Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1Background and Statement of the Problem

Against the backdrop of the intellectual milieu of the Enlightenment, where faith in the power of
rational thought and the search for universal objective principles of knowledge, science, and
morality predominated, political authority, formerly considered to rest on the divine right of
monarchs working within a larger natural and divine order, came to be thought of as resting
ultimately on the consent of the governed (Christman, 2002).
For political philosophers, the fundamental question is what justifies the authority that political
institutions wield over citizens? What conditions would justify the exercise of legitimate political
authority? Social contract theorists like Hobbes attempts to justify political authority on the basis
of a social contract among the governed. For Locke the natural rights one exercises in consenting
to adhere to a political authority fixes the grounds for the legitimacy of that authority. And for
Rousseau, a society is just (free) only when governed by a social contract which embodies the
general will of the people. Kant also developed important views concerning political authority
(Ibid.). In democracies, political authority hinges on the will of the electorate. And hence, among
others, media serve as a potent instrument to secure the voice of the public. It is against this
backdrop that Noam Chomsky called the media as ‘the manufacture of consent’ (Chomsky,
2002). The media in a way have become one of the strongest linkage institutions – bridging, as it
were, the gap between the state and the citizens.
It is a commonplace that media play a pivotal role, positively or negatively, in the
democratization process of a given nation, albeit with some controversies. Yet, this institution
has found itself in a tenuous relationship with other institutions in its daily operations. In a more
restricted sense, we can define the media as “the multitude of ways for the public to gain access
to political news, analysis and commentary” (Ubani, 2008). And in a more general sense, the
media provide the public access to any kind of information whether political, business or
entertainment. Thus, media serve as the eye, ear and voice of the larger society. In short, the
media upholds the right of the public to know. This is a very critical component of every modern
democracy. However, the ability and willingness of the media to carry out this function

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effectively depend largely on the form of the state and other institutions in which the media
operate and the character of the media itself (Ibid). This is another way of saying that there is a
correlation between the existence of a free media and democratic governance. As a matter of
fact, one of the main distinguishing features of a democratic form of government is the existence
of free and independent media. What follows then is that the advanced democracies without
doubt, boast of freer media environment. In a general sense, the media in most developing
democracies or transitional societies tend to enjoy less freedom.

Like media organizations elsewhere, the Ethiopian media, both public and private, have a role to
play on the democratization process of the nation. It is against this backdrop that this study
examines the role the Ethiopian media play in the democratization process and the interplay
between media, politics and democratization in the country. While examining these relationships,
the study mainly considers the role the Ethiopian media play in the transition from dictatorship to
multipartyism. Thus, written sources on Ethiopian media are used and other sources dealing with
media politics and democracy as well as philosophical traditions are also used wherever it is
deemed appropriate.

1.2 Objective of the Study

The study has both general and specific objectives. Generally, the study aims to explain the
relationship between media, politics and democracy in Ethiopia. Specifically, the study’s
objectives are:

 Why democracy for Ethiopia, anyways?

 The role of the media in the democratization process of the country.
 The interplay between media, politics and democracy, and how these factors work.
 The contribution of various philosophical traditions in explaining the interplay between
media, politics and democracy.
1.3 Research Questions

The paper tries to answer the following research questions:

 What exactly constitute the media?

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  What roles do the media perform?
 What is the character of the media in a developing democracy and how does it impact on
governance, democracy and politics?
 What role do the media play in the democratization process of the nation?
 What role do the media play in the transition from authoritarian to multipartyism?
 What factors hinder for its poor performance?
 What is the relationship between the media and other institutions such as the government,
opposition political parties and others?
 Do other institutions play a positive role for the emergence of an independent media in
Ethiopia?

1.4 Significance of the Study

No doubt, the role of the media on democratization has been a hot issue since recent times
throughout the world. But there are a few research papers done on or related to the role of the
media on the democratization process of Ethiopia such as the Political History of the Private
Press in Democratic Ethiopia 1991-2007 by Hallelujah Lulie (2008); Self-Censorship among
Print Journalists in Ethiopian Government Media by Nebyu Yonas (2008); Uneven Performance
by the Private Press in Ethiopia: An Analysis of 18 years of Press Freedom by Terje Skjerdal
(2009), among others. However, it can be safely stated that there are no research papers done on
the role of the media on the democratization process of the nation in a philosophical approach.
This research paper, hopefully, would become a pioneer in this regard and ultimately would spur
further studies through philosophical approach.

The study may also be useful:

 For the development of philosophical perspectives to the study of media politics and
democratization in Ethiopia.
 For other researchers who would like to understand the role of the media on
democratization through philosophical approach.
 For those who set public policy affecting the media and media issues and freedom of
speech.

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  For media organizations eager to shape public policy.

1.5 Research Methodology

The paper attempts to answer the aforementioned research questions by setting appropriate
philosophical models and theoretical frameworks. Thus, the paper uses the Chomsky’s
“Propaganda Model” to explain the public media and Francis Kasoma’s Theory of Media to
analyze the private media in Ethiopia. Moreover, it uses vast secondary data, analysis and
reflections to explain the interplay between media, politics and democratization in Ethiopia.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study focuses both on public and private media - print and broadcast media in Ethiopia.
However, the study excludes social media and other alternative media.

1.7 Limitation of the Study

There are some constraints in this study:

 There are no adequate written materials that dwell on media, politics and democracy in
Ethiopia in whatever form, in general.
 But most importantly, there are no research papers that use philosophical approaches to
explain the relationship between media, politics and democratization in Ethiopia,
specifically.
 The study does not include the role of social media, albeit playing a very crucial role
positively or negatively, for resource constraints.

1.8 Organization of the Study

The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter one outlines the study’s general background,
statement of the problem and research objectives. It also describes the study’s significance and
limitations. Chapter two deals with the various philosophical traditions underpinning the study,
and this chapter mainly tries to describe the relationships between the various philosophical
traditions with politics, media and democracy. Chapter three briefly describes the political
history of Ethiopia and describes the genesis of media in the country. It also deals with the role

4
both the public and independent media have played on the democratization process of the nation.
Chapter four examines and tries to analyze both public and private media using Chomsky’s
“Propaganda Model” and Francis Kasoma’s media theory for the public and independent media
respectively. Finally, chapter five discusses the study’s summary and conclusions and presents
issues for further studies.

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 Chapter 2

2.1 Setting the Framework: Linking Philosophical Traditions with Media

Politics and Democracy

The relationship between democracy, on the one hand, and media and journalism, on the other,
can be described in terms of a social contract, a theory propounded by philosophers like Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Stromback, 2005). Accordingly, media and
journalism require democracy as it is the only form of government that respects freedom of
speech, expression and information, and the independence of media from the state. By respecting
and protecting these necessary freedoms, democracy fulfills its part of the social contract with
the media and journalism. At the same time, democracy requires a system for the flow of
information, for public discussion and for a watchdog function independent of the state. This is
where media in general and journalism in particular enter the picture.
According to Stromback (2005: 81):
In theory media fulfill its part of the social contract by providing citizens with the
information they need in order to be free and self-governing, the government with the
information it needs in order to make decisions in the common interest sensitive to
public sentiments, an arena for public discussion, and by acting as a watchdog against
abuse of power in politics and other parts of society.
Eighteenth Century French political philosopher and enlightenment theorist, Montesquieu,
prescribed publicity – that is, the spread of appropriate and necessary information - as the cure
for the abuse of power (Opuamie-Ngoa, 2010). According to this prescription, to participate
more meaningfully in political and social life and have a better understanding of the actions and
activities of government officials and institutions, citizens must be properly informed; otherwise,
the governed will not be able to hold governors accountable . Media, of course, also provide
many other things. Entertainment and advertisements are but two examples of this (Ubani, 2008).
Nevertheless, media needs democracy for its freedom and independence and, in turn, democracy
needs media for the flow of information, for public discussions about political issues, and as a
watchdog against the abuse of power. As Carey writes, ‘‘without journalism there is no
democracy, but without democracy there is no journalism either.’’ Against these backdrops, let

6
us see first the fundamental concepts of the social contract theory (Carey, 1999, cited in
Stromback, 2005).
2.1.1 The Social Contract Tradition

The general proposition in social contract theory is that state power is justified only if such
power has been agreed to, by way of a contract of some sort, by those living under that power
(Christman, 2002). Thus, social contract theory, nearly as old as philosophy itself, is the view
that persons’ moral and/or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement
among them to form the society in which they live. Social contract theory is rightly associated
with modern moral and political theory and is given its first full exposition and defense by
Thomas Hobbes. After Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are the best known
proponents of this enormously influential theory, which has been one of the most dominant
theories within moral and political theory throughout the history of the modern West.

2.1.2 Hobbes’s Social Contract: Mechanism, Egoism and Rationality

Whereas Augustine, Aquinas, and other Christian thinkers conceived of the natural law as the
moral law of God, Thomas Hobbes construed the natural law as neither the law of God nor moral
law (Moore and Bruder, 2011). In fact, Hobbes’ political theory is best understood if taken in
two parts: his theory of human motivation, psychological egoism, and his theory of the social
contract, founded on the hypothetical state of nature. Hobbes has, first and foremost, a particular
theory of human nature, which gives rise to a particular view of morality and politics. His
psychological theory is greatly informed by mechanism, the general view that everything in the
universe is produced by nothing other than matter in motion.
Christman (2002: 62) states that for Hobbes:
Human beings were no different, nor were their voluntary actions. For Hobbes, voluntary
movement (what he called ‘animal’ motion) was caused by the external impact of some
force on the senses proceeding to internal motions that are either helped (pleasure) or
hindered (pain), issuing eventually (or not) in external movement. Such a system would
operate according to a fundamental principle of continual motion, so that the most
aversive eventuality would be death (the ceasing of all motion).

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According to Hobbes, this extends to human behavior. In Hobbes’ view, this mechanistic quality
of human psychology implies the subjective nature of normative claims. Hobbes was both a
mechanist and a materialist, believing that natural phenomena were made up (only) of physical
elements that functioned according to deterministic laws of cause and effect (Ibid).
In addition to subjectivism, Hobbes also infers from his mechanistic theory of human nature that
humans are necessarily and exclusively self-interested. In addition to being exclusively self-
interested, he also argues that human beings are reasonable. From these premises of human
nature, Hobbes goes on to construct a provocative and compelling argument for why we ought to
be willing to submit ourselves to political authority. He does this by imagining persons in a
situation prior to the establishment of society, the State of Nature.
Gingell et al (2000: 96) further explain it as follows:
Hobbes believed that, in the state of nature, that is life without any central authority,
humans are in perpetual danger from each other and are incapable of living in
harmony. Not only do humans seek to preserve their lives and their means of securing
those lives, but they exist in a state of continual competition with each other for honor
and dignity (unlike social animals such as bees).
Sutton (2009) also explains that according to Hobbes the natural concern of man in the state of
nature is self-preservation. There is no appeal in such a state to justice because there can be
nothing unjust if self-preservation is the highest end. Hobbes identifies the blameless liberty of
each man to use his own power for the preservation of his own nature as the right of nature.
Kenny (2006) also quoted Hobbes as follows: “Unless and until there is a common power to
keep men in awe, there will be constant quarrelsome and unregulated competition for goods,
power, and glory. This can be described as a state of war: a war of every man against every
man.”

The situation is not, however, hopeless because men are reasonable. Sutton (2009: 43) further
explains Hobbes’s concepts saying:

Being reasonable, and recognizing the rationality of this basic precept of reason, men
can be expected to construct a Social Contract that will afford them a life other than
that available to them in the State of Nature. ‘‘The mutual transferring of right’’ is
accomplished by what we call the social contract but what Hobbes calls the covenant.

8
 What is transferred is the right to all the means necessary for self-preservation - a
right that prevents men living in peace.

According to this argument, morality, politics, society, and everything that comes along with it,
all of which Hobbes calls ‘commodious living’ are purely conventional. Prior to the
establishment of the basic social contract, according to which men agree to live together and the
contract to embody a Sovereign with absolute authority, nothing is immoral or unjust – anything
goes (Ibid). After these contracts are established, however, then society becomes possible, and
people can be expected to keep their promises, cooperate with one another, and so on. The Social
Contract is the most fundamental source of all that is good and that which we depend upon to
live well.

For Hobbes, this contract is constituted by two distinguishable contracts. First, they must agree
to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had against one
another in the State of Nature. Second, they must imbue some one person or assembly of persons
with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract. This was further explained by D. A.
Thomas (1995: 67) as:
Hobbes had argued that in order to establish a secure peace, rational men, who found
themselves in a state of nature, would make a covenant with each other, having the
effect of creating a sovereign power. The sovereign’s commands would be law, and
the sovereign would also have the coercive power (limitless compared to the power of
any ordinary citizen) to enforce that law. In order to preserve peace all citizens ought
to obey the commands of the sovereign.
Thomas (1995: 68) further said that Hobbes believed that there was no option between virtually
unconditional obedience to the commands of the sovereign, and the disintegration of the
sovereign power, leading to civil war. The will of the sovereign ought not to be thwarted on the
supposed ground that it was in violation of the citizen’s natural rights. No limitation on the
authority of the sovereign power by the citizens can be allowed.

Since the sovereign is invested with the authority and power to mete out punishments for
breaches of the contract which are worse than not being able to act as one pleases, men have
good, albeit self-interested, reason to adjust themselves to the artifice of morality in general, and

9
justice in particular (Ibid). Society becomes possible because, whereas in the State of Nature
there was no power able to “overawe them all”, now there is an artificially and conventionally
superior and more powerful person who can force men to cooperate. Hobbes offers a
contractarian account of the formation of the state and is, therefore, in an important sense, a
precursor of liberal thinking about consent and obligation. His version of the social contract,
however, leads to an account of the relationship between state and subject that we would now
regard as absolutist (Gingell et al, 2000: 98).

2.1.3 Lock: Reason, Morality and Freedom

Locke, like Hobbes, begins with a consideration of the state of nature. But Locke’s conception of
a state of nature is very different from that of Hobbes.

Kenney (2006) said that Locke’s state of nature is not a state of war, because everyone is aware
of a natural law which teaches that all men are equal and independent, and that no one ought to
harm another in his life, liberty, or possession. This law is binding prior to any earthly sovereign
or civil society. It confers natural rights, notably the rights to life, self-defense, and freedom.

Gingell et al (2000: 99) explain Locke’s state of nature further as:

In such a state people are equal and free, but such equality and freedom has to be
managed within a law of nature which, mediated by reason, comes from God. So, for
example, no one in such a state may destroy themselves, nor may they legitimately harm
another in ‘his life, health, liberty, or possessions’, because this would offend against the
fact that they are God’s equally created creatures. And, just as people in such a state
have a right to preserve their own lives, liberty and possessions; they also have the right
to defend those of others, if these are threatened.

According to Locke, the State of Nature is a state of perfect and complete liberty to conduct
one’s life as one best sees fit, free from the interference of others. This does not mean, however,
that it is a state of license: one is not free to do anything at all one pleases, or even anything that
one judges to be in one’s interest (Ibid). According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locke’s State of Nature, although a state wherein there is no civil authority or government to

10
punish people for transgressions against laws, is not a state without morality. In other words,
Locke’s State of Nature is pre-political, but it is not pre-moral.

Thomas (1995) sates that Locke wished to develop a theory of legitimate political authority
which was consistent with his principle of the natural equality of persons. ‘Natural law’ in Locke
refers not to scientific laws governing physical processes, but to normative laws. Natural laws in
Locke are laws in accordance with which human conduct ought to occur, not laws in accordance
with which people always do act (Ibid). Natural rights are simply rights conferred upon persons
by the laws of nature. Natural rights seem to be regarded by Locke as rights of control people
have over themselves. They are rights of self-ownership: ‘every man has a property in his own
person’. These rights protect you in controlling yourself so long as what you do is consistent
with the self-ownership rights of everyone else (Ibid).

Property plays an essential role in Locke’s argument for civil government and the contract that
establishes it. According to Locke, private property is created when a person mixes his labor
with the raw materials of nature. Property is the linchpin of Locke’s argument for the social
contract and civil government because it is the protection of their property, including their
property in their own bodies that men seek when they decide to abandon the State of Nature
(Kenney, 2006).

Copleston, S. J. (1995: 142) states:

According to Locke, 'The great and chief end of men's uniting into commonwealths and
putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property'. But this
assertion is misinterpreted if we take the word 'property' in the ordinary restricted sense.
For Locke has already explained that he is using the word in a wider sense. Men join
together in society 'for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which
I call by the general name, property'.

Locke proposes a two-stage process by which government is formed. In the first stage each
person makes a compact with every other wishing to quit the state of nature whereby it is agreed
to surrender her executive power of the law of nature, and to make it over to all those (as a
collectivity) who have entered this compact (Ibid). But it is not yet a state because there is no

11
formally constituted body which has the authority to wield this power; that is, to legislate, and to
enforce the law. The formation of the community leaves things incomplete, and calls for a
second stage in order to establish civil society. So their collective executive power of the law of
nature must be exercised by a formally constituted authority. This will be referred to as the
‘government’ (Copleston, S. J., 1995).

According to Thomas (1995: 77):

The process by which the collective executive power of the law of nature is entrusted to
a form of government is undoubtedly majoritarian in Locke’s view. That said, it remains
true, of course, that Locke asserts that in the last resort political power lies in the hands
of the people. Corresponding to these two stages in the process by which legitimate
government is established there are, for Locke, two senses in which government rests on
consent. First, each individual consents to the original compact by which he divests
himself of the executive power of the law of nature. Here consent is contractual. One
agrees to give up a right to something which in the state of nature is one’s own, and to
transfer it to the community, on condition that everyone else does likewise. Second,
government rests on the consent of the people; that is, on the consent of a majority of the
people, to the continuance of that trust whereby the government has the right to exercise
the executive power of the law of nature.
Now, Locke is concerned to show that political society and government rest on a rational
foundation. And the only way he can see of showing this is to maintain that they rest on consent.
Copleston (1995) also states that for the complete freedom of the state of nature is necessarily
curtailed to some extent by the institution of political society and government, and this
curtailment can be justified only if it proceeds from the consent of those who are incorporated,
or, rather, of those who incorporate themselves, into political society and subject themselves to
government. At any rate his main concern was to show that absolute monarchy was contrary to
the original social compact, and he doubtless thought that the danger to liberty from majority rule
was much less than the danger to liberty which comes from absolute monarchy (Ibid). And
having included consent to majority rule in his 'original compact' he was able to say that
'absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed
inconsistent with civil society and so can be no form of civil government at all (Ibid).

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 2.1.4 Lessons from Rousseau

In seeking the original state of nature, Rousseau criticizes his predecessors, Hobbes and Locke,
for not going far enough back to discover its true character (Deutsch and Forniieri, 2009). For
Rousseau the State of Nature was a peaceful and people lived solitary, uncomplicated lives.
Their few needs were easily satisfied by nature. Because of the abundance of nature and the
small size of the population, competition was non-existent, and persons rarely even saw one
another, much less had reason for conflict or fear. With this criticism, Rousseau begins a schism
in modern political thought over the status and meaning of the state of nature.
According to Gingell et al (2000: 104):

The simple, morally pure persons were naturally endowed with the capacity for pity,
and therefore were not inclined to bring harm to one another. Humans are essentially
free, and were free in the State of Nature, but the ‘progress’ of civilization has
substituted subservience to others for that freedom, through dependence, economic and
social inequalities, and the extent to which we judge ourselves through comparisons
with others. Most importantly however, according to Rousseau, was the invention of
private property, which constituted the pivotal moment in humanity’s evolution out of a
simple, pure state into one characterized by greed, competition, vanity, inequality, and
vice. Hence, the invention of property constitutes humanity’s ‘fall from grace’ out of
the State of Nature.

Deutsch and Fornieri (2009: 153) also state that Rousseau’s prescription in The Social Contract
offers a public path of redemption that will restore something of the lost freedom and happiness
of man’s original condition by means of the general will. The social contract transforms private
individuals into public citizens who are capable of recognizing that their individual good and the
public good now coincide. According to Rousseau, once human beings left the state of nature
and entered into civil society, they tacitly agreed to exchange natural liberty (freedom from) for
civil or public liberty (freedom to)—that is, they tacitly agreed to the self-imposed rule of law
and to the obligation of social duties. The general will thus substitutes public or civil liberty for
private liberty (Ibid).

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According to Rousseau having introduced private property, initial conditions of inequality
became more pronounced. Some have property and others are forced to work for them, and the
development of social classes begins (Gingell et al, 2000). Eventually, those who have property
notice that it would be in their interests to create a government that would protect private
property from those who do not have it but can see that they might be able to acquire it by force
(Ibid).

By the creation of a social contract in which the sovereignty of the people was established, the
principle of consent to the functional role of the state was also put in place. This brings us to
perhaps the most significant concept in Rousseau’s work: the notion of the general will. The
argument constructed in The Social Contract puts heavy emphasis on our ability to set the
common good above narrow self-interest. Hence, most importantly, the legitimacy of the social
contract is grounded in the general will, which is an expression of the collective or common
good among free and equal people (Deutsch and Fornieri, 2009).

Copleston (1995: 146) states:

Rousseau assumes that the general will is directed towards the common good or interest,
that 'the most general will is always the most just also, and that the voice of the people is
in fact the voice of God'. The general will of the State, being more general than the
general will of any society within the State, must prevail; for it is more just and directed
to a more universal good. We can conclude, therefore, that 'the first and most important
rule of legitimate or popular government, that is to say, of government whose object is
the good of the people, is ... to follow in everything the general will'.

Significantly, for Rousseau, the general will necessarily reflects the particular history, customs,
habits, and manners of a people (Deutsch and Fornieri 2009). On one hand, the general will is
present as the guiding principle that animates virtuous citizens to unite for the common good. On
the other, it is reflected in the outcome of public policies that have followed the proper
democratic procedures.

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A distinction is drawn by Rousseau between sovereignty and government. The sovereign is the
power which possesses the right of legislation; the government's function is executive and
administrative, that is, to administer the law. In Rousseau’s eyes ‘sovereignty … was not like a
piece of property that could be freely disposed of: it was an inalienable possession, part of the
individual’s very humanity’ (Gingell et al, 2000).
Deutsch and Fornieri (2009: 155) state:
Rousseau makes clear that the general will is possible only under rare and special
circumstances. He specifies those enabling conditions necessary for its emergence. First,
the general will can be operative only in a small territory. Rousseau rejects the American
founders’ teaching that liberty is best secured in an extensive republic. On the contrary,
he maintains that freedom is best secured in a small republic where social bonds are
stronger.
Moreover, Copleston (1995) stresses that according to Rousseau participatory democracy is the
only legitimate form of association, this follows from his definition of freedom as obedience to a
law one prescribes to oneself and for the general will to be operative, citizens must be self-
determining in voting directly on laws themselves. Every citizen is, in effect, a lawmaker. The
same person is both an author of and subject to the same law. All good governments are
participatory and republican. In general, representative forms of government are illegitimate
because citizens do not participate directly in lawmaking. For Rousseau, this implies an
extremely strong and direct form of democracy. One cannot transfer one’s will to another, to do
with as he or she sees fit, as one does in representative democracies. Rather, the general will
depends on the coming together periodically of the entire democratic body, each and every
citizen, to decide collectively, and with at least near unanimity, how to live together, i.e., what
laws to enact (Ibid).
2.1.5. From Consent to Legitimacy

The survey of the prominent historical figures in the social contract tradition mobilizes various
themes in the theoretical structure of consent and legitimacy, a principle one of which is that the
justification of political authority must be a function of the individual approval of those subject
to that authority. What was noted, however, was that in so far as such actual, even tacit, consent

15
is a necessary condition for legitimacy, there arise serious objections to the view that state
authorities for complex societies are ever legitimate.
Christman (2002) states that another option pursued by contemporary followers of the social
contract tradition is the use of the model of hypothetical consent in order to justify political
institutions and instead of (problematically) demanding that citizens actually express their
acceptance of the political authority under which they live (however tacitly), one could claim
that state authority is justified if such citizens would accept that authority under conditions of fair
choice, and consequently they are thereby bound by its principles. Indeed, these theorists argue,
in so far as such hypothetical consent can be secured, such a state is just.
According to Christman (2002: 68):
So that the question of whether we want to join a society is moot, rather it is a question of
whether we are in fact obligated, morally, to obey the dictates of the government to which
we have cultural, personal, and psychological ties. The answer to that question depends on
whether the principles guiding that state are just (in Rousseau’s view, whether we can
maintain our freedom within it), more particularly, whether they function in a way that
expresses respect for us as free and equal persons.
Let us say merely that an acceptable theory of democracy may well succeed in preserving the
connection between political legitimacy and the actual wills of citizens, a view central to the
liberal conception of justice arising from the work of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.

2.2 Media and Democracy: Philosophical Foundations

In order for democracy to flourish, it is vital that the citizen has various sources of information
and access to proper forums for open and fair debate. The media plays a critical role in
stimulating debate about important issues, presenting facts and reporting news, uncovering
corruption and misconduct and providing a vehicle for diverse perspectives.
McQuail (2003) states that rightly or wrongly, media are perceived to occupy a key position in
the public life of most societies and have thereby attracted strong but divergent expectations and
attitudes. This influence may be feared or harnessed, but they are also expected to perform some
essential tasks of public communication, especially in relations to democratic politics and the
rule of law (Ibid).

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Against this backdrop, Schulty (1998: 55) says:
For nearly two centuries the idea that the press plays a central role in the management
and maintenance of a representative democracy has framed debates about the media.
The eighteenth-century claim, that the press was entitled to its own independent
standing in the political system, as the Fourth Estate, has become an ideal which
continues to influence the attitudes of those working in the late twentieth century news
media, as well as politicians and citizens. The press, in the words of Jurgen Habermas
was the public sphere’s ‘pre-eminent institution’ and despite profound changes to
society, communications and political life, the modern news, and those engaged in its
production, continue to embrace this institutional role.
Lavarch (2012: 31) also puts it as follows:
Importantly, the media is also a key accountability mechanism for keeping the
institutions of power in check. These institutions include the political power of
executive government, the social and cultural power of institutions as diverse as
churches and sporting groups, and the economic power of the business sector. This
creates a dichotomy, because as a consequence of this role, the media itself accrues an
enormous amount of power, in that it packages and shapes the flow of information.
The power to promulgate that information is key to the freedom of the press, and one
that is jealously guarded — and rightly so.
Schulty (1998) argues that the legitimacy of the contemporary news media in continuing to claim
this institutional role is now under question, as such the owners, editors and journalists who
make up ‘the media’, and who influence and control content, have a range of motivations, which
are brought to bear on the multiple messages being communicated,’ these motivations naturally
and invariably influence the exercise of media power. Just as the media is an accountability
mechanism for powerful institutions, so too must it be accountable. A failure of the media to be
accountable is a serious deficiency in a democracy, as is the failure to hold other sources of
power to account (Ibid).
Alison Gillwald quoting Curran (1991) states that the basic requirements then of a democratic
media system are that it encourages accessibility to public information for all, reflects the
diversity of interests in society, assists other political organs of democracy through scrutiny and
debate and allows citizens to participate equally in the processes of public policy-making, but

17
'the media should do more than reflect the prevailing balances of forces in society and it should
redress imbalances of power through broadening access to the public domain (by) compensating
for inferior resources and skills.
Therefore as McQuail (2003: 126) rightly puts it:
A number of normative issues arise from the multiple and sometimes pivotal role that
media have come to play in society and from which they cannot escape even if they wish
to. At the core of positive expectations facing the media is their contribution to democratic
political process. They are an essential intermediary between citizens and governments.
The entire process of democratic election itself depends on several conditions that in turn
depend on the media. These include the existence of an informed electorate, a well-
informed and stable public opinion, and a readiness on the part of the citizens to
participate actively.
The notion that media have obligations to society is a contested one, since it appears inconsistent
with principles of freedom of expression (McQuail, 2003). There are several different sources of
theoretical reflection on the role of media in society, ranging from general social and political
theory to more media-specific normative theory. Let us see some of the major theoretical
traditions.
2.2.1 Market Liberals and Elitist Democrats

Since the 1980s, the ‘free market’ vision of democracy has gained political and cultural
hegemony. Known variously as market liberalism, neo-liberalism or neo-conservatism, this
ideology holds that “that government is best which govern least” – with the exception that the
State’s military, police and prisons are seen as necessary to preserve the social order.

Democracy is seen not as an end in itself but as normally the best institutional arrangement to
maintain political stability and a liberal political culture characterized by individual rights and
choice, particularly economic rights of ownership, contract and exchange.

It often adopts a populist and anti-elitist stance, but this ‘free market” vision actually fits well
with an elitist version of democracy, classically articulated by Joseph Schumpeter, 1976 (cited in
Baker, 2002). His theory of “competitive elitism” meshes with market liberalism’s emphasis on
private consumption rather than public virtue (Baker, 2002, cited in McQuail, 2003).

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McChesney (1999: 214) says:

Given the complexity of modern political issues, the vulnerability of the masses to
irrational and emotional appeals, and the risk of overloading the political system with
competing demands, Schumpeter argued, ongoing public participation is neither
necessary nor even desirable. Policy-making elites should be fairly autonomous from the
mass public, they can be held sufficiently accountable through periodic elections, the
entrenchment of individual political rights (assembly, expression), and a free press. In
this view, democracy is a procedure for selecting leaders, with citizen participation
confined mainly to voting every few years – essentially, the role of consumers in a
political market place.

McQuail (2003) argues that market liberals offered a solution to the dilemmas posed by the
transition from a commercial and hierarchic to pluralistic and democratic form of society by
promoting freedom of expression as an unconditional right of citizens. Thus, journalism in this
model would have several roles. By exposing corruption and the abuse of power, the press
should act as a watchdog on government, which is considered the main threat to individual
freedom.

Baker (2002) cited in McQuail, (2003) maintains that the press need not provide for nor promote
people’s intelligent political involvement or reflection, since meaningful understanding of social
forces and structural problems is beyond the populace’s capacity; nor need it raise fundamental
questions about State policy or the social order. But journalism, particularly the ‘quality’ press,
can usefully report intra-elite debates and circulate ‘objective’ information helpful to elites
themselves. This ‘elitist’ mandate for journalism was articulated as early as the 1920s by the
legendary American political columnist Walter Lippman (Ibid).

McChesney (1999) also states if free market conservatives see a democratic deficit in
contemporary journalism, they usually focus on one of two perceived problems – one is the
influence of the State, whether through informal attempts by governing politicians for
manipulate journalists, or through formal laws and regulations, such as restrictions on media
concentration, or ‘public service’ content requirements in broadcasting.

Curran and Seaton (1991:156) succinctly put the role of the media in free market theory as:

19
 Three political ‘functions’ of the press are usually stressed in liberal theory. The press
provides a forum of public debate about the issues of the day; it articulates public
opinion arising from this debate; and it forces governments to take account of what
people think. The press is thus the agency though which private citizens are
reconstituted as a public body exercising supervision of the state.

Thus, market liberals regard commercial, privately owned media as more democratic, shaped as
they allegedly are by reader, viewer and listener preferences. A commercial media system, it is
argued, gives audiences what they want: the consumer is ‘sovereign.’

Curran and Seaton (1991) further state that according to free market theory, the freedom of the
press is rooted in the freedom to publish without being subject to pre-publication censorship by
the state. This ensures that the press reflects a wide range of opinions and interests in society. If a
view point is not expressed in the press, this is only because it lacks a sufficient following to
sustain it in the market place. They further explain that this neutrality of the market makes the
press a representative voice of the people. ‘The broad shape and nature of the press,’ argues John
Whale for instance, ‘is ultimately determined by no one but its readers, this is because
newspapers and magazines must respond to their readers if they are to stay in business in a
competitive market (Ibid).

McQuail (2003: 129) argues:

Market liberalism holds that the free market is the best solution to ensuring democracy
and safeguarding individual rights. In sprit it is generally utilitarian, claiming to achieve
the greatest good for the greatest number by a minimum of intervention.

The underlying principle of free market approach is that consumers are the best judges of what is
in their interests. Media policy should be geared therefore to creating the conditions of greatest
possible competition in which consumers can exercise sovereign control, thus, media regulation
contradicts the democratic principle of consumer sovereignty, and therefore, free market
theorists argue that the freedom to publish and compete in an unrestricted market produces a
press which is diverse, accountable and representative (Ibid). In reality, though, many structural
factors refract or undermine the expression of consumer preferences in commercial media
content, and even if media could be made as responsive as possible to consumer preferences,

20
they would not necessarily produce the kind of public forum and quality news that are a
precondition of informed citizenship (Ibid).

2.2.2 “Public Sphere” Liberalism

The elitist model of democracy has been criticized on many grounds. Its negative view of
citizens’ participation is unduly pessimistic; in referenda and elections on fundamental issues
citizens have shown a remarkable capacity for learning and civic engagement. Moreover, the
elitist model overestimates the competence and accountability of policy makers, in the absence
of ongoing public participation. Such considerations have strengthened an alternative vision that
accepts the elitist democrat’s support for individual rights and an independent ‘watchdog’ press,
but places a much higher value on popular participation through established political channels.
Participation can be valued as a means to both produce more just legitimate policies, and to
develop the democratic capacities of citizens (McChesney, 1999).

Liberal participatory democrats prioritize the role of media in facilitating or even constituting a
public sphere – ‘that realm of social life where the exchange of information and views on
questions of common concern can take place so that public opinion can be formed’ ( Dahlgren
1995, cited in McChesney, 1999).

McChesney (1999: 231) says: “As theorized by Jurgen Habermas, the public sphere is not
necessarily a physical setting, but a conceptual space with in various venues and groups, one
characterized ideally by discussion free of domination, equality of participation, and rationality
in the sense of an appeal to general principles rather than sheer self-interest.” In a participatory
democracy, government policy would reflect the decisions of a civil society collectively debating
and determining its future. The media would provide an arena of public debate, and reconstitute
private citizens as a public body in the form of public opinion (Ibid).

McQuail (2003: 148) also explains:

Habermas conceptualized the public sphere as that realm of social life where the exchange
of information and news on questions of common concern can take place so that public
opinion can be formed … since the scale of modern society does not allow more than

21
 relatively small numbers of citizens to be co-present, the media have become the chief
institution of the public sphere.

Gillwald cited in McQuail (2003:149) states:

Habermas' notion of the public sphere refers to a realm between the state and civil
society where decisions were publicly reached through rational discourse. He identifies
the nineteenth century press in England as the golden era of the public sphere, in which
a plurality of ideas was aired in a context free from both state and capital intervention.
But, for Habermas, this becomes undermined through the concentration of media, the
dominance of advertising and public relations, which sell ideas rather than debate them.
This situation, for Habermas, is compounded by the entry of the state (through anti-
monopoloy acts or state-sponsored media) into this realm to prevent the domination of
capital, with the devastating effect of blurring the public and private realm.
Kellner (www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner) also adds:

The principles of the public sphere involved an open discussion of all issues of general
concern in which discursive argumentation was employed to ascertain general interests and
the public good. The public sphere thus presupposed freedoms of speech and assembly, a
free press, and the right to freely participate in political debate and decision-making.

Baker (2002), cited in McQuail (2003), advocates two off-setting roles or tasks which are
expected of public sphere building journalism: first, a segmented system that provides each
significant cultural and political groups with a forum to articulate and develop its interests; and
second, journalism organizations that can facilitate the search for society-wide political
consensus by being universally accessible, inclusive (civil, objective balanced, and
comprehensive), and thoughtfully discursive, not simply factual.

McQuail (2003) states that the role assigned to media is to promote an effective public space in
which diverse voices can be heard, ideas exchanged and debated, issues of moment debated in a
rational way, and public opinion formed.

Norris (2000), cited in McQuail (2003), proposes a check list of ‘public-sphere’ tasks for
journalism. If news media are to provide a civic forum that helps sustain pluralistic political
competition, do they provide extensive coverage of politics, including a platform for a wide

22
plurality of political actors? Do media provide ‘horizontal’ communication between political
actors, as well as ‘vertical’ communication between government and governed? Are there
multiple sources of regular political news from different outlets, underpinning effective
government communication, multiple venues for public debate, and reduced costs to citizens for
becoming politically informed? Is there equal or proportionate coverage of different parties?
Finally as an agent in mobilizing public participation, does journalism stimulate general interest,
public learning, and civic engagement vis-à-vis the political process?

But they argue that journalism should not be blamed for flaws rooted elsewhere in power
relations and social structure – consideration which leads to a third tradition of media critique.

2.3.3 Radical Democracy

The public sphere liberals’ critique is vulnerable to refutation partly because it is a limited one; it
seeks to reform the practices of journalism but does not raise fundamental questions about the
market-oriented corporate structures of news media, and still less the social and political order.
By contrast, radical democrats offer a more robust set of benchmarks for evaluating media
performance. Although radical democracy theory originally derived from criticism of liberalism,
it largely represented conventional and establishment of the social obligations of the press
(McQuail, 2003).

If market liberals emphasize individual liberties and restrictions on government power, and
public sphere liberals highlight public deliberation about policy, radical democrats add a third
dimension – a thoroughgoing view of democracy as not just a set of procedural rules, but a
societal environment which nourishes developmental power – everyone’s equal right to ‘the full
development and use’ of their capabilities (Macpherson, 1977, cited in McChesney, 1999).

Pickard (2006) cited in McChesney (1999: 233-234), states:

Unlike traditional Marxism, this model conceives power and resistance in ways that
refuse to privilege the contestation of certain power hierarchies (such as class) over
others (gender, race, and sexuality). While many activists adhering to these radical
democratic models are adamantly opposed to corporate capitalism, they are loath to
subscribe to what they often see as another totalizing grand narrative and instead favor
radically nonhierarchical and decentralized structures -/hallmarks of radical democracy.
23
McChesney (1999: 236) summarizes it as follows:

Such a standpoint transcends public sphere liberalism in several respects. First, radical
democrats seek not just to reinvigorate the existing system of representative democracy,
but to move beyond it towards direct citizen participation in decision-making in the
neighborhoods, workplace and family and gender relations – the life world. Second, they
prioritize equality as a core principle of democracy, one increasingly undermined by
neo-liberalists. Citizens should have not only equal legal and political rights, but also
approximate equality in wealth and power. Third, radical democrats regard power
relations as antagonistic in societies with structured inequalities, even in prosperous
capitalist democracies, political and economic elites may have interests which conflict
with those of the rest of the population. Fourth, drawing from the tradition of critical
political economy, radical democrats analyses power holistically. A democratic public
sphere cannot be insulated from power hierarchies embedded in State, economy, gender
and race, so long as they exist, they will tend to undermine equality of voice in the
public sphere. Finally, given these and other assumptions, radical democrats are often
quite critical of unregulated corporate capitalism and its impact on politics, society and
the environment.

Gillwald cited in McQuail (2003: 154) also adds:

In contrast, and under very different international conditions, the radical democratic
approach is highly pragmatic. Curran suggests an innovative solution to overcome the
deficiencies of both the orthodox liberal and Marxist approaches and exploits their
strengths. He meshes the general market approach with a collectivist approach to
democratize the public sphere by making it more representative and accessible.
Rethinking the media as a public sphere, as Curran and others have done, is a useful
way of breaking out of the state-civil society polarization that has dominated media
debate. Radical democratic theorists reject the way the distinction is made between
private and public realms, which underpins the liberal definition of the public sphere.
The mediation role of the press and broadcasting is said to extend to all areas where
power is exercised over others, the workplace and home.

24
Given this view of democracy, what political roles are expected of news media? Radical
democrats endorse the watchdog and public sphere functions celebrated in the other models
respectively, but add such criteria as these: analyzing horizontal communication between
subordinate groups, including social movements as agents of democratic renewal (Ibid).

Thus, McQuail, (2003) says the essential task was to ensure that the media would somehow earn
its right to freedom by delivering on the unwritten contract made with the people to inform fully
and freely.

Pickard (2006), cited in McChesney (1999: 237), states:

Aiming to empower marginalized voices, the media goes beyond advocating greater
voice in policymaking or a seat at the table. It seeks active re-appropriation and
redistribution of space, technology, and other resources to democratize society and thus
would level all hierarchies.
McChesney (1999) says that by giving public voice to civil society, media can facilitate needed
social change, power diffusion and popular mobilization against social injustice; expanding the
scope of public awareness and political choice by reporting events and voices which are socially
important but outside, or even opposed to, the agendas of elites, such issues include
environmental sustainability and other extra-market values integral to a just and humane society;
counter-acting power inequalities found in other spheres of the social order.

Whereas public sphere liberals worry about public mistrust of government, radical democrats
like Herman and Chomsky (2002) worry about that media are altogether too successful in
‘manufacturing consent’ for unjust State and corporate policies, while marginalizing dissenters
and ordinary citizens from political debate.

2.2.4 Marxist Media Theory

During the 1960’s and 1970’s much more radical criticism, inspired by neo-Marxist, was
directed at the media in general (McQuail, 2003). A central feature of Marxist theory is the
'materialist' stance that social being determines consciousness. According to this stance,
ideological positions are a function of class positions, and the dominant ideology in society is the

25
ideology of its dominant class. This is in contrast to the 'idealist' stance that grants priority to
consciousness (as in Hegelian philosophy).

Curran et al. (1982) assert that in fundamentalist Marxism, ideology is 'false consciousness',
which results from the emulation of the dominant ideology by those whose interests it does not
reflect. From this perspective the mass media disseminate the dominant ideology: the values of
the class which owns and controls the media. According to adherents of Marxist political
economy the mass media conceal the economic basis of class struggle; 'ideology becomes the
route through which struggle is obliterated rather than the site of struggle’ (Ibid).

McQuail, (2003: 157) states:

In its strongest forms, it rejected the whole set of media institutions, as simply serving as
the informational and cultural arm of a capitalist-beurocratic state apparatus, with little
responsibility of reform or democratization within. In its earliest formulation, mass culture
(the dominant culture of the media and of most people) was portrayed not only as
abysmally poor in quality (aesthetic, ethical) but also effectively designed as an
ideological tool used by capitalist media owners to captivate the masses, blunt any critical
perspectives, and divert them from the revolutionary tasks. It also misrepresented social
reality, especially the true position of the working class and promoted conservative
ideology.

Gillwald cited in McQuail (2003) notes that Marxist approaches are based on the conception of
dominant ideology as ‘a monolithic rationalization of dominant material interests. It generally
overstates the unity between ideas and economic interests, the internal consistency of dominant
discourses, the homogeneity of dominant interests and the extent of ideological domination of
subordinate classes’.

Daniel Chandler (1994: 55) also explains:

The mass media are, in classical Marxist terms, a 'means of production' which in capitalist
society are in the ownership of the ruling class. According to the classical Marxist position,
the mass media simply disseminate the ideas and world views of the ruling class, and deny

26
 or defuse alternative ideas. This is very much in accord with Marx's argument that: ‘The
class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same
time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it’.

According to this stance, the mass media functioned to produce 'false consciousness' in the
working-classes. This leads to an extreme stance whereby media products are seen as monolithic
expressions of ruling class values, which ignores any diversity of values within the ruling class
and within the media, and the possibility of oppositional readings by media audiences (ibid).

Thus, Curran et al. (1982: 221) summarize it as follows:

In Marxist media analysis, media institutions are regarded as being 'locked into the power
structure, and consequently as acting largely in tandem with the dominant institutions in
society. The media thus reproduced the viewpoints of dominant institutions not as one
among a number of alternative perspectives, but as the central and "obvious" or "natural"
perspective.'

2.3 Theoretical Frameworks

Here I would explain briefly two media-specific theories, namely, the ‘propaganda model,’
propounded by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, and Francis P. Kasoma’s Media theory.
These two media theories will be used later in the following chapters to analyze media, politics
and democracy in the Ethiopian context.

2.3.1 The Propaganda Mode: Media as a ‘manufacturing of consent’

Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky analysis of the media centers in what is called a
‘propaganda model,’ an analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of the
media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate.
According to these writers, among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandize on
behalf of the powerful societal interests that control and finance them (Herman and Chomsky,
2002).

27
Herman and Chomsky (2002) show that contrary to the usual image of the news media as
cantankerous, obstinate, and ubiquitous in their search for truth and defense of justice, in their
actual practice they defend the economic, social, and political agendas of the privileged groups
that dominate domestic society, the state, and the global order. Based on a series of case studies -
including the media’s dichotomous treatment of “worthy” versus “unworthy,” “legitimizing” and
“meaningless,” Third World elections, and devastating critiques of media coverage of the U.S.
wars against Indochina - Herman and Chomsky draw on decades of criticism and research to
propose a Propaganda Model to explain the media’s behavior and performance.
The ‘propaganda model’ states that the representatives of these interests have important agendas
and principles that they want to advance, and they are well positioned to shape and constrain
media policy. This is normally not accomplished by crude intervention, but by the selection of
right-thinking personnel and by the editors' and working journalists' internalization of priorities
and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the institution's policy (Ibid).

Herman and Chomsky (2002:4) explain the propaganda model as:

The special importance of propaganda in what Walter Lippmann referred to as the

"manufacture of consent" has long been recognized by writers on public opinion,
propaganda, and the political requirements of social order. Lippmann himself, writing in
the early 1920s, claimed that propaganda had already become "a regular organ of popular
government," and was steadily increasing in sophistication and importance. We do not
contend that this is all the mass media do, but we believe the propaganda function to be a
very important aspect of their overall service.
Thus, the propaganda model tries to explain the performance of the mass media and asserts that
the media serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private
activity.

For Herman and Chomsky structural factors are those such as ownership and control,
dependence on other major funding sources (notably, advertisers), and mutual interests and
relationships between the media and those who make the news and have the power to define it
and explain what it means. The propaganda model also incorporates other closely related factors
such as the ability to complain about the media's treatment of news (that is, produce "flak"), to

28
provide "experts" to confirm the official slant on the news, and to fix the basic principles and
ideologies that are taken for granted by media personnel and the elite, but are often resisted by
the general population.

According to this view, the same underlying power sources that own the media and fund them as
advertisers, that serve as primary definers of the news, and that produce flak and proper-thinking
experts, also, play a key role in fixing basic principles and the dominant ideologies. Chomsky's
concept of necessary illusions is linked to power elites dominating how life happens, with part of
the population -- about 20 per cent who make up the political class and are expected to
participate as cultural managers in a limited fashion -- are indoctrinated, and most people - the
other 80 per cent of the population - are marginalized, diverted from political awareness and
participation in self-governing, and reduced to apathy so they do not vote or take charge. Media
are a tool of society's power elites and owned and controlled by them and are used to impose
those illusions that are necessary to keep people diverted from the political process (Ibid).

The ‘propaganda’ model states that what journalists do, what they see as newsworthy, and what
they take for granted as premises of their work are frequently well explained by the incentives,
pressures, and constraints incorporated into such a structural analysis. Perhaps this is an obvious
point, but the democratic postulate is that the media are independent and committed to
discovering and reporting the truth, and that they do not merely reflect the world as powerful
groups wish it to be perceived. If, however, the powerful are able to fix the premises of
discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear, and think about, and to
"manage" public opinion by regular propaganda campaigns, the standard view of how the system
works is at serious odds with reality (Ibid).
2.3.2 Francis P. Kasoma’s Media theory

Francis P. Kasoma, a Zambian, explained the role of the independent media in relation to
democratic developments in Africa, zeroing on English-speaking Sub-Saharan African countries,
though he also take heed to French-speaking West African countries. He asserts: “the
independent press is pivotal for both the establishment and the sustenance of democracy,
although the African press has failed its duty in various ways.”

29
A precondition of Kasoma’s theories is that the press must be clearly alienated from any type of
governmental, political or economic control, or from material or infrastructure control (Skjerdal,
2009). He would not accept that any type of state-run or party-affiliated press could be called
“independent” (Ibid).

According to Skjerdal (2009), Kasoma’s theory about the role of the independent press in
relation to democracy is two-fold: Firstly, he claims that this part of the press prepared the
ground for multiparty democracy in the first place. Secondly, he claims that the independent
press is seminal in securing the multiparty system; without its constant pressure the multiparty
system would wither. To the first argument, Kasoma saw the independent press as an active
stakeholder already when multiparty systems were discussed across Africa in the late 1980s and
1990s.

Kasoma (2000:77) writes:

It is my considered view that the independent press, and to a much lesser extent
the government press, had more or less a facilitative role to play in the realisation of each
of the democracy benchmarks, although the extent of its input was not with the same
intensity in every case and for every country.

Kasoma nonetheless admits that the independent or private press may have been weak or even
non-existent in some countries before the introduction of multipartyism; even so, he affirms that
there must be a certain measure of press freedom in place before democracy can be born
(Skjerdal, 2009). Kasoma notes that Anglophone countries, which have enjoyed a freer press
than francophone countries, had a quicker return to democracy after the demise of one-party
regimes. Other than this he makes little use of direct empirical evidence to back the claim that
the press has been vital in bringing about multiparty democracy, although he refers to some
general observations about the independent press in the early 1990s: (a) the press destroyed the
myth that one-party rulers were untouchable; (b) the press created a climate for public
discussion;(c) it appealed to the international community which in turn put pressure on the
regime; (d) the press revealed misuse of funds by former leaders; and (e) it gave positive
coverage to the leaders who were about to come to power (Skjerdal, 2009). Kasoma also refers to
the importance of the independent press in promoting transparency, accountability and good

30
governance by “revealing to the citizenry what government is doing or not doing that deserves
public scrutiny” (Ibid).

When speaking of the actual performance of the independent press in multiparty democracies,
Kasoma became increasingly critical and in his 1997 article, he goes as far as to put the blame on
the media themselves if they face new restrictions from the government, as such, he reports that
the media behave in shamefully unethical ways and claims that the “widespread
unprofessionalism of journalists of the independent press in Africa is itself responsible for a large
proportion of governmental intervention to limit press freedom” (Kasoma, 1997, cited in
Skjerdal, 2009) This leads governments to establish media councils with the view to control the
press. Kasoma deeply regrets this situation but says it is a result of bad advocacy journalism,
overuse of anonymous sources and the press behaving as an opposition party (Ibid).

31
 Chapter 3
3. Media, Politics and Democratization in Ethiopia

3.1 A brief political history of Ethiopia

The modern state of Ethiopia is an indigenous institution whose antecedents, according to

historians, go back over centuries. This institution, after emerging in the highlands of Axum,
disintegrated into a Dark Age period (1769-1855) known as Zemene Mesafint, ‘the era of the
princes’. In the late 19th century, efforts to reconstruct the state were made by a series of
emperors, culminating in the modern state and consolidation of power under Emperor
Haileselasie I (Aaron, 2002).

Bahru (2002: 7) succinctly puts it as follows:

The Ethiopian state has endured considerable vicissitudes since its genesis. At times, it has
expanded; at other times, it has contracted. It has changed its loci on a number of
occasions. Its component units have also altered with time. But three epochs stand out as
formative periods for the evolution of the central political institution: the Aksumite
(lasting roughly from the first to the eighth centuries AD), the medieval period (1270-
1527) and the modern, beginning from the late 19th century.

Bahru (2002) further argues that the picture of a centralized monarchy that one often encounters
in the literature is far from accurate, to a large extent there has been more of a decentralized
monarchy rather than a centralized one. However, Bahru argues, the picture changed
significantly under Haile Sellassie I.

Aaron (2002) also explains that the relationship between state and society in modern Ethiopia
has undergone three transformations: from the imperial era to military rule to the beginning of a
democratic state.

Aaron (2002: 52) further explains:

32
 The basis of political power under the Haile Sellassie regime was rural, and political
power was centralized. A half-hearted imperial attempt at decentralization, and later,
representative government failed, ushering in an urban breakthrough that became known
as the Ethiopian revolution. The regime that followed proved to be even more
authoritarian and sought to solve its crisis by more centralization, which led to increased
societal resistance. Both regimes dealt with societal problems through centralization and
undemocratic rule. They shared a pan-Ethiopian conception of the state and failed to
address regional aspirations.

In other words, the modern political history of Ethiopia is the story of a transition from a
decentralized form of patrimonial rule to bureaucratic centralism. The bureaucratic centralism
was followed by the military regime, which monopolized political power through tightly
centralized party apparatus and instituted authoritarian rule (Aaron, 2002). As such, the nation’s
modern political history became full of conflicts of regional groups against the center (Ibid).

This historical legacy of conflict between center and region finally resulted in the defeat of the
military regime at the center by the coalition forces of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front in 1991 (Harald Aspen, 2002, cited in Bahru, 2002).

Bahru (2002: 9) also explains:

The picture changed dramatically with the coming to power of the EPRDF. The global
situation dictated abiding by the canon of democratic governance. Its own long-standing
commitment to the principle of national self-determination almost inexorably led the
EPRDF to adopt ethnic federalism as the bedrock of that governance. Initiated in 1992
during the tenure of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), this creation of
autonomous regions based on linguistic affiliation was formalized with the adoption of a
new constitution and the subsequent establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia (FDRE).

Siegfried Pausewang (1994) cited in Bahru (2002) also argues that in 1991 no new government
could hope to win legitimacy without solving the nationality issue. A solution was found in the
Charter which provided for federal state promising wide local and regional autonomy (Ibid).
Thus, a cardinal element of that constitution has been a contentious article that guaranteed the

33
principle of self-determination of nationalities up to and including secession (Bahru, 2002).
These moves were accompanied by measures of political liberalization, of which the
guaranteeing of freedom of the press, at any rate at the formal level, has been perhaps the most
conspicuous.

However, the tension between the formal and actual, between declaration and implementation,
remains palpable. While such tension is perceptible in other African countries that have adopted
the path of democratization, it is bound to be more pronounced in a country like Ethiopia, where
the weight of tradition (the burden of history) lies so heavy (Bahru, 2002). A number of
questions thus present themselves, among others, how free is the press? Does it play constructive
role in the democratization process?

3.2 A brief political history of the Ethiopian media

The beginning of the print media in Ethiopia, ‘sporadic and foreign inspired for the most part,’
are catering predominantly to religious subject matter, has been traced by some to the mid-
nineteenth century, when the first printing press was set up in 1863 at Massawa by Lazarist
Missionary known as Father Lorenzo Biancheri (Shimeles Bonsa, 2000, cited in Frezer, 2011).

In the 1890’s a Franciscan missionary called Father Bernard secured Emperor Menilik’s
acceptance, and started publishing a weekly French-Amharic newspaper entitled ‘Le Semaine d’
Ethiopie,’ planned mainly for campaign against leprosy (Richard Pankhurst cited in Frezer,
2011). According to Shimeles ‘the reign of Emperor Menelik could indeed be said to have
represented a crucial stage in the initiation of an Ethiopian journalism in terms, for instance, of
press ownership and issues covered (2000). Though there is disagreement of which is the first
periodical in Ethiopia among Father Bernard’s weekly Le Semaine d’ Ethiopie, Blatta Gebre-
Egziabher’s handwritten sheets expected every week in the capital, and A’emro, the first two
papers due to their question of ownership and lack of adequately convincing evidence, A’emro
appears to be Ethiopia’s first periodical universally accepted with its earliest issues around 1901
having 24 copies of circulation at first and handwritten that increased to 200 after coping
machine was imported (Shimeles, 2000, cited in Frezer, 2011).

Following this early period, ‘the foundation in 1923 of what was called Berhanena Selam
printing press and, in 1925, of a weekly government owned newspaper named Bernanena Selam,
34
represented a landmark in the history of the Ethiopian press (Shimeles, 2000, cited in Frezer,
2011). The progress of the Ethiopian press was ‘interrupted for about five years (1935-1941) as a
result of the country’s occupation by Mussoloni’s forces’ where ‘printing presses were
demolished, as happened in Harar and Jimma, or were into centers for the production and
dissemination of Fascist propaganda, as happened to those in Addis Ababa (Ibid). Nevertheless,
‘some type of a bi-weekly field paper of the liberation forces, Banderachin (later renamed
Sendeq Alamachin – our flag) was issued including the ‘many publications produced in foreign
countries to promote the Ethiopian cause’ (MIO, 1996, cited in Frezer, 2011). According to
Shimeles (2000) cited in Frezer (2011), ‘post liberation period witnessed a comparatively
significant expansion in terms of number of periodicals produced and the size of their
circulation. Such influential and long lasting weekly papers as Addis Zemen and The Ethiopian
Herald came out the scene in 1941 and 1943 respectively, which became dailies in 1958 (Ibid).

Moreover, according to Janas (1991) cited in Skjerdal (2012), radio broadcasting came to
Ethiopia in 1935, just before the Italian occupation 1936–41. The new medium was only allowed
a year of operation before Mussolini’s forces took over the governing structures and prohibited
practically all local media. Radio transmitters were destroyed by Ethiopians just in time to
prevent the Italian governors from using the local media for propaganda purposes. However, the
Italian forces redeveloped a broad-casting structure and spread Fascist propaganda using radio
programs in addition to print material which was produced on a few surviving printing presses
(Ibid).

In contrast to the previous radio venture, which was established primarily by means of foreign
expertise, Addis Ababa Voice of Ethiopia began broadcasting in 1942 with local personnel and
could boast of being the only Sub-Saharan radio not established by colonial authorities (Janas,
1991, cited in Skjerdal, 2012). The first television signals in Ethiopia were distributed on a
closed circuit in Africa Hall in Addis Ababa in May 1963 on the important occasion of the first
meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Ethiopian Television (ETV) began
permanent broadcasting on 2 November 1964, coinciding with the 33th coronation of Haile
Selassie I. Hence, Ethiopia was among the first nations in Africa to establish a television service
(Gabriel, 1962, cited in Skjerdal, 2012). By 1968, as many as 10,000 television sets were in
operation in Addis Ababa (Ibid).

35
Skjerdal (2012: 22) argues:

On the whole, media governance during the Ethiopian Empire served to manifest
imperial immunity. The feudal mindset affected both media structures and media content.
Likewise, a decisive ethnic inclination was reflected in the language policy of the
permitted media outlets. Thus, the demise of the Ethiopian Empire left the media
environment with a number of unresolved issues. Despite serious journalistic reporting
and significant growth in audience figures, especially in the domain of radio
broadcasting, the media had been misused by the rulers for the promotion of their own
interests and the subjugation of others. A new media policy was needed. Unfortunately,
the upcoming regime would only make the situation worse.

Mekuria (2007) cited in Skjerdal (2012: 24) summarizes it as follows:

The time 1931-74 was the commencement of journalism in the country and it was under
total control of the imperial government. Therefore, it was unthinkable to talk about press
freedom. The media served as an instrument of government propaganda tool and
concentrated on glorifying the government of his majesty rather than serving the public.

With all these all impediments from 1974-1991 the country fell under the military dictatorship
and as that of other democratic and human rights freedom of press and expression was
prohibited. The media was totally engaged in propagating socialist ideology (Ibid).

According to Tadbabe and Wuletaw (1990) cited in Frezer (2011: 16):

The period of military dictatorship from 1974 to 1991 was one of the total government
control of the media and the flow of information. This was in line, for instance, with
proclamation No. 26/1967 E.C., which was issued to regulate the operation of the media
(though it failed to specifically stipulate the possibility of establishing a private press),
neither did the government’s control of the media ease despite a provision for freedom of
expression in the 1987 Constitution.

Alongside with the ‘confiscation of privately-owned papers and the prohibition of

establishing new ones, the government proceeded to eliminate any trace of independent
exercise in the government-owned print medium (Shimeles, 2000).

36
Skjerdal (2012: 26) summarizes it as follows:

The years of the Derg regime have unequivocally been portrayed as a dark chapter in
the history of Ethiopian media and journalism. The regime turned all media outlets
into propaganda channels and effectively forbade any opening for professional
independence. The newsroom environment was marked by fear and anxiety. In the
words of contemporary media analyst Frank Barton, founding editor of African Times,
the Derg’s media became ‘the worst piece of Marxist mouthpiece on the Continent’.

Mekuria (2007) cited in Skjerdal (2012) claims that the 1992 press proclamation that
preceded by the 1995 Constitution is still the most important law. It was this Proclamation
which accorded legal protection to freedom of expression (ibid). Article 4 of Proclamation
No. 34/1992 provides that ‘press stands for the pursuit of fundamental freedom, peace,
democracy, justice, equality and for the acceleration of social and economic development.

According to Shimeles (2000: 52):

The assumption of power in 1991 by the EPRDF ushered in a period of fundamental

transformation in the political economy of the country. As part of the democratization
process, the EPRDF-led government conceded freedom of the press. This concession
was granted concomitantly with the new government’s acceptance of the 1948
Universal Declaration of the United Nations (217 A/ 11), especially Article 19.

Article 19 states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this right
includes freedom to hold opinion without interference and seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Following the government’s recognition, ‘an incredibly large number of newspapers and
other periodicals burgeoned, with ownership ranging from party/government through public
and professional associations to the private sector, of these the share of independently-owned
papers and magazines reached 287 by 1997 (Tedbab cited in Shimeles, 2000). These moves
were considered by many as marking the beginning of a new period of openness and
democratization in Ethiopia.

37
 3.3 The media and the democratic process: From authoritarianism to
multipartism and democratization

Nyamnjoh (2005) quoting Hyden et al. (2002) states that the democratic process in Africa has
brought with it not only multypartism, but also a sort of media pluralism and in almost every
country the number of media increased dramatically with the clamor for more representative
forms of democracy in the early 1990s. Similarly, in 1991 EPRDF, the party which overthrew
the Marxist military regime introduced a multiparty political system and guaranteed freedom of
expression in the TGE charter. Many legal opposition parties and many more independent
newspapers, which are central for the new multiparty democratic system, appeared.
According to Bereket Simon, former Information Minster (2000-2005) and head of the political
department of EPRDF cited in Hallelujah (2008: 42):
“…… the 1992 press proclamation was drafted in the transitional time when the nation
was transferring from the dictatorial military regime to a multi-party, free market federal
system based on the willingness and rights of nations, nationalities and peoples of the
country.
Thus, the 1991 regime change brought major political, economic and social restructuring of the
nation. Shimelis (2000) says that the 1992 press proclamation is the major landmark in the entire
media history of the nation since it is the manifestation of the whole political system which
introduced multiparty politics, and as it was a transition from a one party/one press regime to a
multiparty/multi-press era.
According to Skjerdal (2012) there is, however, no agreed terminology which encapsulates the
current governance system of Ethiopia apart from nominal descriptions such as ‘ethnic
federalism’. In political analysis, the government has been described as everything from
democratic (Henze, 1998) to authoritarian (Ibid).
Skjerdal (2012: 28) further argues:
At the same time it is clear that the official Ethiopian understanding of democracy
diverges from a liberal democracy model. As pronounced by Foreign Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister (now Prime Minister) Hailemariam Desalegn, ‘we do not follow
the liberal democratic principles which the Western countries are pushing us to follow’.
Ethiopia has instead pursued a revolutionary democracy model, which entails a

38
 sometimes bewildering combination of centralized directives and a direct ‘coalition with
the people’.
He further explains that alongside the move towards democratic-centralist developmentalism
since 2005, critics note authoritarian tendencies in EPRDF’s governance practice. However,
some argue that the ‘non-electoral context’ must be taken into account, demanding a multi-
layered analysis which contemplates international relations, cultural authority and ideological
reorientations (Skjerdal, 2012).
Pauseweng et al. cited in Dagim (2013: 32) also express the state of democratization in Ethiopian
as:
The constitution follows a modern ‘Western’ understanding of democracy. It provides for
a division of powers and for the protection of human rights, and it declares all human
rights covenants and instruments ratified by Ethiopia as integral parts of Ethiopian law.
The essentials for a democratic development in political practice are thus in place. But
unfortunately, our analyses have demonstrated that the democratic institutions are not
allowed to work according to the spirit of democracy.
Dagim (2013) also maintains that if Ethiopia’s democratization is measured referring to the
minimal conception of democratization, it seems that the country is on the right track of
democratizing its governance and its society as well, for a democratic constitution and elections
are already there. Nonetheless, if the measurement is made based on the liberal conception, the
country has still a long way to go, for the constitution has to be translated into practice in a way
that freedoms as freedom of assembly and freedom of the press are respected and elections are
conducted democratically (Ibid).

At any rate, modern democracy - representative democracy - heavily depends on the media in
order for reaching the represented large electorates. If all what democracy needs is an informed
citizen that could actively engage itself in political life, it would mainly, if not solely, come true
through the media. On the other hand, media have also been criticized for not making ‘creating
citizens that democracy needs’ their center of attention, and even sometimes they are blamed for
contributing to the creation of ‘politically apathetic’ public through a trivialized content (Dagim,
2013). However, with all the critics and the challenges, the media still have a lot to play in
democracy. Against these backdrops, this section tries to reveal, using various sources, the role
of both the private and public media to the democratization process of the nation since 1991.

39
 3.4 The ‘Independent’ Press since 1991

Before 1990 the African media was mostly controlled by governments where journalists were
considered as the adherents of the system and were expected to pay allegiance to the government
by respecting the canons of the civil service rather than those of journalism (Nyamnjoh, 2005).
He adds to this argument that the private press, by taking upon itself a highly oppositional
political role, has often allowed itself to be “used as pawns in the dirty game of politics” and has
eased the destruction of its professional credibility with sensationalism and suspicious advocacy
(Nyamnjoh, 2005). The Ethiopian scenario was hardly any different.
Hallelujah (2008: 33) in reference to Nolawi (2006) argues:
The history of the press in Ethiopia is dominated by political partisanship on both the
privately owned and state controlled media outlets. Though the media was carefully
watched and controlled by the EPRDF who took office ousting the military regime, the
private media has had better environment to flourish and give the people alternative sources
of information.
Unfortunately, however, Hallelujah (2008) argues “…. the independent press began its mission
as a sworn enemy of the government.”
Shimeles (2000: 54) also holds similar views:

An important distinctive feature of the private press in Ethiopia is polarization. The

private press has begun life not as an instrument of government but as rebel.
Accordingly the story it presents, interlocked as it is at every point with the political and
social changes in the country, is a saga of valor in the defense and, to large extent, the
fostering of the democratization process.

3.4.1 Whose watchdog? Political Role and Independence

Shimelis (2000) argues that the 1992 press proclamation is the major landmark in the entire
media history of the nation as it is the manifestation of the whole political system which
introduced multiparty politics. It was a transition from a one party/one press regime to a
multiparty/multi-press era. Thus, private newspapers have started to flourish in the newspaper
market. The number of independently owned newspapers and magazines reached 287 by the year
1997 (Tedbabe, 1990 cited in Shimelis, 2000). In 2008, the 1992’s and later the 2003’s Press

40
Proclamation has been replaced by a proclamation named ‘Freedom of the mass media and
access to information.’ Following this proclamation, until august 2012 there were 39
publications, of which 19 were newspapers and 20 were magazines (Dagim, 2013). There are
also some commercial radio stations namely, Fana Broadcasting Corporate, Sheger FM 102.1,
Afro FM 105.3 (English radio station), Zami 90.7 FM, and Dimtsi Woyane (Ibid).
The private media in Ethiopia is ideally believed to have indispensable roles in creating an
informed citizen that would actively participate in the democratic process and in serving the
society as a watchdog over maladministration. However, Shimeles (2000) argues that the
evolution of the private press in Ethiopia like the first-born of the modern media in Ethiopia
began life as a rebel against the government which led to a strong attachment to the opposition.
Hallelujah (2008) also argues “…. the independent press began its mission as a sworn enemy of
the government.”

Shimelis (2000) discusses three labels attached to the non-governmental press in Ethiopia:
‘private’, ‘independent’ and ‘free’. He says the three denominations have been used
interchangeably and in a preferential way, a sizable number of those newspapers and magazines
which are labeled as ‘opposition publications’ prefer to call themselves ‘free and independent’
(Ibid). The Ethiopian government, however, claims that private newspapers have “no economic and
development and democratization agenda. They are resorted to distort and exaggerate the existing
situation and even create non-existing issues” (MOI, 2004, cited in Frezer, 2011).

Sommerland (1966) cited in Shimeles (2000) argues that it ‘used to be believed that the motives
of would-be publishers, at least initially, were less the making of profits than the influence they
sought to exercise, or the prestige they gained by owning a newspaper.’

Shimeles (2000: 54) further reveals:

In Ethiopia, interviews with some publishers on why they joined the profession in general
tend to indicate the primacy of ‘attraction to the profession’. “the other explanation for
joining the profession is ‘love for the country’, a claim which could be, and in fact, imply
opposition to the government in power’ which was particularly stated in the editorials of
several of the newspapers in the most possible direct ways.

The following is a case in point (Tedbab, 1990, cited in Frezer, 2011: 18):

41
… It will oppose some of the policies of the political establishment.

…. It will work for the preservation of the country’s unity and foundation of a democratic
system.

….. It will not publish any news or article favoring or promoting the policies of the government.

According to Shimeles (2000), ‘all these show that political motivations rivaled, and in some
cases surpassed, professional and economic interests as a rational for establishing a newspaper.
Though, the constitution clearly stipulates the freedom of expression. But most of the
independent press which started its operation as a sworn enemy of the government and the party
in power, strongly opposed the constitution and some even overtly showed that they did not
accept it (Ibid).

Dejene Tessema, Editor-in-chief of the government-run English daily, The Ethiopian Herald,
was quoted as saying in Hallelujah (2008) many of them did not recognize the constitution and
the legal framework of the country and the legitimacy of the structures. “Defiantly most of the
independent press was the unofficial papers of opposition parties with no balance and high
degree of sensationalism,” (Ibid).

Skjerdal (2012) also maintains similar views by stating that many of the private newspapers were
politically motivated. Shimelis (2002) also claims that Ethiopia’s independent press came to life
as a ‘rebel’. By and large, the press was highly hostile of the EPRDF government. The
government’s politics of ethnic federalism were portrayed as a grave concern, and so was the
official strategy towards Eritrea (Ibid). Dessalegn and Meheret (2004) cited in Skjerdal (2012)
estimate that of the 65 newspapers published in 2004, less than five per cent were positive
towards the government. This is comparable with the situation in the early/mid 1990s.

Skjerdal (2012: 31) further explains:

Many newsrooms were staffed with persons who earlier held key positions in the Derg’s
media edifice. The popular weekly Tobiya (1992–2005) is but one example. Launched
as a magazine in April 1992, the publication began with 15 reporters and editors, many
of whom were central media officers of the previous regime. Founding editor Mulugeta
Lule, for example, was former head of the official Press Department and served as editor

42
 for the Derg’s party publication Serto Ader. Another of Tobiya’s founding members,
Goshu Mogus, had been in charge of the censorship office. A third well-known press
personality who also worked for Tobiya is Kifle Mulat, whose past career included
prominent positions in the government organ Addis Zemen. Residing in Houston, Texas,
he is today (in 2012) president of the Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association in
Exile.

Shimeles (2000: 27) further argues:

Though the independent press has, despite its infancy, been informative, daring and
remarkable outspoken, it has been largely libelous, uninvestigative, gullible,
irresponsible and highly sensational. For some papers, the boundary between news
reporting and news making is, in fact, blurred. In the process of evolution, full of trials
and tribulations, it has come to assume an outspokenly partisan character.

He summarizes it by saying: “it may be argued that this is an acute manifestation of a

tradition of political intolerance as witnessed in the fighting and consequent fratricide
(sororicide too) between various political groupings in the country’s recent history.
Instead of a pluralistic press representing a wide spectrum of opinions there is, therefore,
now a partisan press serving as the mouthpiece of a polarized population (Shimeles,
2000).

3.4.2 Professionalism and objectivity

As scholars repeatedly claim much of the bad journalism in Africa has been blamed on the lack
of professional training for journalists. Onadipe (1998) cited in Hallelujah (2008) supports this
by saying that the problems with the capabilities of the messenger affect the nature of the
message and how it is received. This has made quality, prestige and credibility suffer. In most
African countries, journalists in the private press have little or no formal training, and the media
have assumed a partisan, highly politicized militant role (Ibid).
Shimelis (2002) as cited in Skjerdal (2012) notes that there were two generations of journalists
entering the Ethiopian private press in the 1990s. The first generation consisted of press veterans
with journalistic experience from the Derg years, some even with experience back in the days of
the imperial media of Haile-Selassie and the second generation, appearing a couple of years later,
43
consisted of inexperienced and aspiring young media personalities. The latter group did not
necessarily have an outspoken political purpose, but could be driven by profit-generating
motives as well (Ibid).

Shimeles (2002) cited in Skjerdal (2012: 34) further argues:

Within both constituents, however, there were ample examples of unprofessional and
unethical journalism. Newspapers printed stories without the slightest attempt to check
facts. Unsubstantiated claims of the government preparing military campaigns and
secretly receiving massive support from international partners were published without
mention of any source. One newspaper claimed that the Derg was planning a
counterattack against EPRDF as late as 1994. Defamatory assaults on named persons
were commonplace. Slanderous reports reached such heights that an oppositional news-
paper claimed that EPRDF was secretly behind the rumors for the purpose of discrediting
the private press.

The professional standards of the early independent press, Shimelis (2002) describes it as a
‘rampancy of misquoting, misinterpreting, and plagiarism, the focus on trivial issues, poor
layout, subjectivity, sensationalism, fixation on most sordid and volatile issues, obscenity and
outright lies’. Hallelujah (2008) argues the journalists’ newfound freedom led many to
‘mistakenly assume that there were no limits on what they could and could not write’.

Shimelis (2000: 29) emphasizes the challenge of qualified staff as a key factor in the successful
launching and operation of a new newspaper:
In Ethiopia there is invariably scarcity of qualified personnel with experience in
newspaper editing and management people with the knowledge and skills required to
plan a newspaper provide an attractive editorial content and deal with such vital issues as
supplies, finance, advertising and circulation are in short supply pathetically poor
conditions of work and rates of pay combined with the low status of the profession make
it an uphill struggle for Ethiopian journalism to attract talent and compete with other
(more rewarding) callings.
Hallelujah (2008) explains that out of 25 editors and reporters Shimelis interviewed, 58.6% were
12th grade graduates, 7.2% were holders of a college diploma, 5.2% had a first degree (and one

44
with a master’s degree), and 2.5% had pursued a two-to-three-years education in one or another
of the vocational schools, institutes or colleges around the country. The rest (4%) were not
willing to specify their educational qualifications (Ibid).
Hallelujah (2008) also hold similar views saying that the lack of professionalism is acute with
regard to the editorial staff as the number of qualified and experienced journalists available is
incomparably lower than needed by the private newspapers under circulation. The concentration
of the few qualified journalists in a small number of newspapers has limited the possibility of
distribution of journalistic knowledge and experience. Accordingly, many newspapers are run by
under-qualified individuals with little or no experience and in exceptional circumstances no
training at all (Shimelis, 2000, cited in Hallelujah, 2008).
Hallelujah (2008: 36) quoting Tedbabe (1990 E.C) also concedes:
The trainings, workshops and seminars organized by several foreign organizations have
been limited by the fact that they have been conducted in most cases in a language few
understood (English). Courses have also tended to be too technical to comprehend and to
apply to the Ethiopian scenario. Besides, most private newspapers are too understaffed to
spare people for these workshops. All this is reflected in the deterioration of the standards
and ethics of journalism in many newspapers, hence the rampancy of misquoting,
misinterpreting, plagiarism, focusing on trivial issues, poor layout, subjectivity
sensationalism, lies and others.
Nolawi, a journalist at a local newspaper who produced a paper on the independent press of
Ethiopia presented in a meeting held in Kampala, Uganda in 2006 as quoted in Hallelujah (2008)
states that technically, the media in Ethiopia is incapacitated, under-resourced, and plagued with
a high degree of political partisanship, extremism, unprofessionalism, and a low level of
journalistic skills and ethics.

3.4.3 The legal framework of the private press

Andargachew (2006) explains the Ethiopian media legal framework as …. “When it came to
power in 1991, the EPRDF had a choice of policies it could have pursued regarding the mass
media. On one hand it could have maintained state control of the media as its predecessors did,
as China, Cuba and North Korea are still doing.” on the other hand, he says, the EPRDF could
have denationalized all the state-owned media and encouraged the development of the private

45
media which is by and large the major practice in the west and the desire of the international
economic institutions. EPRDF adopted a middle-of-the-road option instead of pursuing either of
the above options by retaining the already existing public media under its control and greatly
expanding it and by allowing the private sector to participate in the media industry (Ibid).
Andargachew (2006: 27) writes:

The most liberal law of EPRDF is proclamation 34/1992 initially intended to govern both
the electronic and print media in the private sector (art.2 (1) of proclamation 34/1992). It
is more liberal than the other laws in part at least because it does not envisage the creation
of a government agency to regulate the sub-sector.
Article 3(1) of the proclamation states, “freedom of the press is recognized and respected”, while
Article 3(10) also states, “censorship of the press and restriction of a similar nature are hereby
prohibited,” and right of access for journalists to state officials is supported in Article 8(1), as
well as Article 19, which states: “Government officials shall have the duty to cooperate with the
press in the furtherance of the principle that the people have the right to know about the
operations of government and the accountability of government officials” (Ibid).
However, Hallelujah (2008) states that the legislation governing the press is viewed by many as a
hindrance to the development of a free press in Ethiopia. He further argues that though the press
proclamation was later solidly backed by the constitution of Ethiopia in 1995 establishing
freedom of speech in Article 29, most of the independent press which started its operation as a
sworn enemy of the government and the party in power, strongly opposed the constitution and
some even overtly showed that they did not accept it.
Following the 2005 national election, in 2008, the 1992’s and later the 2003’s press proclamation
has been replaced by a proclamation named ‘Freedom of the mass media and access to
information’ (Dagim, 2013). In the period behind 2005, the private media have been subject to
change due to the closure of a number of critical papers with the claim by the government that
they have malfunctioned during the 2005 national and regional elections (Ibid). Hence,
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), cited in Hallelujah (2008) contends that the ruling party
EPRDF has come under mounting criticism for its antagonistic attitude towards the country’s
burgeoning private press. The CPJ reports have claimed that authorities have used a restrictive
press law to imprison journalists for critical reporting and to intimidate others into silence on
sensitive issues, such as government infighting and secessionist ethnic groups (Ibid).

46
 3.4.4 Commercial priorities

It is an established fact that the commercial nature of the private media is a source of both
strength and weakness - the strength comes from the independence that profits alone can buy and
a media that is profitable has much greater autonomy, its managers can say no to those who
would seek to buy its patronage. Financial success can insulate a media organization from the
demands of politicians, lobbyists, advertisers and merchants. Shimeles (2000), however, argues
that in the Ethiopian private media economic considerations as using the profession towards
making profits as in the case of some publishers was at the bottom of the list.

However, he also argues:

It should, however, be noted that there was an ‘incredible disparity in capital investment in
the newspaper business’ where with the exception of few ‘most of the publishers went into
the business with very little initial capital and an insignificant investment in the form of
equipment like computer with accessories, camera, tape-recorder, offices and furnishings,
necessities which in most cases, were post-service acquisition.

However, many argue that political affiliation of the private media to the opposition politics
have created an opportunity for private media owners to mobilize funds from other sources
and not to worry about the commercial nature of their products (Dagim, 2013).

3.5 The Public Media and the Democratization Process

Contemporary Ethiopia faces an apparent paradox: a situation of extraordinary economic growth

despite, according to critics, an increasingly authoritarian political atmosphere. Thus, Skjerdal
(2012) maintains that economic prosperity coincides with mounting concern for the political
situation in the country and, according to analysts; the exercise of political power in Ethiopia is
becoming increasingly authoritarian.
Skjerdal (2012: 36) further argues:

In this regard, the media policy of the incumbent is commonly portrayed as an exemplar
of Ethiopia’s alleged authoritarian turn. Thus, tightly controlled state media channels are
widely used as potent instruments to sustain the ideology of the government which is

47
 based on democratic state developentalism. Evidently, the current political leadership
regards the media as an integrated part of its governance strategy, similar to the approach
of preceding regimes.

Dejene (2011) also supports this notion that in line with the philosophy of development
journalism, which is being promoted by the government of Ethiopia, all state owned news media
are supposed to play a significant role in the efforts being exerted to transform the country.

As development is at the center of the incumbent’s agenda, the Ethiopian state media are grossly
considered to be development promoters and despite the arguments and counterarguments
around development journalism, the Ethiopian government believes that pursuing development
journalism would support nation’s development endeavors if implemented effectively (Ibid).
Some documents produced by the government (the ruling party) declare that public media should
do development reporting as per the established principles of the genre.

3.5.1 Whose watchdog? Political Role and Independence

According to Dejene (2011) in the previous systems, both monarchial and communism, there
was no explicit guideline as to what type of journalistic philosophy befitted the country even
though it is not difficult to understand from their very natures how media behaved and operated
in those systems. It is only after coming to power of the incumbent that development journalism
was identified as a philosophy that state media should follow in their journalistic undertakings
(Ibid).
Against this backdrop, the Ethiopian government has produced various documents that require
the state owned media to pursue the philosophy of development reporting in doing journalism.
Just few examples of such documents are: Revolutionary Democracy: Strategy, Tactic and
Question of Leadership (2007), “Our Media’s Developmental and Democratic Working
Philosophy: Basis and Directions” (2008) and Media Content Presentation Method and Working
Manual (2008).

One of these documents “Our Media’s Developmental and Democratic Working Philosophy:
Basis and Directions” (2008) plainly prescribes that the philosophy of the Ethiopian media (state

48
media) should be development journalism so that they would be able to support development
endeavors of the government.
This document argues that a working philosophy that can serve and strengthen the democratic
and developmental political economy of the country is the philosophy of development
journalism. The document provides a number of justifications for adopting this philosophy.
Development journalism is described in this document as a type of journalism that would enable
the people understand proper developmental ideas and liberate them from poverty and
backwardness. Development journalism according to this argument would enable the people
foster positive development and democratic values, believe in them and participate actively in
their implementation. It is a journalism that plays great transformational role in social justice and
life improvement.
In doing so, the document also recognizes two inherent limitations in development journalism.
These are that:
The ability of developmental journalism to bring about change is determined by the
conduciveness of a given political economy (it would be able to become change agent provided
there is developmental and change oriented government. And second, it would be exposed to the
danger of being a mouthpiece of government and its propaganda tool under the guise of
developmental journalism. This is the strong criticism against this type of journalism. The
proponents of liberal journalism magnify this shortfall of developmental journalism to
undermine its developmental role. However, it is possible to overcome the inherent drawback
through consideration of the fact and devising a mechanism which can fill the gap. This
limitation can be overcome through adopting suitable liberal media techniques and strengthening
of investigative journalism which is one aspect of developmental journalism (Ibid).

True, scholars also stress that development reporting should have people at the center and is not
retelling official accounts and making news out of government handouts. However, the case
seems different. Dejene (2011) argues that state media reporting is government centered than
people and does not verify such reports and not include reflections of the people and independent
voices. Many scholars also maintain that the state media in Ethiopia is rather used as a potent
instrument of the government.

49
Dagim (2013) maintains that for the media to play important roles in the democratic process of a
given country, they have to be free and independent first. To be able to entertain the views of
different political parties, which are key actors in a democracy, the media need to be free from
the control of the government; however, the so-called government media in Ethiopia do almost
nothing more than flattering those in power (Ibid).
In support of this view, Shimelis (2000: 32) explains:
Journalists in the state-owned print medium were then let loose to pursue their traditional
function, which they did with great vigor and dedication: praising and glorifying the
government, at times beyond reasonable proportions, and condemning and castigating
actions of previous governments as well as those of current political opponents of the
regime in power.
Dejene (2011: 42), analyzing one of the oldest state media newspapers, Addis Zemen, states:
As regards content orientation Addis Zemen has been government affiliated throughout its
history. Needless to state, it was established by government; budget is always allocated for
the paper by government like any other public agencies in the country. Staff employment,
contract termination and promotion of employees (both support staff and journalists) are
processed as per the civil service regulation. This rule applies to any state owned media
for that matter. It has also been disseminating information about government policies,
plans and activities till today. Though the paper survived under three regimes
uninterruptedly, it remained without change of ownership and significant change of
perspective in editorial position. It has always been used as a government mouthpiece
despite the changes in political orientations.
Gebremedhin (2000) cited in Dejene (2011) also observed that during the reign of Haile Sellassie
I, Addis Zemen’s news stories and other content elements praised the emperor. The paper
supported political, economic and social system of the day. This doesn’t mean it had no useful
contents, in the same fashion, it served the junta regime after the overthrow of the emperor and it
has still continued to serve the current government with no fundamental change; irrespective of
the change with regard to censorship (Ibid).

No wonder, ownership pattern would influence content of a given media. The state funded media
faces a different challenge when asserting a role of independent scrutinizer of power, when the
government provides funds; it attempts to shape content, beyond the predictable way the media

50
gives succor to those in power (Shimeles, 2000, cited in Dejene, 2011). Silverblatt (2004) cited
in Dejene (2011) also notes that owners of media organizations can also regulate content of the
media and therefore, “official” state media content is very prescriptive, telling its audience what
to think and how to act.

Former Manager of the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA) Selome Tadesse (2007)
explains that the ERTA was set up independently from the Ministry of Information in a view to
ensuring the objective of institutional independence and legitimacy, and thus the state owned
media that exists today has the proper legal framework that enables it to cover various opinions
of the people and promote accommodation. However, Selome (2007) argues that although the
legal frame work exists, there are problems that are observed when it comes to implementation.
These problems include: structural problems, perception and self-censorship, which are observed
on every staff from the manager to the journalists (Ibid).

Selome (2007: 28) further notes:

Although the board of the state owned media is appointed by the government, and this is
also a common practice in many countries around the world, it should be noted that the
process has to be transparent and representative. However, intervention of the executive
or officials of the ruling party in the media will lead to self-censorship. From my personal
experience, I do not believe that this problem can be avoided in a developing country
such as ours whichever party is in power. Intervention, however, deters the proclamation
from achieving its goals.

Selome seems implicitly to accept the intervention of the executive or officials of the ruling party
on state media. Others also hold that journalists and producers in the public sector media, free of
commercial constraints, have not become sufficiently emboldened to critically analyze prevailing
established viewpoints of the government (Shimeles, 2000, Dejene, 2011, Dagim, 2013). Many
believe that the public media has not asserted and won increasing autonomy over content. Dejene
(2011) maintains that the state media are not allowed to criticize government policies. The
reason is that the journalists consider themselves as part of the government and as implementers
of policies like any government agencies (Ibid).
Dejene (2011: 44) recounts a view expressed by one deputy editor-in-chief as follows:

51
 We don’t touch policy issues for we are one of the implementing agents of
government policies. We are government media. We are policy implementers. We
don’t criticize policy. We can criticize individual representatives of government,
agency heads etc. I remember one case where we exposed inefficiency of Addis Ababa
Transport Authority head. Last year the authority announced that it would introduce
zoning of taxi service in the metropolis. But it has not yet been realized. We asked the
head about this matter. She was so rude to us defending her office that taxi service is
not a problem in Addis Ababa and that only the media fans the problem to put
government in conflict with the public.
Selome (2007) also attributes self-censorship and lack of political independence as a major
predicament in the state media, particularly on the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency.
She sates it as follows:
Party affiliation exists on the board as well as on the management. Those party
affiliated individuals are biased to their party’s interest not because they are forced
but because they want to. This would create self-censorship on the manager and it
would pass on to all levels.
It is common knowledge that the top management of the media organizations is politically
appointed and hence government - loyal, and all general managers of the three state media
organizations (EPA, ERTA and ENA) are picked from trusted government circles (Skjerdal,
2012).

Skjerdal (2012: 76) further adds:

The government itself is open about this condition. When asked about political
appointments in the state media, (former) Government Communication Affairs Minister
Bereket Simon returns the question by asking if this isn’t the situation anywhere in the
world. Managers in the Ethiopian state media are thus expected to back official media
policy, in which development journalism is a central tenet. “Anybody who doesn’t have a
positive attitude towards bringing development to this country will not be appointed,”
Bereket affirms.

An Editor-in-chief of Addis Zemen, as quoted in Dejene (2011: 45) also holds the same opinion
on criticizing policy of the government.

52
 As a rule we are aware that we can criticize polices when they are tabled for discussion.
After they are approved by the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPRs) and become
laws, we can’t criticize them. We are part and parcel of the executive. How can we
criticize the policy we are supposed to implement? It would put us in contradiction of
ourselves.
An editor cited in Dejene (2011: 46) also said:
Our reports are one sided. We report whatever government officials tell us. We don’t
aggressively dig out the issues and see the other side of facts. Even success stories which
we are obsessed with are incomplete because we don’t report why those who didn’t
succeed failed to be successful. We report only from the government side.
Selome (2007) also argues that because only one side of the story is reflected many people do
not have confidence on state media. Aimed at measuring people’s attitude towards the state
owned media on politics, economy and social issues, Selome conducted a research on 228
people with different educational background. According to Selome (2007) on politics, only
27 said they have confidence in the state owned media while 189 stated that they do not.
Another editor, cited in Dejene (2011), also recalls that a report she wrote sourcing a non
government institution that refuted government’s claim of economic growth was rejected
because it depicted some flaws in the claim. Below is her perspective as quoted in Dejene (2011:
46):
When the government announced economic growth in the country, there were other
voices that the economy didn’t grow as the government claimed. The case in point is
report of the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA). That report was not considered
because it was contrary to government’s claim. Don’t forget that we are instructed by
the government to pursue development journalism and that we are in government owned
media. Even, some of our actions contradict with the editorial policy of EPA.
According to Dejene (2013) the worse scenario is direct interference of government agencies in
the editorial matter of the state media, thus a senior journalist in the position of deputy editor-in-
chief was quoted as saying:
I am in charge of the news section. I don’t have the authority to decide on front page
stories. Someone calls me from the Prime Minister Office and instructs me to wait for a
story that comes from that office. Someone calls me from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

53
 and instructs me to wait for a story that comes from that ministry. Someone also calls me
from the Office of Government Communication Affairs and I wait for a story to come to
me. I personally protested against such orders and I was finally told that the chief editor
determines which story to carry in the front page and which to leave out. I was told to
obey the rule. Other columns have relative freedom compared with the news section.
Another editor also reflected in Dejene (2011: 46) as:
I think, the bad side of development journalism is when a government owns a media. … we
follow footsteps of the government to report development activities. Priorities are given to
government agendas. Therefore, the government maneuvers the paper like any government
owned media.

It can be concluded what the state media journalists practice as development journalism is what
Edani (1993), cited in Dejene (2011) defines as developmental journalism:
that journalist who sees his/her main responsibility as that of publicizing government
policies, projects, statements, and activities, and who usually avoids communicating the
views of the people back to the government, especially when those views are critical of the
government, as they very often are. The developmental journalist engages in development
journalistic work on an ad hoc basis, that is, whenever there is a particular government
development policy or project to publicize. When there is none, he or she does ordinary
routine information officer of the ministry of information or public affairs officer in any
other government establishment or parastatal.

3.5.2 Professionalism and objectivity

According to Dejene (2011) some of the journalists attribute the reason why they don’t be
critical of government activities to lack of knowledge and inattention while others attach it to a
holdover of the previous tradition in the preceding systems.
A veteran journalist who has been working in the state media for over the last 26 years was cited
in Dejene (2011: 47) as saying:
I think our major problem is lack of knowledge on development reporting. We are not
fully aware of what development reporting is about and we don’t try to write
comprehensive stories on development. We print frequently reports of government
executives and rarely include different voices. A given development project involves a
54
 number of actors like experts, engineers, beneficiaries and government agencies. It needs
to involve in a story all the actors. They may have opposite views to what officials claim.
But we don’t do that. The reason in my opinion is lack commitment.
Skjerdal (2012) explains that obviously state media is run by public fund, however, it is not a
property of government in power, though the perception by the journalists in state media is that
the government owns media and they are part and parcel of government themselves and they also
call themselves government journalists. Moreover, some of them consider the newspaper as one
of government policy implementers, thus, it is difficult to decide where government interests end
and where professional interests begin and from the government’s perspective, official interests
and journalistic merits are two sides of the same coin (Ibid).

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 Chapter 4

4.1 Media, Multipartysim and Democracy: The Paradox

The crux of argument in this chapter is that the media, though it is both a necessary prerequisite
and co-requisite for democracy and multiparty politics in general and in ‘manufacturing consent’
in particular, has failed to play a significant role in the political transition of the nation towards
multipartysim and democracy. Thus, the subsequent analysis attempts, based on the findings in
the previous chapter, to shed light on why the media has not performed its expected role in the
democratization process of the nation by trying to analyze the Ethiopian media-politics, i.e. the
interplay between the media and politics as well as the role and involvement of the media in the
political process. The study presents and analyzes the media-politics using the theoretical
frameworks of Francis P. Kasoma’s Independent Media Theory and Naom Chomsky’s
Propaganda Model to analyze the Ethiopian ‘independent’ and ‘public’ media respectively.
However, the study does not pretend to give a detailed account of the Ethiopian media-politics,
but merely tries to shed some light on the media in relation to its independence, ownership and
control as well as professionalism and ethical standards thereby its contribution for
multipartysim and democracy.

The analysis begins with an overview of the major political factors that affect the media in its
contribution to the democratization process during the last two decades.

Thus, prominent authorities in the field maintain that the argument for democratization in
Ethiopia, a country that for decades was characterized by absolutism and militarism, was
compelling for a plethora of reasons during the 1990s. First, the absence of democratic rule at the
national level had mean the trampling of basic constitutional and economic rights of man, while
at the sub national level it had manifested itself as a brute centralizing force. The result was
armed conflict and untold destruction of man and property. Thus, the need for some form of
democratization was self-evident. Moreover, Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual multi-
religious nation, hence democratization was believed to bring decentralization and some form of
power sharing among the nation’s communities thereby ameliorating deeply held grievances
against the center.

56
To this end, the incumbent government has designed the F.D.R.E. Constitution which stipulates
for self-determination of nations and nationalities up to and including cession and a new form of
state governance, i.e. federalism, or better, ethnic federalism, among others, in a bid to
“rectifying historical legacies.” However, this radical political change was welcomed in a mixed
feeling. On the one hand, some groups, though they received it warmly, demand for a less
intervention of the central government on the affairs of regions and clamored for the full
implementation of federalism. On the other hand, others out rightly rejected the federal structure
and the Constitution, for both were, and still are, seen as threats to the unity and integrity of the
nation by these groups. Thus, the political polarization of these two seemingly irreconcilable
political groups started right from the outset while the seeds of democratization were sawn in the
country. In the same vein, the Ethiopian media has since then become an epitome of this
polarized political reality of the nation. Thus, it could safely be said that the undemocratic,
polarized and, in some cases, irresponsible behavior of the media is the reflection of the interplay
of political factors, historical legacies and its deeply intertwined nature with local and
international political order.

It is against these backdrops that we can analyze how the Ethiopian media have been performing:
What kind of role has the Ethiopian media played in these all processes? No doubt, the media –
both state and private – are entrusted with the Herculean task of promoting democratic culture,
regardless of the political ideology they have, for it is believed that democracy is the raison
d’être for the existence of the nation and one of lofty ideals that the nation has been clamoring
for decades. As such, at least theoretically, the media is expected to play an instrumental role in
narrowing the political cleavages among the various political groups and creating consensus
among the different ethnic groups in the nation by ameliorating tensions, mistrust and deep
rooted grievances. Thus, in this chapter the study tries to analyze, first, the independent media
from Kasoma’s perspective and then the state media using the Propaganda Model of Naom
Chomsky. In doing so, the paper tries to analyze the role of the media in the democratization
process of the country and its interplay with politics.

4.2 The ‘Independent’ Media from Kasoma’s Perspective

Scholars agree that the emergence of the independent press in the 1990s in Africa has often been
accompanied by the switch to multiparty politics. Though there is no consensus among scholars
57
whether independent press is a prerequisite for democracy or the other way round – democracy
as a prerequisite for the emergence of an independent press, Kasoma’s theories hold the view
that the independent press is both a necessary prerequisite as well as co-requisite for democracy
and multiparty politics – if it performs its role ethically and professionally (Kasoma, 1997).
Moreover, Kasoma generally concedes that the African independent media has failed its role as a
catalyst of democratization in the continent. The Ethiopian private media is no exception to this
generalization.

According to Kasoma there are three fundamental malaises of unprofessional practices in the
African independent press: the use of newspapers as political opposition, bad advocacy
journalism, and the overuse of anonymous sources, which in many instances are the archetype of
the Ethiopian ‘independent’ media.
Kasoma (1997: 24) states:
One of the independent press’s ill-conceived roles is that of acting as political opposition,
which African governments have found very objectionable and used as justification to
muzzle the press. African governments, hitherto unaccustomed to political opposition,
see themselves as being under double pressure: from the opposition parties, which are
vying to replace them in power; and from the independent press, which they see as being
in cahoots with the opposition parties. They find themselves in a spot. On one hand, they
cannot get rid of opposition parties and continue to call themselves democratic
governments. The international community, whose good will and aid they need, would
cease to support them. On the other hand, they cannot get rid of a critical independent
press by over means lest again international aid be denied to them. They have to do it
covertly through the seeming use of the law and other supposedly orthodox means.
The Ethiopian media-politics has been more or less the same with Kasoma’s analysis. The
Ethiopian private media has become a vast political business increasingly exercising self-
interested political and economic power of the opposition than acting as a disinterested check on
the abuse of power by the government. It, unfortunately, has been increasingly driven by the
expectations of polarized and sensational stories trumpeting the voices of the opposition group
with which it has aligned itself. Moreover, many private newspapers have been writing
sensational reports and mixing up opinion with facts, biased and unbalanced. They also publish

58
without counterchecking their sources. As a result, the cardinal principles of journalism,
particularly fairness, impartiality, and accuracy, have always been at stake since its inception.

One of Kasoma’s assertions is that the African private media is the mouth piece of the
opposition. There is, indeed, a widespread, and reasonable, stance that the ‘independent’ media
in Ethiopia have failed to adequately serve as a platform for the cross fertilization of ideas by
giving spaces to different and opposing voices thereby promoting a democratic political culture.
The private media is believed, at least theoretically, as an institution of political life designed to
act on behalf of the people to report on and give voice to those in positions of political, economic
and social power. However, the idea of the independent media successfully fulfilling a political
role that transcends its political, ideological, commercial interests and ethical weaknesses has
been seriously suttered. Its power, commercial interests, political bias, and ethical weaknesses
have undermined its institutional standing. In the intervening decades the ‘independent’ press has
itself become a source of real and significant power and influence for the opposition groups, and
ended up an industry exercising and pursuing polarized political, ideological and ‘hidden’
agendas of the opposition and other pressure groups.

Though the private newspapers have never admitted explicitly that they have been pursuing the
interest of the opposition, one can easily see their strong affinity and highly interconnected
relationships with the opposition from their contents and editorials. No doubt, right from the
outset, the private media started its mission as the arch enemy of the ruling party. They explicitly
expressed in their editorials that they would never accept its legitimacy. In many cases they were
even overtly expressing their nostalgia to the ousted government. The radical position of the
private publications which were established in the early 1990s could be easily illustrated in their
titles such as Kebrit (match), Mebrek (‘thunder’), Moged (‘storm’), Seife Nebelbal (‘fire-spitting
sword’) and Gamora (‘erupting lava’), just to name a few. Their stance in the political debate
was accordingly hostile to the EPRDF government and habitually supportive of the preceding
star-crossed Derg regime. This was manifested by a series of headlines containing slogan-like
captions such as ‘Mengistu is our father’ (Mebrek), ‘One country, one leader – that is Mengistu’
(Andebet) and ‘17 years of Derg administration better than EPRDF’ (Seife Nebelbal) (Skjerdal,
2012).

59
Kasoma (1997) further argues that the rate of truth-reporting in Africa’s newspapers, particularly
those behaving as political oppositions, is extremely low, and the newspapers are full of
exaggerations; basing their reports on flimsy hear-say; making headlines cry ‘wolf’; quoting
sources out of context; not giving people against whom allegations are made a fair hearing;
downright. In the same vein, an array of newspaper headlines which were evidently the result of
pure speculation and outright falsehood were also common in Ethiopia. Such examples could be
ranging from rumors of ethnic conflicts, war and famine to premature announcements of the
opposition’s alleged victory in elections. An early headline in Agerie cited in Skjerdal (2012), for
example, reads: ‘Meles’ Satanic administration has come to an end’ (1994), while Tarik similarly
spreads the rumor that: ‘One government brigade has been destroyed’ (1998), (Ibid). The ethnic
bias was also clearly present in the headlines of some newspapers. Tarik, for example, claims
that: ‘The Amhara people is suffering from famine’ (1997), and Menilik writes ‘If the Amhara
people votes for EPRDF, it assures its subordination to Tigreans’ (2005), while Seife Nebelbal,
known as the most militant Oromo-affiliated newspaper, equally falsely claims that: ‘Oromiffa is
banned in Addis Ababa prison’ (1997), Skjerdal (2012).
During this early period, there was a huge lack of professionalism and ethical standards of
journalism accompanied by abuses of freedom of the press and expression by the new born
‘independent’ press and strong attacks on the new government. In many instances, as Hallelujah
(2008) rightly observes it was difficult to name the press independent as it acted as a political
opposition with a massive practice of advocacy journalism and sensationalism. This is consistent
with Kasoma’s observation which states that another habit of journalists in independent
newspapers is that of practicing too much advocacy journalism, often accompanied by
sensationalism. Kasoma says that although it is not easy to judge the motive of a person’s
actions, journalistic advocacy included, some indicators of dishonorable motives often begin to
emerge when journalists start telling blatant lies, half truths, distorted facts given out of context,
one-sided coverage favoring the side they support, not giving credit where it is due especially to
government, quoting fictitious or dubious sources, and using insulting language which end up in
bad advocacy journalism (Ibid). However, Kasoma maintains that advocacy journalism is about
championing a cause by presenting well reasoned and consistent arguments to win over public
sympathy. It is not about repeating the same insulting and vulgar statements ad nauseam against
those in authority as many independent newspapers in Africa are in the habit of doing (Ibid).

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Kasoma (1997) further says that the bias of Africa’s independent newspapers is more
conspicuous in election time, during which they endorse their chosen candidates and present
them in the most favorable and biased manner to the electorate.
Kasoma (1997: 36) states:
The candidates belonging to the parties they do not support are given a raw deal through
bad or not coverage. They should not cheat members of the public by posing as
independent newspapers when they are ipso facto party newspapers. The independence of
a newspaper is not only determined by its private ownership but also by its editorial
policy. A newspaper that has taken a permanent political side by uncritically supporting
one political party forfeits its independence. A newspaper serving democracy makes
available to the people all the information they need, including that which it finds
unpalatable, because in a democracy the people have a right to know all the information.
The media-politics in Ethiopia was no different from Kasoma’s observations during elections,
particularly during the 2005 national elections. The 2005 national elections period can be
considered as the second phase in the history of the Ethiopian private media since its inception in
the early 1990s. Not surprisingly, the media started to play a more aggressive and radical, in
some cases, negative role during the pre and post 2005 election period. As such, the
‘independent’ media had practically ceased to exist as ‘independent’ for it had become very clear
that it not only favored the opposition group, but it had also become clear which newspaper
favored which group even within the opposition camp and whom among opposition political
personalities. Hence, the tug-of-war was not only between the private media and the ruling party
but also within the private media itself for it was commonplace to see one newspaper supporting
one opposition group or party, or even individual, and another giving its blessings to another
group. As such the private media was divided against itself, just in the same fashion as that of the
powerful opposition groups and personalities behind it.

To this end, thus, tensions heightened and speculations escalated in the private press during the
2005 elections and election results were prematurely presented, typically in favor of the
opposition, for example, Finch, prematurely reported that it had ‘confirmed’ results that the
opposition party Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) had won 240 seats in the Parliament
against EPRDF’s (Skjerdal, 2012). As the final results did not give the opposition the announced
victory, the press supposedly began to nurture ideas of aggressive overthrow: some examples

61
include a headline in Ethop, which reported that: ‘Armed struggle would be possible’ (2005), and
Abay, which wrote in an editorial that: ‘If power is not possible through free elections, it will be
through civil disobedience’ (2005) (Ibid). Stories that call for violent regime change and having
ethnically biased reports were also common. Thus, during this period the ‘independent’ media
had moved extra miles to incorporate a more radical activist role, scrutinizing even the
consequences of actions and decisions of the opposition and consequently representing the
interests of its patronages. The private media was highly augmenting and reinforcing the
opposition interest and cause, by reporting competing views or amplifying the concerns of
aggrieved individuals in the opposition camp, interest groups and lobbies who felt that their
perspectives and concerns had been inadequately addressed. Its role as the ‘principal feedback
mechanism of democratic system management’ had been greatly jeopardized.

However, Kasoma says that giving a hearing or publicity to the opposing side should be genuine
and honest. It should not be done in an unfair manner in which information from the opposing
side is twisted to prove a point. He further says that there are journalists from independent
newspapers in Africa who selectively choose what to publish from the opposition, reporting only
information which tends to show that their newspaper’s stand against those they politically
oppose is correct. They are even prepared to quote statements from the politicians they oppose
out of context to prove their point (Ibid). This is evidently a very common practice in the
Ethiopian ‘independent’ media journalism. Skjerdal (2012) rightly observes “ … newspapers of
the private press ridicule the government officials or anyone with different views by misquoting
and trying to divert his/her speech or remark by taking it out of the context.” This was also
clearly seen at the 2005 national elections in Ethiopia where much of the independent press was
busy in demonizing the government and its officials in any way possible (Ibid).

According to Kasoma the root of the problem is that both the government and the newspaper
claim to speak for the people. Kasoma says:“ …when they contradict each other, as they often
do, the tension rises. But the upper-hand in resolving the conflict is usually held by the
government, which uses the state machinery to silence recalcitrant newspapers and journalists.”
This was exactly what happened in Ethiopia, particularly, following the 2005 national elections.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, following the charter and the press proclamation of the
FDRE, private newspapers have started to flourish in the newspaper market. The number of

62
privately owned newspapers and magazines reached 287 by the year 1997 (Tedbabe, 1990 cited
in Shimelis, 2000). In 2008, the 1992’s and later the 2003’s press proclamation has been replaced
by a proclamation named ‘Freedom of the mass media and access to information.
In the period behind 2005, the private media have been subject to change due to the closure of a
number of critical papers with the claim by the government that they have malfunctioned during
the 2005 national and regional elections and a number of publications were forced to close as a
result of the detentions of their managers and editors, including critical outlets such as Addis
Zena, Ethop, Menelik, Meyisaw, Meznagna, Netsanet, Satenaw and Seife Nebelbal (Frezer, 2011,
Dagim, 2013, Skjerdal, 2012). According to the then Ethiopian Ministry of Information,
department of press licensing (Dagim, 2013), the number of newspapers with political,
economic, and social issues (current affairs) from 8 th July 2004 to 7th July 2005 were 63, whereas
the total number of newspapers that included sports, culture, and arts newspapers, were 134 and
the total number of magazines were 46. According to latest report of the Ethiopian Broadcast
Agency (EBA), the total number of newspapers circulated on January 2013 was 18 while the
magazines were 21. Of the 18 newspapers, 12 focused on political, economic, and social issues
whereas the rest focused on sports and health. Moreover, only eight magazines focused on
political, economic, and social content and the remaining 13 magazines focused on fashion, art,
culture, and sports issues. This figure reveals that the political press has diminished through time.
In the years followed, the private media still continued to become a crucial political institution,
intimately connected to the concerns and preoccupations of the opposition, though the meaning
of the ‘independent’ media had varied in response to the changing political and economic
circumstances. At any rate, however, it maintained the core idea of reporting those in the
opposition. The defunct Awramba Times, whose owner and Managing Editor is now leaving in
exile in U.S, is a case in point. Awramba Times carried front page news stories of a one-time
prominent opposition leader, and now of the Ginbot 7 opposition group based in the U.S, Dr.
Berhanu Nega, for 26 consecutive editions, in a row, with headlines such as “Democratic options
are over,” (2011) “We will fight using all means available (It meant, using violence and military
means to overthrow the ruling party) (2011). Awramba Times was generally considered as the
mouth piece of Dr. Berhanu and his party Ginbot 7. In his recent article, Dawit Kebede, the
Managing Editor of the defunct Awramba Times newspaper which goes online now, revealed
that he had ‘strong connections’ with the leaders of Ginbot 7, particularly with Dr. Berhanu

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Nega, however, he also revealed that he is now, after he had moved to U.S., in logger heads with
the leaders of Ginbot 7 and has severed his ‘longstanding ties’ (Lomi Magazine, 2013), revealing
a strong affinity between the private media and opposition groups even during the post 2005
election nightmare.

When we look at the current private media, especially newspapers, a very similar feature is being
manifested, which, according to Skjerdal (2012), Hallelujah (2008) and Dagim (2013), “implies
that the late 1990’s peculiarities have had a lasting impact on today’s media system of Ethiopia.”
Some manifestations include radical advocacy, sensationalism and misuse of anonymous sources
as the main features.
Kasoma (1997: 42) says:
Advocacy journalism practiced by many independent newspapers in Africa is
characterized by sensationalism which is characterized by telling a story in a highly
exaggerated manner or reporting in hyperboles. If, for example, a few ministers in
government are accused of corruption, a sensationalist reporter will condemn the whole
government as being corrupt. Or if some constituencies record irregularities in voting on
polling day, then the whole election process is declared null and void because ‘it was not
free and fair’. To journalists and newspapers who are involved in sensationalist reporting,
nothing seems to be illogical: a single incident is universalized and a couple of isolated
incidents are twisted to represent a trend ….. Sensationalist reporting has destroyed the
credibility of many independent newspapers in Africa.
In line with this assertion, for example, the recent move of the government to hold some high
government officials and prominent business persons responsible for corruption was given
different meanings by different private media outlets. Many private media outlets declared that
the move was, among others, to ‘clear dissent and squash some inconvenient personalities’ in the
ruling party, (such as Addis Guday Magazine, 2013) while others reported it as a ‘proof’ for
rampant corruption in the ‘whole government’ structure. Another area of professional
malpractice by journalists on the independent newspapers emphasized by Kasoma is the misuse
of anonymous sources which he says is very common in Africa. “Many reporters are in the habit
of attributing information to unnamed sources. When pressed to name the sources, the journalists
often hide behind the ethical requirement that sources to whom journalists have promised
confidentiality should not be named” (ibid). Such malpractice is ubiquitous in the Ethiopian

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private media. Such example includes Fact Magazine’s edition headlined: “E.P.R.D.F splits into
four factions” (2013), there is no mention of sources; the whole story seems fictious, given the
fact that the party was, and still is existing and also there were no official as well as other reports
that reinforce any type of division in the party. Had there been a division with such a magnitude
in the ruling party, it would have not been kept secret by any means.

Kasoma argues:

Journalists on Africa’s independent newspapers behave as if journalistic sources should

always be secret. Generally in news reporting the identity of sources should be revealed,
otherwise readers tend not to regard the news that is reported as being authentic. In the
event of the reporter agreeing not to reveal the source, he or she should not break their
promise, even if it means going to jail for refusing to disclose the source in court. The
ethical requirement for the reporter not to name the source only applies to cases where the
reporter has made a specific undertaking. It does not apply to any source who has not been
named in a story.

At any rate, however, as Kasoma rightly asserts the irreparable damage done to the
reputations of the people against whom the serious allegations are made apparently remains
of no concern to the journalists – on the contrary, they are too happy to see their political
enemies ‘framed’. However, Kasoma says that advocacy journalism does not mean
sensationalizing issues by creating a story where there is none and creating panic and
despondency. He argues it should be based on principle and not on selfish motives or, worse
still, on personal feelings.
To cap it all, though Kasoma argues that the independent press is a cog in the democratic wheel,
the Ethiopian private media has, unfortunately, not played its expected role in the
democratization processes of the nation. Professor Andargachew (2006) cited in Hallelujah
(2008) summarizes it as follows: “…. it can be claimed that Ethiopian journalists in the private
sector have been acting as the fourth estate as they were critical of the government, however,
they have irresponsibly exceeded the legitimate bounds of acting as a fourth estate.” He
maintains that their treatment of issues has been one-sided, which practically prevented them
from seeing that any good has been achieved by the government, as such their publications have
been too partial and sensational so as to lead one to believe that they are not in the business of

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reporting politics but, rather, making it and it is as though they have a mission to accomplish, a
mission which they pursue with extraordinary zeal and at all costs (Ibid).

4.3 The Public Media from Chomsky’s Perspective

Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky‘s book entitled ‘Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media’ (2002) provides a comprehensive picture of the US corporate
media. Herman and Chomsky analysis of the media centers in what is called a ‘propaganda
model,’ an analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of the media in terms
of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate. According to this
Model, among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of the powerful
societal interests that control and finance them.
Herman and Chomsky (2002: 6) further explain the Propaganda Model as:

The special importance of propaganda in what Walter Lippmann referred to as the

"manufacture of consent" has long been recognized by writers on public opinion,
propaganda, and the political requirements of social order. Lippmann himself, writing in
the early 1920s, claimed that propaganda had already become "a regular organ of popular
government," and was steadily increasing in sophistication and importance. We do not
contend that this is all the mass media do, but we believe the propaganda function to be a
very important aspect of their overall service.
Thus, the propaganda model tries to explain the performance of the media by asserting that the
media serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state. This Model also
maintains that the US media generally support US foreign policy national interest in general and
dishes up the interest of the state, as a consequence the role of the media is subservient to the
powerful elites in society (Herman and Chomsky, 2002). In other words, Herman and Chomsky
argues that the US media rarely produce coverage deviating from the stand of US officials,
which exactly is an epitome of the state media in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state media has rarely
produced coverage deviating from the stand of high government officials (Dejene, 2011, Dagim,
2013).

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For Herman and Chomsky the major structural factors that help those in power to manipulate the
media are those such as ownership and control as well as mutual interests and relationships
between the media and those who manipulate the news and have the power to define it and
explain what it means. The Propaganda Model also incorporates other closely related factors
such as the ability to manipulate about the media's treatment of news (that is, produce "flak"), to
provide "experts" to confirm the official slant on the news, and to fix the basic principles and
ideologies that are taken for granted by media personnel.

Herman and Chomsky (2002: 8) in their Propaganda Model further argue:

The same underlying power sources that own the media and fund them serve as primary
definers of the news, and that produce flak and proper-thinking experts, also, play a key
role in fixing basic principles and the dominant ideologies. Media are a tool of society's
power elites and owned and controlled by them and are used to impose those illusions that
are necessary to keep people diverted from the political process. Contrary to the usual
image of the news media as cantankerous, obstinate, and ubiquitous in their search for
truth and defense of justice, in their actual practice they defend the economic, social, and
political agendas of the privileged groups that dominate domestic society and the state.
With regards to structural factors of the Propaganda Model such as ownership and control, as has
been mentioned in the previous chapter, the Ethiopian state media - both print and broadcast -
have been owned and controlled by government and affiliated to it throughout their history.
Needless to state, they were established by government; budget is always allocated for these
media by government like any other public agencies in the country. Staff employment, contract
termination and promotion of employees (both support staff and journalists) are processed as per
the civil service regulation. This rule applies to any state owned media. The State media have
also been required to disseminate information and propagandize about government policies,
plans and activities till today. Though these media survived under three regimes uninterruptedly,
they remained without change of ownership and significant change of perspective in editorial
position. They have always been used as government mouthpieces despite the changes in
political orientations.
Hence, state media system, and indeed all print and broadcast media units in Ethiopia are still
owned and controlled by the government. That is why the media serve as the organs of both the

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national and regional propaganda system, which is under direct control of the government in
power. The media are considered to be political units of the government. No wonder, ownership
pattern would influence content of a given media. The state funded media faces a different
challenge when asserting a role of independent scrutinizer of power, when the government
provides funds; it attempts to shape content, beyond the predictable way the media gives succor
to those in power. As Silverblatt (2004) cited in Dejene (2011) notes “… owners of media
organizations can also regulate content of the media.” Therefore, Ethiopian state media content is
very prescriptive, telling its audience what to think and how to act which is exactly in line with
the assertions of the Propaganda Model of Herman and Chomsky.
The Propaganda Model further states that the representatives of these interests have important
agendas and principles that they want to advance and they are well positioned to shape and
constrain media policy. This is normally not accomplished by crude intervention, but by the
selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors' and working journalists' internalization
of priorities and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the institution's policy (Herman
and Chomsky, 2002).
In the same vein, the Ethiopian government has designed developmental journalism as the
guiding philosophy of the state media, which is seen by many observers as a media policy that
highly promotes the ideologies of the government by restricting and narrowing the space for
competing views, particularly of the opposition. Thus, the Ethiopian state media are grossly
considered to be development promoters. Despite the arguments and counterarguments around
development journalism, the Ethiopian government believes that pursuing development
journalism would support nation’s development endeavors if implemented effectively. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, some documents produced by the government (the ruling
party) declare that state media should do development reporting as per the established principles
of the genre. Thus, the Ethiopian government has produced various documents that require the
state owned media to pursue the philosophy of development reporting in doing journalism. Just
few examples of such documents are: Revolutionary Democracy: Strategy, Tactic and Question
of Leadership (2007), “Our Media’s Developmental and Democratic Working Philosophy: Basis
and Directions” (2008) and Media Content Presentation Method and Working Manual (2008).
One of these documents “Our Media’s Developmental and Democratic Working Philosophy:
Basis and Directions” (2008) plainly prescribes that the philosophy of the Ethiopian media (state

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media) should be development journalism so that they would be able to support development
endeavors of the government.

Hence, tightly controlled state media channels are widely used as potent instruments to sustain
the ideology of the government which is based on democratic state developentalism. Evidently,
the current political leadership regards the media as an integral part of its governance strategy,
similar to the approach of preceding regimes. This is in line with the Propaganda Model of
Herman and Chomsky which states that the media serve as powerful instruments of sustaining
the ideology of the government. Furthermore, the Model establishes that content is a function of
ideological positions to maintain the status quo, influenced by government officials. In light of
this assertion, there seems to be some organizational agreement in the state media in Ethiopia in
which more of positive news is entertained to maintain the status quo. As such it is possible to
argue that the media reflects the ideology of the ruling party who control the power. It is
common to see media products which are politically slanted aiming at persuading audiences
and/or the readership to support the existing policy using convincing and persistent phrases.
Developmental news content are intentionally selected and presented to reinforce some
ideological views. Such news and programs cover events or issues such as efforts being
underway to transform the nation socio-economically like activities being underway to meet the
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), efforts to curb corruption, social welfare for
marginalized groups and political activities performed by government officials such as
parliamentary meetings. Politically slanted news mainly focuses on convincing audiences to
support the current policies and strategies of the government. Such news mainly touches more
issues of national interest. These relate to issues such as the legacy of the late Prime Minister,
well produced programs related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia’s role in
regional and continental affairs such as peace keeping missions, illegal human trafficking, local
peace and stability agendas and federalism, inter alia.

Currently, for instance, the majority of the programs and stories are associated with continuing
the legacy of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Such stories are represented in politically
slanted contents propagating the genuine contribution of the late Prime Minister. When it is said
as such, any kind of media content is associated with repeating phrases such as – Meles! Your
promise will be kept; the GERD will be realized through public participation, Meles‘s legacy,

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Meles’s operation for Growth and Transformation, Meles‘s Values and Continuing the Best
Deeds of Meles (The Ethiopian Herald and Addis Zemen), as such these media products are
meant to convince the public to support the ideology of the ruling party and are believed to have
an implication on mobilizing the public by the side of the ruling party through focusing on the
achievements of the government. When such politically slanted media products are portrayed as
such, they are also required to emphasize that the public has benefited from the development
activities of the government. In a way, it can be said that the state media not only fully supports
but also vigorously works to sustain the ideology of the government and the ruling party, actually
with great vigor and dedication, though theoretically, media should not give special preferences
to the ideology of the party in power. No doubt, if the media entertain and support the ideology
of the ruling party in such a magnitude, it will lose its independence and cannot be free.

Another point Herman and Chomsky raise in their propaganda model is the absence of
journalistic independence for, according to this Model, media content is dictated by those in
power.
The Propaganda Model argues:
What journalists do, what they see as newsworthy, and what they take for granted as
premises of their work are frequently well explained by the incentives, pressures, and
constraints incorporated into such a structural analysis. Perhaps this is an obvious point,
but the democratic postulate is that the media are independent and committed to
discovering and reporting the truth, and that they do not merely reflect the world as
powerful groups wish it to be perceived. If, however, the powerful are able to fix the
premises of discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear, and
think about, and to "manage" public opinion by regular propaganda campaigns, the
standard view of how the system works is at serious odds with reality.
No doubt, for the media to play important roles in the democratic process of a given country,
they have to be free and independent first. To be able to entertain the views of different political
parties, which are key actors in a democracy, the media need to be free from the pressure, at
least, of the government, if not from its full control. Unfortunately, the so-called public media in
Ethiopia ‘do almost nothing more than flattering those in power.’ The media professionals act as
the mouth pieces of the government to make laudable the voice of government officials. The
media act to shape the public attitudes by presenting the views of the government elites. As

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Shimelis (2000) rightly observes journalists in the state-owned media were then let loose to
pursue their traditional function, which they did with great vigor and dedication: praising and
glorifying the government, at times beyond reasonable proportions, and condemning and
castigating actions of previous governments as well as those of current political opponents of the
regime in power.
Another fundamental assertion of the Propaganda Model of Herman and Chomsky is that the
greatest and primary source of information for news is the government in power. Simply put, it is
about who has the greatest position of power to determine what is said. And for this reason
alone, the largest mass of any dissent movement has much less ability to produce their own flak.
That is why; the media do not have independence and do not have a space for the issue of the
public, particularly for the views of the opposition. Most importantly, the Propaganda Model
emphasizes the inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass-media interests
and choices. This relates to the situation in Ethiopia where the government and opposition
groups do not have equal power or even proportional power, to use the ‘public media,’ as such
for instance, news of opposition politics has rarely been given space and never been selected as
example of success story.

Worse, there seems reasonable consensus that the government uses the state media not only as a
powerful instrument of promoting its ideology but also of properly squashing competing
ideologies, the views of opposition groups and the ‘inconvenient and irresponsible’ private
media. Some examples include documentary programs broadcasted by ETV such as Akeldama, a
documentary produced, which is believed by many, to ‘tarnish’ the image of opposition political
groups, and articles written on the state owned daily Addis Zemen against the critical weekly
newspaper Addis Neger. Let us see, for example, a documentary program produced by ETV
which was meant to evaluate the ‘performance of the free press.’ It was during the period August
2009 to January 2010 that ETV broadcasted the documentary series which was seen by many as
a ‘proof’ for the unfriendly attitude of the government towards the ‘free press,’ which also
ignited heated debate in the Ethiopian media politics. Many observers concede that the program
was aimed not only at steamrolling the private media but also the opposition. Though, the
documentary was meant to ‘evaluate the performance’ of the private press in Ethiopia, it claimed
from the outset that the ‘independent press,’ has been irresponsible, unethical and heavily biased

71
in favor of the political opposition and has been mainly used as a tool for opposition politics
thereby it has played a negative role on the ongoing democratization process of the nation.

The documentary was biased in its presentation of evidences and expert opinion. Firstly, the
private press was portrayed as an irresponsible recipient of the freedom of expression ‘granted’
by the government. Secondly, it mentioned nothing about the challenges of a private media
performing in fragile and emerging democracy as well as infant free market economy. Moreover,
it remained silent on the government’s role, whether as a facilitator or steamroller of free media
environment, in the entire program. Over all, the motive seemed to greatly undermine the
performance of the private media, and its overall tone was very unfriendly towards the ‘free
press.’ As such it concluded by claiming that the ‘free press’ was nothing more nothing less than
a pawn of the radical opposition.

It further claimed:

Freedom of expression was enshrined in the F.D.R.E Constitution and censorship was
lifted following the demise of the military Derg regime. This created a fertile ground for
the proliferation of many press products. However, the free press played distractive and
negative roles by propagating negative media products against the peace and tranquility of
the nation.

The documentary further presented examples of ‘destructive’ media contents of several

newspapers and the political affiliation of media representatives, managers, owners and reporters
of the ‘free press’.
The documentary asserted the ‘irresponsible’ and ‘highly affiliated’ behavior of the ‘free press’
with the star-crossed military regime and the current opposition as follows:
There is no iota of doubt that the ‘free press’, many of them, were failed to perform their
duties in line with journalistic professional and ethical standards. As a matter of fact,
many of them preached polarized opposition politics and extremely biased against the
incumbent government by reporting and fabricating baseless messages and served as
mouthpieces for the opposition. The majority of ‘free press’ practitioners were also
members of the previous Derg regime having nostalgia towards it as well as working with
great vigor and dedication to restore the dictatorial regime. Moreover, they were striving

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 towards overthrowing the incumbent government by unconstitutional means during the
2005 national elections. Overall, their role was destructive and negative.

As mentioned earlier, the documentary was accused heavily by many as soon as it was aired and
seen as a clear manifestation of the government’s unfriendly behavior towards free press in the
country. These accusations seemed right for various reasons. First, the production of the
documentary was made purposely to coincide with previous campaigns published against the
private media on the government owned daily Addis Zemen, particularly against the weekly
Addis Neger newspaper, which led for the termination of the later, i.e. Addis Neger, just a couple
of weeks after the documentary. Second, the documentary was aired during the pre-election
period of the May 2010 national elections, a proactive move by the government to contain
‘inconvenient’ roles of the private media similar to the role it had played during the pre-and post
2005 national elections. This exactly is what Herman and Chomsky called it ‘producing flak’ i.e.,
pressure tactics to sway media content toward their own purposes – to make media contents
favorable toward sustaining political power, and an archetype of the Propaganda Model’s
emphasis of ‘a symbiotic relationship between the media and political elites.’

All in all, by taking seriously the issues that the ruling party sees ‘politically correct’ and
entertaining only the success stories of the government which has highly controlled the
gatekeepers of the media, the Ethiopian state media is considered biased. Critical scrutiny of
those in power is absent. Therefore, through ownership and tight control of media organizations,
and by exercising its will through the chains of command within media organizations, the
government has come to dominate the content of the media without giving space to competing
views.

However, here is a departure point: Though Herman and Chomsky maintain that through the
structure of ownership, power relations and pressures on news organizations, government elites
are able to ensure that certain views prevail and media products become a means for the ruling to
control ideas in society to produce its pre-eminence, this notion is not reflected in Ethiopia.
Against Herman and Chomsky’s perspective who argue that the media ‘manufacture the consent’
of the people towards the government, the Ethiopian ‘public’ media have failed to manufacture
the consent of the public in favor of the government, thus hardly achieve the goal and aspiration
of the government and the ruling party, for the state media is merely seen as a ‘propaganda tool’

73
and mouthpiece of the government. Evidently, this had been seen during the 2005 national
elections, where the ‘public media’ was outdistanced and surpassed by the propaganda of the
opposition group, who used mainly the private media. To cap it all, the Ethiopian state media
have not ‘manufactured’ the consent of the public in favor of the government owing to
confluences of factors, but most importantly, due to the fact that they are one-sided, devoid of
critical and divergent views, save in very rare cases, as a consequence, they have not won the
hearts and minds of the general public. In many cases, their media products have proved futile
and counterproductive.

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 Chapter 5
Conclusion and Recommendations

We have reached the point when it is time to pull together the more important observations made
in previous chapters and draw the conclusions of the paper as well as present the way forward.

The study has been conducted against the backdrop of one fundamental philosophical question:
what justifies the authority that political institutions wield over citizens? Or better, what
conditions would justify the exercise of legitimate political authority? Some social contract
theorists attempt to justify political authority on the basis of a social contract among the
governed by claiming that the natural rights one exercises in consenting to adhere to a political
authority fixes the grounds for the legitimacy of that authority, while others argue that a society
is just (free) only when governed by a social contract which embodies the general will of the
people, among other views. In democracies, political authority hinges on the will of the
electorate. At any rate, consent remains central to political authority.

In light of this thesis, media serve, among others, as a potent instrument to secure the consent of
the public in democracies. It is also against this backdrop that philosophers like Noam Chomsky
argue that media play a pivotal role in ‘manufacturing consent.’ The media in a way have
become one of the strongest linkage institutions - bridging, as it is, the gap between the state and
the citizens. This is another way of saying that there is a correlation between the existence of a
free media and democratic governance. As a matter of fact, one of the main distinguishing
features of a democratic form of government is the existence of free and independent media. As
Francis Kasoma also rightly argues independent media and democracy are inseparable. There
can be no democratic governance without an independent media. Therefore, it is beyond a
shadow of doubt that media play a positive role, if it performs its role professionally and
ethically, in the democratization process of a given nation.

Thus, the study has been conducted to examine the role of the Ethiopian media – both public and
private, in the democratization process in general and the interplay between media, politics and
democratization in the country in particular. While examining these relationships, the study has
also considered the role the Ethiopian media have been playing in the transition from

75
authoritarian to multiparty politics. As such it has raised such research questions as: Do the
public media have really been manufacturing consent? Do the private media contribute a positive
role in the democratization process of the country? Are they really independent, anyways? What
is the intercourse between media and politics?

Specifically, the study employed the media theory of Francis Kasoma to analyze the political
history of the Ethiopian ‘independent’ media in the last two decades, particularly on its interplay
with local politics, independence from the political groupings and its problems regarding
professional and ethical issues thereby analyzing the contribution it has made in the
democratization process of the nation. Moreover, it employed the Propaganda Model of Edward
S. Herman and Noam Chomsky to analyze the performance of the ‘public media,’ its political
independence and its role in manufacturing consent as well as its role to democracy and
multiparty politics.
It seems, however, the Ethiopian media in general, both public and private, have not played their
role up to the expectations in fulfilling this lofty ideal – democracy and multi-party politics, and
as such they have failed to become a powerful instrument in the democratization process of the
country, for various reasons.

On the one hand, the state media, though much more institutionalized than its private
counterpart, have failed to build the trust and secure the consent of the people for it is used solely
by the government to propagate its ideologies, having offered very little or no space for
competing voices. As a consequence, it has been labeled by the general public as one-sided and
the mouth piece of the government. On the other hand, the private media, though enjoying much
more acceptance for its bold and critical stance against the government, have failed for its
polarized political position, sensationalism and unprofessionalism. The upshot is then, the
Ethiopian media, both public and private, have played insignificant role, and in some cases
negative role, and have failed to serve as a catalyst for the promotion of a democratic political
culture in the country, though each for different reasons imbued with various challenges.
The thesis which tried to analyze the performance of the private media industry based on Francis
Kasoma’s theories on the role of the independent press found that the Ethiopian private media
has, to large extent, failed to play its role as an independent institution in the democratization
process and in the transition from the time-dishonored legacy of authoritarianism towards

76
multiparty democratic system. Unprofessionalism, political attachment to polarized politics and
unethical practices have been the manifestations of the Ethiopian private press just from the
outset. The claim by many scholars that the independent press is an opposition media in some
ways fits the scenario which created a very strenuous and antagonistic state-media relation.
Although it cannot totally be concluded that all the independent press in Ethiopia is that same,
the independent press has been serving the interest of the opposition, which in many ways, not
only damages the credibility of the media itself but also hampers the democratization process of
the nation. As Hallelujah rightly observes “the press forfeited its independence, damaged its
credibility and destroyed the professional ethics of journalism by supporting the opposition
baldly.” The unprofessional and unethical behavior of the independent press, coupled with the
unfriendly actions of the government towards private media, made the state-media relations, at
best, poor and at worst, unhealthy, in the last two decades.
Similarly, the thesis which tried to analyze the performance of the state media based on the
Propaganda Model of Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky found out that Ethiopian state
media has failed its role as a potent instrument in the democratization process and in
manufacturing the consent of the public. Tightly controlled state media channels are widely used
as mere pawns of sustaining the ideology of the government which is based on democratic state
developentalism, having offered little or no space for divergent and competing views. Worse, the
current political leadership regards the media as an integral part of its governance strategy,
similar to the approach of preceding regimes. As such, the Ethiopian state media has rarely
produced coverage deviating from the stand of the government in power. The so-called public
media in Ethiopia do almost nothing more than flattering the views of the ruling party. The
media professionals were acting as the mouth piece of the government to make laudable the
voice of government and the ruling party. However, although, the media acted to shape the
public attitudes by presenting the views of the government, in many instances its one-sided
reporting has failed to win the hearts and minds of the general public, and proved futile. Thus,
the state-owned media pursue their traditional function: praising and glorifying the government,
at times beyond reasonable proportions, and condemning and castigating actions of previous
governments as well as those of current political opponents of the regime in power.

77
It is therefore safe to conclude, though somberly, that both the state and private media have
failed to play their expected roles in the overall political transition of the nation towards
democracy and multi-party politics.
Be this as it may, however, by claiming that media is significant an institution for promoting
democracy, the thesis does not argue that open media alone is sufficient condition for promoting
democracy. There are some points that are particularly important with regard to the role of the
media in the democratization process of the nation. One is what role we can expect the media to
play in the democratization process that fits best the conditions prevailing in Ethiopia. The
second refers to what are the factors that thwart the Ethiopian media from making positive
contribution in the political process. And, what are the remedies?

Drawing on the experience of the media in established democracies, various authors have arrived
at rather definite conceptions of what role the media should play, as it has been mentioned in the
previous chapters. With regards to all the aforementioned roles, however, the media are viewed
as independent actors. Media should, first and foremost, independent. Thus, the Ethiopian media
should be free and independent if they are to play their expected roles. Moreover, though a
noticeable shift has taken place in the Ethiopian media environment in the last two decades, and
that it is considerably more open today than some 20 years ago, the Ethiopian media has been
operating in a context of fragile democracy and highly polarized national politics which forced it
to face numerous problems. Thus, the media is a reflection of the highly polarized national
politics. On the one hand, the majority of private media representatives are still struggling with
the legacy of an old highly polarized politics and see the incumbent as their arch enemy, and on
the other hand, there is reluctance on the part of the government to let the media have a place as
the ‘fourth estate’ in society. These two factors suggest that the shadows of polarized politics in
the national political arena in general and in the media landscape in particular tend to negate the
potential for gains that the democratization processes could provide.

Further, the media, while much stronger nowadays, remain weak in most cases. There is a
definite need for bolstering their capacity to strengthen democracy in the country. Ethiopian
media are still a long way from performing the kind of roles that is expected of them in
democracy. It is necessary, therefore, to explore the extent to which the media may play any
‘contextualized’ role that fits best to the ongoing political process in the nation. One such role

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that seems to be overlooked in the democratization process is its contribution to building trust
between the various political groupings and forming public opinion that favors for democratic
mind set. We have seen in many instances that media have an influence on the minds of ordinary
citizens and political groupings. The notion of ‘communicative spaces’ in which people and
political groups can comfortably discuss politics is an important aspect of democratization that
would help them to form opinion on subjects important to them. The media in Ethiopia,
therefore, can play an instrumental role in creating much space with a view to building trust
among political groupings and making citizens politically or civically more conscious, inter alia.

For this to happen, however, the media must be independent. For as long as the media remains
the mouth pieces of the government or opposition groups, the Ethiopian media politics would
remain the same – polarized and incapable of entertaining divergent views. However,
polarization is anathema to emerging democracy and multiparty politics. Last but not least, as
Kasoma rightly underlines, in a democracy the press and government should never be bed-
fellows. Neither should they be sworn enemies as the two extreme scenarios only serve to
distract the two institutions away from their common purpose: to make democratic governance
possible.

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