How Ethical Theory Can Improve Practice: Lessons from Abu Ghraib

Author(s): Nancy E. Snow

Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 12, No. 5, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:
How do They Relate? (November 2009), pp. 555-568
Published by: Springer
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Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2009) 12:555-568
DOI 10.1007/sl0677-009-9180-8

How Ethical Theory Can Improve Practice: Lessons

from Abu Ghraib

Nancy E. Snow

Accepted: 3 May 2009 /Published online: 4 June 2009

? Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Abuses atAbu Ghraib prison in Iraq confrontus with thequestion ofhow seemingly
ordinary soldiers could have perpetratedharms against prisoners. In thisessay I argue thata
Stoic approach to thevirtues can provide a bulwark against the social and personal forces that
can lead to abusive behavior. In part one, I discuss Abu Ghraib. In two, I examine social
psychological explanations of how ordinary,apparentlydecent people are able to commit
atrocities. In three,I address a series of questions:why shouldwe turnto ethics forhelp with
theseproblems, andwhy, inparticular, to Stoicism insteadof other ethical theories,such as
utilitarianismorKantianism? Given thepower of situationsin influencingbehavior, is a turnto
characterethicsa viable response toproblems such as thoseatAbu Ghraib? I argue inpart four
thatcharacterformationdrawing on Stoic values can provide soldierswith the innerresilience
to resist the situationalfactors thatpress them tounwarrantedaggression.

?
Abu Ghraib ?Social psychology ?Stoicism Virtue ?
ethics Military ethics
Keywords

1 Abu Ghraib

In spring2004, theAmerican public saw photographsof abuses perpetratedagainst Iraqiprisoners

byU. S. soldiersat theAbu Ghraib prison (Zimbardo,p. 332). The photographs showed a few
enlisted soldiers?Private First Class Lynndie England, Corporal Charles Graner, Jr.,Staff
Sergeant Ivan Frederick , and fourothersof enlisted rank?physically and sexually abusing
Iraqiprisoners.These soldierswere armyreservists, most ofwhom were assigned guard dutyon
thenight shifton TierlA, known as the"hard site."England,who was a file clerk,oftenvisited the
hard site tobe with herboyfriend,Graner. In a now infamousphoto,Englandwas shownholding
a nudemale Iraqiprisoneron a dog leash.Another photo depicted a hooded prisoner, wearing a
smock, standingon a box with outstretchedarms.Wires had been attached tohis penis, fingers,
and toes.He had been told,falsely,thatshouldhe losehis balance, electriccurrentwould be sent
throughthewires. Other photos showedmale prisonersbeing forced to simulatefellatio and
homosexual intercourse; naked prisonersbeing terrorizedwith unmuzzled dogs; and a smiling

.E. Snow
(M)
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, PO Box 1881, Milwaukee, WI 53210-1881, USA
e-mail: Nancy.snow@marquette.edu

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 556 N.E. Snow

Graner andEngland standingbehind a pile ofnakedmale prisoners.Hundreds of thesephotos can

be foundon the internet.
Army investigationsintotheaffairhad been ongoing since fall2003. The Army's initialpublic
responsewas the "bad apple" theory:a few rogue soldiershad violated Army and Pentagon
policy. But the storywas more complex. Findings in reportsabout Abu Ghraib by theU.S.
government?the Ryder, Taguba, Milolashek, Fay/Jones, and Schlesinger reports?and by
internationalagencies such as Human RightsWatch (HRW) and theIntemationalCommittee of
theRed Cross (ICRC), indicatethatabuses cannotbe explainedby the"bad apple" theory.
Testimony in theTaguba Report makes clear thatArmy intelligenceofficers,CIA agents,
private contractors and other government agencies requested thatMilitary Police (MP)
guards "set physical andmental conditions forfavorable interrogationofwitnesses" (quoted
inZimbardo, p. 383). Exactly which conditions laywithin thebounds of acceptability and
which lay beyond was unclear. The Taguba Report faultshigher and mid-level command
for failures of leadership, including the failures to enforce standards and accountability, to
supervise adequately, and to enforce theGeneva Convention's guidelines (see Zimbardo,
pp. 389-390). Other reports corroborateand amplify these findings,pinning responsibility
to very high levels in theU.S. government. In fact, the ICRC warned theU.S. Department
ofDefense about tortureand abuse atAbu Ghraib inMay and July,2003 and inFebruary,
2004. These concernswere ignored, abuses worsened, and inspections by the ICRC were
curtailed (see Zimbardo, p. 407; Gourevitch andMorris 2008, p. 88).
Abu Ghraib was closed as of August 15, 2006 (Zimbardo, p. 334). Eleven enlisted
soldiers were convicted of crimes in connection with abuses committed there (see
Gourevitch and Morris 2008, pp. 268-269). Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Jordan, the
directorof the interrogationcenter,was theonly officerto go on trial.Jordan'sbackground
was in civil affairs.
When put in charge of interrogation,he had no trainingor experience in
that area (see Gourevitch andMorris 2008, p. 58). He was acquitted of other charges but
reprimanded for disobeying a general's order not to talk to others about investigations into
the abuse. The reprimandwas later liftedand removedfrom his record (see Gourevitch and
Morris 2008, pp. 268-270). The prison commander, Brigadier General JanisKarpinski,
who had seldom visited Tier 1A, faced administrativeaction andwas demoted from therank
of general, but was not criminally charged (Time.com, August 28, 2007).

2 Explanations from Social Psychology

How could theperpetratorsdo it? Social psychologists contend thatdecent people who are
not antecedentlydisposed to harm others can come to commit evil acts in certainkinds of
circumstances. Psychologist Ervin Staub, a Holocaust survivor, argues that difficult life
conditions and predisposing cultural tendencies can lead people to commit atrocities.
Difficult lifeconditions,he maintains, can threatenthephysical as well as thepsychological
self. Staub 1989 (p. 15) contends thatpowerful self-protectivemotives arisewhen people
Why rum to violence tomeet needs for self-protection?In the
are faced with such threats.
difficultlife circumstances thatcan activate physical and psychological needs thatpress for
satisfaction,Staub (1989, pp. 18-20; 51-56) believes the turn to violence ismade more
likely by predisposing cultural tendencies. Among these tendencies are the tendency to
aggression, an authoritarian culture, and the presence of scapegoats blamed for societal
problems.
How does thishelp us understandAbu Ghraib? Some of Staub's remarks apply to the
U.S. in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terroristattacks. Many Americans felt

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How ethical theory can improve practice: lessons from Abu Ghraib 557

physically unsafe and psychologically vulnerable.Many also feltdiminished self-esteem,as

the attacks had caught the U.S. "off guard," and shown the nation to be militarily
unprepared. The ideological nature of the attacks inviteda reassertion of traditionalvalues
and patriotism, and a devaluation of persons and values associated with Islam or Islamic
fundamentalism. It is not implausible to think thatAmerican troops imbibed the general
climate of physical and psychological vulnerability that characterizedU.S. culture in the
wake of 9/11. In such a climate of physical threatand psychological diminution, the "global
war on terror"became a military and ideological response that satisfied deep-seated
psychological needs to feel safe, in control of circumstances, ideologically righteous, and
dominant.
Add to thisgeneral cultural context the specific conditions atAbu Ghraib. Soldiers were
forced to work long shifts in dangerous conditions. The prisoner-to-guard ratio was
approximately 75:1 (see Gourevitch andMorris 2008, p. 89). Weapons were smuggled to
prisoners by Iraqi guards, and violence was frequent (see Zimbardo, p. 351). Located in a
combat zone, the prison was regularly subject tomortar and sniper fire (see Zimbardo,
pp. 334-335). Sanitary conditionswere appalling; food and housing, inadequate; command
structures,absent or lacking (see Zimbardo, p. 347). MPs were led to believe thatviolence
against prisonerswas necessary in order to get "actionable" intelligence, and distinctions
between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" violence were blurred.
Given thismilieu, it is not implausible to think that guards resorted to violence
against prisoners as a way to relieve the pressure of deep-seated, unmet needs for
physical safety and self-esteem. The guards were under constant physical threat and
psychological strain, and Iraqi prisoners were seen as possible terroristswho were
threateningAmerican values and traditions.Violent and dehumanizing treatmentof
prisoners could have been ways inwhich guards could see themselves as reasserting
American authority and assuaging damaged self-esteem.
A remarkfrom one of the perpetrators,Sergeant Javal Davis, illustratesthese themes.
His rage at Iraqi prisoners expresses fear,frustration,and theurge to retaliate in the face of
ongoing attacks:
Iwanted tohurthim, thegentlemanwho hit thefemaleMP in the facewith thebrick.
Iwanted to hurthim really bad, because I felt thathe deserved it. I felt that theyall
deserved it. So I stepped on theguy's finger. I stepped on the guy's toe . . .That's
what the atmospherewas like. Itwas, They blew up our buildings, they'rekilling us
out there,you know, kick the crap out of them (quoted inGourevitch andMorris
2008, p. 190).
As this comment reveals, Iraqis prisoners, at themercy of the guards, were easily
scapegoated. The tendency to aggression and an authoritarianculturewere also likely at
Abu Ghraib. The military trainspeople to engage in aggression. Though thataggression is
supposed to be controlled, thereare numerous cases inwhich itgets out of hand under the
pressures ofwar. Moreover, military culture is paradigmatically authoritarian.Those lower
in the chain of command customarily look to those higher tomaintain order, set the tone,
and issue specific commands.
Staub offersa picture of how difficult life conditions can activate deep-seated physical
and psychological needs for safety, security,and self-esteem.These needs thenpress for
satisfaction. Predisposing cultural tendenciesmake itmore likely thatpeople will seek
satisfaction throughviolence. All of these factorswere probably operative atAbu Ghraib.
Yet even under the conditions Staub describes, individualsmight seek to satisfyunmet
needs through non-violent means.

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558 N.E. Snow

Albert Bandura's work supplements thispicture.Aggressive tendencies thatcould result

in violence are normally curbed by internalized self-sanctions, such as the fear of
punishment,moral principles, codes prohibitingviolence, and empathy for others.Bandura
(1998, p. 162; pp. 180-181; 2004, p. 123) examines "mechanisms of moral disengage
ment"?factors thatdisengage or blunt theforce of the internalizedself-sanctionsthatmight
otherwise curtail aggression. These mechanisms focus on how reprehensible conduct,
detrimentaleffects,and victims are perceived and portrayed in theminds of perpetrators.
According to Bandura (1998, p. 162), perpetratorsuse moral justification, or more
precisely, moral rationalization, advantageous comparison, and euphemistic labeling to
reinterpretdestructive conduct. Moral rationalization is used to make destructive acts
personally and morally acceptable by portraying them as servingmoral purposes (see
Bandura 1998, p.163).1 Perpetrators also use advantageous comparisons in their
conceptualizations of reprehensible acts, comparing present destructive acts to past
destructive acts thatwere "justified" (see Bandura 1998, p. 171). The euphemistic labeling
of acts is a device of reinterpretation:"terrorists"are called "freedom fighters;" "torture,"
termed "abuse;" "threats," and "mtimidation," as "softening up"
"beatings," euphemized
(see Bandura 1998, pp. 169-170). Minimizing, ignoring,ormisconstruing the consequen
ces are other rationalizing devices thatenable perpetratorstomisrepresent and thus,more
easily perform,evil acts (see Bandura 1998, p. 162). Each of thesemechanisms enables the
perpetrator to reinterprether actions. The reinterpretationassuages her conscience, and
blunts the psychological force of self-sanctions thatmight otherwise block the urge to
aggression.
The displacement and diffusionof responsibilityare also mechanisms of disengagement
(see Bandura 1998, pp. 173-176). The displacement or shunting of responsibility onto
another is illustratedby the familiarrefrain,"I was just following orders." The diffusionof
responsibility occurs when different agents are responsible for separate aspects of a
complex policy or plan which results in an evil act. No one person seems to have full
responsibilityfor theplan or the resultingacts (see Bandura 1998, p. 176).
Victim-centeredmechanisms ofmoral disengagement, such as dehumanization, also play
roles in enabling perpetratorsto cause harm.Dehumanized victims are no longerviewed as
persons, but as subhuman "towel-heads," and so on (see Bandura
"gooks," "savages,"
1998, pp. 180-181). Forcing prisoners towear uniforms or be naked and placing hoods
over theirfaces and eyes facilitatesdehumanization by strippingprisoners of theirunique
identities, rendering them vulnerable, preventing eye contact, and masking facial
expressions of pain towhich perpetratorsmight respondwith compassion or empathy.
In addition,Bandura (1998, p. 181) notes thatunder certain conditions, the institutional
exercise of power changes power holders in ways thatmake dehumanization easier,
especially in the absence of safeguards.He also writes thatattributingblame tovictims can
serve self-exonerative ". . . one's own violent conduct can be viewed as
purposes:
compelled by forcibleprovocation" (Bandura 1998, p. 184).Witness Sergeant JavalDavis's
comment, quoted earlier, thatthevictim of his abuse "deserved it" because of theviolence
he and his Iraqi comrades had perpetrated.
Several more points fromsocial psychology will round out our explanation. The firstis
that individualswho join specifickinds of organizations tend to be self-selected (see Staub
1989, pp. 69-72). If so, thosewho self-selectfor themilitary,which requires a willingness

1
Bandura (1998, pp. 163ff) uses the term 'justification' to describe a perpetrator's portrayal of destructive
acts as serving moral purposes. However, what Bandura describes seems closer towhat philosophers would
call 'rationalization' than towhat theywould call 'justification.'

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How ethical theory can improve practice: lessons from Abu Ghraib 559

to performacts of violence, could have propensities to aggression. SergeantDavis is a case

in point. His aggression came out in gratuitous acts of violence, such as punching new
prisoners in the kidneys while in-processing them (see Gourevitch and Morris 2008,
p. 101-105).
Second, Bandura (1998, pp. 185-186) remarks thatmoral disengagement is a gradual
process that can involve self-deception.To explain how people gradually become able to
commit atrocities, Staub (1989, p. 80) contends thatperpetrators learn by doing. Regular
participation in harm-causing can render it a routine part of one's life. The effects of
routinization can be inferredfrom a comment by Sabrina Harman: "In the beginning . . .
you see somebody naked, and you see underwear on theirhead, and you're like,Oh, that's
prettybad?I can't believe I just saw that. . . .you come back thenext day, and you see
somethingworse. Well, it seems like the day beforewasn't so bad" (quoted inGourevitch
andMorris 2008, p. 106). Not onlywere theharms becoming a routinepart of her life,but,
as theywere becoming mundane, she losther initial sense of how bad they reallywere.
A thirdpoint is that there is a "magnitude gap" between a victim's and a perpetrator's
perception of the same act: themagnitude of a harmmight be much less in theperpetrator's
eyes than in the victim's (see Baumeister and Campbell, 1999, p. 211). Differences in
perspective and perceptions of themagnitude of harm can be discerned in Harman's
recollection of an incidentwhose photographic image is now famous. The prisoner the
guards called "Gilligan" was theman who was hooded, drapedwith a poncho, and stood on
a box with electricwires fastened to his fingers,toes, and penis. Harman recalls:

I knew he wouldn't be electrocuted ... So it really didn't botherme. Imean, itwas

justwords. There was reallyno action in it. Itwould have been meaner if therereally
was electricitycoming out, and he really could be electrocuted.No physical harmwas
ever done to him (quoted inGourevitch andMorris 2008, p. 177).

To Harman, who knew thewires weren't "live," the episode was just a game?she
minimized the harms to the prisoner. But he could not have known that thewires were
disconnected, nor, if it reallywere a "game," would he have been able to "quit."
Fourth, opponent-process theory supplements the foregoing observations by explaining
how perpetrators come to take pleasure in harmful acts (see Baumeister and Campbell
1999, pp. 213-214). Novice perpetratorsoften experience aversion, disgust, or physical
illness when harming others. Opponent-process theorists postulate that these negative
reactions are counteractedby opponent processes, which bring theperpetratorsback to their
pre-aversion state.A powerful opponent process thatwould counteract initialaversion, they
claim, is pleasure. The pleasure in committingevil acts could be weak at first,but would
eventually grow strongerwith repeated performance. Baumeister and Campbell (1999,
p. 214) believe thatopponent process theoryexplains thehabit-formingor pseudo-addictive
quality of harmdoing described by some perpetrators.
The pseudo-addictive quality of harmdoing is suggested by a comment from MI
interrogator Roman Krol. Krol was photographed participating in an incident inwhich
naked Iraqi prisoners were handcuffed to each other and forced to pile into a human
. . .Then I couldn't make
pyramid. Krol is quoted as saying, "I thought I should leave
myself leave ... I wasn't really having fun" (quoted in Gourevitch and Morris 2008,
p. 154). Krol's ambivalence is palpable. Attracted and repulsed at the same time,he was too
mesmerized to tearhimself away, and participatedwith otherswho threwa "Nerf' football
at the Iraqis.
Lastly, Gourevitch and Morris write (2008, p. 157): "At times some of them [the
perpetrators]may have found satisfaction,even pleasure, in theirpower to treatmen as

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560 N.E. Snow

sacks ofmeat, but thatpower came from being in control,not from losing it."Abusers
deliberately orchestrated the humiliations of prisoners, therebydemonstrating their total
control over them.Perhaps humiliating theirchargeswas a way inwhich they sought and
control over a chaotic situation?a war, a tour of duty, an assigned task?that had,
gained
for them,gone badly awry.
To summarize,we now have an explanation of how ordinarypeople can come to commit
evil acts: (1) difficultlife conditions activate deep-seated physical and psychological needs,
includingneeds for safetyand self-esteem,thatpress for satisfaction;(2) cultural tendencies
predispose individuals to satisfy these needs throughviolence; (3) mechanisms ofmoral
disengagement function to blunt the force of internal self-sanctions thatmight otherwise
curb aggressive tendencies; these mechanisms also help to form the perspectives of
perpetrators,which differfrom those of victims; (4) novices who begin to commit evil acts
learn by doing, and, through the repeated performance of evil actions, come to see
a
harmdoing as routine and to takepleasure in it; and (5) harmdoing can be way of taking
control of an environment that is otherwise largelyout of the control of theperpetrators.

3Why Ethics? Why Stoicism?

At this point, several questions might arise. First, why ethics as a possible preventive
measure? Second, why Stoic ethics, and not some other ethical theory?Finally, given the
power of situational influences in affectingbehavior, why focus on an ethic of character
formation,a demanding and, for those impressedby the recent situationistcritique of virtue
ethics, psychologically untenable approach? Let us address each question.
First, why should ethics, and not something else, such as some form of behavior
management trainingfrom psychology, be used to address the kinds of problems that
surfaced at Abu Ghraib? If ethics is used as a possible preventivemeasure, does doing so
reduce ethical theoryto self-help training?The demand for ethics education stemsfrom the
nature of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. These abuses were not just failures of military
discipline wrought by the effects of situational forces on soldiers' inner resiliency.They
were also formsof harm. The fact thatthe abuses were formsof harm places the incidentsat
Abu Ghraib squarely into the ambit of ethics. To prevent such abuses from occurring in the
future,ethics should include but not reduce to self-help training.The self-help that ethics
provides helps soldiers to do themorally right thing.
Second, why rum to Stoic ethics forguidance, instead of to some other ethical theory,
such as utilitarianismorKantianism? Let us disqualify at theoutset utilitarianismfrom the
listof possible contenders.Here iswhy. Torturehas been used on suspected terroristsin the
name ofmaximizing utility?for example, tortureused as a means of getting informationto
prevent furtherattacks.The tortureof one or a few people has been claimed tobe necessary
to prevent harm tomany others. Proponents of utilitarianism could counter that this is a
misapplication of their ethical theory.They might be right. However, the point is that
some
encouraging utilitarianismwould risk exacerbating a mentality alreadymanifested by
people engaged in the "war on terror"?one that claims that"the ends justify themeans."
Because of this, utilitarianismwould lend itself to abuse in precisely those kinds of
situations inwhich ethical safeguards are most needed, and should, for this reason, be
strickenfrom the list of viable ethical alternatives for themilitary.
Would Kantianism be subject to similarmisuse? After all, one can imaginemilitary
personnel being told that torturingprisoners suspected of being terroristsis part of "doing
one's duty."Kantian ethicshas built-in safeguards against this,however. To "do one's duty"

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How ethical theory can improve practice: lessons from Abu Ghraib 561

in theKantian sense, one must act from respect for themoral law, and respect for the
rational humanity of all persons. Respect prohibits torturingprisoners. Such built-in
safeguards against human rights abuses are not obviously part of utilitarian theory.So
Kantianism survives a bit longer thanutilitarianismon our list of alternatives to Stoicism.
Confining ourselves to the traditionof western philosophical ethics,we are leftwith
Kantian ethics and Aristotelianism as possible alternatives to Stoicism.2 Kantian ethics
contains elements thatappeal to themilitarymentality: it is a law- and rule-orientedethic, it
highlights doing one's duty,and it stresses theneed forwill power to overcome temptations
thatpull one away from duty.Aristotelianism, like Stoicism, appeals to characterformation,
and to the power of entrenchedvirtues thathelp one to navigate the uncertainties of life.
Why prefer Stoicism to these two options?
There are threereasons forpreferringStoicism. First, it contains all of the elements that
mightmake its competitorsappealing to themilitarymind. Like Aristotelianism, Stoicism is
an ethic of character. Like Kantianism, its conceptualization includes a law-governed
universe, a concern with duty, and the need forwill power in the face of temptation.
Second, thevirtues and values ithighlights, such as honor, courage, strength,and resilience,
cohere well with traditionalmilitary values and culture. Finally, theworldview of Stoic
cosmopolitanism iswell suited to guide military personnel in a globalized world.
First, consider thatStoicism contains all of the appealing aspects of its competitors. It
focuses on character,as does Aristotelianism, and stresseswill power and dutywithin a
law-governed universe, as does Kantianism. Yet Stoicism interpretsand contextualizes
these features inways thatrenders itmore congenial tomilitary needs. Stoic ethics is part of
a largerworldview according towhich the universe is governed by divine law,which is
beyond the control of human agents. People sufferthe vicissitudes of fate?death, illness,
loss of loved ones, of property,etc. Strengtheningone's characterby cultivating thevirtues
of courage, resiliency, fortitude,and honor provides one with a measure of protection
against losses caused by forces beyond one's control.That is, thevirtues are suited tobuffer
the individual against death and loss; theyhelp her to behave honorably andmaintain her
moral integrityin difficultcircumstances.Having the Stoic virtues, on thisview, is the only
form of happiness?our character is the only thingwe can control.Unlike theAristotelian
virtues,which suit one for civic lifewithin the polis, the Stoic virtues suit one to be a
citizen of the largercosmos. The idea thatwe are all citizens of the cosmos is thenotion of
Stoic cosmopolitanism.As I arguemore fullyinpart four,this idea is a valuable perspective
for themilitary, for itchallenges them tobroaden theirview beyond themilitary community
as well as beyond allegiance to theirnation. It invitesmilitary personnel to see all humans
as part of a single community?as denizens of a shared universewho deserve our respect.
The Stoic view of the role of virtue is thusboth broader and grimmer than theAristotelian
outlook?Stoic virtue extends beyond the polis and helps to insulate us against loss. For
both of these reasons, it is better suited to the challenges faced by themilitary,who must
deal with diverse groups of people and facewartime losses.
Stoicism is preferable toAristotelianism, then,because it interpretsand contextualizes
virtue in a way that ismore congenial to the needs of themilitary. It is preferable to

2
I leave aside both religious ethics and non-western ethical theories. Due to the separation of church and
state in theUnited States, itwould be problematic for the U. S. military to advocate religious ethics. In
addition, given the plurality of religious beliefs that soldiers might have, themilitary's advocacy of values
from any one religious tradition could be deeply alienating and unhelpful to soldiers of other faiths. I also
believe the adoption of non-western ethics would be problematic, since those traditions, though valuable, are
sometimes at odds with military aims and values (e.g., Gandhian non-violence and Buddhism's emphasis on
and are sometimes difficult forwesterners to understand and absorb.
compassion)

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562 N.E. Snow

Kantianism for similar reasons. Here Stoicism's explanatory clarity and conceptual
accessibility give it an edge. When theKantian is asked, "Why do one's duty?," she
replies, "Because themoral law requires it." Further answer would require an elaboration
of a complex metaphysics and epistemology.When the Stoic is asked, "Why do one's
duty?," shemaintains, "Because doing one's duty is an exercise of virtue, and the best
way tomaintain personal and moral integrityin the face of uncertainty and loss." Both
answers can be elaborated more fully.But, unlike theKantian line of response, the Stoic
answer ismore comprehensible and resonatesmore fullywith theneeds and experience of
themilitary.
These observations lead us to the second reason for preferring Stoic ethics to its
competitors: it coheres well with traditionalmilitary values and culture. Sherman (2005)
offers an extensive explanation of how Stoicism meshes with traditionalmilitary values
such as courage, honor, fortitude,and obedience, and of how Stoic perspectives on
character,virtue, emotion, and conduct can informand enhance military education and
culture.Without repeating Sherman's excellent account, I hope here to have provided
enough background about Stoicism to convince readers that ithas promise for themilitary.
However, two important caveats are necessary.

First, a few lectures on any kind of ethical theorywould be inadequate to have a

significanteffectonmilitary life.To have an impact,Stoic values should be well integrated
intomilitary training.Military education is not value-neutral; it seeks to inculcate values
such as discipline, obedience, courage, honor, and patriotismwith an eye to developing an
efficientsoldiery and helping soldiers to survive inwartime. Stoic psychology and ethics
can enhance these traditionalmilitary aims. The fact that Stoicism coheres with military
values suggests that it can be deeply and smoothly integrated into traditionalmilitary
education at numerous points in military curricula and training regimes.What I am
advocating here, then, is not just thatmilitary education "throw in" a few lectureson Stoic
ethics. Instead, I am encouraging a thoroughgoing integration,at appropriate points, of
Stoic values and perspectives throughoutthe entire course ofmilitary education. The fact
thatStoicism meshes well with traditionalmilitary values and culturegives it an advantage
over its competitors in this regard.
The second caveat is thateducation in Stoicism should be thorough,yet realistic. I do
not require that soldiers become Stoic sages. Genuinely absorbing Stoic values and the
Stoic perspective can, I believe, help soldiers in difficult circumstances. All that can
reasonably be required of a soldier is that she should do the best she can. As I argue in
section four, Stoicism can provide soldiers with inner resources and ethical guidance.
Sagehood is not required in order to gain these benefits.
Before concluding part three,one furtherchallengemust be addressed. Impressedwith
studies in social psychology thatattest to thepower of situations in influencingbehavior,
some philosophers have argued against the viability of traditionalvirtues and character
ethics as guides to behavior (see Harman 1998, 2002, 2003; Doris 1998, 2002; Merritt
2000). Though they specifically criticizeAristotelian virtue ethics, they are skeptical about
the action-guiding force ofwhat they call 'global' or 'robust' traits.These are traitsthatare
manifested in cross-situationallyconsistentbehavior, that is, behavior that is consistent or
regular across a variety of differenttypes of situations.According to theoriesof virtue that
endorse the notion of virtues as global traits,we expect honest people, for example, to
behave honestly in a variety of types of situations?when making change for customers,
when managing others' bank accounts, when reporting income taxes,when testifyingin
court, in everyday conversation, and so on. Similar comments apply to the other virtues.
Situationists argue thatsocial psychological evidence shows thatbehaviormanifesting traits

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How ethical theory can improve practice: lessons from Abu Ghraib 563

is not consistent across a variety of situation-types,and thus,does not underwritebelief in

thewidespread existence of global traits.
Situationist philosophers often draw on thework of Philip Zimbardo to support their
claims. Zimbardo was the architect of the Stanford Prison Experiment (http://www.
prisonexp.org). In this experiment, conducted in 1971, college studentswere recruited to
simulate a prison, playing the roles of guards and prisoners, with Zimbardo as
superintendant(Zimbardo, p. xv). The elaborate simulationwas meant to testhow students
would react?how thoroughlywould the students take on their respective roles, towhat
extentwould the simulated situation influence theirbehavior? The experiment,originally
scheduled for 2 weeks, had to be discontinued aftera few days when the "guards" became
too abusive toward the "prisoners" (Haney and Zimbardo 1998, p. 709). Zimbardo (2007)
concludes from the experiment that situationspowerfully influencebehavior?far more so
than traits?and uses the Stanford Prison Experiment as a model for understanding the
actions of the perpetratorsatAbu Ghraib. If situationistsare correct, it is futile to look to
traditionalcharacter ethics to counter the effectsof situations on soldiers inwartime.
Some philosophers argue against situationism's dismissal of global traits and virtue
ethics (see, e.g., Kupperman 2001; Sreenivasan 2002; Miller 2003; Kamtekar 2004; Sabini
and Silver 2005; Webber, 2006a, b, 2007; Wielenberg 2006). I, too, join thedebate in Snow
(forthcoming), where I admit that social psychological studies amply attest to the influence
of situations on behavior, but argue that recentwork in social-cognitive psychology,
especially the work of Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, provides the basis for a
conception of traitsthat are potentially global (see, e.g., Shoda et al. 1994;Mischel and
Shoda 1995; Shoda and Mischel 1996; Mischel 1999). So my view is that empirical
psychology does provide us with a conception of traitsthatcan be virtues in the traditional
sense. But if so, it is not misguided to look to character ethics to provide possible
preventivemeasures for the kinds of abuses perpetratedatAbu Ghraib. Indeed, Zimbardo
(2007) is useful in identifyingthe situational pressures soldiers were under. Identifying
problematic situationalpressures can thenpoint theway to thekind of characterformation
thatwould be helpful in combating them.

4 Toward Prevention: A View from the Stoics

What do we want in the characterof a soldier?Certainlywe want soldiers not to perpetrate

abuses and to be able towithstand the physical and psychological challenges of warfare.
More ambitiously, I shall advocate the character ideal of themorally conscientious soldier.
This soldierwould: (1) obey only legitimateorders; (2) maintain professional discipline;
and (3) do themorally right thing for the right reasons. The personal qualities, such as
practical wisdom and courage, needed for (3) also underpin (1) and (2). These and other
virtues are found in the character ideal advanced by the Stoics. To flesh out this ideal,we
need to understand theStoic theoryof value. I use thephrase 'Stoic theoryof value' to refer
to the fact that the Stoics identifyvarious ways or modes of valuing differentkinds of
things.Their theoryof value is part of their largervision of the cosmos and of humans'
place in it.
Consider firstthe Stoic theoryof value. For the Stoics, both virtue and flourishing are
valued as ends in themselves. Being virtuous is both necessary and sufficient for
flourishing.Virtue is one's happiness; one's truegood cannot be affectedby good or bad
or fortuneor other vicissitudes of life.As Seneca (p. 212) terselyputs it, ". . . ifhis [a
person's] virtue iswholly uncorrupted and maintains its bearings, thenvirtue is his sole

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564 N.E. Snow

good and it is impossible for any accident tomake itotherwise."Moreover, the outcomes of
virtuous activitydo notmatter, provided thatone's actions reflectthe appropriate character
state and commitment.
The Stoics believe our valuing of virtue as an end in itself is but one mode inwhich
value is expressed. Another mode is found in theirconception of 'preferredindiff?rents.'
Preferred indiff?rentsare goods such as health, fit sensory and mental faculties,wealth in
due measure, freedom,property in due measure, friends,and family (see Sherman, p. 32;
Reydams-Schils 2005, pp. 59-62). Whereas virtue is valued for its own sake; preferred
indiff?rents,as Sherman (p. 32) says, are ". . . somethingwe value as having natural
advantage, thoughwe do not seek or choose it as part of happiness."
The Stoic theoryof value is interwovenwith theirview of theperson and her place in
the cosmos. Their ideas are given a lucid interpretationinReydams-Schils's (2005, pp. 15
22) multifaceted notion of the Stoic "self as mediator." The Stoic selfmediates between her
virtuous character states,which she can control, and the outcomes of her virtuous actions,
the success ofwhich depends on forces outside of her power. She also mediates between
appropriate attachment to preferred indiff?rents, and the recognition that they can, at any
time, be taken from her.Her success atmediation depends upon her appropriate judgments
of the value of virtue and of the preferred indiff?rentsin her life.Appropriate value
judgments rely, in turn,on a correctunderstanding of thenature of the cosmos and of the
place of human beings in it.Appropriate attachment is an intermediate state between
complete detachment frompreferred indiff?rents and attachment in excess. This seems tobe
the view of the Stoic Seneca, who held that one could be appropriately attached to some
preferred indiff?rents, such as friends and family, and could mourn their loss with an
appropriate measure of He writes: ". . . for some measure [of grieving] nature
grief.
demands of us; more [is contracted] throughvanity" (quoted in Reydams-Schils 2005,
p. 136).
Yet, the Stoics deemed inappropriateattachmenta formof sickness.Here isEpictetus on
inappropriate attachment to the preferred indifferentof money (quoted in Graver 2007,
p. 165):
When once you have desiredmoney, if there is an application of reason,which will
lead you to recognize the evil, thedesire stops and our directive facultygoverns as at
the start,but ifyou do not apply anything in theway of therapy,itno longer returns
to the same [condition], but when it is again stimulated by the corresponding
. . . [i]f this keeps
impression it is kindled into desire more quickly than before.
happening ... the infirmity gives stabilityto greed.
The very desire formoney, which Epictetus thinks is an mfirmity,signals thatone has
made a mistaken value judgment. If the desire is satisfied, it is more readily stimulated
again when the appropriate conditions arise.Repeated desire satisfactionmakes the desire
more readily activatable and entrenches the"sickness" as part of one's character in theform
of greed. The antidote is cognitive therapy?the mind's judgmentmust interveneto curb
inappropriatedesire when it is initiallyfelt. In otherwords, one's judgment is capable of
controllingone's desires, and of regulatingappropriatelyone's attachmentsto theobjects of
desire.
The notion of Stoic cosmopolitanism?the idea thatall persons are citizens of a shared
universe?includes the idea that appropriate attachment to others should be extended
outward, to those not personally close to one. The Roman Stoic Hierocles offerspractical
advice for how to achieve appropriate attachment to all persons. He uses the image of
persons as standing in a series of concentric circles, and claims (Long and Sedley 1987,

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How ethical theory can improve practice: lessons from Abu Ghraib 565

p. 349): ". ., [i]t is the task of a well temperedman, in his proper treatmentof each group,
to draw the circles togethersomehow towards the centre,and tokeep zealously transferring
thosefrom the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones . . .The right pointwill be reached
if, throughour own initiative, we reduce thedistance of the relationshipwith each person."
Sherman (pp. 170-171) contends thatHierocles's point is similar to one made byMarcus
Aurelius?that the capacity for respect is enlivened through imagination and empathy.
Marcus (1997, pp. 61-62) writes: "Suppose that you have detached yourself from the
natural unity?for you were made by nature a part, but now you have cut yourself off?yet
here there is thisbeautiful provision, that it is inyour power to unite yourself again."
How would Stoic character prescriptions contribute to the ideal of the morally
conscientious soldier? Consider feature (3). Soldiers who took on the role of the self as
mediator would be inclined to do themorally right thing for theright reason,would use
judgment in deciding and acting, andwould see virtuous endeavor as constitutiveof their
happiness, whether the ends of virtuous actionwere obtained or not. Of course, this does
not entail that soldierswould be immune to disappointment should theirvirtuous actions
fall short of intended outcomes. Applying Stoic advice would, however, give them the
wherewithal to realize that outcomes often lie beyond our control, and to temper their
emotional responses in lightof thisknowledge.
Instructive here is the story of Sergeant Andrew Stoltzman (see Gourevitch and
Morris 2008, pp. 63-64). A member of anMI unit that sufferedtheheaviest casualties in
a mortar attack atAbu Ghraib thenight of September 17, 2003, he was notwith his unit,
but with a detachment that remained behind. Tormented by "survivor guilt," he asked
himself: ". . .you always wonder, why wasn't itme? You always have this in theback of
your mind, Who was in charge thatreally decided? I believe inGod, and I have a strong
relationshipwith Jesus, and that's the only thing thatkeeps me from going insane about
it?that itwas out ofmy control, and itwas just notmy time" (quoted inGourevitch and
Morris 2008, p. 64). The Stoics would have approved of Stoltzman's realization thatsome
outcomes were beyond his control, and, like him, would regard that recognition as a
source of solace.
Stoicism would prescribe action in accordance with feature (2) of the soldierly ideal, the
maintenance of professional discipline. Empathy can help with this.Empathy surfaces in
Specialist JeremySivits' recollection of his feelingsupon witnessing the "human pyramid"
incident inwhich naked Iraqi soldierswere forced topile on top of each other: "To see them
start the pyramid, itwas a little funny.But then it clicked. It's like,How would I feel?"
(quoted inGourevitch andMorris 2008, p. 195). Unfortunately,Sivits did not even leave
the scene,much less to challenge or reportthe ringleaders.However, his recollection shows
thateven atAbu Ghraib, empathetic responseswere possible. To be sure, a few lectureson
Stoic ethicswould likelynot have been enough to fortifySivits' natural human reaction.
Yet a thorough integrationof Stoic values with military education and trainingregimes
could have made a difference?by legitimizingSivits' natural empathy and linking itwith
themaintenance of appropriatemilitary discipline.
What would the Stoics have said about feature (1), obeying only legitimateorders?The
Stoics would have condemned not only the excesses of theMPs, but also the insinuated
commands fromMI to the guards to "soften up" prisoners for interrogation. What would
the Stoics have advised theMis and MPs to do? They would have advised themnot to
participate in abuses, to seek guidelines for treatmentof prisoners, to report and protest
abuses, and to go as high up the command chain as needed to get theabuses stopped. This
would not have been easy, given leadership failures at Abu Ghraib and the physical and
psychological factors stresses on soldiers.

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566 N.E. Snow

But itwas not impossible. Someone did reportthe abuses atAbu Ghrait)?Joe Darby, an
Army Reservist at thebottom of themilitary hierarchy (see Zimbardo, pp. 330-331). Other
individuals have acted heroically in difficult circumstances, for example, Chief Warrant
OfficerHugh Thompson, Jr.,a helicopter pilot flying at the scene of theMy Lai massacre in
Vietnam, radioed formore helicopters and stood between wounded Vietnamese civilians
and American soldiers until thewounded were safely evacuated (see Zimbardo, pp. 474
475). Stoic idealswould bolster thepersonal qualities needed to judge situations correctly
and actmorally, even if thatmeant challenging or disobeying orders.
How would the Stoic character ideal safeguard soldiers against committingabuses? The
firstpitfall to guard against is threatsto physical and psychological security.How should
soldiers handle deep-seated physical needs for safety and psychological needs for self
esteem that press for satisfaction? The Stoics regard physical safety as a preferred
indifferent?a good over which we ultimately lack control. Those who choose military
service know thephysical risks ofwar, but the dangers are fearsome. Proper assessment of
the value of physical safety, the Stoics would maintain, should offset or allay fears of
danger. Yet this rings hollow. Here is where the Stoic notion of virtue as inner
psychological strengthcomes intoplay.
Virtuous character provides us with innerpsychological strength?an "inner citadel"
(Hadot 1998). A soldier's inner strength would not renderher completely immune to fears
of physical danger, nor to threats to psychological self-esteem,but itwould provide an
innercore of resiliency?a reserve of strengthonwhich to draw to overcome fear and guard
against physically and psychologically debilitating forces. The inner strengthof virtuous
character states,which could be inculcated inmilitary trainingand abetted by a community
of like-minded comrades and supportive commanders,would assuage fear of danger and
mitigate the force of threatsto the self-conceptand self-esteem.
A strongcharacterwould strengtheninner self-sanctionsand therebycounter effectsof
mechanisms ofmoral disengagement. Central to this characterwould be the ability tomake
correct evaluations of actions and events. Should a soldier believe thather enemies are
nonhuman savages? Should she believe thather responsibilityforher actions is lessened by
those higher up in the chain of command? Should she see the consequences of harm to
others from only her perspective, or from theirs? Stoic cosmopolitanism offers these
answers. and are owed to all persons, even to one's enemies, who should
Respect empathy
not be dehumanized. One is always responsible for one's actions, which should be
expressions of virtue. Finally, empathy requires one to imagine that theharm one does to
another is done to oneself. The Stoic worldview demands thatsoldiers take a perspective on
theiractions that is at once narrow and broad?narrow in the sense that itdoes not relieve
the individual of responsibilityforwhat she does, broad in the sense thatthe individual sees
herself as part of a largernatural order, and can imagine herself in the other's place.
The positive potential of Stoic ethics notwithstanding,even the strongestcharacter can
buckle under the pressures of war. But character ideals, knowledge and appreciation of
values, and supportive comrades can help. Gourevitch and Morris (2008, pp. 213-225)
write of Sergeant Ken Davis, a "road MP" who drove trucks to and from Abu Ghraib.
Davis wrote passages from Scripture on his cell walls at Abu Ghraib, calling them his
"anchor," "... a positive place to come back to ifhe startedto driftor lose focus" (quoted
in Gourevitch and Morris 2008, p. 216). He struggledwith anger after attacks on his
convoy.Having a supportive comrade remindhim of his anchor points helped him to snap
back (see Gourevitch andMorris 2008, p. 223). Similarly, Sherman (pp. 1-7) writes that
Admiral JamesB. Stockdale read and absorbed Epictetus's Enchiridion. Stoic values helped
Stockdale survive seven and a half years as a POW inVietnam. Stoic sagehood was not

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How ethical theory can improve practice: lessons from Abu Ghraib 567

required forhim to benefitfrom Stoic values. Military trainingthat seriously incorporates

Stoic values could help other soldiers cope with thepressures ofwar, especially when that
trainingdraws on social psychological explanations of how ordinarypeople become able to
commit atrocities. Social psychology provides diagnostic explanations. Stoic ethics, I have
argued, offers constructive solutions.

Acknowledgements I thankmy audience at the Conference for the Tenth Anniversary of the journal Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, March 22-23, 2008, and an
anonymous referee for this journal.

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