GeoJournal 47: 395–409, 1999.

© 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

395

Grid-group cultural theory: an introduction

Virginie Mamadouh
Amsterdam Study Centre for the Metropolitan Environment, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
(E-mail: v.d.mamadouh@frw.uva.nl)

Received 24 June 1999; accepted in revised form 7 July 1999

Key words: cultural bias, cultural theory, grid-group analysis, grid-group cultural theory, myths of nature, theory of
sociocultural viability

Abstract
This article offers an introduction to grid-group cultural theory (also known as grid-group analysis, Cultural Theory or
theory of socio-cultural viability), an approach that has been developed over the past thirty years in the work of the British
anthropologists Mary Douglas and Michael Thompson, the American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, and many others.
This assessment begins with a presentation of the main claims of the theory, distinguishing two characteristic breads of grid-
group cultural theory, in the one it is conceived as a heuristic device, in the other it is seen as a full explanatory theory. This
brief is followed by a discussion of the typology generated by the theory. This includes a presentation of the two dimensions
of sociality it posits, the cultural map they produce, as well as the four (or five) cultural types derived from them and their
designations. The article proceeds with a discussion of key issues including the incorporation of other typologies (such as
the one developed to analyse myths of nature), the relations between cultures or rationalities and several methodological
issues. Finally the article introduces the contributions to this special issue of the GeoJournal.

This special issue of GeoJournal is organised around a
theory. The theory in question is known under several names
(see below), among which we have chosen here the label
grid-group cultural theory. This diversity is symptomatic of
the variety of interpretations and applications that one en-
counters in the literature linked in one way or the other to
this theory.
It is not surprising that such variety is found, as the
approach emerged thirty years ago (Douglas, 1970, 1973,
1975, 1978). During three decades, insights evolve. Besides
the ongoing changes in mainstream social science theory and
methodology did also contribute to this diversification. But
diversity is mostly the result of the diverse backgrounds of
the many authors involved. It is perhaps odd that a theoret-
ical framework designed to deal with cultural diversity in
remote places by an author interested in rituals, symbols,
witchcraft, food and drinking habits, can be relevant in so
many fields of social science at home. But the challenging
character of the theory has aroused people from various aca-
demic disciplines and they have tried to apply the theory in a
broad range of research fields to generate insights about the
most diverse topics.
The purpose of this special issue is to show what the the-
ory has to offer to geographers. Although most contributors
are not geographers, they all deal with topics most rele-
vant to geographers and those interested in environmental
sciences, such as water management, water pollution, post-
industrialisation, international relations, urban democracy,
political violence and political cultures, and they cover a
wide range of cases on three continents.
The purpose of this article is to introduce grid-group cul-
tural theory. This introduction is meant as an assessment of
the main features of the theory as well as the issues at stake
when it comes to the coherence of the theory, its method-
ological implications, its relevance and its application to
diverse fields of social science. As the grid-group map is
the most famous exponent of theory it will be discussed at
length. The article goes on with a short review of the main
pitfalls regarding the application of the theory and it ends
with a presentation of the contributions to this special issue.
What’s in a name?
The theory is introduced here as the grid-group cultural the-
ory, but this choice needs to be justified, as it is not the
most common usage. The theory was first referred to as grid-
group analysis (Douglas, 1978; also in the volume of essays
edited by Mary Douglas in 1982; in Douglas, 1982a; Gross
and Rayner, 1985) but this label has been abandoned as the
awareness grew that the approach was a theory. By the end of
the eighties the term cultural theory had become established
(especially Wildavsky, 1987; in Thompson et al., 1990; Dou-
glas, 1992) as a way to emphasise that the theory puts culture
at the centre of the explanation of social life. Nevertheless
the label is most confusing as this specific theory is not the
only cultural theory in town. Because of that, authors often
396
used capital letters to emphasise that they mean the Cultural
Theory. Of course, this in turn often irritates readers, es-
pecially those interested in other cultural theories, as it is
understood as an arrogant gesture. Neophytes are puzzled
and labelling loses its power.1
Cultural theorists, also less respectfully called grid-
groupies, have been discussing a possible way out of this
terminological fog, but it seems that they cannot get rid of
the CT label. To this day, the most accurate description put
forward to clarify the content of the theory is the following:
the theory of sociocultural viability (Thompson et al., 1990)
but this adequate denomination is so unattractive that the
authors of that volume propagate the use of Cultural Theory
as a shortcut – in fact this is also the plain title of their book.
I have chosen to join an emerging convention (Ward,
1998; Hood, 1998) in which the two most used denomina-
tions grid-group analysis and Cultural Theory are merged
into one. It emphasises that it is a cultural theory and at the
same time it makes clear which kind of cultural theory it
is.2 However there is no reason to believe that this will the
conclusive solution to the labelling problem and as we will
see below the terminological fog is not limited to the name
of the theory.
The theory behind the typology
Grid-group cultural theory is often confused with the cul-
tural map it has produced. The terms grid and group refer to
two dimensions of sociality which structure that map. Based
on these two dimensions, ideal typical social positions are
constructed which are claimed to be able to account for cul-
tural diversity in the most parsimonious way possible. The
typology is catchy and has often attracted all the attention of
readers, at the expense of the theory on which it is grounded.
In this section I would like to highlight the theory, the ty-
pology and its many variants will be discussed in the next
one.
Grid-group cultural theory exists in two breeds, and all
intermediary shades. In the soft version, it is conceived as
a theoretical framework, a heuristic device, a classification
scheme. The hard variant is a full explanatory theory.
The original presentation (grid-group analysis) belongs
to the soft breed. The grid group approach has been devel-
oped as a tool to deal with cultural diversity. In Cultural Bias
published in 1978 (reprinted in Douglas, 1982a, pp. 183–
254)3 Mary Douglas addresses directly the failure of an-
thropologists to theorise cultural diversity and to compare
1 For example, the expression is useless to search for relevant literature
in a library catalogue.
2 Another alternative is the expression grid-group theory which has
been used by some authors in this volume.
3 In my view, the earlier presentation of grid and group in Natural
Symbols (Douglas, 1970, 1973) was a very embryonic one. It is mostly
focused on classifications and codes, and is still very close to the work of
Basil Bernstein (1971). In fact the diagram of grid and group presented
there (Douglas, 1973, p. 84) is reproduced in a subsequent publication as a
scheme of classification and control, as adapted from Bernstein’s work (in
Douglas, 1975b, p. 218). Grid runs from a private system of classification
to a system of shared classification. Group stands for the relation between
ego and the others: it runs from zero to increasingly exerting pressure that
cultures. She discusses specifically the problems of British
anthropologists trained with theories based on field work in
Africa who lack tools to analyse their findings during field
work in Melanesia. From the start she makes a few provoca-
tive thoughts: we need a framework that is able to deal
with culture everywhere and we should start with cultural
diversity at home (in the western societies).
Mary Douglas came up with a radical proposal: that of
identifying two basic dimensions of sociality, arguing that all
cultures can always be assessed and classified according to
these two dimensions. Subsequently she takes four cosmo-
logical types and shows how they are linked to four extreme
types of social context, as ‘for purposes of demonstrating the
present argument, it will be clearest if only extreme cases
are considered’ (Douglas, 1978, p. 19). The typology was
constructed.
The approach has been subsequently developed in many
essays by Mary Douglas, especially Risk Acceptability ac-
cording to the Social Sciences (1985), How Institutions
Think (1986), Risk and Blame (1992), Thought Styles
(1996), as well as the very influential Risk and Culture in
collaboration with Aaron Wildavksy (1982) and recently
Missing Persons with Steven Ney (1998). Other core pub-
lications are by Steve Rayner, Michael Thompson, Aaron
Wildavsky and Richard Ellis such as Measuring Culture
(Gross and Rayner, 1985), Divided we stand (Schwarz and
Thompson, 1990), Cultural Theory (Thompson et al., 1990),
Culture Matters (Ellis and M. Thompson, 1997) and Human
Choice and Climate Change (Rayner and Malone, 1998).
Several edited volumes have bundled applications of the
theory, especially Essays in the Sociology of Perception
(Douglas, 1982b); Politics, Policy and Culture (Coyle and
Ellis, 1994), Kultur som Levemåte (Grendstad and Selle,
1996) and Cultural Theory as Political Science (Thompson
et al., 1999).4
The main features of the theory, soft and hard, can be
summarised in a few claims.
The main claim of grid-group cultural theory is that cul-
ture matters. Preferences and justifications shape the world
of social relations. Everything human beings do or want is
culturally biased. Therefore this is a cultural theory.
The second claim is that it is possible to distinguish a
limited number of cultural types. That can be done by con-
structing a typology of cultures. This typology includes vi-
able combinations of patterns of social relations and patterns
of cultural biases (or cosmologies). These combinations are
often called (sub)cultures, ways of life or rationalities, some-
times ways of organising, social orders, solidarities, political
cultures, or simply types. Combinations are viable when so-
control others to the left, and from zero to increasingly controlled by other
people’s pressure to the right (Douglas, 1973, p. 84). Nonetheless the basic
elements of grid-group analysis are there: the concordance between natural
symbols and social experience, and the idea of four distinctive systems of
natural symbols.
4 For introductions see a recent review article (Verweij, 1997), an in-
troduction to a cultural theory of risk (Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999), to
Cultural Theory and international relations (Verweij, 1995; Ward, 1998)
and to Cultural Theory and new institutionalism (Grendstad and Selle,
1995). For a benevolent critique, see Selle (1991) and for a less benevolent
critique limited to risk analysis see Boholm (1996).

cial relations and cultural biases reinforce each other, that is:
the cultural bias justifies the social relations which confirm
the expectations raised by the cultural bias. In other words,
when people behave rationally. The very fact that rationality
is plural and that several types of rationality can be estab-
lished is an important contribution of the theory to social
science in which the rational choice paradigm is hegemonic.
As such it can be seen either as an alternative to it or an
expansion of it (see also Wildavsky, 1994).
The viable combinations can be ‘discovered’ by assess-
ing two main dimensions of sociality. We could use more,
but to be parsimonious we stick to two dimensions. It is cru-
cial to retain more than one dimension to allow for change in
different directions. Any unidimensional typology suffers a
serious flaw: moving away from one pole means necessarily
moving towards the other pole.5 Instead of opposing individ-
ualism and collectivism as two poles of the same dimension
(a common practice in social sciences), they are conceived
as two dimensions: one of individuation and one of social
incorporation (Douglas, 1978, p. 7 or 1982a, p. 190). These
two dimensions of sociality have been named group and
grid. Group stands for incorporation into a bounded group
(it is strong when the individual is a member of one corpo-
rate group, weak when individuals do not belong to such a
group) while grid stands for ‘the cross-hatch of rule to which
individuals are subject in the course of their interaction’
(Douglas, 1978, p. 8, or 1982a, p. 192).
The third claim is that the typology of viable combi-
nations is universal. It can be applied anywhere anytime
because the two dimensions of sociality grasp the funda-
mental nature of the social being. Grid-group cultural theory
postulates that people derive a great many of their prefer-
ences, perceptions, opinions, values and norms from their
adherence to a certain way of organising social relations,
which is revealed by their preferences with regard to the two
basic dimensions of social life: incorporation or bounded-
ness (group) and regulation or prescription (grid). In a way,
institutions do the thinking for us (Douglas, 1986). Grid-
group analysts can therefore deduce preferences, attitudes
and behaviours regarding all kind of topics for each ideal
type.6
These three claims together are already quite a program,
but the hard version of the theory goes a few steps further.
It has been presented systematically by Michael Thompson,
Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky in a book published in
1990: Cultural Theory. They posit the following series of
propositions. First the compatibility condition (p. 2) asserts
that social relations (patterns of impersonal relations) and
cultural bias (shared values and beliefs) can not be combined
contrary to each other: they must be mutually supportive. It
implies both consistence and coherence: the first refers to
the fact that both are patterned (a cultural bias is a consistent
5 On one and two-dimensional models, see also Ostrander (1982).
6 In Cultural Bias Mary Douglas (1978) works out views on nature,
time, human nature, and social behaviour. In Divided we stand, there are
many more: preferred way of organising, view of resources, scope of knowl-
edge, learning style, ideal scale, idea of fairness, preferred economic theory,
perception of time, preferred form of governance, model of consent, etc.
(Schwarz and Thompson, 1990, pp. 66–67).
397
bunch of preferences) and the second that the two patterns
reinforce each other. Second the impossibility theorem (p. 3,
also Wildavsky, 1987, p. 5) states that there are five and
only five7 ways of life (the ones deduced from the grid and
group dimension) that are viable combinations of bias and
relations. Third the requisite variety condition (p. 4) alleges
that ways of life need each other to be viable: because of its
specific blind spots, each cultural bias leads to catastrophe
if it is not ‘corrected’ by the other (curvilinearity). In addi-
tion, each way of life needs its rivals to define itself against.
There is an interdependence, ‘conflict among cultures is a
precondition of cultural identity’ (Wildavsky, 1987, p. 7).
As a result, the authors assume the five ways of life to be
present in any society at any time,8 be it in various strength
and in various patterns of interaction. The competition be-
tween the ways of life is a state of constant disequilibrium
(Thompson et al, p. 4, pp. 83–100): adherents are constantly
moving from one way of life to the other (the authors use
the metaphor of a flock of starlings, p. 83). Finally, change
is explained by the theory of surprise (pp. 69–81). Ways of
life are resistant to change, and events that do not fit the
expectations raised by a way of life, are explained away. But
the cumulative impact of successive anomalies or surprises
(major, painful accidents) provoke a change of paradigm.
The content of the theory will be clarified in the fol-
lowing by a discussion of its main components (the two
dimensions of sociality, the cultural map, the analytical lev-
els and the cultural types), followed by a discussion of a few
of the main problematic or controversial issues.
The two dimensions of sociality
These two dimensions of sociality have been named group
and grid. The exact nature of the two dimensions have been
the topic of many discussions, especially related to method-
ological consequences.9 The two dimensions should be seen
as polythetic scales (Douglas, 1978, p. 15; Hampton, 1982;
Gross and Rayner, 1985, Chapter 4). That is: they include
a series of aspects, but those are not necessarily present in
each case observed.
For grid (perceived as more difficult to grasp than the
group dimension), Mary Douglas distinguishes in Cultural
Bias four elements: insulation, autonomy, control and com-
petition (Douglas, 1978, p. 16). In his study of work crime,
Gerald Mars develops a classification of occupations, he lists
four elements to assess the strength of grid dimension: au-
tonomy, insulation, reciprocity and competition; whereas the
four elements of group strength include: frequency (of inter-
action), mutuality, scope (of activities) and (group) boundary
(Mars, 1982, pp. 24–28).
7 Four or five is however a matter of discussion, more later on.
8 If the ways of life are conceived as preferences (as in Verweij, 1995)
it is much easy to accept this condition than if ways of life are seen as
directly determined by social environments. In that case, the requisite va-
riety condition can only expected to be met in complex organisations and
societies.
9 Are the dimensions independent from each other? Do they intersect
at right angles? These are important matters for those who want to test the
theory by statistical means.
398
A most detailed discussion of the dimensions can be
found in Measuring Culture in which Steve Rayner and
Jonathan Gross present a mathematical model for grid-group
analysis (Gross and Rayner, 1985). Their book is an at-
tempt to formalise and operationalise the two dimensions
and it includes a computer program to ‘calculate the val-
ues of grid/group predicates from experimental data’ (Gross
and Rayner, 1985, p. 117ff). Their model is however not
meant as the ultimate selection and weighting of predicates,
because the relevance of each predicate depends on context.
Gross and Rayner include five group predicates in their
model (1985, pp. 73ff): proximity (closeness of members to
each other), transitivity (of relations), frequency (proportion
of the allocable time of members during which they inter-
act with other members of the unit), scope (activities with
members as proportion of all activities inside and outside the
relevant social unit), and impermeability (which measures
how easily eligible non-members who want to join actually
join the unit). They also mention other predicates such as a
commonality of experience and life-support dependency.
Likewise, they have four grid predicates (pp. 79ff): spe-
cialisation (operationalised as the proportion of all possible
roles that a member assumes), asymmetry (lack of symmetry
in role exchange), entitlement (operationalised as the pro-
portion of all roles that are ascribed to certain categories of
persons, as opposed to roles open to all that can be attained
by achievement), and accountability (operationalised as the
proportion of all roles that are accountability interactions,
which are interactions in which there is one dominant role
and one subordinate role, the former can put sanctions on
the later). The final step in the model is to aggregate the
predicate scores by (weighted) average.
In Measuring Culture, the model is applied to a fictitious
case-study about the location of a nuclear power plant in an
imaginary small New England coastal town and this quan-
titative approach is contrasted with a qualitative analysis of
the same (fictitious) case. The model developed by Gross
and Rayner did not come into use because of the obvious
difficulty to gather the kind of detailed data needed to feed
their computer program. The study remains however rec-
ommended reading to grasp the complexity of the grid and
group dimensions and as such it may help understand why
presentations are so diverse in different publications.
The two dimensions are generally acknowledged as such,
but their presentations may vary. Aaron Wildavksy for ex-
ample generally introduces the two dimensions as grasping
the answer to two fundamental questions for each human
being: (1) who am I? and (2) how should I behave? (for
example, Wildavsky, 1987, p. 6). Many authors focus on
specific grid and group features relevant to their topics of
investigation, therefore they select one specific predicate of
grid and group: for example fettered/unfettered competition
(instead of group) and symmetrical/asymmetrical transac-
tions (instead of grid) (Thompson, 1997a, p. 142, and in
this volume), group strength and number and variety of pre-
scriptions (Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 25) or preferred
amount of group loyalty and preferred amount of prescrip-
tions (Verweij, 1995, p. 92). Sometimes, authors do not
Figure 1. The cultural map: two dimensions, four types (Douglas, 1978,
p. 7).
bother to talk about the dimensions and just present the re-
sulting types, what Michael Thompson provocatively calls
Cultural Theory without grid and group. But before turning
to the cultural types themselves, I would like to discuss the
cultural map and its graphic representation.
The typology portrayed: the cultural map
Mary Douglas illustrates her essay Cultural Bias with a
diagram on which grid and group are portrayed as two di-
mensions generating four types of social environment. The
visual presentation of the typology has been very success-
ful and is found in many presentations of the theory (but
not all, especially not in studies focused on one or two cul-
tural types). Most striking for someone who glances through
the literature is the capricious shape of the diagram. The
main variants will be discussed here because they give away
some of the problematic aspects of the theory and its many
varieties. A recurrent issue concerns the nature of the di-
mensions: are they continuous or dichotomous? Another
discussion is about the number of positions: are there four
or five types to be taken into account? Both questions are re-
lated to each other as the fifth position is generated by certain
conceptualisations of the dimensions and not by others.
As can be seen in Figure 1 (based on Douglas, 1978,
p. 7), the diagram originally published in Cultural Bias is
a map on which specific positions are located. Each quad-
rant of the diagram is characterised by its score on the two
dimensions. The diagram has a major flaw: the dimensions
are continuous but the boxes that materialise the four types
suggest discrete positions. It is not clear what happens when
one moves across the map. There are several ways to deal
with this problem.
One way has been to drop the boxes and represent only
the two continuous dimensions as in Figure 2 (based on Dou-
glas, 1992, p. 178). The four types are generally pinpointed
on the map,10 but sometimes the map is left empty (Douglas
and Isherwood, 1979, p. 23). In these cases ‘any conceivable
combination of values of grid and group corresponds to a
point in a one-by-one square diagram’ (Gross and Rayner,
1985, p. ix). Such mapping can be found in a comparison
10 Douglas, 1992b, p. 473; Ellis and Coyle, 1994, p. 4; Coyle 1994,
p. 221; Verweij, 1995, p. 92.
 399

Figure 2. Two continuous dimensions but no boxes (Douglas, 1992,

p. 178). Figure 3. Types as extreme regions of the continuous grid/group diagram
(Gross and Rayner, 1985, p. 113).

Figure 4. Two dichotomous dimensions, four boxes (Douglas, 1982, p. 4). Figure 5. Four boxes, no dimensions (Douglas, 1993, p. 45).

between Dinka, Nuer and Mandari by Mary Douglas (1973, Thompson et al, 1990, pp. 16–17, n. 23), which intersects
p. 129) or a comparison between eight social categories in with the other two at that same zero-point. The regular cul-
Boyle and Coughlin (1994, p. 204). tural map reveals only the bird’s-eye view. Thompson’s three
An alternative is to emphasise that the types are extreme dimensional model is portrayed in Figure 8 in three slices
cases, pushing them to the edges of the map as in Figure 3 from left to right: two positions score negatively on the ma-
(based on Gross and Rayner, 1985, p. 113), a presentation nipulation dimension; two positions score positively, and the
much used by Mary Douglas in the essays collected in Risk fifth type scores null: this individual does not manipulate
and Blame (1992, p. 106, 205, 264, 287; also in Boyle and and is not manipulated by others. Thompson’s demonstra-
Coughlin, 1994, p. 195). tion uses the properties of a morphogenetic field which has
A third way to deal with the problem is to represent just five flat areas which correspond to the five stabilisable
the two dimensions as dichotomous ones, that is not run- combinations (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 17; Thompson,
ning from 0 to infinite, but distinguishing between weak 1982, pp. 31–63).
and strong, low and high. Such dichotomous dimensions The third dimension is concomitant of the other two: no
produce four boxes, as in Figure 4.11 At times the dimen- new combinations emerge. Therefore it can be ignored in a
sions are not even mentioned, and the drawing only portrays parsimonious model, even if it is useful to comprehend the
four boxes as in Figure 512 while the map may even been fifth position. Related cultural maps show the grid and group
replaced by a table as in Figure 6.13 dimensions as crossing each other at the centre of the map.
Finally another option has been developed by Michael They contain four or five positions, according to whether or
Thompson, who moves the zero-point of both dimensions to
the centre of the map, where a fifth type emerges (Figure 7,
Thompson 1982, p. 36). To clarify what this fifth position
is, he also argues for the existence of a third dimension
called manipulation, or grip to complete the alliteration (see
11 Figure 4 is based on Douglas, 1982c, p. 4; see also in Bloor, 1982;
Ostrander, 1982; Mars, 1982, p. 29; Gross and Rayner, 1985, p. 7; Rayner,
1984, p. 162; Wildavsky, 1986, p. 335; Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 25;
Coughlin and Lockhart, 1998, p. 36; Engbersen, 1993, p. 36; Ward, 1998,
p. 215; Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999, p. 78.
12 Figure 5 is based on Douglas, 1993; p. 45; see also: Douglas, 1996,
p. 43; Douglas and Ney, 1998, p. 101.
13 Figure 6 is based on Ellis, 1991, p. 311; see also Wildavsky, 1984,
p. 193, 1987, p. 6; Selle 1992, p. 102; Grendstad and Selle, 1991, p. 11,
Grendstad, 1995, p. 224; Hood, 1998, p. 9; and most presentations in this Figure 6. A table, instead of a map (Ellis, 1991, p. 311).
volume.
400
Figure 7. A fifth type in the centre (Thompson, 1982, p. 36).
not they depict the fifth type, as in Figure 9, respectively
Figure 10 (as in Thompson and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 176;
Thompson et al., 1990, p. 8; Coyle, 1994, p. 223; Dake
and Thompson, in this volume). When the fifth position is
not shown (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990, p. 7; Thomp-
son 1997a, p. 142), the presentations are quite similar to
those obtained with two dichotomous dimensions, especially
when the name of the dimensions are not mentioned, as in
Figure 5 (for example Davy, 1997, p. 327).
Sometimes graphic representations are confusing be-
cause they include contradictory elements, for example in
Webber and Wildavsky (1986, p. 25; or Wildavsky, 1986,
p. 335) where the dichotomous dimensions are represented
by arrows crossing at the centre of the scheme. And at times
things are really mixed up, such as the figure in which Unni
Edvardsen (1997, p. 218) portrays both two continuous grid
and group dimensions and two dimensions crossing at the
centre of the map or the one by Michael Shackleton (1993,
p. 581) who uses a table but still puts the fifth position in the
middle.
The graphic presentation of the typology is not only a
means to attract attention that as such should deserve care of
the authors. It also has methodological implications. Those
who choose continuous grid and group dimensions are likely
to develop predicates for grid and group to measure the
grid and group scores of a (series of) case(s). Those who
choose dichotomous dimensions, regardless of where they
posit their intersection, are likely to focus on the cultural
types themselves and to select indicators for each of the four
(or five) types. The first group may conclude that X is ‘up
grid’ and ‘down group’ as compared to an ideal-typical po-
sition D, whereas the second group are likely to speak of
mixed types or hybrids between two cultural types. As the
second option is more popular than the first – contributions
to this issue of the journal are no exception – it is now time
to present the cultural types.
The cultural types
Cultural types (ways of life, cultures, rationalities or soli-
darities) have been defined as viable combinations of social
patterns and cultural patterns, but it is now common to
distinguish three levels of analysis instead of two: (1) in-
terpersonal relations, (2) cultural biases, and (3) behavioural
strategies. It underlines the freedom of each individual to
choose a strategic behaviour that fits the social environment,
the cultural bias or both, or to choose a strategic behaviour
that disrupts the social environment, discredits the cultural
bias or do both.
Although the cultural map portrays dimensions of the so-
cial environment, descriptions of the cultural types generally
blur the analytical distinction between patterns of interper-
sonal relations, cultural biases and behavioural strategies.
This is also reflected in the labels used to name the types
(more later on this particular problem).
The type located in the lower left quadrant (in Figures 1
to 10) is characterised by weak group incorporation and
weak regulation or role prescriptions. The individual is free
to enter transactions with others as (s)he wishes, as on a
market. Boundaries are provisional. They are subject to ne-
gotiation. Individuals are relatively free of control by others
but their ability to control others is a measure of their posi-
tion in the network. This pattern is justified by the pursuit
of personal rewards in a competitive environment. Fairness
consists of equality of opportunity. Blame is put on personal
failure (or lack of competition). This way of organising is
vulnerable to the lack of co-operation.
The upper right quadrant is a social environment char-
acterised by strong group boundaries and binding prescrip-
tions. These prescriptions are justified by the importance of
the whole over the parts, the collective over the individuals.
Consequently division of labour, differentiated roles, hier-
archical social relations are typical of these nested groups.
Fairness consists of equality before the law. Blame is put
on deviants who do not endorse the established procedures.
This way of organising is vulnerable to misplaced trust in
authority and expertise.
The upper left quadrant is characterised by binding pre-
scriptions in combination with weak group incorporation.
Isolation can be imposed or by choice (a possibility not al-
ways acknowledged). These individuals have little to say
about the ways they live their life, it is organised from the
outside. They live at the margins of organised patterns dis-
cussed above such as hierarchies or networks. Fairness is not
on this earth. Blame is put on fate (bad luck). This way of
organising is vulnerable to unwillingness to plan ahead and
inertia.
The lower right quadrant is characterised by strong group
boundaries coupled with few regulations. The group is main-
tained through intensive relations between group members.
Internal role differentiation is minimal. Fairness is equality
of result. Shared opposition to the outside world keeps such
an egalitarian bounded group together. Blame is put on the
‘system’. This way of organising is vulnerable to deadlocks
because no authority is accepted to resolve internal conflicts.
Finally, the fifth type is (when acknowledged) one of
withdrawal from coercive and manipulative relations: this
individual is not controlled by others and is not controlling
others (see Figures 8 and 10). In other presentations, it is
conceived as an extreme form of the low grid positions, not
 401

Figure 8. Michael Thompson’s three dimensional model (Thompson, 1982a).

Figure 9. A map with the zero point in the centre: Two dimensions of Figure 10. A map with the zero point in the centre: The five vignettes
sociality and four rationalities (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990, p. 7). mapped onto the dimensions of sociality (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 8).

a specific type. Mary Douglas did discuss autonomy but as hierarchist(s), hierarchy, hierarchies or hierarchical and
conceived it as ‘off the map’ (1978, p. 18). closely related terms as (hierarchical) collectivism.
For the other two types, divergences are more conse-
quential because the alternative terms have different conno-
The importance of labels: catchy or foggy? tations. At present, the most common label for the B position
is fatalism, fatalist(s) or fatalistic15 which seems to be a
In the original diagram Mary Douglas uses four letters: A, B,
Wildasvkian idea. Mary Douglas uses most often the term
C and D to describe the cultural types, starting in the lower
isolate(s), insulated (1978, p. 7) or atomised subordination.
left quadrant (low grid, low group) and moving clockwise
Still she uses fatalists once (Douglas, 1992, p. 264). Posi-
through the diagram (see Figure 1). From the start, the four
tion D is often referred to as egalitarianism or egalitarian(s)
letters were coupled with labels that became more popular
which seems to originate from Steve Rayner’s (1979, 1982,
than the letters, because it is for us easier to use them than to
1984, 1988, 1992) work on egalitarian groups. By con-
remember which was A, which was B, etc.14 The labelling
trast, Mary Douglas uses factionalism, sect/sectarian, and
unfortunately also produces a lot of confusion because labels
enclave/enclavist, but also dissenting groups, communard(s)
stimulate our imagination so readers tend to forget about grid
(Douglas, 1992, p. 264; also in Davy, 1997; Thompson et al.,
and group and fill up the quadrant with the connotations of
1990) and she uses once egalitarian enclaves (Douglas and
the labels, but also because of the inconsistencies in label use
Ney, 1998, p. 101).
(as can be seen in Figures 1 to 10). In addition, the same la-
The fifth type, whose existence and position on the
bels can be used with different diagrams, and different labels
map are much disputed, is labelled either the hermit or au-
with the same diagram.
tonomous/autonomy/autonomist or both16 although it should
There is a fair degree of consensus for the A and C posi-
be noted that Mary Douglas discusses this position in a chap-
tions, the two manipulative cultures (see Figure 8). It is no
ter called individualism in Cultural Bias (1978, p. 41ff.)!
coincidence, these are the two types widely acknowledged
This enumeration (although limited to the core publica-
in social science, most commonly as the opposite poles
tions of the key authors Douglas, Wildavksy and Thompson)
of one continuum: individualism and collectivism. Position
establishes a relative lack of standardisation. It is messy and
A is often referred to as individualist(s), individualism or
it may confuse some readers, but does it really matter? I
individualistic, or slightly more remote terms as competi-
tion, entrepreneurs, markets. Position C is often referred to 15 Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990, 1992; Ellis
and M. Thompson, 1997; Ellis and Coyle, 1994, p. 4; Davy, 1997, etc.
14 Once Mary Douglas tried to match labels and letters using: Active 16 Thompson, 1982; Thompson and Wildavsky, 1986; Thompson et al.,
individualism, Backwater isolation, Conservative hierarchy and Dissident 1990; Coyle, 1994, p. 223.
enclave (1996, p. 43).
402
think so. Labels matter because they transmit different con-
notations. As such they greatly determine how the results of
such analysis are perceived. It may be more acceptable to be
labelled an isolate than a fatalist, or an egalitarian than a sec-
tarian. It is (by definition) impossible to find unbiased labels.
Different labels convey different interpretations of the the-
ory, so discussing them is important, even if the contributors
to this volume spontaneously follow the most conventional
use: individualism, fatalism, hierarchy, egalitarianism.
The labels used for the cultural types do implicitly em-
phasise one analytical level rather than the other. Terms as
isolates, networks, hierarchies, clans, sects, point at pat-
terns of social relations, e.g. social environments. Terms
as individualism, fatalism, collectivism, egalitarianism, sec-
tarianism, point at patterns of beliefs, e.g., cultural bias.
Finally terms as individualist, fatalist, hierarchist, enclavist
point at persons holding certain views and choosing certain
strategies, the same applies to the series of attitudes towards
poverty (the entrepreneur, the ineffectual, the hierarchist, the
sectist and the autonomist) established by Thompson and
Wildavsky (1986, p. 176). Other classifications are neutral,
the original A, B, C and D (Douglas, 1978, 1982a; Gross
and Rayner, 1985), and yet others explicitly metaphorical,
such as the animal typology presented by Gerald Mars in his
classification of occupations (hawks, donkeys, wolves and
vultures, Mars, 1982) and as such they can easily address all
levels at the same time, but they remain biased and as such
immediately repulsive or attractive to each of us.
The very fact that some authors use labels pertaining
to different levels in the same account of the typology17
reveals some confusion between these levels of analysis. In-
deed the distinction is not so important if one believes that
only the matching combinations are to be found empirically.
Still this fogginess weakens the presentation, application and
validation of the theory.
An imperialist theory?
A dangerous temptation for those convinced of the potentials
of the grid-group typology is to incorporate all other 4-types
typologies they came across. A re-interpretation of existing
schemes is often seen as just another proof that the theory
is a hit, but it generally irritates those not impressed in the
first place, confirming in their view that you don’t need grid
and group to do the job. Anyhow there is a real danger of
sterile re-labelling of the old, especially when the theory is
used as a classifying device and not as an explanatory the-
ory. Still, incorporation may be useful to specify the content
of the types in a specific context. Empirical typologies and
classifications and a theoretical typology can strengthen each
other: the first validating the later, the second grounding the
former in an explanatory framework.
One of the most successful cases of incorporation has
been the typology of myths of nature found by ecolo-
gists who studied institutions managing ecosystems such as
17 For example: individualist and isolated in the original presentation
(Douglas, 1978, p. 7), individualism and egalitarianism but isolates and
hierarchy (Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999, p. 78).
Figure 11. Myths of nature (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990, p. 5; Thomp-
sonet al., 1990, p. 27).
forests, fisheries and grasslands.18 Michael Thompson and
his co-authors (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Thompson
et al., 1990; see also Rayner and Thompson, 1998) have
underlined the close links between each myth of nature and
the cultural types. These four myths of nature are nature
benign (corresponding to the A position), and following
clockwise nature capricious, nature perverse/tolerant and
nature ephemeral (with nature resilient for the hermit in
Thompson et al., 1990, p. 26).
Each myth of nature offers a partial representation of
reality. It captures some experience, as such it is true. But
it can be ‘surprised’ by events, as such it is wrong. The
myths are represented graphically by a ball in a landscape,
the shape of the landscape revealing the expected interaction
between ball and landscape (between life and the world) as
in Figure 11.19 When nature is benign, it is robust, it can
take experimentation, trial and error, as the shape of the
hill always brings the ball back to the best position. This
myth corresponds to the individualist viewpoint. When na-
ture is capricious, it is a lottery, one does not know what
to expect, one can not learn from experience. This myth
is compatible with the fatalistic viewpoint. When nature is
perverse/tolerant it is robust, but to a certain point, the shape
of the hill brings the ball back to the best position, at least
if it remains in the safe zone, if it goes too far, things go
wrong. Therefore this myth justifies the power given to ex-
perts as they are the ones who can evaluate the safety zone,
it corresponds to the hierarchic viewpoint. When nature is
ephemeral, it is fragile and the ‘ball’ should be as quiet as
possible, any movement could lead to a fall from the top
of the hill. That is the egalitarian position. Finally nature re-
silient, the myth of nature corresponding to the fifth position,
autonomy, is that the four myths are true at the same time,
it is a myth too, because the myths are contradictory, nature
can not be both at the same time regarding the same object
and the same conditions (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 29–33).
Human nature is constructed accordingly, Thompson
et al. (1990, p. 33–37) argue. For individualists, human
nature is extraordinarily stable and self-seeking. For fatal-
ists, human nature is unpredictable, for hierarchists humans
18 Especially Holling 1986 (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990, p. 4;
Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999, p. 80).
19 It is worth noting that here too, diagrams prompt discussion. In this
case, it is mostly the description of the C position (nature perverse/tolerant)
that is difficult, as the exact drawing may suggest a varied range of
robustness within limits (putting it closer to A or closer to D).

are ‘born sinful but can be redeemed by good institutions’
(p. 35) whereas egalitarians see exact the opposite ‘man
is basically good but his nature is highly susceptible to
institutional influences’ (p. 36).
The two typologies fit so well into each other that the
myths of nature have become an integral part of grid-
group cultural theory. They have been often mentioned in
studies dealing with perceptions and views on the environ-
ment (e.g., Thompson, 1997a; Selle and Grendstad, 1997;
Davy, 1997). Mary Douglas (1992, pp. 263–64) has also
adopted them also adapting them by slightly altering the
labels and applying them to human nature (1996, pp. 88–
89, also in Douglas and Ney, 1998, p. 109): nature/person
robust, nature/person unpredictable, nature/person robust
within limits, nature/person under duress20 (after a try as
nature fragile).
Another example of a happy fit is that of Ouchi’s typol-
ogy of organisations (1980): markets, hierachies and clans,
corresponding to the organised patterns of social relations
(A, C and D). Schmutzer (1994) uses Ouchi’s terminology
and re-constructs the fourth type as the zero-matrix (the
isolates).
Relations between cultures
One of the postulates of the hard version of grid-group cul-
tural theory is the requisite variety condition which posits
the interdependence between cultural types. As soon as
this condition is stated, the relations between the differ-
ent cultures or rationalities emerge as a topic of major
importance.
At first sight, one may think that cultures sharing the
same score on one dimension may have some mutual under-
standing: e.g., the individualist and the fatalist, the fatalist
and the hierarchist, the hierarchist and the sectarian, the
sectarian and the individualist. Instead, cultural theorists un-
derline the connivance between positions situated along the
same diagonal: one is called the positive diagonal (A–C),
the other (B–D) the negative diagonal. The diagonals link
cultural types that share the same position on the third di-
mension, manipulation or grip (see above): it is why one
speaks of the diagonal of affirmation and the diagonal of
withdrawal (Douglas, 1992, p. 45). The positive diagonal is
also called the establishment (Wildavsky, 1986; Webber and
Wildavsky, 1986; Thompson et al., 1990). Another metaphor
to highlight the diagonals is that of the centre (A + C) versus
the border (B + D) used by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982)
in Risk and Culture.
Dealing with larger social environments (e.g. states)
Aaron Wildavsky was interested in coalitions or alliances
between culture, or regimes. He investigated systematically
regimes, assessing four pure regimes (regimes dominated by
one culture) and four hybrid regimes characterised by the
20 The application to persons is visualised by drawings by Pat Novy
in which the ‘ball’ is replaced by a person (Douglas, 1996, p. 89; Douglas
and Ney, 1998, p. 109). Strangely enough, the person under duress does not
stand in a precarious equilibrium on the top of a hill, but is uncomfortably
imprisoned under a bell jar.
403
alliance between two cultures. His four hybrid regimes are
much entrenched in history (labels again!) as he calls them
social democracy (C + D), American individualism (D + A)
state capitalism (A + B) and totalitarianism (B + C) (for
example in Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 25; Wildavsky,
1986, p. 335). Surprisingly he neglected the diagonals as po-
tential regimes (although ‘the establishment’ is mentioned as
a ninth regime in Wildavsky, 1986, p. 335). Discussing Cul-
tural Theory and its shortcomings, Per Selle introduced the
hermit as the ninth regime (Selle, 1991, p. 102) but dropped
it again a few years later (Grendstad and Selle, 1995, p. 11).
Virginie Mamadouh pursues a similar investigation by ex-
ploring other ideal types of conversation between cultures in
national political cultures (Mamadouh, 1997, 1999). Con-
sidering all these patterns of interaction between cultures,
the comparison with chemistry has been made by Michael
Thompson: the grid-group typology as the table of basic
elements.
When dealing with relations between cultures, it is im-
portant to distinguish between active and passive cultures.
A, C and D (individualism, hierarchism and egalitarianism)
are the active cultures, because their adherents propagate
their way of life: they tend to recruit new adherents and to
impose their cultures on others because it is the right way to
do things. By contrast, isolation and autonomy are passive
cultures.
Another fundamental point is that synthesis is not achiev-
able. The cultures are antagonist, they are inherently adver-
sarial (Douglas and Ney, 1998, p. 104–106). It is not possible
to merge them and to obtain the best of them all at once. It is
however postulated by many Cultural Theorists that cultural
plurality is an asset: a society or an organisation in which
the different cultures are present and acknowledged will be
less prone to surprise, it has a broad repertoire of strategies to
deal with a broad range of problems, and it is better equipped
to learn. Grid-group cultural theory in its strongest form is
thus a normative theory.21
Applying the theory
The above presentation of the theory has over-emphasised
variety, but at this point the reader hopefully has a good
idea of the different breeds of grid-group cultural theory.
Before introducing the contributions to this issue, the main
discussions regarding the application, the development and
the validation of the theory will be presented in brief.
The first issue of importance is that of the distinction be-
tween levels of analysis. The distinction of the (two or) three
analytical levels (relations, biases, behaviours) have been
surprisingly poor in most grid-group cultural theory writ-
ings, probably because the cultural types over-emphasise
the coherent combinations. The fact that the three levels in-
fluence each other in a double cycle does not mean that a
21 On cultural pluralism as a definition of democracy see Wildavsky
and Thompson (1987, 1994), Edvardsen (1997), Molenaers and Thompson
(1999), Ney and Thompson (1999), on pluralism and learning see Hendriks
(1994, 1996, this volume).
404
particular application of grid-group cultural theory can not
focus on a specific analytical level or a specific stage of
the cycle: for example on the question how cultural bias
affects strategic behaviour related to making ends meet (see
Thompson et al., 1990). Quite the reverse is true. A careful
clarification of which level is put at the core of a specific
investigation is necessary to make choices in the interpre-
tation and the application of the theory intelligible. And it
may even be indispensable to avoid circular arguments in an
analysis.
The issue of coherence has been raised as the most im-
portant issue over the past ten years. Whether or not there
is coherence between the three analytical levels (that is
when relations, bias, and behaviour reinforce each other)
is a question for empirical research. Inconsistent combina-
tions may be viable after all, in the sense that they occur
in the real world, even if they are probably not enviable
because they are not comfortable. Such inconsistent com-
binations may be temporary, as predicted by the theory, in
the sense that they lead to change in relational patterns, bias
or behaviour to meet the hypothesised coherence, but at any
moment, incoherent combinations could still be more com-
monly observable than the coherent combinations posited as
ideal types by the theory, a possible finding that would be
consistent with the notion of a constant disequilibrium (see
above).
Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990, 1992) discuss at
length so-called ‘stolen rhetoric’: the justification of certain
behaviour by a rhetoric corresponding to another cultural
bias. In addition we could speak of stolen strategy when
means corresponding to one cultural bias are used to achieve
aims belonging to another bias. In both cases, stolen ele-
ments are dangerous as they transform the original social
environment towards the phantom bias. Moreover, surprise
(meaning: discrepancies between expected and observed re-
ality) is important to explain change. Therefore it becomes
more important to distinguish the different analytical levels
and to put consistency (of the cultural bias) and coherence
(across levels) to the test. It could well be that the cultural
types are not only extreme positions on the cultural map (see
Figure 3) but also extreme cases of coherence.
A second issue of importance is the scale at which the
theory is meant to be applied. Originally Mary Douglas
assumed the proper scale to be that of the relevant social
environment, that is ‘the social accounting level, the level
of justification and explanation’ (Douglas, 1978, p. 15). It is
often concretised as the scale of face to face contacts. The
units of analysis should be the individuals in their social
environments. From a methodological point of view, it is
however difficult to determine the extent of the social unit to
be studied empirically (Gross and Rayner, 1985, p. 62–66).
Of course, the problem is more acute in a low group context
than for strong groups with, by definition, strong (external)
boundaries. Delimitation depends in the end on the research
agenda.22
22 The delimitation of the justification context is not easy, an individual
may justify the same behaviour quite differently for different audiences,
But grid-group cultural theory has been applied at very
different scales. In fact the ideal types of social environment
(networks, isolates, hierarchies and clans) can be regarded
as ideal types of relations between elements in any system:
these relations can be symmetrical or not, fettered or not. As
such they can thus be applied to any system: with elements
much larger or much smaller than human beings. For exam-
ple it could be applied to the individual person as a set of
roles, comparing relations between the social roles fulfilled
by a person to the ideal typical patterns. Or it could be ap-
plied to the international system as a set of states. So we
have to conclude that the typology is applicable to a much
broader range of phenomena than the theory itself.
Michael Thompson (1997b) argues that the cultural types
can be operationalised at any scale, from village to world, no
doubt a challenge for geographers. A complicating effect of
scale is that scale can be different for the three analytical
levels. This happens for example when biases concerning
individual behaviours and patterns of interactions between
individuals are studied at the collective level. In that process
of moving from individual to collective voices, the zoom
effect also occurs: an organisation can be assessed to be
voicing a cultural bias in interactions with other organi-
sations, but when we zoom in and study the organisation
itself as an arena, nuances appear and different biases are
present inside the organisation, probably voiced by different
departments. And when we zoom again on a certain depart-
ment, we’ll find the four biases again, inside that department,
voiced by different persons. This flexibility can be seen as an
asset for the theory, but also as a liability, because a theory
too widely applicable is often felt to have weak predictive
power.
The third issue of prime importance is that of individu-
als as carriers of cultural bias. Mary Douglas has proposed
a rigid interpretation in which cultural bias is a permanent
characteristic of a person: it may change over time (she often
discuss examples referring to changes coupled with transi-
tion from one life phase to the other) but it is hegemonic, it
applies to all domains in life. The opposed viewpoint, voiced
by Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavsky is that indi-
viduals may adhere to different biases in different contexts,
the most obvious example being home and workplace. This
implies a lack of coherence of the individual in her/his daily
routines and it is a major flaw for the utility of the theory.
If we believe the rigid version, it makes sense to investigate
the cultural biases of individuals because it will predict their
attitudes and their behaviours in a wide range of environ-
ments, paradoxically it weakens the explanatory power of
the theory because it still has to explain which environment
determined the hegemonic bias and why. If we believe the
flexible version, cultural bias can only be audited for a par-
ticular context at a particular moment, the cultural bias of
individuals is so volatile that it does not make sense to map
it.
Eero Olli (1995, 1999) has done pioneering work on
investigating the validity of the rigid and the flexible assump-
even referring to different biases, which brings us back to the issue of
coherence.

tions. Using Norwegian survey data, he measures coherence
at the individual level by allowing for adherence to differ-
ent biases at the same time and by investigating rejection23
systematically. It means that he differentiates between ‘ad-
herence to A and indifference to B’ against both ‘adherence
to A and rejection of B’, and ‘adherence to A and B’. He
posits three types of individuals: coherent, sequential and
synthetic. Coherent individuals support one cultural bias and
reject others, sequential individuals support one cultural bias
but are open to the others (they may adhere to another bias
in a different context) and synthetic individuals support two
or more biases at the same time. Unfortunately, this exciting
and highly sophisticated application is bringing the typology
away from the parsimonious model it promises to be.
Much effort has been put in establishing the theory in so-
cial and political sciences and making it testable according to
the conventional standards. One of the major developments
has been the elaboration of survey measures to tap the grid
and group dimensions or directly the cultural types through
regular survey questionnaires, an adventure in which two
contributors of this volume, the late Karl Dake and Gun-
nar Grendstad, have done pioneering work (Dake, 1990,
1991, 1992; Dake and Wildavsky, 1990; Dake and Thomp-
son, 1993; Grendstad, 1990, 1995; Grendstad and Selle,
1997, 1999) the first by developing new survey questions,
the second by re-interpreting available survey results.
Such survey research mainly focuses on risk analysis
and environmental issues (recently: Ellis and F. Thompson,
1997; Coughlin and Lockhart, 1998; Marris et al., 1998 to
name a few). It is assessed to have performed rather poorly
(Boholm, 1996; Milton, 1996; Sjöberg, 1997; Tansey and
O’Riordan, 1999) partly due to weaknesses of the individual
research design,24 partly due to the fundamental inadequacy
of survey questionnaires to investigate cultural biases (as
discussed above) and partly due to the lack of rigour of the
theory and its applications (Boholm 1996).
Grid-group cultural theory has proven much more pow-
erful in anthropological studies such as Mars’s (1982) study
of work fiddles and in many fields of political science. In
policy analysis and public administration, it is a mighty
tool to identify competing arguments and conflicting strate-
gies (see for example the imposing study of waste siting
and justice by Benjamin Davy, 1997), to generate compet-
ing scenarios to assess problems and design policies (such
as Van Asselt and Rotmans, 1996), to explain and predict
failures (such as Hood, 1996, 1998), or to assess learning
capacities of institutions (such as Hendriks, 1994, 1996,
1999). These applications are nevertheless vulnerable to il-
lustrative examples and bird spotting,25 especially when the
theory is used as a heuristic device without trying to explain
why which actors voice which bias. They often lie under
cross fires being criticised by both those who would prefer
23 If adherence is measured through agreement with certain state-
ments, rejection is measured through disagreement with these statements
(as opposed to a neutral stand).
24 It appears to be extremely difficult to design survey questions that
would tap the cultural types satisfactorily.
25 Spotting representatives of each cultural bias, for the sake of spotting
them.
405
to keep culture/preferences/attitudes out of the picture and
those who want to study culture but despise typologies as
(too) reductionist.
Claiming that grid-group cultural theory is useful as a
tool for geographers and other social scientists does not
mean neglecting its pitfalls and problems. They are many,
because both theory and typology are so malleable. Such an
observation invites authors to spell things out and specify
how they use the theory. Inevitably, the lack of space gen-
erally prompts them to present only that inch of grid-group
cultural theory they need for their specific analysis. This may
impede the further and coherent development of the theory,
but it does not make it less challenging.
An introduction to this special issue
Mary Douglas presents a short historical account of the evo-
lution of the theory as a parsimonious model, a view from
inside. She justifies the selection of four cultural types, deals
with the original criticisms, and the responses to them. The
emphasis on personal autonomy in adopting a culture was
meant to meet the criticism that the model was determin-
istic. Much attention was given to change in an attempt to
dynamise a model perceived as static. Finally she discuss
efforts to demonstrate the validity of the theory through
conventional methodologies (surveys).
In a contribution with the late Karl Dake, Michael
Thompson demonstrates the very importance of plural ra-
tionality in the field of consumption and sustainability. By
contrast, most conventional models are based, at least im-
plicitly, on the assumption that there is an average household
with an average consumptive pattern for the whole pop-
ulation. This average behaviour is that affluence prompts
more consumption. Such thinking is summarised as the I-
PAT equation in which population (P), affluence (A) and
technology (T) are multiplied to calculate the environmental
impact (I). Grid-group cultural theory is a tool to generate
alternative consumption styles as there are different ways to
make ends meet. To each of the five types of social beings
and their preferred form of social solidarity, corresponds a
consumption style. To show the existence of these consump-
tion styles, Thompson and Dake discuss the results of a study
they carried out in London, Lancashire and Merseyside in
England. Their combination of survey questionnaires and
anthropological interviews provides data about consumption
patterns and social interactions. Obviously, if such diver-
sity exists, policy makers should take it into account when
they design policies to influence the environmental impact
of human behaviour.
The importance of cultural pluralism is also the topic
of the next article. Frank Hendriks is addressing the post-
industrialisation of the urban environment in the West. He
presents four influential political responses to these changes
in the city labelled liberal productivism, communitarian-
ism, institutional perfectionism and participatory democ-
racy. Hendriks uses grid-group cultural theory to assess
the strength and the weakness of these four approaches.
406
He presents a cultural approach to policy oriented learn-
ing, emphasising the importance of cultural pluralism (the
combination and the cross-fertilisation of the four biases
distinguished by grid-group cultural theory) for so-called
double-loop learning and pleading for institutional settings
that stimulate policy oriented learning.
Far from institutional perfectionism and the post-
industrial city, Paul Richards applies grid-group cultural
theory to make sense of the irrational: the extreme violence
of youth rebels in the civil war in Sierra Leone. His case
study reveals the rationality of the ways these youngsters
organise and the role of violence in it. Characterising newly
independent African states as dominated by two compet-
ing hierarchist biases: (traditional) patrimonial hierarchy and
(modern) bureaucratic hierarchy, Richards shows how both
failed the youth, as young people are socially excluded. He
describes the mechanism of forced recruitment in the RUF
and how captives adopt the enclavist or sectarian thought
style that corresponds to their isolation in the forests of the
Liberia-Sierra Leone border. Finally he discusses sectarian
violence and the need to account for world views in attempts
to conflict resolution, assessing grid-group cultural theory as
an alternative to a-social theory of conciliation.
Dipak Gyawali is addressing the water conflict in the
Ganga Plains and its many proponents. The main dispute
involves the state of Bihar and the Union government in
Delhi, with the neighbouring Indian states (Uttar Pradesh
upstream and downstream West Bengal) and the neighbour-
ing sovereign states of Nepal (upstream of most tributaries
of the Ganga) and Bangladesh (downstream) involved in
diverse water projects (dams) with the Indian government
with severe consequences for Bihar’s water rights. A sec-
ond conflict opposes political active inhabitants of the Ganga
basin to the state policies regarding the embankments of the
Ganga and its main tributaries and the technical agency that
implement them. Gyawali uses grid-group cultural theory
to reveal the cultural bias between the institutional style of
the Bihar government, respectively the grassroots social and
environmental activists. He shows how the hierarchic soli-
darity pervades the concerns of the Bihar government at the
national level but its blindness for the water problems at the
local level, namely the unintended effects of embarkments.
By contrast, grassroots actions are driven by the egalitarian
solidarity, while the obvious failure of the water manage-
ment eases recruitment among the fatalist masses. Because
the Bihar government shares the same solidarity as the Delhi
government, it is easily pacified and it neglects completely
the activist critique of the past and present programs of dam
construction.
Marco Verweij is addressing international relations and
more specifically collaboration between states to protect the
environment. He uses grid-group cultural theory in a case
study of the recent history of collaboration between the
riparian countries of the Rhine. Before 1987, relations be-
tween states were ineffective (even if they did implement
national programs) but since 1987 co-operation is extremely
successful. Unlike established theories in International Re-
lations (both neo-liberalism and neo-realism), grid-group
cultural theory provides a tool to make sense of interna-
tional relations before and after the 1987 watershed because
it distinguishes different ways to organise (which applies to
international relations as to everything else) . This watershed
was prompted by the major fire at the Sandoz warehouse in
Basle in December 1986, a major ‘surprise’ in grid-group
cultural theory terms. As a result, the hierarchical bias with
its preference for binding treaties which made agreement
very difficult to reach was discredited and replaced by a
more individualist way of co-operating internationally, with
informal and non-binding agreements limited to goal setting
and implemented pragmatically at the lowest level possible.
This boosted the restoration of the river basin.
Both Gyawali and Verweij deal with the management
of big rivers, the Ganga and the Rhine, still the two ap-
proaches are very different. The point is of course not that
the first is concerned with the management of water flow
and the second with the reduction of water pollution, but
rather that they use grid-group cultural theory differently.
While Gyawali applies the theory to the ways of organising
water management, Verweij applies it to ways of organising
international relations. They demonstrate how much the re-
searcher’s interest determines his/her way to employ insights
from grid-group cultural theory. It is therefore tempting to
guess what they would have to say about each other’s case.
In Gyawali’s perspective, nothing much changed before and
after 1986 in the ways Rhine pollution is managed (engi-
neering is still the answer and it is working pretty well in
that context). In Verweij’s perspective, relations between In-
dian states, between states and the federal state, respectively
between the Indian Union and its neighbouring states, are
frozen. It seems that the recurrent inundations, the politi-
cal mobilisations in Bihar and the democratisation of Nepali
politics are not ‘surprises’ big enough to trigger changes in
the way of organising inter-states relations in the region.
The last three articles bring us back to Europe.
Gunnar Grendstad offers a political-cultural map of Eu-
rope. He applies grid-group cultural theory to explore dif-
ferences between the public of twelve European countries.
He uses the results of the European Values Survey of 1981
and 1990. Assuming that each respondent can be pinpointed
as the adherent of one of the four cultures distinguished by
grid-group cultural theory, he uses a principal component
analysis to construct the profile of these countries in 1981
and in 1990. To do so he both uses gravity point (the av-
erage score of the country sample on the grid and group
components) and the proportions of adherents to the four
cultures. In addition, he compares grid-group cultural the-
ory to a more established model of characterising public
attitudes: the materialism/post-materialism shift analysed by
Ronald Inglehart during the past three decades. The com-
parison includes a test of the predicting value of individual
grid and group scores for (post-)materialist priorities and of
the predicting values of all three measures for environmental
concern.
Virginie Mamadouh offers another political-cultural map
of Europe. Here national political cultures are conceived as
norms and practices in the political arena, which is differ-

ent from the aggregated pattern of individual preferences
obtained in surveys. Each national political culture is char-
acterised by a dominant ‘conversation’ between the rational-
ities distinguished by grid-group cultural theory. Mamadouh
addresses the question of the origins of differences between
national political cultures. She discusses traditional family
structures as a possible explanation, elaborating on the work
of the French historian and demographer Emmanuel Todd.
Family structures are expected to have eased or hampered
the weight of certain rationalities in the political domain.
The two political-cultural maps differ in many respects.
The two authors use different notions of political cul-
tures. Their application of grid-group cultural theory differs:
Grendstad focuses on the proportion of adherents to the dif-
ferent rationalities in the population whereas Mamadouh is
more interested in the conversation between the different ra-
tionalities in the political arena. Remarkably the clustering
of countries on Grendstad’s Figure 3 fits well the character-
isation of national political cultures in Mamadouh’s article.
There are two clusters: one in the lower right quadrant fea-
turing the country with a moralistic political culture, and
one in the upper left quadrant (with the gravity point at least
once in the fatalist quadrant itself) for other national political
cultures. But the distribution of the population among the
four rationalities (see Figure 2 and appendix in Grendstad’s
article) varies much between countries characterised by the
same family type(s) (see Table 3 in Mamadouh’s article).
The two measures of cultural context substantiate each other,
for example high proportions of fatalists and individualists
are found in countries where the egalitarian nuclear family
is predominant, as expected. Nevertheless certain inconsis-
tencies are revealed (especially regarding the importance of
egalitarianism in Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as
the support for individualism in Germany). This is to be
explained through additional intervening factors such as re-
ligion, industrialisation and literacy and the evolution of the
political arena itself (see Mamadouh’s article), the latter be-
ing also the likely explanation for the changes in the makeup
of the cultural context in public opinion between 1981 and
1990.
Florence Faucher presents the results of a political an-
thropological study of green activism in Great-Britain and
in France, and in Oxford and Aix-en-Provence in partic-
ular (see also Faucher 1999). In this article she addresses
the issue of party organisation and democracy. Her starting
point is the analysis presented in Risk and Culture by Mary
Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982) in which great con-
cern with environmental matters is said to correspond to the
egalitarian cultural bias. Faucher first assesses that French
and British greens are trying to organise political participa-
tion according to these egalitarian preferences. The common
‘green culture’ is characterised by a strong emphasis on po-
litical participation for all, therefore aimed at facilitating
face to face contacts between militants, at preventing the
emergence of political elites and at promoting participative
democracy inside the new party. Nevertheless the two party
organisations are not as similar as one might expect, for
example regarding the ways party officials are elected and
407
how political mandates are held or the atmosphere and the
debating style at party conferences. Faucher argues that this
occurs because the two parties are confronted with differ-
ent political opportunity structures and political cultures in
France and in Great-Britain.
Although Faucher is rather vague about what the dif-
ferences between the two national political cultures really
are, the connection to the previous articles is obvious. If
environmental concern is really connected to egalitarianism,
the green agenda is appealing to a much larger proportion
of the population in Germany, than in both Great-Britain
and France (see Figure 2 and appendix in Grendstad’s ar-
ticle). Regarding party organisation, differences in style
between French and British Greens echo the gap between the
obstructive/clientelistic political culture in France and the
entrepreneurial one in Britain (see Table 3, in Mamadouh).
Surely a full series of such studies (including of course dif-
ferent types of parties) is needed to substantiate the portrait
of the national political cultures sketched by Mamadouh.
To complete this issue, two key publications published
in 1998 have been reviewed. The first book review, by Paul
Richards, deals with a tremendous enterprise, an American
initiative to tackle the issue of the social science of climate
change. The resulting series consists of four volumes edited
by Steve Rayner and Elizabeth Malone under the title Hu-
man Choice and Climate Change. The second book review,
by Robert Hoppe, tackles the issue of public management
and its failures as addressed by Christopher Hood in The Art
of the State.
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the importance of lively ex-
changes during workshops such as the ECPR workshop in
Bern, March 1997, the authors’ meeting of Cultural Theory
as Political Science in Leiden, November 1997, the ESSHC
sessions in Amsterdam, March 1998 and the ECPR work-
shop in Mannheim, March 1999, as well as the discussions
on the electronic gridgroup-list created by Mary Douglas
and run first by Matthias Karmasin and now by James
Tansey. I am particularly grateful for stimulating discussions
and enlightening insights from the many participants to these
exchanges, too many to name individually, but I make an ex-
ception to thank Gunnar Grendstad who was so kind to give
me access to his extended Cultural Theory bibliography. Of
course, they do not necessarily endorse my view of the state
of affairs in grid-group cultural theory. All responsibility
for mistakes, omissions and erroneous conclusions remains
mine.
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