk assessment
Assessment confidence assessment
Identify barriers to failure (corrosion mitigation methods)

Operating procedures. Corrosion management matrices.
Planning RBI schemes. Work packs. Written schemes of examination.
Planned maintenance routines. Maintenance scheduling
Operation of continuous mitigation and corrosion monitoring

Implement Scheduled and campaign mitigation, inspection and monitoring
Work instructions. Work packs. Opportunity based inspection
Feedback Operating data and logs. Maintenance reports

into Data gathering Monitoring and inspection data
Urgent reporting. Corrosion damage reports
planning
Information management
Assessment. Corrective action identification
Analysis
Trending. Prediction
Investigation. Root cause analysis
Weekly/monthly/quarterly summary of ongoing operations

Campaign close out reports. Annual summary reports
Reporting
Reports to management. Reports for regulators and ICP
Reports to corrosion management team
Increase dosage rates/change chemical package

Corrective Incorporate/modify cathodic protection. Maintenance coating
action Replace component/change material of construction
Reassess monitoring/inspection requirements/frequency
Figure 8: Implementation and analysis process
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION
5.3.1 The plan should be translated into practical instructions (e.g. planned maintenance routines,
operating instructions, work packs, etc.,) and means for implementation.
5.3.2 Written procedures, work instructions and guidelines for the performance of implementation
tasks should be provided. Responsibility for implementation should be identified.
5.3.3 Adequate manpower, material and equipment resources need to be allocated to undertake
the plan. Permanent physical facilities should be installed.
5.3.4 The locations for monitoring and inspection activities should be defined.
5.3.5 The reporting routes should be defined.
5.3.6 Procedures and instructions should include criteria of non-conformance.
Page 14
5.3.7 A corrosion damage reporting process should be continuously in place to capture

information regarding failures that occur unconnected to the planned activity.
5.3.8 A procedure should be in place to allow for opportunity based inspection, outside of the
plans, of items that are not normally accessible for operational reasons.
5.4 REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
5.4.1 Corrosion mitigation, monitoring and inspection data should be reported in a form which
enables appropriate assessment to be undertaken.
5.4.2 Reporting procedures should address failure to undertake planned activities.
5.4.3 Data should be stored and shared so that trends can be identified over time.
5.4.4 Measured values that exceed allowable performance limits must be highlighted and reported
through identified routes as a matter of urgency so that assessment can be made and
corrective measures implemented.
5.4.5 Analysis of data should be carried out against predetermined time scales to ensure that if
corrective action is required it can be taken before undesirable consequences can occur.
5.4.6 Data should be validated and the measurement uncertainty taken into account in the
analysis.
5.4.7 A review of all mitigation, monitoring and inspection data should be carried out by a
competent person or team, and a clear statement as to the condition and continued
suitability for use should be made both at an item and a facility level. Such reviews should
be carried out at the end of campaign activity and periodically for ongoing activity (e.g.
quarterly or annually). Corrosion damage reports and opportunity based inspection results
should be included in the review.
5.4.8 The findings of the offshore verification scheme should be included, where applicable.
5.4.9 Analysis and review results should be fed back into the corrosion risk assessment and into
the strategic and tactical planning.
5.4.10 Corrective action requirements and time scales should be captured in an information system
that allows implementation and close out to be tracked. Review periods should be placed
on corrective actions of a temporary nature and tracked for implementation.
5.4.11 A procedure should be in place to establish root causes of unexpected failures and near
misses.
5.4.12 Written procedures should govern reporting, analysis and corrective action. Responsibility
for analysis and determination of corrective action should be identified. The recipients of
suitability, investigation and corrective action reports should be defined.
Page 15
6 MONITORING AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE
6.1 PURPOSE
Performance should be measured against agreed standards to reveal when and where
improvement is needed.
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues

Reports

Corrosion risk
assessment and
planning

Implementation
and analysis
Proactive measurement using regular

Measure
checks to show controls are working
Reactive measurement identifies if
system
performance Yes No
Performance is effective
Review Meeting
system the control
Independent
audit
Figure 9: Performance measurement to demonstrate a working system
6.2 GENERAL
Organisations should undertake regular proactive and reactive monitoring to measure the
degree to which the plan is being met and the effectiveness of the plan in eliminating
corrosion related risks and, therefore, the extent to which policy objectives are being met
by the corrosion management system.
Measurements can be identified as being in two distinct categories:
(a) Measurements of success in meeting the performance limits for the effectiveness
of barriers to corrosion failure, and
Page 16
(b) Measurements of success in meeting key performance indicators for the

effectiveness of the management system in identifying the barriers and organising
and planning and implementing the barriers, etc.
(a) can be considered as addressing the technical factors and are used primarily in reviewing
fitness for purpose of the facility, (see 5.4.7), although, clearly, if they are not met there will
be an underlying issue with the performance of the management system. (b) directly
addresses the management factors and are considered when reviewing the fitness for
purpose of the management system. In some cases though the same measurement may
serve both. This section identifies these and other key aspects which contribute toward
effective monitoring and measurement of performance.
6.3 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
6.3.1 Performance indicators should be selected that are meaningful and practicable and relevant
to the management of corrosion and the policy and plan in place.
6.3.2 Performance indicators should be quantifiable to avoid subjective judgements.
6.3.3 Performance indicators should be aimed primarily at demonstrating success or identifying

trends that enable corrective action.
6.3.4 Target values should be determined for all indicators. Values for performance limits for
barriers to corrosion must be determined by reference to the engineered design of the
facility.
6.3.5 Performance indicators should be selected such that they indicate how well the plan is being
implemented linked to corrosion – Proactive measurement/leading indicators.
6.3.6 Performance indicators should be selected that indicate trends toward the achievement of
desired outcomes linked to corrosion – Reactive measurement/lagging indicators.
6.4 RESPONSIBILITY
6.4.1 Responsibility should be combined with ownership to promote motivation towards delivery.
6.4.2 Measurements and targets for management activity should preferably be set by those
accountable for meeting targets and the team responsible for carrying out the measured
activities.
6.4.3 The managers above those accountable for meeting targets should agree and approve the
measures and the targets.
6.4.4 Those responsible for carrying out the measured activities should report results at the
required frequency to the accountable supervisor who should agree an interpretation with
them and present them to management.
6.4.5 The results from all implementing teams should be presented to the corrosion management
team, which should recommend corrective action where necessary.
Page 17
6.5 FREQUENCY
6.5.1 The frequency of measurement should be set so that corrective action, if required, can be
effected before an undesirable outcome may result.
6.5.2 Where appropriate the frequency should be set so that the magnitude of change is likely to
be meaningful given the likely errors associated with measurement.
6.5.3 The responsible team and accountable supervisor should, where necessary, take
measurements more frequently than they are reported in order that timely corrective action
is possible.
6.5.4 Results should be aggregated and interpreted for presentation at intervals appropriate for
the 'customer', e.g. at the frequency of the meetings of the corrosion management team.
6.5.5 A revision of frequency should be considered:

— if a shorter interval is necessary to implement timely corrective action;
— if little change is experienced and a longer interval is supported.
6.6 REPORTING AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
6.6.1 Corrective action should be recorded in a register that enables the issue of work orders or
instructions for corrective action, implementation and close out to be tracked and potentially
overdue actions to be identified.
6.6.2 If serious or persistent failure occurs an investigation should be mounted to determine the
root cause.
Page 18
7 PERFORMANCE REVIEW
7.1 PURPOSE
The organisation can learn from all relevant experience, apply the lessons and achieve
continuous improvement.
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues

Reports

Corrosion risk
assessment and
planning

Implementation
and analysis

Measure
system
performance Yes No
Review activities and trends Meeting

Review
Check for compliance
system the control
Identify success and failure
Learn from experience and improve performance criteria?
Independent
audit
Figure 10: Review performance, meet agreed criteria or make changes
7.2 GENERAL
Organisations should undertake systematic reviews of performance based on data from the
monitoring of system performance and from independent audits. The review process enables
organisations to continuously improve by the constant development of the policy, strategy
and processes to ensure compliance with statutory requirements but also to be consistent
with the changing business plan and changing production requirements.
Page 19
7.3 PERFORMANCE REVIEWS
7.3.1 Reviews should include all aspects of the procedures and processes and take into account
shortcomings in facility and item fitness for purpose, the measures of system performance,
the results of system audit and feedback on supplier performance.
7.3.2 Reviews should involve all key players and contractors in the corrosion management process
and be endorsed by a level of management with the authority to implement necessary
changes.
7.3.3 Where appropriate the review should consider the observations of the offshore, independent
competent person and lessons from other facilities and external sources.
7.3.4 Reviews should consider both proactive /leading and reactive /lagging indicators.
7.3.5 Reviews should assess the effectiveness of the processes and procedures in meeting
performance targets.
7.3.6 Reviews should be undertaken at a frequency that enables changes to be made in a timely
manner, (e.g. quarterly or annually).
7.3.7 Reviews should generate an output of corrective action for the system and feedback into the
strategy. The benefits of new techniques and technology should be considered.
7.3.8 Corrective action should be recorded in a register that enables actions, implementation and
close out to be tracked and potentially overdue actions to be identified. Management, the
corrosion management team and those responsible for actions should receive regular reports
on progress towards close out.
7.3.9 Reviews should identify good performance and promote good practice.
7.3.10 Review reports should be provided to all participants in the corrosion management activity
both down the line as well upwards to management. The senior management of the facility
should receive a copy or a suitable summary.
Page 20
8 AUDIT
8.1 PURPOSE
To provide an independent and objective comparison between the corrosion management

system requirements and the system as implemented to enable corrective action and
improvement.
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues

Reports

Corrosion risk
assessment and
planning

Implementation
and analysis

Measure
system
performance Yes No
Review activities and trends Meeting

Review
Check for compliance
system the control
Identify success and failure
Learn from experience and improve performance criteria?
Independent
audit
Figure11: Independent audit that ensures improvement
8.2 GENERAL
The following section details the process of audit of the corrosion management system. The
purpose of audit is to ensure that the corrosion management system is efficient, effective
and reliable, and that the processes and activities are being implemented in accordance with
the procedures.
Audit results should be used to improve the corrosion management process and,
where appropriate, the strategic plan.
Page 21
8.3 SCOPE AND FREQUENCY
8.3.1 The scope of the audit programme should provide:
— assurance that the corrosion management system includes all essential elements as
required by this document;
— assurance that the implemented activities are suitable barriers to the threats and
suitable monitoring to measure performance;
— assurance that the corrosion management activities are implemented in accordance
with their documented procedures, and
— input into reviews of performance.
8.3.2 Audits should be carried out in accordance with an established check list and on the basis
of objective evidence of compliance.
8.3.3 Both internal and contractor led activity should be subject to audit.
8.3.4 Audits should be carried out by an auditor or team that has both competence in audit
practice and an understanding of corrosion management practice.
8.3.5 The auditor or team should be independent of both the operational and functional teams
that are directly involved in implementing the corrosion management system for the facility
concerned.
8.3.6 Audits should be carried out on a planned schedule.
8.3.7 Management or the corrosion management team should bring forward an audit if there is
evidence of serious non-compliance that threatens the effectiveness of the system.
8.3.8 In the event that non-compliance is detected corrective action should be agreed with the
auditee.
8.3.9 Audit reports should be made available to the facility management and the corrosion
management team and to the audit teams and supervisors to which they relate.
8.3.10 Corrective action should be recorded in a register that enables implementation and close out
to be tracked and potentially overdue actions to be identified. Facility management, the
corrosion management team and those responsible for actions should receive regular reports
on progress towards close out.
Page 22
ANNEX A
GUIDANCE TO NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS AND EXAMPLES OF
GOOD PRACTICE
A1 INTRODUCTION
A1.1 PURPOSE
Annex A provides general guidance to the implementation of the management steps

described in the main section of the document and also examples of good practice in
implementing those steps.
The primary objective of corrosion management is the minimisation of the risk of
harm to individuals and to the environment arising from leaks and structural failures caused
by corrosion. Taking action to eliminate such harm, and the costs that arise both directly and
indirectly from it, will also avoid concurrent loss of plant availability and the cost of repair.
It will also avoid the loss of reputation and investor confidence that can be damaging to a
company’s business ambitions.
Corrosion management activity therefore has a commercial pay-off as well as
providing vital support to safety and environmental objectives.
A1.2 SCOPE
Corrosion management is the systematic use of a wide range of mitigation methods as

barriers to various types of corrosion threats, including.
Page 23
Options C-Mn Steels, corrosion resistant alloys, non-metallics

Locations Pipework, vessels, tanks, valves. CRAs for lines/deadlegs that do not receive
Appropriate materials
inhibitors
Actions Selection of appropriate material at construction/major refurbishment stage
Options Corrosion inhibitors, biocides, oxygen scavengers

Chemical treatments Locations Pipework, vessels, tanks. Use selected packages in gas lines/water lines
Actions Batch/continuous dosing, package modification
Options Organic coatings, metallic coatings, linings, cladding

Locations Subsea facilities and structures. Above water/ground pipework and vessels.
Buried pipelines, pipe and vessels. Internal in pipelines, vessels and
Coatings and linings
pipework.
Actions Inspect during application. Future inspection and maintenance depends on
duty and location
Options Sacrificial anodes, impressed current systems

Locations Subsea pipelines, manifolds and structures. Below ground pipe and
Cathodic protection
pipelines. Internal vessels and large pipe in aqueous service
Actions Potential and current measurement. Anode replacement
Options Identify key parameters, pH, water-cut, temp, pressure, dehydration

Process control Locations Internals of vessels/pipework
Actions Dehydration of gas, control velocity/fluid shear stress, pressure reduction
Options Ensure ease of access/replacement

Design detailing Locations Eliminate crevices, galvanic effects
Actions Stress raiser elimination, ensure smooth fluid flow
Figure 12: Mitigation methods used as barriers to corrosion failure
Annex B provides concise guides to the management of the top corrosion threats and key
mitigation methods whilst this Annex A provides general guidance to the implementation
of the management steps described in the main section of the document. The main section
numbers in this Annex correspond to the related 'normative' requirements to assist in
identification.
A corrosion management scheme is ideally set up when the production facility is
put into operation, drawing on policies and strategies developed as part of the design. In
some cases it may be developed for a mature operation, either because a scheme has not
previously existed or because the facility has moved into new ownership. In the latter case
it may be partly based on a previous scheme.
The precise content and detail of a corrosion management system will depend on
the operator’s particular production scheme and their own general management policies
and approach. Whatever the situation, the operator will need to engage specialist advice
either from within their own organisation or from specialist contractors in order to make the
appropriate choices. This document describes what needs to be done and, in a general
sense, how it can be achieved.
Page 24
A1.3 STRUCTURED FRAMEWORK FOR CORROSION MANAGEMENT
The corrosion management system outlined provides a general and progressive framework
that is compatible with the requirements of a safety and environmental management system
concerned with ensuring the integrity of oil and gas production and processing equipment.
That is, operators should have effective plans, organisation, and activities to control, monitor
and review preventative and protective measures to secure the health and safety of persons,
the protection of the environment and the continuance of business.
Health
integrity and right
corrosion
issues a. Clear policies and objectives adopted by
an organisation. (Section 2)
a
Clear policies b. Organisational structure and
and objectives
responsibilites within the organisation.
Reports (Section 3)
b
structure and improvements c. Corrosion risk assessment and planning
responsibilities
of acitivities according to risk. (Section 4)
c Reviews
Corrosion risk
used to provide d. Implementation and analysis of planned
assessment
and planning correction activity and its reported outcomes.
(Section 5)
d
Implementation
and e. Measure system performance against
analysis pre-determined criteria. (Section 6)
e
Monitoring and f. Systematic and regular review of system
measuring performance. (Section 7)
performance Yes No
f g. Periodic independent audit of the

Review Meeting
system the control management and monitoring systems.
g
(Section 8)
Independent
audit
Figure 13: Framework for successful corrosion
A system, like that shown in Figure 13, will involve close working amongst personnel from
managerial and technical levels within an organisation. The degree of complexity will
depend on the size of the operation, the number of personnel and the roles and
responsibilities of managers, engineers, technical support staff and contractors.
The corrosion management system will also have a high level of technical input,
especially into risk assessments for safety related items and the planning and
implementation of chemical treatment, corrosion inspection and corrosion monitoring. These
are dependent on an understanding of the materials of construction (corrosion resistant alloy
versus carbon-steel), the fluid corrosivity, water cuts, age of the production system and
maintenance strategies adopted.
Practical experience from oil and gas production and processing has shown that the
development of comprehensive corrosion management systems, coupled with a
commitment by both the operator, maintenance contractor and specialists sub-contractors
/ consultants, can lead to a major improvement in the assurance of integrity for production
and processing installations. Experience has also shown that the corrosion management
system works best, and in fact can only work well, when it is a live documented system that
is used, reviewed, audited and improved on a regular basis.
Page 25
A1.4 WHY MANAGE CORROSION?
A1.4.1 Safety goals
Loss of hydrocarbon containment or structural failure on oil and gas processing facilities due
to corrosion can result in severe consequences upon safety, the environment, asset value
and company reputation. An analysis of data on offshore hydrocarbon releases reported by
industry has ranked corrosion as the second most frequent initiating factor leading to a loss
of containment. (Failures of joints and flanges rank most frequent.)
Predicting the rate of facility degradation due to corrosion carries an element of
uncertainty. Uncertainty can be reduced by corrosion management systems that combine
both proactive and reactive management measures.
A1.4.2 UK Statutory Compliance
This document is written to provide a paradigm of good practice against which a scheme
can be assessed, as well as constructed, with regard to conformity to UK legislation. UK
legislation is, however, largely 'goal setting', allowing the operator to adopt a suitable
scheme and then demonstrate compliance. It should apply well to schemes for other
jurisdictions provided that regard is also given to any prescriptive measures required by their
regulations.
The current statutory regime applicable to UK offshore installations places a
requirement on the operator as duty holder to maintain the integrity of the facilities, and to
ensure that equipment can be operated safely and a safe working environment maintained.
It requires the creator of the risk (the duty holder) to provide a system of work such that the
risks to health and safety are reduced to 'as low as is reasonably practicable' (ALARP) i.e.
where to do more would incur a grossly disproportionate increase in cost to the reduction
in risk. This requires the operator to assess the risks and plan for appropriate risk control
measures, including the elements of a corrosion management scheme.
UK offshore legislation consists of a hierarchical framework (Figure 14) where each
level provides further detail on how to achieve the fundamental requirement set by the
Health and Safety at Work Act (HSW) for a safe system of work. The regulations provide a
risk based life-cycle approach and prescribe goal-setting requirements i.e. the regulations
define outcomes but not how these are to be achieved. The management of corrosion is
therefore not specifically identified within legislation. However the law implicitly requires
corrosion, as a foreseeable hazard, to be managed such that the risk to health and safety
arising from corrosion is ALARP.
The key UK Health and Safety legislation relevant to corrosion management of
offshore installations is as follows:
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 HSW Act

Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 MHSWR
(SI 1999/3242)
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/3117) OSCR
Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/2306) PUWER
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations DCR
1996 (SI 1996/913)
Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency PFEER
Response) Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/743)
Page 26
HSW Act
1974
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/3242)

Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/3117)
P P
M D P
F U
A C S
E W
R R R
E E
R R
SI 743 SI 738 SI 913 SI 2306 SI 825

1995 1995 1996 1998 1996
ACoPs
Guidance
RAFT OF ONSHORE LEGISLATION NOW APPLICABLE OFFSHORE
H & WSR, COSHH, RIDDOR, DSEAR, EAWR, PPEWR
Figure 14: Schematic of legislative framework for offshore installations

(Diagram courtesy of Lloyd’s Register of Shipping)
For onshore facilities:
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 HSW Act

Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (SI 1992/3242) MHSWR
Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations, 1999 (SI 1999/743) COMAH
Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/128) PSSR
And for pipelines:
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 HSW Act

Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/3242) MHSWR
Pipeline Safety Regulations, 1996 (SI 1996/825) PSR
Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/128) PSSR
Pipelines are subject to the same regulations as offshore installations in respect of those
elements of the pipeline system on the installation and within its safety zone. PSR defines
the interaction with PSSR. The HSW Act provides the overarching requirement to provide a
safe system of work both offshore and onshore. Each of the supporting regulations provides
further specific requirements on discrete aspects which will have impact on corrosion
management; these can be separated into two categories as follows:
Page 27
A1.4.2.1 Risk assessment and management

MHSWR provides general requirements for suitable and sufficient risk assessment and the
subsequent provision of adequate arrangements. It is also provides guidance on the
principles of prevention i.e. the hierarchy of preventive and protective measures in decision
making.
OSCR (offshore) requires a safety case to demonstrate that the risks from major
accident hazards have been evaluated and measures exist to control them. It also places
requirements for independent competent persons to verify that safety critical elements,
namely those parts of an installation that can cause, contribute substantially to, prevent or
limit the effect of a major accident, are suitable and remain in good repair and condition.
COMAH (onshore) requires a safety report that provides information to demonstrate
to the competent authority (HSE for most facilities) that all measures necessary for the
prevention and mitigation of major accidents have been taken. The purposes and contents
of a safety report are set out in Schedule 4 to the Regulations.
PSR requires a 'major accident prevention document' (MAPD) to be produced for
each major accident hazard pipeline. The MAPD is required to demonstrate that risks have
been evaluated and that an adequate safety management plan is in place. This will include
provisions for corrosion management.
A1.4.2.2 Integrity
PUWER provides requirements for the life-cycle integrity of work equipment, whereas DCR
(offshore) focuses on the life-cycle integrity of the structure. PFEER (offshore) places certain
requirements on the suitability and condition of plant relevant to fire and explosion and
escape, evacuation and rescue.
PSSR (onshore) aims to prevent risk of injury from the unintentional release of stored
energy from pressure systems. A main feature of PSSR is a requirement to have a written
scheme of examination (WSE) certified or drawn up by a competent person (CP) setting out
the nature and frequency of examinations in accordance with the degree of risk.
PSR aims to prevent risk of injury from the release of hazardous fluids from the
pipeline.
A1.4.3 Cost benefits
There is an existing recognition by the UK Oil & Gas Industry of both the direct costs of
corrosion mitigation, monitoring and inspection and the indirect costs borne by their
business that can be attributed to inadequate corrosion control and the consequential
impact upon operations.
DIRECT COSTS INDIRECT COSTS
Inspection Increased maintenance

Chemical inhibition Deferred production
Corrosion monitoring Plant non-availability
Coating maintenance Logistics
Figure 15: Examples of direct and indirect costs
Implementing an appropriate corrosion management system that results in the

reduction/elimination of corrosion related deterioration of the asset not only assists in
compliance with regulatory requirements but also has a direct effect on the asset’s overall
economic performance, i.e. provides a 'double pay back'.
Page 28
A2 POLICY AND STRATEGY
A2.1 PURPOSE
This section outlines the basis of a common approach to setting corrosion policy and clear
strategic objectives. A 'policy' is, in principle, permanent, having the authority of the most
senior manager of the unit to which it is intended to apply.
A policy is a directive that specifies aims and objectives and how a major operational
issue should be handled over the longer term. It forms a basis for subsequent detail in terms
of strategies, organisation structures, performance standards, procedures and other
managerial processes. The corrosion strategy is a statement of the methods by which the
policy is implemented.
A2.2 KEY REQUIREMENTS
All organisations will have in place policies and strategies that deal with hazards and risks
associated with safety, health and environmental concerns. They may also have policies and
guidance on strategy in the form of integrity requirements and corrosion management
practice. A corrosion management policy and strategy should be derived from these broader
policies and be in line with them.
Regulatory Corporate technical Corporate corrosion

requirements integrity requirements management practice
Corrosion Management System Document

Corrosion Management Plan
Facility operating procedure: Facility design and

- Operating and emergency construction records
- Maintenance
- Inspection
Figure 16: Example of corporate relationships to a

facility corrosion management system
Corrosion management is also concerned with the preservation of facilities and avoidance
of business interruption and, therefore, policies should also address these issues, as not all
corrosion related failures will also have an impact on safety or the environment.
Successful management of corrosion requires that cost-effective combinations of
various mitigation procedures be employed to minimise risks. The strategic choice of
corrosion control methods for any specific facility depends on factors such as location,
environment, fluid composition, pressures and temperatures, aqueous fluid corrosivity,
facility age and technical culture of the organisation.
Page 29
A2.3 POLICY
Corporate policies must establish clear, high-level objectives. The majority of operators
incorporate their corrosion management policy, either directly or indirectly, within their
overall facility integrity policy. A few operators, however, state specific corrosion
management policies.
Many organisations also further break down their policy statements into more
specific expectations or objectives for each major activity.
'Business units' with responsibility for processing equipment integrity may apply a
general corporate policy for some activities, such as selection of contractors and training, but
then develop specific expectations and objectives for inspection, maintenance and
management of corrosion.
Specific Corrosion Management Policies
– No leaks or emissions
– Minimum 20% reduction of corrosion related failures year on year
– Pursue reduction of emissions and, where reasonably practicable, eliminate them
Figure 17: Examples of policy detail
Establishing Corrosion Policy
– Some operators conduct all activities associated with the setting up and operation of
corrosion management/asset integrity in-house through internal specialist groups, who set
and develop the corrosion policy and the corrosion strategy.
– Other operators appoint specialist contractors to set up the corrosion policy and corrosion
strategy for ratification by the operators. Some operators will appoint a single specialist
contractor to cover all activities, whilst other operators will use different specialists
(internal/external) for specific activities, viz:
- The setting up of the system and procedures

- The operation of the system
- The verification/audit
Figure 18: Examples of policy establishment
Policy statements together with subsequent expectations and objectives form the basis for
management to measure and audit the effectiveness of the organisation.
Companies should also develop 'performance targets / indicators', which are then
used to measure the extent (or otherwise) to which the policy objectives are met.
A2.4 STRATEGY
Corrosion management strategy may differ significantly between new build facilities and
existing or ageing systems. New build provides an opportunity to incorporate all appropriate
current best practice from concept stage through asset or field life whilst options for existing
facilities will be constrained by features of the original design, such as the choice of
materials.
Page 30
The requirement to systematically and continuously plan and implement an

appropriate corrosion management system remains constant. The practicality and economic
impact of different options will depend on the life cycle stage of the facility i.e. new
build/major refurbishment or existing/ageing asset.
Highly corrosive environments and/or 'sour' conditions (that is process fluids
containing moderate to high levels of hydrogen sulphide), for example, may need special
corrosion resistant alloys for specific engineering solutions.
However, application of newer technical developments, for example the use of
specially designed corrosion inhibitors, may enable equipment to perform satisfactorily
outside normally accepted operational windows.
A2.4.1 New build
A2.4.1.1 Design and forward planning

The development plan for a new asset will adopt a policy regarding the required life of the
facilities. A new build design will have a materials and corrosion control strategy that aims
to provide that life. It will identify those elements that are built into the design and the
performance limits on which they are based and the actions required during operation, if
any, to maintain the design intent and operate within the design limits. If there is a choice
then life cycle costing is often employed to determine the choice.
The design should also include equipment for monitoring (e.g. corrosion probe
access fittings and instruments), provision for data gathering (e.g. the recording of relevant
process and monitoring data within the control system historian), and design detailing to
enable inspection (e.g. pipeline pig traps sized for on line inspection vehicles).
A2.4.1.2 Inherent safety

In addition to meeting specific legislative requirements, the strategy may be to encourage
control of risks using the concept of inherent safety. The principles of inherent safety are
more effective at the concept stage and detailed design stages. However, the same
approach should be applied during operations when modifications and repairs are
considered.
Consideration for "New build" facilities
– Explicit treatment at the earliest stages of concept design to eliminate, where possible,
hazards associated with corrosion damage that combine with operational loads to produce
failures; design assessments should look for sites of probable corrosion and consider the
use of corrosion resistant materials or another effective method of corrosion control
– Design to minimise corrosion damage to safety critical items and systems
– Ensure that key support structures for equipment have a high reliability and resistance to
failure, this is important in areas exposed to marine environments and subject to wash
down or regular deluge from tests of firewater mains.
– Selection of locations, configurations and orientations that minimise threats to the integrity
of equipment, viz. design detailing of impingement/wear plates, drainage, and removal of
deadlegs where corrosive conditions develop/chemical treatments are ineffective
– Design to survive local/component failure by maximising redundancy, viz, backup injection
pumps for inhibitor injection systems
– Design to allow more reliable and effective inspection, ensure adequate access for
inspection/monitoring equipment
– Design for maintainability - easy removal of pumps, motors, valves
Figure 19: Examples of consideration for new build
Page 31
Inherent safety requires a barrier to corrosion that is permanent and requires no further
supporting activity. However, in some cases the introduction of an inherently safe barrier to
one threat may introduce another threat, see an example in Figure 20.
A2.4.1.3 Safeguarding integrity

Whether or not the design is based on the concept of inherent safety there will be an
ongoing need to safeguard the barriers to deterioration incorporated by design. Mitigation
measures should be enacted in operation to provide the barriers assumed by the design
strategy.
Example: Subsea pipeline, threat: Internal corrosion
Barrier option A: Inherent resistance by construction in duplex stainless steel.
Additional threat: Brittle fracture from external cathodic overprotection combined with
excessive stress.
Additional operational barrier: Operational control of temperature to avoid overstress from
thermal expansion.
Monitoring against performance target: Temperature.
Barrier option B: Corrosion allowance of low alloy steel pipe.
Additional barriers: Corrosion inhibition to limit the corrosion rate to achieve the desired design
life.
Routine maintenance pigging to remove water accumulation, deposits and bacterial
contamination.
Monitoring against performance target: Wall thickness measurement by on line inspection.
Corrosion rate monitoring. Inhibitor injection rate and up-time monitoring. Pigging frequency.
Option A requires additional capital finance to install duplex stainless steel pipe and subsea
temperature monitoring and alarm system.
Option B requires an operational corrosion management plan to monitor inhibitor injection

and injection rate and to implement scheduled inspection and pigging. It incurs additional
revenue cost for inhibitor and maintenance pigging and for periodic intelligent pig inspection
and capital cost for pigging facilities and for on-line corrosion monitoring.
Figure 20: Examples of strategy options
A2.4.2 Existing Infrastructure
One major factor that will impact on the corrosion management strategy is planned asset
life. Corrosion management strategy should be based on the long-term corporate strategies
and objectives for the production facility and therefore the corrosion risks need to be
appraised against these objectives when planning and implementing corrosion control
activities to meet the required asset life.
Page 32
Impact of Planned Asset Life
A platform had been operated for over four years on the basis of a fixed End of Life based on the
known recoverable reserves. During the period leading up to the expected abandonment limited
inspection and maintenance was carried out - consistent with the planned abandonment date.
Just over a year before the platform was due to be abandoned the decision was taken to bring on a
new marginal field - using extended reach drilling. This, together with other changes in the
production process, meant the platform had an economically viable life extension of more than 6
years.
The benefit, however, of the extended useful life was reduced due to the heavy cost of
maintenance/repair/replacement of components that, because of the operational regime now had
only a limited (less than two year) remaining life.
If the options for the future of the asset had been made known to the relevant groups earlier, a
different operation and maintenance regime would have been incorporated in the years leading up to
the introduction of new field with considerable savings in the overall operational cost over the
remaining life of the platform.
Figure 21: Example of impact of planned asset life
As technology advances, asset life expectancy is increasingly being extended beyond

originally designed time-scales. It is, therefore, important when extending field life beyond
design limits to be able to accurately gauge corrosion control status. Life extension may well
require re-appraisal of corrosion risks and the introduction of major changes to planned
activities.
The corrosion management strategy should agree with the current planned asset
field life. Consequently, future business and operational requirements for an asset should,
where practicable, be made known to those responsible for setting and implementing the
corrosion management strategy and strategic plan, as outlined in the examples below.
Range of Operational Requirements for Existing Facilities
– Assets may be deliberately managed with a limited operational life in mind

– Limited life assets may be operated with reduced maintenance activity
– After operational or financial reviews the asset may have its operational life extended by a
few to many years
– Operational changes include incorporation of new/marginal fields, acting as a hub for
other fields, or enhanced oil recovery
– In the event of asset life extension the asset may only be viable after additional work in
order to meet the corrosion policy.
Figure 22: Example operational requirement of existing facilities
Separation Vessels - New and Existing
Some of the most critical components in offshore oil and gas production are the vessels used to
separate gas, oil and water. In many cases the corrosion conditions are such that carbon manganese
steels alone are not sufficient to ensure adequate operational life.
Various options are available to provide an acceptable life, which include use of internal coatings
and lining, internal cathodic protection and use of corrosion resistant alloys. The selection of the
most appropriate technique will be dependent on whether the corrosion problem is identified before
fabrication or only after operation. In the later case internal cathodic protection can be used
successfully to provide the necessary corrosion control for carbon steel vessels.
Figure 23: Example, strategy for internal protection of vessels
Page 33
A3 ORGANISATION
A3.1 PURPOSE
This section provides a framework for and examples of how a corrosion strategy helps in the
allocation of roles and responsibilities both within the duty holder's organisation and
contractor/sub-contractor organisations.
A3.2 GENERAL
The effectiveness of any policy depends on the leadership, commitment and involvement of
managers and senior staff. Safety and environmental protection are of concern to everyone;
employer, employee and contractor. Cost containment is a common focus. Corrosion should
also be of similar concern. A positive 'health and safety culture' and 'corrosion culture'
means less risk to individuals and less damage to the integrity of a facility.
For organising corrosion management the four key themes are:
— roles, responsibilities and accountabilities;
— competence;
— communication;
— co-operation.
Consideration of all these is vital, particularly for management of complex multi-disciplinary

areas, like corrosion management, which may well involve non-specialist engineers. There
are many different ways operators can organise and the management of corrosion can be
addressed in many ways. However, a common theme will be the involvement of both
specialists, e.g. corrosion, chemical treatment, inspection, etc, and non specialists such as
those in plant operations and maintenance.
A3.3 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A3.3.1 Roles
The following key roles should be addressed. Note that these are role titles. Companies may
use different post titles for these roles and may combine two or more of these roles into one
post. They may also have allocated other roles to similar post titles:
Operations manager:
The operations manager has overall responsibility for the integrity of the installation, and as
such, must ensure that suitable effective arrangements are put in place to manage corrosion
and undertake monitoring and inspection. Ensures resource for operational activities and
leads operations management. Maintains operating and emergency procedures. Ensures
sufficient budget is available to meet the requirements of the corrosion management system
and associated corrosion/inspection management strategies.
Engineering and maintenance team leader:

The engineering and maintenance team leader is responsible for maintenance activity on the
facility. This includes providing the necessary support (access, entry, cleaning, etc.), onshore
and offshore, to ensure that corrosion monitoring/inspection activities can be carried out in
accordance with the plan. Also ensures that the necessary remedial work is carried out.
Page 34
Integrity manager/team leader:

A larger asset or group of assets may have a integrity manager or team leader who will be
responsible for managing the work programme of a team of integrity engineers and
technical specialists. The manager/team leader will have overall responsibility for the delivery
of the integrity management programme and for the maintenance of integrity management
standards and effectiveness.
Integrity engineer:
The integrity engineer is responsible for the approval and ownership of RBI assessments
including changes and associated inspection intervals. Approves work packs and inspection
recommendations. Is responsible for the management of the inspection contract. Interfaces
with support services required to implement inspection. Reviews corrosion and inspection
reports and disseminates information to the onshore/offshore engineering team, as
necessary. Raises Repair Orders resulting from inspection. Manages the inspection budget.
Maintains integrity documentation and databases. Commissions audit and review of the
inspection management contract.
Inspection engineer:
The inspection engineer is responsible for the preparation of inspection work packs, the
thorough examination of equipment, the supervision of NDT, survey and testing, reporting
on inspections and analysis of inspection results. Depending on competence inspection
engineers may also take responsibility for contributions to RBI planning and the development
of non-intrusive inspection schemes. Responsible for ensuring that the RBI results are
transferred into the planned maintenance system along with appropriate inspection
specification text for the routine.
Materials and corrosion technical authority:

The technical authority (TA) for materials and corrosion evaluates the effectiveness of the
strategy primarily in terms of corrosion prevention and safety issues but also including cost
and field life implications. To do this attends tactical and strategic review meetings and peer
reviews. Acts as a key source of technical advice on corrosion issues to the asset
management on the material degradation aspects of plant, processes, structures and
pipelines. Promotes a consistent approach to management of corrosion across all assets.
Facilitates shared learning sessions. Technical custodian of the relevant safety management
system (SMS) documents. Facilitates the key requirements of the engineering technical
practices to ensure compliance. Approves deviations from corporate standards.
Corrosion engineer:
The corrosion engineer is responsible for corrosion data management and associated
databases. Reviews corrosion related monitoring/inspection findings. Carries out
investigations and prepares reports as required. Generates annual corrosion monitoring
programmes. Reviews and updates pipework RBI as necessary. Populates requirements from
RBI into the inspection database to allow work pack preparation. Reviews changes in the
operating conditions and proposed plant modifications and assesses their impact upon fluid
corrosivity. Recommends and manages specialist services as necessary, (e.g. microbiological
surveys, failure investigations). Produces annual and quarterly integrity reviews. Responsible
for performance monitoring of inhibitor deployment and status of probes and coupons.
Production chemist/chemical treatment specialist:

The production chemist is responsible for selection and dosage rates of chemicals used to
treat the production systems offshore. Sets up trials for selection. Conducts tests of
compatibility with other chemicals. Monitors chemical usage. Establishes effectiveness from
production report data.
Page 35
Microbiologist:
The microbiologist is responsible for setting up treatment schemes and sampling and
analysis schemes, for the interpretation of analysis results, etc.
Production engineer:
An engineer responsible for management production. Sets targets for well performance and
advises choke settings. Manages well workovers and downhole treatment. Manages sand
production.
Operations engineer/process engineer:

An engineer responsible for process and utility plant performance. Sets target for plant
performance and advises on settings. Monitors plant performances. Advises on temporary
operating schemes, isolations, etc. Process engineer also advises process design
improvement for troubleshooting and debottlenecking and advises on process safety
requirements.
Technicians and technical assistants:

Technicians are responsible for implementing skilled technical activities. These include non
destructive examination (NDE), corrosion monitoring servicing, onshore and offshore
cathodic protection surveys, coating condition surveys, chemical and bacterial sampling and
analysis, etc. Technical assistants assist engineers with data entry and data management,
document management and compilation, etc.
Job descriptions should be written so that the mandatory and preferred qualifications and
experience are clearly specified and so that the accountability and scope of responsibility of
each team member are unambiguous. An organigram should be drawn up to identify lines
of accountability
Design
information
Operational
Integrity Manager information
Reporting lines
Maintenance
Data flow information
Inspection
Integrity Engineer information
On-line
monitoring
information
Fluid
Corrosion/materials
Corrosion Engineer Production Engineer sampling
technical authority information
Process
monitoring
information
Operations Engineer Production Chemist
Figure 24: Example of organisational relationships
Page 36
A3.3.2 Responsibility
The roles and responsibilities of the corrosion team members in the planning and
implementation of corrosion management activities should be clearly defined.
The following aspects should be considered:
— operational responsibility for implementation;
— functional responsibility and technical authority for specification, analysis and
recommendation, and
— responsibility and authority to be exercised by contracted bodies.
Responsibility should be allocated in all key areas, e.g.:

— corrosion inhibition. Chemical treatment specialist specifies dosing. Operations
manage dosing;
— use of corrosion resistant alloys. Corrosion/materials engineer specifies;
— corrosion prediction. Corrosion engineer makes predictions;
— cathodic protection. Corrosion engineer specifies monitoring scheme. On land
maintenance do weekly checks, contract out survey. Subsea the pipeline engineer
contracts survey, and
— microbiologically influenced corrosion problems, etc. Chemical treatment specialist
contracts testing.
These are examples. In different organisations different post holders will carry out similar
roles. The important thing is to ensure that all responsibilities are unambiguously allocated.
A3.3.3 Authority
A technical authority for corrosion should be identified and the strategy that is adopted
should describe the links between the parties involved with corrosion management. This is
particularly important where alliances between owner, contractor and specialist sub-
contractors and consultants exist.
A3.4 COMPETENCE
Many decisions and judgements made in managing corrosion in oil and gas production are
safety related. This makes it vital that personnel are fully competent to make those decisions
and judgements.
Personnel should always be aware of their own competencies and should not
engage in making decisions and judgements in areas where they do not have adequate
knowledge.
Management must always look to engage suitably competent personnel.
A3.4.1 Key competencies
The competence requirements for the following key roles should be addressed:
— Technical authority:
– comprehensive knowledge of corrosion management standards and
practices and their application within the organisation. Appropriate
professional qualification, education, and training.
— Integrity team leader/manager:
– knowledge and understanding of the roles, responsibilities and corrosion
management structure operated by the organisation;
Page 37
– experienced in successful review of processes and procedures;

– experience of corrosion risk assessment and corrosion management
techniques used offshore and is able to apply them;
– knowledge of inspection methods, their application and limitations, and
– appropriate professional qualification, education, and training.
— Corrosion/materials engineer:
– familiar with relevant standards and specifications;
– can identify, justify and apply measures required to minimise risks from
corrosion;
– has experience of corrosion risk assessments, and
– appropriate professional qualification, education, and training.
Professional qualification, education and training are discussed below.
A3.4.2 Competence system
The competence system should:

— be verifiable by audit of training, the recruitment process, personnel development
and formal performance assessment;
— provide demonstrable capability of staff within their pre-defined and agreed job
descriptions;
— define agreed levels of competence to be achieved;
— be based upon, equivalent to or better than a nationally or industry-recognised
technical standard;
— be current with respect to the physical plant and management systems in
operation, and
— provide for and include third-party contractors.
[2]
Competency Guidelines
A good example for determining the level of competence required for a particular activity, as well as
the degree of competence provided by individuals, has been developed by the HSE, Institution of
Engineering Technology and the British Computer Society[9] which could be adapted for use in the
offshore oil and gas industry to apply to corrosion management issues.
Figure 25: Example, competency system guidelines
The competence system should retain records of assessment and supporting documents,
accessible for the purposes of audit and/or review.[3]
The availability of standards for the competence of personnel in the roles across the
corrosion management structure is also important. There is considerable variation in
availability and formality:
Technical authority and the integrity team leader competencies:

The technical authority and the integrity team leader should have appropriate professional
standing through education and experience, as discussed below. Professional qualification
should be in an appropriate discipline, preferably at the UK Chartered Engineer level [4] as
well as in the corrosion discipline where that level is not available. Experience extending to
five or more years is usually necessary to achieve the necessary level of competence but even
then the experience must be appropriate to the area of technical authority.
Page 38
Corrosion engineer competencies:

In Europe there are no institutions providing degree level academic qualifications in
corrosion technology. It is therefore appropriate to develop competence through:
— a relevant first degree;
— education in general corrosion science and technology at a post graduate level,
and,
— experience in oil and gas corrosion technology.
The first degree should be a science or engineering qualification with significant relevant
corrosion related content (i.e. corrosion itself, corrosion resistance of materials,
electrochemistry). The most appropriate subjects are materials, chemical engineering and
chemistry.
A number of UK postgraduate courses provide education in general corrosion
science and technology over a year full time for an MSc (by examination and dissertation)
or post graduate diploma (by examination only). Courses may be available on a distance
learning and/or part time basis, albeit over an extended study period. NACE International[5]
operates internationally recognised senior corrosion technologist and corrosion specialist
qualifications, based on a process of examinations and peer review, following specialist
courses and self study.
It is possible to gain knowledge of general corrosion science and technology over
a period of time through work experience and/or in association with MSc and PhD degrees
by research and thesis. Training courses extending to one or two weeks are available from
a number of sources that cover a basic introduction to corrosion science and engineering
and can, therefore, provide an entrance to the subject. Rather more classroom training can
be acquired using university courses on a modular basis where available.
Experience in oil and gas corrosion technology is normally gained through work
experience. Some of the short courses on offer specialise in oil and gas corrosion and
provide an introduction.
Particularly where both general and oil and gas corrosion knowledge are gained
through experience, rather than formal examined postgraduate study, competence needs
to be assessed in a structured manner, normally under the control of a corrosion technical
authority. It will probably require around two years’ structured experience to gain adequate
general corrosion knowledge plus a further two years for oil and gas corrosion knowledge.
However, these timescales are only indicative and assessment must be used to ensure that
fully appropriate competence has been acquired.
Where qualifications are held and experience has been gained then specific topic
relevance has to be taken into consideration e.g. an authority in, say internal corrosion, may
not be competent in some aspects of the cathodic protection of subsea facilities.
Professional qualifications for corrosion specialists are provided in the UK by the
Institute of Corrosion[6], in their Professional Member grades (MICorr or FICorr). Whilst these
demonstrate the possession of a level of knowledge in corrosion technology they do not
guarantee a broad general understanding or oil and gas specific knowledge.
Inspection engineering and NDT technician competencies:

The HSE in its guidance for the Pressure System Safety Regulations [7], and the United
Kingdom Accreditation[8] Service both give requirements for the qualification and experience
of inspection engineers engaged in developing inspection schemes for pressure systems and
conducting inspection and interpreting the results. These are expanded upon by EEMUA[9]
in their guidance document. Generally they can be taken as the minimum for inspection
engineering personnel working within the oil and gas production industry.
The requirements for NDT vocational technician qualification are well developed in
some areas and are well described by various national and international standards and codes
of practice, for ASNT[10], CSWIP[11], PCN[12] qualifications. However these NDT qualifications
together with their associated training and tests have all been developed for application to
fabrication. Therefore, not all practitioners are competent to apply their skills to the
detection and quantification of in-service corrosion defects. Therefore, technician
competence should be verified by tests and/or review of work in the in-service context.
Page 39
Operator and management competencies for corrosion related responsibilities:

Some roles do not require specific corrosion and inspection related skill, for instance the
operations team members and supervisors who are responsible for chemical injection, gas
drying operation, etc. Similarly nor do some managers who are accountable for some of the
specialist activity but do not undertake it themselves. In these instances a corrosion
awareness programme (see A3.5) can be used to provide staff with background knowledge
and foster an understanding of the criticality of their roles to corrosion management. Also
short courses on specialist topics and oil and gas corrosion can be used. It is important,
however, in both cases that the content is targeted to provide the right messages.
In addition to the need for personnel to have technical skills appropriate to their
role, and knowledge and understanding of the area for which they are responsible, it is
necessary that they possess appropriate behavioural skills relating to, for example,
appropriate attention to detail, interpersonal skills and problem solving abilities.
Once the necessary skills, expertise and experience for each role have been defined,
the development of individual training plans and ongoing assessment of personnel are
essential. This ensures that the competence of individuals is appropriate for their current
role. It also enables the requirements for further training to be identified, not just for the
current role but also for personal development into future roles and for professional and
technical development.
A3.5 COMMUNICATION
The corrosion management team (see A3.6.1) is a key vehicle for communication between
the key players. All appropriate team members should be involved in sharing of information
from analysis of corrosion incidents:[13]
— root cause analysis;
— process metallurgical reviews, and
— identified implications for other areas on the plant.
Communication within the operator’s organisation as a whole, and with its relevant
contractors, is also highly important to achieve understanding and obtain support in meeting
objectives. Corrosion management depends not only on those that have direct responsibility
for corrosion management activities but also other engineering and operations personnel,
on procurement, finance and human resource functions and on management at large. An
ongoing corrosion awareness initiative can be used by the technical specialists and the
corrosion management team to communicate with the organisation as a whole.
Corrosion Awareness
The use of Corrosion Awareness training programmes, aimed at the non-specialist, has been found
to improve overall levels of corrosion performance. An inspection technician, maintenance operator
or process chemist, who has a better understanding of corrosion and material degradation, including
how it manifests itself, what causes it and the different options for control, ensures that:
– Signs of corrosion/damage are recognised at an early stage - allowing remedial measures

to be put in place before damage requires major work
– The reasons for the detailed requirements for inspection and monitoring are better
understood - improving efficiency and cooperation
– The effects of corrosion control measures are better understood - again improving
efficiency and co-operation
Figure 26: Example, corrosion awareness
Page 40
The workforce should also be involved. The workforce are the eyes and ears around the
installation. Their involvement is important particularly for external corrosion. There are many
ways to communicate to the workforce:
— safety meetings;
— poster campaigns, notice boards and leaflets, and
— videos, newsletters and presentations.
Corrosion awareness training for the workforce should concentrate on the recognition of
corrosion problems and guidance on significance. There should also be guidance on the
effective reporting of problems, see the discussion on corrosion damage reporting in the
section on implementation and analysis, A5.3.3.
A3.6 CO-OPERATION
A3.6.1 Corrosion management team
The corrosion management team is a key concept for the development of co-operation. In
an operation of any size many parts of the organisation will play an important part in
corrosion management. For that reason it is appropriate to form a corrosion management
team (CMT) to mutually own the corrosion management process and foster cooperation in
making it work effectively. The CMT will meet routinely usually with the responsible integrity
manager in the chair and the corrosion engineer providing the technical and administrative
support. The rest of the team may include:
— a production representative, to provide information on well performance and well
operations;
— an operations or maintenance representative, to provide information on plant
operation and performance issues;
— an inspection representative, to provide a summary of inspection results and
information on anomalies;
— the chemical treatment specialist, to provide information on the treatment
programme, and
— subsea and pipeline engineers, to provide information on subsea inspection results
and anomalies.
Some of these players may be operator’s staff and some may be from service contractors or
specialist suppliers.
A team may be set up for one asset or field or alternatively for a group of assets.
It depends largely on how the individual assets and asset groups are supported
organisationally, internally and by service contractors and suppliers. In organisations that
have central or group level support for corrosion then the central/group specialist can be
represented on the local team to bring in wider knowledge and learning from other assets
and areas.
Co-operation is important in corrosion management particularly as it is cross-
functional and, with the common use of service contractors and specialist suppliers, it is also
cross-organisational.
Relationships that are key for co-operation should be shown on the organigram.
Page 41
Corrosion management team Team members should be aware of

the main corrosion issues and of
their responsibilities in resolving them
Integrity
Manager
Integrity Corrosion
Engineer Engineer
Corrosion
management
Corrosion/materials team meeting Operations
technical authority Engineer
Production Inspection Production

Chemist Engineer Engineer
Team meetings should be led by the Integrity Manager who has sufficient seniority
Figure 27: Example of corrosion management team formation
A3.6.2 Change management
An important area of cooperation is the control and management of change. The operator
must have a process and procedure to manage engineering change and also certain process
changes such as changes in operating mode or in instrument set points.
Changes like new wells, new secondary recovery methods, changes in flow rates
(both up and down), changes in chemical or process treatment and changes in temperature
and pressure all have a potential impact on corrosivity.
It is important that changes are seen as potentially having an impact on corrosion
severity and that the corrosion discipline should be brought into the loop for consultation
through the formal documented process of change management.
The corrosion awareness programme should be used to highlight the types of
change that can affect corrosion rates and cause accelerated failure (e.g. corrosion stress
cracking).
Process Modification
A real example of what can go wrong with Process Modifications occurred on an ageing production
system where, due to increasing water cut, it was decided to change the system from a 3-phase
separator (i.e. oil, water and gas) to a 2-phase separator (i.e. oil-water emulsion and gas) process.
This resulted in oil-water emulsion passing through pipework that had been originally manufactured
in carbon steel, on the basis that essentially only dry oil would be present.
The change in process had been made without reference to corrosion/materials engineers and
without reference to the original design assumptions used in the material selection.
Significant corrosion was subsequently found in the pipework downstream of the separators and
upstream of the corrosion inhibitor injection point
The solution finally adopted was to move the inhibitor injection point to immediately downstream of
the separators and to increase the inhibitor dosage significantly.
Figure 28: Example, impact of process change on corrosion
Page 42
In addition to others being aware of the need to involve the corrosion specialists, the
corrosion and integrity role holders must also know how the operator’s change
management process works and must be able to use it effectively when proposing
improvement changes in corrosion mitigation.
A3.7 CONTRACT SERVICES
Most operators contract out at least part of their corrosion management activity and there
are many different scopes defined and contractual relationships agreed. Examples that have
been implemented include:
— full corrosion and inspection management services with the operator having just a
small number of integrity engineers to provide the customer interface and in-house
corrosion consultants to provide specialist support;
— integrated corrosion and inspection management team under the management
control of the client, and
— chemical treatment programme management covering the use of both the
supplier’s and competitor’s chemicals and including specialist advice and provision
of database facilities.
All four of the key themes have relevance to the success of the operator/contractor
relationship in producing an effective corrosion management outcome.
Ideally organigrams should show lines of accountability and co-operation involving
contract posts.
A3.7.1 Roles, responsibility and accountability in contract services
With respect to roles, responsibility and accountability, it is important that the respective
roles, responsibilities and authorities of the operator and contractor are defined. Where both
parties have a management system in place the agreement should define which is to be
used and whether, for instance, documentation is issued in operator or contractor format
and whose databases and record systems are to be used.
A3.7.2 Competence in contract services
Competence has relevance to both the contractor’s organisation and the contractor’s
personnel.
Corporate competence can be demonstrated in some respects by Quality
Management System certification to ISO 9001, and in respect of inspection body
competence by UKAS accreditation[14]. The First Point Assessment organisation (FPAL)[15]
manages a database of supplier capability, conducts assessments and provides facilities for
ongoing assessment through client feedback. All these can provide valuable information on
the contractor’s corporate competence but, as with personnel, the scope of the competence
has to be relevant to the scope of intended responsibility.
However, there is no standard demonstration of corporate competence in corrosion
related skills. Operators intending to employ a contractor to provide corrosion management
or corrosion consultancy services should have regard to the following:
— are the personnel to be employed servicing the contract competent by virtue of

education and experience?
— is there back-up support from a wider scope of skills and is there coaching and
support from more experienced personnel when necessary?
Page 43
— is there a training programme in place and do personnel have individual training

and development plans that have regard to the contract requirements?
— is there a certified quality management system in place and has the contractor
developed procedures conforming to that quality system that will be applied on the
contract?
The requirements for contractor’s staff are the same as for operator’s staff and the operator
should ensure that the contractor either has a sound competence assurance system or they
should assess the competence of contractor’s staff themselves.
The impact of the contract terms on the contractor’s team competence should be
carefully considered. The ability to employ personnel at a given level of competence may be
influenced significantly by the remuneration on offer. In a contract situation this in turn will
depend on the rates in the contract and the margin that the contractor is seeking to obtain.
In one example, the operator agrees the remuneration of personnel with the contractor and
provides an agreed margin for burdens and profit and therefore has control over these
factors.
A3.7.3 Communication in contract services
Communication may require particular effort especially if the operator and contractor are
physically separated in different offices. A decision has to be made whether to co-locate the
contractor’s and operator’s personnel and if not how to overcome communication issues.
Many operators have benefited from hosting contractor personnel in the office-based
management team where they can directly interact and share access to intranet, file server
and database resources. In other cases it has been possible to use remote access methods
to share these resources and also use video links and conference call techniques to engage
the contractor.
Whatever the methods involved it is important that the contractor’s personnel can
perform effectively in their roles. In particular, appropriate contractor personnel must be part
of the corrosion management team.
A3.7.4 Co-operation in contract services
In achieving co-operation regard should be given to aligning the aims of the contractor and
the operator. Most contractors will find it in their interest to share the operator’s aims with
regard to safety and mechanical integrity as one successful contract in this respect will help
secure others. It is this win-win outcome that facilitates effective co-operation.
Page 44
A4 CORROSION RISK ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING
A4.1 PURPOSE
Planning and implementation are the largest single part of any corrosion management
process.
Planning is the foundation of an ordered and purposeful corrosion management
programme and corrosion risk assessment is used to identify and prioritise the elements of
the plan.
A4.2 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Identification of hazards, the assessment of risks and agreement on the planned activities
to mitigate those risks and monitor for effective implementation are a fundamental
requirement of the management process. Plans must relate to the policy and any strategy
already determined.
Planning and implementation often make use of company guidelines, industry
codes and international standards. Checks are needed to determine whether they are
appropriate and effective for each particular asset.
The ownership of actions and responsibilities relating to the corrosion management
plan are vital to successful operation. As part of this process the operator should keep
appropriate records of planning and implementation to allow full transparency of the
process.
In some instances this information may be incorporated into an offshore UK
production facility’s safety case and verification scheme, which normally forms the basis for
all integrity management requirements and specifications. No corrosion management plan
for an offshore installation should be developed without reference to the verification scheme
to ensure that the two are in alignment.
Similarly, the plan for a UK onshore terminal should be aligned to relevant
provisions of its COMAH Major Accident Prevention Policy and Safety Report and plans for
UK pipelines should align to the Major Accident Prevention Document required by the
Pipeline Safety Regulations.
A4.3 CORROSION RISK ASSESSMENT
Planning should commence with a formal process to identify the components on a facility
that have a risk of degradation due to corrosion. The most common approach to this is to
conduct a corrosion risk assessment.
A corrosion risk assessment is a formal review that identifies the probability of a
corrosion-related failure and its consequences relating to the loss of containment and the
consequential hazards should a failure occur.
The purpose of the corrosion risk assessment is to rank the static equipment in
relation to their corrosion risks and make it possible to identify options to, remove, mitigate
or manage the risks. It is, therefore, a necessary precursor to strategic planning.
In the operational phase of the asset life cycle the primary intent of the corrosion
risk assessment is to guide the inspection and corrosion monitoring activities in order to
track planned or known deterioration and to detect and measure unplanned corrosion
problems. The corrosion risk assessment is also used as the initial step for risk based
inspection systems, which are covered further in A4.4.2.
Page 45
Corrosion risk is normally expressed as the product of the probability of corrosion related
failure and the consequences of such a failure, (as shown in Figure 29), where:
— probability of failure is estimated based upon the types of corrosion damage
expected to occur on a component, and
— consequence of failure is measured against the impact of such a failure evaluated
against a number of criteria, which as a minimum would include safety,
environmental and operational impacts, which would result should a loss of
containment occur.
Corrosion risk assessments can be carried out at two levels:

— a high-level 'system' assessment which groups together components, which are
constructed from the same materials and are subjected to the same process and
operating conditions;
— a more detailed assessment, which looks at the vulnerability of specific
components.
External threat Hazard

- Material type - To personnel
- Environment - To the environment
- Process conditions
Risk = probability x consequences
Internal threat Operations

- Type of material - Time to repair
- Process conditions - Extent of shutdown
- History
Figure 29: Basis of corrosion risk assessment
In each case the process facilities should be assessed for risks on the basis of:
— internal corrosion threat;
— external corrosion threat;
— safety/hazard consequence;
— environmental consequence, and
— operability consequence.
Ideally the corrosion risk assessment identifies the corrosion/degradation threats to each
item of process equipment, assesses the remaining life, and feeds the information back into
the overall risk assessment and control system. The corrosion risk assessment may also be
used to assign priorities for corrosion monitoring and corrosion management procedures,
including input into risk based inspection (RBI) planning.
As part of any corrosion risk assessment, the sensitivity of the different parameters
(e.g. CO2, H2S, temperature, pressure, flow rate, water cut, etc.) to the predicted corrosion
rate should be assessed. This will allow identification of the more critical parameters, where
closer attention to changes (in some cases even small changes) over the facilities operational
life may be required. Increasingly Monte Carlo analysis methods are being applied to the
predicted conditions, to identify the likely range and distribution of corrosion over the range
of operating conditions. This allows a more reasonable approach to assessing risk, rather
than relying on worst-case scenarios.
Page 46
The corrosion risk assessment requires the input of current knowledge of the
facility’s operating parameters and operating mode, its current design, as well as its original
design, its history of failure and metal loss and a current understanding of consequences of
failure for the plant. To do this it is necessary to assemble up to date design and operating
information, and inspection and monitoring history. The assembly and initial assessment of
the data and the generation of corrosion rate predictions will generally be completed by the
corrosion engineer. The ranking of corrosion threats and the consequences of failure should,
however, involve a team that will include, at least:
— the corrosion engineer;
— an inspection representative, with knowledge of inspection history, and
— operations representative(s) with knowledge of current facility operation and
consequences of failure.
This will not only ensure that the information inputs are correct but will also improve the
operation’s buy-in to the risk assessment and also the risk based inspection programme that
will normally follow from it.
The corrosion risk assessment model should ideally be maintained live throughout
the asset life, and requires regular review of the data employed and the assumptions used.
The results of the corrosion monitoring and inspection activities should be fed back into the
corrosion risk assessment model to validate its assumptions, or modify them accordingly.
Review during a period of changing conditions will ensure the risk ranking remains valid.
Review during a period of stable conditions will allow the basis assumptions to be refined,
often justifying a reduction of conservatism and reducing the risk rating of items.
Annual Review/Annual Validation
For non-stable process conditions detailed re-assessment would normally be required at least
annually.
However, for stable process conditions, with good historical trend data, the regular (annual) review
could consist of simply validating the process conditions and that the assumptions used in the
corrosion risk assessment are still valid, rather than running the entire risk assessment every time.
Figure 30: Review of risk assessment
Minimise High Risk
Case examples exist where, by running the corrosion risk assessment several times during the first
few years’ operation of an asset (based on a better understanding of the actual - as opposed to
assumed - conditions) has resulted in progressively fewer items being considered as "high-risk", thus
reducing the requirements for inspection.
For example, the percentage of topside components that were categorised as a Grade 1 risk for a
new platform changed from first oil over a seven year period was:
Year Comments % of Cat 1 Risk

1993 First oil 53%
1997 Second CRA review 39%
1998 Third CRA review (18 months later) 26%
2000 Fourth CRA review 20%
Figure 31: Example of reduction of risk ranking
Page 47
A4.4 PLANNING
Planning and Implementation constantly and rapidly influence one another through the
internal flow of information. This constant "self regulation" works within the overall
framework (Figure 6 and Figure 8).
A4.4.1 Strategic planning
Corrosion management planning should be based on the corporate, long-term strategies

and objectives for the production facility and the results of the corrosion risk assessment.
If a corrosion threat cannot be removed, which is usually achieved through a
change to the design then it has to be mitigated by a barrier. Mitigation is achieved through
the use of different materials, application of coatings, cathodic protection and chemical
inhibition. Management of corrosion risks is achieved through the introduction of a
mitigation, corrosion monitoring and inspection programme.
Planning in the corrosion management process occurs on two levels. The first is
strategic planning that is the identification of the necessary operational activities that
provide barriers to mitigate against corrosion failure together with the activities that measure
the success of those barriers.
This planning process produces the strategic mitigation, monitoring and inspection
plan. It can be published as a set of matrices that account for:
— the safety related item identity;
— the corrosion threat type;
— the consequences of mitigation failure;
— the location of the threat, barrier and monitoring activity;
— the barrier/mitigation activity;
— the measurement method for the effectiveness of the barrier;
— the performance limit for that measurement;
— the monitoring activity;
— the frequency of monitoring, or the basis on which frequency should be
determined;
— responsibility for mitigation and monitoring;
— the action on non-conformity to the performance standard, and
— responsibility for action on non-conformity.
Also document references (to the engineering design, the basis of design, corporate and
national standards that have been adopted, etc,) must be added for the performance limit,
the monitoring method and frequency and the immediate action procedure following non-
conformity.
Performance limits should define acceptance/rejection criteria for the system or
component. The standard should be sufficiently quantitative such that it can be measured
consistently.
In practice elements of the plan will have been determined during the design phase
and the plan should derive from the materials and corrosion strategies developed as the
basis for design.
The strategic plan may be part of a larger plan that considers other types of integrity
threat. In UK operations it must be aligned, offshore, with the verification scheme, onshore,
to the COMAH safety plan and, for pipelines, to the major accident prevention document.
Often a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) or a safety assessment is developed and
used as a basis for design, or for integrity assurance in operation. In such cases the strategic
plan should be aligned not only to the threats identified in the QRA or safety assessment but
also to assumptions regarding barriers/mitigation that have been assumed as the basis for
Page 48
the QRA or safety assessment. This should initially be done at the design stage but as both
documents may be revised due to changes in operation the alignment should be maintained.
A4.4.2 Tactical planning and scheduling
The second level of planning is the planning and scheduling of detailed and specific
monitoring and inspection activities and events where the first level plan has indicated the
basis of frequency.
For instance, one item of the strategic plan may require all pipework and vessel
metal loss not to exceed the design corrosion allowance. Risk based inspection planning will
then take individual vessels and pipework corrosion loops/circuits one by one to determine
the required inspection interval for each.
Offshore verification activities and planned inspection should be scheduled together
where joint witnessing is required.
Risk based inspection:

These planning activities are mainly the risk based approaches to ensure that inspection is
scheduled at appropriate intervals.
Risk based inspection (RBI) schemes are a planning tool used to develop the
optimum plan for the execution of inspection activities. RBI uses the findings from a formal
risk analysis, such as a corrosion risk assessment, to guide the direction and emphasis of the
inspection planning and the physical inspection procedures.
A risk based approach to inspection planning is used to:
— ensure risk is reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable;
— optimise the inspection schedule;
— focus inspection effort onto the most critical areas, and
— identify and use the most appropriate methods of inspection.
The RBI methodology takes the criticality ranking (i.e. the risk of corrosion) and a grade,
which is a rating of confidence in the knowledge of the equipment item condition and of
the corrosion process, and combines them to produce an inspection interval. The interval is
therefore restricted if little is known so it increases the assurance that inspection is carried
out before deterioration is excessive.
The key features of RBI are examined in detail by HSE report CRR 363/2001, Best
practice for risk based inspection as a part of plant integrity management .[16] Therefore,
details will not be discussed here.
Risk based inspection methodologies are also well described in published
documents such as API 581[17] or Det Norske Veritas RP G-10 [18] and these have been
adopted by many operators.
A4.4.3 Work planning
Work planning requires the scheduling and integrating of the mitigation, inspection and
monitoring activities within the overall asset strategy, and identifying the preferred
deployment of mitigation inspection and monitoring resources and technology.
Planned and scheduled activities are best triggered as part of the organisation’s
normal work management processes. For instance:
— process plant inspection activities, cathodic protection monitoring activities and
monitoring equipment servicing often reside as routines and events in planned
maintenance databases;
— instrument output such as temperatures and gas dew point, are programmed into
the DCS;
Page 49
— manually managed inhibitor injection is included in operation instructions.
As a result, corrosion management is not a standalone process and the scheduling of

activities is integrated with the operations and maintenance plans for any particular facility.
Work planning leads on to the development of work scopes and work packs for
campaigns activities in the implementation process.
A4.4.4 Resource planning
The work plans identify or imply both the personnel and physical resources needed for
implementation.
Elements of the plan determined during the design phase should lead to the design
and construction of physical resources, e.g. inhibitor injection, gas drying and measurement
instrumentation.
Resources needed to execute the plan in the operational phase must be put in place
and include:
— the operator’s organisation and personnel. This will need to be integrated with the
resources needed by plans for technical support to other assets and plans for other
operational and maintenance activities;
— contracts for support personnel and specialist services, e.g. inspection, cathodic
protection survey fabric maintenance, scaffolding, cleaning, etc, and
— equipment and spares needed for the operator’s own servicing activities.
Adequate planning processes need to be in place to manage the supply of personnel and
equipment to meet demands. Where inspection tasks require shutdown, or work at height
or over the side and sub sea, offshore, long term planning and commitment are essential
to secure the required resource so that inspection and fabric maintenance activities are not
delayed. Plans in the oil & gas industry can change with little notice, e.g. an unplanned
shutdown may bring forward the opportunity to carry out an inspection. Planning must
include a process to accommodate this.
A4.4.5 Methods and procedures
The corrosion management system should be described in a document with the same
content as this document but describing the particular policies, strategies, organisation,
plans, implementation processes, review and audit adopted for the facility’s operation.
Following on from this the detailed techniques and procedures to be used and
followed during the implementation phase should be clearly identified and developed.
Written procedures are required for all aspects of implementation of the corrosion
management plans in order to ensure consistency in the data collection, definition of criteria
on non-conformance and specification of clear lines of authority and reporting.
Page 50
Procedure Notes
Preparation of a pressure system for inspection Specifying and implementing cleaning, access,
etc.
Vessels, tanks and heat exchanger inspection
Pipework inspection Visual inspection of pipework
Pipework corrosion monitoring surveys Wall thickness measurement of pipework
Topsides deck, riser and caisson inspection
Underwater structural inspection
Fabric maintenance survey Survey of coating condition
Corrosion under insulation assessments
Erosion monitoring Regular wall thickness measurements in critical
locations
Corrosion monitoring servicing Removing and processing coupons, replacing
probes, downloading data from local storage, etc.
Collection and interpretation of chemical analysis data
Cathodic protection surveys
Inspection reporting Recording
Urgent reporting of non-conforming plant Reporting of anomalies requiring immediate
action
Corrosion and materials damage reporting
Identification and implementation of corrosion
Inhibition
Root cause analysis of corrosion failures
Annual corrosion status review and follow-up
Records administration Organising paper records
Corrosion monitoring databases Use of databases
Figure 32: Example of procedures for an offshore platform
Page 51
A5 IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A5.1 PURPOSE
Planning and implementation form the largest single part of any corrosion management
process.
Implementation is the means to the realisation of the corrosion management plan.
Successful implementation of the strategic and tactical plans depends on bringing the
required resources (e.g. equipment and competent personnel) together with suitable
instructions for the implementation task and the reporting requirement. It is heavily
dependent on personnel performance and all the organisational elements come into play.
Planning and Implementation constantly and rapidly influence one another through
the internal flow of information. This constant 'self regulation' works within the overall
framework (Figure 6 and Figure 8).
A5.3 IMPLEMENTATION
A5.3.1 Instructions
Planned tasks should be implemented through instructions written into, for instance:
— planned maintenance routines;
— operating instructions;
— measurement programmed into the plant control system;
— work packs and procedures for inspection activities, and
— instructions and work packs for the execution of service activities.
Planned maintenance routines:
These are the details of activities that are scheduled in the Planned Maintenance (PM)
database. The routine should either contain all the instruction required to define the activity
to the technician who carries it out or it should refer to appropriate procedures and work
instructions. If the routine stands alone it is important that it contains the performance limit
and instructions on the immediate action to be taken if the limit is exceeded.
PM routines are used for a wide variety of corrosion management activities and use
of the PM system is preferred because the database will usually automatically issue a work
order to trigger the activity when it is about to fall due. So routines are used, for instance,
to trigger inspections, monitoring equipment servicing and cathodic protection surveys in
order that they are implemented at the required intervals. PM work orders can be issued to
both the in-house operations, maintenance and inspection teams and to external contractors
and service companies.
Usually activities can be linked so that, for instance, an order can be issued for
preparatory cleaning and access provision as well as the order for inspection.
Activities can be tagged as dependent on shutdowns and other events so that their
execution can be appropriately managed.
Page 52
Operating instructions and measurement programmed into the plant control

system:
Operating instructions should be provided to the operations technicians to specify when
tasks are to be undertaken.
Schedules should be provided to specify chemical treatment rates. Calculation
methods or ready reckoners should be provided to calculate the rates where they derive
from other parameters such as combinations of flow rate and water cut.
The instructions should specify the action to be taken if performance limits are
exceeded either relating to manual measurements by the technician (e.g. oxygen content
of water samples) or plant control system alarms (e.g. a gas stream water dew point moving
out of specification).
The facility’s Distributed Control System (DCS) can in some cases be programmed
to react directly to parameters that exceed their limits. In other cases an alarm can be
initiated for operator action (e.g. if an inhibitor pump stops running).
The data collected by the DCS will normally be held in a database (or ‘historian’) for
a given length of time. Arrangements should be made to download records to corrosion
monitoring databases or for direct incorporation into analysis and into status reports.
Work packs:
Work packs are produced and issued with the work order used where the sufficient details
cannot be all included in the PM routine. Work packs can, for instance, include:
— work pack completion form / punch list form;
— responsibilities and coordination requirements;
— work scope;
— procedures/work instructions (copies or references);
— work orders;
— drawing index and key drawings;
— report forms;
— change control forms and change records;
— daily report forms;
— previous anomaly history, and
— correspondence, e.g. queries and responses.
The work pack should include the performance limits where measurements or observations
are being made. These can be included against items in a scope list or may be included in
procedures. The procedures should include instructions regarding the immediate action to
be taken if performance limits are exceeded.
A5.3.2 Mitigation barriers and monitoring
Management of the corrosion risks is achieved through a combination of proactive and

reactive mitigation barriers and monitoring and inspection measures:
— Proactive measures are where the requirements and implementation of the

mitigation barrier or monitoring/inspection system are identified and put in place
before any corrosion or deterioration has been observed. This is normally the case
where the corrosion risk assessment and strategic plan have identified performance
standards relating to mitigation success or allowable deterioration.
— Reactive measures are implemented after a problem has been identified (either as
a consequence of proactive monitoring or because of an incident or observation of
a problem).
Page 53
Barriers and mitigation:

Mitigation is inherently proactive and includes those barriers to corrosion failure that are put
in place as a result of initial threat assessment for design. This includes measures like the use
of corrosion resistant alloys, processing features such as gas drying and facilities and plans
for chemical inhibition. It also includes those things that can be planned to occur, as fabric
maintenance can.
Nevertheless mitigation can be reactive and new measures can be taken when
proactive measure fail or unexpected corrosion mechanisms appear. This is essentially a type
of corrective action, which is discussed below.
Monitoring:
Each barrier will have a performance indicator and its allowable limit that should not be
exceeded. It is necessary, therefore, to monitor the appropriate parameter and ensure that
the performance limit is not exceeded.
Proactive monitoring comprises in-line and on-line systems that involve the
collection of data, which enhances knowledge of the rate of corrosion degradation or
effectiveness of inhibition and process treatment and allows steps to be taken which will
prevent failure. Off-line systems are techniques that retrospectively identify corrosion
degradation and quantify the causes/onset, extent and degree to which it has occurred.
Reactive monitoring/inspection will normally be limited to off-line systems, and are
also normally aimed at quantifying the extent/distribution of any deterioration that has
occurred.
Corrosion inspection and monitoring are key activities in ensuring asset integrity and
control of corrosion.
Field data and the results of laboratory evaluations should be trended to obtain up-
to-date corrosion information. Management decisions on equipment condition, prediction
of remnant life and requirements for chemical treating are only as good as the information
input provided from field experience.
Figure 33 gives examples of inspection and monitoring related to the performance
limits for various threats.
Consideration should also be given to the following points during the design of
monitoring programmes and analysis/interpretation of data:
— use of inspection data obtained during fabrication and pre-service testing can
provide baseline information;
— comparison of regular/continuous in-line/on-line monitoring data with less frequent
off-line inspections is needed to calibrate monitoring and establish acceptable
correlation for a particular production system;
— measurements from single points ('key point' UT and insert probes) should be
treated as suspect for the quantification of metal loss unless confirmed by back-up
information from other sources. Successive measurements can, however, be used
to infer trends in corrosivity, and
— procedures should ensure that appropriate process data/information on water
cuts/CO2/H2S contents is input into the corrosion data bank for later comparison
with corrosion trends.
Page 54
Threat Barrier Performance limit Monitoring Monitoring Comment

(PL) method frequency
Internal Corrosion Metal loss > CA Wall thickness Determined NDT measurement.
corrosion allowance measurement by RBI Ultrasonic or profile
(CA) radiography
Cumulative loss > Electrical Monthly 0,7 Factor of safety.
0,7CA resistance probe Measure wall thickness if
PL exceeded
Corrosion Dose rate < x ppm DCS signals Continuous Dose rate
Inhibitor = pump rate/treated
Fluid rate
Residual < y ppm Analysis of Weekly
sample
Erosion Corrosion Metal loss > CA Wall thickness Determined
allowance measurement by RBI
(CA) Solids rate >z g/m3 Erosion monitor Continuous
Micro- Biocide Dose frequency Logged Monthly

biological dosage >monthly
corrosion Bacterial activity Analysis of Quarterly No contamination is
< 102/cm2 sample desirable
External Corrosion Metal loss > CA (Pipe, Wall thickness Determined NDT measurement. Pit
corrosion allowance pipeline and vessel) measurement by RBI depth, ultrasonic or
(CA) Metal Loss > 0.1t profile radiography. MFL
(Primary structure) or UT OLIV for pipeline
Coating Degree of rusting > Visual Determined Ri4 is a visual standard
Ri4 (pipe, vessel and assessment by RBI
structure)
No bare metal
(pipeline)
Figure 33: Example of barriers, performance limits and monitoring
In-line systems cover installation of devices directly into the process, but which need to be extracted
for analysis, e.g. corrosion coupons, bio-studs, etc.
On-line monitoring techniques include deployment of corrosion monitoring devices either
directly into the process or fixed permanently to the equipment, such as:
— electrical resistance (ER) probes;
— linear polarisation resistance (LPR) probes;
— fixed ultra-sonic (UT) probes;
— acoustic emission;
— monitoring of process conditions;
— magnetic flux leakage in line inspection of pipelines, and
— field Signature method monitoring spools
Off-line monitoring/inspection is mainly achieved through the use of inspection and NDT techniques,
which include:
— visual;
— manual ultrasonic;
— radiography;
— pulsed eddy current;
— magnetic flux leakage, and
— time of flight diffraction.
The use of alternative methods of detection should be considered in the light of any new findings
recorded. New inspection and monitoring technologies should also be evaluated and considered as
part of an ongoing system improvement process.
Page 55
A5.3.3 Unplanned activity
In essence all activity should be planned at the strategic level. However, important events lie outside
the framework of the tactical plans that are delineated by risk based inspection, etc. Procedures need
to be in place to capture the data presented by unplanned events.
Opportunity based inspection:

It is considered valuable that opportunity based visual inspections (OBVIs) should have a place in the
overall corrosion management scheme. OBVIs occur when an opportunity is presented to perform a
condition assessment of equipment as a result of production or maintenance outage or through
production watch keeping and planned maintenance activities. The data from the opportunistic
inspections should be fed into the inspection and corrosion databases to supplement the information
gained during planned inspections.
Material and corrosion damage reporting:

Procedures should be in place to capture and report on corrosion and materials failures or near misses.
The material and corrosion damage reporting (MCDR) procedure should be set up to facilitate rapid
reporting of events and the determination of corrective action by, or endorsed by, the appropriate
technical authority.
The procedure relies on the workforce at the facility identifying and reporting corrosion
damage. To make this effective the MCDR process should a subject in the corrosion awareness
programme.
A5.4 REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
A5.4.1 Data gathering and storage
Information from corrosion mitigation, monitoring and inspection activities should be collated and
gathered together to enable data assessment. This information should also include relevant process
conditions and chemical inhibition data.
Examples of different sources of data:
— data automatically captured by the plant distributed control system (DCS), e.g. treated gas
dew point;
— date logged manually in operations, e.g. chemical tank dips;
— data logged manually in formatted reports, e.g. NDT reports;
— data logged automatically and transmitted to contractors for processing, e.g. certain types
of corrosion monitoring;
— data logged by contractor’s equipment and reported after processing, e.g. intelligent pig
data;
— data from corrosion and materials damage reports.
It is important that, irrespective of reporting route, certain features are facilitated:
— Measured values that exceed allowable performance limits must be highlighted and reported
as a matter of urgency to the function responsible for immediate action in the case of non-
conformance. For instance, data collected by the DCS should be monitored by an alarm
function and data collected by NDT should be compared to acceptance criteria by the
technician.
— Special reporting routes should be identified for data that require urgent attention to
prevent failure.
Data gathering:
Typically the data gathered, and their typical sources, will include:
— process conditions, highlighting any changes (from the DCS data historian);
— chemical analysis (from plant logs or service company reports);
— inhibitor quantities (from plant logs);
— inhibitor Injection up time (from DCS historian or plant log);
— inhibitor residual (from chemical supplier’s analysis report);
— bacterial analysis (from service company reports);
Page 56
— visual observations (from operator or inspector’s report);

— corrosion monitoring data:
– weight loss coupons, (from service company reports);
– electrical resistance (ER) probes (from DCS historian or service company reports);
– linear polarisation resistance (LPR) probes (from DCS historian or service company
reports);
– field signature method (FSM) (from service company reports);
– fixed ultrasonic measurement systems (from inspector or service company reports),
and
– galvanic probes (from DCS historian or service company reports).
— erosion/sand probes (from DCS historian or service company reports), and
— cathodic protection survey data (from service company reports).
Inspection data covering:

— ultrasonic inspection data (from NDT technician’s report);
— radiographic (gamma- and x-ray) inspection data (from NDT technician’s report);
— pulse eddy current (PEC) inspection data (from service company reports);
— known process escapes/leak statistics (from plant logs);
— corrosion damage reports (from inspection, maintenance or operations personnel), and
— data from on-line inspection of pipelines (from service company reports).
Not all inspection and monitoring systems are required/applicable for any particular facility and their
use will be dependent on the type of corrosion process and material damage that is expected. It is not
intended that this document provides a detailed description of the different techniques which can be
found elsewhere. References can be found in the bibliography.
Data storage:
During the planning and implementation stage careful consideration of data storage, data
management and data analysis is required. Electronic data storage is considered beneficial by many
operators for ease of data management. However, manual paper based systems are also used
successfully, especially for smaller or mature assets. In either case careful consideration should be
given to the upkeep of data, where and how they are stored, and who requires access to them. The
latter point is particularly important where several different organisations are engaged in the corrosion
management process.
Main points for consideration include:

— data traceability and auditability should be considered;
— the asset operator should take overall responsibility for data and data storage and will always
have ownership of the data, however, this does not necessarily mean a requirement for it
to be located on the operator’s facility;
— computerised databases are not mandatory, although a formal, readily searched database
of some recognised format is recommended;
— common format computerised databases that will handle all the different types of corrosion,
inspection and process data are recommended, and can greatly assist data analysis, and
— the ease of transferring data from contractor-to-operator and from contractor-to-contractor
should be considered.
A5.4.2 Data analysis
The individual responsibility for data collation and data analysis should be clearly identified, and the
reporting structure evident. The reporting period of corrosion data should be in keeping with the
potential safety impact of the data assessed, and should be delivered on time.
Key features of the analysis of corrosion data are:
— comparison of measurement with the Performance Limit to identify non-conformity
— the prediction of remnant life;
— the correlation of trends from different monitoring/inspection techniques;
— the correlation of trends with operational parameters and operating events;
— application of relevant statistical analysis to allow correct extrapolation of data to the whole
structure/facility.
Page 57
The use of graphical displays/spread sheets is useful in assisting with the data interpretation to provide
information for good corrosion management. Certain databases allow the measurements from
different sources to be displayed on a common time base. This enables changes in corrosion rate to
be correlated with mitigation measures and changes in operating parameters. Figure 34 is an example.
There are many uncertainties associated with corrosion monitoring and inspection data,
resulting from natural limitations of techniques, variability of corrosion, human performance variables,
etc. In using data to develop trends, rates, remnant lives, etc, consideration should be given to the
reliability of the data.
It is important to question any data value that is uncharacteristic. It may signal a step change
but on the other hand it may have simply been incorrectly recorded or be in some other way in error.
Data require validation to avoid erroneous data being used.
All valid data will, nevertheless, have an inherent unreliability. It is important therefore to
have due regard to the precision of the results when comparing a result to a performance standard,
or calculating a rate of change, etc.
Statistical analysis of data can allow variabilities of the data to be accommodated.
Some operators and consultants are now using advanced statistical analysis, based on
extreme value statistics (EVS) to optimise the results of inspection programmes. For corrosion
inspection EVS provides a method for reliably extrapolating limited information, and can, for example,
identify the likely largest pit (and even the size of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th largest pits etc) across a structure
or facility.[19]
The centralised collection and analysis of corrosion-related data from a water injection system are
illustrated. This combined plot indicates that the increased frequency of high oxygen levels and increased
flow were accompanied by increased corrosion as measured by a linear polarisation resistance probe.
This is particularly noticeable from 10 February 2007.
Figure 34: Example of measurement data correlation
Page 58
Analysis of data – Example of wall thickness trending
If wall thickness data are obtained from the same feature types located on pipework that is exposed to
common conditions that have been similar for the period during which the data were collected, then a
combined plot of the wall loss data versus exposure time may provide useful additional information to
that which is obtainable from a single plot for each individual location. The additional data that can be
obtained from the combined plot include confidence intervals associated with the wall loss for each year
of exposure and the linear regression (best fit) trend line for wall loss versus exposure time with
associated linear regression parameters to indicate the quality of fit to predict future wall loss and retiral
dates. This extrapolation can be made for the average best fit line and for specified levels of confidence.
20
18
16
14
12
Wall loss (mm)
Measurements
Mean
10
99%
1%
8
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Time (yrs)
Example of trend analysis for wall loss data from several pipework features of the same type located on
piping that was exposed to similar conditions. Wall loss for a specified future date can be determined
from the plot for specified confidence levels.
Figure 35: Example of measurement trending
In other cases, for instance, a simple comparison of the mean of two sets of readings can
reveal the order of difference between them.
Where wall thickness measurements are not taken at exactly the same sample point on each successive
inspection a simple analysis is not possible. However, meaningful data analysis can still be obtained by using
basic statistics. For example two separate inspections were carried out (18 months apart) on a production
header, by two different inspection companies obtaining 21 readings in the first survey and 26 readings in the
second. Whilst some of the readings may have been taken at nominally the same point, it was not possible to
carry out a 'like-for-like' comparison, and originally it was concluded that the data therefore had no value.
Simple statistical analysis based on comparison of the means showed that the average wall thickness had
reduced by 1,1 mm over the 18-month inspection period and that this change was statistically significant (at a
1% level of significance*).
*A 1 % level of significance implies that the chance of reaching a wrong conclusion is #1%.
Figure 36: Confirmation of extent of deterioration by statistical methods
Page 59
A5.4.3 Anomaly reporting
Anomaly reporting, responsibilities and procedures should be in place to ensure that, when
anomalies are identified, they are reported in a timely manner and recommendations for
their resolution are acted upon. As discussed above inspection reporting and corrosion and
material damage reporting procedures should provide for fast track reporting of dangerous
anomalies. The reporting structure for anomalies is particularly important where alliances are
in place between the asset owner and one or more contractors.
Anomaly data should be reviewed on a priority basis to ensure that dangerous
anomalies receive the most urgent attention.
Example of anomaly grading
— Level 1 – Wall thickness loss actually or potentially breaching design code

limits for pressure retention or structural reliability.
— Level 2 – Wall thickness loss trending towards Level 1. Underperformance of
cathodic protection systems. Under dosing of inhibitors or excessive down
time.
— Level 3 – Fabric maintenance anomalies
Figure 37: Example of anomaly grading
The reporting format should be structured to ensure the key features and problems are
clearly evident, along with actions to be achieved.
A5.4.4 Facility status review
Reviews of all mitigation, monitoring and inspection data, taken together, should be carried
out periodically by a competent person or team. Their prime objective is to provide a clear
statement of condition and continued suitability for use. This can be for an item, a section
of the facility or the whole facility.
Routine tactical review:

It is common to use corrosion management team meetings to conduct frequent reviews of
data on an ongoing basis. These may be held at intervals of between one and three months
depending on the stability of corrosion trends and the effectiveness of barrier activity. As
these reviews consider recent results of barrier/mitigation, corrosion and process monitoring
and inspection activity they are considered to be tactical reviews and will be used to look for
short term corrective action requirements.
Corrosion damage reports (CDR) and/or opportunity based visual inspection (OBVI)
information should be reviewed monthly and summarised at the CMT meeting. They should
also review the effectiveness of corrosion control matrices.
A traffic light status system can be employed to present information to these
tactical meetings. A summary of the status of each section and the required actions and the
concerns and issues should be formed into a summary review for the facility and delivered
to the facility manager. An example is shown in Figure 38.
Page 60
Figure 38: Traffic light summary of process facility status
Annual review:
It is also common to hold a wide ranging review annually for each section of a facility. The
corrosion and inspection specialists will review all the data and publish them in a suitable
form. An example of format and content is given in Figure 39. The content and format of
the report will depend on the type of facility being reported on.
These reports should give a statement of the suitability of the equipment for
ongoing service and outline any actions that are required to maintain its condition in
addition to the ongoing corrosion management programme. However, this level of detail
is not suitable for all functions and the format of ‘traffic light’ summary in Figure 38 can be
used to display an overview to summarise the overall status and issues for a total facility for
the information of senior management.
It is good practice to hold a peer review session of the data, which can be a special
session of the corrosion management team. It should consider all the reports for the sections
of the facility to identify any shortcomings and to endorse the facility sections’ statuses.
All reviews should include consideration of:
— inspection results;
— corrosion monitoring results;
— mitigation performances, (e.g. inhibitor injected, fabric maintenance completed, gas
drying);
— corrosion damage reports;
— opportunity based inspection results;
— the findings of the offshore verification scheme.
Page 61
The difference between short term and annual reviews is the period over which the data are
collected for the review.
2006 ANNUAL TOPSIDES REVIEW – Any Oil Field
LOCATION: FPSO SYSTEM (Number): Produced Water (48)
SYSTEM DUTY
Produced Water from the 1st Stage Separator, 2nd Stage Separator and Electrostatic Coalescer is collected
in the Collection Vessel V-4801. It is then transported to the Hydrocyclones and Desanding Package
upstream of the Water Injection system (44).
CORROSION RISKS
Internal: The material of fabrication for the Produced Water Treatment piping is mainly carbon steel
with the exception of two lines which are fabricated with stainless steel. The stainless steel lines are
considered to be resistant to the produced water while the corrosion threats identified for the carbon
steel lines are CO2, microbiologically influenced corrosion and erosion.
External: The majority of the pipework is insulated and CUI is identified as a potential threat. Chloride
pitting corrosion is identified as a potential threat to the stainless steel insulated piping in the event of
water ingress under the insulation.
The marine environment is considered to be a potential threat to the un-insulated carbon steel pipework.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Internal: Approximately 50% of the produced water lines were inspected in 2005. These ultrasonic wall
thickness surveys did not reveal any areas of corrosion.
External: External visual inspection of the above items did not reveal any areas of corrosion. CUI
inspection not fully completed.
CHEMICAL TREATMENT/ MITIGATION ACTIVITIES

Corrosion inhibitor injection into the Crude Oil upstream of the Inter-stage Heaters E-2003 A/B is
considered to provide inhibition to the Produced Water pipework.
CORROSION MONITORING
Weight loss coupons and LPR probes located at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Stage Separator P.W. outlets have
indicated consistently low general and pitting corrosion rates since 2003. Bacteria enumerated from
these weight loss coupons have been consistently low during this period.
CURRENT ASSESSMENT
The produced water system appears to be in suitable condition for continued service. The internal
corrosion threat appears to be well-managed at present; however, further inspection of insulated
pipework is required to fully understand the CUI threats.
ACTIONS REQUIRED
1. Maintaining the insulation on carbon steel and stainless steel pipework in good condition.
2. CUI inspections to be completed by 31 March 2007
3. External inspections of stainless steel items to be completed.
Review By: Jack Doe Date: 28 Jan 2007

Peer Reviewed By: JP, CJ, TK, BS Date: 14 Feb 2007
Integrity Engineer Approval: Bill Smith Date: 15 Feb 2007
Status: Amber Issues: CUI inspection not completed

Inspection of stainless steel small bore pipe required
Figure 39: Example of review report for a section of a process facility
Page 62
The output of the review can include:

— assessment of the current corrosion risks and their changes;
— a summary of mitigation activity;
— a summary of inspection activity and results;
— a summary of corrosion monitoring and results;
— an assessment of current conditions and suitability for continued operation;
— recommendations for action required, and
— ongoing issues and concerns.
Inspection and monitoring activities require some immediate review on completion of a

campaign. This would include, for example:
— A review of the corrosion risk assessment (CRA) which would take place
immediately after the completion of the inspection programme. The findings should
be used to update failure probability rankings and confidence factors so that they
accurately reflect the current situation.
— Assessment of actual execution of inspection and monitoring work against
requirements and standards.
Relevant information (e.g. changes in corrosion trends, significant wall thickness loss, loss
of mitigation effectiveness) and lessons learned should not only be fed back into the
corrosion risk assessment but also into the strategic and tactical plans.
These facility status reviews should be considered in the process for corrosion
management system review that is part of performance review. See section A7.
A5.4.5 Corrective action
Once the barrier/mitigation and corrosion monitoring and inspection data have been
collected and analysed the necessary corrective action(s) required need to be identified and
put into place. The options available will depend upon the type of facility and the nature and
extent of the anomaly identified.
There are three types of corrective action:

— Temporary safeguarding, e.g.:
– temporary reduction in pressure or allowed load;
– temporary repairs, such as composite wraps on pipework, and
– temporary cessation or reduction of production where inhibition is lost or
reduced.
Temporary measures should be subject to approval by a competent technical
authority which would normally be given for a fixed period after which it needs to
be replaced by permanent corrective action.
— Action to restore, e.g.:

– like-for-like replacement of pipework or structure;
– restoration of inhibition levels, and
– restoration of coating or linings.
— Action to improve. Needs to be considered if simple action to restore will result in

another early failure or if failures are already frequent. Will be one of the following:
– a change of materials;
– modification of chemical treatment;
– change of coatings and linings;
– modification of cathodic protection settings or facilities;
– permanent modification of process settings, and
Page 63
– modifications of design details.

Any action of this last type must be processed through an appropriate change
management procedure. Continued operation may be allowed pending action but
this should be allowed or endorsed only by a competent technical authority and
normally only allowed for a fixed period without further review.
The practicality and economic impact of different options will depend on the life cycle stage
of the facility i.e. new build, major refurbishment or existing and ageing asset.
Some corrective actions may be taken quickly whilst others, particularly
improvement actions, may take some time to implement. It is important that corrective
action requirements are registered in a monitored list and that progress towards
implementation is tracked, especially if a dispensation is given to continue operation
pending action. Various methods employing text or spreadsheet lists and a variety of
databases have been used successfully.
The corrective action procedure should requires the status of all actions to be
reviewed regularly to ensure that they are carried out in the required timescales.
Positive acknowledgement of completion of actions is required in order to assure
that the loop from anomaly reporting through to resolving the anomaly is completed.
Completion should be verified by the technical authority.
Relevant information and lessons learned should be fed back into the corrosion risk
assessment document.
A5.4.6 Failure investigation and root cause analysis
If a serious failure or 'near miss' occurs, or if persistent shortcomings in performance have

not been corrected, a root cause analysis (RCA) can be performed to ensure that corrective
action is directed at the root cause or causes.
Often corrosion incident investigations tend to be either very extensive or limited
to the metallurgical evaluation of the failure.
A corrosion or materials failure investigation should, however, address a number
of questions:
— what was the mode of failure?
— what was/were the barrier(s) to this mode of failure and why did it/they fail?
— what was monitoring performance of the barrier(s) and why did they not detect
impending failure?
— if relevant, was the performance standard appropriate?
— who was responsible for the barrier(s) and monitoring and did they fail to manage
them properly?
Normal company incident investigation procedures may be very resource intensive and
hence only justifiable for major incidents.
In such cases best results may be gained with the employment of a specialist in RCA
techniques to guide corrosion and management system specialists in appropriate directions
taking an independent view.
A simpler investigation procedure such as that given in Figure 40, is useful to fill the
gap. However, methods like that in the example should be used by personnel with a good
level of corrosion management expertise who will have an understanding of the topics
covered.
During the investigation consideration should also be given to corrosion
management system elements described in other parts of this document. Annex C can be
used to identify relevant factors by working through the list, identifying relevant questions
and then assessing the answers to them.
Page 64
Designer incompetence Significant changes in Pressure, temperature,

process parameters velocity
Incorrect specification
Incorrect Significant changes in Water cut, CO2, H2S,
Organisation pressure salts, particulates,
material fluid composition /
environment microbes,
QA/QC failure
Error / fraud Significant changes in Operational deadlegs,

plant Uncontrolled modifications
Design Operation
failure failure Organisation pressure/
philosophy
Lack of awareness/
Failure to maintain
commitment
Competence/awareness Inadequate resources/
Corrosion beds
Poor QC initiating
design/detail
Poor company culture
Poor planning :
Corrosion Poor risk assessment
incident /
Wrong chemical anomaly Poor equipment
register
Insufficient chemical: Organisational
Failure to maintain changes / factors
equipment Chemical
injection Not inspected
Monitoring failure No access :
failure
Deliberate non Communication failure
injection
Inadequate resources /
injection beds
Too much chemical
Mitigation Inspection Surface masked
failure failure Surface condition not
suitable for inspection
Poor application
Human factors
Failure to maintain Coatings
coating failure Wrong technique
Poor specification
Inadequate Wrong procedure
inspection
Human factors
Investigation procedure
1. Establish the corrosion failure mechanism of the component under investigation.
2. Using the incident causation diagram as the guide gather the relevant inspection, process,
maintenance and design data and establish whether the failure was attributable to design, operation,
inspection or mitigation system failure.
3. Once one or more of the above causes has been established, undertake further detailed evaluation of the
underlying causes for the particular primary causes.
4. Where failure to maintain chemical injection equipment or coating is identified as cause then it is recommended that this be
investigated further. Consider the three factors following after operation failure/ failure to maintain
5. Prepare single page report summarising the direct and underlying causes including any weaknesses in the corrosion
management system revealed by the investigation.
Figure 40: Example of root cause analysis method
Page 65
A6 MONITORING AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE
A6.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this activity is to ensure that the plan is being carried out effectively and, if
not, that it is recognised so that timely corrective action can be carried out.
This activity measures whether or not:

— the necessary actions are being carried out as required by the policy, strategy and
plan, and,
— the desired outcomes are being achieved by the planned activities.
For the first of these, the measures are leading (or proactive) indicators. However, success
in meeting the plan does not necessarily mean success in achieving the desired outcomes
as the plan itself may not be effective. In order to measure this the lagging (or reactive)
indicators must be measured. The process of performance measurement includes
consideration of:
— setting performance measures;
— allocating responsibility for measurement;
— determining frequency of measurement, and
— setting corrective actions
Measurements can be identified as being in two distinct categories:
— Firstly, measurements of success in meeting the performance limits for the

effectiveness of barriers to corrosion failure. These are technical factors and are
primarily used in reviewing the ongoing integrity status of the facility, (see A5.4.4).
Clearly, however, if the performance limits are consistently not met or there is a
rapid deterioration towards non-compliance then there may be an underlying issue
with the performance of the management system that needs to be followed up.
Examples of this type of technical measure include:

– measurement of loss of wall thickness compared to allowable loss;
– measurement of pipeline cathodic protection potential compared with
norms for protection;
– rate of corrosion inhibitor dosing compared to requirement established in
selection testing.
— Secondly there are measurements of success in meeting key performance indicators

for the effectiveness of the management system. Effectiveness in identifying the
barriers and organising and planning and implementing the barriers, etc. These
address management factors and are considered when reviewing the fitness for
purpose of the management system.
Examples of this type of management performance measure include:

– number of inspection activities overdue;
– number of facility status items in 'red' status;
– delivery of facility status reports by due date, and
Page 66
– number of overdue corrective actions.
In some cases though the same measurement may serve both. For example the maintenance
of inhibitor pump running for a given percentage of time is a measure of barrier
effectiveness – a technical factor. It is also a measure of the effectiveness of operations and
maintenance personnel in managing the pump’s operation and maintenance – a
management system measure.
A6.3 PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Performance indicators for the facility corrosion management system should be identified
in the plan on the basis of objectives and targets set in the policy and strategy and agreed
with the asset management team.
For the success of any performance monitoring scheme there are three points that
need to be considered regarding acceptable performance indicators, which must be:
— measurable;
— achievable, and
— realistic.
The Leading (or proactive) indicators mainly refer to the performance standards for
mitigation or the plan for monitoring. They can also refer to the completion of management
activities or the outcomes of audit.
Proactive measurement:
— uses regular checks and inspections, or even continuous evaluations, to ensure that
agreed criteria are being met;
— makes measurements before things go wrong;
— predicts when a system is not working, monitors the condition and, by means of
feed-back reporting and control procedures, prevents damage;
— measures success and reinforces positive achievement by rewarding good work,
and
— should not penalise failure.
(There must, however, be a disciplined approach to the maintenance of corrosion barriers,

the management of monitoring/inspection and the management of corrective action.
Negligence is not acceptable).
Examples of leading/proactive performance indicators of management effectiveness are:

— achievement of inhibitor availability criteria;
— achievement of physical inspection against plan;
— availability of corrosion monitoring against plan;
— cleaning pig activity against plan;
— progress of risk based inspection development;
— completion of review reports, and
— close out of corrective action relating to replacement, repair and fabric
maintenance.
The lagging (or reactive) indicators refer to outcomes from mitigation and corrective action
or from the successful operation of the management system as a whole. Reactive
measurement involves the review of actions taken in the event of incidents and review of
possible changes to reduce further the probability of incidents.
Page 67
Reactive measurement involves:

— reviewing of 'after failure' activity;
— repair incidents;
— other evidence of deficient corrosion control performance, including cases of
unacceptable damage or near misses;
— mal-operation;
— unexpected events, and
— inadequate procedures.
Examples of lagging/reactive performance indicators are:

— number of leaks attributed to corrosion;
— proportion of hydrocarbon releases attributed to corrosion;
— number of other accidents and incidents attributed to corrosion;
— number or duration of unplanned business interruptions attributed to corrosion;
— acceptable metal loss per year, and
— trends – showing no significant problems to end of field life.
A6.4 RESPONSIBILITY
Because this activity relates to the review of the management process itself, the
responsibility for overseeing the process of measuring performance should lie with suitably
competent individuals who are, ideally, appropriately free of production pressures.
The process of setting the measure should involve discussion with, and feedback
to, each relevant business unit manager and the personnel in that unit responsible for the
various aspects of implementation and control of the processes and procedures. It is
important that those managers and personnel understand the relevance of the measurement
as a means of demonstrating achievement as well as being a means of identifying shortfalls.
The measurement of performance tasks should preferably lie with personnel outside
those directly responsible for implementation of the specific procedures and processes being
assessed. The collection of data, however, can often rest with those responsible for the
activity that generates it. In such cases it is important that the data collection is set as part
of a procedure that provides no option.
This separation of responsibility for implementing corrosion management, corrosion
monitoring or corrosion control from the task of measuring the overall performance of these
processes is preferable to avoid potential conflict of interest.
Examples of areas of responsibility include:
— performance standards for inhibition. Data provided by the operations staff and
reviewed and presented by the corrosion engineers;
— performance of inspection to plan. Data collated by the inspection personnel and
reviewed and presented by the integrity engineer, and
— number of release incidents, impact on the environment. Collected and presented
under the control of the manager responsible for Safety, Health and Environment
(SHE) issues.
The integrity engineer should be responsible for the routine presentation of all the
measurements collected together.
Page 68
Activity Target Green Amber Red

Plan
RBI reviews up to date None outstanding None 2 or less 3 or more
Annual pipework insp. scope Completed by year end Yes No
Annual vessel insp. scope By end of January January February March or later
Annual inspection activity plan Completed at beginning of year Yes No
Inspection work packs delivery Sent 6 weeks prior to execution 0 1-2 >3
Annual FM work scope identified 100% completed by end of 3Q By end of 3Q By end of 4Q 1Q
5 year inspection work plan Update annually Yes No
Review and plan offshore vibration survey Conduct review to assess Baseline assessment and Baseline assessment Nothing completed
requirement for survey survey completed complete
Annual CUI scope identified 100% completed by end of 3Q By end of 3Q By end of 4Q 1Q (3)
FM support identified for CUI work scope Resource Identified and agreed Yes No
for forthcoming year
Offshore visit to confirm annual FM work Complete and reported by 2Q Yes No
scope
Implement
% Pipework inspections on target >90% of planned cumulative >90% complete 75-90% complete <75%
completion
Safety critical vessel inspections on target On target or above All on target (0) 2 below target (1-2) >2 below target
as per RBI due date. (=>3)
% of FM work scope on target >90% planned work scope >90% complete 75-90% complete <75%
Inspection programme delays due to Days delay per year <7 days 7-14 days >14 days
platform operations
FM programme delays due to platform Days delay per year <7 days 7-14 days >14 days
operations
Corrosion awareness programmes 6 monthly 2 or more (2) 1 (1) 0 (0)
No. of outstanding work packs No work packs outstanding =<2 3-5 >5
Measure
No. Leaks (safety or prod. critical) No leaks 0 =>1
No. Unexpected leaks (non-crit) No leaks 0 =< 4 >4
Painting FM orders from Inspection <2 <2 2-4 >4
No. of near misses No near misses 0 =< 2 >2
Compliance with temp repair lifetime No temp repairs in service outwith 0 =< 2 >2
(time in service) specified time frame
All postponed inspections Less than 3 <3 3-5 >5
SC overdue inspections No SC overdue inspection 0 1 => 2
Non-SC overdue inspections No Non-SC overdue inspection 0 4 >4
Sufficient insp. resource for inspection as 100% resource availability Yes No
per activity plan
Was there sufficient FM support made 100% resource availability Yes No
available for inspection?
Review
Bi-monthly pipework integrity summary 100% completed Yes No
been updated
Bi-monthly meeting held Hold meeting Yes No
Annual report completed (1Q) Complete report within 1Q 1Q (1) 2Q (2) >2Q (3)
Monthly status reports sent Within specified time frame 9 days >10 days >18 days
Monthly CCM KPIs received Within specified time frame Yes No
Annual review of material degradation Review annually Yes No
strategy
Six-monthly performance review Conducted six-monthly Yes No
Bi-annual management system audit Completed Yes No
Figure 41: Examples of corrosion management key performance indicators for an offshore
facility
Page 69
A6.5 FREQUENCY
The basis of the frequency of measurement depends on the type of measurement. The
frequency of measurements of barrier effectiveness will be mandated in the planning
process and will be carefully designed to capture the requirement for corrective action
before any unsafe condition arises.
The frequency of the measurement of management performance may vary for any
operator and for different business units/assets within an organisation. For example, the
performance for individual assets may be routinely assessed on a three-month or six-month
basis and measurements may be made at corresponding intervals.
The frequency of measurement chosen will depend on the extent to which data
demonstrate historical reliability and stability.
The frequency of measurement required will also depend upon the particular assets
and processes under review. In circumstances where relevant historical data and experience
of operation using the same procedures and processes are available and have been subject
to review and where changes will not be made during the relevant period, then longer
periods before measurement of performance can be justified. In circumstances where new
processes or procedures have been implemented, more frequent measurement is essential.
This may be relaxed subject to effective implementation and proof of adequacy.
A6.6 REPORTING AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
Measurements of performance, both proactive and reactive, should be subject to a periodic

review procedure.
In general measuring performance does not include the identification of the cause
of incidents but rather ensures that the procedures and processes result in appropriate
response to the incidents including identification of cause. However, it is important that any
underlying causes (be they changes in process conditions or in adequacies in the corrosion
management system) are identified.
Remedial action may, for example, involve repair of chemical injection pumps, repair
of leaks or improvements in the distribution of chemicals to multiple locations. In some cases
it will require action to improve performance of the team responsible for an activity and this
may require training, corrosion awareness sessions, etc.
For each review, reports should be made to the teams performing mitigation and
monitoring and to their management and to the facility management. The performance may
be graded to focus attention to the more important findings.
Grade Definition Colour code

On target Measure meets target
Green
Off target Measure not meeting target. Corrective action

Amber
possible before dangerous outcome
Critical Immediate corrective action required to prevent
Red
dangerous outcome
Figure 42: Example of performance indicator grading
Procedures would normally be set up to ensure that any incident results in review of the
processes and procedures, and that preventative modification is implemented wherever
appropriate.
Page 70
Where performance indicator targets have not been achieved it is important that the
cause(s) are identified and that any necessary measures to ensure that the system can be
improved are implemented. It is the constant re-examination and incorporation of lessons
learnt that lead to improvement of the corrosion management system.
Page 71
A7 PERFORMANCE REVIEW
A7.1 PURPOSE
Performance review enables lessons to be learnt and improvements to be made on a

continuous basis.
Here performance review refers to the in-house review of the corrosion management system
performance and does not cover the periodic, detailed technical review of mitigation,
monitoring and inspection data or any formal audit of the system. The review of facility
status is discussed in item A5.4.4.
Performance review in this context relates to review of the performance of the
corrosion management system drawing input from reviews of the facility corrosion status,
measurement against KPIs, audits and, offshore in the UK, findings from the operation of
the verification scheme.
A7.3 PERFORMANCE REVIEW
The scope of the system review will include all aspects of the procedures and processes.
The objective is the assessment of the effectiveness of the processes and procedures
in terms of improving safety and environmental protection. For example, this may include
reducing the number of emissions, reducing the number of incidents, improving
conformance to schedules and improving procedures to minimise escalation of incidents. It
also includes ensuring that feedback is effective in improving performance and reducing
incidents.
The system review includes:
— review of measured parameters covering both proactive and reactive measures;
— review of the effectiveness of the system in achieving improvements in the lagging
indicators;
— any consistent failure to meet performance targets across the system;
— review of any major failures of the system and review of the relevance and impact
of problems experienced by other operators;
— review of facility status (see A5.4.4) and in particular any general issues;
— review of the effectiveness of the management of corrective actions;
— ensuring that the procedures and processes in place will not be compromised by
planned changes arising from the business plan and by changing production
requirements;
— review of the impact of major engineering and production changes to be made to
the scope of facilities covered by the scheme;
— review of the effectiveness of the system in sharing learning across installations and
in communicating with other operators and learning from them;
— review of the impact of changes in legislation, industry practice and other external
influences;
— review of options to take advantage of developments of new technology;
— ensuring that information generated as a consequence of incidents and the
associated changes to procedures and processes is being incorporated into
Page 72
company wide instructions and is being implemented properly by all businesses and
assets, and
— review of whether or not particular areas/businesses/assets are performing better
or worse than average in terms of achieving Key Point Indicators (KPIs) and in
reducing incidents.
In drawing conclusions from a review for UK offshore installations it is useful to incorporate

the findings of the Verification process as this will invariably include a separate review of the
effectiveness of the corrosion management activities.
A7.4 FREQUENCY
The frequency of review will depend upon the particular nature of the assets and the
processes involved and the circumstances prevailing at the time. The interval to the next
review should be addressed at each review. The interval will depend upon how successful
and stable the operation of the corrosion management system is and whether or not
changes in the production process and external factors are demanding consideration of
change.
The most frequent reviews are the meetings of the corrosion management team
held at frequencies ranging from one to three months – depending on the stability of the
corrosion control activities. The CMT meeting will generally review the performance of the
ongoing operational activity that maintains the barriers to corrosion – inhibition, bacterial
control, gas drying, cathodic protection, etc., (see A5.4.4). However, CMT meetings should
also review some key management processes such as the ongoing inspection activities and
corrective action management.
Interim reviews of management performance indicators may be held quarterly
which gives enough time for trends to develop but enables corrective action to be put in
place in a timely manner. The interval between these interim reviews should be reconsidered
at both these and the annual review. If the management system is working well and activity
is under control then effort can be saved by extending the interval. If, however, there are
red status measures or a lot of amber status measures then the management system needs
more frequent consideration of corrective action.
The initial review of a new system or a substantially changed system should take
place after a relatively short period, e.g. one year. The management or corrosion
management team should bring review forward when warranted.
Where the business plan or production process requirements change between
planned reviews a review of the corrosion management system and plan should be
considered. The management of change procedures should allow for this. There should be
a procedure in place to review the potential impact on the corrosion management system
and to ensure that modifications to procedures are made and processes are developed,
tested and implemented before those changes take place.
A7.5 IMPROVEMENT ACTION
Improvement action refers to corrective changes required to the corrosion management

system itself, and not to repairs to equipment or modifications to the corrosion control
programme.
As with any other corrective action process, the improvement actions must be
registered given target completion dates and tracked to completion.
Page 73
Many companies have corporate systems for managing management review and
audit actions and they should be used where available.
The completion of improvement action should be verified before it is signed off the
register.
A7.6 REVIEW PROCEDURES
Where changes are required to be made prior to the next scheduled review which are
outside of the anticipated conditions identified at the previous review, then a review should
be undertaken immediately and before those changes are made. This review will:
— identify which assets will be affected;

— identify the changes that will take place;
— feed back the changes to the relevant departments/businesses/responsible
individuals for:
– assessment of potential impact, and
– identification of changes required to processes and procedures, and
— ensure that appropriate changes are made to processes and procedures and that
they are implemented.
It is important that no changes to production operations as a consequence of changes to

the business plan are implemented until the above steps have been completed, either at a
scheduled review or at a special review arising due to the required changes.
Another aspect that should be considered in the review process is to consider any
lessons learnt from incidents on other installations and industries, e.g. onshore
petrochemical.
Page 74
A8 AUDITS
A8.1 PURPOSE
Audits provide a view of the conformity of the corrosion management system to the
requirements for an effective system.
Audit provides an independent view of the performance of the corrosion management

system.
Offshore UK, the Safety Case Regulations (SCR) requires the duty holder to
demonstrate that he has established adequate arrangements for audit.
Annex C provides a check list on which audit that reflects the normative
requirements in this document may be based.
A8.3 SCOPE AND FREQUENCY
Audits are an essential check on the performance of the corrosion management system and
will normally be carried out by an independent party. In principle the audit would cover
review of the management processes that are being employed to ensure continuing integrity
and the condition of equipment. The audits cover all aspects of:
— implementation of procedures and processes;
— competency;
— checks in place, and
— compliance.
The audit does not review the achievement of performance targets, but does review the
processes and procedures aimed at achieving those targets, and determines if the
procedures for ensuring that they are being achieved are being properly implemented.
Where activities are not in accordance with the procedures and processes they will be
identified as being non-compliant.
Audits can be planned in two ways. A complete audit of all elements of the
management system can be made in one exercise. Alternatively individual elements may be
separately audited on a rolling basis.
To allow time for audit, reporting, corrective action and close out and stabilisation
of the improved system the audit cycle duration will generally need to be two to three years.
In addition to these audits, more frequent internal audits should be carried out
covering specific procedures or implementation in specific units or by specific functions.
Contractors’ procedures will be audited on award of contract if not covered by pre-
qualification, and then audited periodically in the same way as the operator’s procedures.
A8.4 RESPONSIBILITY
Audits should be carried out by persons sufficiently independent to ensure that their
assessment is objective. In most instances, audits will be carried out by independent
organisations on behalf of the duty holder/ operator. The duty holder/operator will be
responsible for ensuring that appropriate remedial action is taken. This process will ensure
Page 75
that the audit cannot be closed out until all actions are cleared. Audits may be carried out
by either external third party organisations or by an in-house, but independent, consultancy
group. In all cases it is important that the auditors are not directly involved in the day-to-day
operation of the corrosion management system and are trained in audit practice.
The more frequent audits relating to specific aspects of the assets or functions can
be carried out by in-house personnel provided they are appropriately independent of
production and trained in audit practice.
A8.5 CURRENT BEST PRACTICE
The success of audits depends on the implementation and maintenance of a fully auditable
structured framework including clearly defined responsibilities and roles.
Audits should be carried out by trained, competent persons. Where outside
organisations are employed for independent audits, the individuals should be appropriately
competent.
The audits will include review of procedures, review of records and discussions with
relevant company personnel. Audit reports should include progress results and
recommendations.
Highlights from the annual audit reports and all in-house audits should be
disseminated to all relevant personnel. Details of the in-house audits and findings should be
made available to the independent auditing body prior to the annual audit.
Wherever practicable, checklists should be developed for specific
processes/installations in order to ensure consistency of audits and to ensure appropriately
comprehensive cover.
An example of an audit checklist is given in Annex C. This example covers all the
different aspects of a corrosion management system as described in this document.
One aspect that has been identified by several organisations is that the results of
audits of corrosion management systems are often not as well documented as may be
implied by the above examples. This is often because the corrosion management system
audit is carried out as part of a general audit of an organisation’s operation. For the most
benefit to be gained it is important that the results, and in particular the recommendations
and list of improvement actions identified in the audit, are recorded within the corrosion
management system and its improvement action tracking system.
Page 76
Checks to ensure that procedures and processes are being complied with include:
— Review of documentation and records to assess conformance

— Review of records of non conformances and incidents to ensure that:
– Appropriate investigation was undertaken in accordance with the procedures
– Any investigation was effective and that any necessary changes to procedures
and processes to prevent recurrence have been developed
– Changes have been incorporated in to the procedures and processes
– Changes are being implemented
— Tracking of specific procedures and processes to ensure compliance including
competency of responsible individuals, departments and organisations and including
correct implementation, reporting and reaction.
— Wherever non compliances are identified, this should result in the following programme:
– Investigation of cause(s)
– Assessment of changes to procedures/processes to prevent recurrence
– Implementation of changes
— When a non compliance is identified, the audit should nto be closed out until the
appropriate changes have been implemented.
Figure 43: Example of key audit activity
Page 77
ANNEX B
TOP CORROSION THREATS AND CORROSION MITIGATION
METHODS
The sections of this Annex give overviews of the top corrosion threats and main corrosion mitigation
methods encountered in oil and gas production and processing. Each section overview describes the
threat or mitigation itself and then describes how it is managed by reference to the corrosion
management model.
The sections have been written by members of the work group and reflect one professional
view of the threat or mitigation method and its management. They may be used as an introduction
to each topic and as a stepping stone to wider sources of information and advice. They should not
be seen as a complete guidance to the topic.
The sections and their topics are as follows:
SECTION TOPIC
Threats
B1 CO2 corrosion
B2 H2S corrosion and cracking
B3 O2 corrosion of seawater and water injection systems
B4 Microbially influenced and dead leg corrosion
B5 Galvanic corrosion
B6 Weld corrosion
B7 Grooving corrosion of pipelines
B8 Flange face corrosion
B9 Atmospheric external corrosion
B10 Corrosion under insulation
B11 Stress corrosion cracking and localised corrosion of stainless steels in chloride
environments
B12 Erosion/corrosion
Mitigation methods
B13 Chemical treatment management
B14 Mitigation by coatings
B15 Mitigation by cathodic protection
Page 78
ANNEX B1 – CO2 CORROSION
MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY Notes and comments

B1.1 INTRODUCTION
CO2 Corrosion occurs in equipment conveying and processing
fluids produced from oil and gas reservoirs. Carbon Dioxide
(CO2) is a naturally occurring component of reservoir fluids
along with hydrocarbons, water and other gases such as
helium, nitrogen and hydrogen sulphide. The composition of
reservoir fluids, including CO2 content, varies widely.
CO2 is an acid gas. It dissolves into the water phase (in

proportion to its partial pressure) increasing acidity and
increasing corrosivity. The iron carbonate corrosion product is Figure 1 – CO2 Corrosion in valve
outlet. Pitting mode top right.
protective but prone to removal leading to both pitting and
General corrosion at bottom. Iron
general forms of metal loss, depending on flow conditions. carbonate corrosion product is
grey. Flow pattern exiting valve
has increased corrosion rate in
lower half by removing the
corrosion product layer.
B1.2 POLICY AND STRATEGY
Safety, environmental and commercial policies influence the
choice of strategies for mitigation and monitoring/inspection.
Strategy usually determined
Mitigation strategy options include: during design. Choice
a. Resistant materials, e.g. duplex stainless steel. factors include lifecycle
b. Low alloy steel with a corrosion allowance. cost. Options a. and b.
c. Low alloy steel with corrosion inhibitor (CI). often combined as CI does
d. Water removal, e.g. by gas drying. not completely stop
corrosion.
Monitoring/Inspection strategy can include:
a. Process parameter monitoring, e.g. temperature, pressure, Effective use of resistant
dew point. materials may depend on
b. Corrosivity measurement, e.g. coupons and on line probes. control of process
c. Metal loss measurement, e.g. NDT, pipeline on-line conditions.
inspection (OLI).
B1.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved include: a. and b. lead on risk
a. Corrosion and materials specialists. assessment, planning and
b. Production chemical specialists and chemical suppliers. analysis. c. leads on
c. Facilities Operations teams. mitigation implementation.
d. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. d. and e. lead on metal loss
e. Pipeline engineers and OLI contractors. measurement.
Communication activities should aim at increasing awareness of Factors include

the factors that influence CO2 corrosion to ensure the impact of temperature, pressure,
operating changes are fully understood. flow, dew point and CI
treatment rate and uptime.
Page 79

B1.4 CORROSION RISK ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING
Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should include a CO2 corrosion Rate measurements and
threat if the factors in B1.1, are recognised. CO2 corrosion predictions can often give
probability and metal loss rate can be determined from a very different results and all
combination of: have considerable
a. Quantitative corrosion rate prediction, e.g. Norsok M-506, uncertainty of
Cassandra. measurement or prediction.
b. Corrosion monitoring results. Judgement is required to
c. Inspection observations and measurements. produce a useful result.
The CO2 corrosion threat will normally have a number of line

items in the corrosion management strategic plan matrix to The CM strategic plan may
specify: be part of a wider integrity
a. Mitigation methods. management plan. For
b. Performance indicators. offshore installations the
c. Monitoring methods and frequencies. strategic plan should be in
d. Immediate action required on non-conformance. line with the verification
e. Organisational responsibilities for mitigation, monitoring and scheme.
immediate action.
Tactical planning activities result in: Tactical plans may jointly

a. Operating instructions e.g. process parameter targets, CI cover activities relating to
injection rates. other corrosion threats.
b. Plant instrumentation and data collection via DCS and data Onshore inspection
historian. schemes will be part of
c. Elements of risk based inspection schemes. statutory written schemes
d. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. for inspection tasks, of examination for pressure
corrosion monitoring services, chemical sampling and systems.
analysis.
e. Inspection and corrosion monitoring service work packs,
covering responsibilities, coordination, procedures, scope,
anomaly criteria and reporting requirements.
B1.5 IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
Implementation should be carried out in accordance plan. In
addition, opportunity based internal visual inspection of
pipework is valuable to identify patterns of CO2 corrosion.
(Figure 1 in item B1.1 is an example.)
Data relating to CO2 corrosion is gathered through different

routes:
a. Process parameters, corrosion monitoring data and, (Note: Commercially
sometimes, CI injection data can be acquired in real time available database product
into specialist databases (such as Amulet). Chemical names are given for
analyses and corrosion coupon results can be added information. No warranty
manually from formatted reports. of suitability is implied for
b. Inspection data is usually collected in formatted reports and specific application.)
entered manually into specialist inspection databases (e.g.
ACET, Credo) although download from NDT wall thickness
instruments is available.
Page 80

Data relating to CO2 corrosion management is analysed in two Data can sometimes be
stages: plotted on the same time
a. Initial comparison with performance targets to determine base to determine the
need for immediate corrective action, (e.g. CI injection effects of process and
restart or rate change, plant item fitness for service). treatment changes on
b. Analysis of all the data, usually by the corrosion engineer, to corrosion rate trends.
ensure that the strategic plan objectives are met and the Statistical analysis can help
CRA and tactical plans are amended if necessary. enhance the value of NDT
data.
B1.6 MONITORING AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE
The following can be used as proactive (leading) indicators:
a. CI injection rates and uptime against plan.
b. Frequency of process parameters (e.g. dew point) off spec. The strategic plan should
c. Completion of inspection activities against plan and schedule. give performance targets
for CI injection up time and
The following can be used as reactive (lagging) indicators: rate.
a. Frequency of CO2 corrosion related leaks.
b. Reduction of wall thickness against corrosion allowance.
c. Corrosion monitoring results against target corrosion rates
based on require life and corrosion allowance.
B1.7 PERFORMANCE REVIEW
Performance review should include the following:
a. Annual (and if appropriate quarterly) reviews of CO2
corrosion mitigation, monitoring and inspection outcomes.
Corrective action for these programmes if indicated.
b. Review of performance measures, in particular the
assessment of reactive indicators and the overall trends in
proactive indicators. Corrective action in strategy,
organisation and planning if indicated.
c. Root cause analysis of CO2 corrosion failures or management
system failures with appropriate corrective action
recommendation.
d. Overall review of a., b. and c. together with verification
findings for offshore installations and audit results.
Corrective action in strategy if indicated.
B1.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of CO2 corrosion should be
included in corrosion management system audits.
Page 81
ANNEX B2 – H2S CORROSION AND CRACKING

B2.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) may be encountered naturally
occurring in oil and gas reservoirs through ab initio vulcanism or
bacterial activity, or may be generated by anaerobic bacterial
activity in producing reservoirs (souring) during production
operations. It can also be generated in downstream plant during
production, processing and storage operations.
H2S is a fairly stable gas over the range of temperatures and

pressures encountered in oil and gas production systems,
though it can be oxidised to elemental sulphur in the presence
of strong oxidisers such as O2 and Fe³+ producing elemental Figure 1 – Example of
microblisters on internal surface
sulphur related issues in high pressure gas pipelines and storage
of a flow line due to hydrogen
facilities. It is found in concentrations up to 80+% in natural gas sulphide corrosion resulting in
reservoirs, though may be absent altogether (certainly initially) in hydrogen uptake in this
other pools and reservoirs. production tubing.
H2S has been a known corrodent in oilfield equipment since the

1880s when sucker rods in pumped wells in the Indiana and
Illinois oilfields were found to have suffered enhanced corrosion
due to its presence in produced fluids. In early days, due to the
toxicity of and handling difficulties with H2S, hydrocarbon pools
and reservoirs with high indigenous levels of the gas were rarely
exploited, though this position has steadily changed.
The gas is acidic in nature and can readily dissolve in water at

the temperatures and pressures encountered in many
production situations to form an acidic aqueous electrolyte
which can be highly corrosive to many metal and alloy
Figure 2 – Example of pitting
substrates. The reaction of steel with this electrolyte produces
corrosion on internal surface of
iron sulphide corrosion product and monatomic hydrogen. flow line due to hydrogen
When present as sole corrodent alongside water the corrosion sulphide corrosion producing
process can result in a number of different manifestations such stress raising features and
resultant lateral cracking from the
as hydrogen derived microblisters in affected substrates (Figure pits.
1) or pitting corrosion and cracking (Figure 2).
Page 82

However, it is for the contribution to the conjoint corrosion
mechanism of sulphide stress corrosion cracking (SSCC), which
can be an extremely fast acting and catastrophic mechanism in
susceptible metals and alloys at relatively low temperatures, that
H2S is perhaps best known (Figure 3). The cracking mechanism is
intrinsically linked to hydrogen uptake from the corrosion
reaction and potential embrittlement and cracking of vulnerable
substrates.
Figure 3 – Example of SSCC in a
susceptible steel matrix showing
The cracking may take a number of forms depending upon
both intergranular and trans-
circumstances including hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) and granular crack propagation
stress orientated hydrogen induced cracking (SOHIC). features.
Consequently, much attention has been given over the years to
the SSCC mechanism which has resulted in the important NACE, H2S is an exceedingly toxic
gas, which poses a very
EFC and ISO standards or guidelines referenced below.
serious health and safety
threat even in small
concentrations in gaseous or
aqueous environments.
Mitigation strategy options include: Strategy should ideally be

a. Use of resistant materials e.g. appropriate austenitic matrix determined at design stage
Cr – Ni steels or higher alloys, though care requires to be as retrofit of required
exercised to ensure specific compositions and specifications treatment facilities may be
are suitable for sour service. prohibitively expensive or
b. Low alloy steel with a corrosion allowance. impractical to develop at
c. Low alloy steel with corrosion inhibitor (CI). later stages.
d. Non - metallic materials.
e. Water removal, e.g. by gas drying.
f. 'Sweetening' of process fluids by e.g. amine treatment.

a. Process parameter monitoring, e.g. temperature, pressure, Effective use of corrosion
dew point. resistant materials may
b. Corrosivity measurement, e.g. coupons and on-line probes. depend on control of
c. Metal loss measurement, e.g. NDT, pipeline on-line process conditions.
inspection (OLI).
B2.3 ORGANISATION
c. Facilities Operations teams. mitigation implementation.
d. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. d. and e. lead on metal loss
e. Pipeline engineers and OLI contractors. measurement.
f. Safety and environmental specialists.
Page 83

Communication activities should aim at maintaining and Organisations should be
increasing awareness of safety issues and the factors that alert to any risks that H2 S
influence H2 S corrosion to ensure the impact of operating concentrations may rise
conditions and changes are fully understood. over time due to effects
such as reservoir souring,
progressive bacterial
infection and anaerobiosis
etc.
Awareness and application

of the various relevant
codes /standards relating
to H2S such as `Texas Rule
36`, NACE MR 01 75/ISO
15156 -1, EFC PN 17 and
API RP 55 are often
mandated.
A corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should include consideration Rate measurements and
of the various manifestations of an H2S corrosion threat resulting predictions involving H2S
in the corrosion and cracking phenomena outlined in section 1 can often give very
above. Much of the corrosion assessment work on H2 S has different results and all
concentrated on the relatively low temperature sulphide - stress have considerable
cracking (SSCC) mechanism and there are, as yet, no industry uncertainty of
recognised models for assessment of H2S pitting and general measurement or
corrosion rates in C-Mn steels. prediction. For example,
any reliance placed on iron
In addition, the possible influence of H2 S in high temperature sulphide (or iron sulphide
SCC requires to be considered in appropriate exposure composite) corrosion scales
circumstances. Furthermore, it may also be the case that an H2 S to provide long term
threat may not act alone and its contribution should be corrosion protection to
considered alongside other factors such as associated water vulnerable substrates
corrosivities and the presence and activity of other corrodents should only be taken with
such as bacteria and CO2. Iron sulphide in certain forms can the fullest system
remain reasonably electrically conductive and may exhibit knowledge and assurances
considerable non – stoichiometry in some circumstances. on present and future
operating conditions.
However, there is also evidence that this corrosion product can,
when it remains coherent and intact, provide protection to the
steel substrate and there are reports of successful deployment of
low alloy steels in high pH2S environments which naturally rely
on the continued protectiveness of the iron sulphide scale (or
mixed compositional scale of other species which are present in
the aqueous phase). Low concentrations of H2S in the presence
of CO2 are known to retard corrosion due, it is believed, to the
particular nature of corrosion products formed mainly of FeS and
FeS2. However, reliance on such scales for corrosion protection
can only be made when it is robustly clear that protective films
will remain stable and be undisrupted over operating lifetimes
Page 84

otherwise more serious and intensive localised corrosion may
result.
The H2S corrosion threat will normally have a number of line

items in the corrosion management strategic plan matrix to The CM strategic plan may
specify: be part of a wider integrity
a. Mitigation or removal methods. management plan. For
b. Performance targets. offshore installations the
c. Monitoring methods and frequencies. strategic plan should be in
d. Immediate action required on non-conformance. line with the verification
e. Organisational responsibilities for mitigation, monitoring and scheme.
immediate action.
Tactical planning activities result in:

a. Operating instructions e.g. process parameter limits, CI
injection rates. Tactical plans may jointly
b. Plant instrumentation and data collection via DCS and data cover activities relating to
historian. other corrosion threats.
c. Elements of risk based inspection schemes. Onshore inspection
d. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. for inspection tasks, schemes will be part of
corrosion monitoring services, chemical sampling and statutory written schemes
analysis. of examination for pressure
e. Inspection and corrosion monitoring service work packs, systems.
Implementation should be carried out in accordance with plan.
In addition, opportunity based internal visual inspection of
pipework is valuable to identify patterns of H2S related corrosion
(Figures 1 and 2).
Data relating to H2S related corrosion is gathered through

different routes:
a. Process parameters, corrosion monitoring data and,
sometimes, CI injection data can be acquired in real time into
specialist databases. Chemical analyses and corrosion
coupon results can be added manually from formatted
reports.
b. Inspection data is usually collected in formatted reports and
entered manually into specialist inspection databases
although download from NDT wall thickness instruments is
available.
Page 85

Data relating to H2S related corrosion management is analysed Data can sometimes be
in two stages: plotted on the same time
a. Initial comparison with performance targets to determine base to determine the
need for immediate corrective action, (e.g. CI injection restart effects of process and
or rate change, plant item fitness for service). treatment changes on
b. Analysis of all the data, usually by the corrosion engineer, to corrosion rate trends.
ensure that the strategic plan objectives are met and the CRA Statistical analysis can help
and tactical plans are amended if necessary. enhance the value of NDT
data.
The following can be used as proactive (leading) indicators: The strategic plan should
a. CI injection rates and uptime against plan. give performance targets
b. Frequency of measurement of process parameters (e.g. water for CI injection up time and
availability). rate.
c. Completion of inspection activities against plan and
schedule.
The following can be used as reactive (lagging) indicators:

a. Frequency of H2S related corrosion leaks.
based on required life and corrosion allowance.

a. Annual (and if appropriate quarterly) reviews of H2S corrosion
mitigation, monitoring and inspection outcomes. Corrective
action for these programmes should be undertaken if issues
are indicated.
organisation and planning should be applied if issues or
changes in H2S levels are indicated.
c. Root cause analysis of H2S - related corrosion failures or
management system failures with appropriate corrective
action and recommendations.
B2.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of H2S issues including corrosion,

cracking and other conjoint corrosion phenomena should be
Page 86

B2.9 REFERENCES
EFC Publication number 16: Guidelines on Materials
Requirements for Carbon and Low Alloy Steel for H2S –
containing environments in Oil and Gas Production, European
Federation of Corrosion, 1997, The Institute of Materials, ISBN 0
901716 95 2
EFC Publication Number 17: Corrosion Resistant Alloys for Oil

and Gas Production : Guidance on general requirements and
test methods for H2S service, European Federation of Corrosion,
1997, The Institute of Materials, ISBN 11 86125 001 0
NACE MR0175/ISO 15156 -1: Petroleum and natural gas

industries – materials for use in H2S – containing environments in
oil and gas production – Part 1 : General principle for selection
of cracking resistant materials, International Standards
Organisation.
M Fraser and J Still, Processing of high H2S and CO2

Hydrocarbons, Corrosion Management, July/August 2004, pp 16
– 20.
J L Crolet, Acid Corrosion in Wells (H2S, CO2 ): Metallurgical

Aspects, Journal of Petroleum Technology, August 1983,
pp1553 – 1558.
S. M.Wilhelm and R.D. Kane, Selection of Materials for Sour

Service in Petroleum Production, Journal of Petroleum
Technology, October 1986, pp 1051 - 1061.
B. W. Bradley, CO2 EOR requires corrosion control program in

gas gathering systems, Oil & Gas Journal, 17 May 2006, pp88 –
98.
Oil, Gas or Geothermal Resource operation in Hydrogen

Sulphide Areas, Rule 3.36. Rules of State-wide Application,
Railroad Commission of Texas, September 1976.
Page 87
ANNEX B3 – O2 CORROSION OF SEAWATER AND WATER INJECTION

SYSTEMS

B3.1 INTRODUCTION
This guide covers O2 corrosion for seawater lift and The effective control of
distribution (SW), firewater (FW) and seawater injection (WI) microbial activity reduces the
systems. O2 is present in the seawater lifted from the ocean potential for FeS film
at a level of approximately 8ppm and reacts with carbon steel formation and solid
to form various iron oxides, most of which offer little deposition, both of which
mechanical strength, thereby eventually compromising the accelerate O2-related
integrity of the corroded components (SW). The potential corrosion. Copper/nickel
threat to stainless steel equipment from O2 corrosion is alloys are frequently used in
localised pitting corrosion and/or chloride stress corrosion low flow areas of seawater
cracking. systems due to their excellent
corrosion resistance.
Safety, environmental and commercial policies influence the Safety policies: The required
choice of strategies for mitigation and monitoring/inspection. availability and functionality
Mitigation strategy options include: of the firewater system are
a. Coarse and fine filtration of lifted seawater for removal of defined in the performance
solids (sand and marine life). targets. Leaks from low
b. Choice of material in accordance with material selection pressure systems (SW) may be
guidelines (e.g. Norsok M-001 or Company guidelines). acceptable on condition that
c. Cu-Ni alloys for low flow (<3m/s), low pressure piping temporary and permanent
(FW). repairs are carefully managed,
d. Internally –lined carbon steel (SW and FW). that functionality is not
e. Oxygen removal: Mechanical scavenging (vacuum or gas- compromised and that
stripping Deaerator Tower) and chemical scavenging to wetting of adjacent
typically < 10ppb. equipment is minimised so as
f. Duplex stainless steel (WI) or Super-duplex stainless steel not to introduce CUI or
or 6Mo stainless steel (SW) depending on temperature general corrosion.
and residual chlorine.
g. Low alloy steel with corrosion allowance (WI). Commercial policy: Seawater
h. Overboard discharge when the O2 level is above the injection strongly influences
specified maximum. production capability and
repair or replacement costs
Monitoring/Inspection strategy can include: due to poor corrosion control
a. On-line or manual O2 monitoring (typically Orbisphere and may be substantial.
Chemets respectively) (WI).
b. On-line corrosion monitoring (e.g. Linear Polarisation Environmental policies: These
resistance (LPR) probe and corrosion coupons (WI). seldom influence seawater
c. Ultrasonic wall thickness inspection of carbon steel items systems due to their non-
(SW and WI) and Intelligent pigging (WI pipeline). hazardous nature.
The maximum flow rate of
seawater for effective
Deaerator Tower operation
should clearly defined and
adhered to.
Page 88

B3.3 ORGANISATION
c. Facilities operations teams. mitigation implementation,
d. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. for example following
e. Pipeline engineers. procedures for water quality
control (WI). d. and e. lead
Communication activities should aim at increasing awareness on metal loss measurement.
of the factors that influence O2 corrosion to ensure the
impact of operating changes are fully understood and at
raising awareness of the Safety, Environmental and
Commercial consequences of failure (see Policy section 2
above).
Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should include O2 corrosion Rate measurements and
metal loss rate which can be determined from a combination predictions can often give
of: very different results and all
a. Quantitative corrosion rate prediction, e.g. Oldfield, have considerable uncertainty
Swales and Todd. of measurement or
b. Corrosion monitoring results –LPR probes and coupons. prediction. Judgement is
c. Microbiological information, including planktonic levels required to produce a useful
and sessile levels from biostuds and coupons. result. The CM Plans may be
d. Inspection observations and measurements. part of a wider integrity
e. Leaks/failure reports. management plan. For
offshore installations the
The O2 corrosion threat will normally be addressed in the strategic plan should be in
corrosion management plans/matrix to specify: line with the verification
a. Mitigation methods. scheme.
b. Performance targets.
c. Monitoring methods and frequencies. Corrosion monitoring plans
d. Immediate action required on non-conformance. should be reviewed and
e. Organisational responsibilities for mitigation, monitoring revised to meet changing
and immediate action. operating conditions, either at
f. Operating instructions. a fundamental or tactical
g. Plant instrumentation and data collection via DCS. level.
h. Elements of risk based inspection schemes.
i. Planned maintenance routines. Tactical plans may include
j. Reporting requirements. measures to address the
causes of increased oxygen
levels. These may include DA
Tower antifoam injection,
pump seal maintenance,
increased biocide treatment
or increased oxygen
scavenger injection.
Page 89

Implementation should be carried out in accordance with The results of the regular
plan. Results obtained from maintenance activities may be statutory firewater deluge
useful (see notes and comments). system testing (e.g. nozzle
Data relating to O2 corrosion are gathered through different blockage with corrosion
routes: product or leaks) are useful in
a. Process parameters (temperature and flow rate), corrosion understanding corrosion.
monitoring data (from LPR probes and coupons), O2 levels
and chemical treatment data (residual oxygen scavenger, WI pump maintenance: Loss
biocide treatment and chlorine levels). Preferably these are of seal integrity may permit
mainly obtained in real time and are collected centrally for O2 ingress.
ease of comparison and trending.
b. Inspection data are usually collected in formatted reports LPR probe fouling: Fouling
and entered manually into specialist inspection databases with FeS may lead to short-
although download from NDT wall thickness instruments circuiting of the probe
is available. elements and consequently
Data relating to O2 corrosion management are analysed in erroneous high corrosion rate
two stages: readings.
a. Initial comparison with performance targets to determine
need for immediate corrective action. Performance indicators are
b. Analysis of all the data, usually by the corrosion engineer, likely to cover disposal of
to ensure that the strategic plan objectives are met and seawater overboard if O2 level
the CRA and tactical plans are amended if necessary. is excessive. A controlled
increase in oxygen scavenger
may be necessary to
temporarily compensate for
poor DA performance.
The following can be used as proactive (leading) indicators: Comparison of O2 corrosion
a. Chlorination (SW) and biocide injection (WI) against rate predictions, O2 levels,
targets. coupon results, LPR data and
b. Residual oxygen scavenger. carefully-selected wall
c. Oxygen levels. thickness data may assist the
d. Completion of inspection and corrosion monitoring corrosion engineer in
activities to plan. understanding the likely
degradation rates and the
The following can be used as reactive (lagging) indicators: reliability of each data set.
a. Frequency of O2 level excursions above target.
c. Corrosion rate < (corrosion allowance/design life).

Performance review should include the following with a. Determine if existing
appropriate corrective action in strategy, organisation and corrosion control measures
planning if required: are achieving the necessarily
a. Annual reviews of O2 corrosion management. low levels of O2 and/or low
b. Review of performance measures, in particular the rates of wall loss and whether
assessment of reactive indicators and the overall trends in improved monitoring is
proactive indicators. required.
Page 90

c. Root cause analysis of O2 corrosion failures, excessive c. The root cause of excessive
corrosion or management system failures with appropriate O2 corrosion may be due to
corrective action recommendation. the primary factor, i.e. a high
d. Overall review of a., b. and c. together with verification oxygen level or it may be due
findings for offshore installations and audit results. to secondary factors such as
Corrective action in strategy if indicated. microbial contamination, solid
or marine solid material.
B3.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of O2 corrosion should be The CM system should
included in corrosion management system audits. achieve the objectives of the
commercial policy by
maintaining the integrity of
the WI pipeline throughout
the design life.
Page 91
ANNEX B4 – MICROBIALLY INFLUENCED AND DEADLEG CORROSION

B4.1 INTRODUCTION
Historically, the management of dead legs on an installation has Examples of dead legs are
been problematic primarily because of the large numbers of illustrated in Figure 1.
dead legs that usually exist. Guidance is provided here for The two key causes of
identifying and managing internal corrosion of dead legs in corrosion in dead legs are:
hydrocarbon production. The objective is to outline methods,
which can be used in conjunction with the Risk Based Inspection i) Bacteria, usually
(RBI) procedure, primarily to: sulphate reducing
a. Assess the probability for the occurrence of dead leg bacteria (SRB), which
corrosion which can then be utilised within the risk matrix to proliferate in stagnant,
establish the overall risk of dead leg corrosion. oxygen free water
b. Mitigate the risk of dead leg corrosion. where appropriate
nutrients are available.
A dead leg is a section of pipe work or vessel which contains They oxidise organic
hydrocarbon fluids and / or water under stagnant conditions components in water
(either permanently or intermittently), or where there is no and reduce sulphate
measurable flow. More precisely, a dead leg is any segment of ions to produce
piping extending below the horizontal plane of the pipe which hydrogen sulphide as
can become a trap for water, sediment or other corrosive part of their
materials. Furthermore, a broad definition of a dead leg includes metabolism.
dead ends, which refer to piping that does not extend below the
horizontal plane of the pipe yet contains stagnant fluids. ii) Under deposit
corrosion caused by the
Dead legs can be divided into three main categories: presence of sand or
a. Permanent or physical dead legs: These are areas subject to corrosion products and
long term stagnation which have been built into the plant or where the mechanisms
have arisen from modifications over the course of the life of can vary.
the facility.
b. Operational dead legs: These are locations or sections of In oxygenated systems,
plant that are stagnant for operational reasons. anodic areas can exist
c. Mothballed or equipment temporarily removed from service under deposits due to
is particularly susceptible to dead leg corrosion, especially in differential aeration. In
the absence of an approved treatment. production systems, a
number of factors can be
involved, such as locally
high acidity within pits and
the reduced ability of
inhibitors to penetrate
deposits.
Page 92

The following also need to be considered as dead legs or Operational dead legs
potential dead legs: frequently exhibit greater
a. Lines from vessels or piping to PSVs (normally closed). degradation rates than
b. Instrument tappings / connections. permanent dead legs for
the following reasons:
Some systems are by nature of their mode of operation (no – bacterial and nutrient
flow/slow flow/intermittent flow) more susceptible to dead leg replenishment
corrosion and these should be considered to be 'dead leg – warming, which
systems' e.g. drains, firewater, recovered oil and relief lines. increases bacterial
activity and corrosion
rates
– secondary damage
mechanisms, such as
oxygen corrosion.
As a matter of policy, the duty holder should seek to assure the
continued integrity of all sites with the aim of minimising risk to
personnel, environment and business from the threat of deadleg
corrosion.
On an installation, there may be hundreds of dead legs.

Therefore, in order to manage these large numbers, the
recommended approach is to concentrate initially on those
systems where there is a significant threat of dead leg corrosion.
This approach will allow more focus on the high risk pipework.
Ultimately the highest risk systems will be inspected at the
greatest frequency, with due consideration of surface area
coverage, given the challenge of locating dead leg corrosion.
The strategy by which the objectives of the policy can be

achieved may be divided into a number of discrete areas:
a. Elimination/reduction of the risk: Through removal of any
unnecessary deadlegs.
b. Identification of pipework/locations at risk.
c. Mitigation of the threat (flushing and chemical treatment).
d. Prioritisation of inspection activity: Based upon consequences
of failure and probability of deadleg corrosion.
e. Definition of inspection scope: Type of inspection, coverage
and frequency.
Page 93

B4.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved in MIC management
include: Process engineers and
a. Corrosion and materials specialists. plant operators should
b. Microbiological specialists. assist in identification of
c. Process engineers and plant operators. dead legs and those
d. Production chemists. deadlegs are not normally
e. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. flowing and/or are
mothballed.
Communication activities should aim at increasing awareness of
the:
a. Factors that can affect and mitigate deadleg corrosion.
b. Why specific mitigation activities are necessary.
c. Consequences of not achieving mitigation requirements.

Corrosion risk assessments should be carried out in conjunction Table 1 provides an
with the consequence assessment to establish the risk. example of probability
assessment for dead legs.
Dead legs exist in all process systems. Some systems have
demonstrated that they have a more significant threat of dead An accurate record of the
leg corrosion than other systems. Where large numbers of dead dead legs that exist on a
legs have to be managed, it is important that the appropriate facility is required
resource is applied to these high threat systems, particularly (commonly known as the
when the consequence of failure is also high. dead leg register). This is
normally carried out as
It may therefore be useful to carry out an initial assessment at a part of the corrosion risk
general facilities level, to ensure systems which are particularly assessment for each
susceptible to dead leg corrosion are identified. This process system.
prioritisation should give a high weighting to the 'probability' of Alternatively, it can be
dead leg corrosion. carried out as a separate
exercise if this is
Guidance on susceptibility of systems to dead leg corrosion is considered more
provided below. This information is based on experience from appropriate.
three facilities in the north sea sector.
This register should
contain all physical dead
Probability of dead System legs and, as far as
leg corrosion practicable, all operational
High Produced oil, recovered oil, export oil dead legs. Typically, this
Medium Production headers, diesel, produced would be done by system.
water, closed, open and sand wash drains
Low Produced gas, gas export, fuel gas, flare
The record should be
systems, water injection, drilling. maintained as a live
document throughout the
life of an installation and
updated to reflect both
physical changes in the
plant and changes in the
mode of operation.
Page 94

Potential dead legs should initially be identified using the latest Mothballed or equipment
revision of the piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs). temporarily removed from
Piping isometrics and fabrication drawings, where available, can service should be included.
be used to provide an indication of the orientation of the dead
leg. In practice, it may be more efficient to establish the The dead leg record should
orientation of the dead legs during line-walking, rather than be integral with, or linked
reviewing isometrics. to (either electronically or
by a process) the
It is particularly important to identify operational dead legs. inspection database.
Production and operations assistance should be sought in the
identification of systems that are not normally flowing and/or are
mothballed.
The existence and orientation of dead legs should then be

confirmed by a competent person walking the system to check
the accuracy and completeness of the listing.
Factors to be considered when assessing the probability for dead

leg corrosion to occur within a given system include:
a. Fluid make up – aqueous phase / presence of sulphates /
presence of nutrients / oxygen ingress.
b. Temperature.
c. Materials of construction – e.g. corrosion resistant alloys are
not immune, but are less prone to dead leg corrosion than
carbon steel.
d. Pipe wall thickness (thinner wall pipework may have higher
priority).
e. Microbial status.
f. Deposit potential.
g. Operation – stagnant / intermittent / continuous.
h. Presence of biocide.
i. History of corrosion.
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
The output from the risk assessment includes mitigation, It is generally accepted
monitoring and inspection activities. These activities require that UT wall thickness
discussion on a regular basis to ensure short term corrosion examinations and
management tactics are effective. radiography are the
primary non-invasive
Dead leg corrosion mitigation measures include: techniques to determine
a. Removal or isolation: where dead leg corrosion
is present.
Once dead legs have been prioritised for risk, they should be
assessed for possible removal or isolation.
Careful isolation is particularly important when equipment is

temporarily removed from service, mothballed or
decommissioned. For example, vessels may be isolated at
their nozzles, leaving the inter-connecting pipework
stagnant. This is often exacerbated by 'passing' valves.
Page 95

In the majority of cases the removal or permanent isolation of
dead legs is not an option.
b. Draining, flushing, chemical treatment:
In the absence of a permanent engineering solution, flushing Flushing routines should

dead legs can reduce the corrosion threat. This option is form part of the
particularly important for operational dead legs. Ideally, dead installation suite of
legs should be flushed with fluids that contain biocide to maintenance routines and
inhibit microbial growth. Flushing dead legs with un-treated completed at frequencies
fluids can reduce the threat of corrosion by removing specified by the
deposits and preventing microbial biofilms becoming maintenance system
established. However, this can replenish the nutrient supply,
which can exacerbate microbial growth. This should be
taken into consideration when deciding upon a mitigation
strategy.
Flushing of dead legs should be considered in any system that

is subject to continuous or regular application of batch
biocide treatment. Continuous chlorination of the raw
seawater systems means that stagnant zones and operational
dead legs in the seawater systems should be flushed
regularly, e.g. firewater ring mains.
In plant with seawater injection systems, consideration should

be given to flushing dead legs during the regular batch
biocide treatment of the system.
Although biocide treatment of production and drains systems

is less common, it can be employed when microbial growth
has become established.
If plant is isolated or mothballed, even temporarily, it is

important to ensure that it is actually 'mothballed' and that
an appropriate mothballing procedure is applied, e.g.
draining / flushing / drying or chemical treatment.
Chemical treatment is generally ineffective if deposits are

present, which can shield areas of bacterial activity. Solids
removal is therefore essential prior to chemical treatment.
Chemical treatment target levels and flushing requirements

should be reviewed on a regular basis and modifications
made if required.
c. Inspection of deadlegs
Unless dead legs can be removed they must be inspected at a

prescribed interval identified during the risk assessment
process.
Page 96

a. The management of dead legs should be incorporated within
the routine inspection plans of the facility. Inspection
frequency must take account of the pipe wall thickness and
expected deterioration rates (e.g. thin walled pipework may
need more frequent inspection).
Inspections should be targeted at locations where water and

deposits can collect allowing microbial activity to develop. This is
dependent upon the orientation and configuration of the pipe
work:
a. Bottom third of any horizontal piping between the 4 and 8

o’clock position.
b. Off-takes originating from the lower half of horizontal lines;
inspection will be targeted at low spots, bottom of vertical
sections, horizontal sections, above closed valves etc.
c. Sections of off-takes close to the main line which is the
source of bacteria, nutrients and heat.
d. Lowest parts of vessel bridle work, together with any
associated level gauges.
e. Upstream of concentric reducers.
f. Locations where previous corrosion or erosion has reduced
the wall thickness.
The following are considered as proactive (leading) performance
indicators:
a. Biocide injection against targets. The dataset identified
b. Flushing routines against targets. under leading performance
c. Fluid sampling for microbial activity against targets. indicators will provide
d. Bioprobe, or coupon sampling for microbial activity against assistance to the corrosion
targets (where these exist). engineer in understanding
e. Fluids sampling for solids content. whether the MIC threat
f. Completion of inspection and corrosion monitoring activities associated with deadlegs is
to plan. under control.
In addition, any change in the status of deadlegs should be used

to help understand whether the MIC threat has increased or
decreased.

a. Deadleg related failures.
b. MIC damage in vessels, storage and ballast tanks.
c. Wall thickness loss in deadlegs, against corrosion allowance.
d. Corrosion rate in deadlegs < (Corrosion allowance/design
life).
Page 97

a. Annual reviews of dead leg corrosion mitigation, monitoring
and inspection outcomes. Corrective action for these
programmes if indicated.
b. Review of performance measures where applicable, in
particular the assessment of reactive indicators and the
overall trends in proactive indicators. Corrective action in
strategy, organisation and planning if indicated.
c. Root cause analysis of dead leg corrosion failures or
action recommendation.
d. Capture and roll-out lessons learned.
Overall review of a., b. and c. together with verification findings

for offshore installations and audit results. Corrective action in
strategy if indicated.
B4.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of dead leg corrosion should be
Figure B4.1
Page 98
Table 1: Guidance for assessment of probability for dead leg corrosion to occur
To rank probability for dead leg corrosion to occur within a system, the following criteria can be
used:
High Medium Low
Horizontal or vertical sections Horizontal or vertical sections Horizontal or vertical
containing stagnant fluids with containing stagnant fluids sections containing
water stagnant fluids
and and and
Intermittently Permanently Intermittently Permanently Isolated from normal
stagnant (e.g. stagnant stagnant stagnant flow (i.e. no refreshment
intermittent sections sections which of nutrients)
fluid or which or cannot be
circulation, cannot be isolated from
regular isolated from normal flow
draining normal flow
and and
With no biocide dosing or where
biocide treatment will be
With biocide present
ineffective due to the presence of
sand/deposits
Alternatively
Pipework that is a low point or
below the mid-line of a vessel can
also fall in this category if no
biocide treatment has been
achieved
Note:
If the biocide is effective, it will stop
Corrosion rates experienced in
microbial corrosion. However, if there
these circumstances for carbon
is a risk of CO2 corrosion the
steel items can be 5-10mm/year
corrosion rate depends on inhibitor
concentration in the dead leg.
Page 99
ANNEX B5 – GALVANIC CORROSION

B5.1 INTRODUCTION
Galvanic corrosion is a form of corrosion that can occur at the
junction of dissimilar metals when they are joined together in a
suitable electrolyte (conducting environment). For galvanic
corrosion to occur, three conditions should be met:
a. Presence of a conducting electrolyte.

b. Two different metals in contact with an electrolyte.
c. An electrical connection between the two metals.
The more noble metal (cathode) is protected by sacrificial Galvanic corrosion at a weld on a
4” cupro-nickel spool in a
corrosion of the more active metal (anode). The anode corrodes
firewater system which
at a higher rate than it would if it were not connected to the incorporated both CuNi and
cathode. The potential difference between the two dissimilar duplex stainless steel spools.
metals (as indicated by the difference in positioning within the Design had recognised potential
for galvanic corrosion and a
electrochemical series for the electrolyte) affects the corrosion
550mm isolation spool was
rate – the farther apart the alloys are in the table, the greater installed between the CuNi and
the driving force for corrosion. The relative exposed surface duplex stainless steel spools (5x
areas of the anode and cathode also have a significant effect – pipe diameters) – this was not
long enough.
the corrosion rate of the anode can be high if there is a small
anode/cathode ratio.
Galvanic corrosion or dissimilar metal corrosion is a particular

concern in aerated seawater systems and mixing of different
classes of alloys should be avoided. It is normally of less concern
in production environments due to the lower water phase
conductivity.
Most seawater resistant grades of stainless steels and Ni-Cr-Mo

alloys can be considered compatible with each other but any of
them will promote galvanic corrosion on less noble alloys such
as cupro-nickel and monel; all corrosion-resistant alloys (CRAs)
will promote corrosion of carbon steel.
Connection of carbon steel to titanium alloys should also be

avoided where a risk of galvanic corrosion or hydrogen charging
of the titanium alloy may occur e.g. titanium alloy heat
exchangers (tubes and tubesheets) combined with coated
carbon steel (e.g. water box). Any holiday or defect in the
coating will result in very high penetration rates of the carbon
steel.
Page 100

Safety, environmental and commercial policies influence the Coupling of dissimilar
choice of strategies for mitigation and monitoring/ inspection. metals should be minimised
in the original design to
Mitigation strategy options for galvanic corrosion include: prevent galvanic corrosion
a. Primary mitigation is in appropriate materials selection. The and the potential for
original design should identify and eliminate the potential hydrogen charging.
threat.
b. Avoid small anode/large cathode couples. Any upgrade or change-out
c. Electrical isolation of dissimilar metals. of materials should also
d. Installation of an internal cathodic protection system e.g. consider the potential for
resistor-controlled CP (RCP). galvanic corrosion and be
e. Installation of distance spool between the dissimilar metals captured during the
so that they will be separated by at least 10-20 pipe management-of-change
diameters (guidance varies). Distance spool may either be a process.
solid non-conducting material e.g. GRP, or a metal that is
coated internally with an electrically non-conducting material
e.g. rubber. The coating should be applied to the more
noble metal of the bimetallic couple.
f. Application of a non-conducting internal coating on the
more noble material in the vicinity of the bimetallic contact.
The coating shall extend at least 10-20 pipe diameters into
the nobler pipe material.
g. Apply corrosion allowance (at design) to the less noble metal
(hydrocarbon systems).

a. Galvanic couples without any of the mitigating options
identified above can result in localised corrosion rates of 3x
the average corrosion rate. This should be considered when
planning change-out of materials.
b. Corrosion monitoring although possible, is not practical;
change-out of material or implementation of strategies
outlined above should be pursued.
c. Visual inspection and UT can be used to detect galvanic
corrosion e.g. incorrect bolt specification in flange.
B5.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved include: a. input into materials
specification and identifying
a. Corrosion and materials specialists. the potential risk of
b. Facilities operations teams. galvanic corrosion b. leads
c. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. on change-out of spools,
flange make-up etc. c.
leads on any inspection
findings.
Page 101

Communication activities should aim to increase awareness of Factors include service,
the factors that influence galvanic corrosion, e.g. galvanic materials, temperature.
corrosion can occur through incorrect bolt or gasket
specification when re-making flanges as well as the more
obvious example of dissimilar piping connections.

a. Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should include a galvanic Rate measurements and
corrosion threat if the factors in 1 above, are recognised. predictions can often give
very different results and all
The galvanic corrosion threat (if applicable) will normally have a have considerable
number of line items in the corrosion management strategic uncertainty of
plan matrix to specify: measurement or prediction.
Judgement is required to
a. Current mitigation methods. produce a useful result.
b. Monitoring methods and frequencies.
c. Immediate action required on non-conformance. The CM strategic plan may
d. Organisational responsibilities for mitigation, monitoring and be part of a wider integrity
immediate action. management plan. For
offshore installations the
Tactical planning activities result in: strategic plan should be in
a. Management of change process for change-out and/or line with the verification
upgrade of materials. scheme.
b. Elements of risk based inspection schemes.
c. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. for inspection tasks and Tactical plans may jointly
routine maintenance activities that may make piping/plant cover activities relating to
available for material change-out or implementation of other corrosion threats.
mitigation activities (e.g. replacement of gaskets). Onshore inspection
d. Inspection and corrosion monitoring service work packs, schemes will be part of
covering responsibilities, coordination, procedures, scope, statutory written schemes
anomaly criteria and reporting requirements. of examination for pressure
systems.
Implementation should be carried out in accordance with plan. (Note: Commercially
In addition, opportunity based internal visual inspection of available database product
pipework is valuable to identify patterns. names are given for
information. No warranty
a. Inspection data are usually collected in formatted reports of suitability is implied for
and entered manually into specialist inspection databases specific application.)
(e.g. ACET, Credo) although download from NDT wall
thickness instruments is available. Data can sometimes be
b. Initial comparison with material specifications/piping plotted on the same time
specifications to determine need for immediate corrective base to determine the
action. effects of process and
c. Review of historic material change-outs, upgrades, treatment changes on
deviations from piping material specifications. corrosion rate trends.
d. Analysis of all the data, usually by the corrosion engineer, to Statistical analysis can help
ensure that the strategic plan objectives are met and the enhance the value of NDT
CRA and tactical plans are amended if necessary. data.
Page 102

a. Completion of inspection activities (for known material
anomalies) against plan and schedule.

a. Frequency of galvanic corrosion related leaks.

a. Annual reviews of galvanic corrosion mitigation, monitoring
and inspection outcomes. Corrective action for these
programmes if indicated.
b. Review of performance measures where applicable, in
particular the assessment of reactive indicators and the
overall trends in proactive indicators. Corrective action in
strategy, organisation and planning if indicated.
c. Root cause analysis of galvanic corrosion failures or
d. Capture and roll-out lessons learned.
e. Overall review of a., b. and c. together with verification
B5.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of galvanic corrosion should be
Page 103
ANNEX B6 – WELD CORROSION

B6.1 INTRODUCTION
Corrosion takes place preferentially at welds because:
a. Microstructural (i.e. second phase) and/or compositional
difference between the weld and its parent metal can result
in a galvanic effect that promotes corrosion. The anode (can
be the weld itself, or the heat affected zone, HAZ, whichever
is electrochemically less noble) is relatively smaller than the
parent metal (cathode); a high cathode to anode ratio can
accelerate the corrosion of anode due to galvanic reaction
hence weld can corrode at high rate. More severe corrosion at the weld
(deep groove along the weld)
b. Poor weld quality; weld contains porous holes that favour
indicating that weld preferentially
crevice type of corrosion.
corrodes in CO2 environment.
c. Poor weld dimension, such as weld root protruding out,
resulting in local turbulence flow and erosion corrosion
at/adjacent to weld.
Preferential weld corrosion (PWC) is commonly found in oil and

gas production systems such as seawater system, CO2
containing and high acetic acid environment (see photographs
across) mainly due to galvanic effect. Severe weld corrosion in contact
with hydrocarbon condensate
Alloying additions (e.g. Cr, Mo, Cu and Ni) into weld filler containing only a small amount of
water and saturated with CO2.
materials have been used to make the weld metal less anodic,
however, this may lead to other problems, such as the HAZ
preferentially corroding instead. In CO2 containing
environments welds with Ni additions can suffer PWC
particularly where low conductivity thin aqueous films, typical of
condensed water, are present. The mechanism is not fully
understood and in some cases welds with Ni additions have not
suffered PWC.
Preferential corrosion at HAZ in O2
containing environment.
Other factors such as flow pattern, temperature and carbonate
scale formation may also affect weldment susceptibility to PWC.
Corrosion inhibitor /chemicals that are used to mitigate

corrosion can sometimes be detrimental as it changes the
above-mentioned behaviours.
Due to the complexity of combined factors, as above, pre- Weld in contact with crude
testing of the whole weld sample in process oil/produced water containing
sand. Weld mainly intact at
chemistry/temperature/flow regime with the corrosion
bottom where corrosion product
inhibitor/chemicals is highly recommended. removed by erosion. Corrosion
severe adjacent to corrosion
products (dark). Erosion may have
removed corrosion product on the
weld root and scaled surface may
be noble to the weld.
Page 104

Mitigation strategy options include: Notes:

1
a. Appropriate choice of welding method and filler material, Use of Ni or Ni-Cu
e.g. Ni/Cu containing filler, Ni free filler 1 or hybrid weld. containing filler materials
b. Avoiding welds where possible. can be limited to
c. Stringent control of weld quality, e.g. control of environment (conductivity).
2
microstructure, weld dimension, and low porosity. Pre-testing of corrosion
d. Use of corrosion inhibitor2,3. inhibitor with weld is
e. Use of coating3. recommended.
3
f. Use of cathodic protection, this however can lead to Should these mitigations
hydrogen embrittlement of weld (see section 14)3. fail or become inadequate,
corrosion of weldment can
Monitoring/Inspection strategy can include: be significant.
a. Process parameter monitoring, e.g. CI dose etc.
b. Corrosivity measurement, e.g. on line probes, welded weight Detection and
loss coupons. measurement of weld
c. Metal loss measurement; intrusive or non-intrusive corrosion by NDT is
inspection. difficult. UT, RAD and
TOFD all have limitations.
B6.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved include:
a. Corrosion and materials specialists.
b. Production chemical specialists and chemical suppliers.
c. Facilities operations teams.
d. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors.
All personnel involved should be made aware of factors

affecting weld corrosion, be vigilant to notice any indications of
weld corrosion or changes that are likely to cause weld
corrosion, be able to respond and rectify the condition through
effective communication with associated organisations involved.

Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should include a weld Direct measurement gives
corrosion threat if the factors in 1 above are recognised. the most accurate results.
Probability for weld corrosion to occur can be predicted from a Rate predictions can often
combination of: give variables result;
a. CI pre-testing results. however this can provide a
b. Quantitative predicted corrosion rates for the anticipated relative indication on the
mode of corrosion (e.g. CO2, O2, erosion). corrosion rate. Judgement
c. Corrosion monitoring data and results. is required to produce a
d. Inspection observations and measurements. useful result.
Page 105

The corrosion management strategic plan needs to specify the The CM strategic plan may
activities to be carried out to reduce the identified risk of weld be part of a wider Integrity
corrosion to as low as reasonably practicable. Activities to be Management Plan. For
defined can include: offshore installations the
a. Mitigation methods. strategic plan should be in
b. Monitoring methods and frequencies. line with the verification
c. Measurable performance targets. scheme.
d. Immediate action required in event of non-conformance.
e. Anomaly criteria and reporting requirements.
f. Organisational responsibilities for mitigation, monitoring and
immediate action.
The defined strategic plan needs to be translated into a tactical

plan and schedule for implementation. The tactical plan can Tactical plans may jointly
include: cover activities relating to
a. Competency development plan. other corrosion threats.
b. Written procedures at item level. Onshore inspection
c. Plant instrumentation and data collection via DCS and data schemes will be part of
historian. statutory written schemes
d. Elements of risk based inspection schemes. of examination for pressure
e. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. for inspection tasks, systems.
corrosion monitoring services, chemical sampling and
analysis.
f. Inspection and corrosion monitoring service work packs,
covering responsibilities, coordination, procedures, scope.
Throughout the life of the facility, the CRA is required to be

refined and refocused through operational experience and
inspection findings.

Developed strategic plan shall then be implemented with:
a. Adequate allocation of resources.
b. Sufficient training and raising corrosion awareness activities.
c. Well defined reporting/communication routes, including
reporting procedures that address and rectify any out of
specification incident.
Such that the planned activities in item 4 can be carried out at Data can sometimes be
the specified frequency. plotted to determine the
effects of process and
Data relating to weld corrosion, as following should be treatment changes on
gathered and organised: corrosion rate trends.
a. Process parameters (pH, O2 level etc.). Statistical analysis can help
b. Corrosion monitoring (coupons/probes) results. enhance the value of NDT
c. Chemical/CI injection data. data.
d. Inspection results.
Page 106

Specialist databases are available in the market to help organise
this information, sometimes they can be acquired automatically
in real time into the database. Corrosion damage reports and
maintenance reports should also be logged in an auditable way.
With the availability of various data (and aid of specialist

database/tools) mentioned above, analysis can be carried out to:
a. Trend the weld corrosion rate.
b. Assess if the mitigation implemented is able to reduce weld
corrosion risk effectively.
c. Root cause analysis for any process upset if any (e.g CI
unavailability due to pump broken down) that increased
weld corrosion rate.
d. Predict corrosion rate and service life.
The data gathered and analysis performed will be the

information required for the following steps 6 and 7.
a. Chemical injection rates (e.g. CI) and uptime against plan. Performance targets should
b. Frequency of process parameters (e.g. CO2, O2 level) off be set in the strategic plan.
spec.
c. Effectiveness of response/rectification actions taken in event
of being off spec.
d. Completion of inspection activities against plan and
schedule.

a. Frequency of weld corrosion related leaks.
b. Corrosion monitoring results against target corrosion rates
a. Annual (and if appropriate quarterly) reviews of weld
c. Root cause analysis of weld corrosion failures or
B6.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of weld corrosion should be
Page 107
ANNEX B7 – GROOVING CORROSION OF PIPELINES

B7.1 INTRODUCTION
This section provides guidance on the management of
grooving corrosion of carbon steel pipelines. The term
grooving corrosion normally refers to the elongated wall loss
centred on the 6 o’clock position of horizontal or near-
horizontal pipelines as illustrated alongside.
The existence of a primary corrosion mechanism is a

necessary but not sufficient precondition for grooving
corrosion. Primary mechanisms include oxygen corrosion,
carbonic acid corrosion, microbiologically-influenced Figure 1. Grooving corrosion of a
Water Injection pipeline illustrating
corrosion and H2S corrosion. These are considered elsewhere
the preferential loss of carbon steel
in this Annex, with the present guide providing guidance wall thickness along the 6 o’clock
specific to grooving corrosion. position of the pipeline.
It can be thought of as accelerated corrosion when the lower

section of the pipeline becomes more electrochemically active
(i.e. more anodic) than the adjacent pipeline material due to
the erosion of protective corrosion products and/or to the
depletion of the cathodic reactants under deposits along the
6 o’clock position.
Grooving corrosion is a form of attack that can be more rapid

than a single primary corrosion mechanism due to it
frequently being the synergy of two or more mechanisms and
due to the localised nature of the wall loss leading to more
rapid wall penetration than general corrosion that is 'spread Figure 2. The possible action of solid
material in grooving corrosion can be
out' over the internal circumference of the pipeline.
considered as an erodent and/or a
deposit depending on flow
conditions.
Safety, environmental and commercial policies and the nature Conventional corrosion
of the corrosive environment influence the choice of monitoring devices located on
strategies for mitigation and monitoring/inspection. the topsides piping are not
Mitigation strategy options include: representative of the pipeline
a. Mitigation of the primary corrosion mechanism(s). conditions that give rise to
b. Use of corrosion resistant materials in accordance with grooving corrosion.
material selection guidelines (e.g. Norsok M-001 or
company guidelines). For guidance on the
c. Use of internally coated or lined carbon steel pipe. management of the primary
d. Removal of solid material (e.g. sand, scale, bacteria). corrosion mechanism(s) – see
e. Corrosion inhibition with operational pigging (production the guides for individual
systems). threats, e.g. CO2 corrosion,
f. Flow rate adjustments to reduce erosion or deposition of microbiologically-influenced
solids along the lower section of the pipeline. corrosion, H2S and O2
corrosion.
Page 108

Monitoring/Inspection strategy can include: It is unlikely that modelling or
a. Monitoring the parameters that influence the primary process monitoring alone will
mechanism(s). provide sufficient reassurance
b. Intelligent pigging to determine the morphology and of the integrity of a pipeline
location of wall loss. when grooving corrosion is a
potential threat. Intelligent
pigging is recommended for
this purpose.
B7.3 ORGANISATION
c. Facilities operations teams. mitigation implementation.
d. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. d., e. and g. lead on metal
e. Pipeline engineers. loss measurement. f. provides
f. Process specialists. assists with flow modelling,
g. Pigging specialists. deposition of solids et al. g.
provides and manage
operational and intelligent
pigging.
Initially, the corrosion risk assessment should identify the Normally, the separation of
primary corrosion mechanism or mechanisms. Thereafter, the anodic and cathodic areas is
likelihood of grooving corrosion should be determined by more significant in
considering: oxygenated systems (e.g.
a. The likelihood of solids contacting the pipe walls along the water injection and seawater
lower part of horizontal sections either, at moderate flow systems) than in oxygen-free
rates as erodents or, at very low flow rates as deposits. systems such as production
b. Pipeline flow conditions. systems containing CO2
c. Water transport/settling parameters (e.g. bathymetry). and/or H2S. Furthermore, the
d. Solids content (e.g. corrosion products, sediments etc.). presence of iron sulphide
e. Deposits on the pipeline wall (e.g. corrosion products, (FeS) in oxygenated systems is
sediments, microbiological films and waxes). particularly detrimental since
f. Microbiological activity. it is electrically conductive and
g. Oxygen content (WI). can support the cathodic
h. Cleanliness of the pipeline fluids. oxygen reduction reaction
i. Intelligent pig results. adjacent to anodic sites of
j. Operational/cleaning pig programme. exposed metal.
k. Corrosion inhibitor injection programme.
l. Temperature, pressure and concentration of corrosive
species.

Implementation should be carried out in accordance with the
plan, which will include the mitigation activities and the The results of operational
collection and analysis of data relating to: pigging such as frequency of
– The primary corrosion mechanism: completion, "pig trash"
a. Process parameters (temperature, flow rate, water analysis for solids, water, wax
content). contents, microbiological
Page 109

b. Corrosion monitoring data (from probes and coupons). activity and iron count are
c. Levels of corrosive species (e.g. CO2, bicarbonate, oxygen, useful for the monitoring of
H2S). conditions that may give rise
d. Level of solids (erosion). to grooving corrosion.
e. Chemical treatment data (e.g. corrosion inhibitor level,
oxygen scavenger, scale inhibitor). These may include increases
in water content, oxygen level
– Grooving corrosion data (see section 4). (WI systems), solids, FeS
formation, scaling, corrosion
products and/or bacteria.
The following can be used as proactive (leading) indicators: Intelligent pigging data will
a. Achievement of mitigation activities for the primary indicate the effectiveness of
threats. the strategy in mitigating
b. Corrosion inhibitor injection and operational pigging grooving corrosion and will
(production). inform a fundamental or
The following can be used as reactive (lagging) indicators: tactical revision of the
a. Number of excursions above mitigation targets. strategy.
c. Corrosion rate < (Corrosion allowance/design life).
d. The extent of grooving corrosion (intelligent pig data).

Performance review should include the following with The performance review
appropriate corrective action in strategy, organisation and should consider the adequacy
planning if required: of the existing mitigation and
a. Annual reviews of the parameters governing primary monitoring activities and the
corrosion. adequacy of the corrosion
b. Annual review of that governing grooving corrosion. management system as a
c. Review of performance measures, in particular the whole. It may be necessary to
assessment of reactive indicators and the overall trends in update the corrosion
proactive indicators. management approaches
d. Review of lessons and operator experience across the either fundamentally or
industry in view of the complex nature of grooving tactically, depending on the
corrosion and the difficulty in determining a precise findings of the review.
definition of the problem.
B7.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of grooving corrosion should be The CM system should
included in corrosion management system audits. achieve the objectives of the
commercial policy by
maintaining the integrity of
the pipelines throughout the
design life.
Page 110
ANNEX B8 – FLANGE FACE CORROSION

B8.1 INTRODUCTION
The term 'flange face corrosion' normally describes the internal
corrosion of piping and vessels that occurs at the flange faces of
plant components. It is conceivable that flange face corrosion
could arise from the external environment; however, this is
rarely the case and the discussion in this management guide is
restricted to flange face corrosion arising from the inside. The
external corrosion of flanges and bolting are addressed in B9
and are therefore not covered here.
The mechanism is similar to crevice corrosion and tends to Flange face corrosion revealed
following breaking of the flange
remain undetected until the flange is dismantled for inspection
joint and surface cleaning.
or when corrosion damage progresses to the point of failure
and leaks occur.

continued integrity of all sites with the aim of minimising risks to Commercial policy:
personnel, environment and business from the threat of flange Availability of plant
face corrosion. depends, amongst other
factors, on the integrity of
In addition, the duty holder should seek to optimise expenditure joints. Loss of flange
without compromising integrity through the provision of efficient thickness due to flange face
and effective management of flange face inspection and corrosion may require
monitoring services. remedial machining/facing
repairs or complete flange
The strategy by which the objectives of the policy can be replacement depending on
achieved may be divided into a number of discrete areas: the extent of metal loss and
a. Elimination/reduction of the risk: Through the presence of a the design thickness
compatible gasket/insulating material in the flange, regular requirements. The
monitoring via inspection of the flange to ensure integrity of commercial costs of repairs
the gasket material and correct torquing procedures. and any associated deferred
b. Identification of equipment at risk: Through screening of production may be
flanges to a defined set of rules that identify the risk criteria. substantial. In such cases,
Disturbed flange register. the costs of prevention will
c. Prioritisation of inspection activity: Based upon frequently be much less
consequences of failure and system history. than those for repair.
d. Definition of inspection scope: Nature and frequency of
inspection activity, including flange dismantling.
B8.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved in the management of
flange face corrosion include:
b. Process engineers and plant operators.
c. Insulation materials suppliers and applicators.
Page 111

d. Facilities maintenance teams. Organisational
e. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. responsibilities for
f. Structural and mechanical engineers. mitigation, monitoring and
g. Piping engineers and piping designers. immediate action should be
clearly understood by all
Communication activities should aim at increasing awareness of personnel involved.
the:
a. Factors that influence flange face corrosion.
b. The importance of having a sound tactical approach.
Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should always consider the Seawater systems are
following threats to flanges: particularly prone to flange
a. Exposed crevices (internal or external) where water can face corrosion due to the
settle; vertical flanges. corrosivity of the medium
b. Misalignment of flange faces. (i.e. oxygenated seawater)
c. Dissimilar materials (galvanic corrosion), gaskets. in contact with the internal
d. Coating damage or insufficient coating overrun at flange surfaces of the flange.
face. Flange faces on carbon
e. Pressure rating incompatibilities. steel coarse seawater filters
f. Corrosive medium in contact with the internal surfaces of and on pipe spools are
the flange face. typical locations.
The flange face corrosion probability can be determined from a Mitigation measures
combination of: include the internal coating
a. Inspection observations and measurements. of rebated flanges, correct
b. Leak detection. selection of gasket and
c. Operating temperatures and flange pipe class. retaining ring types,
d. Threats to flanges listed above. external protection of
flanges to avoid water
The flange face corrosion threat will normally have a number of ingress).
line items in the corrosion management strategic plan matrix to
specify: Planned and opportunistic
a. Mitigation methods. inspections should include
b. Performance standards. the inspection of flange
c. Monitoring methods and frequencies. faces; especially for systems
d. Immediate action required on non-conformance. where a significant threat
of flange face corrosion has
Tactical planning activities result in: been identified.
a. Coating maintenance programmes, which may be risk
based. The development of a
b. Leak detection. reliable non-intrusive
c. Elements of risk based inspection schemes. inspection technique for
d. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. for inspection tasks, flange face inspection in
coating maintenance, replacement of corroded items. the field would provide
e. Inspection and corrosion monitoring service work packs, substantial commercial and
covering responsibilities, coordination, procedures, scope, safety benefits and should
anomaly criteria and reporting requirements. be encouraged.
Page 112

Specific monitoring and inspection methods include:
a. Visual inspection. This can be staged. First, close visual
inspection (CVI) to identify areas of concern. Second, if
encapsulated remove any encapsulation system present. If
isolated, ensure the presence of electrical insulation or
bonding (if required).
b. Specialised inspection; phased array, non-intrusive ultrasonic
inspection of flange faces using shear wave techniques.
Implementation of flange face corrosion mitigation, monitoring The implementation of a
and inspection activities should be according to the plans that flange face inspection
are derived from the risk assessment and from reviews of campaign should provide
performance. The tactical plans arising from these higher level for flange face repairs
plans include: according to approved
a. Risk-based inspection plan. procedures (i.e. weld or
b. Inspection programme/regime. coating resurfacing
undertaken according to
It is possible that the inspections may need to be brought system requirements and
forward or pushed out to fit with other planned works; within the installations safe
however, the implications of such delays for flange integrity system of work/permit
must be understood and addressed. system requirements).
The outcome from the application of this strategy will be a

rolling programme of flange inspections scheduled within the
maintenance management system (MMS).
The success or limitations of the system for the management of
flange face corrosion will typically be evaluated by consideration
of the following specific activities:
a. Completion of planned flange inspection activities.
b. Close-out of remedial activities.
c. Completion of gasket replacements where reviews identified
that improvements were required.
A review of the system for the management of flange face There should be feedback
corrosion – typically annually or biennially – can be beneficial in from the performance
the following ways, namely: review in terms of:
a. Identifying overall trends in the performance indicators – Gasket selection
described above. – Internal coatings at
b. Identifying the root causes of flange face corrosion. flange faces
– Piping joint design
– Non-intrusive inspection
techniques
B8.8 AUDIT
The management of flange face corrosion should be addressed
during the audit of corrosion management.
Page 113
ANNEX B9 – ATMOSPHERIC EXTERNAL CORROSION

B9.1 INTRODUCTION
Atmospheric external corrosion is a threat to structural items
(including structural steelwork, handrails, walkways, stairs, pipe
supports, fittings, brackets, Unistruts and cable trays), process
equipment (including pipes, valves, bolted flanges, vessels) and
mechanical equipment (including cranes, turrets etc) on
offshore installations and onshore upstream terminals.
Although the threat is important for carbon steels certain
threats also apply to corrosion resistant materials and aluminium
alloy structures. External corrosion of a pipe at a
pipe support. Both the pipe and
the support are corroding at the
External corrosion is a form of oxygen corrosion. General crevice formed between the two.
corrosion will occur where surfaces are continuously or The coating is also breaking back
intermittently wetted with aerated water. However, higher as it under-rusts in the crevice at
the edge.
localised losses occur due to differential aeration effects in
which a corrosion cell is set up between corroding (anodic)
areas that are depleted in oxygen and (cathodic) areas rich in
oxygen due to their proximity to the air/water interface. Air
borne salt contamination can increase corrosivity and the
tendency for pitting.
Classically differential aeration can occur between the corroding

centre of a water droplet and the edges that are in contact with
the air. Various forms of crevice corrosion are generally the
most damaging, however. Corrosion occurs preferentially inside
the crevice where there is oxygen depletion. A crevice is
formed, for instance, where pipe is held against a support,
where grating is set in an angle frame, where labels and signs
are attached, where bolts pass through bolt holes, etc. A
crevice can also form at the edge of a coating where it has
Heavy under-rusting of the paint
broken down and it is the primary cause of rusting when film on a flange.
coatings deteriorate. Perversely, if a coating is thick and strong
it can under-rust more severely in a deepening edge crevice as it
may not readily break back to a new edge.
Where rust films form, such as in a water droplet or at a coating

edge, the moisture saturated rust can form a site for further
localised corrosion due to the oxygen depletion beneath it. This
leads to the formation of rust scabs.
Stainless steels, whilst generally more resistant, can still suffer

localised corrosion where oxygen is absent such as in crevices or
under deposits. At temperatures over 60°C with salt
contamination, stainless steel items under stress can fail by
stress corrosion cracking.
Page 114

Generally marine atmospheric external corrosion rates are quite
low, i.e. not more than 0,2 mm/yr, however some conditions
cause much higher rates, even up to 1,0 mm/yr. These include:
a. Continuous exposure to salt water, e.g. from deluge
systems, from overhead leaks and in splash zones. The
highest rates are found on hot risers in the splash zone and
where salt water leaks onto hot pipes.
b. Where water is trapped particularly where the water is hot
Handrail corroded by leak of fire
or salt laden.
fighting foam concentrate
c. Leaks of more corrosive fluids, e.g. well treating acids, anti-
chemical.
scale treatment chemicals.
Galvanic corrosion occurs where water is trapped between

dissimilar metals, e.g. in a crevice around carbon steel plugs in
alloy pipework, valves, etc, where carbon steel bolts are used in
alloy flanges, where carbon steel fasteners are used for
aluminium cladding, etc. However, many dissimilar metal
situations do not lead to galvanic corrosion because a
continuous aqueous phase is not continuously present.
Safety, environmental and commercial policies influence the Strategy may be
choice of strategies for mitigation and monitoring/inspection. determined during design
taking into account lifecycle
Mitigation strategy options include: cost. Organic coatings and
a. Low alloy steel with a corrosion allowance. low alloy steel, with
b. Organic coatings. attention to design detail, is
c. Metallic coatings, e.g. galvanising, thermal sprayed, the commonest approach.
electroplate. (See B14, Mitigation by
d. More resistant materials, e.g. stainless steel, composites, coatings, for more
aluminium. information.)
e. Design detail, e.g. to avoid crevices. c. and d. are mainly used
for particular situations.
Coating maintenance is a 'high ticket' item in maintenance Composites and aluminium
budgets and the strategy may attempt to find an optimum are often employed for
between coating maintenance cost and repair and weight reduction as well as
refurbishment cost, where safety and environmental corrosion avoidance.
considerations allow.
Whilst the coating on a steel structure is in reasonable condition

the strategy can focus on coating condition and on coating
maintenance or options to defer coating maintenance and allow
corrosion to occur where there is an effective corrosion
allowance (ECA).
Page 115

If, however, corrosion has already occurred due to coating
degradation the strategy will need to concentrate on substrate
condition and on determining fitness for purpose and then on
restoring protection or requiring repair, as appropriate. Where Note that similar items in
painting maintenance has been extensively deferred and the same structure may
potential corrosion damage to the substrate is widespread it have a variety of ECAs due
may be necessary to adopt a risk based approach to survey and to varying structural
assessment and to prioritisation of repair that brings utilisation. Pipework and
considerations of the consequences of failure into play. Aim to vessel corrosion allowances
minimise damage to grating supports as replacement/ repair are generally provided to
requires considerable effort. allow for internal corrosion
and the ECA for external
Monitoring/Inspection strategy can include: corrosion (if any) depends
a. Visual examination. on the actual internal
b. Metal loss measurement, e.g. NDT, pit depth measurement, corrosivity.
specialist methods such as PEC.
B9.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved include: a. and c. lead on risk
b. Coating materials suppliers and applicators. analysis. d. leads on
c. Specialist contractors for coating maintenance planning. mitigation implementation
d. Facilities maintenance teams. with support from b. e.
e. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. leads on metal loss
f. Coating inspection technicians. measurement and visual
g. Structural and mechanical engineers. assessment and f. on
coating condition survey.
Either specialist personnel or the inspection team may engage in e. and g. work on defect
coating condition evaluation but in either case appropriate assessment.
training should be provided.
The coating maintenance
Communication activities should aim at increasing awareness of planning contractors may
the: provide this training.
a. Factors that influence atmospheric corrosion.
b. Correlation between visual appearance and structural The main influencing
severity and consistent reporting standards for coating factors are location and
breakdown. (See B9.5.). temperature. Coating
c. The importance of having a sound tactical approach. breakdown may look bad
but may not need urgent
action unless it has led to
serious corrosion loss.

Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should always include external Published exposure trials
atmospheric corrosion threats. External corrosion likelihood and will rarely match the user’s
metal loss rate can be determined from a combination of: conditions closely. Coating
a. Corrosion rates from published exposure trial data. performance is dependent
b. Coating performance from trial data and service experience. on a large range of factors.
c. Inspection observations and measurements. Judgement is required in
adopting appropriate
values.
Page 116

The atmospheric corrosion threat will normally have a number The CM strategic plan may
of line items in the corrosion management strategic plan matrix be part of a wider integrity
to specify: management plan. For
a. Mitigation methods. offshore installations the
b. Performance Targets. strategic plan should be in
c. Monitoring methods and frequencies. line with the verification
d. Immediate action required on non-conformance. scheme.
e. Organisational responsibilities for mitigation, monitoring and
Unless a degree of metal
immediate action.
loss is acceptable,
monitoring frequencies
Particular consideration should be given to light section
must allow coating
structures (e.g. grating, floor plating, hand railing, enclosures)
deterioration to be trended
and thinner wall small bore piping, all of which may have a
so that maintenance
safety critical function.
occurs before metal loss is
structurally significant.
If the integrity of a structure is tolerant to the maximum amount
of corrosion loss that might occur over its life then a strategy to
omit coating maintenances may be acceptable. Factors such as
possible alternative use, life extension, unacceptable appearance
and safety threats from falling corrosion product should,
however, be considered.

Tactical plans may jointly
a. Coating maintenance programmes, which may be risk
cover activities relating to
based.
other corrosion threats.
b. Elements of risk based inspection schemes.
There are some proprietary
c. Campaign programmes of survey, assessment and repair
database driven risk based
that may use risk based prioritisation of assessment and
methodologies for coating
repair.
maintenance programme
d. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. for inspection tasks,
planning. Onshore
coating maintenance, replacement of corroded items.
inspection schemes will be
e. Inspection and corrosion monitoring service work packs,
part of the statutory WSE
for pressure systems.
If risk based approaches are used the consequences of failure

must include consideration of the loss of function of structural
items such as loss of escape routes, hazards from dropped
objects and loss of positive pressure capability of enclosures.
Implementation should be carried out in accordance with plan.
Condition data relating to external corrosion are normally of

two types:
a. Coating condition data including estimates of the extent of There are standard scales
breakdown. for quantifying estimates of
b. Inspection data, (visual, wall thickness, etc.), ares usually coating breakdown (e.g. BS
collected in formatted reports with manual entry into EN ISO 12944 parts 1- 8).
inspection databases although download from NDT wall
thickness instruments is available.
Page 117

Specific monitoring and inspection methods include:
a. Visual inspection. This can be staged. First, general visual
inspection (GVI) from normal points of vantage to identify Spreader bars are used
areas of concern. Second, close visual inspection (CVI) using where the corroded area is
access methods to obtain detailed observations and larger and pit gauges
measurements. cannot reach from a
b. Pit depth measurement using pit gauges for small pits or landing on uncorroded
spreader bars. surface.
c. Calliper thickness measurement on plate and steel sections. Wall thickness should
d. Ultrasonic (UT) wall thickness measurement where adequate always be measured by UT
surface preparation is possible and resulting surface profile at an adjacent uncorroded
allows. point for comparison.
e. Pulsed eddy current (PEC) where surface preparation is
difficult. PEC gives an average over
an area related to the
Data relating to external atmospheric corrosion management is resolution setting.
analysed in three stages:
a. Coating condition performance against target to determine
the need for coating maintenance to be scheduled to avoid External corrosion trends
metal loss. are usually followed on a
b. Where coating condition has led to metal loss, comparison qualitative basis although
with metal loss performance targets to determine need for coating breakdown data
immediate corrective action, (e.g. repair of excessively can be trended more
corroded items). See section B9.9 for details of metal loss quantitatively.
performance targets on equipment and structural items.
c. Analysis of all the data, usually by the corrosion engineer, to Trending coating
ensure that the strategic plan objectives are met and the breakdown allows the point
CRA and tactical plans are amended if necessary. Specialist of corrective action to be
contractors will update the coating maintenance programme forecast allowing coating
on the basis of the coating breakdown data. maintenance to be planned
for in advance. This
prevents metal loss
occurring if a backlog of
work is created.

The following can be used as proactive (leading) indicators: The strategic plan should
a. Completion of risk assessment against plan. give performance targets
b. Completion of coating maintenance against plan. for coating deterioration
c. Achievement of surface preparation and coating application limits.
quality targets.
d. Amount of coating breakdown in excess of deterioration
limit.
e. Completion of inspection activities against plan and schedule. Employment of qualified
f. Completion of repair and replacement within allowed paint inspection personnel
timescales for deferment. will assist in the
achievement of application
The following can be used as reactive (lagging) indicators: quality targets.
a. Frequency of external corrosion related leaks.
Page 118

a. Annual (and if appropriate quarterly) reviews of external Particular attention should
corrosion mitigation and inspection outcomes and the be given to any shortfall in
achievement of performance targets. Corrective action for meeting performance
these programmes if indicated. targets or measures and
b. Review of performance measures, in particular the related backlogs in fabric
assessment of reactive indicators and the overall trends in maintenance activity. The
proactive indicators. Corrective action in strategy, relationship to budget and
organisation and planning if indicated. resource constraints should
c. Root cause analysis of external atmospheric corrosion be examined. The advice
failures or management system failures with appropriate of the ICP should be taken
corrective action recommendation. in relation to safety critical
d. Overall review of a., b. and c. together with verification items.
B9.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of external corrosion should be
B9.9 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

B9.9.1 Coating deterioration guidelines
Assessment of the coating condition can be carried out using Photographic and
Annex K in BS EN ISO 12944-8. The following criteria are diagrammatic guides to the
suggested to establish the recommended action. degree of rusting, etc, are
available.
Degree of Degree of Degree of Degree of Recommended

Rusting Blistering (BS Flaking Cracking Action
(BS EN ISO EN ISO 4628 (BS EN ISO (BS EN ISO
4628 part 3) part 2) 4628 part 5) 4628 part 4) Note that 'degree of
Ri5 Density 5 5(S5)b 5(S5)c Maintenance rusting' is a measure of the
painting
required extent of coating
immediately
breakdown and not a
Ri4 Density 4 4(S4)b 4(S4)c Maintenance
painting measure of metal loss.
required in
current/next
annual plan
Ri3 Density 3 3(S3)b 3(S3)c Plan next survey
to occur before
deterioration
exceeds Ri4
Ri2 Density 2 2(S2)a 3(S3)b Survey at
intervals related
to expected
deterioration
rate.
Normally only the degree of rusting is relevant to coating

deterioration.
Page 119

B9.9.2 External corrosion of specific plant and structure item types
Corrosion on pipes, pipe supports and primary structural
members
Where does it occur?

a. On bare steel or where the protective coating system has
degraded and moisture and water together with corrosion
enhancing pollutants are in direct contact with the metal
substrate.
b. Early development of corrosion will occur around edges and
welds, high traffic areas where protective coatings are likely
to be damaged and surfaces subjected to fluctuating Top coat breakdown, enhanced
corrosion under clamp
temperatures.
c. Under deposits such as dirt that collect and hold water or
under adhesive tapes used for marking pipes.
d. Installation surfaces exposed to bird droppings and corrosive
chemicals used offshore.
e. External surfaces of stainless steel pipes and tubing exposed
to salt spray and sea water from deluge system.
f. Water drips onto hot surfaces.
g. Mating faces between pipe and pipe support saddles and
clamps which are natural moisture traps and where coatings
can be damaged by fretting and pipe movement.
Gross corrosion on module
What does it look like? cladding
a. Extended over a large area or can be in patches.
b. A combination of flaking, cracking, and blistering of coating
combined with rusting of the substrate.
c. The corrosion can be general or in the form of localised pits.
d. Carbon and low alloy steels are usually covered in compact
rust scale which under certain circumstances can be thick.
e. Stainless steels will have light stains on the surface possibly
with stained water droplets and/or salts.
f. Corroding cupronickel surfaces would be covered in
blue/green corrosion products.
g. Coating breakdown and corrosion around pipe support Structural corrosion concentrated
along edges, welds etc.
edges and extending along the mating faces.
How can it be managed?

a. Maintaining the coating system is the most effective way of
preventing external corrosion.
b. Avoiding leaks on surfaces from above.
c. Preventing accumulation of salts on external surfaces of
stainless steel including regular washing of the contaminated
surfaces.
d. Corrosion around pipe supports should be controlled by
maintaining effective seals around pipe support edges, Corrosion on cupronickel pipe
providing drainage holes, having pipe reinforcing plates at
the support locations, applying long life coating systems
requiring minimum maintenance.
Page 120

Inspection and monitoring:
a. Visual examination complemented with pit depth and
ultrasonic thickness (UT) measurements are the most widely
used techniques for detecting and evaluating the corrosion
damage.
b. Localised corrosion damage on pressure systems should be
evaluated using radiography before attempting remedial
action.
c. Use of reference areas in accordance with BS EN ISO 12944
parts 7 and 8 as agreed between the contracting parties.
d. Inspection at pipe supports requires a combination of visual
and long range UT. Where possible pipes should be lifted to
allow closer examination of support and pipe mating
surfaces.
e. Pulsed eddy current can be used on rough surfaces where
UT is not possible.
Acceptance criteria
Degree of rusting, Ri4 (BS EN ISO 4628 Part 3) is normally
identified as the point where action is required to plan for
coating maintenance. Failure to carry out coating maintenance
at this point may lead to excessive metal loss and/or to more
extensive preparation and painting. The resulting build-up of
maintenance backlog can be so great that it is not possible to
restore the facility’s fabric to the required state within its
remaining life.
To be more effective in avoiding corrosion loss before

maintenance painting can be implemented, it is best to trend
paint breakdown in successive surveys to forecast when Ri4
might be reached and to plan for painting on that date.
Where corrosion has occurred due to coating degradation the

strategy will need to concentrate on substrate condition and on
determining fitness for purpose and then on restoring
protection or requiring repair, as appropriate. Where painting
maintenance has been extensively deferred and potential
corrosion damage to the substrate is widespread it may be
necessary to adopt a risk based approach to survey and
assessment and to prioritisation of repair that brings
considerations of the consequences of failure into play.
Deferment of repair or replacement requires a demonstration
that such plant and equipment will remain in a safe condition
until the rescheduled maintenance activity is completed. As a
minimum the demonstration should include:
a. Physical assessment of the extent of the degradation
including area and depth.
b. Engineering assessment of the suitability of the corroded
member for the intended service including upset/extreme
event condition. This should be in accordance with
Page 121

recognised standards Design codes and fitness
c. Details of any mitigation to be implemented including for purpose methods (e.g.
enhanced monitoring API 579) can be used for
d. Load limitation, if appropriate, and safeguarding of the item piping and vessels.
from excessive loads. Structural analysis should
be used to determine the
For safety critical items this should be verified by the fitness of primary structure.
Independent competent person.
References:
EEMUA 200 Guide to the Specification, Installation and
Maintenance of Spring Supports for Piping
Corrosion of walkways, stairways and ladders

a. Grating and stair tread bearing, transverse and binding bars.
b. Supports for gratings.
c. Stair tread end plates and stringers.
d. Bolts holding stair treads, clips holding gratings.
e. Handrails, handrail stanchions, mesh infill and toe plates.
f. Plated decking.
g. Ladders, ladder cages, and their safety gates.
Damaged grating requiring
replacement
What does it look like?
a. Grating bars covered in tightly adhering compacted
corrosion products along the sides and in extreme case
complete disintegration of the bars resulting in holes.
b. Coating degradation and general corrosion on grating
supports, stringers and endplates.
c. Bolts and nuts covered in rust, bolt no longer protruding
beyond the nut, clips missing or broken through corrosion.
d. Handrails covered in compacted layer of rust with
indentations where small sections have flaked off. Mesh wire
corroded leaving holes and exposed sharp ends. Corrosion
Decking in need of recoating
of toe plate edges near the deck or in extreme cases holes
with sharp edges. Bottoms of stanchions corroded at the
joint with the walkway structure. Corrosion under clamps/
fittings attaching signs, etc, to the rails.
e. Blisters, cracking in deck coating with compacted corrosion
products under the coating.
f. Corroded/missing grating clips.

a. Implement a rolling programme of inspection, repair and/or Care should be taken when
replacement. Emphasis should be on regular inspection and inspecting corroded and
replacement. However, where replacement needs to be damaged grating and
deferred, fitness for purpose evaluation will be required to handrail which may be
justify continued use of corroded components. Close visual insecure especially if testing
inspection supplemented with UT is normally sufficient to strength by pushing on/
highlight majority of the degradation that needs to be pulling on items.
found.
Page 122

Acceptance criteria
Criteria should be objective and preferably quantitative:
a. If a quantitative approach is used grating, handrail,
stanchion and support member corrosion loss should be
measured and a check made to ensure that it will safely
support the maximum expected load. Criteria can be found
in various standards (e.g. NORSOK standard C-002) and in
manufacturers’ documentation, as well as developed from
design principles.
b. If a qualitative approach is used the extent of deterioration Unacceptable corrosion on rails
should be categorised to a set of standard condition
descriptions and corrective action taken according to a
sufficiently conservative set of rules.
Both quantitative and qualitative examples are shown below.
In addition:
c. Handrails, stanchions and infill mesh surfaces should not
have degraded to such an extent that people could suffer
punctures or lacerations, and/or lead to snagging of
clothing.
Corroded mesh in need of
d. In addition to a. and b., for pedestrian traffic, the deflection
replacement
of floor panels under the design load shall not exceed 10
mm or 1/200th of the span, whichever is the lesser. The
difference in level between a loaded and a neighbouring
unloaded flooring shall not exceed 4 mm (BS4592-0:2006).
e. Grating tread corrosion or deformation should not be
allowed to let large objects to drop through and present a
hazard to those working below. A 20 mm ball can be used
to test openings.
References:
BS 4592-0:2006, Industrial type flooring and stair treads – Part
0: Common design requirements and recommendations for
installation
BS 4592 – 1:2006, Industrial type flooring and stair treads – Part
1: Metal open bar gratings – specifications
BS5395-3:1985, Stairs, Ladders and Walkways – Part 3 Code of
Practice for the design of industrial type stairs, permanent
ladders and walkways
NORSOK Standard C-002, Architectural components and
equipments, Edition 3, June 2006
MMS Safety Alert 194: Guardrails
(www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/safealt/SA_194.h
tml)
Page 123
Quantitative assessment examples

Grating assessment
Detailed offshore survey to confirm fitness for purpose of grating/tread system and
quantify panels/treads/support steelwork to be replaced
y Measure span, depth and spacing of load bearing

y Measure thickness of support structure at most
bars
vulnerable locations (with corrosion scale removed)
y Measure thickness of load bearing bar at several
locations (with corrosion scale removed) [Note 1] Estimate residual thickness of support structure by date
y of replacement [Note 2]
y Estimate residual thickness of load bearing bars
by date of replacement [Note 2]
Determine load carrying capacity based upon Determine load carrying capacity based upon
estimated condition by replacement date [Note 3] estimated condition by replacement date [Note 5]
Is capacity greater Is capacity greater

than actual load than actual load
requirements for this requirements for this
area? [Note 4] area?
Yes Yes
No
No
Record location, size and depth of Support Detail remedial work

Grating is OK steel grating panel or stair tread for structure is OK required to ensure integrity
replacement of supporting steelwork
Notes:
1. For corroded grating panels or treads, break off loose corrosion product and obtain thickness measurements at the
worst spots on at least two load bearing bars local to mid-span and near the supports. Determine average indication
of remaining thickness based upon these measurements. The thickness of the load bearing bars should be measured
using Vernier callipers.
2. With loss of protective coating, default steel corrosion rates (for the UK N Sea) can be used as follows: (a) external
walkway/deck, above main deck, 0.20 mm/yr, (b) internal naturally ventilated modules, 0.10 mm/yr, (c) internal fully
enclosed modules, 0.05 mm/yr.
3. As an example the following tables provide an indication of the safe load carrying capacity of a typical rectangular
pattern grating for various bar thicknesses and spans. The tables are based upon a grating with 40 mm deep load
bearing bar at 40 mm centres and with a serrated top surface. The loads take into account a deflection limit of
span/200 or 10 mm, whichever is less.
The operator must ensure that the assessment that is used, and any safe load tables, are appropriate for
the grating actually in use and in any event approved by the operator's engineering authority.
Note: miminum acceptable thickness of a load bearing bar is 2.0 mm, despite a panel's span and loading
criteria.
4. Generally, grating used for walkways with no wheel loads is designed for a uniformly distributed load of 5 kN/m.
Concentrated loads may need to be considered for specific areas where machinery or other items could be placed on
the grating.
5. The load carrying capacity of all steel support structures should be calculated where the metal loss exceeds 1 mm or
10 % of wall thickness, whichever is the less.
Page 124
Table B9.1: Uniformly distributed load (kN/m2)
Thickness Clear span (mm)

(mm) 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 1 800
5 59.4 38 26.4 16.9 11.4 8
4 47.5 30.4 21.1 13.6 9.1 6.4
3 35.7 22.8 15.9 10.1 6.8 4.8
2 23.8 15.2 10.6 6.8 4.5 3.2
Table B9.2: Concentrated load (kN) applied over area of 300 mm x 300 mm
Thickness Clear span (mm)

(mm) 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 1 800
5 8.2 6.3 5.1 4.2 3.2 2.5
4 6.6 5 4.1 3.4 2.6 2
3 4.9 3.8 3 2.6 1.9 1.5
2 3.3 2.5 2 1.7 1.3 1
Table B9.3: Maximum lateral load (kN/m) for 48.3 mm

diameter post (material grade 43A, Fy=275 N/mm2 Notes:
1. For corroded handrail panels, break
Residual Post spacing (mm) off loose corrosion product at the
thickness critical locations and obtain an
500 750 1 000 1 250 1 500 estimate of the remaining wall
(mm)
thickness. The thickness of the handrail
5 2.26 1.51 1.13 0.9 0.75 post, etc. can be obtained directly
4.5 2 1.34 1 0.8 0.67 using an ultrasonic thickness gauge or
4 1.75 1.17 0.88 0.7 0.58 else indirectly using digital callipers to
measure the diameter and then
3.5 1.51 1.01 0.75 0.6 0.5 estimating the thickness assuming
3 1.27 0.85 0.64 0.51 0.42 negligible internal corrosion.
2.5 1.05 0.7 0.52 0.42 0.35
2. To assist in prioritising the
0.82 0.55 0.41 0.33 0.27 repair/replacement of the handrails, an
2 estimate should also be made of the
residual (lateral) capacity by year end
2007. With loss of protective coating,
default steel corrosion rates (mm/year)
Table B9.4: Maximum lateral load (kN/m) for 1.5-inch NB to be used are as follows: (a) external
schedule 40 post (48.3 OD x 3.7 WT, Fy=240 N/mm2 walkway/ deck areas 0.20; (b) internal
naturally ventilated modules 0.10; (c)
internal fully enclosed modules 0.05.
Residual Post spacing (mm)
thickness 3. Tables B9.3 to B9.6 provide an
500 750 1 000 1 250 1 500 example of the lateral load carrying
(mm)
3.7 1.59 1.06 0.79 0.63 0.53 capacity of handrails based upon a
range of post spacings and various
3.5 1.49 0.99 0.75 0.6 0.5 levels of corrosion at the base of posts
3.25 1.37 0.92 0.69 0.55 0.46 or at the sockets for removable types
3 1.26 0.84 0.63 0.5 0.42 of handrails. The operator must ensure
that the assessment that is used, and
2.75 1.15 0.76 0.57 0.46 0.38 any safe load tables, are appropriate
2.5 1.04 0.69 0.52 0.41 0.35 for the hand railing actually in use and
2.25 0.93 0.62 0.46 0.37 0.31 in any event approved by the
operator's engineering authority.
Page 125
Table B9.5: Maximum lateral load (kN/m) for 60.3 mm

diameter socket (material grade 43A, Fy=275 N/mm2

thickness
500 750 1 000 1 250 1 500
(mm)
5 3.75 2.5 1.88 1.5 1.25
4.5 3.34 2.23 1.67 1.34 1.11
4 2.93 1.96 1.47 1.17 0.98
3.5 2.54 1.69 1.27 1.01 0.85
3 2.15 1.43 1.07 0.86 0.72
2.5 1.77 1.18 0.89 0.71 0.59
2 1.4 0.93 0.7 0.56 0.47
Table B9.6: Maximum lateral load (kN/m) for 2-inch NB

schedule 40 socket (60.3 OD x 3.9 WT, Fy=240 N/mm2

thickness
500 750 1 000 1 250 1 500
(mm)
3.9 2.7 1.8 1.35 1.08 0.9
3.75 2.59 1.73 1.29 1.04 0.86
3.5 2.4 1.6 1.2 0.96 0.8
3.25 2.22 1.48 1.11 0.89 0.74
3 2.04 1.36 1.02 0.82 0.68
2.75 1.86 1.24 0.93 0.74 0.62
2.5 1.68 1.12 0.84 0.67 0.56
Page 126
Handrail assessment
Detailed offshore survey to confirm fitness for purpose of

handrail system and quantify remedial work [Note 2]
Coating breakdown and corrosion of handrail panel

Lack of integrity of handrail panel system
system (post, rail, socket/stiffener)
Mesh infill panel missing or badly damaged;

Kick plate missing or badly damaged;
Handrail panel system badly damaged due to impact.
Measure post spacing;

Estimate remaining wall thickness of post local to base fixing
and/or rail(s) (with corrosion scale removed) [Note 3];
For removable handrails, estimate remaining wall thickness
of socket (with corrosion scale removed) and spigot;
Estimate residual thickness of post/socket by year ending
2007 [Note 4].
Measure size of replacement mesh infill panel, kick
plate and/or handrail panel depending upon extent
of damage/deterioration.
Determine lateral load carrying capacity of panel system based
upon current condition and estimated condition by year end 2007
using Tables provided [Note 5]
Detail remedial work required
to reinstate integrity of handrail
panel system
Determine actual load requirements for area:
[a] heavy duty and muster areas, 1.50 kN/m; [b] escape routes,
0.74 kN/m; [c] all other areas, 0.50 kN/m
Is
capacity
greater than
actual load
requirements for
this area?
YES
NO
Record location, dimension Record re-coating

of panel, etc. for repair/ requirements
replacement
Page 127
Mixed quantitative and qualitative assessment examples

Grating assessment
Inspection and prioritisation

of grating repairs
Assess level of support: Assess grating specification against

SWL for area:
Single load bar not supported - P3
Grating falls below spec for SWL/span combination
More then one load bar not supported - P1 - P2
Loss of average support wall thickness > 10% - P2 Grating falls below spec for SWL/span combination
Loss of average support wall thickness >20% or plus metal loss - P1
any perforation - P1
Assess security of grating: Assess level of grating corrosion/

metal loss:
More then one grating clip missing/insecure and
loose - P2 Complete breakdown of galvanised coating and onset
Number of clips missing/insecure plus panel of corrosion - P3
presents dropped object or trip hazard - P1 Average loss of thickness > 15% or perforation of one
load bar - P2
Average loss of thickness > 30% or perforation in
more than one load bar - P1
No significant loss of thickness (< 0.5mm) is acceptable
for lifeboat embarkation, laydown areas and
areas for wheeled loads.
SWL Safe working load for grating based on calculation or supplied by manufacturer.
P1 Replace panel immediately or otherwise make area safe ( e.g over lay scaffold boards, barrier off areas
etc).
P2 Plan to replace grating in six-month time frame. Carry out follow up inspection of all areas at six-month
intervals to assess further deterioration.
P3 Plan to replace within twelve months. Carry out follow up inspection of all areas at six-month intervals
to assess further deterioration.
Page 128
Inspection and prioritisation of

handrail repairs
Assess movement of railings: Assess level of railing/kick plate

corrosion:
Movement of up to 100 mm and/or cuff links Complete breakdown of protective coating with
missing - P2 onset of surface corrosion - P3
Movement of 100 mm from vertical measured One through thickness corrosion area and general
at top rail - P1 advanced corrosion (up to 2 mm wall loss)
elsewhere - P2
Numerous/wholesale through thickness corrosion
areas - P1
Assess condition of handrail panel:
Severe loss of thickness ( >2mm) and/or more - P1
Panels with corroded and or loose panel clips
- P2
Loose panels with more than one missing clip and/
or holes in mesh due to corrosion or impact
damage - P1
P1 Replace section immediately or otherwise make safe area (e.g scaffold pole strengthening, barrier off
area, etc). Where handrail cannot be immediately replaced corrective action should be completed within
three months. Repair panels and replace clips immediately or make area safe.
P2 Plan to replace handrail within six months. Carry out follow up inspection of all areas at six-month
intervals to assess further deterioration. Carry out local repair to the corroded area. Fit new cuff links as
soon as possible.
P3 Plan to replace within twelve months. Carry out follow up inspection at six-month intervals to assess
further deterioration.
Inspection and prioritisation of

ladder repairs
Assess security of ladder Assess mechanical damage to

rungs and vertical rails
Single ladder fixing has become detached and/or
ladder shows any movements - P2 Ladder has bent / distorted rungs or rails - P3
More than one fixing has become detached - P1 Missing rungs - P1
Assess level of corrosion

Complete breakdown of the galvanised coating
with onset of surface corrosion - P3
Extensive corrosion and associated metal loss
across whole ladder (wall loss < 1 mm) - P2
Severe corrosion at fixings, rungs and rails (wall
loss> 1 mm) - P1
P1 Make ladder safe (e.g. barrier off ladder, erect alternative access using scaffolding etc). Corrective action
should be completed within three months.
P2 Corrective action should be completed within six months. Carry out follow up inspection of all areas at
six-month intervals to assess further deterioration.
P3 Corrective action should be completed within 12 months. Carry out follow up inspection of all areas at
six-month intervals to assess further deterioration.
Page 129

B9.9.2 External corrosion of specific plant and structure item types (continued)
Bolting
A typical oil and gas installation contains a very large number of

bolted joints in the structural members, mechanical plant and
process plant. Management of joint integrity over the life of an
installation is crucial for the safety critical elements which
includes management of bolt corrosion. Allowing bolts and nuts
to corrode leads to:
a. Increased risk to personnel from working with seized bolts.
b. Increased maintenance time.
c. Affects plant and structural integrity.
Localised bolt corrosion.
a. On bolted joints exposed to frequent wetting through
exposure to marine spray (i.e. outer exposed parts of the
installation, wellhead areas, flare booms), to sea-water from
deluge systems and/or through wash down activities.
b. Low alloy bolts on stainless steel flanges can suffer
accelerated galvanic corrosion if the bolt corrosion
protection coating is poor.
c. Stainless steel bolts tend to suffer pitting and/or stress
corrosion cracking in the typical offshore environment
particularly when exposed to thermal cycling and frequent
Significantly corroded bolts
chloride salt spray wetting and drying conditions.
requiring replacement.
d. Blind holes where water can collect resulting in localised
attack of the bolt shank particularly if a galvanic cell is
present.
e. Crevice corrosion under bolt heads and nuts
f. Crevice corrosion under thick but broken and disbanded
coatings where water collects, particularly at pipe flanges.
What does look like?

From light to heavy corrosion. Studs can lose thickness and
thread form. Nuts can lose shape through corrosion of the
flats.
Major bolt corrosion.
a. Implement a risk based corrosion management scheme
based on identification of the likelihood of bolt corrosion
and the consequence of the bolted joint failure. For pressure
systems this should form a part of the bolted joint integrity
management system as outlined in the EI document
Guidelines for the management of the integrity of bolted
joints for pressurised systems.
Reinstated piping system.
Page 130

The likelihood of bolt corrosion depends amongst other things
on:
a. Degree of exposure to salt spray
b. Flange orientation (horizontal more likely than vertical)
c. Coatings (hot dip galvanised or zinc/nickel coated– best with
service of up to eight years, Cadmium plated – worst with
life of around two years, Cadmium coating plus PTFE coating
–with life of around five years). Structural bolting is normally
covered in the same coating system as the main structure
and if maintained can have a very long life.
d. Bolt material (stainless steel is clearly better than low alloy
steel although the former is expensive and more likely to fail
through stress corrosion cracking in appropriate conditions).
e. Flange material (in particular low alloy steel bolts in contact
with stainless steel flanges).
f. Diameter of bolts (smaller diameter bolts are likely to fail
earlier through corrosion than larger diameter bolts)
Bolt preservation systems consisting of applying two pack

system of inhibited grease or covering with plastic caps or
wrapping in Denso tape have been used with varying success.
Performance of plated and galvanised bolting can also be
significantly improved if coating is also applied. Applying a
multi-coat paint system has also proved successful. In order to
prevent water ingress from flange faces some duty holders now
require the joint to be sprayed with inhibited oil and sealed with
Denso tape.
Visual inspection is the most commonly used system for

monitoring degradation supplemented with sample removal of
bolts for closer examination. A very important additional benefit
of gathering sample bolts is that they can be used to provide
actual mechanical property data if and when required.
Specialised phased array UT systems for bolt inspection are
available but not widely used.
Acceptance criteria
a. Bolts with mechanical damage to the stressed plain shanks
or threaded portions or cracks in any portion should be
replaced.
b. Bolts, studs and screwed fasteners suffering corrosion along
the shank to such an extent that the thread is no longer
discernable or the diameter has been reduced by 10% of the
nominal value should be replaced.
c. Bolt heads and nuts corroded to such an extent that cross
flats dimension has been reduced by 10% should be
replaced.
d. If stud shank is no longer protruding beyond the top of the
nut then the stud and nut should be replaced.
Page 131

References:
Guidelines for the management of the integrity of bolted joints
for pressurised systems – Energy Institute
PD 6484:1979 - Commentary on corrosion at bimetallic contacts
and its alleviation.
Cable trays, cable ladders, unistruts
Cable trays, unistruts and ladders are constructed from a variety

of materials but in the UK offshore sector the majority are
galvanised carbon steel or stainless steel. Galvanised coatings
are estimated to protect the carbon steel substrate for around
10 years in the offshore environment. Stainless steel
components on the other hand have generally performed very
well with few reported problems/incidents. Allowing these
components to corrode results in the cables and fittings not
being supported as designed and raising the possibility of
harming personnel from being hit by falling corroded sections. Corroded cable tray.

Prepare and implement a maintenance strategy consisting of
planned inspection and replacement.
Acceptance criteria
a. The general requirement according to BS EN 61537:2007,
Cable management - Cable tray systems and cable ladder
systems is that cable tray systems and cable ladder systems
shall be so designed and so constructed that in normal use,
when installed according to the manufacturer’s or
responsible vendor's instructions, they ensure reliable Corroded cable ladders.
support to the cables contained therein. They shall not
impose any unreasonable hazard to the user or cables. In
addition cable tray systems and cable ladder systems shall
provide adequate mechanical strength and all system
components shall have adequate resistance against corrosion
in accordance with Table 7 of BS EN 61537:2007.
b. In order to demonstrate the above the cable tray and ladder
systems should be in a condition to comply with the physical
test requirements outlined in BS EN 61537:2007.
c. Cable trays over walkways must be maintained in suitable
condition to ensure that escape routes are kept clear as
required by PFEER. Regulation 14.
d. Galvanised cable trays, ladders and associated fittings should
be replaced once the coating has disappeared and active
corrosion has commenced as it is unlikely to satisfy the
above standards.
References:
BS EN 61537:2007, Cable management - Cable tray systems
and cable ladder systems
Page 132

Valves
External surfaces of valves, including flanges, hand wheels,

levers, supports, actuator mechanisms and casings, stems etc.
should be protected from the highly corrosive offshore
environment in order to ensure that their function is not
impaired. Although corrosion resistant materials are used to
some extent, most installations still have a large number of low
alloy steel valves that require active corrosion management.

a. Ensure that valves are purchased with adequate materials
selection and coating for the severity of exposure.
b. Avoid galvanic corrosion problems, e.g. by ensuring plug Corroded hand wheel.
materials and bolts are either compatible with the body
material or, in the case of bolts, suitably isolated from it.
c. Valve external corrosion management should be included in
the process plant corrosion management system and the
same acceptance criteria as outlined above for pipework
should be used to govern the remedial measures.
d. To protect the stem and flange an approach adopted by
some users with some success is to seal them with Denso
tape.
e. Hand wheels and levers, chains and chain wheels, etc,
require adequate maintenance. Pressed steel wheels and
levers are more susceptible because of their limited thickness
and hence where reasonably practicable cast or forged steel Valve body corrosion.
versions should be used.
f. Include valves in the pipework inspection scheme and ensure
that the inspection includes attention to the condition of
hand wheels and levers, chains and chain wheels, actuators,
stem seals and seal retainers, bolting, grease nipples and
plugs.
References:
Guides for good practice in corrosion control – Pumps and
valves. National Physical Laboratory.
http://www.npl.co.uk/lmm/docs/pumps.pdf
Page 133
ANNEX B10 – CORROSION UNDER INSULATION

B10.1 INTRODUCTION
The term 'Corrosion under insulation' (CUI) describes the
external corrosion of piping and vessels that occurs beneath
insulation following water ingress. CUI tends to remain
undetected until the insulation is removed for inspection or
when corrosion damage progresses to the point of failure and
leaks occur.
CUI is a major challenge on offshore and onshore sites and has

been responsible for a number of major hydrocarbon releases CUI on hydrocarbon pipework
(insulation removed). The
leading to health, safety and environmental incidents and lost
localised nature of the – often
production. This document describes an example of good severe - attack makes it very
practice in the management of CUI. difficult to detect by non-intrusive
techniques; similarly the external
appearance of the cladding may
At time of writing (October 2007) a cross- industry study into
not correspond with the condition
the issue is being finalised which provides further, more of the underlying pipework as
comprehensive, guidance on all aspects of this mechanism – water can migrate.
EFC WP13 WP15 Corrosion Under Insulation Guideline

continued integrity of all sites with the aim of minimising risk to
personnel, environment and business from the threat of CUI.
In addition, the duty holder should seek to optimise expenditure

without compromising integrity through the provision of
efficient and effective management of CUI inspection and
monitoring services.
CUI on small bore offtake.
The strategy by which the objectives of the policy can be
achieved may be divided into a number of discrete areas:
a. Elimination/reduction of the risk: Through insulation
removal and use of better insulation specifications.
b. Identification of equipment at risk: Through screening of
insulated equipment to a defined set of rules that identify
CUI risk criteria.
c. Prioritisation of inspection activity: Based upon
consequences of failure and system history.
d. Definition of inspection scope: Nature and frequency of
inspection activity, including extent of insulation removal.
Page 134

B10.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved in CUI management
include:
b. Process engineers and plant operators.
c. Insulation materials suppliers and applicators.
d. Specialist contractors for insulation removal.
e. Facilities maintenance teams.
f. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors.
g. Structural and mechanical engineers. Insulated pipework with no
external indication of CUI.
the:
a. Factors that influence CUI (see B10.4).
b. The importance of having a sound tactical approach.
Not all insulated equipment will be at risk from CUI therefore a
screening exercise is required to identify which lines fall within
this category. See Figure B10.1.
Factors that influence whether there is a risk include operating
temperature (both steady and intermittent), material of
construction, operating environment, damaged or ineffective
cladding and sealing arrangements.
For carbon and low alloy steels the expected deterioration

mechanism will be external corrosion. For the purposes of this
strategy any line that is not permanently frozen, i.e. there is a
likelihood that the insulation and parent pipe could be in
contact with free water, should be considered as being at risk, Damage to cladding allowing
which gives an effective temperature risk range of 0 to 120 °C. water ingress.
Notwithstanding that, for the purposes of prioritising
inspections equipment falling within the temperature
range 40 to 80 °C can be considered as the highest risk.
Consideration should also be given to the operating

temperature of all parts of the system. All or some of the
system may be subject to intermittent/fluctuating operating
conditions (small bore off takes, deadlegs etc. may not be at the
CUI on valves (insulation
same operating temperature as the rest of the system).
removed).
This is particularly relevant to mature plant where the insulation,

pipe coating and pipe material may have been subject to
contact with free water over a number of years and hence even
low corrosion rates present a threat over this extended period of
time.
For insulated stainless steels failure due to stress corrosion

cracking and/or localised corrosion can be very rapid. The risk is
a function of alloy composition, operating temperature and CUI on gas cooler pipework.
probability of chloride contamination of the substrate.
Page 135

The typical locations of the oil and gas production sites
combined with other factors such as exposure to seawater fed
deluge systems gives a high probability of chloride
contamination. This is exacerbated by the progressive
evaporation of moisture on a hot surface giving rise to an
increase in normal concentrations.
External stress corrosion cracking and pitting corrosion due to

chloride concentrations are the most significant problems with CUI at deck penetration.
(Bestobell-type seal)
austenitic stainless steels and the lower grades of duplex
stainless steels and all equipment operating between 35
and 200 °C should be considered to be at risk from this
type of attack.
In order to prioritise inspection effort and timing, equipment

identified as being at risk from CUI needs to be allocated a
criticality. In light of the problems associated with identifying
the probability of failure through CUI (notwithstanding the
broad brush screening criteria highlighted above) the criticality
ranking should be carried out on a consequence of failure basis
CUI on crude oil heater.
only. This consequence analysis in its simplest form is based
upon the nature of the fluid service.
An assessment of the fluid service should be carried out and the

consequences of failure identified as high, medium, or low. It
may also be desirable to further prioritise in terms of business
risk (lack of redundancy etc.) for those systems having a similar
safety consequence ranking.
In order to concentrate effort on the higher risk systems it may

be decided that non-hydrocarbon service can be discounted
from the review at this stage although it may be included upon
completion of hydrocarbon scope from a safety perspective
(operating pressure etc.) or a business risk perspective.
The following is included as guidance on a criticality ranking of

lines based on fluid service.
FLUID SERVICE CRITICALITY

Hydrocarbon gas High
Condensate High
Hydrocarbon multiphase fluids Medium
Production hydrocarbon liquids Medium
Flammable utilities (Heating medium etc.) Low
Non-hydrocarbons Case by case
Page 136

In addition to fluid service driving the criticality and hence
priority for inspection, the maintenance and inspection history
for each system needs to be reviewed and considered. The
dates of the last full strip to bare pipe of the systems needs to
be ascertained together with any remedial coating works carried
out at this time. It should be noted that the system criticality is
not related to the extent of inspection activity applied (see
below) it is used only to prioritise the allocation and timing of
inspection resources.
The inspection strategy to be implemented is based around a Use has been made
major inspection event where the insulated equipment of a previously of NII techniques
given system will be fully (100%) stripped to bare metal to to carry out screening
inspect for coating deterioration and external corrosion. This is inspections in an effort to
supported by intermediate inspections at which a percentage of identify areas where CUI
the insulation will be stripped. See Table B10.1. may be already active
without removing
As a baseline therefore all insulated pipework identified as insulation. Although used
being at risk from CUI will be subject to a full 100% bare pipe with some limited success
strip (major inspection) every 12 years. The intermediate in the past it is considered
inspections supporting this will be carried out nominally at year that the results obtained
+5 and year +10. This will allow sufficient credit to be taken for from such techniques are
robust and efficient coating and insulation specifications on too inconsistent and open
systems where the intermediates inspections do not find any to individual interpretation
areas of concern whilst also ensuring that where problem areas to be effectively relied
exist they can be identified and remedied. upon. To this end this
strategy does not include
A first intermediate inspection will be carried out nominally +5 such NII screening
years after each major and will consist of a sample strip and techniques.
inspect to bare substrate. The extent of this sample will be as a
minimum, 10% of the insulation or 10 metres (for systems Although areas susceptible
where there is not a large quantity of insulated pipe). This is to to CUI can be readily
be regarded as a minimum only and can be increased subject to identified it must be noted
findings and inspector requirements. The scope of the that there are numerous
intermediate sample should capture all high risk locations examples of CUI occurring
(penetrations through insulation for branches, supports etc, low in locations once
points etc) as well as any areas where site observation reveals considered unlikely (e.g.
potential for water ingress due to cladding damage, open mid way along vertical
seams, evidence of staining etc. sections with no obvious
breaks in insulation/
cladding) so this must be
borne in mind when
identifying extent and
location of intermediate
strips.
Page 137

Where evidence of coating breakdown and/or corrosion is
found then the sample size should be increased to ascertain
whether there is further deterioration. Any areas found with
such deterioration should be refurbished and the insulation
reinstated where required to correct specifications.
In order to identify the scope and timing of baseline CUI

inspections required by application of this strategy the
inspection and maintenance histories of the insulated Large scale stripping of
population should be reviewed to identify last strip dates so that insulation can only be
suitable next inspection dates can be assigned to all systems. carried out when
operationally acceptable. It
It is possible that the inspections may need to be brought may be that due to
forward or pushed out to fit with other planned works. In cases temperature or operational
where the inspections are to be deferred past the 12 years’ limitations systems can only
frequency for full strip a risk assessment for operation of the be stripped during plant
pipework outwith this period is required. Participation in this outages. Therefore the
and approval of the outcome should include senior site planned inspections need
management in addition to inspection and assurance personnel. to be considered as part of
the overall plant operating
The outcome from the application of this strategy will be a strategy and tie in with
rolling programme of equipment inspections scheduled within shutdowns etc. where
the maintenance management system (MMS). appropriate.
Completion of CUI inspection and remedial programme against
plan is the main input KPI
The following can be used as output KPI:

a. Frequency of external corrosion related leaks attributed to
CUI.
b. Reduction of wall thickness against corrosion allowance as a
result of CUI.
Performance review should include the following: Particular attention should
be given to any shortfall in
a. Annual (and if appropriate quarterly) reviews of CUI meeting performance
mitigation and inspection outcomes and the achievement of targets or measures and
performance targets. Corrective action for these related backlogs in fabric
programmes if indicated. maintenance activity. The
b. Review of performance measures, in particular the relationship to budget and
assessment of output KPI and the overall trends in input KPI. resource constraints should
Corrective action in strategy, organisation and planning if be examined. The advice
indicated. of the ICP should be sought
c. Root cause analysis of CUI failures or management system in relation to safety critical
failures with appropriate corrective action recommendation. items.
Overall review of above together with verification findings for

offshore installations and audit results. Corrective action in
strategy if indicated.
Page 138

B10.8 AUDIT
The effectiveness of corrosion management activities including
the CUI programme will be included in the planned integrity
management system audits. The intention of the audit process
is to provide assurance that the CUI management programme is
proceeding according to plan.
An annual audit and review plan for integrity management

system shall be developed and maintained by the duty holder
for each site. All aspects of corrosion management including
the CUI programme shall be audited against the checklist
provided in Annex C of this document:
Sample checklist for assessment of corrosion management

system for oil and gas processing facilities.
Page 139
Line
list/equipment
inventory
CUI risk screening
No
Insulated
Material of
construction
Yes
Stop
Insulation
review
Corrossion Carbon and low
resistant alloys alloy steels
Insulation Yes Stop
required for
process reasons No
Chloride Operating temp leads
No No
No contamination to presence of free
likely water
Yes Yes
PPE issues
Yes
Operating temp Perform critcality
between 35 and and ranking
Yes No
200 oC review
No
Remove and Remove and

fit cages leave exposed
Stop
Figure B10.1 Overview of insulation review and CUI risk screening
Table B10.1
Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Major Major

Year 0 inspection inspection inspection inspection inspection inspection
1 year scope 2 year scope year scope
Last Year 0 + 5 Minimum 10% Year 0 +10 Minimum 10% of Year 0 + 12 Full 100%
documented of insulation or insulation or 10 strip to bare
full line strip 10 metres metres length pipe.
and coating length whichever the
check/re- whichever the greater (risk
instatement greater assessment
to spec. (baseline scope – required for
(baseline scope Sample different continued
– scope to be areas from Inter 1 operation
increased if but still include all outwith this
initial findings high risk areas. period)
warrant further Scope to be
inspection) increased if initial
findings warrant
further
inspection.)
Page 140
ANNEX B11 – STRESS CORROSION CRACKING AND LOCALISED

CORROSION OF STAINLESS STEELS IN CHLORIDE ENVIRONMENTS

B11.1 INTRODUCTION
Stainless steels are utilised for numerous applications in the
offshore oil and gas industry, typically where the use of carbon
steel with corrosion mitigation is either technically or
economically prohibitive.
However, stainless steels can be susceptible to localised attack

or stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in chloride-bearing aqueous
environments. Such environments can be either deaerated, e.g. Transgranular SCC of a 316L
fitting under insulation.
from formation water in raw production fluids, or aerated, e.g.
in seawater handling, submerged or marine atmospheric
conditions.
Factors which influence the susceptibility of a given alloy include

exposure temperature, chloride content/concentration effects,
oxygen availability, applied/residual stress levels, arrangement
(i.e. crevices and clamps) free chlorine and pH.
Crevice corrosion on 316L
The following information on management of localised
instrument tubing.
corrosion and cracking threats includes both internal risks in
aerated/deaerated brines and external risks in submerged,
atmospheric and under insulation marine service.
The strategy adopted for control, mitigation and monitoring Control strategy is usually
depends on the nature of the system and identified risk, i.e. determined during the
from the likelihood and consequence of failure. The approach design stage with selection
to risk management is influenced by specific safety, driven by technical
environmental and commercial policies. constraints.
For external risks, mitigation measures include: Material selection is

a. Selection of material compatible with temperature/ dictated to a large extent
environment. by the surface temperature.
b. Coating systems, e.g. TSA. Some guidance on
c. Environmental control, i.e. salt deposits, dripping overhead exposure limitations is given
lines, SW deluge/deck washing, HVAC, plugging trunnion in documents such as
weepholes, etc. NORSOK M-001. Materials
d. Cathodic protection for submerged equipment (note - can be used beyond these
appropriate consideration of HISC risks in duplex/martensitic limits where a suitable
materials). surface coating system, e.g.
e. Maintenance of insulation integrity. sealed thermally sprayed
f. Limiting stress and degree of cold work, e.g. for instrument aluminium (TSA), is utilised.
tubing fittings.
g. Elimination of crevice sites by clamp design.
h. Chemical inhibition, e.g. CI impregnated clamps for crevice
corrosion.
Page 141

For internal risks, mitigation measures include:
a. Selection of materials compatible with temperature and
environment or use of liners or overlays. This may involve
lower grade materials subject to other degradation
mechanisms.
b. Deaeration in water injection service.
c. Control of chlorination in seawater systems.
d. Limiting chloride content or dilution with wash water, e.g. in
low formation water cut conditions.
e. Avoidance of sessile bacteria.
f. Correct design to avoid stagnant legs or excessive flow
velocities. Super duplex weld corrosion in an
aerated seawater system
g. Chemical inhibition.
operating at elevated
temperature.
Monitoring strategies for external risks will typically concentrate
on maintenance of the physical barrier, i.e. condition of the
coating system or insulation, and control of the environment,
i.e. salt deposit removal, prevention of continuous wetting, etc.
For internal risks, monitoring of process control, e.g. dissolved

oxygen management, wash water availability or process
temperature, is the principal method although techniques have
been proposed for online electrochemical monitoring of both
localised corrosion and cracking. Of these, electrochemical
noise is considered the most capable.
Inspection strategies for external localised corrosion and

cracking should generally incorporate screening by general and
close visual inspection/boroscope examination for evidence of
damage or other leading indicators. For cracking, this is
followed up, where necessary, by surface or volumetric NDE.
Several techniques have been used to date including DPI, MPI, Internal SCC of duplex stainless
CHIME, ACFM, manual/multiprobe UT and acoustic emission. steel.
B11.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that should be involved include: Roles a. and b. lead on risk
b. Process specialists. analysis. c. leads on
c. Facilities operations/maintenance teams. mitigation implementation.
d. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. d. leads on systems
examination and detection.
the factors that influence chloride corrosion and cracking in the Significant factors are listed
various applications identified. Furthermore, given that the in section 1.
principal mitigation measures are fabric maintenance and
process control, it is essential that the impact of inadequate
control is fully understood by the disciplines involved.
Page 142

The corrosion risk assessment process for localised corrosion The CM strategic plan may
and SCC threats should be triggered when stainless steels are be part of a wider integrity
considered for an application. It should be noted that, unlike management plan. For
mechanisms such as CO2 or O2 corrosion, localised corrosion offshore installations the
and cracking rates are not quantitatively modelled. Instead, strategic plan should be in
factors influencing susceptibility are considered against line with the verification
established material performance limits, i.e. temperature, scheme.
chloride content, residual chlorine, etc, and the probability of an
active mechanism established.
The threat of localised corrosion and cracking of stainless steels

will typically be addressed by the corrosion management
strategic plan, which specifies:
a. Mitigation methods.
b. Performance targets.
c. Monitoring methods and frequencies.
d. Non-conformance response plans.
e. Organisation responsibilities.
f. Elements of RBI schemes.
g. Reporting requirements.
a. Operating instructions, e.g. process parameter limits.
b. Plant instrumentation and data collection via DCS.
c. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. inspection, removal of
deposits, water sampling, etc.

Implementation should be carried out in accordance with the
corrosion management strategic plan. In addition, opportunistic
inspection of pipework and insulation condition can provide
valuable indicators of potential degradation.
Data relating to controlling the risks of localised corrosion and

cracking are gathered in a variety of ways, depending on the
particular mechanism and system. These can be summarised as:
a. Process parameter monitoring and water analyses Opportunistic inspection detected
staining emanating from a
b. Inspection data, which is usually collected in formatted
trunnion internal. This
reports and entered into specialist inspection databases. subsequently resulted in
identification of external SCC on
Data gather by the means indicated above are subject to 22Cr duplex stainless steel.
analysis in two stages:
a. Initial comparison against control levels or performance
targets to determine the need for immediate action, e.g. loss
of wash water for chloride dilution.
b. Periodic analysis of all data to compare performance against
the strategic plan and allow remedial actions to be evaluated
as necessary.
Page 143

Proactive (leading) indicators include: The strategic plan should
a. Completion of inspection and maintenance activities against give performance targets
plan and schedule. for important control
b. Control of process parameters. parameters such as wash
c. Control of chemical additions. water availability.
Reactive (lagging) indicators include:
a. Incidence of leaks or identification of degradation.
b. Trending of process and chemical addition control.

a. Periodic reviews of chloride stress corrosion cracking (CSCC)
and localised corrosion mitigation, monitoring and
inspection outcomes. Corrective action for these
programmes if deficient.
organisation and planning as required.
c. Root cause analysis of relevant corrosion and cracking
failures or management system failures with appropriate
corrective action recommendation.
Corrective action in strategy as necessary.
B11.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of localised corrosion and cracking
risks in stainless steels should be included in corrosion
management system audits or subject to separate audits to
confirm that processes are functioning adequately.
B11.9 FIELD EXPERIENCES AND REFERENCES

Numerous instances of external localised corrosion and cracking
damage on stainless steels have been experienced on North Sea
offshore installations. Experiences include crevice corrosion of
instrument tubing under clamps, pitting corrosion at elevated
temperature and in the presence of deposits and SCC of
compression fittings under insulation. Whilst the majority of
cases have involved lower grade stainless steels such as 316,
external SCC has been experienced in hot 22Cr duplex piping
where an unsealed trunnion weephole resulted in seawater Pitting and SCC inside a trunnion.
ingress.
Experiences of internal corrosion and cracking of stainless steels

in chloride containing waters are generally linked to either
inadequate assessment/understanding of risks or process control
error, e.g. excessive operating temperature (leading to
Page 144

preferential corrosion of welds) or residual chlorine contents
(crevice corrosion on flange faces). Internal cracking of 22Cr
duplex stainless steels has also been experienced in high
temperature condensate service. In these cases, an
undersaturated vapour phase created by pressure drops across
valves generated chloride concentration effects due to water
evaporation. Cracking at welds resulted.
References:
1. Stress Corrosion Cracking of Duplex Stainless Steel Piping
Systems in Hot Chloride Service, HSE Offshore Information
Sheet 7/2007. Instrument tubing fitting
2. Review of External Stress Corrosion Cracking if 22%Cr exhibiting SCC.
Duplex Stainless Steel, HSE Research Report 129, 2003.
3. Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking of Duplex Stainless Steels
in the Absence of Oxygen, HSE Research Report 298, 2005.
4. NORSOK Standard M-001, Materials Selection.
5. DNV RP F112 Design of Duplex Stainless Steel Subsea
Equipment Exposed to Cathodic Protection
Page 145
ANNEX B12 – EROSION/CORROSION

B12.1 INTRODUCTION
Erosion and erosion-corrosion occurs in equipment conveying
processing fluids produced from oil and gas reservoirs that
contain solid particles. Solid particles produced from the
reservoir enter the production tubing and are carried through to
topsides production separation and export. Solids prefer to
follow the most dense fluid, therefore generally speaking the
particles will prefer to follow water, oil and gas fluids
respectively.
The erosive nature of solid particles is dependent on a number
of factors including, but not limited to, process fluid Severe erosion of a choke valve.
constituents, temperature, pressure and particle geometry.
Solid particles erode equipment items due to physical impact.
Erosion-corrosion occurs where solid particles erode corrosion
products from the metal surface thereby exposing it to the
corrosion process.

Sand prediction should be carried out for each field / well prior
to detailed design. The impact on facilities should be
determined and appropriate mitigation strategies set in place as
per the bullet points below. Individual company safety, Downhole sand control
environmental and commercial policies influence the choice of strategy usually determined
strategies for mitigation and monitoring / inspection. during design.
Mitigation strategy options include:

a. Downhole sand control.
b. Corrosion / erosion allowance.
c. Erosion resistant materials (e.g. tungsten carbide choke
materials).

a. Sand detection (intrusive and/or acoustic).
b. Process parameter monitoring, e.g. temperature, pressure,
flowrate.
c. Corrosivity measurement, e.g. coupons and probes.
d. Metal loss measurement, e.g. NDT.
B12.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved include:
a. Materials and corrosion specialist.
b. Production technology.
c. Production chemical specialists and chemical suppliers.
d. Facilities operations teams.
e. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors.
Page 146

the factors that influence erosion/corrosion to ensure the impact
of operating changes are fully understood.

Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should include an erosion/ Rate measurements and
corrosion assessment to establish the potential effect on predictions can often give
equipment. Erosion/corrosion probability and metal loss rate very different results and all
can be determined from a combination of: have considerable
a. Quantitative corrosion rate prediction, e.g. Tulsa erosion uncertainty of
model. measurement or prediction.
b. Erosion and corrosion monitoring results. Judgement is required to
c. Inspection observations and measurements. produce a useful result.
The erosion/corrosion threat should be identified in the The CM strategic plan may
corrosion management strategic plan matrix to specify be part of a wider integrity
a. Quantified threat to equipment. management plan. For
b. Mitigation methods. offshore installations the
c. Performance targets. strategic plan should be in
d. Monitoring methods and frequencies . line with the verification
e. Immediate action required on non-conformance. scheme.
f. Organisational responsibilities for mitigation, monitoring and
immediate action.
Tactical planning activities result in: Tactical plans may jointly

a. Sand management strategy development. cover activities relating to
b. Operating instructions e.g. process parameter limits, CI other corrosion threats.
injection rates.
c. Plant instrumentation and data collection via DCS and data
historian.
d. Elements of risk based inspection schemes.
e. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. for inspection tasks,
corrosion monitoring services, chemical sampling and
analysis.
f. Inspection and corrosion monitoring service work packs,
Implementation should be carried out in accordance with the (Note: commercially
sand management strategy. available database product
names are given for
Data relating to erosion/corrosion is gathered through different information. No warranty
routes: of suitability is implied for
a. Process parameters, sand monitoring data, corrosion specific application.)
monitoring data and, CI injection data.
Page 147

b. Inspection data is usually collected in formatted reports and
entered manually into specialist inspection databases (e.g.
ACET, Credo) although download from NDT wall thickness
instruments is available.
Data can sometimes be
Data relating to erosion/corrosion management is analysed in plotted on the same time
two stages: base to determine the
a. Initial comparison with performance targets to determine effects of process and
need for immediate corrective action, (e.g. fitness for treatment changes on
service). corrosion rate trends.
b. Analysis of all the data, usually by the corrosion engineer, to Statistical analysis can help
ensure that the strategic plan objectives are met and the enhance the value of NDT
CRA and tactical plans are amended if necessary. data.
a. On-line sand detection. The strategic plan should
b. Process parameter monitoring (e.g. flow rate, pressure, give performance targets
temperature). for maximum sand
c. Completion of inspection activities against plan and production rates and also
schedule. provide corrective action.

a. Frequency of erosion / corrosion related leaks.
a. Annual (and if appropriate quarterly) reviews of erosion
c. Root cause analysis of erosion corrosion failures or
B12.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of erosion corrosion should be
Page 148
ANNEX B13 – CHEMICAL TREATMENT MANAGEMENT

B13.1 INTRODUCTION
Chemical treatment of process and service fluids is widely used
throughout oil and gas production and processing in relation to
corrosion management.
Common treatments are:
- Corrosion inhibitor, - Wax inhibitor, - Scale inhibitor,

- Methanol, - Biocide, - pH buffer,
- H2S scavenger, - O2 scavenger, - Anti-foulant,
- Glycol, - Sodium hypochlorite,
Each of these treatments has individual purpose, not necessarily Chemical selection should
for corrosion management, but also having important include performance
contributions to corrosion mitigation and control. testing, compatibility
testing and feasibility
The management of all the various strategies for injection of studies before
these chemicals is a complex issue. Ensuring the correct implementation.
chemical is fed at the correct dose rate /concentration to the
correct location at the correct time, while ensuring those
chemical stocks are always available is a major challenge and is
key to the oil and gas production process running smoothly,
effectively and efficiently.
It should be noted that chemical treatment can sometimes be

detrimental to certain materials – i.e. possible SCC of Ti and Ti
alloys in contact with methanol or corrosion of pipe wall due to
concentrated corrosion inhibitor, hence consideration should be
taken in the selection of chemical.
Safety, environmental and commercial policies influence the Use of CRA materials to
choice of strategies for the management of chemical treatment. reduce operating costs, or
The balance between a high capital/low operating inventory choose carbon steel to
policy and low capital/high operating inventory policy will reduce capital costs but
dictate the choice of strategy. have to increase costs
relating to chemical
Strategies utilise chemical treatment as a way of meeting those treatments.
policy requirements. Strategy should be defined, normally
during design or when new chemical treatment is introduced,
to show how the policy is implemented such as:
a. Detailing chemical name, purpose.
b. Continuous/ batch dosing and its rate and frequency.
c. Injection method*/location.
d. Responsibilities#.
Page 149

*
Transfer of the treatment programme from 'design' to Manual injection,
'operations' is crucial – operations, maintenance and inspection automatic pumps, squeeze
need to be made aware of the functional requirements of the operations, soaks, slug
system and the HSE implications. treatment.
#
Storage of chemicals,
preparation of
concentrations, preparation
/maintenance of facilities,
operation of pumps/ valves/
quills.
B13.3 ORGANISATION
Roles involved can include:
b. Offshore operations/maintenance team.
c. Process engineers/production chemists.
d. Chemical suppliers.
e. Supply chain/purchasing department.
f. Inspection/monitoring team.
Communication activities should aim at increasing awareness of Tasks are completed more
the factors that influence the effectiveness of chemical effectively when the
treatment and of the importance of carrying out tasks relating reasons for doing them are
to corrosion control. understood and have
realistic benefits.
Integration of the chemical supplier/representative into the CM
team should be considered, at very least participation in tactical
meetings.
The system CRA should consider the risk of corrosion failure
based on the probability of which the system will be operating
outside the protection frame and its consequence on the
corrosion rate. The risk for the system which chemical treatment
is related to, will in turn identify the criticality of the injection
system itself. The ongoing need for chemical treatment should
be a factor in CRA when dealing with changes in operating
regimes and / or new equipment. Change control systems
should be employed to risk assess the impact of changes to
chemical treatment products and processes and should involve
corrosion/materials function.
Consider alternative/back-
High risk systems need to be managed more effectively than up injection facilities, or
low risk systems. Contingency plans can be developed to make additional treatments
provisions for pump breakdowns, out of spec production, following start-ups from
unplanned shutdowns etc. extended shutdowns.
Strategic planning should integrate with corrosion mitigation

and inspection planning strategies. Development of inspection
and monitoring recommendations as part of CRA should
consider need for verifying chemical treatment performance.
Page 150

Tactical planning should include operating instructions,
maintenance routines, data acquisition, data analysis and
review.
Implementation of chemical injection should be carried out in
accordance with a pre-approved plan and in line with work
procedures. Data relating to chemical treatment are often
recorded on daily operations reports (injection rates, volumes, Fluctuating conditions
concentrations, pump up-time etc) and summarised by the mean it is not always
chemical vendor on a periodic basis. Injection rates should be possible to match injection
linked to production rates and other key variables where rates to production rates
appropriate – consideration should be given to optimising, and other variables.
where the risk level dictates, to prevent under dosing.
Implications of over dosing should be appreciated with respect
to operational and cost issues.
Analysis should initially be compared with performance targets

to determine need for immediate corrective action. Exhaustion Stock management system
of the chemical supply can be a simple but common problem together with supply vessel
and is easily avoided. planning should make this
easy to avoid.
Detailed analysis is normally performed by the corrosion
function. This information can then be logged in specialist Analysis of inspection and
databases to aid correlation with corrosion monitoring and monitoring data should
inspection data. Chemical analysis (residual concentration, take into account the
dissolved iron content, pH, microbial count) can be used presence of chemical
proactively to help identify ineffective treatment performance treatment.
prior to failures occurring.
Simple acceptance testing for chemical supply will reduce the

possibility of using the incorrect chemical. Compatibility Compatibility testing can be
between chemicals and with injection hardware should be done as part of selection
assured prior to implementation to avoid problems in the field process.
Ad-hoc/reactionary injection of chemicals should be risk

assessed and approved.

The following KPIs can be used to gauge performance:
a. Pro-active/leading: The strategic plan should
- injection rates, give performance targets
- pump up-time vs plan/specification, for pump up-time.
- residual corrosion inhibitor concentration.
b. Re-active/lagging:
- leak reduction,
- wall thickness loss,
- no. of pump problems.
Page 151

Comparison of supplier data (i.e. quantity delivered) with
injection dose records can reveal discrepancies and underlying
issues.
Links should be made between corrosion monitoring results
(online) and pump up-time to help verify performance.
Assess ‘availability’ statistics of corrosion inhibitor / reliability
analysis of injection equipment.
Residual concentration of chemicals can be used to optimise
injection rates.
a. Inclusion in regular tactical corrosion management meetings.
b. Review of performance measures/indicators for suitability,
trends etc.
c. Annual reviews of monitoring and inspection outcomes, and
comparison with chemical injection activities.
d. Recommendation of corrective actions.
e. Link with root cause analysis results for incidents.
Performance review is carried out to determine the effect that Benefits might include:
the management of chemical treatment is having. reduction in failures, plant
availability increased,
The effectiveness of key 3rd parties can also be reviewed, with corrosion rates under
performance reviews linked to payments. control, cost of chemicals is
better justified.
B13.8 AUDIT
Audit of 3rd party chemical suppliers.
Audit of operational records.
The management of chemical treatment should be considered
as part of corrosion management system audits.
B13.9 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
References:
EFC No.39 - The Use of Corrosion Inhibitors in Oil and Gas
Production.
Page 152
ANNEX B14 – MITIGATION BY COATINGS

B14.1 INTRODUCTION
Coatings are a primary method of corrosion protection,
predominately used for protection against atmospheric external
corrosion (see B9). They are also used for protection from
seawater corrosion subsea and from a wide range of
environments internally in processing plant.
Most coatings are applied as relatively thin films of organic resin

materials containing finely ground inorganic pigments and fillers
conveyed in a solvent, either organic or aqueous. These are
usually applied in a number of functional coats – a primer, for Spray painting a vessel externally.
(Photo: International Paint)
surface tolerance and corrosion inhibition, a build coat for
thickness and a topcoat for appearance. From a practical point
of view these coatings are generally the easiest to apply by
spray, brush, etc. Nearly all coatings used for external
atmospheric protection are of this type, as well as some subsea
and internal coatings.
Some coatings are solvent free, applied by airless spray or

trowel and used for more demanding applications including
many internal protection applications. The build thickness is
higher and usually only one or two coats are used. These types
of coating can also be applied hot in piping spools but this is a
Airless spray unit coating pipe
shop process. internally with solventless epoxy
coating.
There are many special coating types, often thick film. Pipelines
traditionally used fibre reinforced bitumen and coal tar based
coatings but now use a variety of shop applied multi-layer
coatings that include, for example, fusion bonded epoxy and
thermoplastic layers.
The chief causes of coating deterioration are:

a. Water transport through the film, by osmosis, causing under
rusting and blistering, counteracted by film thickness, resin
type, filler properties and surface cleanliness after
preparation. Multilayer pipeline coating
b. UV component of sunlight breaking down the organic resin – fusion bonded epoxy,
base, counteracted by pigments. copolymer adhesive and
c. Chemical or solvent action attacking the resin base and polypropylene.
pigments, counteracted by appropriate choice of resin,
pigments and fillers.
Page 153

Important issues in coating application are:
a. Applications conditions. Surface preparation and coating
application in a shop or under cover normally gives a
superior quality result. Special attention needs to be given
to quality control and inspection of unavoidable field joint
coating.
b. Surface preparation to remove contaminants and provide a
key for coating adhesion. Grit blasting, if acceptable, is
much better than power and hand tool methods.
c. Design to avoid sharp edges, rough areas (e.g. weld caps)
and difficult to reach places where film thickness may not be
achieved.
There are other considerations for coatings:

a. Appearance may be as important as protective qualities.
b. They are used subsea, and sometimes internally, in
conjunction with cathodic protection. This allows a low level
of coating defects but requires coating types tolerant to the
higher pH conditions at the cathodic surface.
c. Some coatings are used as fireproofing. They are generally
thicker film coatings formulated for the role but still need to
provide corrosion protection.
Safety, environmental and commercial policies influence the Strategy may be
choice of strategies for mitigation and monitoring/inspection. determined during design
taking into account lifecycle
Coating strategy depends mainly on the required life and life cost. (See B9, Atmospheric
cycle costing. External Corrosion, for
more information.)
For accessible external coatings, the coating’s maintenance is a
'high ticket' item in maintenance budgets. The initial strategy a. works where items are
may attempt to find an optimum between the initial coating readily accessible, e.g.
quality and cost and the coating maintenance costs that follow. onshore plant and manned
Subsequent maintenance strategy is generally one of the topsides. b. is better for
following: inaccessible areas, e.g.
a. Reactive maintenance following reports from inspection or splash zones and
coating condition survey. unmanned platforms. c.
b. A planned programme based on survey and prediction of and d. require engineering
coating breakdown. assessment of the coated
c. Substrate condition monitoring then coating maintenance item, which is outside the
only if metal loss trends towards the limit for the planned scope of this Annex but is
item life. considered in more detail in
d. Repair or replacement of the coated item if metal loss B9, Atmospheric External
exceeds the limit, without coating maintenance. Corrosion.
Page 154

Maintenance strategy needs to take account of operational Blast cleaning provides the
restrictions for surface preparation and painting when choosing best surface preparation
methods and materials. This includes consideration of damage results but in the
to and contamination of plant areas, difficulties working on hot operational phase this may
plant, ignition hazards, etc. give rise to unacceptable
contamination of plant
Normally inaccessible internal and subsea coatings will initially areas and ignition hazards.
be chosen on lifetime considerations. Coatings on subsea Solvent based materials
structures and pipelines are never replaced. Internal coatings in may be a hazard. HP water
vessels and tanks can be replaced at shutdown but the lost blasting or hand tool
revenue penalties and cost of installing a high quality coating preparation may be used
need to be taken into account in the life cycle cost. for preparation and water
based paints for coating.
Surface preparation and coating of all types needs careful However, both produce an
quality control with attention to: inferior coating life.
a. Surface finish and cleanliness.
b. Prepared surface profile.
c. Paint film thickness.
d. Curing and intercoat times.
e. Temperature and humidity conditions.
In-service inspection and survey of coating condition is normally

visual.
B14.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved include: a. and c. lead on risk
b. Coating materials suppliers and applicators. analysis. d. leads on
c. Specialist contractors for coating maintenance planning. mitigation implementation
d. Facilities maintenance teams. with support from b. e., f.
e. Subsea inspection teams. and g. lead on coating
f. Inspection engineers. condition survey.
g. Coating inspection technicians.
The coating maintenance
Either specialist personnel or the inspection team may engage in planning contractors may
coating condition evaluation but in either case appropriate provide condition
training should be provided. evaluation training.
Communication activities should aim at increasing awareness of The main influencing

the: factors are location and
a. Factors that influence coating deterioration. temperature. Coating
b. Consistent reporting standards for coating breakdown. (See breakdown may look bad
B14.5.) but may not need urgent
c. The importance of having a sound strategy for coatings action unless it has led to
maintenance. serious corrosion loss.
Corrosion risk assessment (CRA) should always take account of Coating performance is
potential coating performance, which can be obtained from trial dependent on a large range
data and service experience. Reviews of the assessment should of factors. Judgement is
take into account the coating condition and its likely remaining required in adopting
protective life. appropriate values.
Page 155

Corrosion mitigation by coatings will feature in the corrosion The CM strategic plan may
management strategic plan matrix alongside: be part of a wider integrity
a. Performance targets, usually in terms of coating breakdown. management plan. For
b. Monitoring by visual survey and survey frequency. offshore installations the
c. Action required on non-conformance. strategic plan should be in
d. Organisational responsibilities for mitigation, monitoring and line
remedial action.

a. Coating maintenance programmes, which may be risk Tactical plans may jointly
based. cover activities relating to
b. Planned maintenance routines, e.g. for coating other corrosion threats.
maintenance. There are some proprietary
c. Coating survey work packs, covering responsibilities, database driven risk based
coordination, procedures, scope, anomaly criteria and methodologies for coating
reporting requirements. maintenance programme
d. Coating survey elements in subsea inspection work packs for planning.
structures, pipelines and manifolds.
e. Coating work packs, covering responsibilities, coordination,
specifications, scope, quality control and reporting
requirements.
Specific monitoring and inspection methods are generally

confined to visual inspection. Subsea this will normally be by
remotely operated vehicles. For coating above water Annex K
in BS EN ISO 12944-8 should be used for the measurement of
coating deterioration.

Implementation of maintenance coating and coating survey
should be carried out in accordance with plan and work packs.
Data should be reported:
a. Date and scope of coating completed together with QC The standard scales for
data. quantifying coating
b. Condition survey data relating to coating condition as an breakdown are in BS EN
estimate of the extent of deterioration. ISO 12944 Annex K, parts
1- 8.
Data relating to external atmospheric corrosion management
are analysed in two stages:
a. Coating condition performance target to determine need for
coating maintenance scheduling.
b. Analysis of all the data, usually by the corrosion engineer, to
ensure that the strategic plan objectives are met and the
CRA and tactical plans are amended if necessary. Specialist
contractors will update the coating maintenance programme
on the basis of the maintenance work carried out and the
coating survey data.
Page 156

The following can be used as proactive (leading) indicators: b. and c., only, for subsea
a. Completion of coating maintenance against plan. coatings.
b. Amount of coating breakdown in excess of deterioration
limit. The strategic plan should
c. Completion of coating survey against plan and schedule. give performance targets
for coating deterioration
The following can be used as reactive (lagging) indicators: limits, topside, onshore and
a. Breakdown of coating vs. expected life. subsea.

a. Annual (and if appropriate quarterly) reviews of coating Particular attention should
maintenance and survey and the achievement of be given to any shortfall in
performance targets. Corrective action for these meeting performance
programmes if indicated. targets or measures and
b. Review of performance measures, in particular the related backlogs in coating
assessment of reactive indicators and the overall trends in maintenance and survey
proactive indicators. Corrective action in strategy, activity. The relationship to
organisation and planning if indicated. budget and resource
c. Root cause analysis of early coating failures or management constraints should be
system failures with appropriate corrective action examined. The advice of
recommendation. the ICP should be taken in
d. Overall review of a., b. and c. together with verification relation to safety critical
findings for offshore installations and audit results. items.
B14.8 AUDIT
Activity for the management of coating maintenance and survey
should be included in corrosion management system audits
B14. 9 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Coating deterioration guidelines Photographic and

Assessment of the coating condition can be carried out using diagrammatic guides to the
Annex K in BS EN ISO 12944-8. The following criteria are degree of rusting, etc, are
suggested to establish the recommended action. available.
Page 157

Note that 'degree of
Degree of Degree of Degree of Degree of Recommended rusting' is a measure of the
Rusting Blistering (BS Flaking Cracking Action
(BS EN ISO EN ISO 4628 (BS EN ISO (BS EN ISO extent of coating
4628 part 3) part 2) 4628 part 5) 4628 part 4) breakdown and not a
Ri5 Density 5 5(S5)b 5(S5)c Maintenance measure of metal loss.
painting
required However, at Ri5 coating
immediately
breakdown will have
Ri4 Density 4 4(S4)b 4(S4)c Maintenance
painting advanced to a degree at
required in which metal loss may be
current/next
annual plan expected.
Ri3 Density 3 3(S3)b 3(S3)c Plan next survey
to occur before
deterioration For items sensitive to metal
exceeds Ri4 loss it is advisable to trend
Ri2 Density 2 2(S2)a 3(S3)b Survey at
intervals related
coating deterioration and
to expected forecast when Ri4 may be
deterioration
rate. reached and plan in
advance for coating
maintenance that avoids
Normally only the degree of rusting is relevant to corrosion loss corrosion loss of the
resulting from coating deterioration. substrate metal.
See Annex B9 for more

information.
Page 158
ANNEX B15 – MITIGATION BY CATHODIC PROTECTION

B15.1 INTRODUCTION
Cathodic protection is one of the main techniques used for
protecting buried or subsea pipelines and structures against
non-atmospheric external corrosion. External protective
coatings are used in conjunction with CP, to reduce the
amount of current required to be supplied by sacrificial
anodes and/or trans-rectifiers to protect the structure.
There are two types of cathodic protection systems:

a. Sacrificial or Galvanic Anode. The anode (e.g. Al, Zn and BSI 7361-1:1991 (Table 4):
Mg alloys) corrodes in preference to the pipe/structure For comparisons between a.
(cathode) being protected, supplying it with the necessary and b.
protection current.
b. Impressed Current. In this case current is supplied by
means of an external DC source.

Safety, environmental and commercial policies influence the Cathode protection potential
choice of strategies for mitigation/monitoring such as: measurements can be taken
a. Prevent external corrosion of the pipeline/structure over at galvanic anodes locations
the specified design life. to obtain information on their
b. Provide and distribute sufficient current to the protected performance (ISO 15589-2).
pipeline so that the selected CP criteria are achieved
effectively.
c. Provide an adequate number of anodes to meet the
specified design life of the pipeline/structure being
protected. Overprotection can be a
d. Provide adequate allowance for anticipated changes in serious problem where high
current requirements with time e.g. coating breakdown. strength steels such as duplex
e. Avoid overprotection of materials at risk of failure by stainless steels are concerned
hydrogen induced stress cracking. due to susceptibility to HISC.
f. Install anodes at the optimal locations where the Mitigation includes
possibility of disturbance and damage is minimal. mechanical design and
g. Provide adequate monitoring facilities to test and evaluate materials related measures
the systems performance. (refer to DNV-RP-F112) and
potential limiting methods
such as diode control.
B15.3 ORGANISATION
Organisational roles that can be involved include: A person/owner with overall
a. Cathodic protection, corrosion and materials design responsibility for the CP
engineers and specialists. system should be clearly
b. Inspection engineers and NDT contractors. identified (e.g. technical
c. Pipeline and facilities engineers. authority).
d. Mechanical and electrical specialists.
Page 159

The CP system should be designed according to recognised CP design basis should
codes and targets. include the basis of design,
surface area considerations,
The following information is required to undertake a system current demand calculations
requirement assessment or to formulate plans for system and project specific
design and operation: requirements. Drawings
a. Description of the system and its components. including anode distribution,
b. System design life. detailed design,
c. Site survey details and results (including resistivity test). manufacturing and
d. Commissioning report. installation, transformer
e. Drawings for as-built components/systems. rectifier documentation
f. Design, manufacturer/supplier and installation including capacity, control
documentation and certification. etc.
g. Design standards/specifications e.g. ISO 15589, DNV-RP- Sacrificial anodes should be
B401, DNV-RP-F103 etc. supplied with all required
h. System minimum current requirements and potential testing and materials
criteria. specification certificates.
i. Monitoring plan and frequency, including procedures,
schedules and equipment for each type of monitoring
facility installed on the pipeline.
j. Safe operating CP system guidelines.
k. Maintenance procedure.
l. Interference testing.
The implementation phase for CP should ensure correct The planned activities to
operation to achieve protection of pipeline and/or structure: ensure effective operation of
a. Instantaneous on and off potential measurements post- the CP system should be
commissioning and during operational phase. correctly implemented and
b. Potential reading locations, (in terms of distance from a the obtained data should be
specified reference point or test points etc.). reviewed and analysed.
c. Measured field gradients (if required). Measurement requirements
d. Description of the operations performed. may cover: pipe-to-
e. Technical characteristics and operating parameters of the seawater/soil potentials,
monitoring equipment used. anode current outputs, visual
f. Any permanent or temporary monitoring facilities. inspection of anode
g. Required monitoring installations and equipment to carry dimensions, pipeline isolation
out such surveys. testing, etc.
h. Frequency of each type of measurement.
Additional information such
Impressed current cathodic protection as water temperature at the
Impressed current systems, commissioning procedures shall seabed, oxygen concentration
include: at the seabed, pipe burial
a. Pipeline isolation testing. depth (if buried) and
b. Energising of impressed current CP hardware. identification of exposed span
c. Measurement of adequate protection levels (potential lengths and locations, water
measurements). flow rates at the seabed,
d. Anode/cathode connections and cable integrity. including seasonal changes if
e. Interference testing, if applicable. relevant etc. may be included
for offshore CP.
Page 160

Inspection data covering: Close interval potential
a. Visual inspection data (e.g. coating damage, anode surveys (CIPS), direct current
condition, connection cables, corrosion damage etc.). voltage gradient (DCVG)
surveys, C-scan survey etc. are
Data analysis shall include some of the techniques used
a. Plotted graphs of pipe/structure potential along the for carrying out CP potential
pipeline/structure, identification of under-protected or measurements.
over-protected areas, etc. with details of repair methods.
b. Inspection observations and measurements. Inspection observations: This
c. Failure reports. shall involve visual inspection
d. Comparison of recorded data to those from previous to identify any: build-up of
surveys. anode corrosion products,
indication of HISC if the
pipe/structure is constructed
from high strength steels
(Specified Minimum Yield
Strength > 550 MPa),
significant coating damage,
electrical continuity damage,
etc.
The following shall be used as pro-active performance If interference is identified,
measures indicators: the chances of stray current
Galvanic anode CP systems need to be surveyed at early corrosion being present are
stages if: very high.
a. CP design and anode performance indicate any deviations
from specified standards e.g. ISO 15589, DNV-RP-B401, For impressed current
DNV-RP-F103 etc. cathodic protection the anode
b. A post-installation survey had not been carried out and shall always be connected to
significant deficiencies are identified (e.g. onshore soil the positive terminal and the
resistivity). cathode to the negative
c. Coating damage is more than the specified standard terminal, otherwise the
requirements. structure or pipeline being
d. Presence of interference with other pipelines and protected will corrode in
structures. preference to the anode.
e. CP risk assessment has not been carried out with
satisfactory results. Under protection is identified
by instantaneous off
The following shall be used as reactive performance potentials more positive than
indicators for both Galvanic anode and impressed current minus 0.8V
cathodic protection: (Ag/AgCl/Seawater) and
a. Signs of under-protection (examples may include corrosion minus 0.9V
damage or rust discolouration etc) and over-protection (Ag/AgCl/Seawater) for
(examples may include heavy calcareous deposits close to aerobic and anaerobic
the anodes) during potential survey analysis. environments respectively.
b. Interference with other pipelines or structures.
c. Coating and electrical continuity cable damage. Overprotection is identified by
d. Anode depletion or major corrosion product build-up. potentials more negative than
minus 1.05 V
(Ag/AgCl/Seawater).
Page 161

Performance review should include the following with Root causes may be due to
appropriate corrective action in strategy, organisation and coating breakdown, stray
planning if need be: current corrosion as a result
a. Monthly or quarterly reviews of potential measurements. of interference, anode
b. Annual review of performance measures, in particular the wastage, deterioration of
assessment of reactive indicators and overall trends. anode/cathode connection(s),
c. Root cause of any significant changes in potential deterioration of anode or CP
measurement readings and specified remedial actions. cables, breakdown of
electrical equipment (e.g.
power supplies).
B15.8 AUDIT
Overall performance review of 7; a., b., and c. together with A plan should be produced to
verification findings for offshore installation and audit results. correct any audit findings.
Page 162
ANNEX C
CHECKLIST FOR ASSESSMENT OF CORROSION MANAGEMENT
The checklist covers all the different areas of the corrosion management system as described in
the main document, and is intended to be used by auditors to confirm that the corrosion
management system is being properly implemented and by individuals/organisations in setting up
corrosion management systems to ensure that all the necessary actions and tasks are
incorporated.
This checklist covers all the different aspects of a corrosion management system and as such
the entire checklist may not be applicable to the management system of particular facility
operators.
Reference should be made to the chapters and items in the guideline document and the
informative information in Annex A in order to interpret the questions.
In particular auditors should bear in mind the scope of the document. The following terms should
be taken to include at least the scope described:
— Item – Vessel, pipe, structural member, pipeline section, subsea assembly.
— Monitoring – On line corrosion rate and erosion monitors, on line analysers and instruments,
sampling and chemical analysis, cathodic protection monitoring.
— Inspection – Vessel and pipework visual inspection, wall thickness NDT, Subsea visual
inspection of pipelines, manifolds and structures, on line inspection of pipelines, visual survey
of coating condition.
Page 163
CORROSION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AUDIT

Date: Facility(ies): By:
Item Question Yes/No Not Supporting evidence/

used references
1.0 CORROSION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM See section 1
1.1 Is there a documented corrosion management system based
on a defined management model?
1.2 Is the scope of the system’s application defined?
2.1 CORROSION POLICY See section 2, item 2.3
2.1.1 Is there a company policy for corrosion management (or
including corrosion management) that deals with risk
associated with:
– health and safety?
– environmental protection?
2.1.2 Does it clearly state objectives for corrosion control?
2.1.3 Does the policy address risks to business profitability and
business interruption but in a way that does not conflict
with the management of risks to health, safety and the
environment?
2.1.4 Does it clearly state expectations and objectives by which
compliance with the policy may be measured?
2.1.5 Do health, safety and environmental objectives take
precedence over commercial objectives?
2.1.6 Does the policy demonstrate management commitment to
corrosion control?
Is the policy issued on the authority of the most senior
manager of the facility?
2.1.7 Is there evidence of an awareness of this policy at all levels
within the organisation?
– senior management?
– engineers and technicians?
– offshore staff?
2.1.8 Are the personnel committed to the policy?
2.2 CORROSION STRATEGY See section 2, item 2.4
2.2.1 Is there a documented corrosion strategy for the asset?
Does it provide the method(s) by which the policy is
implemented?
2.2.2 Does it place responsibility for corrosion management?
Does it define the links between all parties involved,
including:
– operations?
– technical functions/discipline engineers?
– contractors and suppliers?
2.2.3 Does the corrosion strategy interface with:
– the safety case and verification scheme, offshore?
– the safety plan, onshore?
2.2.4 Are review periods for the corrosion strategy specified?
2.2.5 Does the strategy clearly define the facility life?
3.1 ORGANISATION – ROLES, RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY See section 3, item 3.3
3.1.1 Is the organisational structure for corrosion management
fully documented? Does it detail the relationships between
roles in different departments of the organisation,
(operations, maintenance, engineering, technical support,
etc.)?
Page 164

used references
3.1.2 Does this include any contractors used in corrosion
management?
3.1.3 Does it reflect current organisation?
3.1.4 Are sufficient resources available to implement the corrosion
strategy?
3.1.5 Are roles and responsibilities for individuals clearly defined
and documented?
3.1.6 Are authorities and reporting routes clear and documented?
3.1.7 Are interfaces with other parts of the organisation visible?
3.1.8 Have gaps and overlaps in responsibility been identified and
eliminated?
3.2 ORGANISATION – COMPETENCE See section 3, item 3.4
3.2.1 Are the competence requirements for all key operational
and functional roles defined?
3.2.2 Are the procedures in place to assess the competency of
staff assigned to corrosion management activities?
3.2.3 Is authority given for key tasks in line with competence,
including:
– qualitative risk assessment?
– anomaly and fitness for purpose assessment?
– approval of temporary repair and limitation?
– item or facility suitability for use?
– inspection methods and non-intrusive inspection
schemes?
3.2.4 Are training requirements identified and implemented for
the development of technical competence and behavioural
skills?
3.2.5 Is performance assessed routinely with corrective provisions
made?
3.2.6 Do all involved understand the risks, understand the
working practices, have awareness of their own role and
recognise their own limitations and the limitations of those
they supervise?
3.2.7 Are all competence, training and performance assessment
requirements equally addressed by contracted bodies?
3.2.8 Do contracted bodies have appropriate corporate
competence, demonstrated by accreditation or certification
where applicable, including possession of appropriate
methods, equipment and experience?
3.3 ORGANISATION – COMMUNICATION See section 3, item 3.5
3.3.1 Is appropriate information shared including:
– information of hazards and preventative measures,
including lessons learnt from incidents elsewhere?
– procedures, instructions and guidelines?
– the organisation structure, the key players and the
accountable management?
3.3.2 Is training on corrosion awareness given to non-specialist
personnel that is appropriate to their role?
3.3.3 Are key players formed into a corrosion management team
(CMT) that meets regularly to review:
– implementation status?
– trends in deterioration and failures?
– status of corrective actions?
– planning and budgetary issues?
– performance against KPIs
Are key contract players included in the team?
Page 165

used references
3.3.4 Do the following contribute to the CMT meeting?
– integrity engineer?
– corrosion engineer?
– an operations and maintenance representative?
– a production representative?
– an inspection engineer?
– a chemical treatment specialist?
3.3.5 Is the CMT
– effective in delivering improvements in corrosion
management?
– visible to senior management?
3.3.6 Are experiences shared with external bodies and other
facility teams?
3.4 ORGANISATION – CO-OPERATION See section 3, item 3.6
3.4.1 Is appropriate input to the control of risks obtained from:

– managers?
– designers?
– operational staff?
– maintenance staff?
– inspection departments?
– specialist technical personnel?
– consultants?
3.4.2 Do change management procedures require review by
materials and corrosion specialists for:
– engineering change?
– operating changes?
Is the (onshore) competent person consulted on pressure
system changes?
3.4.3 Are staff consulted for opinions as part of planning and
performance review?
3.4.4 Are there clear written interface rules for co-ordination with
contracted bodies?
4.1 CORROSION RISK ASSESSMENT See section 4, item 4.3
4.1.1 Are all safety (and environmentally) related elements of the
facility identified? Are business critical elements identified if
policy requires it?
4.1.2 Is a formal corrosion risk assessment (CRA) method used? Is
it documented? Has it been tested to ensure that it always
provides rational results?
4.1.3 Are all significant deterioration threats identified? Does the
method assist in this?
4.1.4 Does the method assess the likelihood/rate of all
deterioration?
4.1.5 Does the method consider the level of the safety,
environmental and business consequences from corrosion
threats?
4.1.6 Does it combine likelihood and consequence to provide a
criticality level on which appropriate action can be based?
4.1.7 Does it use the following as inputs?
– safety policy and quantitative risk assessment?
– environmental policy and impact assessment?
– legislative requirements?
– asset business plan?
– design conditions?
– current operating conditions?
Page 166

used references
4.1.8 Are the operating conditions against which the CRA is
carried out clearly stated?
4.1.9 Does the CRA consider process excursions outwith the
normal operating case?
4.1.10 Does the CRA consider future operational scenarios or
"what if" cases?
4.1.11 Are the results from historic operational corrosion
monitoring and inspection used?
4.1.12 Is experience from other operations and facilities taken into
account?
4.1.13 Does a cross discipline peer group review and endorse the
CRA results?
4.1.14 Is the CRA subject to periodic review and are the initiating
factors for a review documented?
4.2 PLANNING See section 4, item 4.4
4.2.1 Is there a strategic plan for mitigation and monitoring
activities that makes failure risk As Low As Reasonably
Practicable?
4.2.2 Are measurable performance standards set for the barriers
to/mitigation of each threat?
4.2.3 Are methods of monitoring, inspection and measurement of
barrier/ mitigation performance defined? Are there
philosophies and guidelines to the choice of methods?
4.2.4 Are the frequencies of measurement defined?
4.2.5 Is corrective action to be taken in the event of non-
conformity to the performance standard defined?
4.2.6 Are the responsibilities for mitigation,
monitoring/measurement and corrective action defined? Is
the plan published in a form, (e.g. a matrix), such that all
responsible parties can identify their roles and activities? Do
they include roles in:
– production operations?
– chemical management?
– on line corrosion monitoring?
– inspection and testing?
– fabric maintenance?
4.2.7 Does the plan recognise the role of statutory bodies?
4.2.8 Are the strategic plan requirements translated into tactical
plans and schedules as generally used to control activity in
the implementing units, (e.g. planned maintenance,
schemes of examination, operating instructions)?
4.2.9 Are there registers at the item level for strategic plans
(vessels, pipework, structural elements, pipeline sections,
etc.)? Are registers kept of special features for inspection,
including:
– dead legs?
– fatigue sensitive pipework and structure?
– unnumbered small bore pipework?
4.2.10 Are drawings, schematics or pictures, (e.g. inspection
isometrics), used to uniquely identify locations for inspection
and monitoring?
4.2.11 Are inspection programmes developed using a risk based
inspection (RBI) methodology that relates inspection
intervals to a prediction of corrosion risk?
4.2.12 Does the RBI methodology modify the inspection intervals to
take account of the level of confidence in the prediction?
Page 167

used references
4.2.13 Are appropriate methods of detection for the expected
deterioration methods documented?
4.2.14 Are effective tactical plans in place for external fabric
maintenance? Do they prioritise or schedule with regard to
failure risk of the substrate material?
4.2.15 Do tactical plans/schedules for corrosion monitoring,
inspection, fabric maintenance, etc, include plans for access
provision?
4.2.16 Are tactical plans (e.g. risk based inspection schemes)
updated after implementation and analysis? Are confidence
levels reviewed?
4.2.17 Are written procedures produced to cover implementation
of mitigation and monitoring activities?
4.2.18 Do the written procedures and work instructions define
actions to be taken in the case of non-conformity to the
performance standards?
5.1 IMPLEMENTATION See section 5, item 5.4
5.1.1 Is the plan translated into practical instructions, (e.g. work
packs, planned maintenance routines (PMRs), operating
instructions)? Are there standard formats that aid consistent
production?
5.1.2 Are inspection schemes, work packs, PMRs and instructions
controlled documents with formal review and authorisation?
5.1.3 Do inspection work packs include procedures for the use of
relevant inspection and monitoring techniques?
5.1.4 Are locations for corrosion monitoring and inspection clearly
identified within the work packs?
5.1.5 Do the inspection schemes, work packs, PMRs and
instructions, include criteria of non-conformance?
5.1.6 If a non-conformance is identified do the work packs, PMRs,
or instructions define the reporting procedures? Does this
define time scales for action?
5.1.7 Are the physical means for implementation in place, (e.g. on
line monitoring, inhibitor injection plant)?
5.1.8 Are adequate manpower resources in place? Are contracts
in place for contracted resources?
5.1.9 Are opportunity based inspections used outwith planned
activities? Do PMRs for maintenance tasks include
opportunity based inspection requirements?
5.1.10 Is there a material and corrosion damage reporting
procedure in place and operating?
5.1.11 Are the limitations of the applied corrosion monitoring and
inspection techniques known?
5.2 DATA MANAGEMENT, REPORTING AND ANALYSIS See section 5, item 5.5
5.2.1 Are the data to be gathered for corrosion management
requirements clearly defined and reported in a form which
enables appropriate assessment? Are registers kept where
data are transmitted on documents?
5.2.2 Do reporting procedures address failure to undertake
planned activities in part or in whole? Is it specifically
reported?
5.2.3 Is it clear who should receive and evaluate reported data?
Are they identified on the basis of their competence to
undertake analysis?
Page 168

used references
5.2.4 Are procedures in place to validate the gathered data? Are
the limitations of the applied corrosion monitoring and
inspection techniques known and taken into account?
5.2.5 Are data stored and shared so that trends can be identified
over time? Is the location where the mitigation, corrosion
monitoring and inspection data stored defined?
5.2.6 Are data from all sources, (process conditions, inspection,
and corrosion monitoring and chemical data) collected and
evaluated centrally to allow conclusion to be drawn
holistically? Are the findings of the (offshore) verification
scheme included?
5.2.7 Are data analysed against a predetermined time scale that
ensures timely corrective action is possible?
5.2.8 Are procedures in place for the urgent reporting and
evaluation of data that exceed allowable limits? Does the
procedure allow for urgent implementation of corrective
action?
5.2.9 Does the holistic analysis of all data result in a clear
statement of continued suitability for use at both the item
and facility level? Are these reviews carried out at the end of
campaigns or on a suitable frequency?
5.2.10 Can an up-to-date summary of facility condition be provided
to the facility manager and to an (offshore) independent
verifier within a short time period following completion of a
work campaign or the set review period?
5.2.11 Are the results fed back into the review and improvement of
strategic and tactical plans?
5.2.12 Does operational experience get fed back into design?
5.2.13 Are corrective actions and their completion time scales
captured in an information system that allows
implementation and close out to be tracked and verified?
5.2.14 Where corrective action is of a temporary nature, (e.g.
temporary repairs, temporary limitations), is it subject to a
review period? Is this tracked in the same way as permanent
actions?
5.2.15 Are material and corrosion damage reports and opportunity
based inspection reports integrated into the analyses?
5.2.16 Are investigations conducted to identify the root cause of
corrosion incidents?
5.2.17 Are the recipients of suitability, investigation and corrective
action reports defined?
5.2.18 Are results of routine analysis and root cause analysis made
available to the management performance review?
5.2.19 Are lessons shared within the organisation as a whole? Are
lessons shared externally?
6.0 MEASURING PERFORMANCE See section 6
6.1 Are relevant key performance indicators (KPIs) of the success
of the corrosion management activities in place? Do they
measure:
– how well the plan is implemented – proactive/leading
indicators?
– achievement of the policy objectives – reactive/lagging
indicators?
6.2 Are the performance measures meaningful and practical?
Do they use quantitative measures where possible?
Page 169

used references
6.3 Are the Performance Indicators aimed primarily at
demonstrating success or identifying trends toward
corrective action?
6.4 Is responsibility for meeting targets combined with
ownership to promote motivation? Are measures and
targets set by those accountable for meeting them together
with the team responsible for the measurement? Are the
measures approved by their management?
6.5 Are interpretations agreed with supervisors and presented
to management?
6.6 Are all measures presented to the corrosion management
team? Does the team agree corrective actions?
6.7 Are measures made at a frequency that:
– allows corrective action before an undesirable outcome
occurs?
– a meaningful magnitude of change?
Are changes made if these are not met?
6.8 Are results aggregated and reported more widely and to
senior management at an appropriate frequency by the
corrosion management team? Is a scheme to identify
priority items used, e.g. traffic light coding?
6.9 Are corrective actions and their completion time scales
6.10 Are investigations conducted to identify the root cause of
serious or persistent failures to meet targets?
7.0 PERFORMANCE REVIEW See section 7
7.1 Are the corrosion management activities subject to a formal
review?
7.2 Are reviews carried out at a specified frequency that allows
for timely corrective action and is this documented?
7.3 Are reviews of corrosion management of offshore safety
critical systems carried out at a frequency that aligns with
the Verification Scheme?
7.4 Do the reviews include all parties in the corrosion
management process and is this documented? Does the
review involve key contractors?
7.5 Is the review process endorsed at a management level with
authority to implement changes?
7.6 Does the review consider:
– the effectiveness of the processes and procedures in
meeting performance targets?
– shortcomings of facility and item suitability for service?
– results of investigations into the root causes of
problems?
– observations of the (offshore) independent competent
person?
– feedback on contractor and supplier performance?
– findings from audit?
7.7 Does the review evaluate:
– lessons from other facilities and from external sources?
– benefits to be gained from introducing new techniques
or technology?
7.8 Does the distribution of the findings include senior facility
management?
Page 170

used references
7.9 Are actions and their completion time scales captured in an
information system that allows implementation and close
out to be tracked and verified?
7.10 Does the review feedback into the corrosion strategy?
8.0 AUDITING See section 8
8.1 Are the corrosion management activities audited to ensure:
– the corrosion management system includes all essential
elements?
– that the activities are implemented in accordance with
the plan and their documented procedures?
8.2 Are audits carried out:
– using a check list and on the basis of objective evidence
of compliance?
– by competent auditors with an understanding of
corrosion management practice?
8.3 Are audits undertaken on a planned basis? Does the
corrosion management team consider bringing forward an
audit if warranted by serious non-compliance?
8.4 Are corrective actions and their completion time scales
Are corrective actions agreed with the auditee and assigned
to the auditee or an identified party?
8.5 Are contractors in the corrosion management process
audited?
8.6 Are audit reports made available to senior facility
management and to the corrosion management team?
8.7 Are audit findings used to improve the policy and plan and
the implementation and analysis processes?
Page 171
ANNEX D
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
D1 TERMS
hazard: that which has the potential to cause harm or damage.
in-line monitoring: refers to installation of monitoring equipment directly in the bulk of the process,
but data acquisition requires extraction of probes or process shut down for analysis, e.g. corrosion
coupons, bio-studs, etc.
intrusive monitoring: requires penetration through the pipe or vessel wall to gain access to the
interior of the equipment.
non-intrusive: monitoring from the outside of the pipe or vessel without monitoring having to gain
access to the interior of the equipment.
off-line monitoring: refers to measurements carried out on the equipment intermittently, for
example analysis of liquid samples, non-intrusive inspection (e.g. UT, PEC, radiography, etc.).
on-line monitoring/inspection: refers to installation of monitoring equipment for continuous

measurement of metal loss, corrosion rate or other parameters in an operating system. Data are
obtained without the requirement to remove the monitoring device, e.g. LPR probes, ER probes, fixed
ultrasonic transducers, etc.
proactive indicator: to investigate / review an item without any prior requirement. Used to predict
events rather than to react to them. Also referred to as a leading indicator.
reactive indicator: to investigate / review an item following an incident or some other factor which
prompts the investigation. Also referred to as a lagging indicator.
risk: the combination of the severity of the effect (the consequences) and the likelihood of it
happening (damage mode and probable frequency).
D2 ABBREVIATIONS
API American Petroleum Institute

ASNT American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
CDR corrosion damage report
CI corrosion inhibitor
CM corrosion management
CMT corrosion management team
CRA corrosion risk assessment
CSWIP certification scheme for weldment inspection personnel
DCR Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, Etc) Regulations 1996 (SI
1996/913)
DCS distributed control system
Page 172
DNV Det Norsk Veritas

EEMUA Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association
EFC European Federation of Corrosion
EI The Energy Institute (formerly the Institute of Petroleum)
ER electrical resistance
EVS extreme value statistics
HAZ heat affected zone
HSE Health and Safety Executive
HS&E health, safety and environment
HSW Health and Safety At Work Etc. Act 1974
ICORR Institute of Corrosion
KPI key performance indicators
LPR linear polarisation resistance
MAWT minimum allowable wall thickness
MHSWR Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/3242)
NACE National Association of Corrosion Engineers
NDT non destructive testing
OBVI opportunistic based visual inspection
OSCR Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, 2005 (SI 2005/3117)
PEC pulse eddy current
PCN personnel certification in non-destructive testing
PFEER Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response)
Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/743)
PV pressure vessel
PSV pressure safety valve
PWC preferential weld corrosion
RAD radiographic NDT
RBI risk based inspection
RCS risk control system
SCADA Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (System)
SHE safety, health and environment
TOFD time of flight diffraction
TQM total quality management
UKAS United Kingdom Accreditation Service
UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf
UKOOA UK Oil & Gas Operators Association (Now UK Oil & Gas)
UT ultrasonic NDT
hazard: that which has the potential to cause harm or damage.
in-line monitoring: refers to installation of monitoring equipment directly in the bulk of the process,
but data acquisition requires extraction of probes or process shut down for analysis, e.g. corrosion
coupons, bio-studs, etc.
intrusive monitoring: requires penetration through the pipe or vessel wall to gain access to the
interior of the equipment.
Non-intrusive: monitoring from the outside of the pipe or vessel without monitoring having to gain
access to the interior of the equipment
Page 173
off-line monitoring: refers to measurements carried out on the equipment intermittently, for
example analysis of liquid samples, non-intrusive inspection (e.g. UT, PEC, radiography, etc.).
on-line monitoring/inspection: refers to installation of monitoring equipment for continuous

measurement of metal loss, corrosion rate or other parameters in an operating system. Data are
obtained without the requirement to remove the monitoring device, e.g. LPR probes, ER probes, fixed
ultrasonic transducers, etc.
proactive indicator: to investigate / review an item without any prior requirement. Use to predict
events rather than to react to them. Also referred to as a leading indicator.
reactive indicator: to investigate / review an item following an incident or some other factor which
prompts the investigation. Also referred to as a lagging indicator.
risk: the combination of the severity of the effect (the consequences) and the likelihood of it
happening (damage mode and probable frequency).
Page 174
ANNEX E
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
E1 REFERENCES
[1] Successful Health and Safety Management, HS(G)65, HSE Books

[2] a. Managing competence for safety-related systems, HSE, Institution of Engineering
Technology and the British Computer Society, 2007
b. Developing and Maintaining Staff Competence, Second edition, Office of Rail Regulation
[3] Step Change Asset Integrity Toolkit, Step Change in Safety, Aberdeen
www.stepchangeinsafety.net/stepchange/resources_asset.aspx
[4] UK SPEC, Engineering Council UK. www.engc.org.uk/ukspec
[5] NACE International, Houston, Texas, USA
www.nace.org/nace/content/Education/EducationIndex.asp
[6] Institute of Corrosion, Leighton Buzzard, UK
www.icorr.org/banner/framesmembership.html
[7] Safety of pressure systems: Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000. Approved Code of
Practice, HSC L112, HSE Books
[8] Accreditation for In-Service Inspection of Pressure Systems/Equipment, RG2, UKAS
[9] Recommendations for the training and development and competency assessment of
inspection personnel Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association, publication
no 193:1999
[10] American Society of Non-Destructive Testing http://www.asnt.org/
[11] Certification Scheme for Welding Inspection Personnel (CSWIP), TWI Certification Ltd.
http://www.cswip.com
[12] Personnel Certification in Non-Destructive Testing (PCN)
http://www.twi.co.uk/j32k/unprotected/band_1/pcn.html
[13] Hydrocarbon Release Reduction Toolkit, Oil and Gas UK http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk
[14] United Kingdom Accreditation Service, 21-47 High Street, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 4UN
http://www.ukas.com
[15] First Point Assessment Ltd., 7 Burnbank Business Centre, Souterhead Road, Altens,
Aberdeen, AB12 3YS http://www.fpal.com
[16] Best practice for risk based inspection as a part of plant integrity management, CRR
363/2001. HSE 2001 http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/crr_pdf/2001/crr01363.pdf
[17] API Publ 581: Base Resource Document—Risk-Based Inspection http://www.api.org
[18] DNV RP G-101: Risk Based Inspection of offshore Topsides Static Mechanical Equipment
http://www.dnv.com
[19] Extreme Value Statistics and its Relevance to Corrosion Engineering, D G John and P J
Laycock, paper presented at UK. CORROSION '92, Manchester, UK, pub. Institute of
Corrosion, Leighton Buzzard, UK
Page 175
E2 BIBLIOGRAPHY
E2.0 GENERAL
National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE)

http://www.nace.org
An Historical Perspective of the Management of Ageing Infrastructures; D Geary, J L Dawson and

D G John, NACE Meeting, Dubai, April 1997
NACE Corrosion Engineer's Reference Book, Robert Baboin (Editor). 3rd ed

http://www.nace.org/newbooks/cerb.asp
Health and Safety Executive (HSE), published by HSE Books

http://www.hsebooks.com
Evaluation of Process Plant Corrosion / Erosion Incidents. Permanent Background Note PBN 99/4
Successful Health and Safety Management, HS(G)65, HSE Books 1997
Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics and Analysis HID statistics report 2002, HSR 2002 002
http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/statistics/hsr2002/hsr2002.pdf
Monographs
Corrosion Engineering, Fontana, M G, National Association of Corrosion Engineers, 3rd ed., 1986
Metallurgy for Engineers, Rollason, E C, Edward Arnold 3rd ed 1961
E2.1 CORROSION AND MATERIALS ENGINEERING FOR OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
American Petroleum Institute (API)

http://www.api.org
API Publication 950: Corrosion Control in Oil Production

API TR 950: Survey of Construction Materials and Corrosion in Sour Water Strippers
API RP 14E: Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Offshore Production Platform
Piping Systems
Corrosion Control in Oil and Gas Production R.S. Treseder and R.N. Tuttle 1998 Edition, by CorUPdate
Inc
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

HID CI 5B: Under-lagging Corrosion of Plant and Pipework, Hazardous Installations Directorate

http://www.nace.org
Corrosion-Resistant Alloys in Oil and Gas Production, NACE, J. Kolts and S. Ciaraldi (Editors)
Page 176
Corrosion Under Wet Thermal Insulation, NACE, W I Pollock and C N Steely (Editors)
Fundamentals of Designing for Corrosion Control: A Corrosion Aid for the Designer, NACE, R.J.
Landrum
NACE MR0176: Metallic materials for sucker-rod pumps for corrosive oilfield environments
NACE TPC 3: Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion and Biofouling in Oilfield Equipment
NACE TPC 5: Corrosion Control in Petroleum Production, 2nd Edition, H G Byars
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)

http://www.iso.ch
ISO/TS 15510: Stainless steels -- Chemical composition

ISO 13680: Corrosion-resistant alloy seamless tubes for use as casing, tubing and coupling stock —
Technical delivery conditions
NORSOK
http://www.standard.no
NORSOK Standard M-001 Materials Selection; Revision 2
DNV
http://www.dnv.com
DNV RP O501: Recommended Practice – Erosive Wear in Piping Systems
European Federation of Corrosion (EFC)
EFC Publication Number 16: Guidelines on Materials Requirements for Carbon and Low Alloy Steel
for H2S-Containing Environments in Oil and Gas Production
EFC Publication Number 17: Corrosion Resistant Alloys for Oil and Gas Production: Guidance on
General Requirements and Test Methods for H2S Service
EFC Publication Number 23: CO2 Corrosion Control in Oil and Gas Production – Design
Considerations
Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI) Guideline, EFC publication 55 Produced by the EFC Working Parties
- EFC WP13 and WP15 Eds S Winnik, ExxonMobil, March 2008
Monographs
Handbook of Corrosion Data, Materials Data Series, Craig, D and Anderson, D B, 2nd ed, ASM
International
Handbook of Materials Selection, Kutz, M. (Editor), John Wiley and Sons Inc
Metallic Materials Specification Handbook, 4th Edition, Ross, R B, Springer
Principles and Prevention of Corrosion, 2nd Edition, Jones, D A, Prentice Hall
E2.2 MATERIALS TESTING AND EVALUATION FOR OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION

A Test Method to Determine the Susceptibility to Cracking of Linepipe Steels in Sour Service. HSE OTI
95 635
Page 177
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)

http://www.iso.ch
ISO 7539-7: Corrosion of metals and alloys — Stress corrosion testing — Part 7: Slow strain rate
testing

http://www.nace.org
NACE MR0175/ISO 15156-1: Materials for use in H2S-containing environments in oil and gas
production – Part 1: General principles for selection of cracking-resistant materials
NACE TM0177: Laboratory Testing of Metals for Resistance to Sulfide Stress Cracking and Stress
Corrosion Cracking in H2S Environments
NACE TM0198: Slow strain rate test method for screening corrosion-resistant alloys (CRAs) for stress
corrosion cracking in sour oilfield service
NACE TM0284: Evaluation of pipeline and pressure vessel steels for resistance to hydrogen-induced
cracking
Rippled strain rate test for CRA sour service materials selection, NACE Corrosion/97, Paper 58, Nisbet,
W J R, Hartman,R H C and van den Handel, G, 1997
E2.3 COMPETENCY
Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET)

http://www.iet.org
Safety, Competency and Commitment: Competency Guidelines for Safety-Related System

Practitioners, IET, London
Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA)

http://www.eemua.co.uk
EEMUA Publication no 193: Recommendations for the Training, Development and Competency
Assessment of Inspection Personnel
E2.4 CORROSION PREDICTION AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION

Corrosion risk assessment and safety management for offshore processing facilities, OTO 1999/064
NORSOK
Standard Z-CR-008: Criticality Classification Method; Rev 1

Standard M-506: CO2 Corrosion Rate Calculation Model; Rev 1
Page 178
Research papers
Pipeline corrosion risk analysis – An assessment of deterministic and probabilistic methods, Lawson,
K, Anti-Corrosion Methods and Materials, Vol 52, No 1, 2005, pp 3-10
Application of internal corrosion modelling in the risk assessment of pipelines, NACE Corrosion 2003,
paper no. 03179. Gartland,Per O, Johnsen, Roy and Ingar Øvstetun, Ingar
CO2 Corrosion Nomogram, de Waard, C and Milliams,D E, 1991 CorCon website
http://www.xs4all.nl/~cdewaard/
An integrated approach to accurate corrosion prediction, Bybee, Karen. Journal of Petroleum

Technology, Vol 58, No 5, May 2006, pp 76-79
E2.5 CORROSION MONITORING
American Society for Testing of Materials (ASTM)

http://www.astm.org
ASTM G4-01: Standard Guide for Conducting Corrosion Tests in Field Applications
ASTM G96: Standard Guide for On-line Monitoring of Corrosion in Plant Equipment (Electrical and
Electrochemical Methods)

http://www.nace.org
NACE RP0192: Monitoring Corrosion in Oil and Gas Production with Iron Counts
NACE RP0497: Field Corrosion Evaluation using Metallic Test Specimens
NACE RP0775: Preparation, Installation, Analysis, and Interpretation of Corrosion Coupons in Oilfield
Operations
Technical Committee Report 1C187: Use of Galvanic Probe Corrosion Monitors in Oil & Gas Drilling
and Production Operations
Technical Committee Report 3D170: Electrical and Electrochemical Methods for Determining
Corrosion Rates
Technical Committee Report 3T199: Techniques for Monitoring Corrosion & Related Parameters in
Field Applications
NORSOK
NORSOK Standard M-CR-505 Corrosion Monitoring Design:

http://www.standard.no/pronorm-3/data/f/0/01/37/0_10704_0/M-505-CR.pdf
NORSOK Standard M-506: CO2 Corrosion Rate Calculation Mode:
http://www.standard.no/imaker.exe?id=1369
E2.6 INSPECTION AND RISK BASED INSPECTION PLANNING
American Petroleum Institute (API)

http://www.api.org
Page 179
API 570: Piping Inspection Code: Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Rerating of Inservice Piping
Systems
API RP 579-1/ASME FFS-1: Fitness-For-Service
API Publ 581: Base Resource Documentation - Risk-Based Inspection
Det Norsk Veritas (DNV)

http://www.dnv.com
RP G-101: Risk Based Inspection of Topsides Static Mechanical Equipment
Energy Institute
http://www.energyinst.org
Model Code of Safe Practice Part 12: Pressure vessel examination

Model Code of Safe Practice Part 13: Pressure piping systems examination
E2.7 CORROSION MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION

http://www.astm.org
ASTM G96: Standard Guide for On-Line Monitoring of Corrosion in Plant Equipment (Electrical and
Electrochemical Methods)

http://www.nace.org
NACE RP0775: Preparation, Installation, Analysis, and Interpretation of Corrosion Coupons in Oilfield
Operations
E2.8 ANALYSIS OF INSPECTION AND MONITORING DATA

http://www.astm.org
ASTM G16: Standard guide for applying statistics to analysis of corrosion data

Guidelines for use of statistics for analysis of sample inspection of corrosion, Research Report 016
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr016.pdf
Monographs
Introduction to life prediction of industrial plant materials – application of extreme value statistical
method for corrosion analysis. Kowaka, M, Allerton Press Inc, 1994
Probability and Statistics in Engineering, Hines, W W, Montgomery, D C, Goldsman, D M, and Borror,
C M, John Wiley and Sons
Statistical analysis of extreme values, Reiss, R D, and Thomas, M, Birkhauser Verlag, Basel. 1997
Page 180
Research papers
Extreme value prediction of maximum pits on pipelines, Hawn, D E, Materials Performance, March
1977, pp 29-32
Statistical analysis of UT corrosion data from floor plates of a crude oil aboveground storage tank,
Joshi, N R, Material Evaluation, Vol 52, No 7, July 1994, pp 948-849. Erratum, Vol 52 No 11, Nov
1994 p 1285
Extrapolation of extreme pit depth in space and time. Laycock, P J, Cottis, R A and Scarf P A, J.
Electrochem. Soc., Vol 137, No 1, 1990, pp 64-69
Predicting the Remaining Lifetime of In-Service Pipelines based on Sample Inspection Data, Schneider
C R A, Muhammed, A and Sanderson, R M, Insight, Vol 43, No 2, Feb 2001, pp 102-104
Statistical tools for ultrasonic thickness data analysis, Part 1– Piping Thickness Analysis. Sparago, M,
Inspectioneering Journal, January/February 1999
Statistical tools for ultrasonic thickness data analysis, Part 2 – remaining life estimates. Sparago, M,
Inspectioneering Journal, March/April 1999
Statistical approach to inspection planning and integrity assessment. Khan, F I and Howard, R,
Insight: Non-Destructive Testing & Condition Monitoring, Vol 49 Issue 1, January 2007, pp 26-36
Statistical characterization of pitting corrosion–Part 2: Probabilistic modelling of maximum pit depth.
Melchers, R E, Corrosion, Vol 61, No 8, 2005, pp 766-777
Page 181
Energy Institute This publication has been produced as a result of
61 New Cavendish Street work carried out within the Technical Team of the
London W1G 7AR, UK Energy Institute (EI), funded by the EI’s Technical
Partners. The EI’s Technical Work Programme
t: +44 (0) 20 7467 7157 provides industry with cost effective, value adding
f: +44 (0) 20 7255 1472 knowledge on key current and future issues
e: pubs@energyinst.org.uk affecting those operating in the energy sector,
www.energyinst.org.uk both in the UK and beyond.
ISBN 978 0 85293 497 5
Registered
Issued under licence to Chevron Charity
employees Number 1097899
only.

EI Corrosion Management O&amp;G

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

EI Corrosion Management O&amp;G

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Guidance for corrosion management in

oil and gas production and processing

Issued under licence to Chevron employees only.

For further information, please visit http://www.energyinst.org.uk

BG Group Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited

Copyright © 2008 by the Energy Institute, London:

ISBN 978 0 85293 497 5

Published by the Energy Institute

Further copies can be obtained from

Electronic access to EI and IP publications is available via our website, www.energyinstpubs.org.uk.

Issued under licence to Chevron employees only.

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

2 Policy and strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

4 Corrosion risk assessment and planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

5 Implementation and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

6 Monitoring and measuring performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Contents cont... Page

Annex A Guidance to normative requirements and examples of good practice . . . . 23

Annex B Top corrosion threats and main mitigation methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Annex C Checklist for assessment of corrosion management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Annex D Glossary of terms and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Annex E References and Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

The Technical Department,

Elspeth Allan ConocoPhillips

Wayne Jones HSE OSD

They are based on the elements of a simple management model:

Figure 1: The basic corrosion management process model

Annex C provides a structured checklist of activities and requirements against which a

1.2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION

1.2.1 Management system scope

1.2.2 Production facilities scope

The document is intended to apply to the following facilities:

1.2.3 Deterioration processes scope

1.3 STRUCTURED FRAMEWORK FOR CORROSION MANAGEMENT

f g. Periodic independent audit of the

Figure 2: Framework for successful corrosion management

The document is in four parts, as detailed:

1.3.1 Normative requirements

1.3.2 Informative guidance

2 POLICY AND STRATEGY

Policies on risk and reliability

Figure 3: Setting the policy

2.3.5 The corrosion management policy should clearly state:

Policies on risk and reliability

Figure 4: Identify ownership of the corrosion management process

The key aspects divide into:

Except in the smallest organisations a cross-function corrosion management team should

3.3 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY

3.3.3 Key areas that require special expertise should be identified.

3.5.1 Appropriate information should be disseminated to the correct people.

3.6.5 Co-ordination should be maintained with external bodies.

4 CORROSION RISK ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING

Policies on risk and reliability

Identify hazards and assess risks Reviews

Figure 5: Planning is vital for success

Threat and consequence identification

Identify barriers to failure (corrosion mitigation methods)

Figure 6: Corrosion risk assessment and planning

4.3 CORROSION RISK ASSESSMENT

4.4.6 The organisational functions responsible for barriers/mitigation, monitoring/measurement

5 IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Policies on risk and reliability

Identify hazards and assess risks Reviews

Implement planned activities

EI Corrosion Management O&G

EI Corrosion Management O&G