‘Training & Convention Division University of the Philippines Law Center SUGGESTED ANSWERS to the 2018 BAR EXAMINATIONS IN CIVIL LAW 1 Sidiey and Sol were married with one (1) daughter, Solenn. Sedfrey and Sonia were another coupie with one son, Sonny. Sol and Sedfrey both perished in ‘the same plane accident. Sidley and Sonia met when the families of those who died sued the airlines and went through grief-counseling sessions. Y'zars later, Sidley and Sonia get married, At that time, Solenn was four (4) years oid and Sonny was 5 years old. These two (2) were then brought up in the same nousehold, Fifteen (15) years later, Solenn and Sonny developed romantic {eclings towerds each other, and eventually eloped. On their own and against their parents’ wishes, they procured a marriage license and got married in church. (a) Isthe marriage of Solenn and Sonny valid, votdable, or void? (2.5%) ‘The marriage is voi able for lack of parental consent. At the time of their marriage, Solenn and Sonny were only 19 and 20 years old, respectively. Assuming their marriage was under the Fai Code, Article 14 provides that parental consent is required where either or both of the parties are between 18 and 21 years old at the time of marriage. In the absence of such tal consent, Article 45 of the Family Coie provides that the marriage is voidable. Since the marriage was against their parents’ wishes, their marriage is voidable. Unlike in the Civil Code, their being step-siblings is immaterial under the Family Code and will not render the marriage void since such is not considered incestuous nor against public pol (b) If the marriage is defective, can the marriage be ratified by free cohabitation of the parties? (2.5%) sitean ber: ified by free cohabitation. Article 45(1) of the Family Code provides that such voidable marriage may be ratified by freecohabitation of the partylies over 18 years old but below 21 who married without the eonsent of his/h zr parents, by living together as husband and wife after attaining the ege of 21. Here, Solenn and Sonny freely cohabitated and lived as husband and wife after attaining 21 years, then the marriage is considered ratified, provided that the parents have not filed an action for annulment before the parties reached 2i years old. tl ‘After finding out that his girlfriend Sandy was four months pregnant, Sancho married Sandy. Both were single and had never been in any serious relationship in the past. Prior to the marriage, they agreed in a marriage settlement that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage. Shortly after the marriage, their daughter, Shalimar, was born, Before they met and got married, Sancho purchased a parcel of land on installment, under a Contract of Sele, with the full purchase price payable in equal annual amortizations over a period of ten (10) years, with no down payment, and secured by a mortgage on the land. The full purchase price was PhP Imillion, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, After paying the fourth (4"” annual installment, Sancho and Sandy got married, and Sancho completed the payments in the subsequent years from his salary as an accountant, The previous payments were also paid out of his sa'ary. During their marriage, Sandy also won PhPImillion in the lottery and used it to purchase jewelry. When things didn’t work out for the couple, they filed an action for declaration of nuility of their marriage based on the psychological incapacity of both of them. When the petition was granted, the parcel of land and the jewelry bought by Sandy were found to be the only properties of the couple. (a) Whatis the fillation status of Shalimar? (2.5%) SUG: ESTED Sha SWER: imar is a legitimate child. Children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage because of psychological incapacity under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate (Article 54, Family Code). Since Shalimar was born befure the judgment g ting the petition for declaration of absolute nullity ge ef Sancho aud Sandy under Art. 36 became final and executory. Shalimar is a legitimate chile.(b) What system of property relationship will be fquidated following the declaration of nullity of their marriage? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: ‘The property regime that will be liquidated is co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shail be governed by the rules on co-ownership (Article 147, Family Code). Sancho and Sandy were eapacitated to marry cach other; however, their marriage was declared void under Article 36, (c) In the liquidation, who should get the parcel of land? The jewelry? (2.5%) TED ANS’ ER: Sancho should get the parcel of land while Sandy should get the jewelry. According to Articie 147 of the Family Code, property acquired through their work or industry by a man and a woman, who are capacitated to marry each other and who cohabited under a void marriage, shall be governed by rules on co-ownership and in the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they live together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry. In the given ease, Sancho bought the parcel of iand and paid for it using his salary while Sandy used her ings from the lottery to purchase the jewelry. It was not established that Sandy cared for or maintained the family; hence, she should not be deemed to have contributed to the acquisition of the parcel of land. The jewelry was acquired by Sandy using her lottery winnings which she obtained not by work or indusiry but by chance. (€) Is Shaiimar entitled to payment of presumptive legitime? If yes, how much should be her share and from where should this be taken? 2.5%)GEST! Ne D ANSWER: , Shalimar is not entitled to presumptive legitime. The liquidation of the co-ownersbip under Article 147 did not provide for the obligation to pay the presumptive logitime of the common children, Said obligation applies only to the liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains pursuant to Arti 50 and 51 of the Family Code, which provisions are inapplicable to a void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, The should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership [Dino v. Dino, 640 SCRA 178 (2011); Valdes v. RTC, 260 SCRA 221 (1996)}- rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the pa ma Silverio was a woman trapped in a man’s body. He was born male and his birth certificate indicated his gender as male, and his name as Silverio Stalon. When he reached the age of 21, he had s sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, an¢, from then on, he lived as a female. On the basis of his sex reassignment, he filed an action to have his first name changed to Shelley, and his gender, to female. While he was following up his case with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, he met Sharon Ston, who also filed a similar action to change her first name to Shariff, and her gender, from female to male. Sharon was registered as a female upon birth. While growing up, she developed male characteristics and was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal hyperplasia (“CAH”) which is a condition where a person possesses both male and female characteristics. At puberty, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had greatly minimized, and she had no breast or menstrual development. Alleging that for ali intents and appearances, as well as mind and emotion, she had become a male, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender should be changed from female to male, and that her first name should be changed from Sharon to Shariff. Silverio and Sharon fell in love and decided to marry. Realizing that their marriage will be frowned upon in the Philippines, they travelled to Las Vegas, USA where they got married based on the law of the place of celebration of the marriage. They, however, kept their Philippine citizenship (a) Ie thers any legal bases for the coust to approve Silverio’s petition for correction of entries in his birth certificate? (2.5%) ER: No, there no legal bases for the court to approve Silverio's petition. As settled in the case of Silverio vy, Republic (G.R. No. 174689, October 22,2007), our laws do not sanction change of name and correction of entry the civil register as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Sex reassignment is not one of the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed under Republic Act No. 9048. The peti mn for correction of entry as to sex of the birth certificate of Silverio cannot prosper, because the said document contained no error and it eannot be corrected. Silverio was born a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth. Consider'ng that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassigument, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. (b) Will your answer be the same in the case of Sharon's petition? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER No, my answer will not be the same. In the ex of Republic v. Cugandahan (G.R. 166676, September 12, 2008), the Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sharon is considered an intersex, because he has CAH, which means that she has the biological e cteristics of both male and female. Based on that case, Sharon’s petition should be granted since he has simply iet nature tak course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. The change of name should also be granted considering that it merely recognizes Sharou’s preferred gender. (c) Can the marriage of Silverio (Shelley) and Sharon (Shariff) be legally vecognized as valid in the Philippines? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, it cannot be legally recognized as valid. Laws relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad (Article 15, Civil Code). One of the requisites of a marriage is that the con ing parties must be a male and a female (Article 2, Family Code). Since Silverio and Sharon are Filipinocitizens their status, condition and legal capacity is ‘tetermined by Philippine law, their marriage abroad is uot a valid marriage under Philippine law, because both contraeting parties are males. Yes, the marriage can be legally recognized in the Philippines. Since Silverio is male and Sharon is also male, they eannot be legally married in the Philippin ; however, they got married in a place outside the Philippines where same-sex marriages are allowed. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized outside the Philippines and considered valid there should also be considered valid here, except for specific exceptions. Being of the same gender is not one of the exceptions, so the marriage should be considered va ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes. If Silverio and Sharon used their original birth certificates-- one shewing that one is registered male and the one showing that other is registered female, thea the marriage may be a valid marriage under Philippine law. Vv Severino died intestate, survived by his wife Satumina, and legitimate children Soler, Suipicio, Segundo and the twins Sandro and Sandra. At the time of his death, the twins were only:11 years of age, while all the older children were of age. He left only one property: a 5,000 sq. m. parcel of land. After his death, the older siblings Soler, Sulpicio, and Segundo sold the land to Dr. Santos for PhPSOO,000 with a right to repurchase, at the same price, within five (5) years from the date of the sale, The deed of salz was signed only by the three (3) older siblings and covered the entire property. Before the five (5) years expired, Soler and Sulpicio tendered their respective shares of PhP166,666 each to redeem the property. Since Segundo did not have the means because he was still unemployed, Saturnina paid the remaining PhP166,666 to redeem the property. ‘After the property was redeemed from Dr. Santos, the hhree (3) older children and Saturnina, for herself and on behalf of the twins who were still minors, sold the erty to Dr. Sazon, in an absolute sale, for PhP million. In representing the children(a) Was the first sale to Dr. Santos, and the subsequent repurchase, valid? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER Yes, the sale is valid but only with respect to the shares pertaining to Soler, Sulpicio and Segundo. Upon Severino’s death, his heirs became the co- owners of the only property he left since the rights to the succession are transmitted from che moment of the death of the decedent (Ari. 777, Civil Code), Twa co-ownership, each co-owner may -lienate his part but the effect of th nation with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to she portion which may be allotted to the co-owner who alienated his share (Article 493, Civil Code). The repurchase by Soler and Sulpicio was valid up to their spective shares. ‘The repurchase of Segundo's share did not make Saturnina the owner of the share redeemed although she is entitled to reimbursement. (b) Was the second sale to Dr. Sazon valid? May the twins redeem their share after they reach the age of majority? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: ‘The second sale was valid only as to the aliquot shares of Saturnina and of the three older siblings. Under Article 225 of the Family Code, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemaneipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. This guardianship, kowever, only extends to powers of administrat ion over the property of the child, and does not include the power to alienate, which is an act of strict Cominion, Saturnina had no authority to sell the twins’ property, and the sale to that extent is unenforceable, Since it is already unenforceable, the twins do not need to redeem the property upon reaching the age of majority. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: ‘The second sale is valid as to Saturnina and the other siblings, but as to the twins the sale is in valid and the twins are allowed to recover or demand the reconveyarce of their share in the property.v Sol Soldivino, widow, passed away, leaving two (2) legitimate children: a 25-year old son, Santino (whom she had not spoken to for five [5] years prior to her death since he attempted to kil! her at that time), and a 20-year-old daughter, Sara, She left an estate worth PHP 8 millicn and a will which contained only one provision: that PhP1 million should be given to “the priest who officiated at my wedding to my children’s late father.” Sara, together with two (2) of her friends, acted a5 an attesting witness to the will. On the assumption that the will is admitted for probate and that there are no debts, divide the estate and indicate the heirs/legatees entitled to inherit, the amount that each of them will inherit, and where (ie, legitime/free portion‘intestate share) their shares should be charged. (5%) officiated at the wedding of Sol to her children’s father is entitled to receive PI Million as legacy from the free portion of the Sol’s estate. 2 Million out of the 3.5 Mil ion comes from their legitime, while the remaining 1.5 Million is from the free porti on. Santino is not disqualified to inherit from her mother, hecause an attempt against the life of the decedent is a cause for unworthiness of an heir only if there is a final judgment of conviction (Article 1032, Civil ode). The given facts do not mention that Santino was convicted of an attempt against of Sol. jtated to inherit from So’. The statement found in '¢ 1027 of the Civil Code that an attesting witness to the execution of 2 \Wwill shall be incapable of suecceding is qualified by Article 823, Civil Code, which provides that the de or legacy in favor of a person who is an attest 1g witness to the execution to the will shall be void. Sara is not a devisee or legate under Sol’s will, She is an intestate and compulsory heir. ‘The priest is also capable of succeeding as a legate, because under Article 1927, Civil Code only the p who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness and his relatives within the fourth degree and the churei to which ie belongs are disqualified from inheriting from the decedent by ill, The priest only officiated the wedding of the decedent.VI Sammy and Santi are cousins who separately inherited two (2) adjoining lots from their grandfather. Sammy is based overseas but wants to eam income fiom his inherited land, so he asked a local contractor to build a row cf apartments on his property which he could rent out. The contractor sent him the plans and Sammy noticed that the construction encroached on a part of Santi’s land but he said nething and gave approval to construct based on the plans submitted by the local contractor. Santi, based locally, and who loved his cousin deasty, did not object even if he knew of the encroachment since he was privy to the plens and visited the property regularly. Later, the cousins had a falling out ané Santi demanded that the portion of the apartments that encroached on his land be demolished, Can Santi successfully file legel action to require the demolition? (5%) PED ANSWER: No, Santi cannot successfully file a legal action to require the demoli ion. Since the builder and the landowner both acted in bad faith, their rights shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith (Article 453, Civil Code). Sammy is not a builder in good faith with respect to the portion of the apartment encroaching on Santi’s property, because he knew that he was not the owner of the land when he built the apartment. There is bad faith, likewise, on Santis part, because he did not object to the construction although he had knowledge thereof (Article 453, Civil Code). In cases where both the landowner and the builder acted in good faith, the landowner does not have tne option to demand the demolition of the work (Article 448, Civil Code). VIL Sydney, during her lifetime, was a successful lawyer. By her own choice, she remained unmarried and devoted all her time to taking care of her nephew and ‘two (2) nieces: Sootates, Saffinia, and Sophia. She wrote a will giving all her properties remaining upon her death to the three (3) of them, The will was admitted to probate during her lifetime. Later, she decided to make a new will giving all her remaining properties only to the two (2) girls, Saffinia and Sophia. She then tore up the previously probated -vill. The second will was presented for probate only after her death, However, the probate court found the second will to be void for failure to comply with formal requirements (0) Will the deetrine of dependent relative revocation apply? (2.5%) 9SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the said doctrine will not apply. In the case of Molo v. Molo (G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951), the court stated thar the doctrine of relative revocation is a rule where revocation of the old will is a suspensive condition or depends upon the efficacy of the new disposition, and if the new will intended as a substitute i inoperative, the revocation fa is and the original will remains in force. This was applied based on the fact that the original will appears to be lost; hence, the second will was executed with 2 revocatoty clause, but in both instances, the wife was instituted as the universal heir. In this case, however, the revocation of the original was not through the execution of a subsequent will with a revoeatory clause, but through destruction with intent to do so. It does no. appear either that the revocation of the old will operates as a suspensive condition fo the efficacy of the subsequent will, because the testator revoked the 1" original will, as she does not wish to institute the same heirs, unlike in Molo v. Molo where the wife was the heir in boti wills. SWEY Yes, because the uct of destroying the previous will is connected with aking of the new will raising a presumption ‘hat the testator meant the revocation of the previous will dependent upon the efficacy of the new will ‘This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. Here, the revocation is conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new will. Si will ce the new n this case turns out fo be void for failure of to comply with formal requirements, the previous will is not considered revoked (IIT Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ett, p. 145). (b) Will your answer be the same if the second will was found to be valid ‘but bo.h Saftinia and Sophia renounce their inheritance? (2.5%) ANSWER: es, my answer will be the same. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation does not apply where the the new will is rendered ineffective due to the renunciation of the heirs instituted therein. Renunciation has nothing to do with the validity of the will, but only pertains fo whether or not the heirs 3} cpt their share in the inheritance. Since the new will is still valid, the doctrine dues not apply (Article 832, Civil Code).Vu Sofonio was a married father of two when he had a brief fling with Sabrina, resulting in her pregnancy’and the birth of their son Sinforoso, ‘Though his wife knew nothing of the affair, Sofronio regretted it, but secretly provided child support for Sinforoso, Unfortunately, when Sinforoso was 10 years old, Softonio died. Only Sofronio’s father, Salumbides, knew of Sabrina and Sinforoso. For the purpose of providing support to Sinforoso, Salumbides gave Sabrina usufructruary rights over one of his properties — a house and lot — to Jast until Sinforoso reaches the age of majority. Sabrina was given possession of the property on the basis of caucion juratoria. Two (2) years after the creation of ‘the usufruct, the house accidentally bumed down, and three (3) years thereafter, Sinforoso died befor he could reach the age of 18. Will the usufruct continue after the house has burned down? If yes, will it continue after Sinforoso’s death? (2.5 %) Yes, the usufruct will continue after the house was burned. If the usufruet is constituted on immovable property of which a building forms part, and the latter should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and the materials (Article 607, Civil Code). The usufruct over the land and the materials continues. The thing was lost only in part, the right continues on the remaining parts (Article 604, Civil Cove). No, it will be extinguished after Sinforoso’s death. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age, shall subsist for the number of years specified, even if the third person should die before the period expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of such person or contrary intention clearly appears (Article 603, 606, Civil Code). The circumstances given show that the usufruct was established by Salumbides in consideration of the existence of Sinfroso. It was meant for his support; hence, his death nguished the usufruct even though he died before reaching the age of majority. 1x Newlyweds Sam and Sienna had contracted with Sangria Hotel fer their wedding reception. ‘The couple was so unhappy with the service, claiming, among other things, that there was an unreasonable delay in the service of dinner and that certain items promised were unavailable, The hotel claims that, while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the suclelen increase of guests to 450 from the guaranteed expected number of 350, asstated in the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract. In the action for damages for breech of contract instituted by the couple, they claimed that the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract was a contract of adhe ion since they only provided the number of guests and chose the menu, On the other hand, the hotel's defense was that the proximate cause of the complainant's injury was the unexpected increase in their guests, and this was what set the chain of events that resulted in ihe alleged inconveniences. (a) Does the doctrine of proximate cause apply in this case? (2.5%) SUGG . ANSWER: No, the doctrine does not apply. In the ease of Spouses Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la Hotel (G.R. No. 190601, September 7, 2011), the doctrine of proximate cause, is applicable only in actions for quasi-deticts, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to 1 person where there no relation between him and another party. Where, however, there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who make law between them. Here, there is a contract, the terms and conditions of such contract will govern the rights and obligations between the contracting parties in case of breach thereof, not the doetrine of proximate cause. (>) Was the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract a contract of adhesion? If yes, is the contract void? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, it is a contract of adhesion, but the same is not void. A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-made form of contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot m . Here, the contract is ready-made by Sang, as the spouses only chose the menu and provided the number of guests but they cannot modify the terms’ thereof hence, a contract of adhesion, Although a contract of adhesion, i not entirely against the law and is as binding as ordinary contraets, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely, but the effect, as ruled in Orient Air ». CA (GR. No. 76931, May 29, 1991), that in case of ambiguity it isconstrued against the party who caused it to be drafted and could have avoided it by the exercise of a little more care. x Sinclair and Steffi had an illicit relationship while Sinclair was married to another, ‘The relationship produced a daughter Sabir.a, who grew up with her mother, For most parte of Sabina’s youth, Steffi spent for her support and education, When Sabina was 21 years old, Sinclair's wife of many years died. Sinclair and Steffi lost no time in legitimizing their relationship. After the 40-day prayers for Sinclair's late wife, Sinclair and Steffi got married without a marriage license, claiming that they have been cohabiting for the last 20 years. ‘After gradusting rom college, Sabina decided to enroll in law schoo! Sinclair said that he was not willing to pay for her school fees since she was no longer a minor. Sinclair claimed that if Sabina wanted to be a lawyer, she nad to work and spend for her law education. (a) What is Sabina’s filiation status? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Sabina is an illegitimate child of Sinclair and Steffi because she was ge (Article 165, Family Code). She was not legitimated by the subsequent marriage between Sinclair and Steffi. conceived and born outside a valid mar Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated (Art. 177, Family Code). At the time of Sabina’s conception, her parents were disqualified by an impediment to marry each other, because Sinclair was married to someone else. (b) _ Is Sinclair legally required to finance Sabina’s law education? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWEI Yes, he is legally required to finance Sabina’s education, Support comprises everything indispensable for education among other things in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported shall include his schooling or training for some profession even beyond the age of majority (Art. 194, Family Code). Parents and their illegitimate children are obliged to support each other (Article 195, nFamily Code). Cousidering the foregoing rules, Sinclair is enjoined by law to finance Sabrina’s law education even beyond the age of majority. xI Samantha sold all her business interest in a sole proprietorship to Sergio for the amount of PhP | million. Under the sale agreement, Samantha was supposed to pay for all prior unpaid utility bills incurred by the sole proprietorship. A month after the Contract to Sell was executed, Samantha still had not paid the PhP 30,000 electricity bills incurred prior to the sale, Since Sergio could not operate the business without electricity and the utility company refused to restore electricity services unless the unpaid bills were settled in full, Sergio had to pay the unpaid electricity bills. When the date for payment arrived, Sergio only tendered PhP 950,000 representing the full purchase price, less the amount he paid for the unpaid utility bills, Samantha refused to accept the tender on the ground that she was the one supposed to pay the bills and Sergio did not have authorization to pay on her behalf. (a) What is the effect of payment made by Sergio without the knowledge and consent of Sarrantha? (2.5%) STED ANSWER: ‘The payment by Sergio resulted in the ex guishment of the obligation of Samantha to the utility company and Sergio was legal subrogated to the utility company’s eredi Sergio, thus, became Samantha’s new creditor. Under Article 1302 (3), Civil Code, i is presumed that there is legal subrogation when, even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the obli ation pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter's share, A person interested in the fulfillment is one who will benefit from the extinguishment of the obligation, Here, Sergio is an interested person since he was the business suecessor-in-interest of the Samantha and he cannot conduct his business without paying the debtor of Samantha. Since there is legal subrogation, Sergio stepped inty the shoes of the utility company as P30,000 credit; thus there ean be valid partially legal compenss ovo credits between him and Samanch who are principally debtors and creditors of each other up to the concurrent amount of P50,000 (Art 1279, NCC).() Js Samantha guilty of mora accipiendi? (2.5%) ANSWER: Yes, Samanta is guilty of mora accipiendi. ‘The requisites for mora accipiendi are: (j) offer of performance by the debtor: (ii) offer must be to comply with prestation as it should be performed; and (ii) the creditor refuses to accept the performance without just cause. Flere, Sergio validly made an offer to comply with the prestation of payment, albeit for P950,000 only. Sergio’s offer is justified based on the concept of partial legal compensation up to the amount of PS0,000, since Sergio and Samantha are in their own right principal debtors and creditors of each other. Samantha's refusal was without just eause as she cannot be p the obligation to pay the electricity bills. mitted to benefit or use as # defense her own failure to fulfill her part of xt Saachi opened a savings bank acconnt with Shanghainese Bank. He made an initial deposit of PhP100,000, Part of the bank opening forms that he was equired to sign when he opened-the account was a Holdout Agreement which provided that should he incur any liability or obligation to the bank, the bank shall have the right to immediately and automatically take over his savings account deposit. After he opened his deposit account, the Shanghainese Bank discovered a scam wherein the funds in the account of another depositor in the bank was withdrawn by an impostor, Shanghainese Bank suspected Sachi to be the impostor, and filed a criminal case of estafa against him. While the case was still pending with the Prosecutor's office, the >ank took over Saachi’s savings deposit ‘on the Dasis of the Holdout Agreement. (a) What kind of contract is created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank? (2.5%) sucG TED ANSWI A contract of simple loan is created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank. Fixed, savings and current deposits of money in banks and simi institutions shall be governed by the provi ns_concerning simple loan (Article 1980, Civil Code]. ‘The creditor is the depositor, while the debtor is the bank,(b) In this case, did the bank have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the bank did not have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit. In the case of Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosales (G.R. No. 183204, January 13, 2014), it was held that the "Hold Out" clause, which was similar to the Holdout Agreement in the instant case, can be invoked only if there was a valid and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation enumerated in Article 1187 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi- d t. The only possible source of obligation of Sachi co Shanghainese Bank based on the given facts is delict. As the criminal case filed by the bank against Sachi was still pending and no final judgment of conviction kas been rendered, Saachi had no valid and existing obligation to the bank; thus, the bank had no right to take over the deposits of Sachi. xm Soany Inc., (SI) purchased several heavy machineries from Single Equipment Philippines, Inc. (SEP) for PhP 10 million, payable in 36 monthly installments. A chattel mortgage was constituted on the same machineries as se: urity for the amount, As additional security, the President of SI, Stan Smith, ‘mortgaged his personal house and lot, SI failed to pry the 16" and succeeding ‘monthly installments, SEP then commenced a collection suit against SI, and in the course of the proceedings, 2 writ of attachment was issued against SI’s properties, including the mortgaged machineries. The attached properties were subsequently sold at public action, but the proceeds thereof were insufficient to satisfy the judgment ezedit, (a) Can SEP legally recover the deficiency? (2. GESTED ANSWER: Yes, SEP can legally recover the ciency. The prohibition against further collectio: under Article 1484 of the Civil Code, or the Recto Law, ouly applies if the seller chooses to foreclose the “hattel mortgage and not when the seller opts to exact the fulfilment of the obligation (Tajanlangit v. Southern Motors, GR. 10789, May 28, 1957). SEP chose to exact the 16fulfillment of the obligation by commencing a collection suit against SI. SEP did not opt to foreclose the chattel mortgage over the equipment. The machineries were sold in an execution sale and not in a foreclosure sale; hence, the prohibition against further collection does not apply. (b) Instead of collecting the deficiency, can SEP commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose the mortgage on Stan's house and lot in cerder to recover the deficiency? (2.5%) Yes, SEP can commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose the mortgage. SEP may choose to foreclose the mortgage on Stan’s house and lot. What SEP is prehibired 10 do, based on the ease of Cruz ». Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation (G.R. No. L-24772, May 27, 1968), is t0 ext \judicially foreclose the mortgage after it has extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage on the machineries sold on invtalment, because if such is allowed, the protection given by Article 1484 would be indirectly subverted, and public policy overturned. In this ease, SEP has not forzelosed the chattel mortgage over the machineries, ALTERNATIVE ANSW! No, because when SEP commenced the collection suit, it thereby waived its mortgage lien (Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. IAC, 176 SCRA 741 (1989). The remedies of an ordinary ai icn to collect the debt and foreclosure of the real estate mortgage are alternative remedies and not cumulative, An election of one remedy eperates as a waiver of the other. The mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure (Art. 1484 (3), Civil Code). xiv Socorro is the registered owner of Lot A while Segunda is the registered owner of the adjoining Lot B. Lot A is located at an elevated plateau of about 15 feet above the level of Lot B. Since Socorro was aliegecly removing portions of the land and cement that supported the adjoining property, Segunda caused the 7annotation of an adverse claim against 50 9. m. on Lot A’s Transfer Certificate of Title, asserting the existence of a legal easement. (=) Does a legal easement in fact exist? If so, what kind? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWE! ‘Yes, a legal easement of Iateral and subjacent support exists. According to Article 684 of the Civil Code, no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient Interal or subjacent support. In the given case, an easement of lateral and subjacent support exists in the property of Soecoro in favor of the property of Segunda, In the case of Castro v. Monsod, (G.R. No. 183719, February 2, 2011) in which the situation of the properties of the two landowners were similar to that in the given problem, the Supreme Court held that an easement existed in favor of the property of higher elevation, because it was the owner of the said property which sued to have the easement recognized. Such finding, however, does not mean that no similar easement exists in favor of the property of lower elevation, since Article 684 does not make a distinetion as to the elevation of the property. (b) Ifa legal easement does in fact exist, is an annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the servient estate proper? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land Custro v. Monsod, 641 SCRA 486, Feruary 2, 2011). Segunda is not claiming ownership over the property of Socorro. She only wanted a judicial recognition of the existence of the easement, According to the Supreme Court in the cited case, an annotation of the existence of the lateral and subjacent support is no longer necessary, because it exists whether or not it is unnotated or registered in tle registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already bit.ds the property and the owner of the same, including her successors interest.ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: No, it is not proper because an annotation of the existence of the lateral and subjacent support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not itis annotated or registered in the registry of property. Although, there is nothing which bars the annotation of an easement, not as an adverse claim, but as a recl right. XV Simon owned a townhouse that he rented out to Shannon, a flight attendant with Soleil Philippine Airlines (SPA). They had no written contract but merely agreed on a three (3)-year lease. Shannon had been using the townhouse as het base in Manila and had been paying rentals for more than a year when she accepted a better job offer from Sing Airlines. ‘This meant that Singapore was going to be her nw base and so she decided, witrout informing Simon, to sublease the townhouse to Sylvia, an office clerk in SPA. (a) Can Simon compel Shannen to reduce the lease agreement into writing? (2.5%) STED ANSW Yes, Simon can con:pel Shannon to reduce the While an ‘cement into wri -eement fer tne leasing of real property for a longer period than one year is covered by the Statute of Frauds, thus, requiring a written ns under Article 1403, Civil Code. g to Article 1406 of the Civil Code, the parties may only avail memorandum of its essential provisi Accor themselves of the right under Article 1357 of the Civil Code if the contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The contract was taken out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds under the Doctrine of Part Performance. Under Article 1357 of the vil Code, the contracting parties may compel fh other to cbserve the form of contract required by law. (b) Dees the sublease without Simon's knowledge and consent constitute a ground for ierminating the lease? (2.5%) su ANSW! No, it does not constitute a ground for terminating the lease, In the contract of lease of things, if there is no express prohibition, the lessee may 19)sublet the thing leased (Article 1650, Civil Code). In this contract, there appears to be no prohibition regarding subleasings thus, there is no violation of the contract which can be used as a ground for terminating the contract, ‘The act of a lessee in subleasing the thing without notifying the lessor leased is not one of the causes for which the lessor may terminate the lease and judicially eject the lessee (Article 1673, Civil Code). XVI Selena was a single 18-year old when she got pregnant and gave birth to Suri. She then left to work as a caregiver in Canada, leaving Suri with her parents in the Philippines, Selena, now 34 years old and a permanent resident in Canade, met and married Sam who is a 24-year old Canadian citizen who works as @ movie star in Canada. Sam's parents are of Filipino ancestry but had become Canadian citizens before Sem was born. Wanting Suri to have all the advantages of a legitimate child, Selena and Sam decided to adopt her. Sam's parents, already opposed to the marriage of their son to someone significantly older, vehemently objected to the adoption. They argued that Sam was not old enough and that the requisite age gap required by the Inter-Country Adoption Act between Sam as adopter and Suri as adoptee was not met. ‘Are Sam's parents correct? (2.5%) ESTED ANSWER: No, Sam's parents are incorrect. Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8043 or the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, the requirement that the adopter must be at least twenty-seven years of age and at least sixteen years older than the adoptee does not apply if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adoptee. Since, Sam is the spouse of Selena, who is the parent by nature of Suri, Sam may adept Suri even if he is below twenty- seven years of age and is not at least sixteen years older than the sdoptee. NOTE: The Inter-Country Adpotion Act of 1995 requires that only a child who is below 15 years of age and is voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Di srtment of Social Work and Services (DSWD) may be adopted under the inter-country adoption law, and the adopter must be at least 27 years of age and at least 16 years older than the child to be adopted at the time of application sles the adopter is the natural parent of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent} 20XVI Sofia and Semuel, both umnarried, lived together for many yvars in the Philippines and begot three children, While Sofia stayed in the Philippines with the children, Semuel went abroad to work and became a naturalized German citizen. He met someone in Germany whom he wanted to marry. Semuel thereafter came home and filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RIC) for partition of the common properties acquired during his union with Sofia in the Philippines. ‘The properties acquired during the union consisted of a house and lot in Cavite worth PhP 2 million, and some personal properties, including cash in bank amounting to PhP 1 million, All these properties were acquired using Semuel’s salaries and wages since Sofia was a stay-at-home mother. In retaliation, Sofie filed an action, on behalf of their minor children, for support, (a) How should the properties be partitioned? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWE! (a) The properties should be divided equally between Sofia and Semucl The property relations of Sofia and Semuel is governed by Arti je 147 of the Civil Code, because they lived exclusi ly with each other as husband and wife and they were capacitated to marry each other. Under the said provision, the wages and salaries of Sofia and Semucl shat! be owned by them in equal shares; hence, the cash in the bank from Semucl's salaries and wages is co-owned by Semuel and Sofia in equal shares, Article 147 also provides that the property acquired by the partners through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on ownership and in the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired during che cohabitation shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. Article 147 provides further that if the efforts of one of the parties consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household, he or she is deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition of the property even if he or she did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of the said property. Sofia, as a stay-at-home mother, cared for and maintained the fa nily, consequently, she is deemed to have contributed in the acquisition of the house and lot. As co-owner, Sofia is entitled to one half of the property.(b) Should Semuel be readired to support the minor children? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b} Yes, Semuel should be recuired to support the minor children. Parents aud their illegitimate children are obliged to support each other (Article 195, Family Code). Semuel is required to support his illegitimate children with Sofia. The children are illegitimate, because they were conceived and born outside a valid marriage (Article 165, Family Code}. ANOTHER ANSWER: Even if the new national law of Samuel does not oblige him te support his minor illegitimate children in the Philippines, the said Coreign law ‘cannot be applied in the Philippines for two reasons: (1) the Philippines may refuse to apply said foreign law, be use it is contrary toa sound and established policy of the forun nd (2) the Philippine laws which have for their object public policy cannot be rendered ineffective by a foreign law (Art. 17, par, 3, NCC; Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem, 744 SCRA 516 (2014). XVII Shasha purchased an airline ticket from Sea Airlines (SAL) covering Menila-Bangkok-Hanoi-Manila, The ticket wes exclusively endorsable to Siam Airlines (SMA). ‘The contract of air transportation was between Shasha and SAL, with the latter endorsing to SMA the Hanoi-Manila segment of the journey. All her flights were confirmed by SAL before she left Manila. Shasha took the flight from Manila to Bangkok on board SAL using the ticket. When she arrived in Bangkok, she went to the SAL ticket counter and confirmed her return trip from Henoi to Manila on board SMA Flight No. SA 888. On the date of her return trip, she checked in for SMA Flight No. SA 888, boarded the plane, and before she could even settle in on her assigned seat, she was off-loaded and treated rudely by the crew. She lost her luggage and missed an important business meeting. She thereafter filed a complaint solely against SAL and argued that it was solidarily liable with SMA for the damages she suffered since the latter was only an agent of the former. . a) Shou'd either, or both, SAL and SMA be held liable for damages that Shasha suffered? (2.5%)SUGG! ANSWER: Only SAL should be held liable for damages. ‘This case has the same factual milieu wi hh that of China Airlines v. Duniel Chiok (G.R. No. 152122, July 30, 2003), where the court cited British Airways v. Court of Appeals (GR. No, 121824 January 29, 1998), ruling that as the pr cipal in the contract of carriage, the petitioner was held liable even when the breach of contract had occurred, not on its own flight, but on that of another airline, It also cited Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals (GR. No. 83612, November 24, 1994), in which the Court held that the obligation of the ticket-issuing airline remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact that another airline had undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their destinations, In this case, since the contract of air transportation is between Shasha ‘and SAL, the latter as principal remains liable as the principal despite the fact that the brea :h ocurred in SMA. SMA cannot be held liable in this case, because the court has no jurisdiction over it, It is imperative and in accordance with due process and fair play that SMA should have been impleaded as a party in the present proceedings before this Court can make a final ruling on this matter. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER : SAL and SMA may be held solidarily liable to Sasha. SAL is Sasha for breach of the contract of carringe, because it failed to bring Sasha to the latter's destination as agreed upon in the contract. SAM, on the other hand, is liable to Sasha for tort under the provisions of Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, While SAM is an independent contractor, and not an agent of SAL, both SAL and SAM are solidarily Hable to Sasha, because a contractual obligation ean be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpd equiliana, Article 2194 of the Civit Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract, Stated differently, when an act which constiautes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-defictual liability bad no contract existed between the parties, thecontract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply (LRTA v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003). ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: SAL and SMA are jointly liable. In KLM v, CA (G.R. L-31150, July 22, 1915), the Supreme Court held that the ticke ssi ing carrier assumes full responsibility for the eniire trip and shail be held accountable for the breach of guaranty. Damages may also be exacted from SMA, because their acts fall under quasi-deliet. ANOTHER SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Only SMA is liable. Under the Warsaw Convention, the ticket-issuing airline subcontracts the’ contract of carriage to other airlines, as in this stance, ther no agency created and the subsequent carrier is liable for the ayes it has incurred. (b) Assuming that one ig an agent of the other, is the agency coupled with interest? (2.5%) SUG! ED ANSWI Yes, the agency was constituted us a means of fulfilling an obligation which had already been contracted and also a bilateral contraet depends upon the ageney (Article 1927, Civil Code]. In the case of Philex Mining v. CIR, (G.R. No. 148187, April 15, 2008) the Court defined an agency coupled with an interest ag one that cannot be revoked or withdrawn by the principal due to an interest of a third party that depends upon it, or the mutual interest of both principal and agent, Here, since the ticket is exclusively endorsable to the agent, SAM, then it has a mutual interest with the principal, SAL, in the fulfillment of the obligation. XIX Sebastian, who has a pending assessment from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), was required to post. a bond. He entered into an agreement with Solid Surety Com pany (SSC) for SSC to issue a bond in favor of the BIR toSceure payment of his taxes, if found to be due. In consideration of the issuance of the bond, he executed an Indemnity Agreement with $SC whereby he agreed to indemnify the latter in the event that he was found liable to pay the tax. ‘The BIR fventually decided against Sebastian, and judicially commenced action against both Sebastian and SSC to recover Sebastian's unpaid taxes. Simultaneously, BIR also initiated action to foreclose on the bond. Even before paying the BIR, SSC Sought indemnity from Sebastian on the basis of the Indemnity Agreement Sebastian refused to pay since SSC had not paid the BIR anything yet, and alleged that the provision in the Indemnity Agreement which allowed §SC to recover trom him, by mere demand, even if it (SSC) had not yet paid the creditor, was void for being contrary to law and public policy. Can Sebastian legaily refuse to pay SSC? (2.5%) SWER: No, Sebastian cannot legally refuse to pay. A stipulation in an indemnity agreement providing that the indemnitor shall pay the surety as Soon as the latter becomes liable to make payment to the creditor under the ferms of the bond, regardless of whether the surety has made payment actually or not, is valid and enforceabie; in accordance therewith, the surety may demand from the indemnitor even before the ereditor has paid (Security Bank and Trust Co., tne. "Globe Assurance Co., Inc., (58 OG 3708, 1962)). Under the terms of the contract, Sebastian's obligation to indemaify became due and demandable from the moment he has incurred liability and not from the moment of payment. XX Simeon was returning to Manila after spending a weekend with nis parents in Sariaya, Quezon, Ie boarded a bus operated by the Sabbit Bus Line (SBL) on August 30, 2013. In the ‘middle of the journey, the bus collided with a truck coming frei 1 th: opposite direction, which ‘was overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck. Though the driver of the SBL bus tried to avoid {Re truck, «mishap occurred as vhe truck hit the lefi side of the bus, AS a result of the accident, ‘imeon suffered a frectured leg and was unable to report for work for one week. He sued SEL, {or actual and moral damages. SBL raised the defense that it was the driver of the truck who ‘was at fault, and that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver, (a) Is SBL liable for actual damages? Moral damages? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: It depends on what the source of obligaticn the action is based. 28If based on contract, SBL will be lis ble for ual damages, but not moral damages. As» common carsier, SBL is required to observe extrnordinury dilig , and the fnw expressiv provides that its lability does not cease upon proof that it exeveised dhe d of ofa Family i vad supervising Hs driver. Ye is ave tt m ui peuvided hy uve fee : Hi tag prtatal suite cd pilyseai iajevios asa result ot a ALI In 8 contract of fe, the carrier is mjuired to exercise extraordinary dilig ¢ and is liable whenever a passenger suffers injury before he reaches his destina.ion. In au action to recover damages arising from breach of contract of carriage, the passenger needs only to prove the existence of the contract and the failure of the carrier to safely bring him to his destination. Moral damages may not however be recovered from the carrier unless: (a) the passenger dies, or (b) the carrier is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence. Ne hier applies in this case, Bus Con, GR, No. 203962, July 19, 201) (Estrada v. Philippine Rabbit {b) Will SBL be fable to pay inere and delays in the payment of) interest, and from when shou! if it is required to pay damages, ne judament award? What is the rate of the interest start running? (2.5%) IGE Ves, SBL will be liable to pay interes at te ratte of 6% from the ality of the judgment until satisfaction. According to the ease of Nacar ¥. Guilery Frames (G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013), when the judgment of the sum of money be: mies final und exccutory, the rate of legal crest, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction. = NOTHING FOLLOWS -